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Oral evidence
Taken before the Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Committee
on Thursday 31 January 2008
Members present
Peter LuV, in the Chair
Mr Adrian Bailey Mark Hunter
Roger Berry Miss Julie Kirkbride
Mr Michael Clapham Mr Mike Weir
Mr Lindsay Hoyle Mr Anthony Wright
Witnesses: Malcolm Wicks, MP, Minister of State for Energy, and Dr Nick Palmer, MP, Department of
Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, gave evidence.
Q1 Chairman: Minister, welcome. I normally begin
by askingwitnesses to introduce themselves, and any
oYcials they have with them, for the record but it
seems a little otiose today, so Iwill dispense with that
part unless you particularly want to introduce
yourself.
Malcolm Wicks: Malcolm Wicks. I am the Minister
of State for Energy.
Chairman: Thank you. I understand you might be
joined by your PPS later on. This session will be in
two halves. We will look at energy prices, fuel
poverty and the structure of the market in the ﬁrst
half, and then we will turn to supply issues, security
of supply, generating capacity and so on in the
second half of the session. We will begin with the
price issues.
Q2 Mark Hunter: Minister, good afternoon to you.
You will be aware, of course, that you join us today
on the very day that Shell have declared record UK
proﬁts. I would like to start with a couple of
questions about energy price rises. You may feel
there is some connection between these matters and
I would like to explore your views. Could you tell us
what you think are the underlying reasons for
several energy suppliers deciding to increase the
price for gas and electricity in the past month?
Malcolm Wicks: I think there is one major reason
and there might be one or two others that are also
important. The major reason is the huge global
demand for energy which, by deﬁnition, we are
seeing around the world which is leading to a huge
increase in energy costs, including the wholesale
prices that the supply companies themselves have to
pay. The reason for the global demand is, I think,
familiar territory. It is about the great emerging
economies. China perhaps comes to mind ﬁrst, but
also India, but many other economies are growing
too, South Africa and South America, et cetera, as
well as the continued demand for energy in the
developed world. Perhaps I could give you some
ﬁgures for wholesale gas forward prices since
January 2007. These are the prices that the supply
companies have to pay. Since January last year, in
other words over last year, gas forward prices have
increased by 50% and coal forward prices by some
85%.Whilst one does not welcome it, one should not
be surprised that the retail price to our constituents
and to business customers has increased. I think that
is the major factor. If I could just give you a little bit
more information, I am advised that wholesale
prices make up around half of the increases that we
are now seeing in the domestic electricity and gas
sectors, whereas, when it comes to the industrial
users, wholesale prices are making up more like 70%
and 91% of those prices increase. I think that is the
major factor. Another point I would make through
you, Chairman, to Mr Hunter, which I think this is
only just being understood is that, as we seek to
tackle the great challenge of climate change and
global warming, and we put in place mechanisms
here in the UK such as the renewables obligation
and across Europe we put in place the emissions
trading scheme, these factors themselves raise the
price of energy, because at the moment many of
these technologies, renewables, are expensive
compared with producing our electricity in the
conventional way, from coal and gas, and that is also
nowbeing reﬂected in prices. There is an inevitability
about that. The lesson is that saving the planet does
not come on the cheap.
Q3 Mark Hunter: I would accept that entirely. I was
going to ask a supplementary about climate change
policies, which you have partially answered already.
In the light of the proﬁts of the energy suppliers in
the UK and also the reference I made earlier to
people like Shell and so on, do you not have any
concerns that this is a diYcult argument/debate to
win with the public about the cost of climate change
policies, when the consumer sees suppliers
apparently proﬁteering at their expense?
Malcolm Wicks: I think it is a diYcult argument to
win actually.
Q4 Mark Hunter: What is your view on it?
Malcolm Wicks: To say there are rip-oVs going on,
there is no proper competition, the customer is the
victim—that story—through numerous press
notices, is, as it were, around the media before what
I think is a slightly calmer analysis gets out of the
starting blocks. I just think that is inevitable. I am
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not complacent about the competitive market. I
want to see the market competitive and I ask
questions almost every day in my department
about this.
Q5 Chairman: We will come on to the competitive
elements a bit later on.
Malcolm Wicks: So you do not want me to pursue
that?
Q6 Chairman: Not at too great a length. We will
come on to competition elements later.
Malcolm Wicks: Okay. I must not disrupt the order,
as it were. There are issues about competition. In
terms of climate—which was your question—that is
the fact of the matter. If you look at the renewables
obligation, which is, I suppose, our major way in
which we bring forward investment in renewables
technology, by simply saying to supply companies,
“You will source so much of your energy from
renewables” is costing £1 billion by 2010 and
inevitably that gets passed on to the customer. I
think we have to get used to this idea that tackling
climate change does increase energy costs at the
moment, given the state of the technologies.
Q7 Mark Hunter: As I said earlier, I do not think
there would be any disagreement between us about
the fact the climate change policies rightly are
needed and do come with a price tag attached to
them, but I am just interested—and I will ask one
last time before we move on—about whether or not
you see there is a role for government in trying to
have a more constructive dialogue with the energy
suppliers in this country about the speed and
regularity with which they pass on price rises directly
to the consumer—very substantial price rises now—
which are directly and adversely aVecting people on
ﬁxed incomes in particular.
Malcolm Wicks: The main thing I worry about now
is what we currently call fuel poverty: the impact on
our most vulnerable constituents. That is the thing I
most worry about at the moment.
Q8 Chairman: We will give you an opportunity to
talk about that as well, Minister.
Malcolm Wicks: I am sorry.
Q9Chairman:Do not apologise. I am trying to help.
Malcolm Wicks:We frequently meet with the supply
companies on awhole range of issues. In terms of the
competitive issue—which we will return to later, I
am told—it is for Ofgem, the regulator, tomake sure
that proper competition takes place. I think they are
convinced at the moment that that is the case. From
the evidence I see, I think that is the case, although,
I repeat, I am not complacent, and we can get on to
some of the issues there.
Q10 Mark Hunter: But you think they are listening?
You referred to regular meetings with the suppliers,
and you think they are listening?
Malcolm Wicks: We are coming to fuel poverty
later, I understand, and I can say something about
the meetings I have personally had with the supply
companies on that very important issue.
Q11 Mark Hunter: You touched on the wholesale
prices earlier. How much of the rise in the wholesale
price of gas can be accounted for by gas price
increases on the Continent, in your view, as opposed
to the more UK-speciﬁc factors, such as the delays
at Milford Haven?
Malcolm Wicks: I havementionedwhat I think is the
key background fact, the global prices, wholesale
prices, and I have cited ﬁgures of how they have
increased. We now have to be aware that the energy
market is increasingly becoming global. Gone are
the days, frankly, for good or ill, when, in a sense,
you could talk about a national energy market
related to the costs of exploitation of the North Sea
oil and gas and how that would impact. Increasingly
now, certainly, there is a Europeanmarket, albeit an
extremely imperfect one—and we can talk about
market liberalisation at the appropriate point.
Q12 Chairman: And we will.
Malcolm Wicks: If necessary. That is something else
I have anticipated!
Q13 Chairman: Everything is connected to
everything, Minister. We are just trying to keep it as
distinct as we can.
Malcolm Wicks: I wonder if I might just be quiet for
20 minutes.
Q14 Chairman: No, you are doing very well.
Malcolm Wicks: My point being that, with
interconnections now with the European market
and without needing to import gas and, yes, from
time to time our exporting of gas in the summer,
inevitably I think we are going to see an increasing
connect between prices here in the UK and prices on
the Continent.
Q15 Mark Hunter: The delay at Milford Haven? A
small factor? A big factor?
Malcolm Wicks: I think it has only been a small
factor. That would be my judgment. I am
disappointed, there has been a delay, but I think it is
only a delay by…. I had better not say oV the top of
my head. Sixmonths to a year is what I have inmind,
but we can try to verify that sort of ﬁgure with you.
I think I ammore enthused—and I have been to both
ends of it, as it were, I have seen it in Qatar—by the
fact that Qatari liqueﬁed natural gas will be ﬂowing
fromMilford Haven really quite soon, alongside the
gas from Langeled, the Norwegian pipeline is going
to be a huge bonus to us in the future.
Q16 Mr Wright: Speciﬁcally what you have said on
the interconnector, and that we export a lot of gas in
the summermonths, when obviously demand is at its
lowest, and presumably at that time when demand is
at its lowest the price of the commodity is at its
lowest, is not one of the problems that the capacity
we have to store gas during the summer months is
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less than they have on the Continent? Instead of
exporting gas at a low price, we could build our
storage capacity so that we could maintain those
levels at the lower price.
Malcolm Wicks:There are two things there you have
asked about. Given that this is a competitivemarket-
place, where private companies, as it were, like any
other companies, seek to sell the commodity at the
highest price, storage itself would not stop them
selling at a better price in the summer than they
might get here in Britain. But I think you have
touched on a very important and strategic issue
about our need to develop more gas storage in the
future. Until recently we could say, I think with
some security rather than complacency, “Our
natural store has been the North Sea.” It is on our
doorsteps, we have had storage. Centrica’s Rough
storage has been very, very important to us, but we
now need to store more gas for a number of obvious
reasons. That is an objective of our energy strategy
and it is one of the reasons, but only one reason, why
we need to streamline planning in this country so
that that can come about. Where are we now? These
are rough ﬁgures, but let us say 20% of our gas at the
moment is imported—and we have only just become
an importer of gas really because of all the riches of
the North Sea. If you roll forward to 2020, and that
is really quite soon, our gas being imported could be
somewhere between 50% and—as some even say—
80%. That in itself raises challenges, but one of those
challenges is to have more gas storage.
Q17 Mr Wright: You mention that as one of the
plans or proposals, but surely to goodness we should
be looking at the median rather than planning for
the future, because, when 2020 comes and we are
relying on 80% importation of gas, it is too late. Our
ability to use our own gas on our own continental
shelf has gone because we have exported it all to
mainland Europe, they have stored it to use for their
own customers at a much cheaper price. Surely we
are missing the trick here.
Malcolm Wicks: We are not going to delay until
2020. There are already some proposals in—no pun
intended—the pipeline in terms of gas storage.
Sometimes they hit planning impediments. We
always have to maintain the right of people to object
to a particular proposal but we do need gas storage
and I think we are on course to have more gas
storage.
Q18 Mr Wright: Would you give a time scale as to
when the proportion would increase? Is it increasing
already? Are we relying on LNG?
Malcolm Wicks: Chairman, I like to be accurate
about these things, as it were, rather than
speculating. Perhaps I could write to try to give you
a timeline on some of this. It is a little awkward, of
course, when it does come down to planning
authorities saying yea or nay to some of these things,
but as an aspect of—and I would use the word—
“national” security, we need a greater capacity to
store gas in the future.
Q19 Mr Weir: Following on from that and without
treading too much on the diVerences between the
continental European market and our own market,
one of the allegationsmade about the interconnector
is that continental companies often buy gas when it
is cheaper in the UK for use on the Continent and
that is one of the reasons why prices in the UK have
pushed up. Is there any evidence for that? Is there
any investigation by your department into whether
that is happening?
Malcolm Wicks: Yes, we have looked at that. Ofgem
themselves have looked at that. I have discussed it
with the company that runs the interconnector and
the companies that supply the interconnector. My
particular concern, certainly two winters ago when
things were relatively tight—although, contrary to
the pessimists’ view, the lights stayed on—and when
spot gas prices here were extraordinarily high, the
gas should have been gushing towards us through
the interconnector and it was not. That is the thing
that concerns me and I think there is still an issue.
The interconnector has not been such a big feature
this winter because of the relatively mild weather
and because of greater gas supplies from elsewhere.
But it is evidence to me of the fact that we do not
have in continental Europe a liberalised energy
market. Otherwise, those companies, to make
money in that winter two years ago would have been
selling us lots and lots of gas. That is the issue that
does concern me.
MrWeir:We had this debate in the House about the
Lisbon Treaty. What is your feeling about if and
when we are ever going to get a liberalised market?
Chairman:No, we will do that later. Good tryMike.
Q20 Mr Hoyle: What seems to be apparent is that
good old UK public are the losers, are they not? We
export cheaply when we have plenty of gas around
in summer. It is stored in Europe. Presumably some
of it is exported back to us and we import more
expensively.We are the loser in both ways. If we had
the storage capacity, I know you say they would not
but there would be an ability to store our spare
capacity in summer, use it in winter, just like the rest
of the Continent does. The only people who are the
losers are business and the public that they
represent. We keep coming around to this
conversation—we had it last time you were here
Minister—that we have to make these companies
take seriously storage capacity. We can say it is
about planning permission but the fact is we have
not seen an increase like we should have been seeing
and we have had a lot of promises. How do we turn
those promises into factual storage?
Malcolm Wicks: That is the question. I think the
answer is that a number of companies have plans for
storage. We cannot just do it overnight. There are
planning regulations. I repeat: it is one of the drivers,
only one of the drivers, behind the planning bill that
is currently before this Parliament. Mr Hoyle,
perhaps I could, through the Chairman, ask you to
look at this picture.
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Q21 Chairman: Could I ask Mr Hunter to ask his
question and then we will look at the picture. You
will see how relevant it is, if I have understood your
comments correctly. I think it help and it will save
the Committee time.
Malcolm Wicks: All right.
Q22 Mark Hunter: Thank you, Chairman. I was
going to acknowledge the Department’s assistance
in helping us understand these issues, because we
have had the picture, as you put it, circulated twice:
one in black and white and one in glorious
Technicolor, just to make sure that we got the
message.
Malcolm Wicks: Excellent.
Q23 Mark Hunter: It is quite helpful.
Malcolm Wicks: I wanted you to get the message at
least twice.
Q24 Mark Hunter: Absolutely. We talked earlier on
and you made your views clear about the factors
behind price rises. If I were to put to you the feeling
about wholesale price increases being passed on to
the consumer rathermore quickly than reductions in
price are passed on to the consumer when the
reduction in energy itself is coming through to the
companies, would you feel that was a fair criticism
of the energy suppliers themselves?
Malcolm Wicks: No, I do not think it is. Certainly
last year, 2007, as the graph shows when the yellow
line goes down at the bottom—these are retail prices
for gas—prices were going down at that stage.
Q25 Chairman: Would it be helpful to explain to the
wider audience what the graph shows.
Malcolm Wicks: The black and white copies will
become the rarity items—so hang on to those! I
suppose in an ideal world it would be nice to be able
to give the Committee, maybe through my oYcials,
a more detailed presentation on some occasion,
because there are a number of graphs and there are
complexities about this and it is always awkward
doing this. Let us be clear that this is about retail
prices—in other words, to our constituents, the
domestic consumer—for gas. There is another
picture for electricity which we can send you later.
During the period since July 1998—which is when
this graph starts and I should be accurate in saying
this is comparing the EU of 15 States, because of the
time series, I guess—our domestic gas prices have
been consistently lower than the European average.
As you can see, Germany is in red and France is in
dark blue, and we have always been lower than both
Germany and France for the domestic customer. I
was thinking of that when Mr Hoyle was
questioning me. He raises an interesting point but
his point would be a stronger one, I think, if our gas
prices were higher than Germany and France
because of all this wheeling and dealing, whereas
they are still lower. I am also advised that in 2007 it
was in Britain and not continental Europe that gas
prices went down, when wholesale prices were
going down.
Chairman: Roger Berry, a statistician, wants to
make a point here.
Roger Berry: This document is headed “Only UK
saw retail prices come down substantially in 2007”.
As theMinister will acknowledge, these graphs show
nothing of the kind. They give us the information for
Germany, France and the UK and the EU 15
median. They do not. We have a departmental
document here with a headline for data which the
data cannot support.
Chairman: There may be additional data which
supports the headline, of course.
Roger Berry:The data does not support the headline
and you might have a word with whoever did that.
It is a bit naughty.
Mark Hunter: It is a bit crude.
Q26 Roger Berry: No, it is inaccurate. If it was
GCSE stats, for example, you would be in real
trouble on this one. Not you personally, Minister,
but the person who did it.
Malcolm Wicks: I will send you more information.
I suppose I was mainly using the graph to show the
yellow line as being consistently below the other line.
I did say to the Chairman that in an ideal world we
would be able to give you a more detailed
presentation.
Q27 Roger Berry: I hate to labour this but I am not
saying it is the detail; I am pointing out that a
departmental document is inaccurate in its labelling,
which I think is unfortunate.
Malcolm Wicks: Okay. I am sure, nevertheless, that
Mr Berry would agree it does show that UK gas
prices have been lower than the European—
Q28 Roger Berry: You have described it correctly.
Your Department’s document does not.
Malcolm Wicks: Okay.
Roger Berry: That is the fourth time.
Q29 Chairman: That is a useful clariﬁcation which I
do not think we will labour at too great a length.
Malcolm Wicks: It was my mistake in trying to be
helpful to the Committee.
Chairman: You are being very helpful.
Q30 Mark Hunter: To come back to the point I was
making, that was not about the prices relative to that
of other countries, it was about the speed with which
energy suppliers in the UK are perceived to pass on
price rises and the slowness with which they are
perceived to pass on price reductions. I was asking
the Minister’s view on that, not the relativity of our
prices in the UK to those of other European
partners.
Malcolm Wicks: I think Ofgem have looked at that
and they are satisﬁed there has been no skulduggery.
Q31 Mark Hunter: Your view is the same, is it?
Malcolm Wicks: I have not seen evidence to the
contrary. At the moment, when clearly we are in the
middle of a series of price rises being announced by
supply companies, nevertheless one company,
Scottish and Southern, despite the wholesale price
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movements have said that they are not going to look
at price rises until April at the earliest. Arguably that
shows competition in the market—and I note that
that is a company that in recent times has gained
market share, perhaps because of that kind of
strategy.
Mark Hunter: I think we will come on to points
about structure later on.
Q32 Mr Hoyle: Minister, you wanted to mention
your graph, but you are missing the main point.
France and Germany do not have the gas ﬁelds. We
in the UK have the gas ﬁelds. That is why the public
are disappointed. That is why we are disappointed.
That is why youwould expect to see gas prices higher
in France and Germany. That is why we should
expect to see lower gas prices and we should not see
the spike which it shows in January 2007 as being at
its highest. All I am saying is thatwe should do better
and the reason we do not is because of lack of
storage facilities.
Malcolm Wicks: I am not sure that is the case. If we
operated just as one nation, if we were not a member
of the European single market, then no doubt we
could run our economy not just in terms of gas but
all sorts of things where we would do it only on a
national basis. But in a European energymarket I do
not think you can stop companies selling gas to the
highest bidder.
Mr Hoyle: Except they have not liberalised their
market—and I do not want to go into that.
Chairman: We are doing liberalisation later.
Q33 Mr Bailey: I am just trying to disaggregate the
diVerent issues here. Gas market, domestic
consumers. In terms of domestic, is this just
residential or is it business as well? Is domestic in this
interpretation just consumers located in this
country?
Malcolm Wicks: It is the householder.
Q34 Mr Bailey: It is just the householder.
Malcolm Wicks: Yes.
Q35Mr Bailey:No reference at all to business users.
Malcolm Wicks: No. That is my understanding of
the graph.We could supply other graphs on business
users. We have data on businesses.
Q36 Mr Bailey: It might be helpful if we could
have that.
Malcolm Wicks: Yes.
Q37 Miss Kirkbride: We have been talking about
rising energy prices—Mr Hunter mentioned that
very brieﬂy—and of course most people notice rising
energy prices when they go to ﬁll their car up at the
pump and they have to take out a mortgage to pay
the bill at the end of it. Today Shell announced the
biggest proﬁt ever made from a British company,
ever in the history of time. That is a bit unfortunate,
that the two should come together like that.
Malcolm Wicks: Things like that come together, do
they not, in politics? I do not think it is right for me
to comment on the proﬁts of any one company. It is
an international company. I am sure they would
argue that they themselves need to make massive
investments, that they are making massive
investments. I am not going to get into the
business—you would not want me to, would you—
of trying to regulate the proﬁts of diVerent
companies.
Miss Kirkbride: When I heard the story on the BBC
this morning, it said that they had made this
massive proﬁt—
Mark Hunter: Record proﬁt.
Q38 Miss Kirkbride: Thank you—record proﬁt—
and that was because of rising oil prices. That
seemed to me even more unfortunate because,
basically, we are paying at the pump—and we have
very little choice—for huge prices on which they
then run the biggest proﬁt ever.
Malcolm Wicks: Surely it should not be altogether a
surprise that when prices are rising people make
more proﬁts, when they are decreasing they make
lower proﬁts. Is that not the nature of the market?
Q39 Miss Kirkbride: I would have thought that if
prices are going up wholesale, they are paying more
money to whoever is supplying them and, therefore,
there does not necessarily need to be an increase in
proﬁt. It depends where the supply is coming from.
Malcolm Wicks: I do not think it is helpful for a
government Minister to get involved in a detailed
discussion about the proﬁts of any one company.
Chairman, perhaps I might say—and it may be a bit
later down the agenda—that there is a need for
massive investment in energy infrastructure in this
country. Given the reliance on fossil fuels in the
future, there is a need for massive investment in the
exploration of fossil fuels. No doubt committees of
this kind and ministers like me would be the ﬁrst to
criticise if that investment was not coming forward.
I guess high proﬁts helped that investment come
forward.
Q40 Chairman: That is what Shell have said, I
believe, in their statement today, so I think we will
leave it there for that. Before we move on to the next
session of questions, could I check two things. The
graph here—which Dr Berry helpfully pointed out
did not entirely justify the claim made for it—
nevertheless does show that British prices have been
consistently below the EU average and fell last year
uniquely, or not necessarily uniquely—I am
corrected immediately—but fell compared to the
EU average last year. Nevertheless British Gas gave
us evidence—and we are grateful to the energy
companies, all of which have produced evidence for
today, and the regulator and the watchdogs and so
on—in which they said, “Average UK electricity
prices including taxes are the ﬁfth lowest among the
EU 15.” So electricity is the ﬁfth lowest. “Britain’s
gas bills are also still amongst the cheapest with the
UK average gas price the second lowest in the EU
15.” That means we are the most liberalised market
in Europe—and we will come back to liberalisation
issues later—and we still do not enjoy the lowest
prices, if those claims are right from British Gas.
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Malcolm Wicks: We need to compare and contrast
evidence. My evidence shows that compared with
the EU 15 over that long period, domestic customers
enjoyed the lowest prices. It is more mixed when it
comes to business customers.
Q41 Chairman: Which is the point Mr Bailey was
making. There is some evidence—and we will come
to this again later—of mis-functioning of the
market, if, given that we are the most liberal market,
we do not enjoy the lowest prices. That may be the
European markets. We will come to that later. As a
matter of record, before we move on, Mark Hunter
was asking about climate change costs to consumers
not of their fuel bills. We have had very good
evidence from Scottish and Southern who say—and
I would like to know if this order of magnitude
sounds right to you—“The total costs to customers
in delivering network infrastructure and
environmental policies”—both and not just the
environment—“have risen by almost 50% in the last
four years and almost £170 on electricity and gas
bills in 2004 to almost £250 in 2008.” That is £250 on
the average consumer’s gas bill for network
infrastructure and climate change considerations.
Would that seem an order of magnitude that is right
to you?
Malcolm Wicks: I am not surprised about the very
signiﬁcant increases. But I do not want to commit
myself to that ﬁgure. I have no reason to doubt it.
Q42 Chairman: But the order of magnitude does not
seem intrinsically wrong to you anyhow.
Malcolm Wicks: Not intrinsically wrong, no,
because I mentioned myself earlier that climate
change does not come on the cheap. Part of the
investment we are needing and we are seeing is in
terms of the grid infrastructure et cetera.
Q43 Chairman: We have at least three factors
driving prices: the markets, infrastructure
requirements and climate change.
Malcolm Wicks: Yes.
Q44 Chairman: At least three. Good. Could I ask
you a question about your old boss, nowChancellor.
Malcolm Wicks: I have had several old bosses.
Which one can I tell you about?
Q45 Chairman: In the words of the old song,
“You’re still there anyhow,” after a brief interlude
somewhere else.
Malcolm Wicks: Okay.
Q46 Chairman: The Chancellor of the Exchequer
was at the DTI—the beloved DTI—and he was in
charge of energy policy. He gave evidence to this
committee: very convincing, very good, very
powerful, very competent evidence, as you would
expect from a man of his intellectual abilities. Why
did he need to talk toOfgem earlier thismonth about
how markets work? Surely he knew.
Malcolm Wicks: I think it is not unreasonable, given
public and parliamentary concern, as we are seeing
today, about the impact of rising prices on the
vulnerable, in particular, that the Chancellorwanted
to reassure himself that Ofgem were looking at this
critically and wanted to hear Ofgem’s own analysis
of the relationship between wholesale and retail
prices.
Q47 Chairman: I have the letter here that he wrote,
and it is a pretty harmless letter—Imean, one can get
too excited about it. “I am particularly interested in
your views on the relationship between wholesale
price movements and feed-through to domestic
retail prices” and so on. If he wrote that kind of letter
to the Governor of the Bank of England about
interest rates, all hell would break lose in the
international currency markets. Was it an
appropriate intervention by the Chancellor of the
Exchequer?
Malcolm Wicks: Yes. For the reasons I have given,
really. It clearly would not be sensible for
chancellors or their ministers of state to somehow
write to Ofgem every day, as it were, but I think this
is a critical issue. We are seeing prices rise at very
considerable levels. There is a great deal of criticism
reﬂected in this Committee understandably about
the relationship between all this stuV, wholesale and
retail, particular worries about the impact on the
vulnerable. It is perfectly proper, inmy view, that the
Chancellor should want to reassure himself.
Q48 Chairman: He was only minister of the issue six
months ago at DTI. He would know all this stuV.
What has happened tangibly, as a result of that
meeting that ﬂowed from the letter?
Malcolm Wicks: There has been a meeting now
between the Chancellor and Ofgem where Ofgem
put forward their analysis and sought to reassure the
Chancellor—I think he was reassured—that,
regrettable as it is, there is a proper relationship
going on between the diVerent factors, including
wholesale and retail.
Q49 Chairman:What is interesting about this is that
the media, the lobby were very heavily briefed about
the signiﬁcance of this intervention by the
Chancellor. You tell me he was just doing it for
information: a sort of tutorial in gas prices to satisfy
himself. But they were briefed rather to the contrary.
It looked like action the Government was taking.
Surely the only action that is possible is interference
with the independence of the regulator.
Malcolm Wicks: No. I am sorry, I am now repeating
myself. It was the Chancellor wanting to reassure
himself and therefore the Government that Ofgem
were satisﬁed that there was no wrongdoing going
on, that the competitive market was working, and
that there was a reasonable relationship between
wholesale and retail.
Q50 Chairman: I hold you in high regard, Minister.
You know that. That is your job. Were you at the
meeting?
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Malcolm Wicks: No.
Q51 Chairman: Should you not have been? Should
you not have been able to provide the Chancellor
that reassurance without giving the appearance that
the regulator was being interfered with?
Malcolm Wicks: I do not think he was being
“interfered with” to use your term.
Q52 Chairman: A slightly unfortunate turn of
phrase, I agree!
Malcolm Wicks: I think it was perfectly proper that
the Chancellor of the Exchequer, among other
things, concerned about inﬂation and all those
issues, should reassure himself about this vital sector
at a time when prices are rising, and not
unreasonable that the public and Parliament should,
as it were, know about that meeting. I think it was
perfectly proper.
Q53 Chairman: But nothing happened as a result.
There was no tangible outcome from that meeting.
Malcolm Wicks: The tangible outcome is Ofgem
having their opportunity to present their analysis to
the Chancellor and, out of that, a reassurance that,
despite what others may say, the market is working
as well as it can and at a time of some diYculty in
terms of global demand.
Q54 Chairman: So theGovernment have no plans to
change the remit ofOfgemor to encourage it towork
in a diVerent way?
Malcolm Wicks: No. I mean, there is nothing in the
Energy Bill about that. It is important, of course,
that alongside Ofgem’s primary objective, which is
about competition, that there is also an emphasis on
secondary objectives, which are about sustainability
and, if you like, the social policy around
vulnerability. I am very keen that Ofgem should
focus on all three.
Q55 Chairman: Do you understand why the cynical
might regard the whole exercise as more of a
publicity stunt than a serious contribution to the
debate about energy prices?
Malcolm Wicks: I cannot understand that at all.
Chairman: I thought you probably would not be
able to.
Q56MrClapham:Canwe go back to the market. As
we have just been talking—
Malcolm Wicks: I think we went back to the market
a few decades ago.
Q57MrClapham:Well, here we are to examine what
we went back to. We have companies that have
interests in the wholesale side of the market, and
they also have interests in the retail side. Do you
think that has been a development that has been
helpful to competition in the energy market?
Malcolm Wicks: I think that is an interesting and
good question and one that I have asked colleagues.
I am often told—and there may be an opportunity
one day for the Committee to ask the companies
themselves—that quite often there is little proﬁt on
the retail side. The margins are quite tight from time
to time, and without that integration with the
wholesale market it might be diYcult to run retail
businesses. That is what I am told.
Q58 Mr Clapham: Nevertheless, given that there are
six companies that virtually dominate the market,
and bearing in mind that it is only a matter of weeks
ago that the Sunday papers were reporting meetings
between the six that were allegedly to ensure that all
their prices kept in step, given that we have this sort
of vertical integration, that we have companies
meeting to ensure that they are keeping step on
prices, surely that is not helpful for competition. In
fact, it is not a competitive market, is it?
Malcolm Wicks: Do the companies meet together?
Yes, they do. They discuss a range of matters and
sometimes with me. Indeed, I have a meeting with
the CEOs of all six companies later this afternoon—
to which I will refer later—and they have an
association through the Energy Retail Association,
where theymeet. I am sure it is just an allegation that
they use those meetings to ﬁx prices. I am assured by
the companies that for reasons of “commercial in
conﬁdence” they do not discuss prices and they
never would.
Q59 Mr Clapham: They could never say they did,
could they?
Malcolm Wicks: Actually I believe them. I believe
them. It is easy to write the story or make the speech
but if people have proof they should come forward
to Ofgem with it. I do not believe that happens; I
really do not.
Q60 Mr Clapham: Is it something you are likely to
raise with them when you meet them this afternoon?
Malcolm Wicks: OV the back of that story, I was
certainly reassured by one of them that it is just
nonsense. I do think it is nonsense, but, if I am
wrong, let people bring forward the evidence.
Q61 Mr Clapham: Given the fact that there are just
six companies, there is no room in the market for
new companies to come in. Again, there are great
restrictions on competition. When the market was
privatised we were told there were going to be
numbers of companies that would be competing
with each other; that this would lead to much lower
prices. But the market has developed in such a way
that new companies cannot get into it. That cannot
be good for competition.
Malcolm Wicks: My own view about this is that,
where you have markets, they have to operate as
markets. I can readily understand that, in the supply
business, which is what we are discussing, you
probably would never have 100 companies
competing because of the investments needed and so
on. However, there is an interesting issue as to
whether six companies is enough competition. I am
interested in that question. I would be even more
interested in it if it was not six, it was fewer than that.
I think it is an interesting question: What is the
diVerence between a market and an oligopoly? I am
not saying that it behaves oligopolistically but I am
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concerned about that. I am particularly interested in
whether there are barriers to new entrants which
should not be there. In a competitive market like this
at the moment, where wholesale prices are going up,
when there are new forms of energy coming into the
system from renewables, when there are new ideas
about decentralised energy systems, combined heat
and power, and all of that, when that is going on I
would rather like to see more competition in the
market. I would rather like to see new entrants—and
some of them could be relatively small, at local or
regional level. I want to discuss that further, without
interfering with their great independence with the
regulator. I think that is a serious, interesting
question when we do have just the six supply
companies.
Q62 Mr Clapham: Which is one of the reasons we
want to avoid a centralised energy market, but we
will leave that for a later time. Do you feel that if we
had liberalised our market in the UK in step with
what is happening in Europe, that the competition
may have been more protected, rather than going
ahead, as we did, and then seeing a European energy
market that is not liberalised and may take a decade
to liberalise?
Malcolm Wicks: We are pressing, as the UK, for the
liberalisation of the energy market. That is what a
single market is meant to be about after all. We have
been, I think it is fair to say, the major voice in the
European Union on that.
Chairman: I do not want to get too far into
liberalisation of the European energy market at this
stage.Wewill come back to that at some length later.
Q63 Mr Clapham: In order to be able to take
advantages and opportunities within the market,
domestic customers need to be well informed. It
would appear from the way the market has
developed that that information just is not there.We
know that half of domestic customers have not
switched and the third who have switched have
switched to a higher tariV, so it is clear that there is
not the information there for customers. Is that
something that troubles you? If it does, are you
looking at ways of making more information
available to domestic customers?
Malcolm Wicks: Yes, I am. It does trouble me, to be
blunt. I do not buy the line that switching is
universally the way in which our constituents always
beneﬁt from competition. I do not buy the line on
that. I do recognise that the evidence suggests that
when most people switch, they switch to a better
deal. One could cite some ﬁgures on that. I am also
aware, however, that some of our more vulnerable
constituents can be subject tomis-selling, and I want
to satisfy myself that the codes in place on that are
rigorous enough. I am going to talk to the supply
companies about that. A ﬁnal point—and I think
this is the most important point—is that those who
aremore conﬁdent about switching as a key solution
here are people who take for granted that everyone
has access to a ﬂat-screen computer, can go to the
diVerent sites and get the best deal, and has the
wherewithal to then revisit and re-switch in x
months’ time. You know as well as I do that many
of our constituents are nowhere near a computer and
have so many issues on their mind that they are not
readily able to make use of switching. Indeed, I was
looking at survey evidence this morning and the
evidence I am shown is, not surprisingly, that many
of the most vulnerable, in the lower income groups,
are the least likely to have switched. I do not want as
an egalitarian switching to depend on the
wherewithal and the access to technologies which
our constituents do not have. As to where you go
from that, I do not have all the answers, but it is a
debate that I think we should open up and I am
pleased to have this discussion with the Committee.
It is a discussion I am having with the companies
and, without interfering with them, it is a discussion
I will have quite rigorously with our good colleagues
in Ofgem.
Q64 Mr Wright: Is not one of the problems, as well,
that the most vulnerable in society cannot switch
because they are on a prepayment meter, which is a
bigger cost and so they are stuck.
Malcolm Wicks: That is an aspect of it. Some people
have reassured me that you can switch with a
prepayment meter. Whether there are particular
complications where that person might have a
history of debt, I want to look at that. Yes, I
understand that issue. I also understand the concern
you are touching on that the costs for prepayment
meter customers have got higher than paying in the
ways in which probably most of us in this room pay
for our energy. I am concerned about that. That is
another aspect of the dialogue I am having with the
supply companies.
Q65MrWright:Of course they pay for it in advance,
whereas we pay for it as we have used it.
Malcolm Wicks: Yes.
Q66 Mark Hunter: Minister, I wonder whether or
not you would agree that the whole issue about
switching is over-hyped in terms of the beneﬁt it
brings to the consumer because for those who do
switch and ﬁnd themselves on a lower tariV as a
consequence it tends to be only a short-term
advantage before things change again. According to
ﬁgures supplied to us by energywatch, not only, as
Michael Clapham has just said, have half of energy
consumers never switched supplier at all, but they
tell us that 65% of pensioners have never switched
supplier, six million people on prepayment cannot
switch supplier, and two million people cannot
switch because they are in debt to their supplier. Do
you not accept that the whole business of switching
to get more competitive rates is as much to do with
marketing advantage rather than it is real beneﬁt to
the consumer.
Malcolm Wicks: I would not go there. I think the
ability to switch is an important part of the market
because it is a way of bringing competition to you
and me and to our constituents. I think that is very,
very important. I have also said, because I want to
get the balance right here, that I am sure for many
people switching is something they are getting used
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to and fromwhich they have beneﬁted—particularly
if they do not just switch once but revisit, as it were.
I have alsomade the point, and I think colleagues are
agreeing, that the people about whom we should be
most concerned at the moment, when prices are
rising, is whether switching is working for the most
vulnerable. As a generalisation, though many will
have beneﬁted—
Q67 Mark Hunter: Many of them cannot switch.
Malcolm Wicks: -- the answer is no at the moment.
Q68 Mr Weir: Whatever the pros and cons of
switching, if it provides evidence of competition that
is only on the retail side of the market. One of the
problems with new entrants, perhaps, is in the
wholesale market and obtaining supplies in the ﬁrst
instance. What evidence do you have there is
eVective competition in the wholesale markets
regarding electricity?
Malcolm Wicks: I think there is evidence that there
is competition. I recognise that from time to time
Members of Parliament on behalf of constituents
will write to me with contrary evidence and I do my
best to take those issues up with the regulator. It is a
rather diVerentmarket there. But if you feel there are
barriers, if you feel that eVectively there is not
competition, I would like to see that evidence and I
will pursue it.
Q69 Mr Weir: Given that most of the energy
companies have long-term contracts with their own
electricity generating capacity, can you give us an
estimate of the amount of electricity that is traded
within the market and the level of liquidity that is in
the market?
Malcolm Wicks: I can give you some things about
the liquidity in the wholesale market. I think the
evidence suggests that it is highly competitive. I have
some ﬁgures here for the Financial Services
Authority which report that between the ﬁnancial
year 2005-06 and 2006-07 the volume of wholesale
electricity traded in the UK increased by 52%, which
prima facie would suggest quite a lot of liquidity in
the market.
Q70MrWeir:Given there has been a lot of publicity
recently about the energy market, calls for it to be
referred to the Competition Commission, have you
ever given any consideration to doing that?
Malcolm Wicks: No, not at the present time, and
that is not the view of Ofgem either. Not that you
are, Mr Weir, but it is easier to assert wrongdoing,
as it were, than to have the reasonable, balanced,
evidence-based argument about it. I am really not an
apologist for the companies. I ask these questions
myself, but at the moment it seems to me that
competition is working. I have cited Scottish and
Southern not increasing their prices. I have cited—
albeit with a controversial headline—that for the
domestic customer our price is a bit lower than the
EU 15 median and lower than in France and
Germany, but I do appreciate, at the moment, that
when I argue this way very few peoplewill believeme
because the contrary story is a more colourful one. I
do think we need opportunities of inquiring into this
very carefully.
Q71 Mr Weir: Is that not the whole point about a
reference? You talk about price being lower than the
median. Perhaps that is true, but it is the relative
price that aVects consumers. Consumers see a
situation where one company will stick its head
above the parapet and raise prices, a couple of weeks
later another one will follow suit and another, and
you will have similar price rises. The whole point
about the investigation is to ﬁnd out whether it is
happening but it certainly gives the impression that
they are not all acting independently.
Malcolm Wicks: I think it does give that impression.
It is a challenge for me as Minister for Energy; it is
a challenge for those companies; it is a challenge for
the regulator. Because, as I have implied, that is a
strong impression which is gaining currency, and I
think one has to balance that against whatever
evidence we have. At the beginning of this session,
Mr Weir, I was citing wholesale gas forward prices
going up by 50% in one year, coal forward prices
going up by 85% in January 2007. When you look at
that, then, as it were, the alternative hypothesis that
it should not be so surprising that retail prices are
increasing, is at least worth considering.
Q72MrWeir: I do not think anybody is arguing that
retail price would not increase in these
circumstances. What is arousing suspicion is that all
the companies are having similar increases within a
very short time. One could argue that that is because
that is a reﬂection of the increase, but at the same
time you could also say in a true competition surely
some of the companies would be seeking to take
advantage and gain market share in that situation.
Malcolm Wicks: MrWeir, I said to you Scottish and
Southern. With respect, should you not take that on
board in your critique? An important Scottish
company have decided they are not going to follow
the others and they have said they will not consider
price increases until April, which brings comfort to
their customers in the winter and some might say is
quite smart commerce because they are the
company, as I said, that are gaining market share at
the moment. Is that not evidence of at least some
competition here?
Q73 Mr Weir: I should declare an interest as a
customer of Scottish and Southern.
Malcolm Wicks: There are worse scandals!
Q74 Mr Weir: There is still some suspicion there.
Indeed, the Chairman of the Competition
Commission has stated concern at the lack of
regulated sectors being referred to it. How do you
respond to that? That is coming from the
Competition Commission not from politicians or
customers.
Malcolm Wicks: I have not seen that comment. If it
is not getting enough business that might be because
all is well, in some senses.
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Q75 Mark Hunter: That is why people do not vote!
Malcolm Wicks: I am sure they will ﬁnd ways of
keeping busy.
Q76 Chairman: I do not necessarily think you can
answer this question. It is a factual question now.
You used ameasure of the increased electricity being
traded in the wholesale markets earlier on and said
that is up by 52%—although I cannot remember the
period you said now. That is an interesting ﬁgure,
but 52% of not much is still not very much. Do you
knowwhat percentage of electricity in total is traded
on the wholesale market? There is no reason you
should know that oV the top of your head.
Malcolm Wicks: No, I do not think I do.
Q77 Chairman: I think that is a much more
important measure.
Malcolm Wicks: We will let you have that.
Q78 Chairman: I should declare an interest here
because I have inmy constituency the seventh largest
energy supply company in the country, BizzEnergy,
who have 1% roughly of the SME market. They say
in evidence to our committee: “As a matter of
practice, vertically integrated suppliers are likely to
contract with their own generation before trading in
the market, thus removing vital liquidity from the
energy market. This has a direct impact on
independent energy suppliers such as BizzEnergy
and its potential new customers.” Of course, if they
are contracting their own generating capacity, one
does not know at what price they are contracting
either, so there is invisibility as well as a lack of
competition. Is that a concern that you could
understand?
Malcolm Wicks: It is a concern I would like to
explore, yes. I am certainly aware that in general
terms it goes back toMrWeir’s line of questioning. I
was arguing that if the wholesale price going up you
should not be that surprised. But of course supply
companies make their own deals. It is a speculative
market in terms of when you buy forward and so on.
I am certainly, as it were, aware that some do that
rather well, and some seem to have done that rather
badly, I am advised in conﬁdence.
Q79 Chairman: What is interesting is former Ofgem
executives, two senior executives, left recently. I am
sure they can be identiﬁed quite easily but they were
quoted in the Sunday Times last weekend as saying:
“The wholesale prices don’t represent what the
energy companies are actually paying. There is a
problem in thewholesalemarkets whichOfgemhave
failed to get to grips with.” That is two quite senior
and well-placed people making that criticism of the
wholesale markets.
Malcolm Wicks: I do not think I could comment on
that. I am not sure who they are.
Q80 Chairman: But you do have at least intellectual
curiosity about the way the wholesale markets are
working.
Malcolm Wicks: I do have an intellectual and
political curiosity about it. On two aspects I have
said there are things that I particularly want to
pursue. One is whether there are barriers to new
entrants. I amnot saying there are, butwhether there
are. I would like to see more new entrants and I have
indicated that around decentralised energy you
would think in principle there should be
opportunity. I have also indicated that in terms of
the impact on our most vulnerable constituents, I
want to investigate quite rigorously how switching
can be of beneﬁt to all and not just to some.
Q81 Chairman: I want to move on to the
liberalisation of European energy markets, but I
note in passing that energywatch, in their very
interesting evidence to this Committee, say they do
not believe there is collusion in the market. They do
not believe the Sunday Times reports of people in a
dark room, (if they are still allowed to smoke) a
smoke-ﬁlled room, agreeing the prices. The market
is so imperfect they do not need to collude. It just
happens automatically because of the imperfections
in the market.
Malcolm Wicks: Yes.
Q82 Chairman: That is a plausible explanation.
Malcolm Wicks: Yes. I would urge them to bring
forward evidence.
Chairman: We might well ﬁnd ourselves doing that.
Q83 Mr Bailey: We have almost strayed into the
issue of the so-called level of liberalisation of
Europe’s energy market or, appropriately perhaps,
the sclerotic nature of the European energy market,
and you yourself conceded earlier that, at a time
when you would have expected gas to have been
ﬂowing from Europe to this country, it was not so.
Basically, what are you doing to improve matters
and what progress do you think is being made?
Malcolm Wicks: As I indicated earlier, I think we
can say with some satisfaction that we led the charge
in the European Union on the need for a liberalised
energy market. We have discussed whether there are
imperfections, but we have liberalised. Other
countries have been slow to do so. It is a matter of
policy that we should do this. It is an aspect of the
single market, after all. It is what the Common
Market in part is meant to be about. We raise this
regularly at European level. I am on the Energy
Council ofMinisters. It is a standard thing that I and
my colleagues talk about. We feel there is progress
being made. You have now got strong
commissioners. The Competition Commissioner,
Neelie Kroes, is very, very strong on this. Indeed,
there have been dawn raids on energy companies, I
understand, to take away documentary evidence.
She is a very tough lady and is acting very toughly on
this and we are in the middle of negotiations across
the Member States about this. This is not just
something we want to do in principle and, although
this is our primary concern, it is not just something
which would beneﬁt theUK and get that gas ﬂowing
through the interconnector, et cetera, when we need
it, actually it would also be of beneﬁt to German
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businesses and German customers who are paying
too much for their energy at the moment compared
with what we are paying in Britain.
Q84 Mr Bailey: There are two issues arising. I
suppose one of the counter arguments is that, under
the current system, because we have a highly
liberalised market in this country and Europe does
not, they get the best of both worlds. They can buy
from this country when ours is cheap and we cannot
buy from them when theirs is cheaper than ours.
That is one issue I would like your views on. The
second point is that you mentioned the European
Commission’s commitment to liberalising the
market, and I think that is welcome, but to a certain
extent should there not be an initiative or pressure
from the respective national governments to do the
same? Is that not rather lacking at the moment?
Malcolm Wicks: National governments to do what?
Q85 Mr Bailey: To liberalise the energy market in
Europe.
Malcolm Wicks: They should. You say “the best of
both worlds”. Germany and France are not getting
the best of both worlds, because their people are
paying more for their energy than they would do if
there was a liberalised market. I had better not go
back to my controversial chart and arouse the fury
of Mr Berry again, but that is what it shows. The
domestic customer is paying less in Britain than in
France and Germany—I think that is what that
shows—so the key people in those countries are not
beneﬁting from it. But, no, I agree, we are absolutely
committed to pushing forward the liberalisation
agenda in Europe. The European Commission
agrees with us and we are in the middle of
discussions about that.
Q86 Mr Bailey: Can I pursue this point a bit more.
Certainly, on the surface of what you say, if the
consumers are getting a bad deal—
Malcolm Wicks: The national governments, yes.
MrBailey: ---youwould expect there to be a stronger
response from the national government in response
to consumer pressure, but it does not seem to be
happening.
Q87 Chairman: Can I add before you answer, Bill
Cash, when we were debating the Lisbon Treaty,
said something interesting. He said he thought the
French and Germans were making some kind of
public announcement about their policy in
opposition to liberalisation. Have you heard any
rumours to that eVect?
Malcolm Wicks: A great European, Mr Cash.
Obviously the national governments are represented
around the table of the Council ofMinisters. It is not
for me, I do not want to say what they should be
saying, but you would hope, would you not, that
democratically elected politicians would represent
the needs of their constituents and their businesses
and not vested interests. This is quite a battle we are
having and we are in the middle of it.
Q88 Mr Bailey: Getting to the point that I was
pursuing, there do seem to be some very powerful
vested interests that work against the consumer both
in this country and in the rest of Europe. That leads
me on to the next question. Four out of the six major
players in the UK are owned by big European
companies. Are you concerned by this domination
of our energy market—I appreciate this has been
touched on—by a few large companies but also the
fact that they are not, by and large, British
companies?
Malcolm Wicks: No, I am not concerned about that.
I understand the anxieties. Obviously I can
understand the question in all sorts of ways, but we
have been champions of free trade and removing
trade barriers and we have been champions of a new
Europe and I think we are relaxed about foreign
ownership. I am not a Liverpool supporter, so I
cannot talk to you generally, but I think we should
be relaxed about foreign ownership of companies as
long as those foreign companies, as it were, behave
properly and do not try to erect barriers and operate
in a liberal and competitive way, and so I am relaxed
about European companies being key players in this
country. What I am less relaxed about is that
because of the timing, because we liberalised earlier
than the rest, I am frustrated by the fact that, given
the illiberalism of energy markets in Continental
Europe, great British companies, good British
companies like Centrica, like Scottish and Southern,
have not had a fair chance to compete and invest in
other European countries. I am irked by that. One of
reasons why we have got to drive forward
liberalisation is so that those very good companies
can have a level playing ﬁeld in which to operate.
Q89 Mr Bailey: I am trying to recall my
undergraduate economics course, which was an
awfully long time ago, but even in a freemarket there
is a tendency for oligopolies to emerge to exploit it
against the interests of the consumer. Would you
accept that this could be one of the reasons why it is
so slow to develop—a liberalised market that is—
in Europe?
Malcolm Wicks: Yes. There are some very powerful
companies with quite close connections with
government, and that is one of the major barriers to
liberalisation in Europe, yes.
Q90 Mr Bailey: You feel that is what we need to
tackle?
Malcolm Wicks: Yes, and we are.
Chairman: Thank you.
Q91 Mr Weir: Following on from that point, is that
not one of the main problems with trying to
liberalise the European market, in that France
Germany in particular have a totally diVerent
attitude to energy security in the market and have
built up their national champions. In the French
case, in fact, I believe the French Government is a
major stakeholder in EDF and I understand, as the
Chairman said yesterday, in the debate the EDF are
now trying to takeover Iberdrola of Spain, which
owns in turn Scottish Power. While the UK
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Government, quite rightly, is trying to liberalise the
market, there is a procedure going in the other
direction, if you like, with state companies with a
large state impact trying to consolidate on the
Continent. I ask the question I tried to ask earlier:
what is the timescale for liberalising the European
market, if there is one?
Malcolm Wicks: It is certainly a fair point to say.
There is clearly a great argument going on at the
moment in Europe and other parts of the world
between the proponents of a competitivemarket and
the proponents of national champions. That to some
extent is what this is all about. I cannot give you a
precise timescale, all I can say is that we are now in
the middle of a great argument in the European
Union about moving towards a proper market in
energy. I think both France and Germany do
recognise the fact the tide has turned and, indeed, I
understand that both France and Germany,
working together, are going to come forward with
proposals for a diVerent approach to liberalisation
in Europe. I have not seen those proposals yet but
that is happening.
Q92 Chairman: Before we move on to Roger Berry
and the impact of fuel prices on those who can least
aVord the increases, we have agreed on four separate
areas that drive energy prices: failing to liberalise the
European energy market, the overall wholesale
markets, network investment and climate change,
and levies, taxes, measures and things like the
Renewables Obligation, and so on.
Malcolm Wicks: If they do not appear magically
from behind me on climate change, there are
ﬁgures on—
Q93 Chairman: Exactly. I have got Ofgem’s ﬁgures
for 2008. The climate change staV was about £22,
£21.50, which is not very much, actually to be fair—
about three pounds—but a wholesale price of £193;
but what we are agreed is, given the average fuel bill
is now in the order of £1,000 for a household, give or
take, a small change in UK conditions that could be
brought about by regulatory intervention here could
have signiﬁcant beneﬁcial impacts on domestic
consumers. So, imperfections in the UK market,
nuclear regulation, if put right, could actually bring
real beneﬁts notwithstanding the rises in wholesale
prices on international markets?
Malcolm Wicks: If you are saying, Chairman, that
there is a need for Ofgem to be ever vigilant, then, I
would agree, yes.
Chairman: I think we will leave that topic.
Q94 Roger Berry:Minister, you said earlier that fuel
poverty is the problem that you worry most about,
and I appreciate that. Could you give us your latest
estimates of the number of households or, indeed,
the number of individuals who are currently deﬁned
as being fuel poor?What are the latest estimates that
we have for this?
Malcolm Wicks: Yes, I can. Always our diYculty is
the time lag, of course, in data.
Q95 Roger Berry: Sure.
Malcolm Wicks:Letme point out before you or your
colleagues do that, of course, at the moment the
thing is moving rapidly—
Q96 Roger Berry: Exactly. That was going to be my
next question. You are always ahead of Committee.
Malcolm Wicks: ---in the wrong direction. From the
most recent published ﬁgures for the United
Kingdom, but they go back to 2005, there were
around 2.5 million, two and a half million
households living in fuel poverty. It may help the
Committee, Chairman, if I say that by “fuel
poverty” we mean people who have to spend over
10% of their income on energy. This is a precise
statistical deﬁnition. I have got more recent ﬁgures
for England, if Mr Weir will forgive me. Estimates
for households living in fuel poverty in England in
2006 indicate an increase from 1.5 million in 2005 to
2.4 million in 2006. The UK ﬁgures for 2006 will be
ﬁnalised later this year, but, of course, these are out
of date ﬁgures, I recognise that. Because of the price
increases that we have been discussing, the numbers
in fuel poverty will now be increasing quite
signiﬁcantly.
Q97 Roger Berry:Do you have any best estimates of
what the current ﬁguremight be following the recent
price increases?
Malcolm Wicks:No, I do not, but if, in writing, I can
help the Committee on that, I will do so.
Q98 Roger Berry: Thank you.
Malcolm Wicks: Can I say (and I would like to add
this), this picture of increasing numbers in fuel
poverty, of course, follows a number of years where
we saw quite a dramatic decline because prices were
relatively low, because of home energy eYciency
schemes and because of the diVerent social security
measures we were taking and high levels of
employment, et cetera.
Q99 Roger Berry: I entirely agree, but given Defra’s
target is to eliminate fuel poverty in vulnerable
households by 2010, which is two years away, and
given that in recent times the number of people in
fuel poverty has increased quite signiﬁcantly, is there
any chance of meeting that target and, if so, how?
Malcolm Wicks: I amnot giving up on the target, but
I am being realistic. I am recognising the diYcult
global circumstances of rising energy prices. Would
it be helpful if I say something about the diVerent
instruments we have to tackle fuel poverty?
Q100 Roger Berry:Everyone is agreed that there are
three things that determine the number of people in
fuel poverty. One is prices, then it is housing
conditions and then it is income. You cannot control
prices, so it is presumably what the Government is
doing in relation to energy eYciency in people’s
homes where Warm Front and other things are
happening, of course, but also people’s incomes,
fundamentally.What is theGovernment going to do
over the two areas, the two instruments, it can have
some inﬂuence on?
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Malcolm Wicks: Let us recognise that, the statistical
target, which is an important one because if people
are having to spending too much, often on quite low
incomes, on energy, that is problematic for them—
of course it is—but I think other indicators show a
great deal of process. I think we should all be proud
of the fact that across theUnitedKingdom some two
million households have beneﬁted from the range of
diVerent energy eYciency schemes that we have and,
as colleagues will know from visiting these homes
during Warm Homes Week, when you see someone
beneﬁting from better loft insulation, a more
eYcient boiler, decent heating systems, it is a real
gain for that individual, and some of us have seen the
human faces behind that twomillion ﬁgure, and that
is important.
Q101 Roger Berry: With respect, I think they are
important, I think they are very signiﬁcant, but
despite all of that, where we are today—you have
just described the extent, we are talking about a few
million people whatever ﬁgure we take—for the UK
as a whole we are probably talking about three
million, I guess, people in fuel poverty. The question
is what, over the next two, or three, or four years, is
the Government going to do what further measures
to address that problem?Why, for example, did you
decide not to mandate the implementation of social
tariVs by energy companies? That would have been
one way.
Malcolm Wicks: I will come to that. One thing, of
course, is that there will be an extension of home
energy eYciency schemes through the successor to
EEC (the Energy EYciency Commitment) and that,
together with the programmes likeWarm Front and
the equivalent in the other nations of the United
Kingdom, will mean more people beneﬁting from
energy eYciency schemes in the future. That is a
very, very important and lasting investment and I
put a lot of store on that. You will understand, Mr
Berry, that in terms of other social security beneﬁts,
levels of winter fuel payments, I have to do the
customary thing and say, “That is a matter for the
Chancellor”. The third area which you mention,
social tariVs: the judgment at the moment, but I
emphasise “at the moment”, is that we do not need
to legislate to require companies to develop their
social tariVs. All companies have social programmes
of diVerent kinds. I have met with each of the chief
executive oYcers of the six supply companies on a
one-to-one basis, by which I mean not collectively,
we have had individual meetings with them, to urge
them to domore and to review their programmes.As
a result of that the help available has increased from
£40 million this is for this coming winter, the one we
are in, 2007-08—to £56 million and that will beneﬁt
some 700,000 households.
Q102 Roger Berry: But Energywatch is saying that
only one in 15 fuel poor energy accounts are being
reached by the current schemes oVered by the ‘Big 6’.
That does not suggest that they are a very signiﬁcant
instrument.
Malcolm Wicks: One in ﬁfteen of the fuel poor
households, is that?
Q103 Roger Berry: Yes, one in 15 of the fuel poor.
Malcolm Wicks: Yes, sure.
Q104 Roger Berry: For 14 of the 15 these schemes
mean nothing. It is not much of a strategy, is it,
really?
Malcolm Wicks: I am meeting, after this meeting
(and the timing is purely coincidental), all the CEOs,
or their representatives—I hope they are all
coming—to discuss this very issue, the very issue
being that because of widespread parliamentary and
public concern can they do more, are they doing
enough, where are we on a range of issues, including
pre-payment meters? That is my main meeting this
afternoon after this one.
Q105Roger Berry:Maybe the viewwill be expressed
to you, as Npower expressed to Ofgem, that the
interests of the fuel poor is best served by a
mandatory social tariV and this is the only means by
which the Government’s 2010 and 2016 objectives
can be achieved. Npower believes that. Why does
not the Government?
Malcolm Wicks: We are not convinced. My
Secretary of State, John Hutton, has made it clear in
the House of Commons that we are looking at this
and if we feel in the future it is necessary to do it, we
will do it. We are not convinced at the moment (a)
because we are seeing some movement in the right
direction in terms of social tariVs and (b) because
there is, I think, a very serious concern that there
could well be a situation, if you mandate social
tariVs, that that simply becomes the minimum that
they all do and that there would be no competition
between them. Where would be the incentive to do
more? They would come up to the minimum and
they would think they have done that. I think that is
a very real danger, Mr Berry.
Q106Roger Berry:You raisedwinter fuel payments,
which was interesting, I think, because winter fuel
payments are allocated not on the basis of people’s
need for ﬁnancial support to pay winter fuel bills,
they are a non-taxable supplement to the basic state
pension.Notwithstanding the fact that other arms of
government may have diVerent views in terms of the
fuel poverty strategy, do you accept there is a case
for having winter fuel payments that are addressed
towards those who have extra need for paying their
fuel bills: for example severely disabled people under
the age of 60 who at the moment are not entitled to
a winter fuel payment?
Malcolm Wicks: Can I make one point, before I
answer that, about winter fuel payments? It sounds a
rather technical point, but the way in which we have
drawn up our target that fuel poverty is about
paying more than 10% of your income, we are not
going to revisit this but it is worth pointing out that
the winter fuel payment at the moment, which after
all, by deﬁnition, is to help with your winter fuel, is
actually counted—
Q107 Roger Berry: Initially it is available for people
over 60, whatever their winter fuel positionmight be.
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Malcolm Wicks: It is counted as income when you
do the analysis, rather than, as it were, knocked oV
one’s expenditure on fuel. I make that point because
that has always struck me personally as rather
curious, given that the intention is to help with
winter fuel. It would slightly change the fuel poverty
statistics if you said against the expenditure
(someone said nearer £1,000 now) we can knock oV
the £300 for the over eighties. If you add £300 simply
to the income, then statistically it makes life more
diYcult in reaching the target. It is just useful to
point out that statistic.
Q108 Roger Berry: Your statistic, of course, is that
disabled people and their families are twice as likely
to be in fuel poverty as non-disabled people and their
families. Your department’s ﬁgures show, twice as
likely to be in fuel poverty. That is the critical
statistic.
Malcolm Wicks: I am coming to your point, but
occasionally I have this desire to be fair to myself in
terms of the statistical presentations and weakness.
We have discussed this before actually on diVerent
occasions, and I understand the point, but the winter
fuel payment is there to help elderly people—the
£200, the £300 for the over eighties. It is worth citing
the statistic, Chairman. I think I am right in saying it
is some two billion pounds public expenditure every
year which the former Chancellor, or the Prime
Minister, has committed ourselves to for this
Parliament.
Q109 Roger Berry: With respect, that is not the
question. I support that. Of course, I do. I am asking
why is it that the people in fuel poverty under 60who
have particular needs for warmer homes do not get a
penny fromwhat is a “winter fuel payment scheme”?
Malcolm Wicks: Because of the concern about the
particular vulnerability of elderly people, and,
obviously, for people with disabilities of diVerent
kinds, there is a range of other beneﬁts, disability
living allowances, which are looking at their needs,
but it is a perfectly reasonable argument for you to
present to the Chancellor.
Q110 Roger Berry: Does your department have an
estimate of the number of disabled people under 60
who are living in fuel poverty?
Malcolm Wicks: I do not certainly have that in my
head. If we have that kind of data, I will send it to
you.
Q111 Roger Berry: I would be grateful if you would
inform us if you keep that data. A ﬁnal question.
Malcolm Wicks: I certainly recognise the issue. A lot
of people with speciﬁc disabilities and in general, as
a generalisation, peoplewith disabilities, spendmore
time living at home than the rest of us and these
issues are not just about some magic cut-oV point of
over 60 or over 80, they aVect other people. Howone
addresses that is, I guess, a more interesting and
controversial issue.
Q112 Roger Berry: Part of the answer, clearly, in
terms of fuel poverty, is if we accept the fact that
what the Government can do relates to the
conditions of home energy eYciency on the one
hand and people’s incomes on the other, then, as in
one of your many publications on the Welfare State
that I have read, the beneﬁt system is actually quite
important, is it not, and so I look forward to an
answer too. I hope the Government can continue to
keep this under review. A ﬁnal question, because
colleagues have other questions. Ofgem,
interestingly, has come up with a windfall tax
proposal, you will be well aware of, that you should
take some nine billion windfall from the UK energy
companies that they are set to receive from the free
allocation of permits under Phase II of the EU
Emissions Trading Scheme and use this to help those
in fuel poverty. A windfall tax seems to me very
commensurate withNewLabour policy. It was there
at the very beginning. Is it worth going back to
consider it, do you think?
Malcolm Wicks: If it is, it is a matter for the
Chancellor of the Exchequer.
Q113 Roger Berry: You appreciate the frustration
we have here, in the sense that the key issue in terms
of raising resources to tackle fuel poverty you are
very reluctant to explore other than to say we should
contact the Chancellor.
Malcolm Wicks: I do not think it would entirely help
the Chancellor if I speculated wildly—
Q114 Roger Berry: It would help us, though, when
you are giving evidence to this Committee?
Malcolm Wicks: ---about what we should do. I am
bound to say, Chairman, reﬂecting on Mr Berry’s
comments, you will forgive me as Energy Minister,
but I do want the energy companies to have money
to build power stations as well and wind farms.
Q115 Roger Berry:Youwere the one who said—this
is my ﬁnal comment and I simply remind you, with
respect, I believe this, I know it is your view that fuel
poverty is the issue you worry most about. That is
what you said and I believe that and I just put that
back on the record.
Malcolm Wicks: I worry most about it because it
remains a disgrace that in a civilised society there are
some people who are cold when many of us at a
macro level are worried about global warming. Of
course I worry about that. I am pleased with the
progress that we have been making in recent years in
home energy eYciency schemes and social security
measures; I am distressed that we are now being
knocked oV course because of global factors
contributing to rising energy costs and I, in my own
way, am going to do what I can to try to move us
back in the right direction. I am very concerned
about these matters.
Q116 Chairman:Your answer just then very usefully
links us from the section on energy prices to the
section on security of supply. I have heard it said
quite often actually by various industries that, for
example, the nine billion windfall that the
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companies have received you are very happy with
because it will help give them the money to build
nuclear power stations. You sort of endorsed that in
your answer just then.
Malcolm Wicks: I suddenly realise it would not be
parliamentary language to say, “Steady on” to a
Chairman of a select committee, but I think that is a
little leap.
Q117 Chairman: You did say it was good for them
to have money to build power stations though.
Malcolm Wicks: Maybe we are coming on to this.
Q118 Chairman: We are.
Malcolm Wicks: But we are going to need a great
deal of investment in our power infrastructure.
Chairman: Let us talk about that. Tony Wright.
Q119 Mr Wright: Let us move on to the nuclear
issue.
Malcolm Wicks: Less controversial. Thank
goodness!
Q120 Mr Wright: At the beginning! In 2006
following that, the High Court ruled in favour of
Greenpeace. Are you conﬁdent that youwill not face
another High Court challenge from Greenpeace?
Malcolm Wicks: That is up to them and their
members’ money, is it not? It is not up to me. I
cannot foretell these things. We were challenged by
Greenpeace; the judge did ﬁnd, as it were, in favour
of Greenpeace. We then did an extremely full
consultation, I think, as someone interested in
political science, probably the fullest public
consultation on a major policy issue we have ever
had in this country. It was not just getting evidence
from the usual suspects—that was very helpful—but
random samples of electors were drawn from the
registers, we talked through the issues in an objective
way at arm’s length via an independent company
with over a thousand people in major city centres
across this country. I sat in on one in London; I
thought it was a fascinating exercise. Then, as
governments have to do, we made a judgment, and
the judgment was that there should be a place for
new civil nuclear. I would rather these things be
settled, as it were, within the Parliament and in
government rather than in other ambits, but let us
see.
Q121 Mr Wright: I would tend to agree.
Malcolm Wicks: I think the argument hasmoved on.
A lot more people are interested in the arguments
about civil nuclear power—they are concerned
about climate change, they are concerned about
energy security—and I think we have had a much
more reasoned debate that probably would not have
been possible ten or 20 years ago about nuclear.
Q122 Mr Wright: Do you think it has been quite
helpful in trying to change public opinion towards
new nuclear and achieving political consensus in
that in as much as the previous submission from the
High Court judge was saying that the consultation
process has been misleading, seriously ﬂawed and
procedurally unfair? Are you conﬁdent that since
2006 we have moved on and the public are more
tuned in to the debate on the nuclear question?
Malcolm Wicks: I am very conﬁdent we had the
fullest possible public consultation. I thought it was
a very successful and, indeed, interesting exercise. A
little bit of me is pleased we were enabled to do that.
There is, as I say, a much more reasoned debate out
there. There are still those who are ﬁercely opposed
to nuclear, and I have a great deal of respect for the
position. There are big issues around waste, security
and safety. Equally, there are vociferous proponents
of nuclear—some were in the middle on this issue
wanting to look at the arguments—and, as I say, the
Government has now made its judgment.
Q123MrWright:One of the concerns certainly from
my point of view and, I know, of other members of
the Committee is not the question of building power
stations, it is the decommissioning and obviously the
question of the waste management. What you have
said there is that they will meet the full costs of
decommissioning and their full share of waste
management costs. What do you mean by “the full
share of waste management costs”?
Malcolm Wicks: I mean 100 %. That is what I mean.
This is a feature of the Energy Bill, and the only
feature of the Energy Bill which is about nuclear is
setting up arrangements to make sure that our
principle that they should meet the full share is put
into practice. It is not just their full share of building
the reactors and all the construction costs and the
running costs, but, as you imply, it is the full share
also of the eventual decommissioning of those
nuclear reactors safely and the full share of their
disposal of the waste.
Q124 Mr Wright: I suppose it was in the
terminology, because, I repeat, what you said at the
time was “meet the full costs of decommissioning
and the full share of waste management”. What you
meant to say was “the full costs of decommissioning
and the full costs of waste management”?
Malcolm Wicks:Certainly that is what it means, and
it includes, for example, a contribution towards the
ﬁxed costs of constructing the geological disposal
facility, because, after all, that disposal facility
would have to be somewhat larger than simply what
we need to dispose of the legacy of nuclear waste. It
involves that. We are going to put in place
arrangements whereby from the moment that the
nuclear reactor is built and is up and running from
year one the company has to set aside money for the
eventual decommissioning and disposal of the waste
into a separate fund altogether diVerent from the
company’s own funds, and we are going to set up an
independent board, which will include, I guess,
people like accountants and others, to advise us on
how we determine those costs over time.
Q125 Mr Wright: Are you still conﬁdent that from
the beginning there will be no government subsidy
from the construction of the nuclear sites right the
way through to the nuclear waste: no government
subsidy whatsoever?
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Malcolm Wicks: There will be no government
subsidy, no. Indeed, in terms of developing the costs
that they will have to pay, there will be a premium
put on it. In other words, we are going to ask them
for rather more money than probably we think is
needed, just to safeguard the taxpayer on this one.
Q126 Mr Clapham: Minister, just a couple of quick
questions. On the one hand we talk in terms of
building nuclear and a little earlier, when we were
discussing themarket, you recognised that there was
a need for a decentralised energymarket, but herewe
are likely to see the development of nuclear power,
and once the rods are in that reactor and the
electricity is ﬂowing, it has to ﬂow. Consequently, we
get centralisation, which is going to prevent the kind
of energy market developing for the future that you
would like to see, a much more decentralised one,
one where communities can actually have an input.
Secondly, are discussions taking place with EDF?
EDF, a French electricity company, a nationalised
company, has shown an interest in wanting to build
a nuclear power station. Are we likely to see them
drawing a proﬁt from that electricity provided by
their nuclear station but leaving us with the
decommissioning costs? Are negotiations taking
place with the company?
Malcolm Wicks: That is the policy. In no way are we
going to allow someone to build the thing and then
let the taxpayer clear up the waste and pick up the
considerable bills. The whole purpose of our
strategy is to state that principle very clearly, that
they will pay 100 % of the costs, and the Energy Bill
sets up a framework to start to move from principle
to practice over time. We are absolutely committed
to that, it is very, very vital, and I am conﬁdent that
actually it will happen. On your earlier point,
although you have proponents of both sides, I
myself feel it is perfectly sensible in the future to
think that alongside a National Grid, which I am
sure will be there for decades to come, based on big
power station like coal or gas or nuclear, you start to
see the development in diVerent localities of
decentralised energy systems. I visited one recently
in Barkantine on the Isle of Dogs. It was owned and
run very well by EDF but this was a relatively small
power station in the community, it combined heat
and power, which was a particularly important
feature, serving the local community and providing
heat to several hundreds of local dwellings and the
local school that I visited and soon the local
community centre that I visited. That struck me as
an extraordinarily interesting model of what we
could see in the future and linking it in to where the
housing ministry is, Department of Communities
and Local Government. There we have set ourselves
as a government an extraordinarily radical objective
that by 2016 we will only build in this country low
carbon housing. That is interesting because, apart
from anything else (and I am on the committee with
the Housing Minister on this as we think this
through), what that means is we have got to connect
up our thinking about housing and the design of that
kind of housing, very ﬁrmly eYcient and so on, with
all this talk about decentralised energy and
renewables andmicro-generation, and I think that is
an extremely exciting project. Why do I mention
that? Because that will itself, I think, bring forward
decentralised energy systems which will be very
diVerent from the big power station, National Grid
model that we have at moment, and it is one of the
reasons why I am interested in new entrants to the
market, because I do not think they all need in the
future to be a big player; some of them could be
relatively small serving local communities and
maybe in part owned by local communities.
Q127MrHoyle: It is obviously very interesting what
you have said, but the truth of the matter is you
cannot manage without the National Grid. That is
the reason why the lights go out, is it not? If you are
reliant on the local source and something goes
wrong, you have no other choice. The other thing is,
if they have got spare capacity, you need to put it
into the National Grid. What we have got to say is
we do not want to get rid of the National Grid, we
want to work with the National Grid for the future.
Malcolm Wicks: I agree with that.
Q128 Mr Hoyle: That is a good start. The cynics are
saying that the Government is more than happy to
watch energy prices rise, Ofgem are happy to sit back
as well, in order to allow proﬁts to be made and
justiﬁcation for nuclear. Is that fair or have the
cynics got it completely wrong?
Malcolm Wicks: Cynics are normally cynical. I do
not think that relates to the truth at all. I am
reﬂecting on what you have said. I think one grain of
truth in that is that we are going to be in a world of
high energy costs and, just as that raises particular
challenges in terms of tackling the fuel poverty
issue—Mr Berry was leading on that—it is also an
encouragement to energy conservation and energy
eYciency. This is one of the dilemmas we have got
now. If we were simply people looking at global
warming, you might welcome rising energy costs. If
you are looking at the social policy thing, you are in
some diYculty about it. The challenge for us all now
in an era of high energy costs, when, perfectly
properly, to tackle climate change, we will adding to
those energy costs as we bring forward renewables
and carbon capture and storage and clean coal
technologies and all of those things, is how do we
then redouble our eVorts to protect the poorest? It is
a dilemma, it is something I think we can move our
way through, but it needs quite radical thinking.
Q129 Chairman: Filling in the sandwich between
nuclear—we can ask you a lot more about that but
there will be other opportunities I am sure—and
renewables, which Julie Kirkbride will ask you
about, one of the common features here is the need
for these national policy statements which are part
of the Planning Bill’s proposals to speed major
infrastructure investments, which is the National
Grid as well and, because we believe the
Government thinks there is a role for Parliament in
scrutinising these statements, there are a few
questions I would like to ask you, which I have told
your oYcials about, to make sure we understand
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exactly what is involved.We do not really know even
howmany of these policy statements there are going
to be, so the ﬁrst question is: is it correct that there
will be a single over-arching national policy
statement on energy, with subsidiary statements on
speciﬁc energy technologies beneath that? Is that the
way it will be done?
Malcolm Wicks: Yes. That is the simple answer to
that question. We will certainly have an over-
arching national policy statement on energy, for all
sorts of obvious reasons. We need to bring these
things together. We are expecting that that will be
published sometime, I cannot say exactly when, next
year, in 2009, but also under that we need to see the
need for a number of other statements on
renewables, obviously, and on nuclear. Exactly how
they will ﬁt together, the big statement will come
ﬁrst, but whether these other statements will be
technical appendices or whether they will be
separate documents coming later I do not think at
themoment we know, to be blunt, and I do not think
that is unreasonable at this stage.
Q130 Chairman:Would you expect there to be more
than one policy statement on the renewable sector,
because there are diVerent technologies involved?
Malcolm Wicks: We certainly see the need for
additional statements or, as I say, annexes—I would
not worry too much about the detail on fossil fuel
generated electricity, on renewable energy, on gas
storage and transportation, obviously on nuclear,
and actually a kind of cross-cutting one on electricity
networks, which is very important too.
Q131 Chairman: So that is at least one over-arching
statement and ﬁve subsidiary statement annexes?
Malcolm Wicks: Yes, but I do not want to say it will
never be six.
Q132 Chairman: No. The diYculty we have is that
we have got to make decisions very soon, while the
Planning Bill is going through, as to how Parliament
can best copewith these statements.We do not really
know what is involved. We do not know how long
they are going to be, howmuch detail they are going
to go into. For example, a particularly important
question for parliamentary scrutiny will be: will
there be site speciﬁcity in these statements? Will the
nuclear ones say, “The Government wishes to see X
nuclear power stations and they will be on these, X,
sites”, because that will have big implications?
Malcolm Wicks: That is our expectation.
Q133 Chairman:Because, in that case, it will become
more like the Crossrail Bill, a Private Bill
Committee. Rather than a scrupulous policy
statement, it becomes a much more detailed
scrutiny process?
Malcolm Wicks: Yes.
Q134 Chairman: You expect currently that the—
Malcolm Wicks: I do not know where I will be then,
but I will not have time to be on that committee.
Q135 Chairman: That is rather my concern,
Minister. I do not think the Government has quite
thought through how much scrutiny these
documents might need if they go into that level of
detail. You think it will not just say, “We believe in
new nuclear power stations to help the UK meet its
objectives”, it will actually say, “We think need a
new Sizewell C or a new Dungeness B”, or whatever
it is?
Malcolm Wicks: Yes. Obviously Parliament has to
scrutinise—
Q136 Chairman:These are not catch questions. I am
giving you all the information.
Malcolm Wicks: ---the national policy statements,
yes. It will be for the planning process, as hopefully
reformed by the Planning Bill, to decide on the
speciﬁc issues about speciﬁc sites.
Q137 Chairman: It does sound as if you are
eventually, after consultation initially, picking the
number of nuclear power stations you will actually
want built at some stage. If they are going to be site-
speciﬁc, you have got to have a national policy
statement which encompasses the sites.
Malcolm Wicks: We are not going to be in the
business of saying there should X nuclear power
stations.
Q138 Chairman: You just said you would in answer
to my question.
Malcolm Wicks: No, I said that to be helpful to
Parliament and the public, we would want to talk
about siting. We are not going to talk about how
many there would be on this site or that site.
Chairman: You are not. I am not quite sure where
that leaves me. We may need some further private
dialogue on this, because these are very important
issues for the conduct of energy policy and the way
Parliament scrutinises energy policy.
Q139Roger Berry:Part of the issue, of course, is that
the Government has said it is not its job to pick
winners and so it will set an environment in which
the energy companies will decide whether or not to
say, “We want to build a nuclear power station here,
or here, or here.” So, as I understand it, the
Government is not planning a strategy, the
Government does not actually have a strategy as
such for nuclear energy, it will have a benign climate,
it will have incentives, it will have an infrastructure
that you believewill encourage companies towant to
come forward and do it, and so in that sense you
leave it to the market to say how many nuclear
power stations there will be and where they want to
go. Is that my understanding? Is that not what this
is all about?
Malcolm Wicks: It is a combination of, yes, the
market, the companies coming forward with
proposals for nuclear power stations, but
government, through the diVerent agencies,
establishing criteria about what sites are
appropriate.
Ev 18 Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Committee: Evidence
31 January 2008 Malcolm Wicks, MP, and Dr Nick Palmer, MP
Q140 Roger Berry: That I understand.
Malcolm Wicks: And, by deﬁnition, what sites are
inappropriate.
Q141 Chairman: Indeed, some of the oV-shore wind
proposals, which are sometimes controversial in this
area. What you are saying is, “We will say this list of
sites appears to us to be suitable. It is up to the
industry to decide how many of those it wants to
take forward.” Is that the position?
Malcolm Wicks: Yes. The expectation is that this
statement will include agreed site and criteria and a
list of sites that meet the criteria.
Q142 Chairman: I think I probably falsely put words
into your mouth by the way I asked the question
earlier. You are not mandating a speciﬁc number of
sites or a speciﬁc number of power stations?
Malcolm Wicks: No. According to the criteria, site
X might be okay against the criteria; it does not
mean someone will come forward with a proposal. I
have been reminded, as they say on these occasions,
that there is a certain timescale of the process, but I
think it would be tedious if I, as it were, read out my
note. Would it be appropriate if I sent that to you?
Q143 Chairman: Yes. If you could send it to us
before we have our meeting with the Leader of the
House next week to discuss in more detail how this
matter is conducted.
Malcolm Wicks: Yes. On the parliamentary process,
obviously it will be for Parliament to determine, but
I think there has been a suggestion that the joint
expertise of four select committees might come to
bear on this matter and I also understand that John
Healey is seeking with the Leader of the House to
meet the Chairs of the committees to discuss this.
Q144 Chairman: We are actually seeking a meeting
with him and her, but we have got it now.
Malcolm Wicks: Whatever. There will be a meeting
of minds anyway, I hope, on 7 February.
Q145 Chairman: Indeed. We do not want to labour
this point, this is a rather tedious parliamentary
point, but we were rather concerned when the
Government announced as part of the Planning Bill
that therewould be a new joint committee of the four
select committees, which we think is a possible way
forward. I must say, we are strongly in support of
these national policy statements, they are a very
good idea, but some of us have reservations about
what happens after that when we instruct a planning
commission. They will help the nuclear sector, the
renewable sector, the National Grid and others
bring forward proposals in a much more eYcient
way, but we are anxious to make sure scrutiny is
done well and eVectively and uses our resources
eVectively and actually serves the Government’s
purpose, because we share the Government’s
objectives entirely. I think that is probably all we
need to discuss on that for the time being. Thank you
very much, Minister, for those answers, which are
genuinely helpful in helping you meet your
objectives.
Malcolm Wicks: Chairman, thank you very much.
Q146 Miss Kirkbride: Moving on to another issue.
Malcolm Wicks: I thought we had ﬁnished. No?
Q147 Chairman: We have got a few more yet.
Malcolm Wicks: Such eVusive thanks from the
Chairman!
Chairman: I was softening you up for the killer blow,
Minister!
Q148 Miss Kirkbride: The EU’s renewable energy
targets are clearly very demanding. I would like you
to have a few words on how you see it being possible
and if you could also speciﬁcally, in giving your
answer, say how much you expect of that renewable
energy target to come from electricity?
Malcolm Wicks: First and foremost, we are fully
signed up and in agreement with the objective for the
European Union to have 20% of all of its energy
from renewables by 2020, and the key words there
are “all of its energy”, because in the past many
countries, certainly the UK, have set targets for only
electricity. This is all energy across the piece,
including the stuV we put in our motor cars and fuel
industry with and so on. Let us recognise that that is
an extremely demanding target. We have now
received documentation from the European
Commissioner, Andris Piebalgs, where, as part of a
broader range of proposals about British
contribution on the Directive, he is suggesting that
the UK target should be 15%. We, alongside many
other Member States, are now negotiating about all
of that, and that is a perfectly proper process, but
whatever our target will end up being, it is going to
be huge. It is going to be, whatever, a seven-fold
increase, or something, on where we are now.Where
we are now is that, whilst 4 or 5% of our electricity
comes from renewables, I think slightly less than 2%
of our total energy comes from renewables, so you
can see, Miss Kirkbride, this is a hugely demanding
target for us. Did I miss one aspect of your question
there in my answer?
Q149 Miss Kirkbride: You raised quite a number of
things there. When we discuss this in the European
Commission what ﬁgure are we asking them to put
in instead of 15%?
Malcolm Wicks: I am sorry.
Q150Miss Kirkbride:You say we are discussing this
with the EuropeanCommission, so what ﬁgure is the
BritishGovernment plugging for if it is, presumably,
less than 15%?
Malcolm Wicks: We are discussing this. I do not
want to reveal our negotiating hand. One of the
thingswe have pointed out to theCommission is that
when you look at our share here, our share of the
costs (because costs are quite considerable in
Britain) will be really very high compared with other
Member States, and I think it is perfectly proper that
we feed that into the equation.
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Q151 Miss Kirkbride: So, whatever the ﬁgure is,
somewhere around the 15%mark, the assumption is
that we will have to getmost of that renewable target
out of electricity production rather than the wider
energy market?
Malcolm Wicks: Yes.
Q152 Miss Kirkbride: Do you have a ﬁgure for what
that might be?
Malcolm Wicks: Yes. I do not want to predict this,
it is not becoming a target before we have agreed the
other target, but some suggest that this could mean
a contribution of over 40% renewable energy.
Q153 Miss Kirkbride: Renewable electricity.
Malcolm Wicks: Sorry, what did I say?
Q154 Miss Kirkbride: You just said renewable
energy.
Malcolm Wicks: I stand subject to correction, but
this could mean say 30, 40%. I am suddenly
reminded I should be more general, 35 to 45% of our
electricity.
Q155 Miss Kirkbride: Is that the average?
Malcolm Wicks: It is encouraging. The lights are still
on and I can read my notes!
Q156 Chairman: This is a serious point.
Malcolm Wicks: It is a very serious point.
Q157 Chairman: Because it is a huge ﬁgure.
Malcolm Wicks:Obviously, this reﬂects the fact that
suddenly having more renewable fuel in our cars is
a more demanding objective in this time period than
seeing more electricity from renewables. It reﬂects
that. I will not be committed to that ﬁgure, but I
want to be helpful, as ever, and this could be the kind
of range, and it is a huge proportion, of course it is,
given that, as I said earlier, only 4 or 5% of our
electricity at the moment is from renewables. This is
a revolution.
Q158 Miss Kirkbride: It certainly is. On the subject
of being helpful, can you answer some of the
speculation there has been when Tony Blair went to
discuss these very demanding targets with the
European Commissioner, the EuropeanUnion, that
he had not quite twigged the diVerence between
renewable energy targets and electricity renewable
energy targets?
Malcolm Wicks: That is nonsense.
Q159Miss Kirkbride:He did not mind signing us up
to something that is going to be jolly tricky do.
Malcolm Wicks: He fully understood the diVerence
and, indeed, was a leading proponent that we should
be ambitious, given climate change, to set a
demanding renewable target for the European
Union. I really can assure you, I do not have to curry
favour, not that I ever would.
Q160 Miss Kirkbride: It is ﬁne to tell us the truth.
Malcolm Wicks: There is another guy now, I think,
at Number 10, but the reality of the matter is that
when I led the energy review for the Prime Minister,
Tony Blair, this man knows his energy, he really
does. He has expertise in this area. I think that
expertise includes knowing the diVerence between
just electricity and all energy, really.
Q161 Miss Kirkbride: Given other outside
electricity, what are you going to do to make that
step change diVerence?
Malcolm Wicks: Some of the things we have
announced already. The Secretary of State, John
Hutton, announced some weeks ago in terms of the
new licensing round what will be a very considerable
expansion of oV-shore wind turbines: because one of
our obvious renewable sources in this country, and
it varies from country to country depending of
geography, terrain, rivers, all that stuV, is wind, and
I thinkmuch of the expansion ofwind power is going
to be oV-shore and we are in the process of enabling
that to happen. That is one answer. I should say that
next year we overtake Denmark in being the leading
world nation in terms of oV-shore wind, the London
Array outside the Thames Estuary will be, I think,
the world’s largest oV-shore wind farm, but we do
not want to go just for wind. We have announced
recently at Port Talbot what, again, I think will be
the world’s largest biomass plant, and you know
about the feasibility study on Severn Barrage. All
these things are pretty ambitious, but will they take
us to X% by 2020? No, they will not on their own,
and, therefore, we have now got a review going on
andwe are going to publish a consultation document
in the coming months, I think, on the next stages on
renewables. We are not complacent. This is a
revolution—I say this as a gradualist—this is a
revolution in terms of renewables, and, therefore,
Chairman, through you, a huge opportunity for
British industry, following the Nick Stern analysis,
about the economic opportunities to get in the right
place in terms of these new cleaner, green energy
industries that we need to see in Britain.
Q162Miss Kirkbride:That is an optimistic scenario.
It could also be a huge cost to the British industry
when it is forced to go further and faster than is
realistically possible. Therefore, is it likely that the
Government is going to have to buy-out some of its
share because it is simply not going to be doable on
the present forecast?
Malcolm Wicks: The proposals as they stand at the
moment do involve some trading, I suppose is the
word, across European nations, if it is felt to be less
expensive to develop our share, and a small part of
that is in another European country all that is being
discussed but I certainly see for the great bulk of this
the British commitment being in Britain, and that is
important for reasons of energy security as well as
climate change. I think that more and more parts of
British industry now, instead of just seeing the costs,
which, I think, was where it was ﬁve years ago, are
now seeing the economic opportunities of moving
towards a low-carbon economy. We will see that in
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housing, we will see that in renewables, we will see it
in terms of carbon capture and storage and in many
other parts of life. If anything, it will sometimes be
the companies urging government on rather than the
other way round.
Q163 Miss Kirkbride: Are you happy to sell to the
electorate in the future the idea of being taxed by
Europe for our dirty energy?
Malcolm Wicks: I do not understand the reference
there.
Q164 Miss Kirkbride: At the end of the day,
whatever you want to call it, there is essentially a tax
if we do not meet these energy requirements. If it
ends up being 15 % and we do not meet it, the
buying-out amounts tomoney that the British public
will be giving to other countries in Europe because it
has not met those targets. Do you think that is going
to be terribly popular with the electorate?
Malcolm Wicks: I think the British public are
increasingly becoming concerned about global
warming and climate and, if anything, they will be
frustrated if we do not take radical action. I think
that is where the pressure comes from, and it is a
pressure I welcome, but we are not gung-ho about
this, we have to, obviously, be aware of prices and
competitiveness and develop renewable energy with
more than half a eye to the costs involved—of course
we do—which is why the issue about training is
something that may seem sensible.
Chairman: There is the possibility of a vote shortly,
we are informed. I think we have ten or 12 minutes
ideally of questioning to do. If colleagues ask their
questions quite snappily I think we might be able to
get through and not have to come back.
Q165 Roger Berry: Some cynics are suggesting that
the Government might redeﬁne renewables to
include nuclear. Can you dispel that myth?
Malcolm Wicks: No, nonsense, because it is not a
renewable. It has many of the features, but uranium
is not renewable, as I understand it.
Q166 Roger Berry: Thank you. We very much
welcome, in terms of reference, the feasibility study
into tidal power, nominating the Severn, whether it
is a barrage or two or three little barrages or tidal
lagoons, whatever. Do you think this can all happen
fast enough so that tidal power in the Severn will
contribute to the 15% renewable target by 2020? Can
things happen over 12 years and, if so, how much
will it contribute to that target?
Malcolm Wicks: I think we would be lucky for the
Severn Barrage to be up and running by 2020. First
of all, we do not know yet whether we are going to
build it, the environmental considerations are very
important in terms of feasibility, the unique eco-
system there.We have got to take that very seriously.
It is just possible that it could be up and running by
then and help us with the target, but one of the things
we are discussing with the Commission is urging
them to be sensible. If you have a unique
infrastructure project taking many years to build
and develop and it just slightly goes over the 2020,
we hope those looking at the arithmetic of targets
will be sensitive to that kind of factor. One of the
answers to your question—no, it is not really. I was
going to say you know it. It could be 4 or 5% of our
electricity. Your question was more about—
Q167 Roger Berry:That is probably about 2% of the
target. Again, as indeed the Secretary of State did in
theHouse, you have focused on the barrage as if that
is the only—
Malcolm Wicks: Well, it could be tidal lagoons.
Q168 Roger Berry: That is right. The issue here, of
course, is that the percentage tidal power is so great
that if we are serious about any tidal power in the
UK something will have to be done in the Severn. It
may not be the Severn Barrage, in which case it may
it not have the environmental impacts that you have
referred to.
Malcolm Wicks: No.
Q169 Roger Berry: That it what feasibility study is
all about?
Malcolm Wicks: As I understand it, the barrage
would probably be the big gain in terms of electricity
and CO2.
Q170 Mr Weir: The Committee has sometimes been
calling for action on space heating, which is
responsible for almost half of carbon emissions.
Given that we are talking about a renewable energy
target, is it your intention to bring forward
proposals, such as a Renewable Heat Obligation, to
address issues of space heating?
Malcolm Wicks: Heating is absolutely crucial to this
and it is sometimes the kind of Cinderella. Cinders is
going to come to the ball, as it were, in terms of
climate change and energy. Heat, I think, is some
47% of CO2 emissions, from memory, not just the
heat to keep us warm in our homes and our oYces
but also the heat used for industrial processes of
diVerent kinds, and so it is a very considerable part
of the situation. The relatively new OYce of Climate
Change, which has been established as a new unit
across government, has done importantwork on this
and only today we have published details of a
consultation thatwewant to launch on this.We have
got to take it very, very seriously, and, as I indicated
earlier, I recently visited a combined heat and power
plant on the Isle of Dogs, I have been to Denmark
and looked at it as well, I am very committed to
looking at this very carefully because it is part of the
equation which, frankly, has not been there in the
recent past and it should be.
Q171 Mr Weir: But no speciﬁc Renewable Heat
Obligation in the mean time.
Malcolm Wicks: I do not think in the mean time---.
I do not think that is where we are at the moment,
but clearly we need to think how we would bring
this forward.
Q172 Chairman: Because it was ten pages in the
White Paper last year out of 300, so I am encouraged
by your newfound enthusiasm, Minister.
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Malcolm Wicks: But all the other ten pages were
vital too.
Chairman:The other 290 pages were very important,
yes. Brieﬂy, carbon capture and storage.
Q173MrClapham: If we are going to impact onCO2
over the next 50 years, we have got to have
technology that we can transfer and carbon capture
and storage is one of those technologies. For
obvious reasons, such as proliferation, we are not
going to be able to transfer nuclear. When are we
likely to see a fully operational demonstration plan?
Malcolm Wicks: I am proud of the fact that the UK
Government is going to fund and facilitate a
demonstration project. The competition has now
been launched and it is up to diVerent companies to
come forward with proposals around a coal power
station to have a post-combustion technology. I
think it is diYcult to predict the timescale on that,
but I am proud of the fact that we are a leading
nation on that with huge potential to help climate
change, not only in the UK but also in China.
Chairman: Minister, there are a few more things we
want to ask you, there is not really time and it is not
worth coming back after the division to ask those
questions. We will break oV there, consider what
you have said and decide how to take forward the
matters we have been debating today. Thank you
very much indeed.
Q174 Mr Hoyle: Can we have your draft as well?
Malcolm Wicks: I will send you another draft, yes,
but I will check the headline on it ﬁrst!
Chairman: Meeting closed.
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Q175 Chairman: Thank you very much indeed.
Welcome to this ﬁrst public evidence session of the
Committee’s inquiry into energy prices. I meant to
bring with me the folder of evidence we have
received from organisations to this inquiry. I think
I can say we have never had such a large volume of
submissions from the outside world. Your own
submission was a particularly signiﬁcant
contribution to our inquiry. I think I have coped
with most of it. The public have access to the ﬁrst
volume of your ﬁve volumes of evidence to us, the
technical submissions, but thank you very much
indeed for that very detailed work. Can I also
expressmy gratitude to you for coming on your own.
It always helps the Committee when witnesses are
single-handed and shows great conﬁdence. It also
means we can get through the questions much more
eYciently, so thank you very much indeed for that.
Can I begin by asking you to introduce yourself for
the record and, although this Committee knows, to
explain the remit of energywatch and who
constitutes the organisation.
Mr Asher: Thank you. I am Allan Asher, Chief
Executive of energywatch. energywatch is the
statutory consumer watchdog for energy. We have
three very simple tasks: to try and promote eYcient
energy markets, responsible energy markets and
sustainable energy markets. Sadly, we have not
succeeded in any of those three goals yet. For this
inquiry we have closely interviewed 50 industry
experts, that is, traders and large buyers and sellers,
but, most importantly, we have drawn on our
records. We have helped ﬁve million consumers
since 2002 and we genuinely believe we know what
circumstances consumers face, how the market
works and, sadly, how it does not work.
Q176 Chairman: When you say consumers, are you
meaning just retail consumers in the home
environment or small businesses as well?
Mr Asher: energywatch’s remit is for all consumers.
Most of our work is, of course, with domestic
consumers and we have a particular programme for
the fuel-poor. However, we ﬁnd that micro-business
and small business are also in a very bad way. They
do not have access to any of the protections that
domestic consumers have, and yet they do not have
the buying power or the ability to negotiate good
deals like big business, so often they are even
worse oV.
Chairman: Thank you. That is helpful. There is one
issue that Mr Oaten would just like to explore about
your remit.
Q177 Mr Oaten: There seems to be a little bit of a
gap in the regulation and support for consumers.
Many of us around this table represent large rural
constituencies where constituents are dependent on
fuel oil, where they are dependent on liquid
petroleum gas, or Calor gas, and in some cases LPG
prices have gone up by 82% over a two-year period.
What role do you have in that area and, if you do
not, do you think that somebody should be stepping
in to regulate this particular sector?
Mr Asher: Yes, I agree there is a gap. The way that
the law was written, our jurisdiction is where there is
gas conveyed by pipes or power conveyed by wires.
So for people oV the gas network—and, sadly, there
are several million of those and they really face a
tough time, especially in rural areas or in the north
of Scotland and things like that—we help where we
can. We were active witnesses at the Competition
Commission inquiry into LPG. Also, we think that,
for sustainability reasons, we have just got to ﬁnd
ways of being able to support those combined heat
and power installations and all those non-grid
applications. For us though it is a bit irrelevant as we
are to cease existing at the end of September.We can
only hope that the National Consumer Council,
which will take over, has a wider remit.
Q178 Mr Oaten: So you would welcome bringing
these into the family, if you like?
Mr Asher: Certainly. There are consumers with
problems with heat and warmth, and that is really
what we should be about.
Q179 Chairman: That would require statutory
change to eVect that for the National Consumer
Council.
Mr Asher: I do not think so, in that, as an advocacy
organisation, they have a remit at large. I do not
think it requires that. It just requires enough
resources so that they can do it.
Q180MrWeir:Can I just follow that up?Obviously,
like Mark, I have a similar problem. If it is coming
under the National Consumer Council, has any
thought been given to including that within the
energy remit of the National Consumer Council to
make sure it just does not disappear and fall between
two stools?
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Mr Asher: We have been invited by the Chief
Executive, Ed Mayo, to put forward to him ideas
about a forward work programme and, as part
especially of our responsible markets work, we have
been very active in some of these areas. Indeed, with
the Rural Advocate, we have a very close working
relationship and we have been major information
providers. I cannot say what is going to be in their
work programme.What I can say is that Parliament
just three weeks ago stated that the new NCC needs
to come up with a work programme over the next 12
weeks or so for public consultation and that that will
be the work programme they need to work on from
1 October this year to 31 March 2010. So I think
there is ample opportunity to inject those ideas, and
we certainly will.
Chairman: We certainly welcome your enthusiasm
to encourage the Council to take this on board,
though it is a shame that both you and Postwatch are
being abolished at probably the most sensitive
moments for the industries you oversee. It is going
to be quite a burden for the new Council to eVect the
transition.
Q181 Mr Wright: Just very quickly on a similar
point, as has been said, many of us have rural
constituencies, which is a major concern in terms of
energy supplies. Would you suggest, for instance,
that because the energy by pipe or wire has been
controlled by yourselves since 2000, when you were
set up, companies have taken advantage of the fact
that there is no regulation of liqueﬁed gas?
Mr Asher: Undoubtedly competition problems have
been even worse in oV-gas and oV-power networks
and the CompetitionCommission spelt this out in its
LPG report. One of their draft recommendations
was that our remit be expanded to deal with that but
at the time I think the Government did not want to
pursue that. Of course, because so many people in
rural areas usually only have access to a single source
of energy, it is usually going to be power, and so the
prices are always considerably higher. Even inWales
and Scotland power prices are considerably higher
than in the rest of GB.
Q182 Mr Wright: Would you consider, for instance,
that had it been regulated, the prices would have
been much lower?
Mr Asher: In bits. For example, with LPG, what was
happening was that the few competitors would not
allow one another to use the same cylinders and
things like that, and that hugely increased the cost,
suppressed competition and, of course, consumers
paid the price. That sort of thing happens all the
time, sadly, even in what should be a competitive
sector of the market.
Q183 Chairman: Thank you very much indeed. Can
wemove on to some of the issues thatwewant to talk
to you about, starting with retail market
concentration. This is a diYcult inquiry for
politicians because we get into very technical
economic areas quite quickly. Both Roger Berry and
I studied economics at university but we are not
actually with the Herﬁndahl Hirschman Index or
how it is composed. We will take it at face value. I
notice that a highly concentrated market is 1,800 on
the HHI score. Ofgem say that the index has fallen
since 2002 from 4,300 to around 2,830, so despite the
fact that 14 suppliers are out of the market, it is
becoming more competitive, though it is still highly
concentrated. Can you explain this conundrum to
me?
Mr Asher: It is very easy to do if you change the
deﬁnition of themarket. Put in its most simple form,
the HHI is just an indicator of when markets reach
a certain level of concentration. It is based on the
square of market share and a few other technical
details but it is used widely around the world by
competition authorities to give themselves the idea
of where to look more closely. It is not conclusive of
anything but it is a sort of smoke signal. All of our
markets—and we can give you very detailed
information about this—are well over the 1,800
level, regardless of whether it has fallen or increased,
but the point that we make is that Ofgem regard GB
as having aGB-wide market whereas our evidence is
that in any particular area, say, in the north of
Scotland, 89% of consumers are going to just deal
with one or two competitors, and around the whole
of GB that is the pattern. It is the old RECs, the old
electricity franchises, which form the backbone of
markets, and typically a supplier will be able to
charge a lot more in their old monopoly area and
then they will do a bit of discounting in one or two
other markets just to keep their toe in, but the
markets are quite anti-competitive and under any
standard competition test people would say there is
alarm. I will happily submit to you the full tables
that we have calculated by area. I think for MPs in
this room, we have looked at most of your
electorates and most of them, or in fact every one of
them, should raise competition concerns.
Q184 Chairman: Am I right in saying that in the gas
market British Gas is the incumbent across the
country, whereas in the electricity markets it is the
regional electricity companies?
Mr Asher: Yes, British Gas of course had 100% a
decade ago and it is down to about half that now, but
in power it is more widely distributed.Market shares
actually do not change all that much from year to
year. There is a lot of pretence of competition and
huge amounts of churn but it does not amount to
really good companies winning and really bad
companies losing and, again, we have sad and
detailed data that show the bad do prosper and the
good fail.
Q185 Chairman: So the reason for the stickiness of
the consumer in the retail market on electricity is
presumably not because they are loyal to a name of
their supplier, because most of us do not know who
supplies us now as the names change so often. The
old names we are familiar with have all gone. It is
just incumbency fact. You do not have anything to
do. You just stay with the supplier.
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Mr Asher: There are a range of factors. One is
incumbency and, particularly amongst prepayment
meter customers, it is very hard. There are huge anti-
competitive obstacles to them switching. Often you
will not be able to switch on the websites, access to
a bank account, access to the internet, lower levels of
information, being in debt, and the companies
actively ensuring that those people do not switch,
mean that of the 5.9 million PPM consumers, one
million are really closed out of themarket. There are
another 268,000 with dynamic telemetering, a form
of technology used in Scotland and elsewhere; only
one supplier in each region operates to those. So
sadly, we have 20 suppliers 10 years ago shrunk to
just six in a comfortable oligopoly who really do not
feel the need to innovate or compete and, sadly,
consumers are the losers.
Q186 Roger Berry: In a comfortable oligopoly there
is usually a leader or two and the rest are followers
in terms of price setting. Have you been able to
identify in particular markets who the leaders are in
terms of price setting and who the followers are?
Mr Asher: Quite clearly, in our market the ﬁrst
mover is typically British Gas, with a huge market
share and lots of signalling. Already we have seen
that at their last annual meeting, where they scratch
their chins and say, “Oh, it looks like prices will have
to go up again in the Spring,” and then others will
respond in similar ways, and sadly, lo and behold,
that will come about. There is a myth that there is
vigorous price competition between them. If I were
to tell you that for the main product, the one that
they most actively sell, which is direct debit for dual
fuel, selling both gas and electricity using direct
debit, the price diVerence between the cheapest and
the most expensive right now is about £16 a year; it
is just a few pence a week.
Q187 Roger Berry: So there is no evidence of
collusion in the unlawful sense.
Mr Asher: Yes.
Q188 Chairman: That is a very important point.
There is no evidence of collusion in the lawful sense.
Mr Asher: I think that in oligopoly markets you do
not need to meet in smoke-ﬁlled rooms because it is
called “conscious parallelism” or “combined eVects”
or “tacit collusion”. There are all sorts of economic
terms for it but the manifestation that we see is that
consumers get it in the neck.
Q189 Roger Berry: That was going to be my second
point, that if you have an oligopoly with a market
leader and followers situation, you actually do not
need to meet in smoke-ﬁlled rooms.
Mr Asher:That is right. Can I just give you onemore
illustration? People will constantly say “Ah, yes, but
what about that well-known maverick, Scottish and
Southern, who do not behave in that way?” They
have a marvellous marketing department, but if I
were to tell you that the diVerence between them and
the next company is at the moment something like
£3, that will tell you that what they did was delay
their price rise for 90 days, and they have been able
to trade all year on that, but their prices are also in
that very tight batch for direct debit dual fuel.
Q190Chairman: Is it not possible that this is a sign of
a highly competitive market operating in a very low
margin environment? Tesco’s and Sainsbury’s are
pretty competitive organisations.
Mr Asher: Yes, that is right, and the economists will
say that perfect competition and price ﬁxing can
look just the same.However, in this sector, when one
looks at company proﬁts and actual high levels of
ineYciency—and it is not necessarily huge proﬁt. It
is a mistake to think that oligopolies always make
huge proﬁts. Often they have just bloated cost
structures and they are ineYcient and, sadly, that is
what we have: tens of thousands of people to ﬁx up
the errors they make in their billing systems; one in
three bills that they send out are wrong. These anti-
competitive dimensions just go right through this
market and it is highly ineVective and consumers are
losing out. It should be manifested in keen pricing,
but I have a number of charts here that, if we get a
chance, I will show you that show that far from all
the information you get from public oYcials here
about how low our prices are, prices inGreat Britain
are systematically rising much more quickly than in
Europe, and that our electricity prices are the fourth
highest in Europe and, according to a recent
European Commission survey, our gas prices are the
10th highest.
Chairman: The European market is something that
will concern this Committee greatly, of course,
during the course of this inquiry because of the
problems of liquidity there.
Q191 Mr Weir: I was just interested in what you
were saying about going down to the big six.
Obviously, there have been a lot of rumours in the
business market recently about perhaps some of the
Continental companies concentrating in takeovers
could lead to a reduction from six to perhaps ﬁve in
the UK. Would you consider that to be very bad for
competition in the UK, this further concentration in
the market?
Mr Asher: The only relevant test for that is if after
themerger a company can give less and chargemore,
it is bad, and on that test I think quite clearly that is
the case. Even Centrica expressed huge alarm at the
prospect of British Energy being snaZed by EDF.
That would mean that at the moment at the
generation level, where the independents have just
about 45% of the market, that would fall to 25%. So
the six vertically integrated suppliers would control
three-quarters of that market. Sadly, the only logical
consequence of that is worse service and higher
prices.
Q192 Mr Weir: But if we are in an oligopoly of six,
possibly going down, what measures should be
taken to introduce more competition into the
market?
Mr Asher: I think the very ﬁrst thing is to stop it
getting worse, and then to ﬁnd ways of promoting
new entry. It is not just that there are only six. It is,
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unfortunately, that our policy makers have allowed
us to go from six retailers and a competing upstream
market to vertically integrated, so that the six
suppliers acquired more than half the generation, so
that they now self-supply and all of that trade has
gone from the wholesale market. We need to ﬁnd
ways of forcing open contestability in both
wholesale and retail markets. It is about removing
barriers to entry, the credit rules, and all sorts of
things that have seen 20 suppliers and 20 generators
crushed out of this market since 2000.
Q193 Chairman: We will look at the wholesale gas
market separately later during the questioning. The
Committee intend to explore some of that in a little
more detail because it is an important point. Can I
just ask two last questions, small points but I think
quite important ones, before we move on to my
colleagues. First of all, do you accept that world
energy prices are rising and consumers would have
to see price increases in this market irrespective of
the level of competition that exists in the market
here?
Mr Asher: Of course.
Q194 Chairman: And signiﬁcant increases?
Mr Asher: Energy is a complex mix and oil prices
clearly are sky-rocketing but I would draw the
distinction between some of those commodities
which are in a globally traded market and the
natural gas that we consume, 75% of which is still
coming from territory under our legislative and
regulatory control, more of it from Norway but
some from the Netherlands, and so the bits that are
hotly traded in China do not include the gas that
we burn.
Q195 Chairman: Before we move on to the question
of retail prices speciﬁcally, can I just ask you a
question about prepayment meters and standard
credit? The possession of a prepayment meter does
not indicate poverty necessarily, does it? People on
standard credit terms can be just as poor as PPM
customers.
Mr Asher: That is right. About a third of the 5.8
million prepayment meter customers you would
describe as being poor, not necessarily the fuel-poor
deﬁnition of more than ten% of income but, sadly, if
you are looking for the people at the bottom of the
pile, you are more likely to ﬁnd them amongst
prepaymentmeter customers. They are the ones who
are going to have debts, they are the ones who
cannot switch, and they are the ones who have to pay
these punitively higher prices.
Q196 Chairman: But two thirds of those people with
PPMs are not in fuel poverty?
Mr Asher: They are not in fuel poverty.
Q197 Chairman: Do you have an estimate of the
number of people on standard credit terms as
opposed to direct debit who would be in fuel
poverty?
Mr Asher: I guess the other two thirds spread across
various…
Q198 Chairman: Predominantly the standard credit
group—is that right?
Mr Asher: That is right, but there is still a huge
number who just have ordinary credit accounts
where you are billed. That is where most are.
Q199 Chairman: Those people could be very hard
up indeed.
Mr Asher: Indeed. Millions are, sadly.
Chairman: I think there is a slight laziness in the
debate sometimes that prepayment meters becomes
a surrogate for fuel poverty and that is not
acceptable; it is wrong.
Q200 Mr Weir: You have mentioned already the
diVerence in the spread of prices between those on
direct debit and those on prepayment meters. Can
you tell us why in your view there is such a narrow
spread in one and a larger spread in the other?
Mr Asher: The actual spread in prices is about the
business models and for direct debit there is huge
transparency, these things are seen on the internet
and there are lots of very eYcient services nowwhich
help people switch between them, and that means
that their business model keeps that tight. Not so for
prepayment meters, where that is far less visible and
typically people are going to be in debt. If you are in
debt, you are prohibited from switching if you owe
more than £100, and even if you owe less than that
you cannot switch. Often you are not going to have
access to the internet so you cannot get those good
tariVs. The better question is to ask why it is that
prepayment meter customers are paying £200, £300
up to £400 a year more for the identical commodity
that those on direct debits have. There is no
justiﬁcation for that gap. There is, of course, a
slightly higher cost of service and Ofgem calculate
that as £85 per annum but the diVerence is a
minimum of £201 up to £361.
Q201 Mr Weir: That does not answer the question
as to why there is such a huge diVerence. I think it is
£107 as opposed to £26, basically four times that.
Are some companies taking a more reasonable
attitude with prepayment meters? What is the
reason?
Mr Asher: I fear I would put it in a diVerent way. I
would say some are not being as exploitative as
others, and I mean that, because a diVerence existed
up until recently where Npower was charging £452 a
year more for its prepayment meter customers over
those with their online tariV. I think it is close to
immoral. Many others have compressed those rates
and I am really pleased to say a couple of companies
have now normalised their prepayment and
standard credit rates and I thinkwith Scottish Power
you can get a prepayment meter for power slightly
less than the others. So practices do diVer. Some are
good in that respect but none will give you for both
gas and electricity prices equivalent certainly to their
online nor even to their direct debits.
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Q202 Mr Weir: In your submission to Members for
the Energy Bill Report Stage you did a piece on
smart meters, and you indicated in that that
payment meters were being installed, I think, from
memory, at a rate of 100,000 every month.
Mr Asher: Yes, that is right.
Q203 Mr Weir: So it would appear to be a problem
that is increasing and likely to increase. Do you
think smart meters is a way to tackle this problem,
and in what way will it tackle it given the nature of
a prepayment meter tends to be to key in the money.
Mr Asher: The best evidence I can give you is that in
Northern Ireland four or ﬁve years ago the regulator
there encouraged the suppliers to get rid of the old
prepayment meters and put in what you would call
semi-smart meters, keypad meters, and that so
drastically cut the cost of service that typically in
Northern Ireland prepayment meter customers pay
less than standard credit rates, not more. A roll-out
of smart metering would certainly have that beneﬁt
across GB. Of course, it will take some years for that
to happen and that is why we argue that when the
roll-out does occur, there should be a priority for a
prepayment meter consumers. That will make the
market work better, it will cut the huge number of
billing errors—as I said, one in three bills are wrong
because they are based on estimated readings—and
actually, it will help consumers knowhowmuch they
are consuming, andmoderate their consumption for
carbon saving purposes.
Q204 Mr Weir: You mentioned that according to
Ofgem a true price or a diVerence of £85. Do you
think that is reasonable?
Mr Asher: No, I do not, because I cannot not see
why the companies should treat themselves as being
entitled to that premium when there is available
technologywhich actuallymakes it cheaper for them
to serve than for ordinary credit accounts.
Remember, people are paying in advance. There is
no credit risk, there is no collection risk, and they
should reﬂect that in their pricing. Instead there is
this immoral premium. Indeed, I do not think we
should call them prepayment meters; we should call
them “the poor pay more meters”.
Q205 Mr Weir: It seems to me the only example
where you are charged more for paying cash in
advance.
Mr Asher: Indeed.
Q206 Mr Weir: Going back to direct debit, there
seems to be a very narrow band. We have all seen
that when prices go up, one company takes the lead
and the rest duly trot along behind fairly shortly, yet
everybody says there is no collusion in themarket. It
is very diYcult to collate the two because, clearly, if
there is a very narrow band and everybody puts up
their prices one after the other, it does seem that
there may not be collusion but at least they are all
acting together.
Mr Asher: The economists have done a lot of work
on this and there is a theory called co-ordinated
eVects, and the Competition Commission itself in its
store card study—and several others have looked at
this—and they say if you have a market where
people can readily see the price, you can block out
competitors so there is no new entry and it is very
hard for consumers to negotiate.
Q207 Chairman: Mr Binley wants to explore this in
detail later.
Mr Asher: However, there is well-developed
literature on this point.
Q208 Mr Binley: In order for me to understand
where you are coming from, can I ask if you have
ever been in the private sector and can I ask,
secondly, whether you understand that there is a
diVerence between theory and the actual practice
and culture of running a business? Can I hear a little
about your thoughts on that?
Mr Asher: Certainly you may. In fact, for 13 years I
was Australia’s gas and electricity regulator, so I
have had quite extensive experience in the regulation
of these markets.
Q209 Mr Binley: I did not ask that question. That is
not the question I asked.
Mr Asher: I worked for an international
telecommunications company.
Q210 Mr Binley: How long for and which one?
Mr Asher: I worked there for three years. It was an
international telecoms company. I worked for
chartered accountants, where I was an auditor for
ﬁve years, and I worked for an international credit
analyst, Dun and Bradstreet, for three years.
Q211 Mr Binley: So you feel you truly do
understand the diVerence between theory and the
actual working culture of business? Because I am
hearing an awful lot of theory and I am hearing little
understanding of the working culture of a business,
and I want to clarify that.
Mr Asher: I think you are perfectly entitled to do
that. I thought I said at the beginning we based our
evidence on the experience that we obtained from 50
of the most senior business practitioners, real people
doing real business, and drawing from our direct
experience of 5 million consumers. In our
submissionwe have dealt only in fact.We have given
you price movements, we have given you
concentration ratios, we have given you entry and
exit issues, we have given you lots of examples, and
I have to say that we are not in the business of
theorising. Our problem is the real damage being
caused to real people by our broken markets.
Q212 Mr Binley: Let me move on then and talk
about your view that transfer of prices can be used
to block out competition. You do understand that
there is not a business in the land that is not totally
aware of all of its competitors’ price structures. Do
you understand that that is a vital part of ensuring
you know themarketplace you are competing in?Do
you understand that?
Mr Asher: If I were in business, of course I would
seek to do very close competitor analysis.
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Q213Mr Binley: That is not what I asked you. I said
do you understand on this particular matter of
prices, that that is vital to the competitive nature of
a business?
Mr Asher: If you are talking about prices, that is one
thing, but costs are quite a diVerent thing and the
diVerent costs of capital, the diVerent supply costs
and all of that in this industry are endemic. Let me
suggest to you that the long-term costs of gas
purchase are totally opaque as between all of the
suppliers. Seventy per cent of the gas is currently
traded outside open markets and nobody knows
from one company to the next about the contractual
terms, the volumes, discounts, or all of those things,
and all of that again adds up to a conspiracy against
an eVective forward market. In most markets of this
sort, commodity markets, you would have liquid
forward markets with lots of volume traded, and
buyers and sellers would be contending for
customers. Not so in our power market or gas
market, where liquiditymore than sixmonths out on
power you just will not see a single transaction. That
is an indictment of the market.
Q214 Mr Binley: How do you free up the market?
Mr Asher: Most importantly, we need to force some
of the gas sales and power sales from the vertically
integrated bodies back into that forwardmarket.We
need to get rid of some of the insurance rules, the
costs of business, we need to ensure that the rules are
not stacked against new entrants and others, and
customers to be given back some buying power; they
have lost it in these markets.
Q215 Mr Binley: So what you are telling me is that
you have failed as a regulator.
Mr Asher: I am telling youwe are not regulators.We
are a consumer group.
Q216 Mr Binley: I understand that but the regulator
has failed. You feed a lot into the regulators, as you
know. The regulator has failed. That is what you
are saying.
Mr Asher: I think the regulator is failing, although
Alistair Buchanan just last week expressed alarm at
this price behaviour, and he said that he thinks it is
time that there was a reference to the Competition
Commission if structural problems can be found and
if consumers are suVering. We think we can
demonstrate both of those, and I think the best role
for the regulator is to refer this sector to the
Competition Commission for a thorough review.
Chairman:We are beginning to tread on all the other
areas of questioning. Understandably, that
addresses Mr Binley’s question. I am ruling more
questions like that out of order. That is for a little
later in the agenda.
Mr Binley: I am totally happy with the answer,
thank you, Mr Chairman.
Q217 Mr Wright: In regard to retail switching, you
have certainly tried to persuade people to switch
between companies to make signiﬁcant savings. In
2006 you had your campaign “Are You Missing
Out?” but really you did not hit the majority of the
market, did you? Although there were signiﬁcant
savings, some up to £600 a year in savings, yet you
only persuaded 50% of people to transfer. Why do
you think that is? Why do you think people did not
switch but stayed with their company?
Mr Asher: I think there are a couple of reasons, but
ﬁrstly I can say that we actually actively encourage
people to switch. It is a good thing to do. If people
especially have not switched, there are big savings
possible. We suggest that they switch payment
method to direct debit where they can, dual fuel
where they can, for savings from prepayment to
those methods. We also encourage people to do all
sorts of money-saving and energy-saving things, but
research, not just in GB but around the liberalised
world, shows that typically only about half of
consumers are going to be active in these markets.
That is true across credit cards and mortgages. Car
insurance is a bit diVerent. There is this large group,
around 50% in GB, who have not and are not likely
to switch.We have concentrated our eVorts in recent
years on those for whom the burden is worse, the
fuel-poor, those on prepaymentmeters, and we have
actually had teams helping people through the
switching process. Two things: if for direct debits the
diVerence in price is about £30 a year, that is hardly
worth the eVort, and sadly, for a group of people
that we helped switch prepayment meters, many of
them actually turned out before long to be worse oV
because the company they had switched to increased
prices by even more. So sadly, in a market that is
structurally uncompetitive, switching becomes just
meaningless churn.
Q218 Mr Wright: You mentioned earlier one
company that had attracted a lot of customers and
then within 90 days increased the price. Is that not a
problem with switching? Is that why people, you
would suggest, would not switch companies? The
other side of the coin is, is it more diYcult to switch
companies if you are on a prepayment meter?
Mr Asher: Yes. It is almost impossible to switch if
you are on a prepayment meter. You have a look on
the website and you will see a number of very active
companies—uSwitch and many others—who will
happily help you to switch but not if you are a
prepaymentmeter customer. The companies seem to
be discouraging that hugely. I have written to each
Chief Executive demanding to know why they are
not allowing prepayment customers to switch so
readily, and there is no good explanation, except
that they are being a market targeted and that the
companies make an extra £0.3 billion a year by
charging them that premium. Sadly, it is an area
where all of the regulators and groups like us have
not succeeded in changing that. The debt blocking
needs to go. At the moment, if you owe money to a
company, they are able to prevent you from
switching to another, or the ones with this
technology trap, the dynamic telemeter; if you have
that, you simply cannot switch. In rural areas, where
you only have a choice of one energy source, it is
even worse.
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Q219 Mr Wright: So rural communities fare worse.
Mr Asher: They certainly do. We have recently done
work in rural Wales and the north of Scotland and
the prices are bad and the service is worse.
Q220 Mr Wright: In theory, I suppose if we could
persuade every single consumer, where possible, to
switch to the cheapest supplier, that would drive
down the market price.
Mr Asher: In theory it would not, because what
would happen is the prices would then be
redistributed as the companies gained their revenue
across a wider base but, nonetheless, a certain
amount of switching will discipline prices, and we
wishwe could say that it would improve their quality
but Npower, which is by far the worst supplier in
terms of customer service in the last year or so, has
seen its market share go up and E.On, which has
been the best improving company in terms of its
conditions, has seen its market share go down.
Q221 Mr Wright: Why would that be? Is it just
marketing strategy?
Mr Asher: It is advertising campaigns, local
strategies and things like that but, by the way, these
market shares move by just tenths of a percent.
There is no major change in power markets. There
has been in gas, of course, because over ten years
British Gas have lost 50% of its market.
Q222 Mr Wright: What would be the maximum
saving from the worst to the best in the current
market?
Mr Asher: For direct debit dual fuel, it is a matter of
£16 a year. With prepayment meters it goes up to
£150 or so. However, there can be quite substantial
savings if you are able to switch from a bad
prepayment deal to a very good direct debit one,
especially if it was an on-line one. Hundreds of
pounds a year could be saved in that way.
Q223 Mr Weir: You mentioned, very interestingly,
that many of those who switched then found
themselves in a worse position because of rising
prices. Is that not inevitable when the companies
stage their price rises one after another? Putting it
bluntly, do you think there is a deliberate strategy by
the companies to undermine switching?
Mr Asher: Actually, there are two elements there.
One is the business model that leads them to act
more or less in parallel but there is another
phenomenon as well. Most people actually do not
wake up and say, “I knowwhat. I’m going to go and
switch my energy.”Most people switch because they
see an attractive ad on television, get a phone call, or
somebody knocks on their door, and sadly, the
evidence there from the University of East Anglia is
that around a third of people who do switch actually
switch to a company which charges them more,
because you do not know. When somebody is at the
door and promises you a saving, there is no way that
you can actually tell whether or not you will have
saved. The evidence is that many consumers are
worse oV, not better oV.
Q224MrWeir:Does that notmake amockery of the
whole idea of switching?
Mr Asher: It makes a mockery of those who say we
have got a vigorously competitive and healthy
market. We do not.
Q225 Chairman: People could switch for reasons
other than price. There might be service
considerations, environmental, green tariVs, they
might be fed up with the supplier for some reason.
There are other reasons for switching apart from
price.
Mr Asher: That is certainly true. If this were an
inquiry about green tariVs, I would have to tell you
that there is a huge amount of fraud there too.
Q226 Mr Oaten: That is a great comfort because I
switched to a green energy supplier last week! I am
really confused on switching, because when we
talked to Ofgem they said it is fantastic, it is the way
forward, and £70 a year was the average saving that
could be made. You described it this morning as
“meaningless churn” and I am really confused.
Could you give me an estimate as to what you think
the annual saving is? Do you agree with the Ofgem
£70 ﬁgure or are you actually saying that they are
over-estimating the value of switching?
Mr Asher: We were talking earlier about theory and
practice. It is one thing for somebody to look at price
levels and say if theoretically somebody went from
that tariV to that tariV, they could save that amount
of money, but what I am saying is that often that is
just not what happens because there are all sorts of
barriers, serial price rises and things like that. Many
people do switch and save money, especially if they
are going from a credit account to a dual fuel direct
debit one. A third of customers still buy gas and
electricity from diVerent companies, and in bringing
those together there are of course some savings. It
would bewrong forme to be saying switching is bad.
It is a useful thing. All I am saying is that nobody
should see that as an indicator of a perfect market.
It is really a marginal thing as between groups in
this way.
Q227 Mr Oaten: Is it possible to have a note on why
eco-switching is possibly a bad thing? I cannot let
that comment go un-noted.
Mr Asher: I will see you separately.
Q228 Roger Berry: How often do you consider
switching?
Mr Asher: I have switched four times now. Two of
them have gone without error and the other two
were, like many consumers face, a source of
frustration and delay. I have not switched
necessarily for the purposes of saving money but so
that I could get a diVerent experience of the diVerent
suppliers and because I am a practical person.
Q229 Roger Berry: Four times over what period of
time?
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Mr Asher: Over four years, so once a year I switch.
Q230 Roger Berry:Would your advice to consumers
be to consider switching once a year?
Mr Asher: If you have already switched, the evidence
is that you are not likely to beneﬁt by more than a
few pounds a year. The ﬁrst switch can be very
valuable, because you are going from being trapped
with the incumbent supplier, and possibly with an
in-area supplier of the other fuel, and on that ﬁrst
switch £70, £80 or even £100 can be saved, but we are
down to that rump of 50% of people who are not
likely to switch. There are abundant surveys in GB
and elsewhere about that.
Q231 Roger Berry: So your advice is do it once.
Mr Asher: Yes.
Q232 Mr Wright: Finally, you mentioned the
question of somebody standing at the door selling
you energy. Do you think that Ofgem are doing
enough to tackle that particular problem? Surely,
when you have a salesperson at the door, or even at
the end of the phone, and they are giving you this
message that they can save you money on your
energy costs, it is very diYcult to go against that, but
when you get the bill, you ﬁnd out it is not as good
as you anticipated. Surely there are other ways of
doing it. Do you think that Ofgem are doing enough
to tackle that issue?
Mr Asher: I think a lot more could and should be
done. It is not much more than a year ago that there
were proposals to remove all of these licence
conditions entirely. We have been delighted to say
that Ofgem have recently announced a probe into
the marketing behaviour of Npower, who have been
engaged in the most disreputable tactics, pretending
not to be salespeople. Their pricing practices and
their behaviour goes right back to those cowboy
days of early liberalisation. We have written often
enough, andwe are delighted to see that after writing
with more than 400 speciﬁc complaints, Ofgem are
now enquiring into this sector and we look forward
to an investigation that changes this marketing
behaviour. From July 1 this year, by the way, there
will be mandatory complaints handling standards
applied to all those companies—only ten years late.
Q233 Mr Wright: What would you suggest a
consumer does to ﬁnd out whether they are getting
value for money or how to get the cheapest option
available?
Mr Asher: For those with access to the internet, or
perhaps with children or friends who can assist, we
would certainly encourage people to use some of the
online services. energywatch, for example, has a
service where if you put in your postcode, we will
give you all of the range of prices and service
information, and we will also give you a list of the
online services that will help you switch. Lots of
people use those. In fact, of the 4 million or so
incidences of switching each year, I suspect a lot of
these, perhaps like me, are serial switchers.
Q234 Mr Wright: So energywatch is the one to go to
at the moment?
Mr Asher: At the moment. It is unclear when we
disappear whether that will be done by Ofgem or the
new NCC but we are quite happy to see that both of
those groups realise that this is a vital market
conﬁdence-building service.
Q235 Mr Wright: Would you also advise people not
to switch on the case of a phone call or a door-to-
door salesman?
Mr Asher: I would never advise people not to switch.
What I would advise them is to ensure that they get
objective information, that they are able to compare
prices, that they have a look at the customer service
record of the company. After all, we do want the
market to work well for all consumers. The best
form of consumer protection is vigorous
competition in fair and informedmarkets. Sadly, we
have neither of those.
Q236 Chairman: I was inclined to say doorstep sales
techniques should be banned, but actually they are
about the only way that companies have of reaching
the hard-to-reach consumers, are they not? In
practice, the people you most want to switch are
most likely to be reached by doorstep selling.
Mr Asher: I guess that could be true for some. There
are lots of local council areas now that are
introducing these cold call bans and this has been a
subject of great interest and a super-complaint to the
OYce of Fair Trading. At one level, you want people
to have access to new goods and services but at
another level you want to ensure that people are not
deceived or subjected to poor practices. It is a tough
one. We want the market to work but we do need to
put in place protections so that the most vulnerable
are not exploited.
Q237 Chairman: One last question from me: smart
meters. Just to clarify, their major impact could well
be in the competitiveness of the market because they
could give much more information to consumers
about the price of electricity and gas they are
consuming at that time.
Mr Asher: I believe smart metering would transform
the competitiveness of the market. It would
transform it from a sluggish, ineYcient market to a
very eYcient one, but I think it also has incredible
sustainability beneﬁts and potential beneﬁts for the
fuel-poor.
Chairman: The reason I made that point is that I
think the sustainability beneﬁts are well known in
political circles, and talked about. Competitive
eVects are not so well discussed, and could be even
more important.
Q238 Mr Binley: There has been some delay and
some prevarication in terms of installing smart
meters, as you well know.
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Mr Asher: That is right.
Q239 Mr Binley: What can we do more, other than
kickingMalcolmWicks on a regular basis, to ensure
that it happens? The Government is still not over-
happy about this movement, is it?
Mr Asher: Unfortunately, the UK decided to make
the metering part of the market a separate
competitive market. Nobody else in the world has
done that. It was a clever experiment but one which
failed dismally. It is not a competitive market, and
now we are stuck that the suppliers are responsible
for the meters and not the distributors, as in the rest
of the world, where rapid roll-out can happen, and
that is a huge block in this market. Sadly—I have
said “sadly” seven times now; it is terrible—the
problems that we face in unwinding this are fairly
deep, but pressure is the thing.
Chairman: Mr Asher, as I explained to you earlier, I
am afraid an unavoidable diary clash means I have
to vacate the chair but I am going to hand over tomy
colleague, Roger Berry, who will take the rest of the
session. Thank you very much indeed for the
evidence so far. I am sorry about this.
In the absence of the Chairman, Roger Berry was
called to the chair
Q240 Mr Bailey: On wholesale electricity now, I
would really seek some sort of clariﬁcation on your
submission, in that you said traded electricity
volumes appear to be heavily skewed to shorter
durations, particularly in the front quarter or
season. Then you go on to say “The volume traded
is only three times physical consumption—
considerably below the ten times level said to be
evidence of a healthy market.” To a lay person such
as myself, volume traded something three times
physical consumption might seem a reﬂection of a
fairly liquid market. Just how is the level of liquidity
related to physical consumption and volume traded?
Could you just clarify that?
Mr Asher: If we go back to 2002, the markets, say,
just for electricity in GB were very, very active ones.
You had lots of traders whowere buying and selling,
generators whowere buying and selling, and the way
in which forward markets and liquidity is measured
is the amount of times that that power is wheeled
before it is actually consumed. Ours were at the rate
of seven. It is a small chart and I will happily submit
it to you, but since then our market is the only key
market in Europe where liquidity has been
plummeting, and we ﬁnd Germany and the
Netherlands are now much more actively traded
markets than ours, and Belgium, Spain and France
are all increasing in liquidity while ours is falling.
What that means is that the ability for buyers to be
able to negotiate with sellers and get eYciency and
predictability is harder and harder, which explains
why our prices are going up at a rate faster than our
European competitors for business and for domestic
consumers. If you wanted to buy power more than
six months out on the forward market, you simply
cannot get it, and that means that our businesses are
at a huge disadvantage—I am sure subsequent
witnesses will spell that out in more detail—and it
has been, practically speaking, the source of a loss of
100,000 jobs in the GB market in 2005-06.
Q241MrBailey:WhydoGermany andNetherlands
have this increased liquidity despite deregulating
after this country?
Mr Asher: Because over the last ﬁve years there have
been a number of European Directives to liberalise
markets. GB was of course ahead of the world. At
the beginning, during the last decade, GB had some
of the best markets, liquid markets, good
competition, innovation, lower prices, all of those
things. We have allowed that to dissipate. We have
allowed vertical reintegration, we have allowed
concentration, and we have taken our eyes oV that
competition ball. All of the European partners are
doing the opposite. In the Netherlands and even in
Germany there are structural changes to make the
market more competitive. Some of the big
conglomerates are talking about selling oV parts of
their networks and these trading hubs are growing
up. TheNord Pool is a very powerful example. In the
Netherlands they might take over as being the gas
trading hub of Europe because ours are failing and
European markets are succeeding. Their prices are
starting to come down as they liberalise. They have
a long, long way to go. Please do not understand me
to be saying that we are generally worse than Europe
but the big problem is our trajectory is down and
theirs is up.
Q242 Mr Bailey: That is very interesting, because
certainly my perception was that in fact Europe had
lagged, and indeed, there is resistance to further
“unbundling” requirements by the EU, and that
lower prices in Europe were a reﬂection of the cosy
relationship between the generators and suppliers
not experienced by consumers in this country. What
you have said would seem to be in contradiction to
that.
Mr Asher: There are many in Europe who resist
change, and the big conglomerates still do not want
to be broken up. They are happy to have interests in
production, to own the pipelines and wires, and the
distribution businesses and retail. Of course they
are, but the pressure from the European
Commission is to break that up. In fact, the
European Commission Competition Directorate
last year published the most extensive report ever on
Europeanmarkets. One of their ﬁndings, by theway,
was that GB was the only market where liquidity
seemed to be systematically falling.
Q243Mr Bailey:That really is interesting, because it
would appear from what you have said that,
although there is a long way to go in Europe, the
perception has been that prices were lower in Europe
because of, eVectively, a cosy arrangement and
cartels and so on.
Mr Asher: I have never heard of a cartel that charges
artiﬁcially low prices.
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Q244 Mr Bailey: Sorry, I will rephrase that. Cosy
relationships between the generators and suppliers.
However, fromwhat you have said, that really is not
the case. It is actually that, although they have a long
way to go, they aremore liquid than this country and
the problem is in the liquidity…
Mr Asher: I do not want to over-simplify. There are
serious market problems in much of Europe and
there are a number of Member States who still have
price controls. What that often does is transfer
welfare between businesses and consumers in some
cases, or consumers to businesses in others, but
nonetheless leads to terrible investment distortions,
and they are undesirable. On the whole, the moves
in Europe are to far more openmarkets, more liquid
markets, more competition, hence more investment
and growth, whereas ours are atrophying and it is no
wonder that we are speaking of a crisis in investment
for generation for 2013.
Q245 Mr Bailey: Why is it so poor here?
Mr Asher: It is so poor here because I think, having
reached that excellent stage of a really good
competitive market and lots of competition, we
started to believe our own rhetoric and went to sleep
at the wheel, and we just have not noticed that the
rest of the world is whizzing on. We have stuck, and
we do not see that to win is not to stand still, no
matter how good you are. You need a solid
competition focus on this all of the time, and that is
why we have been calling for the Competition
Commission to put the cleaners through what is a
sclerotic sector which is so vital for the welfare of
individual consumers and industry.
Q246 Mr Bailey: You have partly anticipated my
next question, which is, how could it be improved?
Is there anything that you want to say over and
above that?
Mr Asher: I think there are short-term and longer-
term issues, and I have made the point that really, in
our system of markets we have the sectoral
regulators, who are given speciﬁc jobs, and they are
there to spot price-ﬁxing and, in the case of Ofgem,
their main job, after all, is about network regulation.
They do that passably well. I think they make some
mistakes but on the whole they do that reasonably
well. They do not have particular expertise in these
issues of competition. We established the
Competition Commission. It is a hugely well-
funded, globally recognised authoritative body but
they have never had a reference from the sectoral
regulator, and they say that they are puzzled as to
why this is, and that they are ready, willing and able
to do it and there is a need there, but, for some
reason, it is not happening.
Q247 Mr Bailey: Just two quick questions. New
entrants would obviously helpmatters.What are the
problems for new entrants? Secondly, how would
you assess the impact of selling British Energy to an
existing electricity generator?
Mr Asher: New entrants are of course what we want
to see. We want open markets and, by the way, GB
desperately needs vast new investment; whether it is
for nuclear or renewables or clean coal, all of that,
we need tens of millions of pounds. They are not
going to come here if they think that they are facing a
vertically integrated industry with the suppliers who
exist owning the generators. You ask what the
barrier is. It is this: if you were somebody, even like
Tesco, a big, ugly, company like Tesco, powerful, it
cannot enter this market because it knows it has to
buy its gas and power from the people who own it
and who compete against them. So they just will not
be in that market. If you were perhaps a global
generator, you might see this market and you might
see some of the hugely fat margins. After all, Ofgem
said the generators are going to make £6 billion in
unearned proﬁts over the next few years that are not
going to be competed away, a very tasty target, but
no generator will enter this market because they
know they have no way to market. The vertically
integrated companies own all the customers so they
are locked out. That brings us to British Energy,
which actually is able to produce power at a very low
cost per unit but again, they are stuck. They do not
have a retail outlet in a vertically integrated market
and so they are trying to sell out. If that was sold to
an incumbent, it is a perfect formula for them
charging more and giving less, in other words, anti-
competitive conduct, and you will see statements by
Centrica and any sentient economist will say that is
a bad thing to do if youwant an eYcient market with
good investment signals.
Q248MrOaten:There was a rumour that Asdawere
seriously looking at it. Have you heard that?
Mr Asher: I have heard a number of rumours, and
indeed, at the inquiry conducted by Lord O’Neill
just a few years ago, the last time this group looked
at this issue, I think it was Alistair Buchanan who
reeled oV the names of dozens of people who had
licences and were going to enter. All I say is that at
the gym I go to there are thousands of people who
have a membership but never turn up.
Q249 Miss Kirkbride: It seems to me a logical
conclusion of what you are saying is that there
should be a law prohibiting vertical integration and
that companies should be forced to divest
themselves of one or the other, either generation or
their retail customers. Do you think that? Do you
think that might be the conclusion of a Competition
Commission investigation into them, and what
powers do Europe have in all of this versus the
British Government and how are they ﬂexing their
muscles to make that happen?
Mr Asher: Exactly a century ago this was the debate
that was raging in the United States that led to the
establishment of the Federal Trade Commission and
the trustbusters. It was the oil industry then doing
exactly these same sorts of things. In the end they did
break them up and for a century had some of the
most competitive markets with the highest levels of
consumer welfare in the world. I work in many
countries, advising governments about
deregulation, and the ﬁrst thing you do with this
industry is both vertically and horizontally
disaggregating power so that you get those ﬁerce
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winds of competition and innovation. Sometimes it
does not work very well, sometimes it does.What we
have had though for the last six years is everything
to be fast reversed. So ﬁrst, stop it getting any worse,
then secondly, try to lever it open. I doubt that our
political climate would readily cope with
unbundling the suppliers because of their huge
power; we have become so dependent on them.
Economically, it would be a sensible thing to happen
but you can just see in Europe the sort of opposition
that comes out when you start to threaten the
economic interests of incumbents. One of the values
of the Competition Commission is that they are an
objective body and they have industry experts, they
have all of these specialist panels, and they can spell
out the actual costs and beneﬁts. The market I am
talking about is not one for tomorrow but if we want
a market that is eVective for the next 20, 30 years,
now is the time to get these signals right so that we
can get new entry from vigorous competitors at
either the supply or generational level. Do not let the
incumbents own wind, do not let them own nuclear,
and we have a chance of the diversity that we had
brieﬂy years ago, when prices here were genuinely
the most competitive in Europe.
Q250 Miss Kirkbride: What is to stop that? There is
nothing to stop that. You are saying (inaudible) will
not break up the market, so why should all this stuV
not be provided by the existing big six? Why should
anybody come into the market? You have already
set out good reasons why no-one would want to
come and build on this, because they would not get
access to the consumer market.
Mr Asher: There are some other ways of perhaps
levering the market open more gradually. I hope the
Competition Commission would come out with a
ﬁnding that we would be much better oV in welfare
terms and investment terms and sustainability terms
with vertical disintegration.
Q251 Miss Kirkbride: If it did that, what would
happen?
Mr Asher: What would happen is that lots of new
entrants from diVerent parts of the world, diVerent
business models, diVerent technologies would come
in, and we would have a whole raft of innovation
which would transform our economy into a
diVerent sort.
Q252 Miss Kirkbride: I do not understand why the
Competition Commission saying that would make
any diVerence. Surely it would have to have some
legislative force.
Mr Asher: Two things would happen. Them saying
it would have a little more authority than me saying
it. Of itself, you are quite right, but in addition, there
are a number of other measures where we think that
there ought to be much more disclosure of some of
these secret contracts, these long-term contracts by
which gas and power are dealt with. A lot more of
that should be brought into the forward market. I
think the vertically integrated bodies should be
forced to trade a proportion, perhaps 20%, of their
power and gas on the forward markets. They could
buy and sell too perhaps but at least then we would
start to get these signals that would allow people
who see a proﬁt to move in or, if it were the case that
there was a loss, to move out, and you would get the
dynamism that makes a market economy. We lack
that and it is not getting better; it is getting worse.
Q253Miss Kirkbride: In short, it would be legislative
changes which fall short of requiring them to
disaggregate their vertical and horizontal
investments.
Mr Asher: Yes, partly legislative, but the
Competition Commission has the power to
recommend those sorts of split-ups if it wanted to, as
does the European Commission in some
circumstances.
Roger Berry: We will come back to the Competition
Commission in a moment but I want to move on to
wholesale gas.
Q254MrBinley:MrAsher, I just want to pursue this
a little further. In terms of the supply market, what
you are advocating could lead to not having aBritish
champion, quite frankly. Does that worry you?
Mr Asher: If you look at the track record, there are
now just two suppliers still remaining in British
ownership, and part of the reason for that is that we
allowed our market not to be as eYcient and
competitive. If it were competitive and making
higher earnings, they would not have been acquired.
I do not think there is anything, short of absolute
protectionism, that is going to stop those companies
being acquired unless there is a more competitive
market. I believe actually that Centrica is keen on
having a vigorously competitive market. I have had
many discussions with their Chief Executive, and I
hope when they are giving evidence, if they do, you
will ask them some of these questions about what
they are doing to break this toxic gas-oil indexation
and lots of those things.
Q255 Mr Clapham: That is one of the points I want
to come to but, ﬁrst of all, just looking at the way,
for example, in the early Nineties we disaggregated
the energy industry, it seems that one of the things
that we failed to do was to ring-fence each particular
disaggregation to avoid the re-aggregation. Had we
done that, but allowing competition in each of the
sectors, we would have had a much healthier
market today.
Mr Asher: I think so, but remember it happened in
two ways. Initially 20 vigorously competing
suppliers—and I guess that was never going to be
sustainable. Youwould never have that number, but
we just took the brakes oV altogether and that
aggregation from 20 to six, remembering that in
many regions there are really eVectively only two or
perhaps three, so it is not even six people competing
for each consumer, but at the same time we allowed
that vertical acquisition, and that had the double
whammy of, ﬁrstly, that sort of concentration but
also the vertical concentration. In the gas markets,
of course, it was a slightly diVerent area where we
provided 110% of our own gas to this current state
where it is only 75.
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Q256 Mr Clapham: British Gas still has a 50%
market share.
Mr Asher: Yes. 48, I think.
Q257Mr Clapham:Given that we see, and have seen
over the last 18 months, the increase in oil prices—
and it must send shivers through some consumers
when they see a year again when oil prices have
increased and there are nowwell above $100 a barrel
and there is talk about it reaching $200 a barrel.
Each time that happens, of course, as you have said,
British Gas will be rubbing their chin and thinking
“Well, we have got to increase our prices.” What is
the rationale for that indexation of oil to gas and
could it be broken?
Mr Asher: I think it is an absolutely excellent
rationale if you own the gas, and if you are a gas
producer, and if you are a European one who lives
and works in a market where there is the rule of law
and vigorous competition laws that would prohibit
you from illegally agreeing on a price, if however all
of the gas producers independently say, “I know
what, we will relate our prices to this external
variable, oil prices, which are inexorably going up.
That gives us a perfect way of co-ordinating our
conduct without breaking the law and making a
fortune.” There is no rationale behind that in
economic terms and there is no rationale in resource
terms and in fact, the UK, when it had a deregulated
market, had a fully functioning market where the
prices were determined by competition between
demand and supply. Sometimes that went up when
there was an outage or a crisis, and youwould expect
that, or if there was inadequate supply prices would
go up. You want that; it draws in new investors and
it would go down. Now it does not. It is just
inexorably going up, and that is a very negative
thing. Once the inter-connector between theUKand
Europe was opened and we were starting to import
more and more gas from Europe as North Sea
supplies have started to run down, we have been
aVected by the contagion of this gas-oil indexation.
Half of our contracts are now tainted by this oil
indexation. We criticise the competition authorities
in Europe and in the UK for not being much more
vigorously attacking that. They have attacked all the
other bits, the vertical integration, long-term
contracts and all of that, but for some reason they
have allowed this virtual gas OPEC to survive and it
is a toxic thing. It is not as though the gas that is
traded here is in shortage. As Jake Ulrich from
Centrica, who knows much more about this than I
do, said, we are surrounded by gas. We just cannot
get it here. That is about this indexation issue and the
monopolistic control over networks and lack of
liberalisation. They are the things not just in Europe
but in GB that need to be focused on.
Q258 Mr Clapham: Given what you have just said
and given the importance of gas prices, because of
course, 40% of our electricity is generated by gas so
it pushes up the price of electricity, has there been
any real, meaningful endeavour to break that
indexation? If so, why has it failed?
Mr Asher: In fact, it is going the other way. Until
four or ﬁve years ago we had liquid forward markets
where you could buy and sell gas. There were traders
in the market and this is the same story about how
often the gas or power is turned over before ﬁnal
consumption. Those have all been falling and in
part, because our wholesale markets have failed in
gas and electricity, even some large buyers are saying
“We are desperate. We don’t know what makes a
proper price.” So they are often forced, and indeed
some even say, “What we will have to do is accept a
gas-oil indexation because at least that is some
objective measure that we can plan and hedge
against.” The much better approach would be to re-
introduce a fully competitive forward market, get
out all of the restrictive rules, the barriers to entry,
and just get more of the commodity traded in ways
that people will rebuild their conﬁdence in the way
prices are formed and to allow themarket that we all
want to see work work. EVective markets often
require intervention. I think that is one of the errors
in the UK. Somehow we have assumed full
competition in eVective markets means you do not
have intervention. There is no market in the world
like that. Indeed, markets tend toward market
power and monopoly, and why not? That is exactly
the intention of every supplier. The state needs to
intervene every now and then when that market
power reaches a certain level or where the conduct of
getting there breaches certain norms and putting
them back in their box. That is what we want. We
want them to be ﬁghting each other, and they are
not.
Q259 Mr Clapham: And of course, that is what we
have seen in the energy market. We have seen those
extremes; we have gone from disaggregation back to
integration.
Mr Asher: Yes, that is right, and that needs to be
reversed.
Q260 Mr Clapham: Looking at what you say about
the wholesale market, in gas we see that there is a
parallel where we have a wholesale market, and then
we have an oV-market situation where we have long-
term contracts. That obviously is having an
enormous impact on forward markets, as you said
earlier. What is going to be the way in which we
could persuade government to intervene in order to
ensure that we have a proper competitive forward
market?
Mr Asher: Most immediately, to understand what is
happening in those secret oV-market contracts.
Recently Ofgem were asked—it may have been at
the Public Accounts Committee—about whether
they felt that they understood what was happening
in the market, and I think they said they found it
extremely diYcult to get this sort of information. I
will go back to an old thing. The Competition
Commission has express information-gathering
powers that could gather those sorts of contracts. I
do not mean they should publish people’s private
information across the Financial Times but their
experts would be able to look at the relationship
between the commodity costs and the prices to see
Ev 34 Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Committee: Evidence
20 May 2008 Mr Allan Asher
where these rigidities occur. In other markets, in the
United States for example, and in Australia, my
home country, the biggest reforms to the markets
were where these long-term contracts were
renegotiated. They said, “Start again, do it in a more
competitive, open way so that eYciencies will
come.”
Q261 Mr Clapham: When we ﬁrst started the
session, Mark referred to liquid petroleum gas, and
many of our communities are still on liquid
petroleum gas. I think in fact, if you look at the
number of households on gas and compare it with
the number on electricity, you get some idea of just
how many homes still do not have a natural gas
supply. I have a number of communities. Given that
situation, and bearing in mind just how much more
people—I am on liquid petroleum—pay compared
to somebody who uses natural gas, is there an
argument to say that, given the fact that we have
been disadvantaged for so many years, as we have,
and that we are paying extra price, and it looks as
though we are going to be paying extra price into the
future, people on liquid petroleum ought to be
receiving some kind of, shall we say, tax credit,
particularly elderly people, to help in that increased
cost and the fact that we are being kept out of a
market that is much more advantageous?
Mr Asher: At the very least they should not be
punished. When the Competition Commission
brought some of its innovative remedies, ensuring
that suppliers would allow transfer of ownership of
cylinders and a number of things that could
signiﬁcantly increase eYciency, that would be the
best result. We have to recognise though that some
markets are always going to be ineYcient and that
there are various welfare measures. In relation, say,
to prepayment meters and direct debits, we are not
saying that prepayment meter customers should be
cross-subsidised from the rest of the community. All
we are saying is they should no longer be penalised,
so that there is not that negative cross-subsidy from
the poor to the better oV.
Q262Mr Clapham:Finally, given that you are going
to be swallowed up by the National Consumer
Council, are we likely to see a robust energy section
ﬁghting for the consumer?
Mr Asher: It would be my fervent hope that we do.
Q263 Roger Berry: May we turn to the issue of fuel
poverty? We have an interesting situation where the
Government is opposing mandatory social tariVs,
and a number of energy companies are supporting
mandatory social tariVs. Why do you think the
Government is reluctant to go down the road of a
mandatory social tariV given the growing problem
of fuel poverty, for obvious reasons, in recent
months?
Mr Asher: Double puzzling given that two or three
of the suppliers themselves say unless there are some
standards for social tariVs, unless there is some
compulsion about that, the system will fail and,
sadly, without that system, it is failing. I have had a
number of discussions with government oYcials and
their most common comment is that if we have
mandatory standards for social tariVs, that will be a
race to the bottom. All of the others who are doing
more would stop doing more and do less. I was
struck by the absolute distinction between that view
and some powerful statements made by the Prime
Minister and JohnHutton, the Secretary of State for
Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform in
relation to minimum pay. In March this year, just
two months ago, he said in a press release from
BERR that before the minimum wage was
introduced workers could expect to be paid as little
as 35p an hour, our legislation has ensured this could
no longer happen and that he was very proud of the
diVerence that establishing that minimum wage had
made to our whole society. I think the argument is
perfectly symmetrical. By establishing a minimum
set of social tariVs, that is, for the fuel-poor, that are
no worse than are available to the rest of us, who are
well able to pay, we will be lifting up to 4.5 million
households out of fuel poverty. Of course, you
would need to do a lot more than that. It would be
naı¨ve to imagine that that alone would solve it. It is
about measures to houses, it is about incomes, but
the thing that nobody has done anything about is the
price of energy. That is the biggest, most direct
reform that we could make and somehow the
oYcials have their heads in one place, the Prime
Minister, the Secretary of State and the Minister for
Energy have theirs in another, and sometimes I
wonder if they need to meet a bit more often.
Q264 Roger Berry: I think the parallel with the
minimum wage is very telling because obviously
employers’ organisations opposed the national
minimumwage but the last thing they wanted was to
not have a level playing ﬁeld. The parallel is very
interesting.
Mr Asher: If I could add one other element, in fact,
the PrimeMinister inMarch this year said that at the
start of the minimum wage some complained that it
would cost 3 million jobs and the evidence is, of
course, quite the opposite. What it has done is
brought wage justice to a huge part of those who had
no bargaining power and not aVected overall
employment. Similarly, these sorts of tariVs for
those who are desperate and for whom it is getting
worse, every one% increase in energy prices tips
another 40,000 people into fuel poverty. That could
be ﬁxed at a fraction of the cost of the £225 million
that the Government is taking from suppliers.
Q265 Roger Berry: What has the evidence been so
far on voluntary social tariVs, as it were, andwhy are
companies not doing it?
Mr Asher: I think a number of companies are doing
some excellent things. We have seen some really
good social tariVs developed by EDF and British
Gas itself invests the vast majority of all of the
revenues of all the companies into social tariVs.
Some, like Npower, are putting in about the least,
the proportion of the market share that they have as
customers compared with the amount that they are
putting in. So there are some very good and exciting
innovations that have occurred but, as Centrica and
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EDF said, “If the others are not required to do
something similar to this, why would we continue
to?” and our big concern is, sadly, when we have
gone, there is going to be nobody to point that out
and they are going to slip back to their bad old ways.
At least, that is a fear I have.
Q266 Mr Weir: On that point about the diVerence
between companies, it has been said to us that the
former territorial company, if you like, still
concentrate a large part of themarket in their former
territories. Does this mean there is greater
concentration of fuel-poor in some of these
territories where the companies are not doing
enough to help fuel poverty?
Mr Asher: The distribution of fuel poverty follows
the standard map of low incomes, areas where there
are a large percentage of people with very poor
housing, hard to heat housing, the big urban centres
and in the valleys and in rural areas. They are
distributed across three or so of the suppliers who
have the bulk of those customers.
Q267 Mr Weir: That is to be expected, but in every
area there are pockets of poverty, no matter how
well oV the general area is. On your analysis, there
must be some people in fuel poverty who are
particularly badly hit because their local supplier is
not taking suYcient action to tackle fuel poverty. Is
that the case?
Mr Asher: I mentioned the example of Npower in
the North, where if you were obtaining your
electricity from them and your gas from another
company, perhaps British Gas, you could be paying
£361 a year more as a prepayment meter customer
than if you had their online tariV. I am really pleased
to say that diVerential has come down by about
£100, not though because the prepayment meter
price has been reduced but because the online tariV
has gone up.
Q268 Roger Berry:Anumber of measures have been
proposed for addressing fuel poverty. There is the
Warm Front scheme, winter fuel payments,
extension of those to others and so on and so forth.
Has energywatch considered those alternatives and
their eVectiveness in comparison with mandatory
social tariVs?
Mr Asher: Yes.
Q269 Roger Berry:Do you have a view about which
of those are likely to be more eVective?
Mr Asher: Yes. Over a period of two years the
diVerentMinisters for Energy—we seem to have one
each year—had spelt out that the Government, if
suppliers did not respond adequately, would compel
them to, and on constant probing, indeed, from
some members of this Committee, started to spell
out what he meant by social tariVs and he set out
quite a good set of criteria and had asked the
regulator to do a report on that. When the regulator
failed to do that, we commissioned an expert
ourselves and we have actually published a very
detailed report that shows for every supplier every
part of their programmes, what is good, what is bad,
and how it could work better. I was very
disappointed to see that when we submitted that to
the Government, the response was “Well, if we
require everybody to meet a certain level, the level
will fall.” There is no need for people to meet a
certain level. There are a couple of key ingredients
about ensuring that people are no worse oV and
having proper programmes and looking more
carefully before they are disconnected, oVering
diVerent methods of payment, and a whole range of
things which are well known and are used in other
countries that work very well. It is to our huge regret
that the Government just has not appeared to want
to move on this yet.
Q270 Roger Berry: Forgive me. You have not quite
answered my question, Mr Asher. Are you saying
social tariVs is the solution or are you supportive of
a mixture?
Mr Asher: It is a diVerent point. If you think about
it, there is really no such thing as a social tariV. It has
become a generic description of a series of measures
by which those in fuel poverty will receive various
forms of beneﬁt, and you could mix in a number of
things. After all, most of the companies now have
trust funds and a number of them have equalisation
systems, some oVer credit counselling, some oVer
greater access to measures such as insulation and
draft exclusion and low energy light bulbs, all of
those, which are quite valuable measures to insulate
houses. Where they are directed at the fuel-poor I
think they are all legitimately part of a package, and
it is actually good to see a degree of competition
about that. My concern is that following the Ofgem
Fuel Poverty Summit a few weeks ago, it appears
that the suppliers are going to be allowed to just tip
any old thing into that basket instead of them
meeting some objective test. We would like to see at
least an objective test as to what qualiﬁes and what
does not.
Roger Berry: Thank you very much indeed. Finally,
the Competition Commission.
Q271 Mr Weir: You have mentioned the
CompetitionCommission several times in the course
of this morning, and in your submissions to see you
have set out a lot of proposals that could be done
through the Competition Commission. Which, if
any, of your recommendations could be enacted by
Ofgem without a reference to the Competition
Commission?
Mr Asher: They could do a number of these things,
but the distinction is that Ofgem is a reasonably
small, reasonably eYcient sectoral regulator. It is
not set up to do these big studies where they look
around the world, that they dig right into all of the
contracts, where they have these expert panels
drawn from business and the community and
academia, and that they just concentrate; this is what
they do. That is why the OFT and some other
regulators often give them these industry studies to
do. Theoretically, Ofgem could do it but their
staYng, their level of expertise and their experience
really is not up to it. The sensible thing is to realise
that there is this expert body and get them to do the
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job. They are ready, willing and able. I am not
getting a commission from the Competition
Commission, by the way; it is just that, having seen
them work, some of their remedies are much wider,
their information gathering powers, and they are an
authoritative body of a global scale.
Q272 Mr Weir: How long do you think such an
investigation would take?
Mr Asher: It depends on the terms of reference and,
in any event, you would not want them to leave
everything to the end. You would ask them to say
what the immediate measures are, the transparency
measures, perhaps changes to licence conditions, the
barriers to entry that can be readily identiﬁed, and
then some longermeasures that could come out after
a while. They often take a year or more to do their
work, but to that I would say, if you are concerned
that it might take them a year or two to act on this
market, I would just remind you thatwhatwe should
be talking about is not what is going to happen next
year or the year after, but having a sector that is ﬁt
for our economy over the next 20 and 30 years. The
billions that are going to be invested in new forms of
energy and all of that with the sustainability agenda
desperately require the most eYcient, the most
innovative and the best use of scarce capital. I do not
think that a “quicky” by Ofgem while people are
doing their day jobs is going to get very far there.We
need the best minds in the country to focus on it and
give us a blueprint which will restore Britain to
having the most innovative, competitive energy
market in the world.
Q273 Mr Weir: You mentioned earlier new entrants
coming into the market and diVerent types of
generation, particularly renewables, and you
mentionedwind.What implicationwill Competition
Commission referral have for the current energy
companies’ investment decisions? For example,
whether or not you agree with nuclear, the
Government seems to be going down the line of
persuading one or other of the big existing energy
companies to lead on nuclear, perhaps EDF. Is that
likely to happen if they are faced with a Competition
Commission investigation?
Mr Asher: I think there are diVerent considerations.
If you are talking about an incumbent, if they are
being oVered more or less a secure monopoly for
ever, I think they will quite happily invest in that.
Whether the countrywill beneﬁt is quite doubtful. If,
on the other hand, you are asking some of those very
hungry, eYcient generators from anywhere in the
world to come and set up a new competitive
investment here, if they think they are facing a closed
sector, a sector that they cannot get into where they
are never likely to be able to compete fairly, they are
not going to come. So, in a way, it could be a trade-
oV between investment from a lazy incumbent who
is actually buying a secure revenue stream, just like
a government bond, into perpetuity, or whether you
really want a revolution, whether you want the
storms of competition and innovation that can
transform the market and transform industry.
Q274 Mr Weir: In the current sale of British Energy
it seems to be an existing company, EDF and RWE
that are interested in it. It is not the new generators
looking to break into the market by acquiring a
generator of their own, which one would have
thought would have been the ﬁrst step in setting up
in the UK.
Mr Asher: I would not have thought that for the very
reason that I mentioned. We have this vertically
integrated structure and, even if you were a giant
corporation with much experience and many
resources, you would look and say “What is the
point of me building new generation in the GB
market where it is all stitched up? If I enter at the
generation level, what they will do is transfer the
margins to the retail level and I will never make any
money. I will not have a route to customers or, if I
enter just at the retail level, I will have to buy my gas
and power from the people I’m competing with and
I will be squeezed out as well.” That is why we have
seen 40 companies, 20 suppliers and 20 generators,
exit the market since 2000 and not one signiﬁcant
new entry that is sustained.
Q275 Mr Weir: By that argument, you are going to
have to break up the vertical integration before you
get new entrants into the market, and that is not
going to be a quick process, as Europe has shown
when they have tried to do it. The other point about
that is that in the age of the inter-connector, where
EDF can bring electricity across from France or gas
can come from Holland or whatever, can this be
done on a purely GB basis or are we having to look
at it on a European basis?
Mr Asher: Nothing can be done on a GB basis any
more, and that is possibly a good thing. The more
that the market is opened up and that we get cross-
border trading, the better. That is what the
competition authorities in Europe want to do, more
inter-connectors and things like that are useful, but
I think resource and energy nationalism is always
going to make us want to be sure that a certain
proportion of our energy is generated…
Q276 Mr Weir: That does not really address the
point, because it seems to me that whatever the
competition authorities want in Europe, they are
actually going in the opposite direction, where some
of the large national companies, EDF andRWE, are
trying to consolidate their vertical integration, in
fact increase it by going for companies like
Iberdrola, which are not going to aVect the UK
market. You are saying that the Competition
Commission needs to break up the vertical
integration within the UK, and you have accepted
there has to be a European dimension to this, but in
Europe the process seems to be going in the opposite
direction.
Mr Asher: If I could disagree, it is true that some of
the big German companies are wanting to acquire in
Spain, and the Italian companies and the French
companies are wanting to acquire in Belgium, but
what they are wanting to do is to buy it at a
horizontal level. They want to buy businesses in the
same sectors as them, and there is evidence of the
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vertical companies being broken up. One of the huge
German conglomerates, as part of a deal with the
competition authorities, is saying that they are
happy—not happy, but they would be prepared to
settle an anti-trust investigation by divesting all of
their transmission assets. That is a huge
breakthrough, and we are seeing more and more of
that happen. Could I make one more point though
about eVects on investment? Even if there was a fair
wind to all of the nuclear investments, we are still
talking ten, 12, some people think even 15 years out.
In that context, a Competition Commission inquiry
that might take a year or 18 months is no huge
barrier, and in fact, the upside is that it might give
assurance of a sound, eYcient sector, with sensible
investment signals, that will last for 30 years whereas
the current situation is quite unstable, and I think
even the incumbents, even EDF and others, are
going to be very nervous about investing a lot of
money without all sorts of government protections
and bail-outs if in fact we do end up with some sort
of competition review and they discover their big
monopoly investments are not returning the
monopoly rents that they are used to.
Q277 Mr Clapham: Mr Asher, given competition
authorities’ involvement in a study and bearing in
mind that some of the long-term gas contracts that
are forcing gas into the forward market and away
from the wholesale market, legal contracts, how
would we break that situation?
Mr Asher: It depends on whether they are currently
in breach of competition rules. If they are in breach
of competition rules, the contracts can be broken,
but in any event, the authorities can serve notice that
they require them to be renegotiated. That is a legal
process but it happens. It has happened in many
countries as a way of reforming this sector. It is only
when you get the forensic skills of experts to look at
the costs and beneﬁts, the detriment and gains, that
one can get a picture of which are the worst and
which ones are benign. 70% or so of all of the gas
coming in is covered by these mysterious contracts,
and we do not know whether there are restrictive
clauses. It is suspected that a number of the big gas
contracts still prohibit buyers, whether in the UK or
other European countries, from sending the gas on
to another destination. I would regard those as
highly anti-competitive and needing to be exposed
and broken up. Similarly with power contracts; we
just do not know what sort of mysterious anti-
competitive clauses are in there, and some of them
might be in breach of existing laws. If I could make
just one ﬁnal comment about prices, because I am
sure that youwill have a stream of witnesses whowill
swear that our prices are the lowest in the world. I
just got this from the European Commission for
2007, where they looked at the prices of gas and
electricity to consumers across the whole of Europe.
The red one is Great Britain and in both cases we are
actually pretty expensive, and not very cheap.
Q278 Mr Clapham: Could we have a copy of that,
please?
Mr Asher: Certainly. I will happily submit all of
these tables to you, and background information on
all these other points.
Roger Berry: On that note, Mr Asher, can I thank
you again for the written submissions that you have
made, and thank you very much indeed for this
morning’s session. I could tell that the public gallery
was ﬁnding it as exciting as we were. It was really
thought-provoking and incredibly helpful to the
Committee. Thank you very much again.
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Q279 Chairman: Gentlemen, welcome to this
evidence session of this Committee’s inquiry into
energy prices. We will begin with the easy questions.
Thank you verymuch for yourmemorandum, by the
way, which the Committee has greatly appreciated
and it informed the questions you are going to get
now. The easy one is if you can each introduce
yourselves for the record and say what your
organisation does, and also I am curious to know
whether there is any overlap to your memberships,
how discrete your organisations are?
Mr Nicholson: I am Jeremy Nicholson and I am
Director of the Energy Intensive Users’ Group. It is
an umbrella group that represents a dozen or so
trade sectors—steel, glass, ceramics, cement,
aluminium manufacturers and so on, and including
the Chemical Industries Association and theMEUC
within our membership. We are solely there to
represent the interests of the intensive sectors that
depend on secure and internationally competitive
energy supplies.
Mr Conway: I am Hugh Conway and I am the
electrical Chairman of the Major Energy Users’
Council. We are an organisation which was founded
about 20 years ago upon the privatisation of gas and
electricity and we have members who are basically
buyers for large energy users, and they range from
individual manufacturing companies right through
to multi-site retailers and also more recently
government purchasing agencies, which I think is
possibly quite interesting.
Mr Tane: I am Chris Tane. I am here with two hats
on today: I am representing the Chemical Industries
Association, which is the trade association for the
chemical industry in the UK, which is, as I am sure
you know, one of the major contributors to the UK
economy; and also in my real job I am the Chief
Executive of INEOS Chlor Ltd, which is one of the
major chemical producers in the UK and we are the
largest single point user of electricity in the UK at
our site at Runcorn.
Q280 Chairman:Mr Tane, you are the only member
of our witnesses today with a current commercial
interest. You used to be with Rugby Cement, Mr
Conway, but you are now representing an
organisation.
Mr Conway: And I do not have any connection with
them now at all.
Chairman: Thank you very much. Mark, do you
want to come in with your point?
Q281 Mr Oaten: We are going to get into the issues
but just generally I am interested to understand as
the three bodies which represent so many users of
energy what actual power do you feel that you have
yourselves to try and inﬂuence energy costs and
energy prices? Are you under enormous pressure at
the moment from your members who are saying to
you, “Look, come on guys, you are meant to be our
voice; use the muscle. We come together because we
want jointly to put pressure on the Government and
the suppliers; what are you doing about it?” I just
wondered what power you have got and what action
you have been taking to try and aVect the current
diYculties?
Mr Nicholson: The perception of energy users is that
we are very much price takers. That is the ﬁrst point.
We are at the mercy largely of what events produce
in the wholesale market of gas and electricity and, as
you will see from our evidence, it is the wholesale
market price that really underpins all of our energy
costs as large consumers and it accounts for the
overwhelming bulk of the bill to our sectors. We do
not feel that we have the inﬂuence that is warranted
in terms of dealing with government departments
and the regulator and that the issue of international
competitiveness, in our view, although
acknowledged is perhaps not given the emphasis
that it deserves on occasions, and indeed there has
been some denial I think, at least for the intensive
sectors, about the extent to which we are facing
genuine competitive disadvantage at the moment.
Maybe that is not true equally for all classes of
consumer but for the large industrial users there is an
abundance of evidence now that we face signiﬁcant
and enduring price disadvantage in power, and to a
lesser extent in gas.
Mr Conway: Can I make a very simple comment
which might explain some of the problems we have.
Just to give you an example, if I were to buy gas for
my company from October for 12 months, the
current price is, shall we say, 87 pence wholesale. On
top of that we might have to pay three pence for
transport and the last number is 0.5% suppliers’
margin, so we have no—
Q282 Chairman: We are getting into some of the
detailed stuV.
Mr Conway: What I am trying to say is we have no
control over what is going on; that is our biggest
problem.
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Q283 Mr Oaten: But the point I am trying to get is
that collectively with so many of you coming
together can actually have no inﬂuence at all?
Mr Nicholson: In terms of on the market I think that
is unfortunately the case. Chris may want to add
something from the perspective of an international
operator.
Mr Tane:My company of course is a major buyer of
gas as it happens and we have no ability whatsoever
to have any impact on the market. We are a big
buyer of petro-chemical feedstocks for example and
we are suYciently big that we inﬂuence the market
as a buyer. That does not happen in the gas market
at all and we have no ability to either directly
ourselves or through the trade association get
recognition of the problem. As Jeremy was saying, it
has been pretty diYcult over the last two or three
years. We have been saying repeatedly that we see a
major problem of competitiveness emerging and,
generally speaking, the response that we have seen
from regulators and government has been to say
there is no problem. Now it is very clear to
everybody that there is a big problem but it is rather
late to do anything about it, so we have not really
had the inﬂuence that is needed for an industry that
is as important as the chemical industry is to the UK
economy.
Q284 Chairman: I think it is fair to say that a lot of
the debate at present about fuel prices does concern
residential customers/domestic households but we
attach great importance to this issue too because
competitiveness is one of your key concerns and we
will come to that in a minute. Can I just ask
factually, presumably you buy predominantly from
wholesale markets? How do you buy?
Mr Nicholson: Most of our members buy through
supply contracts. One or two of them are auto
generators, they have their own power generation as
well, but they are a minority, and for the most part
they are on annual or longer supply contracts.
Increasingly with gas there has been a trend towards
indexed contracts where the price of gas moves with
the day ahead price in the wholesale market, so in
eVect, even though they tend to be buying from the
suppliers, although some may source directly from
the wholesale market, the nature of their contracts
means that eVectively they are getting a quote based
on the forward market price at the time the contract
is struck or indeed a contract that is based on a day
ahead wholesale market price.
Q285 Chairman: This is another easy question and
you have already hinted at this in your earlier
answers; how important are energy prices to your
members and to your company in terms of their
competitiveness internationally?
Mr Nicholson: As you would expect, if you are an
aluminium smelter where 40-45 % of your costs
might be energy-based, or if you are a steel maker
and paper manufacturer where 20-25% or more may
be energy-based, if you are an industrial gas
producer where 70% of your production costs may
come from energy, this is a key input cost, and
plainly if there are large and enduring price
diVerences in energy, accepting the fact that there
will be times when our energy prices are higher and
lower, that is natural in markets (although we have
seen a lot of volatility there) it aVects investment
decisions and the ability to remain located in this
part of the world if our energy prices either become
uncompetitive or are set to become uncompetitive in
the future.
Q286 Chairman: But you have given us quite
compelling written evidence suggesting that UK
energy prices for your member companies are
consistently above European prices.
Mr Nicholson: Recently that is true and of course
there are some ﬁrms that are not able to be
represented here because they are no longer trading.
When gas prices hit record levels two winters ago
and the system came under strain we saw demand
destruction and paper manufacturers and glass
manufacturers in particular whose businesses did
not survive that period, and that is the risk, that it
will not necessarily cause major casualties in the
short term but by a process of attrition we will see
continued reduction in the industrial base at a time
when the demand for our products worldwide is
quite high. To put some numbers on it, in the
autumn after that diYcult winter the ONS was
reporting 100,000 manufacturing jobs lost and
relative energy prices were cited as a major reason
for that, and we think there is a danger of that
recurring in the future.
Q287 Chairman: Mr Conway, it was your evidence
that showed the graphs of electricity price
comparisons and it is quite worrying electricity
prices in the UK over our European competitors.
The CIA has many members with foreign
headquarters so loyalty to the UK is not necessarily
very high in these companies.
Mr Conway: I cannot remember when I submitted
that andwhat date it is but the interesting thing is the
curve has continued upwards and it is actually a
greater gap than it was when we sent in our evidence.
MrTane: Perhaps I could give my own example.My
business manufactures our core products in the UK,
Germany, Norway, Sweden and Italy, and 70% of
the cost of making our basic product is energy, so
when the cost of energy in the UK is as
uncompetitive as it is versus those other countries,
we have a very simple choice as to where we put our
investment, and the longer this situation in the UK
persists the more we will be driven—unwillingly
actually—to put our investments into Continental
plants to the detriment of our own position in the
UK but also to the detriment of the UK chemical
industry because we are a supplier of basic chemicals
to the whole UK industry. I think the chemical
industry in general is in exactly that position; it is a
multi-national industry, it operates globally and
generally speaking in global markets. It cannot
aVord to pay uncompetitive prices for one of its key
inputs, in this case energy, because that means it
cannot compete on the world stage.
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Q288 Chairman:A lot of your products presumably
are commodities so price is the key determinant of
who buys what?
Mr Tane: Yes, we are the UK’s only manufacturer
of PVC which is a commodity plastic and business
changes hands if your price is 1% or 2% out they will
go to the French competition or the Belgian
competition, and when 70% of the cost is energy and
energy is overpriced by 15% or 20 %, that is much
more than 1% or 2% diVerences.
Q289 Chairman: We will move on to the way the
markets work and some more detailed questions.
Just one question from me which does not require a
particularly long answer. If things remain
unchanged, do you think the UK wholesale gas and
electricity prices are going to remain consistently
above the European prices in the medium term?
MrNicholson: In themedium term I think it is highly
likely that electricity prices will stay above. We are
approaching something of a supply crunch in
electricity in the medium term. In the long term we
might have some solutions. Also we are rather more
exposed to carbon prices in theUK than for example
markets like France. In gas I do not know whether
we will trade at a premium or not but we do know
that our prices are more volatile and there is greater
risk so even if on average our prices are the same as
they are in Continental Europe the risk of price
spikes is higher.
Mr Binley: Do you ascribe this primarily to the lack
of storage facility?
Chairman: I think I am going to bring in Mr
Clapham straight away because that is really what
Mick wanted to ask.
Q290 Mr Clapham: What we have just heard that
energy prices are a threat to UK competitiveness is
reallyworrying.One of the things thatwe have noted
is the linkage between the oil price contracts and of
course that indexation that knocks on to gas. It has
been described to us as being quite an irrational
linkage. Is it your view that that linkage needs to be
decoupled? Is there any possibility that you can see
of that being done?
Mr Nicholson: You asked two questions there.
Chairman: It slightly anticipates what Mr Bailey is
going to ask about later as well so I have got to keep
control of my Committee here as well as my
witnesses!
Q291 Mr Clapham: I will direct that to LNG in
particular. We see that the gas market is changing of
course: we have got LNG coming into the market;
there is what is left from theNorth Sea, and of course
there is the Interconnector from Europe and the
linkage of course with Norway, so there are a
number of inputs of gas. There is a view that LNG
is actually determining the price and particularly we
see that in winter. Is that your view and is there
anything that you feel might be done?
Mr Conway: Our view of the market in essence is
that the oil price linkage in Continental Europe and
in other markets is eVectively putting a ﬂoor on our
gas prices so they are unlikely for any length of time
to drop below that oil-indexed level from
Continental Europe and elsewhere. LNG is
increasingly important as a marginal fuel,
particularly in winter periods, and youwill have seen
the projections for where we might conceivably be in
20 years’ time. That inﬂuence is only going to grow.
The LNGmarket is highly inﬂuenced by the oil price
and, for reasons we might explore later, we may end
up having to pay a premium over true contracted
LNG in other markets in order to make sure those
cargoes arrive in the UK. Therefore there is every
expectation that our prices could be at least as high
if not higher than Continental prices on an average
basis, and on those occasions when gas prices are
lower internationally countries with greater storage
capacity than we have can take advantage of it; and
we cannot. I do not know if Chris has anything to
add on that because he has an interest in storage as
well.
Mr Tane: Just to give you some statistics. I think
after the new storage comes on-stream in three or
four years, theUKwill have 19 days of storage. That
compares to 99 days in Germany, 122 days in
France, and I believe similar sorts of levels in the
States, so one thing that is clear is that this country
has a very, very low level of storage and that must be
one of the factors in driving the way, both the level
of prices and the volatility of prices. Going back to
the oil linkage point just to reinforce what Jeremy
said, fundamentally what we see is that in the
summer UK prices are at the same level as the
Continent and in the winter they operate at a
premium to the Continent, so from where I sit it will
be extremely desirable if I could buy gas on the
Continent on a Continental-type of contract but, for
whatever reason, that appears not to be possible.My
company last year bought space on the
Interconnector, we went into Europe, we talked to
19 suppliers, many of whom supply our sites on the
Continent and we asked them to give us gas on the
same basis that we would transport it to the UK. Of
the 19 we approached we got six replies and all six
supplies oVered us prices based on the UK pricing
structure not the Continental pricing structure and
adamantly refused to give us prices based on the
Continental contracts that we were enjoying over
there.
Chairman: We are straying into other territory and
we should try and stick to infrastructure. That is very
helpful but we are trying to stay on infrastructure at
present so back to Mr Clapham.
Q292MrClapham: It certainly is helpful in the sense
that we can see that that pressure does contribute
towards increasing the price. Just coming back to
LNG, and the storage issue, why is it that the
terminal at the Isle of Grain is not actually being
used in 2008? What is your view of that?
Mr Nicholson: We want to know the reason for that
but we have some suspicions, one of which centres
round the access arrangements at that terminal. We
understand that the arrangements there mean that
there is only a relatively short number of days’ notice
of when a spare berthing slot comes up and that in
practical terms it is almost impossible for a third
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party to make use of that with such short notice.
There may be other explanations, and perhaps you
might wish to ask terminal operators or indeed the
regulator their view about this, but in our view it was
a mistake for the UK to exempt the import facilities
from regulated third party access and more eVective
“use it or lose it” provisions which will give notice to
the market suYciently in advance of spare berthing
capacity. I think I am right in saying that we have
seen no evidence that a third party has ever been able
to make use of that terminal in the entire time it has
been operational. We hope this is not going to be
replicated on a larger scale when the new and larger
terminals open at Milford Haven.
Q293 Mr Clapham: Has that view been expressed at
all to the Department for Business and Enterprise
and, if so, what is the response?
Mr Nicholson: Very clearly by ourselves and indeed
to Ofgem, the market regulator, who were
responsible for accepting these arrangements in the
ﬁrst place.
Q294 Mr Clapham: Just looking at the import
capacity, the opening ofMilford Haven for example
gives greater gas storage. What kind of eVect do you
feel that will have on price volatility? Is it something
that is likely to be advantageous or disadvantageous
to industry?
Mr Nicholson: To the extent that we need the
capacity to import the gas, it is advantageous to have
it. It is necessary but not suYcient to ﬁx the problem.
As we have mentioned, if you have import capacity,
if you do not have adequate access arrangements
and you do not have the storage to go with it, then
we are not going to get the full advantage of that
potential ﬂow. There is one other aspect to it, in
many othermarkets there is a greater degree of LNG
being precontracted whereas in the UK, at least at
the moment, it seems that it is very much driven by
the availability of spot cargoes. That is a very risky
model on which to run the security of the gas system
which will ultimately depend on those cargoes being
there. As we discovered in recent months and years,
wemay have to pay an extraordinary premium to get
those cargos to arrive in the UK perhaps at a higher
price than industry is able to aVord for its gas.
Mr Tane: The experience with the existing terminal
running well below capacity suggests that terminal
capacity is not the issue so just addingmore capacity
is not going to do very much; the real issue is what is
it that is preventing the gas actually coming through
the terminal in suYcient quantity, and that is the
problem that needs solving.
Q295 Mr Clapham: What kind of responses again
have you received from Business and Enterprise
because you have raised these issues with them and
they know full well what your view is. Are they
sympathetic? Have they made any suggestions with
regards to solutions?
Mr Nicholson: The response we have had is that
decisions have been made and it is diYcult to change
them. The investment has gone ahead on the
assumption that there would be the current access
arrangements and we have heard nothing back,
either from BERR particularly or Ofgem, to suggest
that they are minded to change the arrangements,
which in our view is regrettable.
Mr Clapham: I think that it is a very important issue
that we may raise with BERR.
Q296 Miss Kirkbride: I was very shocked by the
ﬁgure that you gave about the storage capacity that
we have in the UK.Why is that and whose fault is it?
Mr Tane: I think the reason why is that until six or
seven years ago the view was that we had plenty of
storage, it was called the North Sea, and of course
when we had plenty of gas coming out of the North
Sea it was always there underground and could be
turned on or oV as needed. It seems to me that
somehow the authorities, the market, whatever, has
failed to recognise what is now happening which is
the decline of availability in the North Sea.
Q297 Miss Kirkbride: How could that be? There are
plenty of statisticians to tell you how much is left.
How can that possibly be that someone has not
worked that out?
Mr Tane: I can only join you in the question. I think
it has been predictable for many years that this
decline in availability would come and I am
staggered to see that there was no forward thinking
in terms of what diVerence it would make once we
were in deﬁcit.
Chairman: In the interests ofmaking progress I think
you have made your point.
Q298 Miss Kirkbride: Does the Government or the
market have a responsibility that that infrastructure
was not built? It is quite an important question,
Chairman, because if theGovernment or the market
has a reasonability for that infrastructure not
being built—
Mr Nicholson: There is a bit of both is the short
answer. I am sure that the oil and gas industry would
say that planning is a big problem in doing anything
at the moment on energy infrastructure including
storage facilities. That does not explain the extent of
the deﬁcit but it does explain why perhaps that has
been a barrier to getting things on-stream as quickly
as we would like. I would come back to the point are
the incentives for suppliers, particularly suppliers to
the domestic sector where the big swing in demand
for gas comes from, suYciently strong to get them to
invest in the storage that is necessary to secure
supply? Because at the moment if the system breaks
down, as it very nearly did two winters ago and we
came within 24 hours of rationing gas to our
members, and indeed some of our members shut
their plants down for as long as three months as a
result, the default position if we run short on gas is
that ourmembers get their plants shut down in order
to ensure security of supply for the domestic sector.
That cannot be a sustainable model for managing
our energy security.
Q299 Chairman: To answer Miss Kirkbride’s
question then, you blame the regulator for not
putting in place the right market incentives?
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Mr Nicholson: I think we would question whether
these incentives are strong enough. I think there is a
separate but related question as to whether the UK
for strategic reasons needs a strategic gas resource,
but that is somewhat diVerent from the market
question.
Chairman: We will have to move on but thank you,
that was very helpful.
Mr Clapham: Chairman, could I ask one ﬁnal
question ofMr Tane: the situation that you describe
where you went into Europe to buy gas but you
could not get the gas, even though there would have
been space on the Interconnector, again have these
issues been raised—
Chairman: I am actually going to say that Adrian
Bailey is going to ask these questions in some detail
now. Hear what Mr Clapham said and answer that
when we deal with Adrian’s questions.
Q300 Mr Bailey: Before I focus on some more
detailed questions, I personally, and I think
probably other members of the Committee, would
like to get a grasp of the whole issue of the wholesale
gas market and its liquidity. This is an issue which,
forgive me, is jargon-ridden and you will use phrases
every day that we may not be fully understanding
of—I am looking at “forward supply models”,
“long-term contracts”, “index-linked contracts”, the
“oil/gas price link”—and I think it would be helpful
before we went into the more detailed questions if
you could deﬁne exactly what you mean, and the
best way of doing so might be if I were to be a gas
consumer and wanted to get a contract to supply gas
to me, what would be the theoretical options in
purchasing that gas, what would be the practical
options and, if you like, what would determine what
I had to do on this?
Mr Nicholson: Typically industrial consumers will
sign up to 12-month contracts. There is no limit on
that, sometimes you have longer contracts,
sometimes you have shorter, through a supplier in
principle the same way we do as domestic users, and
the price quoted by the supplier will almost certainly
be calculated on the basis of forward market price in
the wholesale market in the UK plus some
additional costs for distribution.
Q301Mr Bailey:What is a forward market price, to
get to the basics?
Mr Nicholson: That is the price in the wholesale
market for a continuous supply of gas over the next
12 months or the month ahead, averaged out, or it
could be done seasonally. One of the alternatives to
that is to have a contract which is where the price of
gas varies throughout the contract period. It is not
quite a spot market price, it is the prompt market,
the day ahead price that tends to determine the costs.
In other words, it is not a ﬁxed price contract, it
depends what happens on a day-to-day basis. Those
are the two principal options. It is rather diVerent,
by the way, in Continental markets where virtually
all sales are indexed on a lagged basis not to a
wholesale market price but to the price of oil
products, and that is where the oil price linkage
comes in.
Q302 Mr Bailey: Right so all other things being
equal the normal preference would be to link to a
forward market price?
Mr Nicholson: Typically yes.
Q303Mr Bailey: Sowhy do gas sellers not sell on the
forward market, which seems to be a problem?
Mr Nicholson: The problem might actually be more
acute in power than it is in gas, but it is a question
that we have asked ourselves and not come to a
conclusive answer. It is certainly true that we have a
more liquid, in other words more trading going on
forward market in gas than many other European
countries, but whether it is adequate is another
matter. I am sure Chris will add to this but
presumably it is not in the commercial interests of
those who are producing and supplying to sell their
gas in this way. They perhaps would be better placed
to say why but what we can see is there is no
alternative for consumers out there and that
relatively small volumes of trading in a thinly traded
market in the future are eVectively determining the
price for all our members’ contracts.
Mr Conway: All the suppliers link their gas prices to
the forwardmarket but as far as we can see they only
buy their gas through bilateral over-the-counter
deals which of course are not transparent. In that bit
we do not know what is going on.
Mr Tane: Clearly volatility and unpredictability is a
major factor, meaning whether to me as a customer
or I am sure to the suppliers, it is very, very diYcult
indeed to predict what the cost or price of gas, in this
case, is going to be 12 months from now in this
market. On the Continent you can look at the way
oil prices are moving and you can come up with a
fairly good prediction where gas will be but in this
market it is very, very diYcult to predict that for a
number of reasons. Because of that I think the
suppliers err on the side of caution and they do not
make commitments long term because they do not
knowwhat the cost to them is going to be 12 months
from now, so they prefer to stay mostly on spot
trading because they can always sell at whatever
today’s price is and I have got to pay it. They have
no incentive to do long-term deals with anybody.
Q304 Mr Bailey: I need to get it clear in my mind.
There is relatively little gas available for the forward
price market and that is because suppliers are
obviously supplying gas in terms of other sorts of
contracts. Exactly where are these contracts focused
and what sort of percentage of the total supply is
involved in these contracts?
Mr Nicholson: I am not sure we could give you
ﬁgures on that. I am sure the gas producers and
suppliers could, but if you look at the volumes that
are being traded in forward market compared with
the total volume of gas that is sold in aggregate, there
is a very big diVerence between the two and plainly
most of the rest is sold between suppliers or, in the
case of vertically integrated producers, contracted
internally on a diVerent basis, and I do not think we
could easily comment on the nature of those deals.
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Q305 Mr Bailey: Is that because of the scale of
vertical integration in the market?
Mr Nicholson: It is a factor, perhaps a stronger
factor in electricity than it is in gas. In gas there is
more in the way of independent suppliers and
separation with producers so I do not think vertical
integration can be the whole explanation there.
MrBailey:Could you elaborate a little further on the
oil/gas price link
Q306 Chairman: Why is it still there? Why can the
European Commission not just say get rid of it?
Mr Nicholson: That is a very good question. In fact
when we have dealt through the European
organisation with the Commission we have been
asking that same question. There is no reason why
there should not be oil-indexed sales if producers
and consumers want to do those sorts of deals; it is
the fact that there is no choice in the Continental
markets that should raise suspicions. I know that is
a view shared by energywatch here, quite rightly.
When all suppliers—and I am trying to avoid using
the word “conspire”—coincidentally agree to price
their product on a consistent basis right across the
market, there is no choice at all. In the UK it is all
on the basis of the wholesale price in ourmarket here
with the margin. In the Continental markets it is all
on the basis of indexation to oil products and it
oVers no choice. Incidentally, sometimes they are the
same players in the UK and Continental market but
strangely on the Continent they will only oVer one
type of model and in the UK they will only oVer the
other. If you go to that supplier and say, asChris and
others have tried to do, “I would like one of your
Continental-style deals in the UK,” they will not
provide it, nor will they provide a UK-based deal on
the Continent. That should raise the suspicions of
any competition regulation in my view and it should
be a matter for the European Commission to get to
the bottom of it.
Mr Bailey: Presumably the Continental model is
cheaper than the model in the UK?
Q307 Chairman: We are going to move on to the
European gas market.
Mr Nicholson: That will vary from time to time.
Chairman: I am going to bring in a couple of
colleagues with supplementaries on this aspect of the
liquidity of the wholesale gas market here in the UK
and then come back to the European market in
more detail.
Q308 Mr Weir: Throughout our evidence sessions
we have been talking particularly about domestic
customers and it has been suggested to us that the
linkage between oil and gas is pushing up prices in
the UK. What I am getting from you is a slightly
diVerent story where you seem to be wishing you
could get the contracts that are linked to oil. It seems
to be totally the other side of the coin. Why is that?
Do you believe it is beneﬁcial? Is it beneﬁcial because
it gives certainty about price or is there another
reason why you believe it is beneﬁcial?
MrNicholson:That is a good question. Please do not
interpret from our remarks that we like oil
indexation and no choice or that we do not like the
competitive market; quite the contrary. There is an
interesting question however, and you will possibly
have seen from the graph in the our evidence that
over the last three years, if you compare the year
ahead wholesale price here with the Continental oil-
indexed price elsewhere in Europe, there has been no
advantage to the UK from our competitive market
compared with largely state-owned monopolies in
the rest of Europe. What does that say about the
state of competition in our market? The point is
whether competition is delivering what it
theoretically could in the UK. You would imagine
that averaged over time it should be an advantage in
the UK but at the moment we seem to have
historically recently no net advantage and some
considerable periods of disadvantage.
Q309 Mr Weir: Is that because in the UK the same
thing is happening—people are looking at forward
oil prices and, if you like, projecting their own price
against where they think the oil price is going to be?
Mr Nicholson: First I should say that we all
understand that it was inevitable that gas prices were
going to go up in the UK given the pressure on
energy prices internationally. We make no
complaint about that. It is diYcult for all classes of
consumers but it is a fact of life so to some extent we
were always going to have to absorb these sorts of
increases in price because that is what is happening
internationally. However, what we have seen is UK
prices spiking above the Continental level in a way
which we would argue is avoidable both in its
frequency and its intensity, and I would go back to
the central point, why are we paying either the same
or a premium relative to monopolistic markets
where there is virtually no choice at all?
Q310Mr Binley: I think this is a very vital point. We
have boasted about a competitive market and the
truth of the matter is it does not exist. Where does
the competitive edge lie and how big is that
competitive edge; what percentage of the total area
is that competitive edge?
Mr Nicholson: I am sure my colleagues will
contribute to this but my initial comment is that we
have historically beneﬁted from it. In a period when
the UK was in surplus with gas we had an extremely
competitive gas market. Unfortunately, partly due
to circumstances beyond our direct control, that
advantage has been lost and arguably we are in a
more risky situation now. In electricity the reasons
are slightly diVerent because we have seen market
concentration and greater vertical integration.
Q311 Chairman: Mr Binley will be asking that
question later.
Mr Nicholson: To a lesser extent that has happened
in gas too. There are a number of reasons why our
competitive market is not delivering competitive
prices and that of course is what matters to
consumers.
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Q312 Mr Binley: Sorry, there must be a competitive
edge somewhere or people would not be competing
to sell you their product. Where does it lie?
Mr Nicholson: It lies in the last 0.5 %.
Q313 Mr Binley: That narrow a margin?
Mr Nicholson: Yes.
Mr Tane: To be clear, as I said before, my business
is the largest single point consumer of electricity and
the third largest industrial consumer of gas in the
UK. Nobody has competed to get my business. I
have never ever, with one notable exception, had an
approach from any gas or electricity supplier trying
to get my business.
Mr Binley: That is crazy.
Q314Chairman:That is interesting and a very telling
observation you just made. Can I ask one question
just to clarify stuV that has been said. Your forward
price contracts are based on prices in a
malfunctioning market a market with almost no
liquidity where strange things can happen for
whatever reason—speculation, hoarding, all kinds
of bad things can happen in that market—and that
badly functioning market determines your
underlying price?
Mr Nicholson: Absolutely and has a knock-on eVect
on power prices too.
Mr Tane: And determines whether my business can
compete with French, German and Belgian
producers.
Chairman: Thank you very much, I think we have
pinned that down. Mike, do you want to come to
your main questions.
Q315MrWeir: I am still a bit confused by this whole
linkage between oil and gas prices. Mr Tane, you
said that the European supplier would not give you
the same contractual terms.Did they give any reason
why they would not give you these contractual
terms?
Mr Tane: The nearest we got to a reason was, “The
UK operates on a diVerent pricing model and that is
the only one we are prepared to oVer you.”
Q316 Mr Weir: So in eVect there is no European-
wide model despite what the EU may be saying
about competition?
Mr Tane: In my simple summary there is a
Continental model, potentially a Scandinavian
model and a UK model in terms of pricing
structures.
Q317MrWeir:And you cannot get the same type of
contracts from the UK suppliers as available in the
European mainland?
Mr Tane: Correct and to come back to your
question earlier as to why would I want to get a
Continental-style contract, the ﬁrst thing is I would
like to have a choice. At the moment I have one
choice and that is it. I would like to have more than
one choice. The second thing is, as I said before, I am
competing with French, German and Belgian
produces (and I do not care what my price of gas is;
what I care about is that it is same price or better
than the others) and at the moment I am facing the
situation where my price is either the same or worse
than theirs and is much more unpredictable and
volatile than theirs, so I am losing out quite
considerably.
Q318 MrWeir: We have heard a lot in our evidence
about this famous Interconnector between the
European mainland and the UK. We are told that
Sam Laidlaw of British Gas has noted that the UK
is in danger of becoming a gas lender of last resort to
Europe in the sense that they will take gas from us
when they need it but will not give it back when we
need it. Is that your experience of what is
happening there?
MrNicholson:Yes and it leaves us very vulnerable as
a highly gas-dependent nation. Maybe that did not
matter so much when we had a lot more indigenous
production but that is in decline. We are becoming
more gas-intensive if you look at the demand from
the power sector just at the time when we are
becoming exposed to some very diYcult price
inﬂuences from outside. You have mentioned what
we see as an inequitable asymmetry. In short they
have got access to our markets; we have not got
equitable access to theirs; we cannot access their
storage facilities; we cannot get access to the
pipelines; we cannot get access to contracts on the
same terms. We have “done the right thing” by
liberalising our market but trying to operate an
import-dependent liberalised market in a less
liberalised whole is leaving us in a very vulnerable
position.
Q319MrWeir: Is the real problem then the failure of
the European mainland, particularly Germany and
France, to liberalise their markets and, if so, what do
you feel the European Commission should be doing
about it to end this situation and have a true free
market across the European Union?
Mr Nicholson: It is unquestionably the case that the
biggest fault lies with other European countries that
have not liberalised their markets. In our view, the
Commission has proposed some very sensible
arrangements to help bring that about, not
dissimilar to the sort of reforms we instituted here in
the UK. The problem is not so much with the
Commission but with a number of other European
Member States who, despite what they have said
publicly, have no intention of fully liberalising their
gas markets, and here I think some criticism is due
of BERR and DTI previously in undue optimism
about this. We applaud the eVorts they have made
to campaign for liberalisation. Indeed, we have been
supporting them in doing it in Europe but, as with so
many European issues, I think there has been a level
of naivety about what our competitors—and they
still are competitors within this allegedly single
European market—are actually going to do. We
need to face up to it because our security of supply
depends on this.
Q320 Mr Binley: That is my next question. Given
that our European partners are not doing what they
said they would do and there is no liberalisation of
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the markets, it is clearly having an adverse eVect on
industry within the UK and on domestic customers
in the UK, so what should the UK Government do
about it, should they be rowing back from the
liberalisation that they have already gone down?
Mr Nicholson: We are not arguing to go against the
liberalisation agenda but we do feel that we may
need to modify our somewhat fundamentalist
market stance, which in an ideal world would not be
problematic, to ﬁt the reality that we are hooked up
to and import dependent on a less liberalised
European market and unless and until that changes
we might need a more interventionist stance, for
example on gas storage and other measures in order
to make sure that we are not at a disadvantage.
Q321 Mr Weir: To go back to Miss Kirkbride’s
earlier question then, whose responsibility is it?
Should the UKGovernment be taking this action or
should it be Ofgem the regulator?
Mr Nicholson: I guess ultimately it is a political
decision. We do not fault Ofgem for presuming that
the best solutions are likely to lie in themarket. In an
ideal world that is true but a political judgment
needs to be made about what realistically is going to
happen within the rest of the European Union
within the foreseeable future.
Q322 Mr Weir: Given the diYculties which we have
heard particularly fromMr Tane about whether this
will impact upon manufacturing and industry usage
in the UK, what sort of timescale are we talking
about for something to be done about this? We have
talked about the liberalisation of markets in the rest
of the EU for years now. We visited the EU
Commission and I do not think those of us whowere
there are in anyway surprised at what you are saying
about the attitude of some other EU countries,
despite what the Commission may be saying. What
timescale are we talking about for something to be
done about this and to stop chasing a dream that is
never going to happen to liberalise the European
market?
Mr Nicholson: When we gave evidence to the Trade
and Industry Committee a few years ago, our view
was that it could take ten years before we sorted out
the market liberalisation, and that is still our view a
few years later. Who knows whether that will
actually be achieved. The problem is to eVect more
changes on gas storage and so on, and there are lead
times there and there is a limit to what can be done
in the short term, but at least we can be planning
within the investment horizon ahead of us over the
next three, four or ﬁve years to ameliorate some of
this risk.
Mr Conway: We have to accept the fact that some
countries regard their energy suppliers as strategic
assets. It is not three months ago that Suez and Gaz
de France merged; that would have never been
allowed in this country.
Q323 Mr Oaten: Could you just repeat what you
said; I did not quite catch it.
Mr Conway: Suez and Gaz de France have merged.
Q324 Chairman: Giving them what market share?
Mr Conway: I do not know what the market share is
but it is a very big gas supplier in France. I am not
arguing that they are right or wrong; it is just a fact.
Q325 Mr Weir: But is that not indicative of the fear
that many of us have that despite what is being said
publicly about European liberalisation, on the
European mainland it is actually going the other
way, with indications for example of EDF trying to
take over Iberdrola which would have a knock-on
eVect on Scottish Power in the UK?
Mr Nicholson: I think that is correct. However, we
should not generalise too much. There has been
progress in some European markets. The
Netherlands for example is moving in the right
direction on liberalisation and there has been some
progress, more so on electricity than gas in some
other markets too. It is not universally negative but
in terms of what is material and aVects the UK
market there are no grounds for optimism there at
the moment.
Mr Tane: If I may come back to your earlier
question, speaking as a company competing in
Europe, it is perfectly clear that the liberalisation of
the Continental markets will not happen for the next
ten years. It seems really clear to me that British
industry, unless something signiﬁcant is changed
during that ten-year period, will be damaged
irreparably because once these kinds of assets close
down they are not going to come back to the UK
and, as we have already heard, in the last major crisis
two years ago 100,000 manufacturing jobs went.My
own company had to cut back production for four
months; we were very, very close to stopping
production altogether. Those kind of issueswill keep
on recurring unless something happens and saying
that it will all be solved in ten years’ time when
liberalisation happens on the Continent is far too
far away.
Q326 Miss Kirkbride: So in your view what should
happen now?
Mr Tane: It is a complex question. There are a
number of ideas which industry and the diVerent
bodies here have suggested, relating to things like
storage, access to import assets, and strategic stocks
for example. There are a number of diVerent ideas
which have been ﬂoated, many of which I am sure
will not be the answer or will not be the only answer,
but I think the starting point would be that
government, BERR and Ofgem actually recognise
that there is a problem that needs solving here rather
than telling us that it will be all right on the night,
which is what we have had for the last few years.
Mr Nicholson: And I would add that critical to that
is making sure that our electricity supplies diversify
away from gas as well.
Chairman: We are going to move on to electricity
now because we are getting a bit short of time and it
is Mr Binley’s set of questions now.
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Q327 Mr Binley: I am coming on to that but I want
to ask a question at the end of the other bit. Are not
the next ten years the most vital ten years in the next
50 years with regard to the global challenge?
Mr Nicholson: Yes.
Q328Mr Binley: I wanted that on the record, that is
really why I asked it, Chairman. Can we now move
on to this whole question of vertical integration and
the need for competitiveness in the British market
because the whole of the British market has closed
down over the last ﬁve years not increased. We have
now got six major suppliers. I think that the number
of smaller suppliers has gone down dramatically and
in fact people cannot now get into the market, in
truth, because it is so wrapped up. This is a pretty
dire situation, is it not? What can we do to change
that and make this a more competitive market on
that level? I have got some ideas but I wanted
yours ﬁrst.
MrNicholson: I should say that we have been raising
repeated concerns with the energy regulator and
with BERR about increasing concentration in the
power market for some time now. If you asked us I
would rather not be in this position to start with but
at least let us not make it any worse. You will be
hearing from the independent generators shortly,
but our expectation is that we are going to lose one
of them and there are precious few independent
generators left within the market, so I do think it is
timely to assess whether the markets have already
become too concentrated in power generation and,
to the extent that vertical integration has become an
issue, we do not have a fundamental view that
vertical integration is necessarily bad, it is the extent
of it and the fact there are so few independents that
worries us. Perhaps you heard some suggestions
fromAllanAsher of energywatch, some of which are
worth pursuing, about the extent to which vertically
integrated players might be encouraged by one
means or another to sell power outside their own
business.
Q329 Mr Binley: Can I ask the other two gentlemen
to comment on that because it seems to me to be a
vital issue, and thereafter can we talk about what we
might do.
Mr Conway: I think there is one other point that
needs to be made. As far as we understand it, the
independent generators do not trade their electricity;
they actually sell on bilateral, over-the-counter deals
and of course it is totally opaque. We have no idea
reallywhat is going on and in fact I have been talking
to one or two of our members one of whom buys at
least £50 million worth of electricity a year and he
has tried to persuade one of the independent
generators to sell his electricity through the market
but they said, “We will go and talk to”—I am being
a bit naughty here—“our friendly supplier,” sort of
thing, and it is worrying. I think our view is that
there needs to be more liquidity even if it is forced.
Q330 Mr Binley: I have got a seller of energy who
sells about £100 million a year to about 40,000
business clients. He would argue that the vertical
integration integrated market is in fact a very
unhelpful trend and he fears that there will not be
room for his £100 million a year supply business to
operate unless we do do something. Do you think
that is so?
Mr Nicholson: It is a genuine fear. In response to
your earlier question I said we should look at
whether concentration had gone too far, but perhaps
a bigger question is why that concentration has
occurred in the ﬁrst place and what are the drivers
behind it. One of them is the complexity of operating
in the market and in our evidence, I think probably
consistent with that which you may have received
from the power industry itself, the barriers to entry
to this market, the complexity, the costs of ensuring
your demand and supply portfolio are in balance
have now become a big deterrent to new entrants to
the market and independents in particular.
Q331 Mr Binley: It is even worse than that because
the big suppliers in order to guarantee supplies are
now demanding shares of that business, are they
not?
Mr Nicholson: Yes.
Q332 Mr Binley: Is there not a monopolist problem
here that we ought to be dealing with?
Mr Nicholson: Clearly we have got a market that is
dominated by an oligopoly and much though all
players in markets like to moan about regulation,
the brutal truth is that large oligopolistic players
quite like regulation as a means of keeping
competition out. In our view, we fully understand
the theoretical arguments in favour of reﬁning the
market and so on but sometimes you need to
recognise there is a trade-oV between theoretical
market eYciency, which Ofgem is very keen on, and
transaction costs, which are a big problem for the
energy industry and the costs of which ultimately get
passed on to us as consumers. We are not clear that
we have got that balance right.
Q333 Mr Binley: What if we legislated to require all
generators to auction 20% of their capacity.
Mr Tane: I would be delighted, to put it simply. One
of the very strange characteristics of this market in
my opinion is the absence of small independent
players. Any other market I buy in, if I buy raw
materials, if I buy steel, or whatever, one of the
things you ﬁnd in a properly functioning market is
the core producers but also traders and independent
operators. They are pretty much absent in the UK
energy market and the key question for further
consideration is what could be done to create that
secondary market, or to bring it back, because I
believe that if therewere a bigger independent traded
sector, whether that is by forcing a percentage to be
sold or whatever, that would give companies like
mine and industries like ours the opportunity to
make choices where at the moment we have one
choice and one choice only.
Mr Binley: I am perfectly happy and I think we all
know about integrated markets.
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Q334 Chairman: Can I put a contentious
proposition to you: the sale of British Energy to a
existing vertically integrated supplier should only be
permitted if a volume of its production is traded
openly.
Mr Nicholson: I think that is an idea well worth
pursuing. We should say that we value the role of
British Energy not just as a key base load supplier
but also as the largest supplier to the industrial
sector.We do not want to lose that from the market,
we do not want to see a further reduction in liquidity
in the market, and if as a result of a takeover there
were some compensatory arrangements which
ensured that market competition and volatility were
not adversely aVected I think we would welcome it.
Q335 Mr Binley: May I go on very quickly to the
question of British champions. You have already
made the point that the European market is
becoming more monopolistic and the French
example is not surprising because the French do
those sorts of things, quite frankly, irrespective of
what the EU says. Given that scenario, should the
Government be putting much more pressure on the
creation of a British champion?
Mr Conway: I do not think that it would achieve
anything necessarily. The important thing is the
result rather than the action, if I can put it that way.
Mr Nicholson: We do not favour the national
champion route, as you might not be surprised to
hear. However, there are means of supporting a
nationally based industry short of subsidy or unfair
interference in the market, not least facilitating the
sort of investment and reducing barriers on planning
and so on that some of those companies wish to
pursue, and especially on the nuclear issue, so there
are areas of technology where British Energy for
example has experience and some other players like
Centrica have a very experienced role in the gas
market, that could theoretically be extended
elsewhere in Europe. I think they deserve support in
the broadest sense and it is a shame that they do not
have the opportunities to explore that experience as
wewould like elsewhere in Europe. I thinkwe should
be very wary of going down the national champion
route.
Q336 Mr Binley: Okay but importing one from
France, is that going to be any better?
Mr Nicholson: It would be unwise of us not to take
advantage of inward investment from France or
elsewhere or indeed their expertise in new build in a
number of technologies.
Q337 Miss Kirkbride: It is quite clear that you see
market consolidation as yet another problem in
terms of what is happening in the gas and electricity
markets. Why do you think that has happened? Do
you agree, for example, with energywatch that it
should be a Competition Commission inquiry that
breaks all this up?
Mr Nicholson: My colleagues may go further than
me in saying this but it was not central to our
submission that we were calling for a Competition
Commission referral. We said that if others had
evidence it is required we would obviously support
it; equally if it was felt necessary to clear the air, we
would support it too. What we would say is that we
think that the market, for whatever reason, has
become too concentrated. The regulator, even if it
felt it could have done more to ﬁght against this
trend in the past, may ﬁnd it diYcult to admit that it
has got things wrong in the past, so an independent
investigation could have advantages. There are
disadvantages as well given that we are moving into
a very big investment phase of power generation
which has implications for our security of supply.
We recognise that the timing of such an investigation
might be unhelpful from the point of view of putting
in tens of thousands of megawatts of new capacity
onto the system. On the other hand, maybe that will
not happen suYciently as it should do or in as timely
a manner without an eYcient market.
Q338 Miss Kirkbride: I would like to hear everyone
else but your point of view is that you think the
regulator has basically been sleeping on watch?
Mr Nicholson: All I can say is that the regulator put
out a public statement in January this year
reassuring the Chancellor that the market was
working and then ﬁve weeks later announced an
investigation to see why it might not be working
(incidentally, leaving out the industrial sector as part
of that investigation). At least one of those two
announcements must have been ﬂawed. I do not
think that was the regulator’s ﬁnest hour and that
these problems have been creeping up on us for some
time. We should say we are strong supporters of
Ofgem and independent regulation but no
organisation is perfect and I think the evidence that
is staring us in the face from prices now should give
them and us reasons to reconsider our views on this.
Q339Miss Kirkbride:Again just going back to what
you have just said there, you say you are strong
supporters of Ofgem and an independent regulator,
but from everything that you have said today, which
I think is frankly quite alarming in terms of UK plc,
somebody has to take responsibility for all of this
and so if the regulator is a good idea in principle but
is not doing it, should they not have been sacked? I
just think this is such a serious situation that has
been allowed to develop and yet I can see the buck
been passed quickly round the table as fast as
possible so that no-one ends up taking responsibility
for what is a very serious situation. Where do you
think the buck stops?
Mr Nicholson: You might say ultimately that the
political buck stops with the government
department but certainly there are devolved
responsibilities for the regulator and if a market is
becoming too concentrated, if it is not
demonstrating in its operation that it is eYcient (not
within its own internal terms but by comparison
with our immediate neighbours) and the empirical
evidence is there that our prices are not competitive
in our market, that is what matters to us as
consumers, and if that is the benchmark we are
judging ourselves against, our market is currently
failing.
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Q340 Miss Kirkbride: Do you think it should be the
regulator or the Competition Commission?
Mr Conway: Not the regulator.
Q341 Miss Kirkbride: He has already failed.
Mr Conway: Deﬁnitely not the regulator; the
regulator has already prejudged this by saying he
does not want to investigate the industrial market.
He is currently investigating the domestic market,
and in fact he keeps on saying the market is working
but he does not look at our side of it at all. Maybe
he should or maybe he should not, that is another
issue, but I think whoever investigates it has got to
be fully independent.
Mr Tane: I would say both for my business and for
the CIA, our view is not that there is anti-
competitive behaviour per se going on; our view is
the way that the market is structured is the heart of
the problem, so to that extent a competition inquiry
of course would throw up some interesting things, it
would certainly focus attention on a core issue for
us, but in the end I think we believe it is the structure
of the market that needs to change not some
competition laws that need to change.
Q342Miss Kirkbride:When you say the structure of
the market, is that about dismantling some of the
vertical and horizontal integration that has taken
place? If it is that, how else do you do it?
Mr Tane: For example the structure of the market
issue that we have talked about already in terms of
the absence of independent players is well worthy of
investigation as to exactly why that is. We believe
that changes could be made which would encourage
new entrants rather than discourage them, and that
in itself would be very helpful.
Q343 Miss Kirkbride: Who would make those
changes to ensure that happens, not to just allow it
to happen, because at the moment it happens if
someone just snaZes them up presumably so that
they cannot—
Mr Tane: I think that is a more technical question
than I can answer.My colleagues here can talk about
which body should be bringing those changes in.
Mr Nicholson: We have an independent regulator
but nonetheless its judgments are aVected by things
that happen outside. We have seen this with the
announcement of its investigation into the domestic
and small business sector earlier on, and doubtless
Ofgemwill take into consideration not just what this
Committee says but what might be coming to them
from BERR and other government departments in
terms of concern about the operation of the market
and security of supply. Going back to the area we
mentioned earlier on—access arrangements,
transaction costs, these sorts of things—are within
the regulator’s power where it would not necessarily
depend on a Competition Commission referral but
those are areas where they could take more action
and therefore facilitate more competition.
MrConway:They have to acknowledge and I do not
think they have as yet acknowledged that there is an
issue within our markets.
Q344 Chairman: I was very surprised indeed that
Ofgem did not look at the wholesale markets as part
of their announcement. I do not know what the
rationale for that was. This is very frustrating, we are
out of time but can I just clarify one thing, in your
answer, Mr Tane, on gas storage, did you say the
UK now has 19 days’ storage or is moving towards
that?
Mr Tane: It will have 19 when the storage that is
currently being invested in comes on-stream.
Q345 Mr Oaten: What is the current number?
Mr Conway: I think it is 13.
Q346 Chairman: Thank you for that. Your real plea
is not so much necessarily for breaking up the
consolidation of the industry but transparency, it is
more the openness of the market that you need to
make sure that the market works properly? I am just
checking.
Mr Nicholson: That is a big component of it and
without the transparent market you are not going to
have an eYcient one either. That applies both at a
European and a UK level.
Mr Binley: With respect, can I just say this, it is all
right you being able to see the ﬁgures but you want
to be able to act within that market and that is what
you cannot do at the moment.
Q347 Chairman: But in order for the market to
function eVectively the market needs to be fed with
information that they are not getting at present,
are they?
Mr Nicholson: Not enough.
Q348 Chairman:Thank you very much. There is lots
we could ask you. We are very grateful for your
excellent written and oral evidence, gentlemen,
thank you very much. If any of you feel that you
have not had a chance to say something the
opportunity exists to give us further written
submissions.
Mr Nicholson: We may well do, especially on prices
which have moved a little since our initial
submission.
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Q349 Chairman: It seems that two or three of my
colleagues have taken the opportunity for a brief
respite from the intensity of the question session and
they are returning as I speak. Can I welcome you
gentlemen to the second part of today’s evidence
session. Thank you very much indeed for what you
have put in writing and what you will say to us
today. Can I begin as I always do by giving you a
chance to introduce yourselves and explain who you
are one-by-one.
Mr Foy: My name is Ian Foy and I work for Drax
Power. Drax Power ownsDrax Power Stationwhich
is the largest, cleanest,most eYcient power station in
the UK. We supply 7% of Great Britain’s electricity
needs. We sell power in all markets from half an
hour ahead to several years ahead.We operate in the
wholesale market. We do not carry supply business;
we are a pure generator.
Dr Riley: My name is Steve Riley and I work for
International Power plc which is a FTSE-100 listed
company. Our business model is quite simple: we
own and operate power stations in various markets
around the world. My responsibility is for the
European assets which include ﬁve stations in the
UK. Again in capacity terms that is about 7% of the
wholesale market. In energy terms it is a fair bit
smaller then Drax because it is a portfolio that is
more peaking and mid-merit in nature, so it is not a
base load generator.
Mr Armour: My name is Robert Armour and I am
from the General Counsel of British Energy. We are
primarily a nuclear merchant generator. We have
eight nuclear stations and a coal station in
Yorkshire. We supply about 17% of the British
market. We do not supply to the retail market. We
supply to the wholesale and the industrial and
commercial market.
Q350 Chairman: I think you have largely answered
in your opening questions helpfully the ﬁrst couple
of questions of who do you sell to and how do you
sell but possibly not quite about long-term
contracts, spot markets and that kind of thing.What
kind of contracts do you have, Mr Armour in
particular?
Mr Armour: We try and build up a portfolio of
contracts over a period of time. As I say, we sell
about half our output on the industrial and
commercial large business sector and about half into
the wholesale market which tends to have as
counter-parties either ﬁnancial institutions or other
utilities whichwill sell on, so that is where we are.We
try and build up our contract portfolio over a period
of time. In many cases it is quite diYcult to get
contracts that are much over a year to 18 months,
except perhaps with some ﬁnancial institutions.
Q351 Chairman: Does anyone else want to answer
that question?
Dr Riley: I will add something to it probably. Again,
we would sell all of our power through the wholesale
markets and we would trade with probably about 30
diVerent counter-parties. Ultimately all that energy
would get bought up by the suppliers to the domestic
or the commercial sector, but there are probably
about 30 counter-parties that we can trade with. We
would probably agree that in terms of liquidity we
could sell as far as two years out some of our output
but not all of it. Within year we could probably sell
all of our output if we wanted to.
Q352Chairman: I think it is helpful of you to explain
that link and I think that has helped build a picture
of the nature of what your businesses are. Mr
Armour, you are presumably absolutely a price
taker given that you are basically a generator?
Mr Armour: Nuclear generation tends to be a price
taker. We have a coal station which provides some
peak and shape to our electricity. I suppose the
market price is set largely by gas rather than coal, so
it is pretty rare.
Q353 Chairman: Dr Riley and Mr Foy, how do you
describe your positions as price takers or price
setters?
Dr Riley: I would comment that we do not really see
that there are price setters and price takers in the
same way that there were in the previous version of
this market. All of our sales are done bilaterally
through the wholesale market but in terms of our
portfolio of plant, as I said earlier, that is more mid-
merit and peaking in nature, so under the old rules
you would have considered those to be price setters.
Mr Foy: We tend to be, if you can describe it that
way, a price taker given that we are a highly eYcient
coal plant.
Q354 Chairman: The retail market holds no
attractions for you?
Mr Foy: In terms of Drax, our expertise is
generation; that is what we know and that is what we
are good at. If you do look at the retail business it
appears that in order to take part you need a volume
of customers and probably what are sometimes
referred to in other places as sticky customers. We
believe that going to market and trying to buy those
is probably quite diYcult, it is whether any of the big
six would let them go; and we would very much
doubt it.
Mr Armour: You need a diVerent set of skills and to
put in quite sophisticated systems to deal with large
volumes and numbers customers, and that is
something we have not invested in.
Dr Riley: In terms of domestic customers, we have
no real interest because we do not think that is a
business you could grow organically. That could
only happen if another supply business or one of the
current six came up for sale for some reason, we
think, because you need some sort of scale. We do
have a small investment in one of the small
independent retailers, Opus Energy, but that is very
much us trying to get an understanding of how the
retail market works in that sector, which again is in
between the large industrial sector that the
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gentleman on my left operates in and the domestic
sector that you will be talking to the vertically
integrated players about some time later.
Q355 Mr Binley: Why do you particularly want an
understanding in that market at that depth? What
do you intend to do with that understanding?
Dr Riley: If I revert back to International Power’s
business model, our risk mitigation is by having
power generation in diVerent markets (whichmay or
may not be correlated) so the risk mitigation we get
for our quality of earnings long term is through that
diversity of portfolio. Clearly there are other ways of
mitigating those risks in various markets, and retail
might be one of those, so we would like a better
understanding of what is involved.
Q356 Mr Binley: So an option is to grow vertically?
Dr Riley: That is an option but I think it would be
more in the industrial sector or the small/medium
enterprise sector rather than the domestic.
Q357 Mr Clapham: We have seen various changes
from the early pool system right from NETA and
now the current cash-out arrangements. Could you
tell us how the cash-out arrangement, which
operates in both the electricity and gas market,
actually works and what your concerns are about it?
MrFoy: I will explain.We do not deal in gas so I will
not comment on gas. The cash out arrangements
with electricity which were introduced in 2001 were
designed to stop any cross-subsidy, it was integral to
NETA that we had a dual cash out price, so
production and consumption accounts were kept
separate. In our opinion, they work reasonably well.
They dowhat they are supposed to do. There is some
talk or some desire possibly to go to a change in these
cash out arrangements where we go to single cash
out. It is probably our view that that is a bad idea
and that will lead to more short termism. What you
will get is more and more plant being taken to the
day ahead stage and just picking up the index price,
trading oV the back of that. Eventually you end up
back at something that probably looks like a pool
with the risk of industries getting caught up.
Q358 Mr Clapham: Is that the view of you all with
regard to the cash out regime?
Mr Armour: There is some debate within the
industry as to whether a single cash out—
Q359 Chairman: What is single cash out?
Mr Foy: If you fail to meet your contractual
obligation—ie, the power does not meet your
contract position—and if you produce too much
power onto the system, you eVectively spill onto of
the system. NGC pay you so much for that power.
If you are short and if you have not produced
enough to meet your contract position, NGC will
eVectively go and purchase that power from very
short term markets and supply you with that. These
two prices are diVerent. If you are short, if you are
not supplying enough, the price tends to be punitive
and tends to be higher than the price you could have
achieved in the forward markets. If you spill or
throw power onto the system that is not required for
contract, it will tend to be lower than the price you
can get in the market or maybe equivalent, so it
encourages contracting.
Q360 Chairman:What is the diVerence between cash
out and single cash out?
Mr Foy: There are all kinds of models but the single
cash out is where both the spill price and the long
price—ie if you are short or if you are long—the
value of that power will be exactly the same.
MrArmour:There is a healthy debate in the industry
between whether the model that penalises you for
being over or under or a single cash out that gives
you a balance both ways would be better. Equally,
does it create a barrier to other people coming in in
the same way as some of the other issues like the lack
of a derivative market which gives depth to that,
which we heard fromMrTane? It is an issue in terms
of pulling in more players and counterparties.
Q361 Mr Clapham: One of the things that we note
from the submissions that have been made is that it
does require a high degree of securitywith the sellers.
There is that aspect of it. Is that a down side to it? Is
that distorting the market?
Dr Riley: On cash out generally, I think the market
needs a mechanism whereby there can be some
balancing for suppliers or generators who are not
able to quite deliver on their contract obligations.
The details of the cash out pricing are fairly detailed
and are being investigated within the industry
structure already. I think it is a second order eVect in
terms of any of the issues of vertical integration or
how this market is functioning long term. It really is
a very detailed point.
Mr Armour:The issue of security that you raise is an
issue, partly because post-2001 with the diYculties
withEnron, TXU, et cetera., themerchant generator
model has been seen as riskier by the credit rating
agencies. That means that companies like ourselves
which do not have an investment grade credit rating
have to post collateral in terms of certain market
trades. Given the volatile market, you have to be
ready, the price moves substantially in a very short
period of time, you may have to post substantial
amounts of money to match the imbalance. You
strike a deal at a certain price and as the market
moves there will either be a risk that the person you
have sold to will not be able to pay it or that the
generator will not be able to provide it. Therefore,
the collateral is there to secure it and that can be
quite a barrier to market-entry as you go forward
because of the amounts of money that you might
have to post.
Q362 Mr Clapham: Given that, as British Energy,
you are in that kind of market, do you feel that it is
disadvantaging the independent generator?
Mr Armour: I think it limits the amount of trading.
If you do not have an ability to deal using parent
company guarantees rather than posting money, it
will limit the volume of trading that you are
prepared to do. Therefore, the level of trading going
to themarket is going to be limited by that exposure.
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Equally, if you end up saying it will be useful to put
more and more proportions of trades through the
market, you have to take into account that that
creates an issue for players coming in. They are
going to have to post substantial amounts of
collateral money or take that risk, whichmay in turn
be a barrier to them coming into the market.
Dr Riley: If we had a more liquid and transparent
market and we had the ability to trade further
forward than we currently do, the amount of credit
support that independent generators have to post
would probably become a constraint to how much
you would want to contract.
Q363 Mr Binley: Is this not just an argument for a
monopoly market? Is that what you are arguing for,
the status quo? Are you not arguing for the status
quo with a monopoly market amongst the big six
and you do not really want to widen it out?
Mr Armour: I do not think that is what we are
saying.
Q364 Mr Binley: It is what I am getting.
Mr Armour: It would be much better if the market
were somewhat deeper, if there were a variety of, let
us say, derivative products which extended it beyond
simply a limited group of maybe 30 counterparties
that are prepared to play the market.
Q365 Mr Clapham: Taking the structure of the
market and the way in which it has changed, I am
looking here at your submission, Mr Armour. You
are saying at paragraph 16 that vertical integration
is largely a response to the market structure and the
risks faced by themarket participants. We are seeing
that the current structure of the pricing system is a
driver towards vertical integration. Is that the view
of you all?
Mr Foy: No. The current market structure is
designed to promote forward contracting and keep
the generation and supply businesses separate such
that the market can operate eYciently. That is what
we would always argue for. We ﬁnd it diYcult to see
how vertical integration can be a response to the
market structure because that would suggest that
there is some kind of cross-subsidy within the
vertically integrated bodies, which helps you
overcome some of the problems of the market. We
would say the structure itself is ﬁne.
Q366 Mr Clapham: Drax is quite satisﬁed with the
market as it currently is?
Mr Foy: We are satisﬁed with the rules of the
market. We are not necessarily satisﬁed with the
potential for vertically integrated companies and
how they would operate in that market and sell and
buy their power. Are they totally transparent? That
is our concern.
Mr Armour:Vertical integration is a symptom and a
market response. I do not think it means cross-
subsidy. If you organise yourself in a way that the
credit agencies are happy to rate because you happen
to have both a supply business and a generation
business and that allows you to therefore compete
eVectively in the market, that is not really cross-
subsidy. That is a logical market response to the
market structure and it goes back to the previous
witnesses who said it is not per se vertical integration
that is the issue. It is the fact that you have the
market structure the way you do.
Q367 Mr Clapham: Currently we know that Ofgem
is undertaking a review of the balancingmarket cash
out regime. Given that, do you feel that an inquiry
by Ofgem is going to be suYcient to address the
problems that you have highlighted in the market,
particularly you, Mr Armour?
MrArmour: I would rather wait and see whatOfgem
come out with in September. There has been a whole
variety of reviews of this market. Last year, the
European Commission. We see a variety saying this
is a pretty competitive market. There are a variety of
things which the industry as well as the regulator
have identiﬁed that could lead to improvements in it.
I would rather not pre-empt the outcome of
Ofgem’s inquiry.
Q368 Mr Clapham: Could I ask the three of you
what you feel are the main issues that Ofgem should
be concentrating on and seeking to address in the
market?
Mr Foy: In the market as a whole?
Q369 Mr Clapham: Yes.
Mr Foy: I think it is transparency. I think it is
convincing themselves that the vertically integrated
companies have true separation between the
generation, supply and trading businesses such that
what may be eYcient for a vertically integrated
company is not necessarily eYcient for the market.
As the gentlemen before us quoted, what they want
is a market where they can understand the prices so
they can potentially hedge forward. That is the area
where Ofgem need to convince themselves that the
market is operating correctly.
Dr Riley: I would echo that. I do not see any reason
why Ofgem could not with the resources that they
have do a thorough investigation and come to a
sensible conclusion on themarket. Clearly, anything
that aids themarket’s transparency and liquiditywill
be beneﬁcial to players like ourselves but as we say
in our submissions we do not particularly think, for
the portfolio of generation stations that we have in
the UK or for our business model, that this market
is a bad market or is particularly broken. We still
view the UK as a well functioning market, relatively
attractive compared to other European markets
where you heard in the previous session there is not
much liberalisation at all. I think there was a
question there about the status quo. We do not see
that a huge amount needs to change for us to be an
eVective, independent power producer in this
market.
Q370 Mr Clapham: You are happy with the way in
which the current rules set the prices?
DrRiley:For the business and the portfoliowe have,
we can trade and manage the risks in our business,
in the market as it currently stands.
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Mr Armour: I would echo all those points with one
further proviso. Is this a market structure that is
going to facilitate new investment? That comes back
to a degree of regulatory certainty, reasonable but
not excessive returns but suYcient of a signal that
allows an industry that is going into an investment
phase the ability to rise to that challenge.
Q371 Chairman: You are happy with a market that
for the last year has been deliberately, systematically
delivering higher prices to consumers than anywhere
else in Europe?
Mr Armour: I am not in the retail market.
Q372 Chairman: It is very good for your investors
but not so good for the consumers.
Dr Riley: You heard from the major energy users
earlier. Clearly, the concerns that they raised are real
concerns and legitimate ones that people should
worry over. I think it is also fair to say that the bulk
of the reason why the UK is facing the issues that it
is facing is down to lack of liberalisation in other
European markets rather than any fundamental
problems with the structure or the rules in this
market.
Chairman: Let us look at the liquidity of the UK
market which does concern me.
Q373 Mr Bailey: It is acknowledged that the
problem with liquidity is because the vertically
integrated companies largely bypass the wholesale
market. What role have the independent generators
in improving that market? Do you feel that you have
any role? As independent generators, what potential
do you think you have to improve that situation?
Dr Riley: All the power we trade goes through the
market. It is oVered to the whole range of
counterparties. There is no more of our power that
we could trade through the market.
Q374 Mr Bailey: You are saying that all the power
that you supply is traded through the wholesale
market?
Dr Riley: Yes.
Q375 Mr Bailey: Does this relatively low level of
liquidity aVect your trading strategy?
Dr Riley: It limits the length of time that you could
trade for. We might see that we would like to trade
for the calendar year 2010 at the moment or we
might be constrained on that because there are other
counterparties out there who either feel that they
want to trade for that particular calendar year or
that they would like to buy at the price we would like
to sell at.
Q376 Mr Bailey: Are you satisﬁed with the level of
liquidity in the wholesale market at the moment?
Mr Foy: I would say no. It should be further. The
longer that you can trade in the market the more
liquidity there is and the less chance there is of
getting prices ﬂattened out. We try to hedge
ourselves. Our business model is we hedge
progressively over a number of years but it takes two
to tango and at the end of the day there is only one
buyer, the big six. They do not appear to come out
into the market beyond a couple of years. We would
prefer more hedging and the more liquidity
obviously. It gives better price signals. It takes away
some of the volatility for the customers and allows
the customers to put in hedges.
Q377 Chairman: I would like to hear each of you
answer that question separately.
Dr Riley: We would like to see more liquidity and
more transparency going forward. I would just
caveat that by saying that even if that were the case
there may be other constraints—for example, the
amount of credit support we would have to post—
that would limit our ability to trade that far out
anyway. It is not just an issue of liquidity and
transparency in the market. We are deﬁnitely in the
position of saying that the market should not allow
any transactions to go on unconditionally that
would make liquidity and transparency any worse
than they are. We are also in the position at the
moment, maybe because we have a diVerent
portfolio to the other players here that can better
manage in the short term, that we are okay with the
market arrangements as they currently are. There is
suYcient liquidity there for our portfolio because it
is more short term responsive plant.
Mr Armour: We would be supportive of greater
liquidity and transparency but mindful constraints
on collateral. EVectively, if all trades went through
the market, you would have to post very substantial
amounts of credit and collateral for that and that
would in turn be a barrier. There has to be a balance.
Q378 Chairman: I know you have slightly diVerent
perspectives. You have diVerent portfolios for
generation and diVerent future owners as well in Mr
Armour’s case potentially. Looking at you, Dr
Riley, you are a shareholder in Opus and Opus
clearly do not think the market is anything like
suYciently open. They say in a submission to us that
a broader ownership of generation assets would be a
beneﬁt to competition. They suggest a break up of
the big six. They think that cannot happen because
of the investment requirements of the markets. They
advocate a public auction of a percentage of all
generators’ outputs—say, 5% to 10%. How would
you feel about having a public auction of 5% to 10%
of all your output?
Mr Foy: It depends what form that auction would
take. Vertical integration itself is not the problem.
Vertical integration can exist. It is the cross-subsidy.
It is making sure the businesses are separated. The
vertically integrated companies must buy all their
retail power from the market and they must sell all
their generation output into the market separately.
If there is no cross-subsidy, it will have no impact
upon them. Either that or whatever internal deals
they may deal with in their businesses from the
generators to the supply to the trade, they oVer those
to the market.
Q379MrBailey:Assuming that the big six remain as
they are and do not divest their generating assets, we
have talked about the possibility of having a certain
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percentage of output auctioned. Are there any other
policies that might be pursued that would improve
liquidity in the market?
Mr Foy: Auctions could be diYcult to run. What
most people suggest is an auction for generation
capacity. You still have the supply side on the other
side. You still have the big six. You only have one
buyer. That may cause some diYculties. Somehow
you have to get them to open the generation book
and sell their generation as a generation portfolio on
the market and buy as a retail business in the market
and take away these internal trades or links.
Dr Riley: A forced auction of some of their output
would bring that to market. That would aid
transparency and liquidity. Whether there is
something that could be done just in terms of more
open disclosure, in terms of the diVerences between
their retail and the generation businesses, that might
also be an aid to understanding the real price signals
in the market.
Mr Armour: Some of the big six do put some levels
of their trade through the market. You might quiz
them on that. Where you are looking at into a
percentage going through the market may well be
one possible solution but it is tempered by the other
point that Opus made, which is that there are some
quite chunky investments required from this market
as well. The idea that you went back and broke up
vertical integration and created a number of small
players who then have to face up to large investment
does not seem a recipe for—
MrBailey: I was discounting that and just looking at
alternatives over and above that situation.
Q380 Miss Kirkbride: I still do not quite understand
your position. The big energy players could still have
money to invest in big plant, nuclear and all the
things that the government and the UK want them
to do. Surely what we are talking about is just having
more small scale suppliers who are not going to be
investing in nuclear plant. They are just going to be
providing small scale energy supply and giving a
choice to the people we heard earlier from to go to
them, to oVer them their supply of power. I do not
see why these things are incompatible. You could
just have more people supplying while still having
really big players in themarket who are doing the big
infrastructure projects. Why are those two things
incompatible?
Mr Armour: I do not think they are.
Q381Miss Kirkbride:The inference of your remarks
seemed to suggest that they were. We can only be a
big guy because we want to invest in big things and
therefore we have to have a monopolistic position in
order to that we can then cash it out. That is how it
sounded to us.
Mr Armour: I was going back to the Chairman’s
quote from the Opus statement which said that in an
ideal world you do this. Alan Asher I think said the
same thing a couple of weeks ago. That is ﬁne in
theory but in practice you have to balance what are
the challenges facing us and is the industry
structured to deal not just with the short term but
with the long term.
Q382Miss Kirkbride: I did not quite understandMr
Foy’s position either. If you have a vertically
integrated company so you have your power supply
and your customers, your argument was that as long
as those two things do not cross-subsidise there is
not a problem. You have a wonderfully
monopolistic situation, have you not, where you are
completely in charge of supply of the market and
complete control. No one really likes moving their
electricity supplier. Even Energywatch only does it
to ﬁnd out what it feels like if you are a customer and
how boring and diYcult it is. No one actually moves
their electricity and gas supplier because it is just too
damned diYcult, so you have got the market
cornered. It is a wonderful monopolistic position
surely. It has nothing to do with cross-subsidies.
Mr Foy: The issue is that, as long as the big six
remain of a similar size and they all get into a group
think and they do not take each other’s markets,
then that is exactly what will happen.
Q383 Miss Kirkbride: It is all very cosy.
Mr Foy: They look very stable at the moment.
Q384Miss Kirkbride:You are saying it is all right as
long as they do not cross-subsidise, but it is not all
right because, as we just said, it is all too cosy.
Mr Foy: Why do they do this? How do they do this,
if they are indeed doing it? They make themselves
potentially look like each other. They all take an
equal share, 15% or 16% of the total supply market.
They have a range of powers stations which they can
call on at any time. They do not have to go out into
the market, compete and buy power because they
know they have reasonably ﬁxed customers. I do not
know what the answer is to ﬁxed customers. You
cannot force people to move.
Q385 Miss Kirkbride: I accept that.
Mr Foy: The down side of that is you get
ineYciencies within each of those vertically
integrated companies. To some extent youmay even
see it now in the market where you have old, small,
250 or 350 megawatt coal ﬁred power stations which
are base loading and other 500 megawatt eYcient
units which are shutting down. You get this
internalisation of costs. If they end up internalising
these costs and valuing it how they value it rather
than how the market values it, eventually what you
end up with is an expensive ﬂeet of power stations in
the UK and generally rising prices. The vertically
integrated players are going to go out there and
make these big infrastructure decisions.Why cannot
a small independent make these infrastructure
decisions?
Q386 Mr Binley: I am seeing an argument which
suggests that you as generators need to have a
reasonably secure market place based on a price that
gives you the conﬁdence to invest in the future. That
has created a scenario where average wholesale
prices in the UK, apart from other factors—and I
recognise those—are almost 30%more than they are
on the continent. That is a massive price for the
consumer to pay to guarantee investment and
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therein I think lies my concern and the concern of
some of my colleagues. In fact, you are not thinking
about your consumer at all. That worries me in a
business. When a supplier gets so divorced from the
market place that there is no thinking in his
philosophy about the consumer, I get worried. I
have not heard any thinking at all about the balance
between the interests of the consumer and the
interests of the generator. Would you respond to
that?
Dr Riley: Maybe part of the answer to this is what
do we do when we are thinking of investing in a new
generation station. Perhaps I can start there. That
may or may not be in the UK. At the end of the day,
there is no investment fromus in a newpower station
if the customer cannot aVord the power that comes
from that. If we build in Portugal, the Netherlands
or anywhere else, whether that is under a long term
contract orwhatever the arrangement is, there has to
be an oVtaker for that power. That is not likely to be
us because we do not own a retail business. We do
not have long term customers. In Portugal we have
just started to build a newpower station. That is with
a Spanish company coming in as a new entrant, in
the retail to the market. They are taking a view as to
whether, at that price, they can gain new customers
from the incumbent. Ultimately, because we do not
have that direct interface with the domestic
consumer or even at the moment with the large,
industrial consumer, it is a bit hard for us to say do
we have the customers’ interests at heart. At the end
of the day, if customers cannot aVord to pay for
electricity, we do not have a business.
Q387 Mr Binley: It is a sneaky argument for further
vertical integration, is it not?
Dr Riley: No. I am deﬁnitely not here to argue for
further vertical integration. I do not want to see any
further vertical integration.
Q388 Mr Binley: I assume you are a capitalist and
you believe in competition. I assume you believe in
serving the consumer.We are both businessmen.We
have a sort of basic philosophy and I assume that is
yours. How then do you explain a market place
where one of themajor users of your product has not
had a competitive approach in three years? If that is
the case, is there not something seriously wrong with
that market place that you say is not broken in any
sense?
Dr Riley: I cannot answer that question.
Q389 Mr Binley: I think I know the answer. I think
it is clear: “Of course it is right but I do not want to
say it.” Is that not what you are telling me?
Dr Riley: No.
Mr Oaten: You are asking the wrong people.
Mr Binley: I do not think I am asking the wrong
people.
Q390 Chairman: I think you are.
Dr Riley: We do not sell gas.
Mr Binley: The point I am making is that the whole
market place has closed down dramatically in the
last ﬁve years to six major players in the generation
business and notmanymoremajorwholesale sellers.
It has closed down sizeably.
Chairman:MrArmour is the biggest single producer
in the country.
Q391 Mr Binley: Vertically integrated companies
have aided that particular movement. We have
arrived at a situation where the market, we are told,
has become massively less competitive. You are
involved in that process.
Mr Armour: I was surprised to hear that, partly
because we are the supplier currently supplying Mr
Tane. I certainly had expected other people to be
competing for that business because I know we
competed pretty competitively to get it.
Q392 Mr Binley: Does it bother you?
Mr Armour: It is very surprising to me. That
comment was not what I expected.
Q393 Chairman: What I am really puzzled about is
that new entrants are not building conventional gas
and coal ﬁred generator capacity. The big six are.
Why?
Mr Foy: We do not see how the spreads can justify
a reasonable return on a power station. We are
somewhat surprised that the big six are building
them.
Mr Armour: You may look at prices now but over
the last ﬁve years we have been operating in a pretty
volatile market which equally has an impact on the
ability to take forward projects. Looking forward,
there is a degree of uncertainty on the price of
carbon. The price of electricity going forward will be
volatile. All of that has to be factored into the
market which you are trying to invest in.
Dr Riley: There are other reasons why that might be
the case in the UK. The vertically integrated players
also by their nature are part of bigger European
utilities generally with big balance sheets, so they can
aVord to build new entrants on their balance sheets.
An independent power producer’s business model
again is quite diVerent andwewould look to the debt
markets to raise a signiﬁcant amount of project
ﬁnance to fund that development. Then you are into
what you need in place to raise that project ﬁnance
in the ﬁrst place, which is amedium to long-term oV-
take agreement. Again, we go back towhen wemake
those investments in other markets. You are looking
to do a deal with an incumbent or with a new entrant
tomitigate your risk by taking some of the supply for
a period of time. We need that to raise the ﬁnance to
build vertically integrated players by virtue of the
fact that they are parts of companies with big
balance sheets, not necessarily just because they are
vertically integrated and can ﬁnance that in a
diVerent way.
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Q394 Chairman: If I understood Mr Foy’s answer
correctly, inevitably the spread between fuel costs
and wholesale prices is an important determinant of
an investment decision. It has to be, by deﬁnition.
There is an implication that spreads could possibly
be wider for the big six.
Mr Foy: Again, this comes back to separation of
businesses. If they are operating the business in the
sameway as we are, they should be seeing exactly the
same spreads as us.
DrRiley:The spreads that they would observe in the
market should be exactly the same for everybody.
The diVerence that there might be is that their return
requirements or their costs of capital might be
diVerent than other players and therefore theymight
be prepared to build with the same technology and
the same spreads but they would see that that would
deliver a diVerent return than their competitors.
Q395 Chairman: Should we be requiring them to be
separating out their accounts so it is clearer what is
happening in the vertically integrated companies?
Mr Foy: That is certainly one way of doing it. You
see where the value is. Again, if we have a diVerent
cost of capital, it is slightly diVerent. Youwould also
probably expect them to compete amongst each
other, not just with the independents. Do they try
and take the market share of the other vertically
integrated players?
Q396 Mr Bailey: Arising from the comments of Mr
Armour about the volatility of the market, in the
context of some previous comments, as independent
operators you are relatively happy with the market
as it has functioned. I hope I am not putting words
into your mouth. That is how I understood the
comments that you made. What concerns me is that
there is a general feeling that it would be beneﬁcial
to have more independent operator suppliers within
the market but that the existing market volatility
ensures that only the big six have the ability to raise
investment, to if you like provide more capacity; yet
you as independent operators seem quite happy with
that situation. I ﬁnd it rather strange.
Dr Riley: I do not think you can say that it is only
the big six who can raise the investment to build new
infrastructure.
Q397 Mr Bailey: I am not saying that. I interpreted
that from what you said.
Dr Riley: We own ﬁve power stations in the UK.
Three of those have signiﬁcant levels of debt on them
that we were able to raise in a merchant market
without a long term contract, which is normally
what is required to allow us to own and operate
those power stations going forward. The market will
go through various cycles and there will be points in
time when we would hope we would be able to raise
ﬁnance to invest new in the UK. There is also a
question I think around what you would class as
investment in new capacity. If I take Rugeley, our
coal ﬁred power station which is quite an old power
station, we are currently investing over £100 million
in ﬂue gas desulphurisation equipment there to keep
open capacity that otherwise would have closed in
2015. There is investment from independent power
generators in capacity in this market under the
current rules.
Q398 Mr Bailey: I welcome that. I worked in
Rugeley Power Station many years ago.
Mr Foy: You say we are happy with the way things
are. When I said I was happy, I was referring to Mr
Clapham’s point about the mechanism in terms of
cash out price. As Dr Riley said, it is a secondary
issue in terms of how this market operates. I cannot
see any great need to delve into those balancing type
rules. In the wider market itself, vertical integration
is a potential issue.
Q399 Mr Weir: We have talked a lot about the big
six and their place in the market. What do you think
the impact of the sale of British Energy to one of
these big six would have on market liquidity?
Mr Foy: If all that power got tracked it would have
a huge impact on market liquidity. That would take
an awfully big piece away and you do need volume.
You need a lot of players out there tomake amarket,
to make it worthwhile, brokers being in existence
and everyone else. It will be a big issue.
Dr Riley: Liquidity works, clearly.
Q400 Chairman: That would be a bad thing?
Dr Riley: That would be. We were fairly clear in our
submission that we would not like to see further
vertical integration, further consolidation amongst
vertically integrated players.
Q401 Mr Weir: We heard a lot earlier about the
situation particularly in the European market where
there has not been the level of liberalisation that
there has been in theUK. Obviously many of the big
European ﬁrms, EDF, RWE and E.ON, are
operating within the UK. Do you think it would be
a bad thing for the market for example if EDF were
successful in taking over Iberdrola of Spain and
ended up dealing with Scottish Power at the same
time, having a further concentration of markets and
fewer than six companies in the UK?
Dr Riley: Yes.
Q402 Mr Weir: Very bad?
Dr Riley: Bad enough that it should not be allowed
without some conditions being placed on it.
Q403 Mr Weir: Given what you are saying about
liquidity, do you think the UK government should
be considering selling British Energy to one of these
companies perhaps, like EDF?
Dr Riley: It depends on the government’s objectives,
does it not? If the government is looking for a
creditable, reputable company to build new nuclear
going forward, a sale to EDF for example would
probably achieve that objective, but that should not
be to the detriment of the current liquidity and the
current market players. It could not just happen
without some other conditions being placed on that
which might be for example that combined entity
auctioning some of its power through the market or
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possibly even forced divestments, not necessarily of
the nuclear plant but of the coal plant that would be
in that combined entity.
Q404 Mr Weir: What you are really saying is that
the government then has to make a political
decision against liquidity in the energy market as
opposed to its desire for more nuclear power
stations, for whatever bizarre reason they may have
for that.
Dr Riley: I think they could achieve both if they
put the right conditions on the transaction.
Q405 Mr Weir: What conditions would these be?
Would it be simple if EDF were to sell oV some of
their existing plant in the UK?
Dr Riley: Yes, that would help.
Q406 Mr Weir: Would that be as an independent
entity to one of the other big six? By selling oV to
the other big six are you not just shifting the
concentration but still having a greater
concentration in the market?
Dr Riley: No. If there were some power stations,
either individual or a small portfolio available for
sale in the UK, that would get interest from new
entrants.
Q407 Chairman: Mr Armour, you are in a diYcult
position, I appreciate, in order for you to comment
on these questions. My prediction is that to sell
British Energy to one of the big six without some
kind of corrective action, whatever that might be,
would not be appropriate because of the eVect on
market liquidity. What you can and cannot say is
a matter for your judgment, I appreciate, in the
situation you are in.
Mr Armour: Thank you very much. I am
constrained. We did make an announcement on 16
May that we were in discussions with a number of
parties. We have scrupulously not said whether
those parties are big six or diVerent parties beyond.
Logically, the time to look at the implications of
any deal is if and when there is a deal proposed
which you can then evaluate. Equally, that is
something that inevitably the competition
authorities would look at if that deal came to
fruition. There is no guarantee that it will.
Chairman: I would like to press you quite hard but
I think that is probably as much as is reasonable
to expect you to say in the circumstances.
Q408 Mr Oaten: Obviously we have heard about
an awful lot of the issues that are taking place in
the industry. There is a number of investigations
and inquiries taking place. There is also talk of a
possible Competition Commission looking at this
and I just wondered whether you would see that as
something which would come in whether people felt
it was necessary or not. We just need to clear the
air. Would you have concerns that any inquiry like
that and indeed some of the other ones that are
taking place are going to get in the way of some of
the big investment decisions that are having to be
taken at the moment?
Dr Riley: It is clear in the current environment of
high energy prices that people would want to have
a look at the market and assure themselves that it
is working properly, or not as the case may be. I
have no doubt that when there are a signiﬁcant
number of regulatory reviews going on at the same
time in the market that that spooks investors and
it does delay investment decisions. Again, sorry to
hark back to it but when we look at investment in
any market because we have a choice as to where
we put our capital, the regulatory environment is
one of the considerations we look at when deciding
whether to invest in a market. At the moment in
the UK we all understand the reasons why we are
where we are but there is a lot of regulatory
scrutiny going on. I think the answer is clear. That
does play a role in people making their investment
decisions.
Q409 Mr Oaten: The phrase that you have no
doubt: could you harden that up to say you are
deﬁnitely sure and you have seen examples of
people being turned away because they are
concerned about the pace of regulation?
Dr Riley: No. I am really saying that it is my view
that investment decisions that people are
considering at the moment are being delayed while
these investigations are going on. They will wait to
see the outcome before they make those decisions.
Mr Foy: It is tough. If there are investigations
ongoing then, yes, it may well put people oV
investing. However, from what you have heard
today and what you hear everywhere else, there is
this problem around vertical integration. Is it a
problem or is it not? The way the market is
structured and the way we deal in this market I do
not think is particularly bad but all that needs to
be cleared up is how do the vertically integrated
players operate. It is not the market. It is just do
they have true separation of businesses; are they
operating eYciently or eYciently for the whole
market? That should be able to be done fairly
quickly.
Mr Armour: If something came out of Ofgem’s
investigation, perhaps that would justify going to
the Competition Commission. Otherwise, I would
very much echo what Dr Riley was saying. A
prolonged Competition Commission inquiry at a
time when we are facing a generation gap is not
helpful unless there is some clear evidence as to
what we are chasing.
Q410 Mr Oaten: This goes back to the signiﬁcance
of cash out, which I am a bit reluctant to get into.
How many times do you have a situation where the
company falls short of the contract and how many
times do you have a situation where you are spilling
over, just so that I can get a sense of how many
times this happens and how signiﬁcant an issue it
is?
Mr Foy: Traditionally so far, the market has been
what is called long. The suppliers spill a small
amount of power. That is how they protect
themselves. Obviously, you are never quite certain
how a customer is going to take the ﬂuctuation but
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the situation tends to be long. For us as generators,
our big problem is we lose plant instantaneously,
so a plant trips. At that point, you are going to be
exposed to these cash out prices. If you are lucky,
it is just a couple of pounds above the price of the
power you have sold so it does not hurt. If you are
unlucky, it may be £500 or £600 a megawatt hour,
ten times what you have sold it for.
Q411 Mr Oaten: Is it happening lots of times?
Mr Foy: Power stations are falling oV and units are
falling oV all the time. I remember some report by
NGC many years ago which was four hours hence,
if you look at the plant that is running, 400
megawatts will go missing within that four hours.
There are 120 units around the system. A couple
go missing every day and a couple come back every
day. You will be exposed to imbalance almost
immediately when you trip and you go to market
immediately and repurchase power.
Q412 Mr Oaten: Is that worse in the UK from
mainland Europe?
Mr Foy: We do not trade in mainland Europe. I
do not know how that operates.
Dr Riley: The cash out mechanism is just an
integral part of the market design at the moment.
I would have thought almost at every instance
suppliers will be slightly out of balance and
generators will be slightly out of balance, so you
have to have that mechanism there to ensure that
both parties are managing that as tightly as
possible to reduce the overall costs.
Mr Armour: This is why the vast majority of trades
are in the short term market in the run up to gate
closure and people are balancing their portfolio,
trying to get themselves in the right position to go
into that last period.
Mr Binley: One of our prime objectives is to
discover whether the current market structure
encourages eVective competition in the retail
markets for gas and electricity, as you know. My
particular concern is business because I think that
unless we start thinking much more about wealth
producing sector—I am sure you would agree with
me—we will be in serious trouble in 30 or 40 years’
time. I was pleased to hear you say that you would
not want to see more vertically integrated
companies in the market but, when I read that the
building of non-incentivised generation capacity—
ie, large, conventional new builds such as gas and
coal—is noticeably dominated by vertically
integrated companies or joint ventures involving
vertically integrated companies, that brings me
back to you. When I also have evidence that tells
me that the competitive margin in the sale to
industry is 0.5% of total costs, we have a problem.
That problem is partly of your making. I just want
an understanding of that because you are also
involved—
Chairman: That 0.5% was a gas ﬁgure, not
electricity.
Q413 Mr Binley: Okay, but you are also involved
in creating an integrated market. You are happy
with the market place as it is. I see really quite
distinct contradictions here.
Dr Riley: Just for the record, that was not our
submission.
Mr Foy: That was ours.
Q414 Mr Binley: I know but it is true, is it not?
Mr Foy: Yes.
Q415 Mr Binley: That is what counts.
Mr Foy: The passage is that the majority of plant
being built is being built by the vertically integrated
players. Everything, as far as we know, that is
currently being built is by vertically integrated
players and not independents.
Mr Binley: I just do not understand why you are
not taking more concern from that perspective.
Q416 Chairman: I do not get a sense from you that
you are itching to increase your own ability to
generate. You are not burning with a passion to put
more liquidity into the market yourselves. Dr Riley,
you have given some helpful indications as to why
that might be the case but I worry why people are
not burning with this desire. The small Opuses of
this world are complaining that they cannot buy
electricity. They buy it from you, Dr Riley, but they
are complaining they cannot. Why are they not
putting small scale generating plants in themselves?
What is preventing them from becoming their own
generators? Why is the market looking so rigid
from my perspective?
Mr Foy: I do not think it is looking rigid. When
you look at the numbers they do not seem to justify
building power stations.
Q417 Chairman: What is the smallest power station
you can build? CHP systems of course are quite a
prospect.
Mr Foy: The CHPs have similar problems in this
market. They tend to be relatively small but they
tend to be dominated by the heat load rather than
the electricity load. Most of the power stations that
are probably going to be built are going to be 800
megawatt CCGTs.
Q418 Chairman: What are the capital costs of one
of those?
Mr Foy: 500 or 600 million.
Dr Riley: I would say the total installed cost would
be over £500 per kilowatt.
Q419 Miss Kirkbride: The price has gone up.
Therefore does the price have to go up even more
to make it economical? Secondly, how come it
would appear that in Europe they can have more
independent producers? What is it about England
that the barrier to entry is the price of building
power stations?
Mr Foy: I do not know about Europe. The price
of power has gone up an awfully long way but so
have the fuel costs. The international cost of the
fuel that Drax buys, coal, from last September to
Ev 58 Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Committee: Evidence
3 June 2008 Mr Robert Armour, Dr Steven Riley and Mr Ian Foy
now has doubled from about $70 a tonne and I
think it is now approaching $160 a tonne, so the
margins are staying relatively strapped in a tight
band. Most of the commentators in the market are
saying they do not meet the new entry costs.
Dr Riley: There is a number of questions there but
I think the common theme is, if I put it directly to
us at International Power, why are we not
considering investing more in generation in the
UK? I thought I had answered that partly before
by saying that we have invested money in Rugeley
to keep that open. If you take a look at what we
have done since 2000 when we were created, we
have increased our share of the generation capacity
from 500 megawatts to over 5,000 megawatts. That
has all been through acquisitions so far. We are
doing that in partnership with Mitsui & Co which
is a big Japanese trading house. There is a strong
partnership there which is very interested in
increasing its exposure to the UK market and it is
then just a case of ﬁnding the right opportunity
with the right risk proﬁle before we could do that.
I do not think again that you should go away with
the conclusion that this market is not of interest to
independent power generators because that is not
the case.
Q420 Chairman: You are beginning to convince me
that you are interested in expanding your
operations. That is what I wanted to hear. I get a
slight sense of complacency from the three of you.
It is all okay really. You could live with it.
Mr Foy: We are in this market. Drax has
announced that we are going to invest around 80
million. We are going to become the biggest
biomass co-ﬁrer in the UK. We are also investing
£100 million in renewing all our HP and LP
turbines to make them more eYcient. We are
willing to invest. We want to invest, but to invest
in the retail business we do not see as particularly
possible and to invest in new power stations we do
not see an incentive in the market.
Q421 Mr Clapham: As a risk proﬁle for example
on an independent investing into new gas stations,
has it gone to a degree where it militates against
that investment?
Dr Riley: For us, when we look at this investment
now, I would probably put my money in other
markets rather than the UK in terms of the deals
that I can do in building new gas ﬁred stations but
I do not necessarily think that is always going to
be the case. If I could get a long term oVtake
contract in other markets and that would present
a lower risk proﬁle for me. In any of the markets
we look at at the moment, one of the subjects that
we have not touched upon at all is just the rising
cost of building new power stations. Not just the
UK but the whole of Europe and elsewhere around
the world is in need of new capacity. If you take a
view over the last two or three years, the cost of
putting a new power station on the ground has also
gone up signiﬁcantly and we have not even started
to see the impact that that is going to have on the
returns of investors.
Q422 Mr Clapham: Given that you are in Europe,
do you ﬁnd that for example with regard to a gas
ﬁred station you are more encouraged to invest in
gas ﬁred stations in Europe than you would be in
the UK?
Dr Riley: At this point in time we are investing in
two gas ﬁred stations in Europe and none in the
UK so I think that answers the question. Referring
to a point that Ian made earlier, if you look at the
spreads now as the key determinant as to whether
you would invest in the UK compared to where
they were two or three years ago, the signs are
much more encouraging. There is optimism there.
Have you the optimism that this market can deliver
the returns that are required to burn new CCGT
on the ground? The question is then your level of
conﬁdence as to whether that is going to be there
for the long term or not. That is changing.
Q423 Miss Kirkbride: Having listened to all the
evidence this morning, it seems to me that we are
in quite a diYcult position because North Sea oil
is running out very quickly, it would seem. We have
a situation where domestic consumers and
industrial consumers are being hammered with the
potential that our industrial consumers might well
withdraw industrial production from the UK,
which is extremely grave. We have an unliberalised
market in Europe which again, according to our
previous guests, suggested that that was meaning
that prices could be higher in the UK because
companies were able to take advantage of UK
consumers without being able to do the same in
Europe. We have producers saying, “Look, if you
really want us to make these investments which are
dead expensive and getting more expensive, if you
do hit us with a Competition Commission inquiry,
you are not going to get what you want in terms
of future capacity.” We are really in a very diYcult
position and yet in 2003 the Energy Minister, Brian
Wilson, had a review of energy in the UK and a
review of nuclear energy in the UK and said,
“There is not a problem. It is all ﬁne. We do not
need to worry about this. We will just put it on the
shelf for the next four years.” Would you like to
comment?
Mr Armour: I think that is why there was another
energy review in 2006 and a series of papers.
Clearly, the gap that is facing the industry in terms
of generation capacity either driven by retirements
or the Large Combustion Plant Directive and
environmental constraints or by low carbon is
getting that much closer.
Q424 Miss Kirkbride: Was that not a grossly
irresponsible judgment at the time?
Dr Riley: It was at a time when generators were
going bust and losing money. Companies were
writing oV signiﬁcant amounts of investment that
they made in those power stations. We should not
lose sight of the fact that back in 2002–03 it was a
completely diVerent environment to the one that we
are facing now.
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Mr Foy: In 2003 I was at Drax and the American
owner walked away. We had in the past year got
rid of virtually all the coal stock. There was not a
lot left at the station. Part of our argument here is
that we do not want these swings. We want to be
able to hedge. We want to have the signals out
there such that you can see a long way forward and
make these big investment decisions. We want a
more liquid market. One of the arguments is that
vertical integration may be stopping those long
term markets.
Mr Armour: All I was saying was investors, credit
rating agencies etc., have a long memory. They, like
all of us here, got burned in 2001–02. Looking
forward at the challenges, regulatory uncertainty is
not a conducive factor to meeting those challenges.
I am not necessarily saying, “Do not do anything
on the Competition Commission.” It is just that
that overall LD Investment environment does not
look easy.
Chairman: We could go on all day. I think you have
agreed with Julie Kirkbride’s question but in a
diplomatic way. Thank you very much, gentlemen.
We have been courteous but we have treated you
with a degree of robustness sometimes. Thank you
very much for rising to the challenge. We are very
grateful to you. If you think there is anything we
did not say or you want to clarify in further written
evidence, please feel free to send it. Thank you very
much indeed.
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Q425 Chairman: Ladies, welcome to this third
evidence session of our inquiry into fuel prices. We
are very grateful to you for coming and for the
writtenmemoranda that you provide the Committee
with.Althoughwe knowwho you are, would you tell
the rest of the world who you are and where you
are from?
Jenny Saunders: I am Jenny Saunders. I am Acting
Chief Executive of National Energy Action, a fuel
poverty charity.
Lesley Davies: I am Lesley Davies, and I am Chair
of the National Right to Fuel Campaign.
Q426 Chairman: Could I start with very factual
questions to get your assessment particularly of your
current estimate of the levels of fuel poverty?
Jenny Saunders: We are estimating that there are 4.5
million households across the UK who fall into the
category of fuel poverty as deﬁned as needing to
spend 10% or more of your income to heat the home
to an adequate heating regime.
Q427 Chairman: That represents what change on
recent history?
Jenny Saunders: That is an increase from about 2.4
million three or four years ago, so there has been a
dramatic increase in the numbers; a doubling due to
the price increases. The distributional eVect has been
that we see certain parts of the UK, certain regions
in England having much higher percentages of
households in fuel poverty, so for example theNorth
East at 20% odd, lower percentages perhaps in the
South East.
Q428 Chairman: Can you characterise those
households? I know that the debate is always about
pensioners and obviously that is a large part of that
group, but are there other groups as well that you
would identify as being particularly important to
remember when we are talking about fuel poverty?
Jenny Saunders: We categorise people as being
vulnerable households who are most likely to suVer
worse symptoms of fuel poverty as being not only
pensioners, but families in receipt of income support
and those with special disability allowances as well.
It is clearly a problem linked to low income, but it is
obviously very clearly linked to the problem of the
housing type, the insulation and heating standards
and the cost of energy.
Q429 Chairman: If my colleague, Roger Berry, were
here—he apologises that he is not because a lot of
this is his special interest subjects but he has a debate
on the Floor of the House on the Future of Care and
Support which he wants to participate in and I
understand that—he would emphasise, for example,
that young disabled people often get overlooked in a
study. Do you think that is a major area of concern?
Jenny Saunders: We have tried to highlight to DWP
for a number of years that perhaps some special
assistance could be given by extending the winter
fuel payment not only to pensioners, but to
households who are eligible for the cold weather
payments and families with disabled members of the
family could fall into that category.
Q430 Chairman: We meet at quite an auspicious
time because we have just had Ofgem’s statement on
the Fuel Poverty Action Programme after the recent
summit. One of the big issues announced is sharing
data so that the suppliers know who is actually in
need and who is not. It seems that it is quite diYcult
to identify which households are speciﬁcally in need.
How conﬁdent are you in the accuracy of the
estimate of 4.5 million that you have given?
Jenny Saunders: I think we can be conﬁdent in the
accuracy of that number because it is based on
statistical data that is collected by the Government
through theEnglishHouse Conditions survey.What
we do not know is where exactly those individual
households are because it is this complex
combination of income, housing type and howmany
members are in the household. It is not easy to say,
unless you get across the doorstep, that this
household is deﬁnitely in fuel poverty, as we deﬁne
it.What we can say is, and we can do somemapping,
that particular parts of the country down to sub-
ward level are more likely to have households
suVering fuel poverty.
Q431 Mr Weir : I want to pick up a point about the
numbers and you mentioned that it is because of
rising prices and of course Ofgem have had the fuel
summit speaking to the ‘Big 6’ generators. I know
that your sister organisation in Scotland, Energy
Action Scotland, has done good work in respect of
oV-grid houses, people who rely on fuel oil, calor gas
and propane gas, for example. Are these included in
your 4.5 million ﬁgure or is there any way to
diVerentiate howmany people fall into that category
outside of the normal suppliers?
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Jenny Saunders: They will be included in that
category. However, we have diVerent degrees of fuel
poverty. You are quite right, people oV the gas grid
area will be having an average energy bill of
somewhere in the region of £1,700 compared to the
average £1,000 if you are on the gas grid. It is
particularly aVecting people in rural areas and there
is no protection. Although they may get assistance
through their electricity supplier through the CERT
scheme, there is no special measure if they are
dependent on calor or oil.
Q432 MrWeir:Most of these are using the oil or the
calor for heating as opposed to anything else, so it is
vitally important.
Jenny Saunders: Yes. In some work that we have
done in some properties oV the gas network we have
shown that by taking them oV bottled gas we can
reduce their heating bills by somewhere in the region
from £42 a week in the winter to about £14 by giving
them an air source heat pump which is a new
alternative technology. We would like to see some
more innovation in the kind of measures that we
oVer people who are living in those oV gas areas.
Q433 Chairman: We must not labour the point now
but I think the Committee is concerned about the
lack of regulatory oversight for these fuel types.
Theoretically it is a very strong oversight for gas or
electricity if you are on the mains, but I have had a
letter from the OYce of Fair Trading only this week
which indicates that there is a serious gap there and
that is an issue that the Committee will be looking at.
Tell me about energy prices and what role they play
in fuel poverty. Obviously insulation is one of the
issues we are talking about in energy eYciency and
obviously usage. People can, for example, set their
own consumption of energy as well. Sometimes one
might be aware of the costs that they are incurring.
Tell me about the role of energy prices in fuel
poverty?
Jenny Saunders:The recent increases in the numbers
of households in fuel poverty we would argue, is
down solely to the energy price increases. Previously
we have tried to map how the diVerent policy
instruments have helped us to reduce the levels. We
have looked at incomes policy and energy eYciency.
Up until 2004, about 60% of the reduction in fuel
poverty was attributable to just helping people to
increase their incomes, particularly the pension
credit, and that has been eroded now. Some
households do not understand the complex range of
tariVs. They clearly do need better energy advice on
how they can save energy in the home, but most
people in fuel poverty will not be proﬂigate; they will
be sparing, they will not be wasting energy if they
cannot aVord to do so. That is our view.
Q434 Chairman: Few people make proﬂigate use of
energy now given the prices. The Government’s
projections on fuel poverty made in last year’sWhite
Paper, which was the most recent projections, what
validity do you think those projections now have in
light of the events since the publication of the
White Paper?
Jenny Saunders: They suggested three possible
energy price scenarios. We are already way beyond
the highest possible scenario that was predicted. We
would estimate that the target 2010 date for
eradicating fuel poverty in vulnerable households
cannot be met with current resources. In 2016 we
would hope that we could meet them but it will
require signiﬁcantly more resource and some new
policies.
Q435 Mr Clapham: In relation to new policies is it
possible to say where you would like to see those
new policies?
Jenny Saunders:Weneed to have an expanded range
of measures on oVer to households. We are not
saying that everything that is being done at the
moment is wrong. We have had faith in the energy
eYciency programmes. We do know that they are
delivering a good deal to people. We have to step up
and we have to bring in, particularly in the oV gas
areas, new insulation products, we have to join up
rather better at a local level and see how the new
performance indicators on local authorities can be
constructively implemented. I think we do need to
look at a social tariV being a statutory obligation,
but we are not saying everything is wrong and we
tear up the strategy, but we certainly need more
resources to deliver.
Chairman:Towards the endwewill come back to the
action programme that Ofgem has announced, so
there may be an opportunity to explore this issue in
slightly more detail at the end, but that is a helpful
overview, thank you.
Q436 Mr Bailey: These questions are primarily
posed at yourself, Lesley, because they are NRFC’s
statistics, but obviously if Jenny wishes to make a
comment then that would be welcome. First of all, in
very broad terms you have claimed that the energy
ﬁrms have made £2.3 billion more in proﬁt in 2006
than in 2003. Can you tell us what is the basis of your
methodology for calculating this?
Lesley Davies: Firstly, I need to say that we may
have included an incorrect table. The ﬁgure is
slightly diVerent to £2.3 billion; it is about £2.07
billion and I will send a corrected table but it does
not undermine any of the arguments that we have
made in the paper. Please accept my apologies for
that error. We were really very concerned when
energy prices were rising so substantially and the
retailers were saying there is nothing we can do
about it, it is all just to do with increases in wholesale
prices, and we wanted to put that to the test: could
you explain the increase in energy prices by increases
in any of the supply chain costs? We commissioned
a consultancy—we did not do this ourselves as you
would not want to trust me with a calculator with
these types of numbers—to look at this so that we
could produce something really quite robust,
bearing in mind though that we were using only
publicly available information and that in itself was
quite a challenge. We have always said that this is a
starting point for a discussion around these areas. It
is also something we had wanted Ofgem to do and
Ofgemhad been asked to do by diVerent parties over
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the period when energy prices have been increasing
and they had not undertaken this task and we are
hoping that they do do it so that perhaps a bit more
robustly than we were able to do it, given their own
powers and duties as part of the energy probe. We
did something really quite simple. We estimated
using BERR data the expenditure that had been
made by residential consumers in 2003 and 2006. In
2003 it was £14 billion; in 2006 it was £22 billion, not
an insubstantial increase and our evidence suggests
that you can explain half of that increase only by
increases in wholesale costs. You can explain around
20% of it by an increase in what we have loosely
termed “other costs” but there are other costs in the
supply chain, for example, increases in distribution
and transmission transportation costs, those types
of things, and costs to serve and so on, but that you
were left with around £2 billion which really could
only be accounted for by an increase in proﬁts to, we
think, just using our data principally from electricity
generation.
Mr Bailey: I am trying to phrase this in a way that
ensures that we do not get bogged down in a morass
of statistics but there are one or two questions that
must involve them. First of all, you have said that the
increase in fuel plus other costs is 104% and 18%, ie
122%. The increase inmargins is 213%, but you have
said that reported expenditure has only increased in
58%. I am a little puzzled how you can only get an
increase in expenditure of the public buying this
electricity of 58%, but the gap between the costs and
the margins is that much greater. How do you run
these statistics oV against each other?
Q437 Chairman: Reported expenses at the top
level—is that the total of the three?What is it? I want
to make sure I understand what “reported
expenditure” actually means.
Lesley Davies: The reported expenditure is the
proportion of total expenditure made by all
consumers, including business, but we have then
reduced that down to what would be representative
of residential consumers. The £14.3 million is the
expenditure made by residential gas and electricity
consumers.
Q438 Mr Bailey: That clariﬁes one point. My next
question was could these be altered if you took in
industrial and other consumers?
Lesley Davies: You would increase it.
Q439 Mr Bailey:Getting back to the point, it would
seem on the surface that if costs have risen by 122%,
but in eVect the percentage change in the amount
that the public have purchased only goes up by 58%,
the companies must have done something to
mitigate the increase in costs.
Lesley Davies: You have to take into account the
proportion of the bill that is made up by energy, so
an increase as I understand it in terms of the
wholesale costs would only impact on around half to
three quarters of the bill. It diVers between gas and
electricity so you are not comparing like with like
with those two percentages. I think perhaps it would
be better if I dropped you a note about that
particular point rather than trying to answer it here.
Q440 Mr Bailey: I am anxious to avoid getting into
too great a detail and then the whole thing becomes
incomprehensible. There is, however, one point that
I must make, and far be it from me to defend the
energy companies but I have to play the devil’s
advocate in this. 2003 was a year when wholesale
and retail prices were very low. Is it really a fair
comparator between 2003 and 2006 to make these
observations on?
Lesley Davies: We chose 2003 because it was when
energy prices were going up and it was also the point
at which fuel poverty numbers were at the lowest, so
that was really our starting point. It was not a
malicious starting point so that we would get a
bigger proﬁt number at the end by making the
comparison, because had we only taken 2006 and
looked only at the proﬁt levels there, I think the fact
that the energy industry canmake proﬁt levels of just
over £2.3 billion at a time when their costs are going
up but their prices are going up even more than their
costs and there are now four and a half million
consumers in fuel poverty, I think is really quite a
telling thing. It seems tome that amarket that is able
to do that is not a market that is working
particularly eVectively. Even if you discount and
ignore 2003, and you ignore the proﬁt comparison,
the levels of proﬁt in 2006 are too high to my mind
and not fair.
Q441 Mr Bailey: It is obvious that the research that
you initiated only goes up to 2006 and there has been
quite a dramatic increase in oil and other prices since
then. How would you assess the situation has
changed since the publication of these statistics in
the 2006 timeline?
Lesley Davies: It is diYcult to say without referring
back to the data because it is diYcult to assess how
much expenditure by consumers has gone up and
what the proﬁt levels of the generating stations that
we use to make this has been declared at, but I do
know that when some of the price increases were
happening at the beginning of the year all the people
that we were talking to were saying that there had
not been any particular constraints on capacity, for
example, that might generate those price increases.
Jenny Saunders: It might be something that you
could ask Ofgem to report on if they are doing the
energy probe. That is something that they will
perhaps have more information on.
Q442MrBailey: I ask you quite deliberately because
if action is to be taken by the Government, it must
be based on the up-to-date situation rather than the
situation that arose in 2006, bearing in mind that
things have changed quite dramatically.
Lesley Davies: Ofgem do have access to far better
and far more detailed and far more accurate
information than we do. We only used publicly
available data for this report.
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Q443 Mr Bailey: I come now to my ﬁnal issue and
perhaps the crunch issue. Do you feel that on the
basis of the evidence in this particular assessment
and your assessment of what has happened since
that there is a case for a windfall tax and, if so, at
what sort of level should it be levied?
Lesley Davies: I personally think there is a case for a
windfall tax, looking backwards between 2003 and
2006. It certainly would not be all of the proﬁt that
had been made. That would not be sensible. I really
do not have a ﬁgure inmy head butmy starting point
would be to think about what is the shortfall that is
needed to supplement the fuel poverty programmes
likeWarm Front and so on, and if a windfall tax was
not palatable or was not appropriate, I also think
that the Government has taken rather a lot in
additional revenues from VAT. I think we have
estimated that between 2003 and 2004 at around
£400 million. There is also petroleum revenue tax
that has added to the Government purse as well
which I really have no idea about because that is
based on proﬁt levels of gas producers and that is a
really diYcult place from which to get any
information. There is an awful lot of additional
money going around here that is really on the back
of the most vulnerable people in society. It seems to
me that it is fair that some of that should come back
and help them deal with the consequences of what is
happening in the energy market at the moment.
Q444 Mr Bailey: What you are saying, in essence, is
that it should be driven by consumer need rather
than the balance sheet or future investment plans of
the energy companies.
Lesley Davies: I am not saying it should necessarily
be driven but that would be my starting point for
working out howmuch youwouldwant to take from
the taxation revenue.
Jenny Saunders: The problem with a windfall tax is
with hypothecation because, having called
previously for a tax on the upstream producers, it
did not necessarily result in the programmes that we
had advocated. Once the Treasury has that funding
it does not always gowhere wewant, butwe do think
that government should prioritise additional
funding as a matter of urgency and, as Lesley
pointed out, having the additional revenue from
VAT on fuel receipts is a way in which it could fund
some of this work.
Lesley Davies: I agree completely with Jenny on that
one about you would only want a windfall tax if you
could hypothecate it properly otherwise it is not
very eVective.
Q445 Chairman: What you are saying is that the
Government has had its own windfall tax anyhow
which could be used for this purpose.
Lesley Davies: Quite.
Q446Chairman:Howdo you estimate the fuel costs?
I thought these were commercially conﬁdential? I
would love to know what Centrica is paying and
British Gas is paying for their gas. In a
malfunctioning market we do not even know what
the actual price is.
Lesley Davies: Some of the information in for
electricity is company speciﬁc, so we do need to bear
in mind just how little information there is available,
as you are saying. For gas we used the declared
revenue for gas production so of course there is an
element of proﬁt included in that and that was for an
indigenous supplier. I think we used the month
ahead market for imported supply and again that
was revenue. There is an awful lot of hypothecation
that we have done ourselves in arriving at this. We
were the ﬁrst to put information like this into the
public domain and it is a starting point for Ofgem to
actually do a much better job with and they can do
better.
MrBinley: I am slightly worried about what looks to
me like a sizeably narrow snapshot of a very big
issue.
Chairman: We do have the full report that this is
based on, so I think we all ought to look at it quite
carefully.
Q447 Mr Binley: I understand that but there is a
concern there and I think you would share that
concern too.
Lesley Davies: Absolutely.
Q448 Mr Binley: I am particularly concerned about
what “estimated other costs” are aswell because that
covers a very big area of activity.
Lesley Davies: This goes again to the way in which
we try to get the data to ﬁt together in some respects
because there were some things that we could not
explain with the numbers. We have been as
transparent as we can with the report. We did not
really want to use it to make any claims that could
not be substantiated by the report itself because that
would be irresponsible. We have put it out to the
industry, to Ofgem and to government and, frankly,
the only criticism that has come back to us has been
about whether or not the £2 billion proﬁt was
reasonable or not, not really that there is any
fundamental inaccuracy in the way in which we have
constructed this, given the data that we have used.
Q449 Mr Binley: You have still not told me what
“estimated other costs” covers?
Lesley Davies: It is all there in the report but it will
include distribution, metering costs, suppliers’ costs
to send billing systems, debt recovery, transmission,
transportation costs.
Q450 Mr Binley: Does it cover investment?
Lesley Davies: Not necessarily.
Q451 Mr Binley: Why?
Lesley Davies: Just because of the way in which we
were able to extract the data but the point that you
make is completely fair and had we had access to
more data and as well in terms of the organisation if
we had had more resources to do a more extensive
piece of work we would have done.
Q452Chairman:You are really oVering this as a best
guess on Ofgem and the ‘Big 6’ can challenge this if
they want to. The ‘Big 6’ are all coming in to give
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evidence later on in this inquiry and I think we will
want to push them quite hard on what they make of
these ﬁgures.
Lesley Davies: I think that will be a really useful
thing to do.
Jenny Saunders: When energy prices were going up
so dramatically at the same time company proﬁt
levels were being reported at record levels. We just
wanted to test out exactly how these things ﬁtted
together.
Q453MrWright:We have taken evidence in the past
regarding the ability or inability of some people to
switch from company to company and quite clearly
we have your views on that. The NEA says
“incumbent suppliers treat their legacy customers
like a cash cow” and obviously there are a number
of people tied into the companies from your own
table up to December 2005. Do you think that the
companies should be allowed to get away with
charging diVerent rates and also to encourage new
customers in knowing that there is going to be a
signiﬁcant number of customers that will not switch?
Jenny Saunders: When the price controls for supply
were abolished we did fear at that point that there
would be diYculties in this area. The ways in which
the tariV structures have been constructed do reward
those people who will switch away and onto the
cheapest way in which the companies will be able to
service them. That is how markets will work. That is
how they will want to be cost-eYcient, but there are
people who for no fault of their own cannot switch
because oVerings are not put to them; the companies
are not giving them incentives. If they are on
particular payment methods such as prepayment
theymay not be able to switch because they are being
blocked. Despite a debt assignment protocol,
nobody with debt has been able to switch supplier.
People who see the companies just keeping track
with each other are fearful that if they do switch they
might switch to a worse deal. The information put
before them is complex and I think we have to
recognise that after this length of time with
competition there is a sector of society, principally
older people and social categories D and E, that are
less inclined to switch and will not. We would like to
see some kind of either loyalty scheme or some
review so that they are oVered a discount for
remaining loyal to that company.
Lesley Davies: I see this in more competition terms
and I cannot really understand the justiﬁcation for
charging in the former payers area consumers who
have not switched higher prices than people who
have switched away and then switched back because
it seems to me that people who have stayed still and
not moved and not done anything to incur costs for
the company are actually a lower cost to the
company. It seems obvious to me that the people
who are moving away incur the cost of switching
away, having a ﬁnal bill, being chased to pay that bill
and then switching back have incurred marketing
costs to the company. It seems a little odd to me and
I think an indication of the sluggishness of the
competitive market that in an area consumers pay
more than they should.
Q454 Mr Wright: Jenny, you have mentioned the
fact that there could be this loyalty scheme. Have
you had discussions with the energy companies? Has
that been put forward to the energy companies
perhaps that they should have a loyalty scheme
because quite clearly looking at the groups
according to this table again it is the over 65s, it is the
people on prepaymentmeters, those that are on ﬁxed
incomes that are going to be less likely to switch are
those groups who need more help and quite clearly
they are not getting that. Presumably the over 65s
because they get the winter fuel allowance and
perhaps companies see that as a little bonus that they
are going to get additional to the other income.
Jenny Saunders: We did raise it at the fuel poverty
summit that Ofgem convened and the chief
executives of all of the six companies were there and
it is for them to think about and to come forward
with their oVerings under the new social action plan.
Some companies are reviewing and one did say that
they would go back to all their customers and check
that they are on the best tariV for them, but we think
it has taken them a long time to think about this and
a real push needs to happen now from Ofgem to get
behind this to encourage that action.
Q455 Mr Wright: In terms of the ﬁgures that you
have published there they are three years old now.
The message coming back to us was that there is
probably less diVerence between the prices in the
companies now than there was three, four or ﬁve
years ago. Has there been a change in the ﬁgures for
people switching signiﬁcantly in those areas since
2005?
Jenny Saunders: There has been an increase in the
number of people switching who were on
prepayment meters, yes, but that has been driven by
publicity campaigns by trying to encourage trusted
third parties and charities and local CABs and there
is more work to be done on that. Having done some
of that work ourselves, working with advice
agencies, we recognise how diYcult it is. It is time-
consuming. People will not necessarily respond just
to a leaﬂet. They need to be taken through the
process. There is not capacity in the existing advice
sector to help and adequately support people as they
go through that switching process. I also do not
think that switching is necessarily the be all and end
all. Why not have something that rewards loyalty
and links it to an energy eYciency package. Some
companies are trying to think their way through this,
but not on the scale that is needed. We have 4.5
million people really in desperate need at the
moment.
Q456 Mr Weir: We were told by energywatch that
the average customer saving is something like £30 a
year. Is switching really worth it for your average
customer? I can see that from a prepayment meter
onto direct debit a lot of saving would be made, but
for the average customer is it worthwhile, especially
now that the companies are raising their prices one
after another very quickly?
Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Committee: Evidence Ev 65
5 June 2008 Jenny Saunders and Lesley Davies
Jenny Saunders: £30 is for the direct debit customer
now, although going on you could save a bit more,
but for prepayment meter customers if you think
that the average diVerential is £200—
Mr Weir: I appreciate that, but everybody is told
that they should switch but in fact it seems tome that
only those who are on prepayment meters and can
get onto a better tariV make any real beneﬁt by
switching.
Chairman: It is prepayment meter to prepayment
meter is what you are saying.We all know that if you
switch from prepayment to direct debit you get a
big saving.
Q457 Mr Weir: If you are on your average direct
debit tariV, as many of us are, is there much point in
actually switching?
Lesley Davies: The other issue to take into account
is whether or not you have ever switched before
because I think there are probably larger savings to
be made if you have never switched before, which
goes back to Jenny’s point about the loyalty issue.
The issue of having switched once and whether you
switch again for £30 is more the answer to your
point.
Q458 Mr Clapham: My questions are on payment
types and they are more directed to the NEA but,
Lesley, if you want to come in, please do so. One of
the things that you say in your submission is that
diVerentials between prepayment and other
payment methods have now increased to an
unacceptable level. Could you tell us about why you
believe that customers on prepayment level are now
having a charge that is at an unacceptable level?
Jenny Saunders: I think the diVerential has been
increasing over the past few years as these newonline
tariVs have come on stream. There are a number of
factors. Traditionally themeters aremore expensive;
the cost of servicing a prepayment meter customer
we recognise may be more. However, we do not
know exactly what those costs would be. It has been
estimated to be in the region of £85 by Ofgem. We
would like to see some analysis as to how we can get
some more eYciencies into that bit of the market.
Overall, energywatch have estimated that
prepayment users are being overcharged in the
region of £300-£400 million a year. For the
individual household if you are on a low ﬁxed
income and there is a diVerential of £300, £6 a week
can go quite a long way if you are surviving on £80-
£90 a week. We do not think that that is acceptable.
A thousand prepayment meters are going in every
day to recover debt. The companies use it as a debt
recovery vehicle. Customers quite like the idea of
using the meters as a budgeting tool but they are
being penalised for that and that is the problem. We
do not think that the sensible approach that
customers are taking to help manage their
household budgets should result in such a high
diVerential, but again we expect in September there
to be some action. Scottish Power reduced its
prepayment meter level down below direct debits
and some of the other companies are having to look
very seriously at their diVerentials now. If it does not
happen voluntarily, wewould want theGovernment
to step in on this issue.
Q459MrClapham:The ﬁgure given by energywatch
is enormous, is it not? £401million excess charges for
prepayment meters.
Jenny Saunders: Yes, it is unacceptable.
Q460 Mr Clapham: Is this something that you have
taken up with government at all or taken up with the
energy companies?
Jenny Saunders: I amamember of theGovernment’s
Fuel Poverty Advisory Group and we have raised
this over the past two years. We have asked for
action on this but again I think the crunch came just
a few months ago when the high proﬁt levels were
being reported and energy prices were going up. I
think it was just at that point that the energy probe
was called. We hope that it does result in some
action.
Q461Mr Clapham:One of the things that you say in
your submission that you propose prepayment
charges be capped at the level charged to standard
credit customers. To some degree that is diVerent to
what, for example, Ofgem are saying. Ofgem
calculate that equalisation of prepayment tariVs for
diVerent debit or standard credit will cost the
average household £14 to £6 per year respectively. If
you introduced, as you want to do, that capped level
of charge to standard credit customers, there would
be a spreading of the cost, would there not?
Jenny Saunders: There would and that is why we
went for the lower ﬁgure. It is £6 a year across every
customer and we think that that is a fairer outcome
than the existing diVerential. That is our judgment
and we hope that those people who are on standard
credit on low incomes would be assisted through a
social tariV and that would be the mechanism to
mitigate that cost for them. That is what we are
hoping that DWP will address in some kind of
oVering to pensioners.
Lesley Davies: Could I make one point about the
diVerential, and it may be a question for Ofgem
again. You can also describe the diVerential as a
margin that is there waiting to be competed away by
suppliers in the market. It would be an interesting
question to ask of Ofgem why they think that
margin, in a market that they think is truly
competitive, has not been competed away when they
keep talking about suppliers looking for newways of
marketing to consumers because that is the thing
that I do not understand why that margin exists in a
competitive market.
Q462MrClapham: 4.5million households are living
in fuel poverty, Jenny. Is it possible to say what
number of those households would be on
prepayment meters?
Jenny Saunders: I cannot remember oV the top ofmy
head what the estimate is but I think people on
prepayment meters are more likely to be on a low
ﬁxed income. They are not all fuel poor, we accept
that, but then it is not easy to identify everybody by
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their payment methods who are in fuel poverty.
They are more likely to be on a low ﬁxed income,
they are more likely to be in debt. They are the
people who are having these meters ﬁtted now for
debt recovery so we think that link can be made.
Q463 Chairman: A lot of people on standard credit
terms are also in fuel poverty and on low incomes.
Jenny Saunders: They are but they can be assisted
through other mechanisms.
Q464 Mr Weir: In the last budget the Chancellor
announced that the leading energy companies had
increased expenditure on social tariVs to £150
million per year. Do you think that will make much
diVerence to the fuel poverty ﬁgures?
Jenny Saunders: If I can make the connection, a 1%
increase in the price of energy results in 40,000
people falling into fuel poverty. Energy prices only
have to go up by 2.5% for that initiative to have been
eroded because it was estimated that that amount of
money could take 100,000 households out of fuel
poverty. I would put it in that context, but I would
say it is not an unwelcome ﬁrst gesture andwe would
see it as something to build on.
Q465 Mr Weir: It does a little bit, not a lot that we
are seeing.
Jenny Saunders: Yes.
Q466 Mr Weir: Looking at social tariVs, there is a
vast diVerence between the various companies. Can
you tell us who gives the best social tariVs and who
gives the worst?
Lesley Davies: The only data that we have access to
is an energywatch report which used the criteria that
BERR may have adopted for assessing social tariVs
and that suggested that British Gas and EDF were
the best and RWE and SSE were the worst, but that
has to come with a huge caveat, not least because, to
defend the suppliers, SSE have sought to hold oV
their fuel price increases more than many of the
others, so I amnot sure whether you can actually just
baldly say best and worst in that context.
Q467 Mr Weir: Is one of the problems that they are
so diVerent? Would you support a standard social
tariV?
Jenny Saunders: Yes, that is the reason why because
it is so diYcult to compare the oVerings. Some of
them have beenmade obviously on a voluntary basis
and they are welcome initiatives, but we cannot with
any surety understand which is the best deal for
certain people and also they are not available in
great enough numbers. They are capped at the
moment and our job is to make sure we get as many
people onto those tariVs as possible.
Q468 Mr Weir: A standard tariV would allow
everybody throughout the country to know exactly
what the social tariV is.What action would you have
liked the Government to have taken in the Energy
Bill on social tariVs?
Jenny Saunders: It is not too late for them still to
take action. CertainMembers of theHouse of Lords
were keen to put down an amendment. We would
like to see an enabling clause that will require
companies to oVer a social tariV with a clearly
deﬁned objective. We would like it linked to
eligibility for cold weather payments. We would like
to see it have a package of being the company’s
lowest oVering linked to an energy eYciency oVering
and referred back to DWP for assistance with
additional income maximisation advice. That is a
holistic approach. That is what is needed and in
terms of new policies they are the kind of progressive
initiatives that should be brought forward. Energy
prices are going to keep increasing; the companies
are telling us that. For a long time they said no, we
have extra gas storage, we have long term contracts
now andwe are certain that things will stabilise. You
are scaremongering if you say prices are going to
stay high. They are now telling us that they are
staying high for security and for carbon reduction.
We have to respond to that without annual knee
jerk, bring the companies in, what are you going to
do? We need to set a framework for this going
forward so we are not always just appealing to their
better nature, appealing to voluntary initiatives. It
should be a statutory duty. This is an essential
commodity for the health and wellbeing of every
household in this country and we cannot leave it to
market forces.
Q469 Mr Weir: We talked earlier about a windfall
tax. Is it the case then that we are really looking at a
future where energy companies are going to have to
invest more of their proﬁts back into helping social
customers and energy eYciency and in fact they are
going to have to make less proﬁt because of that in
the future on an annual basis, not just a one-oV
windfall tax?
Jenny Saunders: We want the companies to make a
reasonable proﬁt because obviously they do need to
invest in new generation plant, they do need to make
those investments and we are not disputing that, and
also the energy companies are not social agents of
government and we do not want them to behave as
such. We want them to be responsible and take care
of their vulnerable customers. The Government has
to respond perhaps with some additional income
payments and stepping up their action. It is amazing
that theWarmFront budget has been cut at this time
and that is the Government’s contribution to this
agenda.
Q470 Mr Wright: Moving straight on to the Warm
Front issue, what are your feelings in terms of the
performance of Warm Front since its
implementation?
Jenny Saunders: There are two elements, I think, to
this question. One is around the framework for the
scheme set by Defra and one is on the delivery by the
installers and the scheme manager. I have recently
started to sit on the Scheme Manager’s Board so I
am trying to get my head round some of these issues
because we have a maximum grant for Warm Front
in England which is lower than the equivalent
Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Committee: Evidence Ev 67
5 June 2008 Jenny Saunders and Lesley Davies
schemes in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.
People are being asked to pay a contribution to the
work which we think is unacceptable. We would like
to see the average grant increased but we have to be
pragmatic. The Government has set the budget for
the next three years at a lower level. We do not think
that the programme should be left to provide the
existing measures that it is providing. It is limited
and we need to bring in new technologies. There is
such an irony that at the time the Government has
more revenue from higher increases in energy prices,
it has cut the budget for Warm Front.
Lesley Davies: The other thing to bear in mind
certainly with the grant maxima is how are the top-
ups picked up? Clearly most low income consumers
would ﬁnd £400-£700 completely out with their
budgets to take advantage of Warm Front which is
a really good scheme in delivering beneﬁts when all
of the things ﬁt. We know from things that our
members have told us that it is local authorities who
pick up the diVerence. It is the British Legion that
picks up the diVerence, so there is an awful lot of
responsibility beingmet elsewhere. If someone else is
picking up the bill why would you feel the need to
address the issue of top up, but it can, if those
moneys are not available, mean that people who
really, really need the beneﬁt of Warm Front do not
get it because they do not have access to the funds to
make the top up.
Q471 Mr Wright: I think most MPs have been
involved in terms of some of the issues surrounding
the top ups on this, but one of the issues that has
been raisedwith eaga andwith others is this question
about the client can actually get the job done cheaper
in the locality than by the preferred installer from
eaga. This has been ﬂagged up on numerous
occasions where perhaps the £2,700 would be
suYcient if they were allowed the ﬂexibility of
getting aCorgi registered local installer to do exactly
the same job as the one that has been given the
contract. Is that something that has been raised as
an issue?
Jenny Saunders: It certainly has. There was a quality
study carried out for the board that made these
comparisons on costs that Warm Front were being
charged by installers and other companies providing
a national scheme for heating and insulation. It
appeared that Warm Front was not paying over the
odds. It is comparing like with like. Some people, if
we were to hand over that grant, would be quite
capable of going and arranging the work themselves,
but others would not. For a government scheme you
have to have monitoring; you have to have some
insurance; you have to have health and safety
considerations at the forefront. That is my view that
it may be done cheaper locally in some instances, but
overall I do not think that you would have the
quality control and you would have that certainty
that you are getting a good quality of work.
MrWright: The fact is that with gas installations you
have to be Corgi registered. The regulations are very
strict in terms of installation for protection and
everything else. If that person is a Corgi registered
installer and can do the job for £500 cheaper, surely
that should suYce the regulations because that
person has to register on an annual basis for his or
her Corgi standard?
Q472 Chairman: We are addressing these questions
to eaga in a few minutes’ time as well. We have
technically four minutes left and two areas of
questioning left, so we need to be brief on this.
Jenny Saunders: There is certainly more that we can
do to bring together theWarm Front and the CERT
schemes into a more holistic package. We might get
some more cost eYciencies in there as well.
Q473 Mr Wright: Finally, you have put forward a
case for an improved hybrid programmewithCERT
as well as Warm Front. Can you tell us how it
would operate?
Jenny Saunders: What we have tried to do through
our subsidiary charity that NEA runs—Warm
Zones—and in the 11 areas it is operating it tries to
bring together the diVerent grants available—Warm
Front, the local housing board funding—but they all
have slightly diVerent objectives. One is a carbon
reduction target, one has a social need. If we are to
have something that is more meaningful for the
household that we could not have to pay
administration costs twice over, wemight have some
of those eYciencies and you would have a better
package oVered. It could be then that local
authorities identify the need in a local area and they
can draw down funding from a central pot. It is that
kind of thing we are exploring as we go through into
the next stage of obligations on the suppliers from
2011. Let’s be a bit more creative and think about
the tariVs being built in; a social tariV linked to an
energy eYciency package that might look diVerent
to just loft insulation or cavity wall.
Lesley Davies: It could then be the focus for a really
strategic approach to dealing with fuel poverty
which we have discussed already is pretty lacking.
The only concern I have with that type of scheme
though in my experience is when you hive oV the
least popular part from the popular scheme it tends
to suVer by withering on the vine and not getting the
budget that it had previously had. I would have that
cynical concern about such a scheme.
Q474 Mr Binley: I have three questions about
incomes. You have both been pretty critical of the
Government in terms of the way it distributes
additional income for the purpose of overcoming
fuel poverty. What more could the Government do
through the beneﬁt system? Is there anything you
would advocate?
Lesley Davies: We certainly want to see the winter
fuel payment extended to people who are non-
pensioner households that are currently eligible for
the cold weather payment because I think that will
cover about half of the people who are in fuel
poverty. That would certainly be one thing that the
Right to Fuel Campaign would advocate.
Q475 Mr Binley: Is it a very ineYcient system of
dealing with what is a sizeable issue?
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Jenny Saunders: The winter fuel payment is going to
about 11 million older people and it maybe is not
reaching those people who are in fuel poverty.
Q476 Mr Binley: How do we improve it?
Jenny Saunders: One proposal might be that we tax
you on the payment that you receive, so for higher
tax payers—
Q477 Mr Binley: Is that not more expensive for the
taxpayer all this administration? I want a more
focused sharper point to what you are trying to do.
I agree with what you are trying to do but I want it
more focused and sharper.
Jenny Saunders: We recognise that the winter fuel
payment is not really a fuel poverty measure. The
Government estimates that it takes out about
100,000 people out of fuel poverty as it is deﬁned as
an income measure. It is very popular with older
people and we do not want to see it taken away. We
want to see some additional kind of payment to
those who are on pension credit and I think that is
something we want to explore with DWP over the
next few weeks how we can get an additional
payment for them.
Q478 Mr Binley: In truth we have no real answers at
the moment about how to spend taxpayers’ money
more eYciently to achieve the object you want to
achieve. That is my concern.
Jenny Saunders:The sustainable way is by putting in
more insulation and better heating systems, by
improving our housing stock, but we recognise that
that takes time. That is where we would best spend
taxpayers’ money, but we have an immediate crisis
where people just cannot aVord it because their
incomes are too low. An additional payment is what
is needed.
Q479 Mr Binley: Will the increased winter fuel
payment cover the increased costs of energy this
winter?
Jenny Saunders: It depends how much the
companies put the bills up by.
Q480 Chairman: Probably not is the implication
because you said earlier that you expect further
increases in energy prices.
Jenny Saunders: It depends. The over 80s are getting
an extra £100 on top of the £300. It is a very
signiﬁcant amount of money but if we look at what
it used to buy, it used to buy about 35% of your fuel
bill; it buys about 24% now. It does not have that
great an impact.
Q481 Mr Clapham: How useful is Ofgem’s Fuel
Poverty Action Programme in helping to reverse
fuel poverty?
Jenny Saunders: It is not going to reverse the fuel
poverty trend signiﬁcantly by its own admission.
What it is trying to do is to help people take
advantage of what is on oVer in the market and to
push through some voluntary initiatives. In terms of
the overall fuel poverty strategy it is not going to
signiﬁcantly reverse the trend. It will bring forward
some very welcome initiatives, and we are not
knocking those at all, but we have to be serious
about where the funding gap is. It is at about £200-
£300 million a year for the next ten years as
estimated by FPAG a couple of years ago before
prices were where they are, to be
invested in energy eYciency programmes and not
just in social tariV rebates.
Q482 Mr Clapham: My ﬁnal question is we have
three government departments that are in some way
involved with fuel poverty—BERR, the DWP and
Defra. Given that there are three government
departments with diVerent responsibilities for fuel
poverty, does it prove to be a barrier, or is it working
reasonably well?
Jenny Saunders: It is a cross-departmental issue, as
we know. It is welcome that they all have their own
responsibilities and that is fundamental to what we
want. We would like to see the inter-ministerial
taskforce meet again. It was established but it has
not met, so perhaps at a ministerial level it would be
helpful to bring them together formally again. I
think behind the scenes they are currently trying to
join up initiatives. For Defra, their fuel poverty
objective is a departmental objective, one of 70-odd
now. We would like to see it having greater priority
and further up the list because there is a fear that the
reason we got the cut in the Warm Front grant was
because it was lower ranking than it had been.
Chairman: Ladies, thank you very much indeed. We
have slightly over-run, but not by much. I hope you
have had an opportunity to say all the things you
wished to have said. I think some further
information was promised in some respects, but if
there is anything you think you would like to have
said to us, please feel free to put that in writing.
Thank you very much indeed.
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Q483 Chairman:Gentlemen, welcome to this second
part of today’s evidence session. Thank you for your
written evidence, which I appreciate. Could you
introduce yourselves and your organisations for
the record?
Mr Clough: John Clough, Chief Executive of eaga
plc.
Professor Chesshire: I am John Chesshire, a member
of the Fuel Poverty Advisory Group, currently
acting Chairman of that group.
Q484 Chairman: Professor Chesshire, there is one
thing that intrigues me about your memorandum. It
has some quite critical things to say about the
structure of the industry and implicitly some of the
behaviour of some of the members of it. I notice that
Graham Kirby of E.ON, Ian Peters of Centrica and
Eva Eisenschimmel of EDF Energy are all members
of the group. Do they not come to the meetings?
Professor Chesshire: They do indeed. They are a
broad church, FPAGmembers. You are quite right,
we have government oYcials there and we have the
voluntary sector, we have the housing sector, fuel
poverty organisations and the energy suppliers. We
can very rarely aim at unanimity, Chairman, but we
do aim at the highest common factor most of the
time, but where there are a set of views which is
shared by amajority where there clearly is a problem
aVecting fuel poverty we try to express it even
though the energy suppliers sometimes would not
wholly share our views.
Chairman: That is a helpful clariﬁcation.
Q485MrWright: In terms ofWarmFront you heard
my comments beforehand. What are your views so
far as the performance is concerned ofWarm Front?
Professor Chesshire: As far as the Fuel Poverty
Advisory Group I think we see it as a very successful
scheme in itself. It has been evaluated, there have
been some diYculties, some of which you raised
yourself a little earlier with other witnesses, but
where there have been value for money assessments
undertaken of the scheme by government and by the
Scheme Board of Warm Front (eaga), it is shown to
be broadly successful. I am sure lessons have been
learnt from those evaluations. I am not being
entirely complacent of it. The primary criticisms are
the sheer scale of the programme and we can come
to that maybe later on. You heard also about the
limit on the grant maxima which is becoming a
constraint in the programme. Some people would
also see a greater focus by joining up some of the
alternative delivery programmes such as CERT and
Warm Front maybe at an area based level.
Mr Clough: In terms of the scheme itself at a macro
level the indicators are that it has never been more
successful than it is at the moment. It has assisted
getting on for half a million homes in the last two
years. The average impact on fuel bills is of the order
of £300 per annum. Those people who receive a
heating intervention then that saving is considerably
more than that but, as John has said, and as you
yourself have echoed, there are some challenges in
the programme. Some of those are architectural by
the nature of the scheme in terms of its grant
maxima, et cetera. To give you a feel for that,
because I know that that is a matter which
particularly interests Members, since 2002 the grant
ceiling of £2,700 has risen by 8%. In the same period,
RPI is above 20%. That is not to be complacent. We
have applied downward pressure to pricing and the
supply chain and that has been somewhat successful,
but we have moved from a programme which, in
2000, was hailed as eVectively free at point of
access—whilst the word “free” was not used, that
was the implication—to a system where now if you
are eligible for a heating intervention, and 65% of
those people who we assist do get a heating
intervention, about half of them are expected to
make a contribution now. The average contribution
is over £500 and, as Jenny said in her evidence
earlier, that is a signiﬁcant sum for this client group.
It is unsurprising, therefore, with the pressure on this
client group that we have because of high energy
prices, and the demand has never been higher for the
programme, nor its satisfaction levels higher, that
we have got this conﬂuence of forces which is
bringing to bear a very high demand and with some
individuals who are in great need an inability to fund
the excess themselves. We work very closely with
local authorities, caring agencies and the likes of the
British Legion. Indeed, we ourselves have a
corporate social responsibility fund and this year we
will forego £2 million of contributions as eVectively
the installer who is the backstop to provide these
services if no-one else will. So there is a signiﬁcant
amount of contribution from the supply chain, from
local authorities and from caring agencies, but there
are still 16,000 people onmy waiting list who cannot
have a heating system because they cannot aVord it.
Q486 Mr Wright: Have any customers been
prevented from going ahead with the Warm Front
because they could not aVord the top up, or has there
always been something in place to take into account
that amount?
Mr Clough: There are a number of people who
basically say “I can’t aVord it”. We try every
available route to assist them. They look obviously
to see if they can aVord it by some other means but
there are a number of people who have sadly fallen
by the wayside because they just cannot proceed.
Q487 Mr Wright: Do you have numbers?
Mr Clough:There are 16,000 at the moment who are
sitting there waiting for more funding. That is not to
say all of those will not go further, but all I can do is
give you a snapshot in time as to the number of
people who are not proceeding through the
programme.
Q488 Mr Wright: Is that 16,000 who could not
aVord the top up, or is it 16,000 waiting for the next
tranche of money to come through from
government?
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Mr Clough: No, we are not constrained at the
moment in the sense that we have not run out of
money, but each individual only gets £2,700, so
those 16,000 are sitting there with a bill greater than
£2,700. We know from the independent
assessment—no-one was keener than I to see the
result of that appraisal—was that the equivalent
service in the, if you like, private sector where you go
out and seek your own contracts would be 57%more
expensive. If I can just pre-empt one of your
questions which you asked previous witnesses—why
is it that a local installer can oVer a cheaper price—
the question is about sustainability of that price
oVering and there is always a spot market available
and that is not to decry that, but a very important
point is compliance with the likes of Part L of the
Building Regulations. The big diVerence between
the likes of Warm Front and if you or I went to our
local installer is that, under Warm Front, we inspect
100% of all of the heating systems independently to
ensure that they have been installed to those building
regulation and safety standards. If you or I went to
a Corgi registered installer, I am afraid we would
take that Corgi registered installer’s view that he was
operating to standard and, to be perfectly frank, as
a non-technician I would have to take his word for
that.
Q489 Mr Wright: I have raised a concern with a
particular constituent of mine with yourselves and I
would question that particular statement in that
respect, but in terms of the eligible households, how
many would you estimate in the UK would be
eligible for Warm Front if they were to put their
name forward for it?
Mr Clough: I would concur with the earlier ﬁgures
where we have, in terms of eligibility for Warm
Front, around the three million number because
they are the vulnerable fuel poor as opposed to the
larger cohort of fuel poor households at four and a
half million, vulnerability being determined as
disability on a means-tested beneﬁt, et cetera. Those
are the proxy eligibility criteria which enable you to
apply for Warm Front.
Q490MrWright: Was there any reason given to you
by the Government as to why the spending had been
cut in this particular area?
Mr Clough: Government do not need to account to
me. The company is there to deliver the programme
at the funding levels provided. Clearly the impact is
signiﬁcant.
Q491 Mr Wright: In terms of numbers, even at the
level of £2,700, how many are we talking about in
reduction on an annual basis?
MrClough:On an annual basis the funding has gone
from £350 million or so of government funding last
year to the order of, and I have yet to have the ﬁnal
number conﬁrmed, £280 million this year, so a £70
million reduction at an average grant spend of about
£1500. That gives you an impact on the number of
households, but in fact because of the increase in
what I would call run rate—the rate of activity
month by month—at the end of last year Warm
Front was operating at a level on an annual basis in
the last quarter of about £400-£410 million, which is
now reduced to £280 million, so the downturn is
signiﬁcantly more.
Q492 Mr Wright: If the Government was to come
back and say there are ﬁnancial diYculties and
decisions to be taken, which there always are, how
would you suggest that they could actually claw
back or raise the extra revenue required to breach
that particular gap, but also go a step further to
make sure that there is more than enough money in
there to take into account the extra costs, but also
the number of people that would require this,
because quite clearly this impact of Warm Front
would have an eVect of reducing the number of
people who are in fuel poverty.
Mr Clough: It would and it is very eVective at
alleviating fuel poverty. If we were just looking to
restore the budget, then we would be looking for
something less than £100 million per year, but the
true demand out there is well in excess of £400
million per year. We know that from the demand we
get in our contact centre and through our networks
each day. In terms of where would those funds come
from, there are a number of choices but clearly they
are political choices and we just oVer some thoughts
on that. We have looked at winter fuel payments in
terms of every individual gets those, whether they
are on a higher tax band or not. The impact of taxing
those people on the higher band and recovering that
would be, we believe, of the order of £200million per
year, so there is an opportunity there. Increased fuel
prices of course, whilst they are the cause of this
problem, also bring increased VAT receipts to the
Treasury and the estimate there from such as FPAG
is of the order of £400million per year. If youwere to
look at recycling the “windfall” under EU emissions
trading schemes, that also has been estimated at
about £400 million a year. I think there are levers
which can be pulled if the political will is there to
pull them.
Q493 Mr Wright: You highlight nearly a billion
pounds of extra income which could be put to
good use.
Mr Clough: Indeed.
Q494 Chairman: I think we have covered some of
this ground already in your earlier answers and we
can take this quite quickly. How successful do you
think the Energy EYciency Commitment was at
tackling fuel poverty?
Professor Chesshire: As an energy eYciency
programme it was a great success. The provisional
evidence from Ofgem, which I received earlier this
week, suggests they have overshot the three year
target 2005-2008 quite considerably. When I looked
speciﬁcally at the impact on fuel poverty the only
data I could ﬁnd readily, Chairman, was in the
Government’s own fuel poverty annual report of last
December which said, looking at the last six years of
EEC 2002-2008 and the CERT Programme to 2011,
that nine year period would lower fuel poverty
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numbers by about 100,000.1 It is important to bear
in mind though that those programmes were not
designed as fuel poverty programmes. EEC was
designed primarily as an energy eYciency
programme and certainly the Carbon Emissions
Reduction Target, as its name implies, has placed
even greater weight on carbon savings, so in a sense
almost by scheme design the fuel poverty reductions
are incidental.
Q495 Chairman: Should CERT be about fuel
poverty at all?
Professor Chesshire: A big battle certainly in the
Fuel Poverty Advisory Group. We argued a case for
a signiﬁcant increase in capital programme
resources both fromWarm Front, the Government-
funded programme for England, but also from the
extension of EEC and what became known as
CERT. We argued for about a billion pounds a year
of capital programmes in England. If Warm Front
had been kept at the same level that would have been
running at or about £400million or thereabouts, but
as you have heard it was cut. We argued, as public
expenditure pressures were mounting undoubtedly
last year, that the share that went into the priority
group in CERT should remain at 50%. The
Government, as you probably know, chose to lower
that to 40%, although they have now said that they
will include all those over 70 years of age, so there is
a bit of awidening. The focus on the priority group is
exactly the same as that on fuel poverty—it is a very
broad proxy—so our view is that overall the
resources for fuel poverty have not increased and
certainly in relation to the population now suVering
fuel poverty they have diminished.
Q496 Chairman: The best way to reduce carbon
dioxide emissions would be to move entirely to
renewable energy and nuclear energy supply, would
it not? It would not do anything for fuel poverty at
all though, would it?
Professor Chesshire: I am not sure that is true,
Chairman. In the climate change programme
evaluation on which John was talking earlier in a
diVerent context, the third most cost-eVective
carbon reduction programme in the United
Kingdom was the Warm Front Programme.
Q497 Chairman: Let’s look at the extent to which
Warm Front and CERT overlap. You have already
mentioned this earlier. How bad do you think that
overlap is?
Mr Clough: There are three areas of potential
overlap or integration: at the policy level, at the
ﬁnancial level and at the implementation and
delivery level. At the policy level clearly they have
primary objectives which are separate. Warm Front
is a social policy programme. The Energy EYciency
Commitment (CERT) is a carbon reduction
programme. There is some overlap which is
attempted but they are largely separate. At the
ﬁnancial level we do have a degree of interaction
1 Note bywitness:The source for this data is theGovernment’s
5th Annual Progress Report—The Fuel Poverty Strategy,
December 2007, page 19, paragraph 3.27.
because what we are delivering is essentially, to a
large extent, insulation in homes. Both of those
programmes have that target in their sights and
therefore to the extent that eaga as Warm Front
main contractor can persuade a utility to contract
with us to fund the insulation measures that we ﬁnd
as we enter a home so that wewill pay for the heating
system, and hopefully reduce the level of
contribution required of the client whilst the utility
pays for the insulation and we do that. To give you
an idea of the quantum, last year with a government
budget of about £350 million we raised about £25
million from the utilities in addition to that by
trading those credits. At an installation level we have
an interest in that regard. Where we enter someone’s
home we will look to fund the measures again by
whichever route is possible. That can be confusing
for the client because they are not quite sure who is
paying for this, what the deal is, it is not a joined up
approach. My own preferred solution is that
wherever we can do the ﬁnancial reconciliation and
as far as the customer is concerned it is a seamless
experience that someone else—an accountant in a
back oYce—does the ﬁnancial reconciliation and
sends the invoices either to Government or the
utilities with forward facing contracts to give us
assurance in that regard. That is by far themost cost-
eVective way of doing it and the most seamless and
best customer experience for the client.
Q498 Chairman: How does that marry up with the
NEA’s suggestion of a hybrid scheme?
Mr Clough: I would see the NEA’s version of the
hybrid scheme to be more a joined up version of
what you can do on the ground and we are great
supporters of Warm Zones which eVectively then
spurs the hybrid programme. In that regard where
you look at a national programme inWarmFront or
a Warm Zones local based initiative or a hybrid
base, the keyword in this policy agenda is “and”, not
“or”. They each have their place, they each have
their function and it is very important that we join
those together and we do simply because we know
one another in the ﬁeld and work very closely on
these things to reduce confusion as much as possible
for the customer.
Professor Chesshire: Warm Front only targets the
private sector and primarily focuses on central
heating systems as well as insulation. The CERT
programme by and large is wider than that.
Historically the EEC programmes have been used
very heavily by local authorities and residential
social landlords and so on because there are clusters
of properties that contractors have found attractive
to handle. They are running out of those clusters.
The only other point I would make is that really
neither programme has an objective of eradicating
fuel poverty. We have no policy instrument in place
to eradicate fuel poverty. I know that sounds an
absurd point to make, Chairman, but it is a fact.
Q499 Mr Wright: I have a couple of quick questions
because I think they were covered in the previous
session and, Mr Clough, you mentioned it very
brieﬂy in terms of the winter fuel payment. Do you
Ev 72 Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Committee: Evidence
5 June 2008 Professor John Chesshire and Mr John Clough
consider it is reaching those most in need and if the
increase that has been announced this year is going
to actually take more people out of the poverty trap
anyway and cover the extra costs?
Professor Chesshire:May Imake a number of points
in response to that question. In the Fuel Poverty
AdvisoryGroupwe take the view that thewinter fuel
payment is not really a winter fuel payment; it is kind
of a Christmas payment. There are those of us on the
Fuel Poverty Advisory Group on the other hand
who would say revenue support is running well over
£2 billion a year UK-wide for winter fuel payments.
The capital programme is almost a tenth of that
through Warm Front and the devolved equivalent.
Some of us are concerned over time of incremental
changes—the increments of expenditure on Warm
Front and increments of expenditure on revenue
programmes such as winter heating payments. You
have heard others give evidence today arguing for an
increase in winter fuel payments. What I would say
there is that we do not know in public policy terms
where the next £50 million is best spent. Is it on a
capital programme, an increment toWarmFront? Is
it on revenue support to winter fuel payments, or
might it be £50 million to DWP to increase take up
of beneﬁts, because we can take up beneﬁts by those
who are not claiming them. On average I think the
beneﬁt health check increases household income by
about £1400 a year. That would make a dramatic
eVect. I think we need some cross-Whitehall analysis
with the constrained resources of where is it best
spent. Speciﬁcally to your question, as John has said,
those paying the 40% marginal rate of tax are
receiving approximately £200 million a year of tax
free income. They are not a priority group I would
have thought. FPAG has argued if resources really
are tight you have to tax that back. The other area
for revenue is value added tax. We heard earlier this
afternoon that the increase in consumers’
expenditure in the household sector on energy in the
last ﬁve years is £8 billion. TheChancellor gets 5% of
that through VAT and there is £400million. There is
the windfall tax already, as it were, so there is money
there. The question is where do we most cost-
eVectively spend it? At FPAG we cannot tell you
that at the moment.
Q500MrWright: Surely themost cost-eVective way,
as you have said, is the beneﬁt checks which ﬂag up
£28 a week extra income on average which in itself
will draw people out of the fuel poverty area. The
Warm Front scheme quite clearly reduces the need
for energy and conserves the energy and the carbon
neutral as well in many respects. Ultimately is the
only way out of this problem that we have with high
energy prices by increasing the incomes of the
individuals, or is this something that we can do
extra?
Professor Chesshire: Incomes is clearly an important
way to go. Whether we can increase incomes at the
rate prices have increased is another matter and with
an economywhichOECDprojects will grow at 1.7%
for the next two years, by and large it will be very
diYcult to increase incomes more than that across
the economy and prices are going up, as we know,
between 35–40%. Even incomes have a limit when
prices change at that rate. The only sustainable way
is to make our dreadful housing stock more energy
eYcient. If one does take the view that energy prices
will rise in real terms, then by deﬁnition they will
probably also rise faster than incomes. That again
caps the extent to which you can rely on increases in
incomes. The last thing I would say is that I think
looking forward, both for carbon reasons and for
fuel poverty reasons, we have to change the nature
of competition in the energy market and that
competition has been based to date on competition
on the price of a kilowatt unit of energy, whereas the
problem facing the fuel poor is the size of their
energy bill.What we have to do is to aim tominimise
the size of the bill and not get quite so exercised
about the size of the unit price. Again, it takes us to
energy eYciency measures, capital programmes and
so on.
Q501 Mr Weir: Do you think the energy companies
are making enough progress in reaching the fuel
poor through social tariVs?
Professor Chesshire:No, I do not, but if I may speak
personally because there is a diVerence of view
amongst our members at FPAG, I really question
the weight government is placing, and possibly
Parliament, on the role of competitive companies to
tackle the social problem. Government has a
statutory objective set by Parliament to eradicate
fuel poverty by 2010 for the vulnerable and by 2016
for everybody else. It is now setting up much
vaunted targets to tackle climate change. When the
going gets tough, the tough get going I suppose, and
one looks for a wider range of players to be blamed
and hence this increased focus on the energy
companies. I think the energy companies can do
more—we have had examples of that this
afternoon—but they are never going to be the lead
players in tackling UK fuel poverty, let’s face it. At
best what they do is tokenistic. What worries me is,
with the Ofgem summit and other initiatives taken
recently, our eye goes oV the ball onto the sticking
plaster and not onto the gaping wound. That is the
perspective I would come to it as someone advising
a group such as this. Do not get carried away with
the marginal increase in money here on a social
programme by an energy company when the
resource requirements are just so much bigger than
that, probably in order of magnitude bigger than
that.
Q502 Mr Weir: But they are part of the solution to
tackling fuel poverty from what you have said
yourself. Is part of the problem, and speciﬁcally we
appreciate there is a wider context regarding social
tariVs, in the way that they vary so much from
company to company?
Professor Chesshire: They do vary because diVerent
companies have a diVerent deﬁnition of corporate
social responsibilities (CSR). Some sponsor sport,
some sponsorNEA conferences or whatever it is and
they have that diVerence of objectives, so I am not
surprised that there would be a diVerence of
approach to the speciﬁc issue of fuel poverty as well.
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As we have heard, some have claimed to have lower
tariV levels than others and so on and it would not
be surprising if those which have a larger amount of
proﬁts to play with might appear more generous
with their social tariV initiative, whereas one might
properly ask themwhy is the tariV somuch higher in
the ﬁrst place? There is a fog of war out there on the
battleﬁeld but my point is this: can it be more than a
sticking plaster? Can we really expect proﬁt-making
companies to address the social ills such as fuel
poverty? Yes, we can, because of corporate social
responsibility—some would be very good at doing
it—and we can also ask them to experiment. I think
if we did get six companies doing more work in this
area we might get more knowledge of best practice.
What is the best way of reaching the really hard to
reach customers, for example? Which marketing
campaigns have worked more successfully? Those
kinds of issues—engagement of trusted social
partners on the ground, for example, the churches,
the faith and community groups and so on, all those
kinds of groups we could learn a lot from a higher
level of social activity by the companies. I am saying
do not rely on this to resolve the problems that
confront Parliament and the Government.
Q503 Mr Weir: I do not think anybody is relying on
it as solving the problem. What we are trying to get
at is, ﬁrst of all, the Government argue that by not
mandating speciﬁc social tariVs it allows the
companies to innovate. That seems to me to be what
you are saying as well. Do you accept that or do you
think the Government should have a mandatory
clear social tariV that applies equally to all the
companies operating in the market?
Professor Chesshire: I think FPAG’s judgment will
be we want a mandatory minimum ﬂoor if we are to
go that way, but not a cap.
Q504 Mr Weir: The other side of the argument is if
we put a mandatory tariV in, the minimum becomes
a maximum because companies will only do what
they have to do. Do you accept that?
Professor Chesshire: In the dynamics of competition
that is the case. In our earlier debate we did not
touch on the dynamics of competition. The issue is
that those customers who are most mobile, most
socially adept, most technologically ﬂuent in the
internet and telephoning call centres are the most
mobile and you are left with a rumpwho are less able
to move, less socially conﬁdent, less in possession of
the information and that will be exploited.
Q505 Mr Weir: There is no competition for these
customers.
Professor Chesshire: When I was advising your
predecessor, Chairman, one anticipated this very
point that the mobile part of the customer base
would become mobile and the margins for them
would be competed away. When I ﬁrst switched I
saved £142 as a direct debit customer to direct debit.
We are now talking about £30. There is no
competition in the pre-payment end of the market.
Q506 Mr Weir: To get a meaningful social tariV,
accepting all that you say about it, it does not tackle
the whole problem. There is going to have to be
action by the Government to set a mandatory
minimum. Would you accept that?
Professor Chesshire: I think it needs to be examined.
We have not formally at FPAG taken the view that
that is the way to go because we want to see what the
oVer is. We want to see some evidence, but it may
well be that if capital programmes cannot increase
and for the reasons I have given incomes cannot
increase at the rate that price increases in this area,
then we might need to consider this. The problem is
some groups—this is my own personal view—will
want the net spread as wide as possible. If you have
say eight million households receiving a social tariV
being supported in total by 25 million customers,
there is an awful lot of cross-subsidy. The nearly fuel
poor suddenly ﬁnd themselves subsidising the fuel
poor and become fuel poor as a result. This is why
FPAG as yet has not taken a decision yes, that is
what we want. We want to see what the oVers are.
Clearly the wider the number of social groups
entitled to this tariV, the bigger the challenge is in its
sustainability over time, but it is an option which we
need to bring onto the table.
Q507 Mr Weir: Taking it slightly wider, I did raise
earlier with the otherwitnesses thosewho are oV grid
and not on the gas supply, for example, have you
thought of any way in which they could be helped
with the rising prices of fuel oil or bottled gas and
suchlike which are not covered apparently by
Ofgem’s recent fuel summit or any other regulation?
Professor Chesshire: I think all of us have paid
insuYcient attention to the non-reticulated
customers—not the wires, not the pipes in other
words. The amount of research time focused on
households using coal, oil or LPG has really been
quite small. There was a Competition Commission
inquiry some two years ago about LPG and so on
and who pays for the tanks and whether customers
are locked in, but by and large outside Northern
Ireland, I think, the amount of policy attention
focused on customers using coal or oil has been quite
small. Those numbers are quite small and, as Mick
Clapham will tell you, Chairman, a number of those
are still in receipt of concessionary coal and so on.
Q508 Mr Weir: It is estimated at one and a half
million households.
Professor Chesshire: There is a problem there
because as you are moving solid or liquid fuels into
rural areas the transportation costs are very high as
well because the amount you are dropping oV at
each point is comparatively small compared with a
dense urban area. Even if one moves to renewable
sources of supply like biomass, unless one can get
clusters, rural areas are always going to be
disadvantaged because you aremoving a low density
fuel around quite large distances using oil as the fuel
to transport it by and large, so that is a problem. I
think programmes such as Warm Front over time,
and certainly CERT over time, need to look at a
range of renewable micro-generation technologies,
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for example, both at individual household level and,
where applicable, because of scale at an integrated
level, maybe a local dairy and a farm with a school
and houses and so on. Not much ﬁeld trial data
exists on those—it is being accumulated—but we
have not spent enough money in my view on
soundly-based ﬁeld trial data to inform public policy
and scheme design, but that will be a feature I have
no doubt of policy programmes in the next ﬁve years
or so.
Q509 Mr Weir: There is nothing that gives any
immediate solution.
Professor Chesshire: There is no silver bullet I regret
to say.
Q510 Chairman: You have heard what I said in
response to the last session to the lack of joined up
energy regulation. From the OYce of Fair Trading
letter it is quite clear that they can only do this by
launching a full scale inquiry and they say that they
must prioritise their work given its limited resources.
There is no-one going oversight here in the way there
is with gas and electricity.
Professor Chesshire: If I could challenge you,
Chairman, there is no ongoing oversight in respect
of the gas market. The reason you are having your
inquiry and the reason why somany of us are getting
rather vexatious is that those who believe in the
much vaunted market do not want to evaluate its
successes or its failures. FPAG has always argued,
and it should be evidence-based—I think Sir John
Mogg takes the same view—let’s do this, but let’s do
it regularly, annually and report frankly and let’s
have it peer-reviewed as well, I would suggest, not
just done by the agency responsible for the
regulation. That is a personal view but peer review is
quite important.
Q511 Chairman: Our next witnesses are Ofgem so I
am sure these issues will be put to them. I would like
to engage in the philosophical discussion about
why—I am intrigued by this debate about social
tariVs—it is right for energy companies to oVer
cheaper prices to some of their customers but not for
food supply companies like Tesco’s or Sainsbury’s.
We will not go into that debate now.
Professor Chesshire: That is my next session
tomorrow, Chairman!
Q512 Chairman: Let’s look at the diVerential
between diVerent forms of payment. Why is the
average diVerential between direct debit customers
and prepayment and standard credit customers so
large? Why do they increase these diVerentials?
Professor Chesshire: I do not think we wholly
answered the question, Chairman, going back to
your colleague. I think lack of competition in some
parts of the market—competition for mobile
customers on direct debit was intense early on. They
were seen to be lucrative customers, they were seen
to be trouble-free customers, they paid up on time
and did not cause debt or disconnection problems
and they were seen as the obvious target market for
suppliers operating outside their historic catchment
geographical area. No one found competition for
the fuel poor or those on prepayment meters, which
are not quite the same, as attractive; in fact,
obstacles were often put in their place where they
had accumulated debt to prevent them switching
suppliers and so diVerentials widened for that
reason—market dynamics. Why they have widened
in the last year or two defeats us, Chairman.We have
drawn attention in the FPAG annual report now for
the last three years to the evidence of this widening
diVerential which cannot be explained by novelty of
a newly liberalised market. We have had the
liberalised market going for a long time now, so
opportunistic companies did take, in my judgment,
opportunity to raise margins where they could in the
least competitive part of their business. We have
argued, and Ofgem knows this, that Ofgem is the
only body really fully qualiﬁed with access to all the
information up and down the energy supply chain to
take a look at this. We have said that two or three
years running.
Q513 Chairman:You have partially answered all the
other questions I wanted to ask you in that helpful
answer. If prepayment meter customers who are not
identical with fuel poor customers—many fuel poor
customers are standard credit—but if they are being
ripped oV by the energy companies with making
more money out of prepayment meter customers,
then there should be enhanced competition for them
logically. If they are paying they should be attractive
customers.
Professor Chesshire: I am an economist and at some
point you must be right. The margins get suYciently
fat, as it were, for some innovator to come in and say
we will specialise in that part of the market, what
others might have regarded as the awkward corner
of the market. If that does not happen then there is
yet another solution of course which is technological
change andwe will I hope before too long see the roll
out of smart meters and this will squeeze those price
diVerentials. That will take a somewhat longer time.
Q514 Chairman:We have had this discussion before
in this Committee and smart metering is often raised
as a solution to carbon dioxide emissions. My own
personal view is that it is much more likely to help
competition in the energy market by highlighting
prices and encourage switching.
Professor Chesshire: Yes.
Q515 Chairman: As a direct debit customer myself
who feels his energy supplier always overestimates
what I owe the company and therefore I think is
taking too much money oV of me too regularly, is
there any prospect that direct debit customers are
being ripped oV by excessive upfront charges?
Professor Chesshire: This is a periodic one,
Chairman, and that is the amount of idle balances
carried forward each quarter by the energy
companies. Certainly at a time when energy prices
were falling that was a problem and people were
accumulating large amounts. I think some quarters
I had over £100 sitting there idly during the summer
months which the companies explained in their
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covering letter would be used to pay oV my higher
consumption in the winter and by and large that is
true. In a rising energy price market of course that is
much less likely to be true. In fact, I would think, and
we do not have an FPAG position, the majority of
customers were rather glad to ﬁnd that they did have
a bit of a carry forward to soften the blow when it
came. Ofgem needs to take a look at that but I think
it is not quite the issue it was because we are on a
rising price curve, not on a falling price curve.
Q516 Mr Weir: The amount taken by direct debit is
rising every time prices go up.
Professor Chesshire: That is true.
Chairman: Speaking from my personal experience, I
did have large carry-overs when prices were falling
and I think on the whole I am doing rather well now
when prices are rising.
Q517 Mr Bailey: Energy companies’ proﬁts—I
gather from your submission that you broadly agree
with the ﬁgures given by the NRFC in terms of
companies’ proﬁtability?
Professor Chesshire: Yes. We do not have a big
research budget. We do rely on the resources of
oYcials in BERR and Defra and sometimes from
Ofgem. Where we placed our own weight in the last
two or three years is looking at the resources
required for fuel poverty so we have not tracked this
area so our submission relies fairly heavily on the
work of others, particularly the National Right to
Fuel Campaign.
Q518 Mr Bailey: Why do you think energy
companies have sought to increase their proﬁt
margins and, secondly, who do you think has been
the biggest beneﬁciaries of these increased proﬁt
margins?
Professor Chesshire: We argue in our memorandum
that the diYculty is arguing what is a reasonable
level of proﬁt in this rather complex energy supply
chain. Undoubtedly there was a time probably ﬁve
years ago, maybe a little longer, when margins were
being squeezed quite severely and there was concern
about a mounting backlog of power station
replacement building up over time. If this was likely
to be low carbon technology it was possibly at a
higher capital cost than combined cycle gas turbines,
for example, so therewas some public policy concern
of the proﬁt margins being made by the industries. I
do not want to sound an apologist for them, but
clearly they were being squeezed very hard at that
time. I think most reasonable analysts would have
expected some return to normal proﬁts. The
diYculty is deﬁning what that normal proﬁt might
be. Clearly the pendulum has gone the other way for
various reasons and they are now making very
signiﬁcant proﬁts in view of the National Right to
Fuel Campaign and the data we present here, proﬁts
which are very high indeed, probably not sustainable
again in the long term but they will be nibbled away
by pressures. You ask who is beneﬁting from this
and I am scrambling around in the notes I have here
to identify who that is and let me try and be as
speciﬁc as I can in response to your question. Our
judgment is that the bulk will be electricity
generators; that would include the independents but
certainly the ‘Big 6’ integrated generators are likely
to be the beneﬁciaries. The diYculty there is they can
pass costs and proﬁts up and down the supply chain
and they can gain from some transfer pricing. The
other beneﬁciaries in that process will clearly be the
traders, the transporters, the shippers, the movers of
electrons and gas, and also the storage and
distribution networks. Some will have gone
upstream to the gas producers themselves who are
also the integrated oil companies in some cases. I
think there has been quite a lot of crumbs on the
table for quite a lot of players is the answer to your
question, Mr Bailey.
Mr Bailey: Earlier you seemed slightly
unenthusiastic about the role of the industry in
alleviating fuel poverty, which seemed slightly at
odds from the general thrust.
Chairman: Through social tariVs.
Q519 Mr Bailey: Yes. Do you think that the
independent generator as in the gas companies
should be included in any scheme to contribute to
alleviating fuel poverty?
Professor Chesshire:Wedo not formally have a view
at FPAG on that point. If Ofgem is looking at this
market and if the Committee is looking at the
market it is something worth looking into. Clearly
there are huge transactional costs. There are a lot of
players involved who are not familiar with the fuel
poverty type of issues, a lot of transformation of
information to lots of diVerent places. My judgment
is that the share of the market you are going to be
capturing, the incremental share of the market is
really quite small and I am not briefed on that. If it
was an awful lot of eVort for 5% more of the market
is it worth the candle? I would not want to rule it out
if we are going to have a root and branch review, let’s
have a root and branch review, but do not be carried
away that there are lots of riches somewhere out
there which are not being captured by the ‘Big 6’
integrated energy suppliers in the domestic sector.
We are talking about the domestic sector in FPAG.
Q520MrBailey:From recollection it was about 23%
from the ﬁgures we had yesterday.
Professor Chesshire: That is not in my head; I am
sorry.
Q521 Chairman:On the question of proﬁts, it strikes
me that there is an issue here in that making a proﬁt
is one matter, but what you do with the proﬁt is
another matter. If you are distributing it to your
shareholders or if you are seeing a large cash amount
and not using it, then that is one issue. If you are
spending it on investment then of course that is quite
diVerent. Do you have any assessment of how these
increased proﬁts are being used?
Professor Chesshire: A signiﬁcant source of
increased proﬁts certainly for the generators is the
operation of the Emissions Trading Scheme and I
am sure you have done inquiries galore on this,
Chairman. Youwill know that theywere gifted these
certiﬁcates—they were not auctioned—and as a
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result of that of the order of probably £550 million
a year of the proﬁts the companies are making derive
purely from that policy design—you might call it
error or learning experience—and clearly there is
pressure tomove to auctioning of emissions and that
will happen in 2011 or later, so we have to be patient
there. Other elements have come because there has
been a bit of a dip in the level of investment by the
companies. There have been indecisions about
investment on nuclear for reasons you will
understand while the policy framework was put in
place. There has been hesitation to move down the
coal generation route.Will they have to have carbon
capture and storage ( CCS) or not?Will they have to
be CCS compliant or fully ﬁtted or not? There is a
large backlog of investment decisions in the oVshore
wind area, in some of the onshore wind areas and so
on, so investment has not been moving at quite the
rate the companies initially anticipated when they
put in planning applications for some of these
schemes. Again, I do not want to an apologist but I
do not think you can look at thewider proﬁtmargins
and say they are just getting fat. I think there have
been some structural reasons for it: one is postponed
investment and one is the windfall from the
Emissions Trading Scheme, but there are other
reasons, I am sure, as well. They will try and get
away with what they can do and, let’s face it, the
structure is now fairly rigid. There is not any new
entry.
Chairman:Exactly, which is one of the issues that we
will soon be looking at.
Q522 Mr Weir: The recent Ofgem fuel poverty
summit—do you think that those range of measures
that came out of that will do enough to reverse the
current trend of fuel poverty?
Professor Chesshire: We have to welcome Ofgem’s
initiative, having argued that Ofgem should take a
more serious part in this debate I think we cannot be
critical when they actually do. I suppose we would
argue that it is kind of a little late. The primary
responsibility for fuel poverty is mainstream
government departments, not Ofgem. Ofgem has a
facilitating role particularly in its relation with the
companies. There has been a scrambling around,
let’s face it, to put something on the table as the
political concern with fuel poverty increased, let us
be honest. I am sure Sir John Mogg and colleagues
sitting behind me have been scrambling around for
a smorgasbord to interest the fuel poverty lobby and
politicians. That may be unfair but it is politically
realistic in my long experience. Are the measures
enough? As I said earlier, they are tokenistic and
some will take some time before they are put in
place. If you look at the time line at the back of the
action programme,who owns responsibility for each
measure—I rather like the way they have set this
out—the target date and the fact that there is quite
a lot of discussion to be held to put the ﬂesh on the
bones, so watch this space, but it is not the solution
to the dilemmas that confront us today, but I
welcome Ofgem’s interest in the ﬁeld.
Q523 Mr Weir: Given that there are three
government departments—BERR, DWP and
Defra—involved in this, do you think that that
dissipates the way forward? Do you think it would
be better if it was under one department?
Professor Chesshire: I wish it were that simple. The
biggest problem we face is existing housing stock
and the fact that the energy eYciency of it is
absolutely lousy. If we are looking 15-20 years, or
even longer further forward, that is the primary
challenge that we face. The poorest quality housing
is occupied by the fuel poor. CLG is of primary
importance that I would add to your list andwe have
talked about taxation and VAT and so on and for
obvious reasons I would bring in the Treasury. A
very fair point was made earlier when the Fuel
Poverty Strategy came out in November 2001, the
Government said this is a complex multidisciplinary
cross-departmental problem and the only way we
are going to tackle this is an inter-department
ministerial group and a shadow group of oYcials. I
agree absolutely. That ministerial group has not met
for a very long time and I think the drive has gone
out of this process.
Q524 Mr Weir: Given that CLG are not involved in
this, you are really saying that they are missing the
real target.
Professor Chesshire: They set issues such as decent
homes, for example, which is very important. There
are a lot of areas where CLG will be involved in the
wider fuel poverty programme. The primary
responsibility for energy eYciency has been with
Defra, for pricing strategy and sponsorship of the
energy supply sector it has been with BERR and
Ofgem’s assistance, and DWP has a lot of data on
household incomes.Whatwe do not know is, andwe
were asked this question earlier on, why can we not
identify the fuel poor? In our annual report we
identify the fuel poor by separating by age, by
thermal eYciency of the properties. Our diYculty is
identifying the fuel poor by six digit postcodes. That
is our problem. We could get our bangs per buck
much greater if we could identify down to that level.
That means some delicate data sharing about energy
use held by the energy suppliers, income levels held
by DWP and there are natural sensitivities there,
particularly with date discs going missing last year
and so on, of which I do not need to remind the
Committee, but if we can crack that we could target
resources very much more eYciently on those most
deserving and we could lower the rising transaction
and search of costs which are bedevilling our
attempts to tackle fuel poverty. If we are not careful
more and more of the money does not go on
measures, it goes on trying to ﬁnd the fuel poor
household. That is another reason for being joined
up.
Q525MrWeir :The proposed eaga initiative coming
out of this, will it make any diVerence given that
energywatch’s own “Are you missing out?” campaign
only persuaded about half of those who could have
saved between £451-£600 to switch?
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Mr Clough: I think the key here is we will ﬁnd out
during that pilot. My own concern is that the pilot
needs to be larger and I am looking forward to
energy companies helping us scale up the pilot from
the 400-500 that we proposed—this is a size which is
designed to ensure the business processes work and
it is a good experience for the customer—up to
something which is 3,000 or more where we can get
some real ﬁndings out of it and we can segment the
datasets such that we ﬁnd out what themoving parts
look like. I have a ﬁrm belief that if anything can
work, that can, given the experience that we have on
beneﬁts entitlement checks and that is a very good
customer experience with very good conﬁdence and
take-up levels that if we can then enlighten people as
to the beneﬁts of switching then if we can open that
door for them that would be very eVective. If I have
a concern it is that we then pass them back to their
existing supplier, and I understand the sensitivities
there, and we are reliant upon the supplier then
doing the right thing. From my own point of view I
will lose visibility on the customer experience from
then on. This is a ﬁrst step. I would not say it is a
solution at all but it is a step in the right direction.
Q526 Chairman: You said that you want to scale it
up. I thought the commitment was to scale it up to
3,000?
Mr Clough: We are in that process now and that is
what will be delivered.
Q527 Chairman: The Ofgem announcement says
that Defra, eaga and energy suppliers will run a pilot
programme and check about 3,000 vulnerable
customers.
Mr Clough: We are absolutely conﬁrming that and
are working with suppliers now to ﬁnalise the
appropriate business processes.
Q528 Chairman: It has been announced as a policy
decision. You are saying that it is actually not yet
agreed?
Mr Clough: We have started. The ﬁnal size of the
pilot, once processes have been ﬁnalised will be
3,000 plus.
Q529 Chairman: That is what we are being told is
already settled. One last question to get ameasure of
the importance of this data sharing issue. When I
spoke to Npower recently, who are almost a
constituency company, about their doorstep selling
techniques, they put huge store on data sharing as
one of the keys to unlocking any problems in fuel
poverty. You have implied that as well today,
Professor Chesshire.
Professor Chesshire: I think it is absolutely
fundamental because the research costs are going to
keep rising, if we are not careful—and the bang per
buck falls. It is not just DWP, energy companies,
intermediates that Ofgemmight identify; it occurs at
local authority levels as well. Information on beneﬁt
recipients held by local authorities cannot be shared
with housing oYcials; a whole lot of things. It is a
very clumsy area. We share data on cars but we do
not share data on housing.
Q530 Chairman: There is a Parliamentary press
announcement to be made shortly. DCLG are not
here again of course. It says DWP, BERR, Defra
and suppliers on this issue.
Professor Chesshire:At theOfgem summit I thought
the single most enthusiastic and constructive
minister was Mike O’Brien from DWP. He had
heard this concern and he was astonished at how
much of a hurdle it was across the waterfront, not
just in this narrow area for local authority levels and
so on. He expressed a very strong personal
commitment to try and get this moving. I have no
brief from him to say that; it is just an observation
that he was committed to make some progress.
Mr Clough: It is worth noting the precedent that
primary legislation has already been passed for the
digital switchover help scheme where DWP provide
information. We happen to deliver that programme
for the BBC. It can only be used for that sole purpose
and that is a restriction but I understand the reasons
for that, but the precedent is already there that we
can, if the will is there, release that information.
Q531 Chairman: What we are told is that the target
date for this is that a Parliamentary and press
announcement will be made shortly. Have you any
idea what “shortly” means?
Professor Chesshire: It usually means within the
calendar year in my experience.
Q532 Chairman: That is my experience too. We will
press Ofgem on that, I am sure, in two weeks’ time.
Professor Chesshire: That is probably unkind.
Q533 Chairman: Your cynicism I think is not
misplaced. Summer extends to about November
normally in parliamentary terms. Unless my
colleagues have any questions or are there any other
points you would like to make and have not so far
had an opportunity to make?
Professor Chesshire: An awful lot of numbers have
ﬂown across the table this afternoon. If you think we
can assist you in any way at all, I will sharpen some
of the numbers because they are like ships passing in
the night in the fog.
Chairman: Professor Chesshire, you have often been
of assistance to this Committee and its predecessor
and we are very grateful for that oVer. Thank you
both very much indeed.
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Q534 Chairman: Gentlemen, thank you for coming
to this important session of evidence of the
Committee’s inquiry into energy prices. We know
who you are. In particular, I have met Alistair
Buchanan both formally and informally on a
number of occasions, but nonetheless perhaps for
the record you would introduce yourselves.
Mr Buchanan: I am Alistair Buchanan, chief
executive of the industry regulator Ofgem.
Dr Wright: I amAndrewWright, managing director
of markets at Ofgem.
Q535 Chairman:Thank you for all you have done to
assist this inquiry and the informal session we have
had with you. We also thank you for your written
evidence and further written submissions which
have been genuinely helpful. Why did you change
your mind? On 16 January you told the Chancellor
of the Exchequer that there was absolutely no
problem and a few weeks later you launched an
inquiry.
Mr Buchanan: On 16 January we went to see the
Chancellor following a letter we received in early
January inquiring about two things, ﬁrst as to what
was going on with regard to increased prices because
Npower had put up its prices in early January;
second, we had an invitation to give the Chancellor
a range of ideas, which we did, with regard to fuel
poverty. At that meeting we basically outlined two
issues. First, we believed that the markets were
working well with regard to investment coming into
the marketplace, innovation both upstream and
downstream, choice and quality. We also felt that
with regard to the patterns of pricing strategywe had
seen in the sector at the end of 2006 and through
2007 when prices were falling the conﬁdence that
Ofgem had had in markets remained. We also
wanted to respond speciﬁcally to the claim made in
the Sunday Times which we were concerned about
on behalf of consumers that there was overt
collusion and meetings on motorways by the ‘Big 6’
so prices were being ﬁxed in that respect. We
conﬁrmed that we had no evidence of that, and such
evidence still has not been presented to us. In terms
of our decision on 23 February at the Board’s
monthly meeting—these meetings are arranged well
ahead—as an executive team the Board conﬁrmed
its concern that the pricing pattern as announced
eVectively by the industry in late January/early
February suggested two things and one additional
factor: ﬁrst, that the pricing strategies we had seen
from the companies before with regard to the timing
of pricing announcements had changed. If you look
at when they dropped prices, eVectively there was a
period of nearly eight months between the ﬁrst
company announcing its drop and the last company
eVectively, largely under name and shame from
Ofgem, following suit. Equally, the amounts by
which they dropped their prices had a range
suggesting a product oVering to the consumer. This
time round the companies went roughly at the same
time. There were immediate price increases and on a
national average you will see that the charts suggest
very little diVerentiation between them. That is
combined with the third factor which is very
important and comes back to our statutory duty to
represent consumers. There was tremendous
consumer concern, including obviously this
Committee’s, that this needed to be reviewed.
Clarity over the word “this” did not matter because
there was a lot of concern. We had similar concerns
in 2004 when we announced our previous probe in
the upstream market. We felt that the combination
of those three factors led us with conﬁdence to go to
the court and take time out to look at the
marketplace particularly with regard to retail
pricing, which is what we are doing at the moment.
Q536 Chairman: There are two concerns about the
integrity of your inquiry. Let us deal with the ﬁrst
one. The fact that our decision to launch an inquiry
was followed two weeks later by yours is also quite
interesting. We are pleased that you followed our
precedent. What about the fact that you have said
eVectively there is no problem but you will
investigate it anyhow? How can you say there is no
problem? You have given part of the answer in
response to the previous question in that you have
said that prices are moving more closely together,
but there is a view out there that really your heart
and soul are not in it because you do not believe you
will ﬁnd a problem. By the way, we agree that there
is no collusion; we have had no evidence of it, but
imperfect markets deliver imperfect outcomes.
Mr Buchanan: Ofgem frequently hears this
accusation. If one goes back to 2004 when we
conducted a probe, that was an inquiry which
arguably stretched outside our normal activity. I
know that today you are taking evidence from
witnesses from BP, Shell and ExxonMobil. They
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were not thrilled about a downstream regulator
coming into their business. Generally, when we
started that probe there was a similar degree of
cynicism, which was that it would be a whitewash; it
was not because we came out with some very
substantial ﬁndings with regard to both the Sean
ﬁeld and why it was not running but also the missing
£1.4 billion that appeared to be being lost to the
British consumer in the very uncomfortable gas/oil
indexing contracts on the Continent. I have to say:
judge us on what we have done before. I feel
conﬁdent that when we produce our results you can
judge us on the quality of the work we have done.
Q537 Chairman: You will have followed the
evidence we have had so far. The otherway you seem
to prejudge your outcomes is by not looking at the
wholesale markets this time. A lot of the evidence we
have had so far indicates that the wholesale markets
are the real problem and that is one of the reasons we
want to talk to the oil and gas companies after you.
Why not look at the wholesale markets?
Mr Buchanan: You will see within our terms of
reference that we have clearly indicated that will not
be excluded. Indeed, within the terms of reference we
are looking at the vertically integrated companies
and that will be taken into the review.
Q538 Mr Clapham: Mr Buchanan, I want to ask
questions regarding the way in which the European
gas market impacts on gas prices in the UK. For
example, we see that in the summer gas is pushed
down the interconnector into Europe. That gas then
bears the European price which is increased, but at
the same time we see gas going into storage also
taking the European price. In winter time we then
have higher gas prices because gas has gone into
storage at the same price as European gas.What can
be done about that?
Mr Buchanan: I think we have come quite a long
way. Your Committee and the British Government
have helped in terms of the pressure exerted both by
DGCOMP and DGTREN in the past two to three
years in Europe but also the pressure we have
brought to bear individually on companies.
Therefore, we have seen substantial advances. You
are absolutely right that markets work with quality
and transparency of information. In France and
Belgium we have had substantial advances in
information ﬂow. That has been a big success in the
past couple of years. DGCOMP has cracked the
whip over some of the companies about which we
have been most concerned, the E.ONs and RWEs.
In reaction to that they are looking at unbundling
voluntarily, but does that get us to the information
we need fromGermany in particular at themoment?
It does not. We need to keep the pressure on
DGTREN and, if need be, to do it by DGCOMP
cracking the whip over them and threatening them
with articles 81 and 82 and serious ﬁnes—10% of
global turnover—if they do not provide us with this
information. You are right that at the moment
Germany has the beneﬁt, due largely to historical
reason, of 18 BCMs of storage compared with
Britain’s 4 BCMs. That is due largely to the fact that
Germany has two large umbilical cords, one to
Russia and one to Norway. You can see why they
needed that storage, but we do not know what is in
it, when it is there and what the ﬂow of gas is. You
are absolutely right that it leads to great uncertainty
in the marketplace and is something on which we
need to keep pressure.
Q539 Mr Clapham: But there is greater uncertainty
for consumers. It is a real worry when one looks at
the oil and gas linkage. We see gas prices linked via
the oil contracting indexation system. Talk of oil
probably reaching $200 a barrel by the end of the
year means that again consumers will be on the
receiving end of hefty price increases. Why can we
not break that link? For example, we have heard
from energywatch that the link is irrational.
Mr Buchanan: All of us—the British Government,
the Committee, the MEUC and Jeremy Nicholson
who came to see you on behalf of industrial
consumers—are trying to bring pressure on Europe.
I know that Philip Lowe of DGTREN is trying to
break this down so we get quality information and
we can identify what is going on. We can then start
to work out how we treat that going forward. I do
not downplay what Neelie Kroes is doing at
DGCOMP. It is rather like looking at what
happened in the UK energy scene in the 1990s when
on the one hand the vision side was pushing market
and transparency of information and, on the other
hand, Steven Littlechild was regularly thumping the
companies, forcing divestment and getting action
that way. One needs both the soft glove and the hard
ﬁst and I believe we have both in Europe at the
moment. The key is that with the third directive
going to the Council of Ministers this week what we
must not do is say, “Phew! Nowwe can worry about
something else”; we have to keep pressure on energy.
Q540 Mr Clapham: I hear what you say about the
hard ﬁst, but what we have here are uncompetitive
European prices that determine prices in the UK to
the great detriment of consumers. You say there is a
move in Europe and further proposals will be put to
the Commission, but what can we do to make those
proposals more robust because there is a clear need
to move towards liberalised markets? How long is it
likely to be before we see liberalised markets in
Europe in your estimation?
Mr Buchanan: I think we will see how the Council of
Ministers resolves the third directive this week.
Clearly, the European Parliament is quite radical in
terms of market liberalisation and forced
unbundling. It will be interesting to see how the
decisions of the European Parliament align with the
Council of Ministers’ and it is worth coming back to
talk about this in the autumn. I am sure that you will
invite me back anyway after we have announced the
ﬁndings of our probe because we will then know
where Europe will go and we will have a much better
feel. We shall need to think very carefully about the
issues that you rightly raise. It is uncomfortable.
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Q541 Mr Wright: One of the issues brieﬂy touched
on was the question of gas storage in theUK and the
diVerence between us and Germany. You talked of
BCMs. What we could have in two three years is
perhaps 19 days’ storage capacity whereas in
Germany it works out as 99 to 100 days. Do you
think that the market will increase the capacity of
gas storage in the UK?
Mr Buchanan: I was looking at my notes when we
had a chat about the 2004 probe. It is worth putting
it in context. We can take Germany and the UK as
quite good examples. Basically, the UK has 4 BCMs
of storage for 100 BCMs of gas demand; Germany
has about 18 BCMs with a demand of 87 BCMs.
Historically, we came from quite diVerent places.
You could argue that the UK had 155 ports of call
with the various ﬁelds on which it could draw,
whereas Germany had its umbilical links to Norway
and Russia in particular. When we spoke in 2004 we
had a genuine hope which was also shared by this
Committee that 4 BCMs would rise to 10 BCMs by
2010. Here we are half a year away and we are
nowhere near that. When you look at the history,
one of the major reasons is planning. A good
example has occurred just in the past few weeks.
Canatxx is looking to develop a huge salt storage
facility in Lancashire and has been denied
permission for the second time. I am afraid that an
element of history is developing here.One hopes that
the new planning Bill proceeding through
Parliament will unblock this because it is clear that
themarket wants to do it. Scottish and Southern and
Statoil are developing Oldbury. Some sites are being
developed, but as we look at it today planning is
something of a curse on storage development. On a
more positive note looking forward, it is worth
bearing in mind that in the UK, certainly from what
I have read of the debate so far, it is not something
that has been given very much coverage. When one
looks at the 180 BCMs of potential supply that
Britain will have next year against 100 BCMs of
demand it is worth bearing in mind that 50 to 60 of
that come from three new pipelines and 50 to 60
come from ﬁve or six LNG facilities, so we have a
range of options in terms of security of gas supply
which Germany simply does not have. Germany has
been planning for as long as I can remember to build
an LNG facility at Wilhemshaven and it still has not
done it. It remains very locked into those essential
relationships with Russia and Norway. From the
point of view of our potential security of supply,
looking out to Nigeria, Oman and Qatar, that is an
advantage we enjoy as a country.
Q542Mr Wright:Wemight have the advantage you
describe as a country, but surely we knew 15 or 20
years ago that eventually North Sea gas would run
out and our capacity for storage would have an
eVect. Quite clearly, the industry is now making an
awful lot of money by virtue of the fact that we do
not have this storage facility within the UK and it is
in their best interests for planning to be delayed even
further. Is this something that the government
should do perhaps in terms of having strategically
placed storage capacity within the UK and taking it
away from the market?
Mr Buchanan: I am sure that is something that you
will be asking the government, but it would appear
to me that to a certain extent the government is
trying to approach that by means of unblocking the
planning process. Stepping back, one of the
concerns is whether it is an art or a science. The oil
majors are to talk to you today. I suspect they will
argue that how fast one has a run-down of a ﬁeld is
an art rather than a science. One of the
complications for potential investors in the market
is that, as you remember, until 2002–03, maybe
2003–04, proper information about the market was
not provided. Therefore, only with that did one start
to get information coming through about the
marketplace. One then had MOD006 that Ofgem
pushed through about 18 months ago which gave us
real time information. If one looks backwards to
decide whether we should have been cleverer, maybe
we should but I certainly think that for potential
investors coming into the marketplace it is a bit like
us looking at German storage today. It was quite
diYcult to see what was going on in the North Sea.
If one takes the argument that ﬁeld depletion is an
art, again one does not want to be too hard on
decisions taken by people 10 years ago.
Q543 Mr Wright: Looking at the other side of the
coin, with regard to LNG it was seen as another
avenue that could be used to ﬁll a particular gap, but
we hear evidence that the Isle of Grain storage
facility has been little used during 2008. Why is that
the case?
Mr Buchanan: Jeremy Nicholson raised that point
and I asked my team to get the data for me. The
LNG facility at Grain has been oVered 64 times and
because there are pre-emption rights BP Sonatrach
has taken that 63 times. EVectively, that is their
facility. Perhaps the ﬂavour of the discussion
suggested that those rights had not been taken up
but that did not appear to be the case from the data
I obtained.
Q544MrWright:Doyou think that the newMilford
Haven and other storage facilities for LNG will
stabilise price volatility in the gas market? Do you
think it will have any eVect?
Mr Buchanan: It will potentially provide a
substantial input for us, but it comes back to the
market price. Where does LNG ﬁt within the global
market? Currently, Japan is paying about 75p to 80p
per thermwhich suggests that arguably on the global
market, which is about $15.5 per NMBTU, it might
compete at that kind of price. Therefore, arguably
the facility would be used in that environment, but
the oil and gas majors who are to come will give you
a better ﬂavour of it.
Q545 Chairman: You say that the Isle of Grain has
been used during this year or might be used?
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Mr Buchanan: From the data that I received this
morning—with the caveat that I will double-check it
because I noted that that question was raised—there
have been 64 opportunities for delivery and 63 have
been taken up by BP Sonatrach.1
Q546 Mr Hoyle: Possibly we see LNG as the future,
but we know that ships have been on the way to the
UK and the product has been resold. What
guarantee do we have in the market when that
happens? Is there further evidence that what we
believe to be a secure supply coming to the UK is
suddenly sold just before it arrives?
Mr Buchanan: If one looks at the pressures within
the marketplace, although current pricing in Japan
suggests a ﬁgure of about 80p per therm the winter
price is about 110p to 120p which is high. Why is
that? It appears that Japan is sucking in LNG
because it has problems with its nuclear plant. As we
have seen on the evening news, Spain which is an
LNG user appears to have problems with its hydro
reserves; they are down by about 7% or 8% on this
time last year. There will be tightness within the
LNG market. We know it is tight because the
Americans are taking none; they are staying with
American natural gas. The American natural gas
price has doubled in the past year but it is still below
the LNG price. You are absolutely right. Although
we have the facilities we are operating in a global
marketplace.
Q547 Mr Hoyle: We seem to come back to the
question of storage facilities to which my colleague
AnthonyWright quite rightly pointed. It is not good
enough. We cannot keep hiding behind the issues.
The bottom line is that the people who should be
providing the storage facilities are failing to do so.
My view is that the reason for it is that they make
more money by not having storage facilities. I think
we will have to drag them screaming all the way to
building these facilities. We cannot have another
session here where it is not taken seriously. It is not
good enough. At the end of the day, whichever way
one looks at it the poor old punter—the housewife
out there—who wants to turn on the gas cannot
aVord to do so because these companies will not
build storage facilities. We have talked about
Germany, but we have not even mentioned France’s
122 days’ storage. We are giving a poor deal. What
are we going to do about it, andwhen will real action
be taken? Are you the toothless tiger that we
imagine?
Mr Buchanan: Some substantial storage facilities
have been denied on planning grounds, so clearly
there is active interest in building them. Let us hope
that the planning Bill unlocks that. We operate in a
market-based environment and therefore when
prices are high we will attract LNG, as we did in the
1 Note by witness: Ofgem conﬁrmed in a supplementary
memorandum that there have been 127 slots available for the
importation of LNG at the Isle of Grain since February
2006. BP/Sonatrach have used 63 of those slots themselves
and, in accordance with the rules, they have oVered 64 for
sale on the open market. None of the slots that have been
oVered to the secondary market have been bought.
winter of 2006–07. You will remember that
Excelerate literally threw up its LNG facility on
Teesside and took its ﬁrst boatload because the price
in the UK was a preferential one. That is what you
get from a global market.
Q548MrHoyle: If oil and gas are brought out of the
Falklands and are supplied straight to theUKwhere
will we store it?
Mr Buchanan: It depends on whether it becomes
LNG. There is plenty of LNG storage.
Mr Hoyle: We will need a lot.
Q549 Mr Binley: I want to ask about wholesale gas
contracting and storage. Mr Buchanan, why do you
think that oil and gas companies favour oV-market
contracts for gas over the open forward market?
Mr Buchanan: I believe this question is about lack of
liquidity of the market which drives contracts oV
market. It may be small comfort but in the gas
market liquidity in European countries is very low.
From the ﬁgures I have seen recently, trading in our
marketplace has gone up from about 16% to 20% in
short-term trading. Based on information from
Po¨yry Associates, in the gas market you can now
trade out to 60 months, so there is liquidity. From
that and other information I have received within
the industry it appears that there is liquidity in the
gas market. The electricity market remains however
profoundly illiquid and in that regard you heard
comments froma number of independent generators
and suppliers.
Q550MrBinley:The long-termmarket is now about
gas contracts of ﬁve to 25 years, are they not?
energywatch has made it clear that this is not a
transparent market, does not help us with planning
our supplies and is generally one of the factors that
force up prices. What should we be doing about
that?
Mr Buchanan: I am not entirely sure what
energywatch is talking about in that respect. As far
as concerns the UK market, it is highly transparent
thanks in part to energywatch which supported
MOD006 that provides real-time information to all
players so industry knows what is going on in the
marketplace. I do not quite understand that issue
with regard to transparency of information.
Q551 Mr Binley: Let me quote what Allan Asher,
chief executive of energywatch, told us: “ . . . we
think there ought to be much more disclosure of
some of these secret contracts, these long-term
contracts, by which gas and power are dealt with. A
lot more of that should be brought into the forward
market”, so he is saying they are not transparent.
Dr Wright: I do not believe it is unusual for amarket
to have commercially conﬁdential long-term
contractual arrangements.
Q552 Mr Binley: Mr Buchanan is saying it is
transparent and you are saying it is not.
Dr Wright: We have transparency in terms of the
ﬂow of gas. We know where it is coming from and
from which ﬁelds but we do not necessarily have full
Ev 82 Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Committee: Evidence
17 June 2008 Mr Alistair Buchanan and Dr Andrew Wright
transparency of the long-term contractual
arrangements between suppliers and companies
which are properly commercially conﬁdential. I am
not certain I understand what harm that does to
consumers. I would say it is normal for a market to
have a combination of public exchange trade
arrangements along with long-term contracts.
Mr Binley: Mr Wright, I am hearing diVerent
answers. Mr Buchanan said earlier in this session
that markets worked best with transparent
information and yet these long-term markets
according to Allan Asher are not transparent; they
are secret contracts. I am not quite sure what you are
telling us.
Q553 Chairman: About 80% of all gas traded is
subject to these long-term contracts. How can you
say it is a liquidmarket when so little is being traded?
Mr Buchanan: With the greatest respect, I am not
entirely sure about that. I was looking at the
industrial and commercial trading ﬁgures. From the
ﬁgures I have, 40% is spot trading and 44% is based
on spot out to amonth, so I do not know fromwhere
that information has come. Certainly, the
information that I have been given by industry
appears to indicate that one of the reasons why the
large industrial consumers, to whom you spoke last
week, are so concerned is because of their spot trade
activity and the fact that they go short term for their
product. That is the best part of two-thirds of all
usage in the UK.
Q554 Mr Binley: We were told by energywatch that
about 80% of long dated physical volume is sold on
long-term contracts. What concerns me is that you
are there to protect the interests of the consumer as
you rightly say. Do you not need that information?
Do you not need to be more aware of what 80% of
the market is doing? If you are not aware how can
you possibly do your job on behalf of consumers?
Mr Buchanan: We have to ensure that the market
has transparent and open information upon which
commercial contracts can bemade. I cannot support
or otherwise those ﬁgures provided by energywatch
because they are not ones that I recognise at ﬁrst
glance.
Q555 Mr Binley: There are a lot of people out there
who are very concerned about rising prices of energy
as you well know. Will you undertake to ﬁnd out
from where energywatch got those ﬁgures because,
quite frankly, you ought to have them?
Mr Buchanan: I certainly will.
Q556 Mr Binley: Given the low level of liquidity in
the forward gasmarket and the eVect of that on price
transparency, does it concern Ofgem that industrial
consumers tell us that the majority of contracts are
linked to forward gas prices? If you ﬁnd out the truth
of this matter what will you do about it?
Dr Wright: The majority of contracts are linked to
forward prices. That is not a concern in itself. If a
company has been able to secure long-term lower
cost sources of gas there is a question as to whether
that ought automatically to be passed through to
consumers. Whether or not that is the case is a
question in an open market. Companies and
suppliers procure gas under a variety of
arrangements, some long term and some short term,
and some of those arrangements are commercially
conﬁdential and some are publicly traded.
Q557Mr Binley: Should not Ofgem have found that
out before it told the government there was no
concern about the market?
Mr Buchanan: Perhaps I may pick up something
about which we have raised a lot of concerns.
Q558 Mr Binley: Can you ﬁrst answer my question?
You can then go on to tell me what else you want
to say.
Mr Buchanan: Do we think that the market has
adequate information? We have sought to ensure
that it does. We are carrying out a probe, as you
know.
Q559 Mr Binley: My question was not that but
whether you should have got hold of this
information before you complacently told the
government in January, I believe, that there was no
problem with this market?
Mr Buchanan: I do not believe that our
understanding of the market and how commercial
contracts are struck within it would aVect the advice
we gave the government at the time.
Q560 Chairman: This line of questioning goes to the
heart of our inquiry. What you have told us is
factually at odds with what we have been told by
previous witnesses as far as I have understood it.
There may be a way of reconciling this because
diVerent deﬁnitions are being used. We were told by
the large users that their contracts were determined
by a tiny volume of traded gas which then
determined their long-term contract prices, so there
is not the liquidity in the market that you claim and
that goes to the heart of the problem. You deny that,
so it is very puzzling to the Committee.
Mr Buchanan: I am saying there appears to be
liquidity in the gas market. Certainly, in the
meetings that we have with the large industrial users
they make it very clear that they seek to trade short
term and do not seek to lock in long-term contracts.
I am interested that they have given you an
indication otherwise. We certainly need to marry up
the information ﬂows.
Q561 Chairman: It is absolutely crucial that we
marry it up.
Mr Buchanan: It is absolutely crucial.
Q562 Mr Binley: We were told that forward curve
prices were therefore based on limited trading
activity andmight not be a robust indicator of future
costs. That does not equate with what you told the
government in January which had a massive impact
on how people now feel about energy prices. It is this
lack of information of which you are in command
that concerns me because you cannot do your job
without it.
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Mr Buchanan: We feel that we can be conﬁdent
about the market with the information ﬂows we
have. Should we feel that we need more information
in the light of the review we are doing that is
something that will have to consider.
Q563 Mr Wright: While we are considering
wholesale gas contracting, one of the issues that has
been raised is the diVerence betweenwholesale prices
on mainland Europe and here. Evidence was given
to us that a company trying to buy gas from
mainland Europe to put through the interconnector
was not oVered the same price in mainland Europe;
the supplier would sell it only on the basis of the UK
wholesale price, which is absurd bearing in mind
that the company has interests in mainland Europe
and can buy it cheaper there, but the same gas would
have to be traded in theUK.Does that concern you?
Mr Buchanan: This is very interesting. I give full
marks to INEOS Chlor who went public with that
information when it visited the Committee. I was
privy to that information a little before that. They
provided that example to DG TREN and DG
COMP. INEOS Chlor has done a very good job in
drawing attention to instances of what appears to be
bizarre behaviour on the part of some of the large
pan-European players in terms of their inability to
move gas across Europe and get a suitable price.
Q564 Mr Weir: To develop that, INEOS seems to
want continental-style contracts with large
suppliers, but in answer to Mr Clapham earlier you
talked about the link between oil and gas prices on
the continent. You gave the impression that this was
a bad thing because it kept prices high, and that is
certainly the evidence we have had from others.
However, that seems to contradict INEOS’s
position; they wish to have these contracts as they
seem to be of the view that thatwill give them longer-
term security on price. Can you explain the apparent
contradiction between the link which keeps prices
high and large users wanting to have contracts on
that basis?
Mr Buchanan:With a caveat, what INEOS has done
has been breakthrough work in trying to assist us to
obtain market instruments and to get the
marketplace to work in Europe. Where I struggle
with some of their discussions is the inference that
they could pack up Runcorn and move over to
Germany or other countries in Europe. The starting
point is the forward price curve. Italy which is an oil
and gas market and Holland and Britain have
substantially higher prices; for Italy and the UK it is
ƒ20 and for Holland it is ƒ10 higher than for
Germany. Why is that? Primarily, it arises because
Germany is driven by a coal-based market whereas
we are driven by an oil and gas-based market. Let us
say one up sticks and goes to the Ruhr. One gets that
ƒ20 pick-up, which incidentally is no diVerent from
where it was when we discussed this three or four
years ago in the probe. There are a number of things
about which one needs to be quite worried. First, the
transportation and network cost within one’s overall
bill is substantially higher in Germany; it represents
over 20% of the bill, whereas in Britain it is below
5%. That wholesale price is therefore not one’s ﬁnal
price. If one moves to the Ruhr one has to consider
two things that might have an impact. First, there is
the oil/gas lag indexwithinGermany. Onemight still
have that impact in the UK, but from ﬁgures that I
have seen coming from the City there is a belief that
the EU trading certiﬁcate is trading ƒ10 low.
Clearly, in a coal-based market that will have an
impact. Therefore, when one looks at the simple
statement aboutmoving fromRuncorn and going to
the Ruhr that is an easy sound byte. One needs to
break that down.
Q565 Mr Weir: That was not my point. We are told
that the oil/gas link creates higher prices in eVect
because of the escalating price of oil, but INEOS
appears to be saying to us that contracts based on
that link are better value than contracts based on the
forward gas price as appear to exist in the UK. I
cannot quite get my head round the contradiction
between these two concepts.
Mr Buchanan: Perhaps we need to go back to them
to get additional clarity, but I believe they are saying
that the German price is more preferable to them
and maybe that is because it is coal-based and they
have not felt the full impact of the EUETSwhich are
yet to come. There are other issues within Germany
such as local tax breaks from the variousLa¨nder that
may have a beneﬁt. I went to Runcorn and chatted
to them about it and they acknowledged that that
could be quite a substantial issue within the overall
package in Germany.
Q566 Mr Weir: We have heard concerns voiced by
some of the small suppliers about lack of liquidity in
the electricity market. Is that a concern you share?
Dr Wright: Yes. It is a message that we hear
consistently from small suppliers. We have not seen
the same increases in liquidity in the electricity
market as we have seen in the gas market over the
past few years. On some measures we have seen a
decline and the increasing vertical integration of the
industry may well have contributed to that in
addition to the exit from the market of various
trading companies such as Exxon and TXU earlier.
That is a concern and it is something we are looking
at as part of the probe. We are concerned by
anything that makes it more diYcult for small
suppliers to establish themselves in the market.
Q567 Mr Weir: Are you able to tell us what eVect
this lack of liquidity has on wholesale electricity
prices?
Dr Wright: Because the majority of electricity
suppliers are vertically integrated to some extent it
may make it more diYcult for new entrants to come
into the market and so it may mean that the
competitive environment in electricity supply is less
intense than it might be if we had a range of new
entrants able to enter the market easily. The
management of wholesale market risk is a major
challenge for a small supplier.
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Q568 Mr Weir: Given that a major player, British
Energy, who produces electricity is not in the retail
market would you be concerned if that companywas
bought up by one of the existing ‘Big 6’suppliers and
so led to even less liquidity within the market?
Mr Buchanan: Perhaps I may just outline our broad
strategy and then answer the question. We do not
comment on any potential deals because we do not
want to be seen to be aVecting capital markets. There
is a 10-day window on the back of a major deal that
John Fingleton at the OFT as competition authority
would oVer.Wewould put out a consultation during
that phase. It will not surprise you that we have had
substantial representations. I have been out on the
road to see a number of companies which have
raised issues in this regard to which I will come back.
The third element is that whether it is the European
Commission or our own Competition Commission
we will make a detailed comment. We have had
similar comments from you and from both
independent generators and suppliers which we take
seriously. My colleague mentions that it is being
reviewed as part of the problem. As they have said
to you, the question is whether there is any way that
a certain amount of the trade should be made
transparent. Should contracts be made transparent
in the marketplace? What will we do about historic
information? From companies like British Energy or
Drax currently one gets a vast amount of
information. Would all of that go or would you get
just one line in an EDF group account, if you are
lucky? Therefore, how can independents understand
what is happening in the marketplace? It is a matter
of both liquidity and information. We hear what
they are saying and, as my colleague infers, that is
something we are looking at within the probe.
Q569 Mr Weir: Another point about lack of
liquidity is what is happening on the continent.
Despite what you say about unbundling there is
evidence that some of the big companies are trying to
buy up others to create bigger entities and that could
have a knock-on eVect in the UK if, for example,
EDF was successful in buying Iberdrola of Spain
which owns Scottish Power. For example, would
you be concerned if there was a contraction from the
‘Big 6’ to the ‘Big 5’ in the UK?
Mr Buchanan: In those instances the likelihood is
that the OFT would blow the whistle and say it
would like to hear from the parties and the usual
range of criteria would be looked at: market shares,
HH index and regional and national factors. I
cannot go further than that, in part because I am not
the competition authority but also because I am sure
that these issues would be raised with it.
Q570 Mr Weir: It has been suggested to us by some
other witnesses that the integrated ﬁrms, in eVect the
‘Big 6’, should be forced to trade some of their
electricity on the open market. Is that something
that you believe has merit?
Mr Buchanan: I want to be very careful here. We
have a probe running. You will be our ﬁrst port of
call when we arrive at our views in September.
Q571 Chairman: We are discussing today primarily
prices but they are related to everything else,
particularly investment. Along with prices
availability of electricity and gas is also crucial. We
face a particular problem in relation to generating
capacity for reasons we all know. What puzzles me
is that incentivised generation where there are
subsidies, for example renewables, is being
undertaken by some smaller companies alongside
the ‘Big 6’, but conventional non-incentivised
generation is taking place almost exclusively within
the ‘Big 6’. Why is that? Is there some market
failure there?
Mr Buchanan: I think it is worth standing back.
There is a tendency to say that because you have a
‘Big 6’ in supply you have a ‘Big 6’ in generation.
Clearly, the issue involving British Energy that we
have just been talking about highlights that that is
not the case. The ‘Big 6’ in generation have 50% to
60%, so what is the remainder? Drax, British Energy
and International Power have grown their market
share from about 4% to 9% in the past few years.
One also has Teesside Power and Conoco. There is
a list of about 13 players in all within the generation
market. One starts from that position. If one looks
at the new plants in what one might call the
traditional end of the marketplace, where are they
coming from or what is changing hands? Teesside
Power with the largest gas-ﬁred power station in
Europe has just been bought byGaz de France. That
is a new entrant into the electricity market in the
UK. A very large power station in Aberthaw in
South Wales is being built by Welsh Power, an
independent. Last week a plant in Redditch was
bought by Severn Power, an independent. Hatﬁeld’s
900 MW power station is an independent. The two
stations that are being built in the traditional sector
are Langage by Centrica and Marchwood by
Scottish and Southern. Those are the ‘Big 6’. Even
within the traditional area the knee jerk reaction that
it can involve only the large players is not working
out like that at themoment. E.ON,RWE et alwould
like to build big power stations at Kingsnorth,
Tilbury, Pembroke and Staythorpe. Yes, they
would, but clearly there are independents coming
into the traditional end of the market. As we
discussed last time we were here, if you are looking
at the kind of subsidy with which the renewables
certiﬁcate provides an entrepreneur will seek to go to
the renewable end of the market because the returns
are quite substantial.
Q572 Chairman: So, they are responding to market
signals?
Mr Buchanan: I think they are.
Q573 Chairman: Until recently there was a risk—
perhaps it still is—that British Energy would be
bought by one of the ‘Big 6’ with the loss of liquidity
that would ﬂow from it as Mr Weir just discussed
with you.
Mr Buchanan: Indeed.
Q574 Chairman: A huge slice, give or take 20%, of
independent generation would be lost?
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Mr Buchanan: Yes.
Q575 Chairman: Are you really conﬁdent that
vertical integration of the electricity market is not
dulling market signals for new entrants?
Mr Buchanan: You have put your ﬁnger on
something that we are looking at within the probe.
Q576 Chairman: Did you refer to a plant in
Redditch?
Mr Buchanan: Yes. RDI has a small oil-ﬁred open
gas plant.
Q577 Chairman: You will know that BizzEnergy is
in my constituency and the Committee will be taking
evidence from them next week. Why are the smaller
electricity companies which say they have a problem
buying electricity not investing in generating
capacity themselves, albeit incentivised generation?
Mr Buchanan: Some are and some are not. Good
Energy whom I saw recently are looking to develop
further their windfarm site. Some smaller players are
doing so, and BizzEnergy will answer for itself.
Q578 Chairman: You are saying that some make a
commercial choice?
Mr Buchanan: Yes.
Q579 Mr Bailey: In a moment I want to ask about
the retail markets particularly prepayment meters,
standing orders and so on. Before I do so, onematter
has been puzzling me. I go back to the issue of
continental liquidity in the gas market. Given the
fact that both energywatch and the intensive users
said in public session that there was illiquidity and
you appeared to think there was liquidity, why did
you not pick it up and explore the reasons for the
diVerence in perspective?
Mr Buchanan: It does depend on perspective. If they
are talking about Europe I do not believe there is
liquidity.Within theUKmarket there ismuch better
liquidity than in Europeanmarkets and perhaps that
was what they were talking about. The best answer
I can give is for me to go back to the large users. I
will speak to Jeremy and Chris Taylor in INEOS
Chlor and come back to you with a written answer.
Q580 Mr Bailey: I am just puzzled why you did not
do that before given that this was public
information.
Dr Wright: It may simply be a matter of some
liquidity being a good thing and more liquidity may
be a better thing.
Mr Buchanan: Let us square the circle and give you
a written answer to that.
Q581 Mr Bailey: I turn to relative pricing. I suppose
that there are two issues: ﬁrst, why is there such a
diVerence in the annual cost to somebody who has a
prepayment meter and somebody who pays by
standing order, particularly prepayment?
Dr Wright: The analysis we have made suggests that
on average the diVerence between somebody paying
by prepayment and somebody who pays by direct
debit is about £125. Our work also suggests that the
diVerence in cost is about £85. We are doing further
work on those cost diVerences and trying to establish
that. On average it appears that the price diVerential
is greater than the cost diVerential.Within that there
is quite signiﬁcant variation between suppliers, so
for some that gap is signiﬁcantly greater and for
others it is close to or even below £85. Therefore,
there is a diVerent picture with diVerent suppliers.
The diVerences in the diVerentials between suppliers
may reﬂect diVerences in costs. That is not
necessarily an excuse. One would expect in a
competitivemarket for cost diVerences of that size to
be competed away. We would be concerned if such
cost diVerences were sustained and those increased
costs were passed through to customers in a
competitive environment. I believe that is an issue
regardless of whether that is cost reﬂective. You
would expect us to say that this is right at the heart
of what we are looking at in our probe. Obviously,
if there is evidence of discriminatory pricing
particularly for groups of vulnerable customers that
is something we are concerned about.
Q582 Mr Bailey: The data we have shows that the
average is £145, not £125.
Dr Wright: One can cut the data in various ways. It
depends on how you average it, whether you extend
it beyond the ‘Big 6’ and how many kilowatt hours
or therms of usage one is looking at. Some suppliers
argue that to use the standard consumption of 3,500
kilowatt hours is wrong because these consumers
tend to use less electricity, for example. There are
methodological diVerences and I am not surprised
that it is possible to come up with diVerent numbers
of that order.
Q583MrBailey: Is it fair to summarise what you say
on that issue that there is a price diVerential that
cannot be accounted for by the increase in cost and
therefore there is a prima facie case for investigating
what appears to be an imperfectly working market?
Dr Wright: We are yet to get to the very bottom of
that.We are doing a lot of work on the cost structure
of companies and how they allocate costs between
diVerent tariV groups and checking whether that
cost allocation is appropriate. We shall get to the
bottom of the issue. I think there are some bits and
pieces of evidence that give us concern. One is that
a number of companies charge a signiﬁcantly higher
premium in some areas than others and it is hard to
see why the cost in Newcastle should be diVerent in
Birmingham, for example. That does make us
concerned.
Q584 Mr Bailey: When will you be publishing the
results?
Dr Wright:That will be part of the initial ﬁndings we
publish in late September.
Q585 Mr Bailey: If you look at the prepayment
market as being separate from the other, there is a
very wide price diVerential in what people pay in
diVerent parts of the country with diVerent deals.
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Dr Wright: Yes.
Q586 Mr Bailey: On the surface that seems to
indicate there is not much competition even within
this particular market let alone the direct debit
market. Would you comment on that?
Dr Wright: That goes back to my previous point.
Even if these are cost-reﬂective diVerentials we
would expect that diVerence to be competed away.
Prepayment customers do participate in the
competitive market in quite large numbers, in some
areas more frequently than the average customer,
but we have some concern that switching decisions
are not always good. There is evidence that some
prepayment customers move onto higher tariVs. We
have written an open letter to try to seek out ways in
which we may be able to improve the quality of
information provided to prepayment customers at
the point of sale to reduce the incidence of
prepayment customers moving to more expensive
tariVs. We are concerned about the quality, not
quantity, of competition and switching in that
prepayment market.
Q587 Mr Bailey: I think that your approach should
be a little stronger than “some concern”. Given the
way prices are rising, the big diVerential and the fact
that a lot of people on prepayment meters are lower
income consumers there ought to be huge concern.
Do you accept that it was a mistake to remove price
controls for prepayment meters?
Mr Buchanan: If I may, perhaps I may hold
judgment on that until we have carried out the
probe. The question is fair and the areas in which
you have sought to interrogate us are all valid and
are ones we are picking up. This Committee will be
our ﬁrst port of call once we have carried out the
probe.
Q588Chairman:You have talked about prepayment
meters a lot but standard credit customers are also
incredibly important and are often overlooked in
this debate. A good number of them are also in fuel
poverty; a lot are on ﬁxed incomes.
Mr Buchanan: More are on standard credit. Only
20% of the fuel poverty lie within PPM, and one of
the areas we are investigating is why the standard
credit gap has risen from about £40 to £60.
Therefore, that is within our review.
Q589 Anne MoVat: I should like to move to
switching which we are very concerned about. There
is a major con going on. How can a market where
half of the consumers have never switched be
described as competitive?
Mr Buchanan: Perhaps I may start with the macro
approach. I think it depends on one’s starting point.
In relative terms the switching that we have seen in
the energy market is quite successful. We see nearly
50% switching in energy. Fixed telecom is about
37%. If you start to get down to mortgages at 20%,
pensions at 10% and bank accounts at 2% the
switching rate is high relative to other sectors, and it
is very high in relation to other markets that have
sought to open. In the half of the United States
market that has been opened only 1.5% of
consumers have switched; in Germany it has been
about 4%. In theNordic countries it has been 10% to
15%. When you look at the contrast, the UK
consumer sees price going up and so does not really
care about that. What beneﬁt is there? I will ask my
colleague to speak about that. The question is
whether the switching proposition is working or
whether one is being encouraged to switch to the
wrong tariV. When one looks at how well the
concept of choice and switching has worked by
contrast to other UK sectors and internationally
where markets have been introduced, this has
worked quite well. Also bear in mind that, based on
the various surveys that have been done—again, it
may be small comfort—of the 50% who have not
switched 15% have self-selected that basically they
never will because they just do not want to, or they
are lucky enough to have too much money or
whatever it is.
Q590 Anne MoVat: When you say “lucky enough to
have too much money” it makes me think about the
fact that a third of switchers end up paying a higher
tariV without realising that is the result.
Dr Wright: If I may make one clariﬁcation of what
my colleague said, the proportion of people or
households who have never switched is more like
20% than 50% because a lot of people have switched
gas but not electricity, so in terms of the households
that have switched one or other of their suppliers it
is closer to 20%. There is a very high level of
participation. As I suggested on prepayment tariVs
in our probe we are very concerned to look
particularly at quality as well as the quantity of
switching. A high level of switching is good; it shows
that themarket is working, there is participation and
that consumers are engaged in the market, but it
could be because of consumer dissatisfaction and
not all those switching decisions necessarily lead to
consumers having a better deal. One thing we have
noted is that a high proportion of switching is in
response to outbound selling as opposed to
consumers actively choosing in a proactive way. One
thing we are looking at is the quality of switching as
a result of outbound selling—doorstep and
telephone selling—which may be a concern. It may
simply be that consumers are making a choice
between two alternatives rather than looking at the
whole market, but that is something that is within
the scope of the review we are conducting.
Q591 Anne MoVat: Do you think there is fairness
among consumers about whether or not it would be
a good idea to switch and whether or not they can
receive the full information, that is, those who are
computer literate and those who have a better
standard of living and some whomay not? I acted as
a daft lassie once when someone came to the door.
The con was unbelievable. I was asked who my
electricity supplier was. I said I did not know.
Immediately they knew they had someone of interest
to them. They came into the house and looked at the
meter; I let them go through the whole process
because I wanted to see it for myself. I am worried
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about the more vulnerable people who will be
conned by switching. Should there be stronger
regulations by you particularly about doorstep and
phone marketing?
Dr Wright: There is a question about individual
fairness in that respect but there is also a question
mark about the market working well. Does
consumer choice and switching provide adequate
price discipline on suppliers? We are looking at it in
both directions. There are really two issues. One is to
ensure that consumers have good information on
which tomake choices; the other is to ensure that the
beneﬁts of competition are available to all
consumers, not just those who are engaging in the
market. One feature one would also expect from a
well-functioning competitive market is that the
beneﬁt is not available just to those who switch.
Mr Buchanan: We will not shy away from using our
enforcement powers. Currently, we are inspecting
the Npower case which has been compiled by a
number of parties including energywatch.
Q592 Anne MoVat: Even if there were some
guidelines that people could access very easily that
would be an improvement on what we have at the
moment.
Mr Buchanan: As to prepayment meters, there are
certain licence conditions whereby companies are
meant to provide the advantages and disadvantages.
Do they, and how do they do it? Is it so diYcult to
get to? Is it slanted? Those are the things that we are
looking at and particularly in this area we would be
happy to come back to the Committee to talk
about it.
Q593 Chairman: I just want to make clear how your
investigation of the doorstep selling scandal
interacts with the fuel price inquiry. Is it entirely
separate and carried out in diVerent compartments?
Mr Buchanan: It will run along its own
enforcement track.
Q594 Chairman: Doorstep selling is hugely
important to switching given the proportion of
switching that it has achieved. In terms of getting
people to change supplier it is important but it must
be done very well.
Mr Buchanan: Indeed.
Dr Wright: There is a large grey area between a
perfectly functioning market and mis-selling which
is in breach of licence. We are potentially also
concerned about where the market is not working
well but it falls short of something that we can
enforce, so we are not just looking at things that are
currently a breach of the licence; we are looking at
how well the market is working for consumers and
how well it is working as a price discipline for the
companies.
Q595Chairman: I think you agree with everyone else
that the big gain from the switching is your ﬁrst
switch. When you move away from the incumbent
monopoly of the CEGB days to the new competitive
world for the ﬁrst time that is when the big savings
come; after that the savings are more marginal?
Dr Wright: Not necessarily. You are right that there
is often a big saving to be made when moving away
from incumbent suppliers, particularly if you move
from standard credit to direct debit at the same time
and get the beneﬁt of a dual fuel discount, but there
are still signiﬁcant savings. If you compare dual fuel
direct debit you can make signiﬁcant savings at the
moment by moving from a standard billing
approach to online billing. There are still substantial
savings to be made from participating even if you
have switched once. We would encourage people to
continue to look around for the best deal because
what was the best deal yesterday may not be the best
deal today.
Mr Buchanan: The majority of it is on price, but it
may be you want to switch to a green supplier like
Good Energy or a supplier like First Utility which
now oVers smart meters within its package. You
may be very distressed by service you get from a
company and go to JD Power; it may be published
in the newspapers and right at the top of the service
league you see “I’m getting lousy service.”
Q596 Chairman: It may be rational to switch to a
higher price?
Mr Buchanan: It may be that you choose to do that.
Perhaps a green product is oVered at a premium
price.
Dr Wright: Some companies have a record of being
at or about the bottom of the price range, if they are
not absolutely the cheapest at every moment in time.
You may choose someone who is on average in the
cheaper half of the tariVs.
Q597 Chairman: So, switch is not a surrogate
measure of competition because it may be logical to
stay with the current supplier because you know that
he will become cheaper in due course?
Dr Wright: I think that is right. Switching may be a
one-dimensional measure of competition. It is
important because it shows participation in the
market; it shows that consumers can switch. If
switching rates were very low it would be a concern
to us, but there are other factors that inﬂuence the
quality of competition.
Q598 Roger Berry: energywatch say that there is “a
huge amount of fraud going on”. Are they right?
Dr Wright: “Fraud” would be a very strong word.
Q599 Roger Berry: “Fraud” was what they
actually said.
Dr Wright: We are currently engaged in a process to
establish some guidelines for green tariVs and
central to that those guidelines will be that any green
tariV must demonstrate an additional beneﬁt to the
environment.
Q600 Roger Berry: Why have you not done this
before?
Dr Wright: We are doing it now and it is something
of which we have become aware and are addressing.
We would expect proposals to be in place before the
end of this year. This is a matter that we have been
looking at for nine months. We are doing it by way
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of co-operation with suppliers rather than relying
necessarily upon the cumbersome licence approach
and we think it will be successful.
Q601 Roger Berry:You acknowledge that at present
there is no scheme to verify the claims made in
relation to green tariVs. For years all of us as
consumers have been oVered deals by suppliers in
relation to green tariVs. Only now are you getting
round to checking to see the extent of the fraud in
that market. Is that not a bit slow? A lot of us have
signed up for green tariVs in good faith and assumed
that what we were told was correct. You are now
acknowledging that that may not be the case.
Mr Buchanan: You are absolutely right that in the
past two to three years green tariVs have developed.
Eighteen months ago the NCC which becomes the
new energywatch in a few months’ time produced a
very good report which ﬂagged up concerns. The
Energy Savings Trust was, I believe, the prime
movers. Either they were invited to do so or they
themselves started to develop green tariVs. You are
absolutely right. We believed that this had begun to
become such a serious issue that we wanted to bring
our own work and brand to it and be involved in it.
That was why we became involved in the past year.
My colleague is very close to releasing what will be
a substantial step up in comfort for consumers. You
are absolutely right to point it out. We are onto it.
Dr Wright: Although it is a small part of the market
it is important that people do not make the
assumption that somehow they can mitigate their
environmental impact by signing up to a green tariV
and they still keep pressure on reduced energy use
through energy eYciency measures at the same time.
Unfortunately, sometimes that is the message that
gets across at the moment.
Roger Berry: That is absolutely correct but it is a
diVerent message.We can all take individual actions
to try to reduce our impact on the environment.
Interestingly, for years and years many people have
signed up to green tariVs in the believe that it is an
additional contribution and only now is the
regulator getting round to looking into it and the
consumer watchdogs say that there is a huge amount
of fraud taking place. I suppose the polite response
is that it is better late than never.
Q602 Chairman: Mr Buchanan nods in agreement,
I think.
Mr Buchanan: No. We are working with it and
trying to take industry and energywatch with us as
well.
Q603MrWeir:National Energy Action told us that
consumers who were oV the gas grid had an average
energy bill in the region of £1,700 per annum
compared with about £1,000 for those on the gas
grid even with rising price. Many propane/home oil
prices are rising faster than domestic and gas
electricity prices. Is Ofgem content with the level of
regulatory oversight of the domestic heating oil and
propane markets?
Mr Buchanan: This issue has been raised with us.
Within our remit we have sought to try to approach
the oV-gas network from the angle of encouraging
the networks to be developed. I think we took some
substantial steps with the initiatives in our gas price
review put through the industry at the end of last
year and early part of this year which will run for the
next ﬁve years. As to regulatory oversight, if they are
local gas networks there is an element of oversight by
us. If it is oV the network I amnot entirely surewhere
we would come into the regulatory oversight.
Q604 Mr Weir: You say that you are encouraging
the development of networks, but many rural areas,
including my constituency and others, will never
have a gas network; it is too far away from the
existing networks. It appears from evidence we have
heard that there is no regulator whatsoever in either
the home oil heating market or propane gas market.
Given that there is regulation in a number of parts
of the energy market and the importance of this
particularly in rural and other areas, it is right that
there is no regulation? Should a regulator like you or
someone else take on this market?
Mr Buchanan: I wonder whether you have brought
this up within the framework of the Energy Bill as
well. That may be a framework suitable for that
debate.
Q605 Mr Weir: It has been brought up in several
fora and nobody seems to be taking it on at the
moment. There does not appear to be any consumer
interest or any regulation of it at all.
Mr Buchanan: I should like to go back and ﬁnd out
more and then have a bilateral discussion either with
you or the Chairman.
Q606 Chairman: This is a matter of considerable
concern. I receive letters from my constituents who
say that prices are rising signiﬁcantly faster than for
mainstream gas and electricity customers. It is not
your fault.
Mr Buchanan: But there is concern about it and we
should follow it up.
Chairman: The OFT says that it can do a major
inquiry but it is busy with all kinds of other things
and it does not have time for it.
Mr Wright: Another reason why regulation is
required is that prices have increased to such a level
that some people cannot aVord the minimum
delivery requirements of the companies. It is now so
expensive that people do not get deliveries; the
suppliers will not supply below a certain amount.
That is another problem.
Q607 Chairman: If this Committee were to
recommend that your remit should be expanded to
include this section of the energy market would you
resist it?
Mr Buchanan: I should like to go away and look at
it in more detail before I give an answer.
Q608MrClapham:Do you have any idea howmany
customers use LPG?
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Dr Wright: We know approximately how many are
oV the gas grid; it is somewhat less than 20% of all
households. This is also an issue for the supply
market probe.We are looking speciﬁcally at whether
the competition is as eVective for customers who are
oV the gas grid. A lot of the focus of the competition
is on dual fuel and often it is harder for door-to-door
salesmen to get to these customers because they are
in rural areas. These customers may well get some
beneﬁt through the CERT and EEC programmes
for energy eYciency. This just shows how
complicated the issue of fuel poverty is because that
is another dimension that feeds into it.
MrWeir:The point is that these consumers have just
fallen oV the radar of the regulator. There is no one
looking at decent tariVs for them as they do in gas
and electricity. In many ways they have been
forgotten. To say that you will develop the gas
network is impractical in many areas of Scotland
and other areas.
Q609 Chairman: The problem is the density of the
population. The irony in Worcestershire is that the
big gas mains that take gas all round the place roar
through the county and people who live almost next
door to them cannot get access to piped gas for their
own houses, and never will; it is not feasible.
Mr Buchanan: Clearly, the range of concern is
substantial, so we shall deﬁnitely follow it up.
Q610 Roger Berry:You recently published your fuel
poverty action programme. I welcome the attention
that you have devoted to this issue.What proportion
of those who are currently living in fuel poverty will
be taken out of poverty as a result of your action
programme, and over what period of time?
MrBuchanan:There is our programme andwhat the
DWP plans to do which in many ways is much more
substantial. As one would expect, they focus on
trying to use data management both to access those
who are fuel poor and to get beneﬁts to them. The
scale of the beneﬁt will be the key. The ability to do
this by the winter and the scale of it are questions I
would be asking them, as I am sure you would. That
will be the main driver. For every 10% increase in
price 400,000 people go into the fuel poor league.
This is a very big problem now, and we are receiving
price warnings from the companies. My answer is
that there are three questions aimed at government
andDWP.Whatwe are trying to do is to enhance the
quality. We have a programme running with the
Citizens Advice Bureau called the best advice
programme. I think it is working well. We are
working with the University of Bristol to ensure we
get good research to identify ward by ward across
England where the worst areas of fuel poverty might
be. We are trying to do what we call our ﬁnd and ﬁx
programme by working with relevant bodies, but I
think the real diVerence will be felt by the scale of the
DWP programme and what the Government will
do.
Q611 Roger Berry: I am sure you are right. The
much proclaimed £225 million of extra social
assistance over the next three years—the deal with
the ‘Big 6’ companies—is an increase from £50
million to £150million annually. I do not say it is not
worth a row of beans; it is money, but the increase is
from £50 million to £150 million. Clearly, someone
somewhere is treble-counting. As I understand what
the DWP has said, this is being targeted as extra
money to help pensioners in fuel poverty. The
obvious question here is: what about the three-
quarters of a million children in fuel poverty? What
about disabled people who are not pensioners but
are in fuel poverty? Where do they ﬁt into this?
Mr Buchanan:That is a very good question. I should
like to come back on the slicing and dicing and the
way it is going up. Thank you for the information.
Q612 Roger Berry: What does Ofgem think of the
Government’s position on social tariVs?
Mr Buchanan: That is an interesting question that is
probably best directed to the Government. I believe
that the Government is trying to approach fuel
poverty through a three-pronged package. The ﬁrst
is the DWP-based package which is linked to what
they are trying to do on the Warm Front
programme. You will know that that was pulled
back a little in terms of ﬁnancing. It is also focusing
on the companies to step forward. We have seen
companies develop their plans possibly under
additional pressure. Scottish and Southern has now
rolled out its energy-plus plan from 20,000 to
100,000 potential customers. It must identify them
and get the beneﬁts to them. Ofgem is concerned
with information facilitation and driving through
the opportunities within the market-place for the
fuel poor. I think that is the Government’s three-
pronged approach to it. If it wishes to take a step
forward and say that it wants to reregulate a form of
tariV then that is really a question you must ask
Malcolm Wicks or John Hutton.
Q613 Roger Berry: You have come up with some
speciﬁc proposals. Perhaps the most celebrated one
is that some of the £9 billionwindfall thatUKenergy
companies are set to receive from the allocation of
carbon permits under phase two of the EU emissions
trading scheme should go towards helping those in
fuel poverty. How much of the £9 billion should it
be, and how do the various partners in this exercise
feel about your proposal?
Mr Buchanan: This was considerably highlighted
when we were invited to see the Chancellor at No.11
and give our views and provide ideas on fuel poverty
as an issue and what the Government could do. Our
ideas included, amongst other things, that we should
get on with smart metering and have a look at the
various DWP data issues now being developed. We
also referred to one of the ideas that we ﬂagged in
April 2006 in an earlier representation to the
Government, namely that this pot of money was
sitting there. The companies will argue that the pot
of money is there for them to be able to reinvest in
renewables. I think an interesting question to ask
them is: have they invested that money in new
technology? It is worth looking at a number of
companies. One company that comes to mind is
Drax. At the moment the City forecasts that about
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70% of its EBITDARover the next four years—£1.6
billion—will eVectively come through the EU ETS
scheme. How much is it investing in the next few
years? On city forecasts it appears that they are
investing about £350 million, so there are some
interesting issues there. I pick just one company; I
am not picking on it, but some interesting questions
can be raised. This is a matter for Government
because Ofgem is not a lobby group. As with smart
meters, we raised these issues with Government and
urged them to look at it. It is up to them.
Q614 Chairman: I want to reinforce what Mr Berry
said about people other than the elderly who are in
fuel poverty. This Committee has been banging on
about it for years and nothing seems to happen. As
fuel prices rise to eye-watering heights it is becoming
a greater problem. I know I am lecturing the wrong
people here, but the Committee attaches importance
to the inclusion of other groups in fuel poverty
measures. You have a diYcult task on your hands. I
began with some questions which expressed
scepticism about your good intentions given that
you thought the market already worked perfectly.
We know that fuel prices will continue to increase.
Look at the oil price. We know that this is a
continuing problem that will get worse and worse.
Companies are talking of further increases all the
time and people are hurting. Every one of us ﬁnds his
fuel bill an intolerable burden. Therefore, if you do
not make a reference to the Competition
Commission at the end of this you will look rather
weak, will you not? It is the only thing that people
think you can do.
Witnesses: MrNigelWooley, Supply Director, BPGasMarketing,MrRichard Guerrant,Director, Europe,
ExxonMobil Gas and Power Marketing, and Mr Paul Trimmer, Vice President, NW European Business
Operations, Shell, gave evidence.
Q616 Chairman: Gentlemen, thank you very much
for coming to this very important session of
evidence. You have heard some the reasons we want
to ask you questions. I know that they have been
explained to you beforehand. We are grateful to you
for the information which you have already
provided to the Committee. I begin by asking you to
introduce yourselves for the record for the beneﬁt of
those who are listening to our proceedings.
Mr Wooley: I am Nigel Wooley, the supply director
of BP Gas Marketing.
Mr Trimmer: My name is Paul Trimmer and I am
with Royal Dutch Shell. We produce and buy and
sell gas in various countries across Europe.
Mr Guerrant: My name is Richard Guerrant, one of
the directors of the ExxonMobil UK group of
companies. I am responsible for natural gas
marketing across Europe.
Q617Chairman:This sessionmarks a change of gear
for the inquiry in a way. Next week we have a very
signiﬁcant number of the chief executive oYcers of
Mr Buchanan: We did not make a reference on the
back of the 2004–05 probe when prices were very
high compared with what they had been previously.
We had been looking at prices of about 10p to 20p
per therm and they went to about 50p to 60p. There
was great concern at the time. We came out with a
package of measures which the CC at that time did
not feel was necessary, but for you and any other
consumer there was a weighty tome of evidence to
show why we had come to that conclusion. I know
that the board will approach September with an
open mind to see what the right course of action will
be, but everything will then be published and you
will see whether or not we have taken the right
course of action. I imagine that we shall be hung
from the lamp posts if you say that in producing the
information our judgment is missing because our
own information tells us to go to the CC andwe have
not done it.
Q615 Chairman:As a well-educated man you will be
familiar with the rock and whirlpool of Scylla and
Charybdis. If the rock of Scylla is the expectation
that you can do something with that kind of
reference failure to push the nuclear button will in
some sense ruin your reputation, but the whirlpool
of Charybdis means that if you do make such a
reference you will disrupt the investment plans of
major city companies at the crucial time to keep on
the lights. You are damned if you do and damned
and you do not, are you not?
Mr Buchanan: It is a diYcult job.
Chairman:On that note we shall bring this session to
a conclusion. Thank you very much for your
evidence. You have promised us at least one matter
in writing. If there are other things that you want to
give us as you characteristically do we shall
welcome them.
the ‘Big 6’ coming in to talk about their work which
will be fascinating. Today we are looking at rather
more speciﬁc issues that aVect your companies. The
ﬁrst blindingly obvious question from the chair is:
why are oil prices so high? Are they here to stay, and
to what extent does speculation contribute to those
high prices? That is the million-dollar question.
Mr Trimmer: If one looks at the medium and long-
term whilst Shell does not speculate on prices—I
shall not give a price forecast; if I did it would almost
certainly be wrong—there are certain fundamentals
coming together on the demand side which are
impossible to deny, that is, growth in demand in
India, Indonesia and particularly China with the
build-up to the Olympics. That puts immense
pressure on the demand side. The populations and
industrialisation of these areas are set to grow, so
there seems to be a very strong fundamental pressure
on the demand side. As to the supply side, the era of
easy to ﬁnd but cheap to produce oil and gas is on
the decline. We are not ﬁnding the large oil and gas
ﬁelds that have been around. There are, therefore,
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two fundamentals coming together which appear to
push in the same direction and provide a medium to
long-term perspective. Reading the newspapers at
the weekend, if you talk about other things that may
have an impact on prices, the amount of money that
is available to go into the markets has gone up from
less than £7 billion in 2004 to over £130 billion this
year. Presumably, a lot of that is going into the
energy markets. The ﬂows of that money in and out
of those markets can have an eVect. Certainly, from
Shell’s perspectivewe ﬁnd it diYcult to rationalise all
of the price movements on the basis of the
fundamentals alone, but whether or not that is a
long-term eVect is diYcult to determine.
Q618 Chairman: You do not know or you are not
telling us; it is one or the other.
Mr Trimmer: I am saying what I believe to be the
fundamentals which are pushing in one direction. If
you look at it over time it is pretty clear that prices
are heading in one direction.
Q619 Chairman: Gentlemen, I suspect that you
agree with the general thrust of that; it is not a very
controversial view. To what extent do you believe
that speculation plays a part in driving current
market prices?
Mr Guerrant: To add just one more comment,
ExxonMobil believes that over the long term the
fundamentals of supply and demand drive the price.
We are surprised about the prices that you see today.
Q620 Chairman: What is the oil price this morning?
Mr Guerrant: I am not sure. Yesterday afternoon I
believe that the WTI (West Texas Intermediate)
benchmark was in the range of $137. As to the
question of what causes it to be where it is today,
clearly there are temporary factors that inﬂuence
some of these things. There are experts round the
world who say that speculation is not the issue. It
may be due to the weak dollar and many of the
familiar things that we read in the newspapers every
day. It is a diYcult question.Our costs in ﬁnding new
supplies are also going up. One of the issues about
which we are concerned is that our job of bringing
on new supplies to try to moderate this, to get access
to new resources and develop them and bring them
online is becoming more diYcult. We are going into
more diYcult and higher cost areas.
Mr Wooley: The fundamentals that Shell has
described are exactly those that we observe in the
market, too.
Q621 Chairman: I understand that in the United
States limits are placed on the size of positions taken
by traders. I know you have underplayed the
importance of speculation, but there is no such rule
in the Londonmarkets and the FSA certainly has no
such provision. Do you think there is a case for
capping the size of positions taken by London
traders in the same way as happens in the America?
Mr Wooley: In relation to the traded gas markets in
the UK one of the beneﬁts we have seen and talked
about is the liquidity in those markets. Obviously,
the positions which various companies and trading
houses take in bringing forward that liquidity are a
beneﬁt to the market. I am not sure what beneﬁt
there will be in capping the size of a position that is
taken.
Q622 Mr Clapham: When we look at the gas market
in Europe, there has been enormous change. For
example, in 2003–04 we imported about 2% and by
2008–09 it is likely that the ﬁgure will increase to
about 40%. When one compares the UK gas market
with Europe—you were in the room during the
previous session and heard what Ofgem said—it
seems as though it is the European relationship that
will impact and have an inﬂuence upon prices in the
UK. Is that your view? Do you see it changing in the
near future, or are we in for a long haul whereby
prices in theUKwill be determined bywhat happens
in the gas market in Europe?
MrWooley:Whatwe have seen over a period of time
is a transition in the UK market. If you go back to
the period prior to 1998 when the interconnector
between theUK and continental market was opened
the UK was essentially an island economy which
beneﬁted from plentiful natural resources around its
coast and was predominantly supplied from UK
sources. It was able tomaintain a reasonable balance
in the market. We entered a period of liberalisation
which encouraged the bringing forward of lots of
new gas supplies to theUK. In themid-1990s leading
up to the opening of the interconnector we saw very
low prices and the development of a very
competitive market in the UK and we experienced
levels of gas on gas competition within the UK
market. As theUKhasmoved away frombeing a net
exporter of gas to an importer of gas the pricing
signals which the UK market experiences are much
more determined by those that come from
continental Europe and the oil indexation and long-
term contract nature of that market. Therefore, I
think the market has seen a period of transition and
as we go forward we expect more and more to be
involved in the European market and to take price
signals from there. Further, with the development of
the LNG terminals which will serve the UK market
increasingly LNG trades at least on a regional basis
and is connected in a global sense. We see some
global price indicators from LNG markets coming
to the UK too.
Mr Trimmer: I emphasise the last point. The
interesting transition is how quickly the UK is
absorbed into pan-European pricing, but how
quickly will pan-European pricing be absorbed by
global pricing? All of Europe’s incremental supplies
now come from very long distances. Even the
Russians, for example have an opportunity to put
gas into LNG or a pipeline; similarly the Algerians
and the rest of the North Africans. Therefore, there
is another overlay. When does the global market
have a very substantial impact on UK prices?
Mr Guerrant: Over the past ﬁve years there has been
an evolution of liquid markets on the continent. In
the Netherlands there is a very active liquid trading
hub called TTF. It is very similar to the way in which
NBP is being traded and it has a gas index very
similar to what you see here in the wholesale market.
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In the past two years we have seen the German
system change with a new grid access model that
allows the markets there to create these trading
hubs.We have seen trading hubs around: there is the
E.ON system aswell as another hotline system called
BEB. In northern France we have seen the evolution
of a trading hub. My company is trading on all of
those hubs today. All of our gas that is not dedicated
to long-term contracts moves to all of these trading
hubs. That is not to say that the liberalisation of the
continent is moving fast enough, but it has started.
We have started to see signiﬁcant liquidity
developing there. We are starting to see that and it is
very encouraging.
Q623 Mr Clapham: It appears that there are two
factors which will impact on gas prices in the UK in
the long term: one is LNG and the other is the
situation in Europe. Mr Guerrant, given what you
say about the interconnectedness of the hubs in
Europe, why is it that gas prices in this country last
winter rose so much higher than European gas
prices? What was the reason for that?
Mr Guerrant:You see a very close correlationwithin
a few pennies of the prices at these liquid trading
hubs on the continent with the NBP because the gas
moves fromNorway and other places back and forth
across those hubs.You have a convergence.You still
have demand centres around certain areas that may
cause prices to be a little bit higher at a particular
point in time, but those usually close back up and
you get prices at the liquid hubs to come back into
some parity within a few pennies which reﬂect
transportation costs across the hubs between the
continent and the UK.
Q624 Mr Clapham: Is that the view of all the
witnesses? I am looking at the graph provided to us
by BP.
Mr Wooley: Referring to the points that have been
made about the connectedness of the European
hubs, primarily the issue is that the amount of
liquidity available at some of these hubs—we have
talked about the French and central European hub,
the EGT inGermany—is at very low levels given the
current state of the market. We have seen some
evolution of traded gas at Zeebrugge and now at the
TTF hub which operates in the Netherlands
liquidity is growing. It is still a long way behind the
traded rates in the UK, but there is some liquidity.
The amount of gas traded on the French and
German hubs still remains very small and therefore
has only a very small eVect on the market.
Mr Trimmer: If you look at the German market and
what is happening in the spotmarket, it is picking up
very signiﬁcantly, but the majority of the gas is still
sold on the basis of an oil-price indexation which
picks up the spikes but smoothes them out. The price
still rises but it is not as volatile.
Q625 Mr Clapham: We hear so much about
European liberalisation and that is constantly
blamed for the gas price increase but given the high
price we saw in winter why did not your companies
provide more gas to that market to bring down
that price?
Mr Wooley:That is a commonmisconception which
has been referred to at one or two earlier evidence
sessions and in some of the remarks by other
companies. There is no great residue of excess supply
being held back by the companies in the North Sea
that they can bring forward to the market.
Throughout the year and certainly in the winter time
the companies in the UK arena are very focused on
producing all the gas that they can from their
reserves for delivery to the UK market. We tend to
take maintenance periods and production outages
during the summer to make sure we do that at
periods of lower gas prices, but in the winter time
when there is the greatest need for gas we try as best
we can within the context of safe operations to run
our facilities as hard as we can to bring gas to the
market. There is no residue of gas out there which
can simply be drawn upon in those circumstances.
Mr Trimmer: Shell did move some gas which was
originally destined for continental Europe across to
the UK, but there is a limit to what we can do for the
reasons that have been identiﬁed, plus the fact that
we have contractual obligations. We need to be able
to comply with our contractual obligations, for
example, in Germany or Denmark at the same time.
Mr Guerrant: The LNG facility that ExxonMobil
and its partners are building in Milford Haven was
based on the ability to be able to move the gas all the
time in the marketplace; in other words, having a
very liquid market like NBP that we enjoy;
otherwise, we would probably have looked at
another location somewhere else in the world. The
fact that you have a very liquid market here and a
producer has the ability to sell all of his gas all the
time at a fair market price is very attractive.
Q626 Mr Clapham: One of the big worries we have
looking at the gas market is that not only is the
domestic consumer paying more than his European
counterpart but it is undermining British
competitiveness. There is a real fear that given the
great increases in gas prices we could see British
competitiveness lose out. You were present during
the previous session when we discussed the fact that
British gas went into Europe when prices were high.
That sets a high price for British gas that goes into
storage for winter time. Consequently, we have high
prices in winter. At no time do we seem to have the
same kind of gas prices that our European
counterparts have and that is a real blow to British
competitiveness. What can be done to deal with the
situation which will help British industry?
Mr Trimmer: One of the things that we are doing in
joint ventures with other parties or by ourselves is to
increase the connectivity of the UK to other sources
of gas supply. Now that we have made the switch
from self-suYciency to dependency on imports we
feel that this is one of the most critical things we can
do. It enhances the choice that theUKhas by having
access to Norwegian gas and continental gas and
LNG but it also enhances the security of supply in
case we have a problem with one of those sources of
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supply. We are very active in trying to increase the
number of links that the UK has to all of the
possible sources.
Mr Guerrant:The biggest thing we can do is to bring
on more suppliers. I point to Milford Haven as a
good example. We and our partners are spending
$13 billion to bring that supply into themarketplace.
What ExxonMobil and the industry can do is bring
on those new supplies and create greater
interconnectivity. If over the past few years you look
atVesterled, Langeled, Tampenlink and the BBL, all
of those pipeline projects bring more gas from the
Netherlands or from the Norwegian sector, which is
very important, and, at the same time ensure that we
get the most out of UK gas: we are all working very
hard to do that, but we have to understand that it is
a mature province that is in decline.
Mr Trimmer: We are making investments to
upgrade and refresh the existing infrastructure and
facilities so they can last longer. We are investing in
prolonging the life of the ﬁelds. The UK has been
astonishingly successful in perpetually pushing out
the date at which we drop oV the cliV. New ﬁelds are
still coming on stream. Some of the incentives that
have emerged most recently to encourage new
investment in existing acreage are good.
MrWooley: It is key to emphasise that the role of the
upstream industry is to invest and bring forward new
supplies to the market. Earlier there was a
commentary about the Isle of Grain and the
terminal where BP shares contract rights with
Sonatrach. We have been able to bring a large
number of cargoes to market over recent years
through that terminal since its inception in 2005.
Obviously, that hasmade an important contribution
to the UK’s supply in a period when prices were
very tight.
Q627 Mr Clapham: Obviously, connectivity is
enormously important, but you guys are involved in
the European market as well as the global market.
What is your view about the timeline for
liberalisation in Europe?
Mr Wooley: I think that those of us who have been
observing and participating in the market for some
period have noted that the pace of liberalisation in
Europe has always been a little slower than
anticipated. Europe has been running through gas
directives and attempts to liberalise.
Q628 Chairman: I do not want to go too far down
this route. We shall ask you about liberalisation. I
want to make sure that my colleagues can ask about
that in some depth. Sometimes I feel a degree of
tension among our three witnesses. We shall not
probe you for commercial secrets; sadly, we do not
have those powers, much as we would love to have
them. But we need to get a feel for the overall
environment in which you are operating. Mr
Wooley, you have talked about the Isle of Grain but
you have not told us a great deal about it.Howmany
gas shipments were landed at the Isle of Grain so far
this year? Is it 63 or a handful?
Mr Wooley: I admit that I was somewhat puzzled by
the comments of Mr Buchanan when he sat in this
chair. In 2008 only one of 13 available slots in the Isle
of Grain has been used so far by BP. Our record over
the period since the terminal opened is that we have
used 32 out of the 80 slots made available to us.
Predominantly, those would have been used in the
ﬁrst quarter of the year—the winter quarter. The
number we have used in diVerent years has varied.
As you would expect, it is used in response to the
relative position of the UK market in comparison
with global markets for LNG. Overall, we have used
just under 50% of the slots that have been available
since 2005.
Q629 Chairman:MrGuerrant, at this point I look to
you. A massive investment is being made at Milford
Haven. To what extent are we insulated therefore
from decisions by those who seek to sell us gas so
that supplies presently at sea will not respond to
price and go to Japan where the price is higher but
will still come toMilfordHaven?What security does
that give us?
Mr Guerrant: Let me talk a bit about how it is
structured which I believe will give you a sense of
how it should work. Obviously, we have built this
facility with the liquefaction, or supply trains in
Qatar and all the ships and the actual import
facilities in the UK. All of that is designed to ﬁt
together for quality. The speciﬁcation for gas here is
diVerent from other places in the world. All of that
is designed to ﬁt the UK market. Having said that,
the question is: how do you put together a
commercial arrangement to ensure that it works? At
the end of the day a supplier like the Qatar
Government wants to ensure that it gets the market
value for its gas compared with all the other markets
in the world. We could have gone down the route
that basically said we should ﬁnd a buyer in the UK
that would guarantee to take all the gas at the
highest price anywhere in the world. That would not
be a very fair thing for the UK consumer; it would
not be a good thing for the country.What we didwas
to put together an arrangement that ensured Qatar
got the market price and it would have the option to
move those cargoeswhen othermarkets were higher.
That allows the gas to be here when the market price
signals say that it should be sent here relative to
othermarkets in the world. That ﬂexibility is critical.
That was the reason I said earlier that it was so
critical to maintain the integrity of that wholesale
market. You have a base supplier that has the ability
to divert to other markets depending on the price in
the UK versus other markets.
Q630 Chairman: Therefore, you and the Qataris
themselves have put a lot of money in a terminal that
may not be used?
Mr Guerrant: When it is not used it is available for
third parties to use.
Q631 Chairman: But they also respond to price
signals round the globe?
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Mr Guerrant: That is true. From the perspective of
LNG supply/demand over the past year or so we
have been in a fairly tight situation. Earlier reference
was made to Japan’s nuclear problems. In addition,
there has been cold weather in Korea. Then new
buyers in China and India have come into the
marketplace and paid high prices for LNG. That has
tightened up the supply/demand balance. We shall
see some new suppliers come on. We have not had
new LNG supplies come on in the past couple of
years. The Qatargas venture will bring on new
supplies and there are other ventures inQatar as well
as other supplies. In 2008 and 2009 we will see new
supplies of LNG come on around the world.
Obviously, depending on weather and how the
world economy responds, we believe that that may
moderate the situation we see today.
Q632 Mr Bailey: Earlier it was said by Mr Wooley
that the price of European gas obviously had an
eVect on domestic prices. Looking at the continental
model where prices are linked to oil prices, what
puzzles me is how in a market you can have the price
of one commodity, ie gas, determined by the supply
and demand model for another commodity, ie oil.
What is the rationale for that?
Mr Wooley: Perhaps I may start with the traditional
Europeanmodel, as it were. The history of gas prices
in long-term contracts that supply the European
market has developed largely on the basis of
competing fuels. When the resource owners in
perhaps Russia, Norway or Algeria look to develop
their gas reserves and sell them into the European
markets theywill place those volumes with the large-
scale, national monopolies within those markets.
The companies that would be buying the gas would
look to make sure that they would be able to place
that gas in their own markets. To go back perhaps
30 years, largely they would be doing that by
developing the gas market by successively displacing
gasoil and fuel oil from heating services within those
markets. Therefore, it was very important for those
companies in the national markets to ensure they
could acquire the gas at a price that would enable
them to compete at the burner tip with fuel oil and
gasoil. That was why as a general rule the contracts
struck with fuel oil and gasoil indices linked to the
base price for gas.
Q633 Mr Bailey: That is an interesting historical
explanation, but what is the rationale now?
Mr Wooley: I think the rationale that has
underpinned it over 30 or 40 years is one that
underpins long-term contracts. The nature of the
business which enables those supplies to be brought
forward is that very large long-term contracts are
put in place to support the development of the
resources in remote regions which will then supply
the market. The continuation and competitiveness
of that pricing structure has been the foundation of
the industry. If your question is that there is now a
diVerent model available within the UK and a
pricing structure which relates more to gas on gas we
can imagine that that competition will start to
develop and move more into Europe, but given the
sheer quantity of gas in Europe compared with that
in the UK increasingly we see the price signals from
Europe come to the UK rather than the other way
round.
Mr Guerrant: I completely agree with the history,
but in considering the traded markets like the UK
and other traded markets round the world it goes
back to: what is the energymix or demand in theUK
and the percentage of the various fuels that provide
that energy mix? For gas to be competitive in that
marketplace it will have to compete with those other
fuels just as my colleague said, but when you do not
have long-term contracts all of that mix of fuels
determines how the price in the traded market and
the demand for that gas will compete against those
other fuels. For instance, at times in a tradedmarket
in the UK the ceiling could be around oil and you
could have the ﬂoor price, because it goes up and
down based on supply and demand, down at the coal
price. My point is that the fuel mix of a particular
country and the extent to which it is connected to
global markets really determines how gas will
compete and ultimately be priced in that market.
Q634 Mr Bailey: I would have expected the price to
determine the mix to a certain extent. Obviously,
there are issues to do with capacity and production,
but in terms of demand I would have expected the
price mechanism to determine the mix, whereas here
it seems to be the other way round.
Mr Trimmer: I think there is a transition. We all
understand the history of the European gas model
and pricing and why it developed that way. If you go
forward and ask what it will be like when there is
extensive and good liquidity across the energy
markets as a whole I suspect you will ﬁnd that, just
as in the States, when one of the main energy forms
moves up the others move with it. If you look at coal
at the moment, for example, that is also increasing
very signiﬁcantly in price not necessarily on the back
of something speciﬁc that is happening to the coal
market but because it is now much more integrated
into the overall global energy mix. The problem we
need to face is that energy as awhole is coming under
pressure and it is not just one market that is moving;
all of them are moving. We tend to talk here about
oil and gas but we see the same thing happening with
coal. It may not be amessage that we like to hear but
that is happening.
Q635MrBailey: I could understand that if they were
separate markets they would often tend to follow
each other, but this is a formalised link between the
twomarkets which I believe is a clear demonstration
in eVect that there is an illiberal market where
normal market mechanisms are not operating.
Mr Guerrant: There is a very liquid and competitive
market here in the UK. Just to demonstrate that, it
trades at about nine times the physical volume in the
UK. If you add together all of the various
instruments it can be as high as 14-plus. If you put it
on the same terms and compare that to the US,
which is a larger market, the volume traded versus
the physical volume is about 1212, so it is very close.
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It is notably the most liquid market in the world.We
look at this market as being one of the most liquid in
the world.
Q636 Mr Bailey: If my memory serves me right, one
of the reasons it is very liquid and price-responsive
to demand is because a relatively small proportion of
the gas is actually traded on this market, so a small
increase in demand has a considerable impact on the
price mechanism. I do not deny that the British
market is liquid, but to a certain extent the increase
in price is due to the illiquidity of the European
market. To move on, where is the demand for the
link between oil and gas? Is it imposed by producers
or demanded by consumers?
Mr Guerrant: If we return to what I said about the
fuel mix, the relative consumers of fuel and how they
build their facilities and the percentage that
ultimately end up determining how gas will compete
with those fuels and will penetrate that market and
be priced. To answer your question directly, it is
driven by consumers and the facilities that consume
fuel in the marketplace and that percentage mix.
Q637 Mr Bailey: How can the link be broken?
Mr Guerrant: When you look at supply and energy
demand overall until 2030, ours and many other
forecasts say that 75% of demand will be met by oil
and gas. That said, we will need all of the fuels; we
will need nuclear, oil, gas and coal—all of them—to
meet our energy challenge in the future. Clearly, one
of the things you can look at is your mix of fuels. Do
you go more nuclear, coal or one of the other fuels?
That mix is the driver for how gas and oil will
compete in your marketplace.
Chairman: The view forming in my mind is that the
reason you are being quite evasive on the oil and gas
question is that it quite suits you in the European
markets in which you operate. I am a bit sceptical
about the evidence we are hearing so far on this
issue. I ask Mike Weir to ask about European
market liberalisation, and Mr Bailey can come back
if he has further supplementaries.
Q638 Mr Weir: We have touched on the
liberalisation of the market already to some extent.
How far away do you think a liberalised European
market is?
Mr Trimmer: One of the things I consider when I try
to answer that question is the motive of diVerent
governments. I believe that one of the issues we also
have to face is that diVerent people in diVerent
constituencies have diVerent objectives. We believe
that because of our history and what we have
experienced so far the best thing for us is a particular
sort of liberalised market. We have mentioned the
French and the extraordinary length of storage they
have. That is driven by the fact that to all intents and
purpose they have no oil or gas and so they have a
perspective on security of supply that we have never
had. I do not believe liberalisation will take place
unless someone has a real go at it and grabs the
whole thing by the scruV of the neck; otherwise, it
will not lead to a converged single interpretation of
that. In terms of the pace of change, that will be
determined by how individual governments react,
but from our perspective one of the key things we
need, maybe not so much as a fully liberalised
market in each location, we would like to be able to
move gas around with more freedom than we’ve
been able to do so far. They have every right to have
a particular structure, but we would at least like the
ability to move the gas around so we can then
achieve what we want in the UK.
Q639 Mr Weir: Given energy security about which
there is some concern at the moment, is there not
evidence that some countries have retreated to
looking after national energy security rather than a
liberalised European market? In that instance is it
likely that there will ever be a fully liberalised
European market?
Mr Trimmer: I guess that is why I said I thought
people would end up in diVerent situations in
diVerent locations, but there is another perspective,
namely if that is the way people wish to go—it is not
for us but elected people to determine that—at least
give us the freedom tomove gas around, sowewould
perhaps focus a bit more on saying that we would
like freedom to move gas around rather than be
particularly concerned about a particular price.
Q640 Chairman: What is inhibiting your ability to
move that gas around?
Mr Trimmer: There are some physical constraints in
the system and also diVerent regulatory
interpretations can sometimes make it diYcult to
move gas round, but that is improving and I believe
that things like unbundling will help that also.
Mr Guerrant: There are also diVerent speciﬁcations
of gas across Europe that make it very complicated.
All of those technical issues need to be worked out.
Therefore, there is a hardware problem which is all
about bottlenecks, speciﬁcations and so forth to
make it fungible, but there is also a software problem
which is more to do with contracts, regulations and
so forth.
Q641MrWeir:Wewere told in an earlier session by
one of the major users of gas, INEOS, that it had
time on the interconnector and had sought to buy
gas in Europe on the type of contract that exists in
Europe but no one would supply on that basis.
Presumably, you all deal in gas both on the
European mainland and in the UK. Why is it that
you or one of your competitors would not supply gas
to them from Europe on a European-type contract
but only a UK-type contract?
Mr Guerrant: I am puzzled when I hear something
like that because it does not make sense. If they were
going to be taking delivery of gas in Europe they
should be able to get the price.
Q642 Mr Weir: They were going to take it back to
the UK through the interconnector.
Mr Guerrant: If my understanding of the question is
that he had taken capacity to where he was going to
take delivery of the gas in Europe hewould be taking
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title to the product there. It puzzles me because there
is gas available to be sold there. I am puzzled that he
was not able to do that.
Q643 Mr Weir: So, if he approached you you would
sell him gas on that basis if he wanted it?
Mr Guerrant: Yes; I am always looking for new
customers.
Q644 Mr Weir: Given the strong link between the
UKand themainland Europeanmarket, is there any
point in the UK having a fully liberalised market if
Europe is not following along and doing the same
thing?
Mr Wooley: I think that what you are observing at
the moment is that the UK has taken a particular
path and Europe, if it has followed at all, has
followed very slowly. Therefore, some of the issues
we are describing are ones where the UK has not
beneﬁted from liberalisation in Europe because it
simply has not taken place. An example I talked
about earlier was security of supply. When security
of supply is in discussion, particularly for the winter,
there are very large storage reservoirs available in
some of the continental European countries. One of
the questions often asked is: when you get into a
peak period in the winter and there are high prices in
the UK why is it that only a limited amount of gas
ﬂows from Europe to the UK? That is certainly an
area where liberalisation would help and you would
expect to see more gas moving around. More
liquidity in the European markets would promote
greater ﬂows of gas to the UK in those periods.
Q645 Mr Weir: But if Europe does not liberalise to
the extent the UK has should the UK for its own
security of supply look to de-liberalise some of the
market here?
Mr Guerrant: First, based on what I said about the
development of trading hubs in Europe it is starting
down that path. I would disagree that there is no
liberalisation because that is occurring now and we
are selling into those markets every day. The fact
that the UK has liberalised has allowed us to make
the $13 billion investment to bring in new LNG into
the UK. The fact that you had a liberalised market
was a key attribute for us to select the UK for that
project. It has allowed the UK to get new supplies
from theNetherlands also with the BBL. I would say
that you have enjoyed more advantages than
disadvantages over time. We may be seeing some
short-term aberration. On the continent many of the
long-term oil-based contracts have lag eVects and
now we start to see higher oil prices we may see
prices on the continent ﬂip the otherway and theUK
may be cheaper. Usually, these things stay pretty
close together over a long period of time and you end
up with aberrations over a short period of time.
Q646Mr Bailey:With oil prices likely to continue to
rise obviously irrespective of other factors the price
of gas will go up. That is very convenient for the
producers. Is that not the real reason why this link is
being sustained?
Mr Trimmer: If we talk about the UK there is no
link. There are some old contracts
Q647Mr Bailey:But it impacts upon the price of gas
in this country?
Mr Trimmer: Yes, that is also why I say we have a
transitional period where there is some inﬂuence
from the continent. One of the biggest inﬂuences
which will arise fairly quickly is that of the global
market. I personally do not see the link and the
motive which says that we would hold on to a
particular way of working on the continent if it did
not give us the signals we need to make the new
investments and to do the sorts of things we want to
do around the UK. The nature of the UK market is
that it provides us with the conﬁdence to invest a
considerable amount of money in the Langeled
pipeline and the very large Ormen Lange gas ﬁeld
that we have just started to bring on the strength of
the UK price base. I do not accept the starting point
which says that Shell is particularly aligned to one
form of pricing or the other. It is the market pricing
in the UK that drives the pretty successful
investment programme at the moment.
Q648 Mr Bailey: But one of the intensive-energy
users said that it had tried to buy gas and asked for
a continental-type contract but could not get it.
Mr Trimmer: I can honestly say that I am astonished
at the statement.
Mr Wooley: I can say for BP that at themoment that
is not an area of the market that we would serve. We
withdrew from that sector of the market some
years ago.
Q649 Mr Wright: We know that during the summer
months there is always a downturn in gas production
in the UK for obvious reasons. Is there any evidence
that the interconnector is used more to export gas
from the UK rather than import it?
Mr Wooley: The balance of ﬂow through the
interconnector over the various periods of the year
is obviously a matter of public record, as it were.
Historically, when the UK had a large production
surplus it was able to export quite signiﬁcant
volumes in the summer months. As the UK has
become less self-suYcient the amount of gas it can
export in the summer has reduced and is quite small.
Correspondingly, the volumes of gas that are
imported both through the interconnector and the
BBL line have increased to the extentwhere basically
we import about 40% of our gas on an annual basis.
Q650 Mr Wright: Is that directly through the
interconnector or BBL?
Mr Wooley: Through a combination of the
interconnector, BBL, some LNG imports and
connections to the Norwegian systems.
Chairman: There is a lot of jargon in this industry
and Anne MoVat will ask you about one example
which is relatively new to me.
Q651 Anne MoVat: It began this morning when the
Chairman did not understand what the national
balancing point was. I do not think any of us knew
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it. One of the notes we have says that it is the virtual
trading location for the sale and purchase of natural
gas. It sounds like something out of Star Trek.
Maybe you can enlighten us.
Mr Guerrant: I will take a stab at it. There are
various segments of the market here in the UK.
Clearly, there is the domestic sector or retail sector,
but the sector inwhichmy company is involved is the
wholesale sector which is what is called the NBP, the
national balancing point. Essentially, this is all the
gas that goes into the national grid system. That gas
is traded on various terms but primarily on a short-
term basis and I talked about the pricing of that a
minute ago. If we look at the absolute volume of gas
going into the grid from which UK consumers pull
their gas, the buys and sells are multiples of nine to
14 times the physical volume that consumers like
ourselves pull oV the system. That system of buying
and selling is what creates the liquidity and creates
the highly competitive market and the transparent
market pricing one has.
Mr Trimmer: You may imagine a market. Why is it
a virtual and not actual location? You do not have
to bring the gas to a particular point in order tomake
the sale; it is virtual because many diVerent points
count as your having put gas into the market. You
do not have to bring it physically to Easington or
London in order to make the sale; you can do that
by putting gas in in the north and someone can take
gas out in the south. That does not matter because it
is within the national grid system.
Mr Guerrant: What is very important is liquidity. If
I had to haul the gas to yourmeter to serve you there
would not be liquidity; there would not be multiple
buyers. By creating this virtual point it allows all the
buyers and sellers to be on the same basis. There is
full liquidity and no one has an advantage.
Q652 Anne MoVat: What proportion of UK gas is
traded by this balancing formula?
Mr Guerrant: The NBP is a market, not a formula.
Looking at UK demand, nine to 14 times is actually
traded, so a lot is traded in multiple times. That
creates the extra liquidity, so it is the other way
round. Does that make sense? You have the physical
volume of molecules that go to the customers. Let us
call that 10 units. The number of buys and sells of all
the wholesale players’ buying and selling is 90 units;
in other words, it is nine times the physical volume.
You have a lot of buying and selling among all the
various traders.
Chairman: But that characterises a lot of markets,
such as futures markets and so on; it is not a
particularly unusual feature. It does not tell you how
much gas is being traded oV that market or how
prices are being set by the small percentage that is
being traded on that market. I will askMrWright to
put his questions.
Q653 Mr Wright: This is quite relevant. There was
some confusion as a result of the previous session
when Alistair Buchanan talked about the amount of
gas put on the oV-market as opposed to the forward
market. energywatch has stated that about 80% of
the product is in the oV-market contracts, leaving
only 20% in the forward market. Is that a true
reﬂection of the amount or is it somewhat diVerent
from that?
MrWooley: In this regard I can speak only in respect
of BP. The history of contracting in the North Sea is
that very often in the early days ﬁelds would be
contracted to customers, primarily BritishGas in the
old days. You would sell the production of the ﬁeld
for the ﬁeld life under a so-called depletion contract.
Youwould commit all the gas from that ﬁeld over its
life. Obviously, in today’smarket we still continue to
sell that gas to the original customer. In the mid-
1990s there were lots of what we call supply
contracts whereby we would commit to supply
reserves from ﬁelds for, say, a period of 15 years.
Those would still be dedicated to a particular
customer. The more recent history is as we have
developed more ﬁelds or old supply contracts have
come to an end is that we put those volumes through
the traded market.
Q654 Mr Wright: The traded market is the
forward market?
Mr Wooley: Yes. BP puts about 60% of its volume
through the traded market and about 40% through
the older contracts.
Mr Trimmer:To complement those numbers, we are
also active in the industrial and commercial sector
and sowemarket directly to companies. Between the
traded market and the industrial and commercial
market as we call it we are between 60% to 65%, so
35% to 40% is left under the old-style contracts
which are similar ﬁeld depletion contracts. That was
all there was at the time because there was a
monopoly buyer.
Mr Guerrant: To put ExxonMobil’s numbers in the
UK in perspective, about 60% of our gas here is on
a traded basis and about 40% comes under the old
contracts.
Q655MrWright: So, the ﬁgure quoted which shows
that 80% of long-dated physical volume is being
traded on the oV-market is not true. You have told
me that the ﬁgure is about 40%.
Mr Guerrant: There are two ways in which gas is
being traded. I am not sure about the question. We
call it the over-the-counter market.
Q656 Mr Wright: What is said is that 80% of the
total production is already committed in oV-market
contracts which are being negotiated behind the
scenes in secret, leaving only 20% to be traded, which
obviously determines the price. You are telling me
that it is approximately 40% on the oV-market as
opposed to 60% that can be traded on the open
market.
Mr Trimmer: I do not know whether this is another
example of slightly diVerent deﬁnitions or
interpretations of a word, but I can tell you that the
traded market is deﬁnitely at 20% to 25% and the
industrial and commercial sector, which is one or
two-year contracts, is NBP-linked and that is
another 40%. That leaves the last 35% to 40% under
the old-style contracts which are described in that
way.
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Mr Guerrant: ExxonMobil is not involved in the
industrial sector.We put either all of our gas into the
wholesaleNBPmarket or it is subject to existing old-
style historic contracts. Our split is about 38% in old-
style contracts and the remainder goes to the
wholesale market. If he says that 80% is in the long-
termmarket it does not make sense for my company
and, from what I have just heard, for others.
Q657 Mr Wright: Is it true that the forward prices
are used as a basis for many of the oV-market
contracts?
Mr Guerrant: We start to get into commercially
sensitive matters. Let me talk here in conceptual
terms; I will not talk about the speciﬁcs of my
company. Generally speaking, based on my
knowledge of the UK a proportion of the old-style
contracts are linked to oil; a proportion are linked to
the PPI; and a proportion are linked to electricity
and coal. The splits can vary.
Q658 Chairman: We have heard a good deal of
evidence that a lot of the contracts of themajor users
are on a forward price basis; they have to pay
whatever the market says at any time. They do not
know the price which changes as the wholesale
market price changes. They say that a very small
proportion of gas is traded and that determines their
contract prices.
Mr Trimmer: I guess you are hearing that there are
three people who do not quite understand that
statement. I have to be careful about competition
law here and so I shall not go into detail, but we now
have about 12—we are creating up to 22—what we
call value propositions, some of which are ﬁxed and
some of which are ﬂoating. Therefore, the customer
can make quite a choice at the time the contract is
signed, and there are even arrangements that allow
the customer to move from one to the other in the
middle of the contract. So this idea that somebody is
at the mercy of a particular market—if they choose
to have a price which is linked to, say, the day or
month ahead gas price that is their choice, but it is
not the only thing that is around in the marketplace.
Maybe they lament the fact that they did not lock in
something earlier. I do not know.
MrGuerrant:What is interesting and very important
information for you is that having a liquid market
allows more customised pricing than a market that
is not liquid.
Mr Trimmer: Absolutely. We would not be able to
oVer some of the things we do if there was not a
liquid market. At the same time, in our marketing
activity we do not feel inhibited by a lack of liquidity
in themarket-place. Several of the things that we put
on oVer are linked to transactions that take place in
the traded market and we could not do them if there
was not liquidity. This question of how much
liquidity—certainly if we are talking one or two
years—if we are talking about ﬁve to 10 years ahead
then we get into a diVerent area, but if we are talking
about the sort of thing which most industrial and
commercial customers talk about from my
perspective there is not an issue.
Mr Wooley: To clarify, the reason why the older
contracts which do not go through the market are
not indexed to gas prices is that when they were
struck perhaps 20 years ago there was no gas market
indicator to which they could be related. That is why
the coal, PPI and fuel oil-type indices were used
instead.
Q659 Mr Wright: My last question is related to
INEOS Chlor which trades in Europe and the UK.
It tried to get the same contract for gas supplies in
the UK as it has in mainland Europe. Why do you
think there are two sets of rules in terms of contracts
for the supply of gas?
Mr Guerrant: I am still puzzled about the comment
and the situation.You have to understand a lotmore
detail about what he was looking for in the
marketplace.
Q660 Mr Wright: I quote from the evidence. They
went to 19 suppliers many of which had supply
points on the continent and only six replies came
back. Every one of them oVered a price based on the
UK rather than the continental price.
MrGuerrant: If he is taking delivery of the gas on the
continent I am puzzled; I do not understand it. I
think the example he gave was that he took capacity
on the interconnector into the continent so he could
buy the gas on the continent and then haul it into the
UK. I am puzzled about that, if that is the situation.
Mr Wright: Obviously, we can take this up with
suppliers anyway, so it narrows it down a bit.
Chairman: It is something that we shall have to take
up with the company again because in a sense it goes
to the heart of what this inquiry is about.
Q661 Mr Binley: I want to ask about gas storage
because we have a serious problem here which from
my perspective has not been dealt with very
eYciently or eVectively. I recognise that the change
from supplier to purchaser in this respect relating to
the North Sea is a major factor, but what I do not
understand is that that can be seen. We are then told
that the planning problems in this country have
added to those diYculties. I am sorry but they have
been around for a long time, too. I do not
understand why the present massive need for gas
storage to help us equalise winter and summer prices
was not seen a considerable time ago. I should like
to know whether the market will deliver increases in
gas storage in the UK and in what timeframe. It is a
big factor. The information we have received is that
we will not get it for perhaps three or four years.
What is your view?
Mr Trimmer: Perhaps I should kick oVwith some of
the things thatwe consider when looking at investing
in underground storage, which is something we do.
We feel that our skill lies more in underground
storage that makes use of, say, depleted reservoirs
than in other facilities. That is the business we are in.
To stick to that, the sort of thing that will be
important is the diVerence between summer and
winter prices. A matter to bear in mind is that that
has increased very signiﬁcantly over the past two or
three years. If you go back three or four years, there
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was no track record of a very large diVerential.
Another element is the availability of reservoirs. We
would naturally want to deplete a reservoir before
converting it into storage, so it is the geology that
determines when ﬁelds come up.When they do come
upwe consider them. The other matters are the ﬁscal
and regulatory regime and the planning aspect that
you have talked about. Another factor is prediction
of the supply/demand balance. It is only in the past
two or three years when the planets have become
aligned with a supply/demand balance which really
focuses on the fact that the end is coming—because
we had false dawns on many occasions—together
with a market, not surprisingly, beginning to show
an increase in summer/winter price diVerentials, that
the commercial environment means one could go
ahead. These things are signiﬁcant investments and
one needs more than a whim and a prayer to make
them go. The economic signals come through.
Things like planning just do not help; they slow
down the whole thing. I believe that with the signals
we now have and the fact that more reservoirs are
becoming available we can expect to see more
projects coming through as we do.
Mr Guerrant: First, I would reiterate that given the
market signals the incentives were not there because
the market was able to handle that ﬂexibility in the
past. Those are now there. Second, we all recognised
that a couple of winters ago the country was really
relying on one large facility and that was another
important signal that we needed to expand. As an
investor when you put down your money you want
to make sure that you can get it done. I do not
underestimate the importance of the two Bills that
are currently being considered to ensure that the
planning process is streamlined and allows it to go
forward so that when investors start to develop these
things they have the assurance that they can get a
reasonable return.
Q662 Mr Binley: In terms of your investment
programmes you were caught out because volatility
has become a much more important factor than you
ever thought it would be?
Mr Guerrant: First, just now we are seeing the
market say that you need it. Second, we need
streamlining in the planning process to ensure that it
can be economically viable and built.
Q663 Mr Binley: If the market cannot do it is there
a case for the government to invest in strategic
storage?With 13 days’ storage we are vulnerable, are
we not?
Mr Wooley: The question may be whether the
market has yet received pricing signals of suYcient
strength and duration to encourage investment in
storage. Clearly, the way the market has evolved
over the past two or three years has brought forward
a number of companies that are beginning to look at
the opportunities in the oVshore and onshore
environment. Companies such as BP are looking at
some opportunities, but in order to bring forward
these things in terms of a depleted oVshore ﬁeld one
is looking at hundreds of millions of dollars of
investment both in the facilities that need to be
developed to extend the ﬁeld life or put the terminals
on the coast but also to provide the cushion gas that
is needed tomake these reservoirs eVective. Onemay
be talking of twice as much again in cushion gas
costs. There need to be strong and sustained
economic signals. As we saw with the development
of the infrastructure and the new capacities in the
pipeline networks given the UK’s development of
the regas terminals, if there are strongmarket signals
over a period of time the track record of the industry
is that it will respond.
Q664 Mr Binley: Here we are as consumers in
Britain at the mercy of supply. We are in a much
more vulnerable position than the continent for
historical reasons, which you have gone into. You
have not seen that coming and as of today you have
not invested enough, and the government has lagged
behind as well. Who will take responsibility for the
vulnerability of our marketplace and the problems
that consumers may face?
Mr Trimmer: Perhaps I may go back to something I
said a little earlier. Interconnectivity is important
and the signiﬁcance of the increase in capacity of the
interconnector, the creation of the BBL which links
us with the Netherlands and the opening of the
Langeled pipeline in the past 12 months are a very
signiﬁcant response from industry. The investment
just behind Langeled for example, Langeled is the
longest oVshore pipeline in the world which links
one of themost challenging, complex and large ﬁelds
in the North Sea. That is industry’s response. There
can be issues to do with whether or not we have
enough storage at the minute, but connectivity is
becoming much greater and in terms of security of
supply and the ability to balance in times of local
shortage that connectivity is worth a lot. For the
future we must have more storage and the signals
will bring it through.
Mr Guerrant: The LNG facilities which have been
added over the past few years and will be added are
signiﬁcant new supplies to meet the need.
Q665 Mr Binley: Therefore, you are saying that the
price volatility that Britain is experiencing because
of shortage and storage problemswill be equalised in
the foreseeable future. When do you think that will
happen bearing inmind that we simply have plans to
go up to about 18 or 19 days from 13 whilst
Germany is about 99 days and France 120.
Mr Guerrant: As new supplies come in volatility will
be dampened.
MrBinley: Perhaps I may turn to a personal concern
of mine: carbon capture and storage. How do you
view that bearing in mind that we have 240 years of
energy requirements under our feet on this island. If
we can solve that problem the North Sea seems to be
important in that respect. Can you tell us a little
about how that is developing and what the
timeframes are? Can you also tell us a little about
whether the projection of 15%, maybe 20%, of
additional fuel from the North Sea can be forced out
perhaps by using that technique?
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Q666 Chairman: If it is oV-piste I understand but it
is interesting.
Mr Guerrant: I believe that globally industry,
governments—all of us—have a lot of work to do to
come up with technologies that are economically
viable to ensure that when we utilise CCS it is cost-
eVective for the consumer. We are a long way from
that. That said, many of us in the industry are today
doing pilots and investing in new breakthrough
technology to ﬁgure out a way to separate CO2 from
other material and to be able to liquefy it and pump
it in a way that is cost-eVective. In addition, we will
need a regulatory framework that makes sense to be
able to do the commercialisation of CCS. If you ask
the very simple question how long it will be I cannot
give a speciﬁc answer, but we have many years to go
before we are able to get the results back from pilot
projects, get new breakthrough technology and put
together a commercial framework that makes sense
in order to use CCS.
Mr Trimmer: In that context there needs to be a
partnership among industry, regulators and
government tomake it go as quickly as possible. For
example, I know that the Norwegian Government is
very active in trying to develop and promote
schemes in Norway.
Mr Wooley: BP’s experience with the additional
scheme at Miller that was touted for some period of
time was a disappointment and a setback to us in
that regard.
Q667 Chairman: We are getting to the end of our
time. I want to put one question to you to summarise
what we have heard over the past two sessions. We
heard some very loud complaints from customers
about the illiquidity of the market and volatility of
prices and the position was quite broken. We have
heard you say that it is all quite liquid and is going
rather well; it is much better than anyone thinks and
for some reason the European model works in
Europe and theBritishmodel works inBritain, sowe
should not break it. The regulator has said he does
not knowwhat is going on, and he even gets his facts
wrong about the level of imports at the Isle of Grain.
This leaves us in something of a quandary to say the
least. This Committee faces the three worst
positions. There is no meeting of minds at all. What
are we to do? What would be the consequences of a
recommendation by this Committee that the only
people who can sort out the wholesale gas market
are the Competition Commission? Apart from the
huge cost, what would be the consequences?
Mr Wooley: As an upstream company the most
important role we can play is to focus our energy on
the development of new resources and to apply our
technologies to bring forward our investment and
new supplies both to the UK and to other markets.
That is where we should be focusing our energy.
Mr Trimmer: I totally agree. In the context of the
UK we should also make sure that we maximise the
beneﬁt we get out of the existing production facilities
and infrastructure we have, so other things can be
done there.
Q668 Chairman: You should be politicians; you
have completely avoided the question. Let us see
whether Mr Guerrant can do it.
Mr Guerrant: You know that I will agree with the
need to bring in new supplies because that is what we
do best and that is what we can do to help the
consumer. You need to protect your market and the
integrity of your NBP wholesale market. We believe
that it is working and it has underpinned huge
investments in this marketplace. If you do
something to send a chill into that good market or
change it there may be consequences which will
concern investors who are investing in it.
Chairman:This is an issuewith which theCommittee
must wrestle. Gentlemen, we are grateful to you for
your time. It was not too painful; you did not have to
give us any great commercial secrets. You have been
helpful, if confusing in terms of the conﬂict with
evidence received earlier. If on reﬂection you believe
there is anything else you would have liked to tell us
we would welcome it in writing. Thank you very
much. I release you from your bonds.
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Q669 Chairman:Gentlemen, welcome to the last but
one evidence session of this Committee’s
investigation into energy prices.We are very grateful
to you for your very thorough written submissions.
I would like to begin, as I always do, by asking you
to introduce yourselves for the record and as you
introduce yourselves, your name, your
responsibility, your organisation and a brief
characterisation of what it does and who owns you
would be very helpful as well, please.
Mr Munday: My name is Keith Munday and I am
the Commercial Director of BizzEnergy. We are a
supplier to small and medium enterprises, started by
venture capitalists in May 2000. We are based in
Worcester and we employ 150 staV. We are very risk
averse. We just want to operate in a very controlled
environment. Our principal business proposition is
to be a retailer. We want to compete on customer
service, innovation and cost to serve.
Q670 Chairman: Thank you very much. I do not
want to correct you right at the very beginning but
you are not based inWorcester; you are based on the
edge ofWorcester inmy constituency, if we can clear
that up for the record! Mr Bennell?
Mr Bennell: Peter Bennell, I am the Chief Executive
of Haven Power. We are a small supplier of energy,
and electricity in particular, to small businesses. We
are part of the Welsh Power Group; 74% owned by
Welsh Power, the balance by management. We
specialise in supplying electricity to small businesses.
Our proposition is that we will treat you as a
business rather than as ICI or as a domestic
customer. Couple that with some personal service
and competitive pricing.
Mr Paul: Good morning, I am Graham Paul and I
am Sales and Marketing Director of
Electricity4Business. Electricity4Business are a
retailer of electricity, meaning that we do not
actually own any generation asset, we just supply
electricity to smaller businesses. Our targetmarket is
about 1.4 million smaller businesses of which we are
supplying approximately 40,000. We are based in
Milton Keynes and we have 150 employees.
Q671 Chairman: This is an important session for us
because there is a lot of media attention,
understandably, on the needs of domestic
consumers and the big energy users get their voices
heard quite a lot and gave some very impressive
evidence to this Committee a fewweeks ago, but this
is the opportunity for the suppliers to the small and
medium business sector, largely anyhow. Can you
tell me what the diVerence is in the market you
supply to the domestic market?
Mr Munday: I do not think any of us are actually in
the domestic market yet although BizzEnergy is on
the edge of going into the domestic market. There
are clearly some diVerences in the nature of
contracts in that the SME market is principally a
ﬁxed-price, ﬁxed-term contract market whereas
domestic customers can leave after 28 days. As
regards other diVerences in the domestic market, I
think there is a view held widely within the industry
that to be a domestic supplier there are very
signiﬁcant economies of scale. This has led to us
having ﬁve or six suppliers each with about ﬁve
million customers. That is something that we are not
convinced of by anymeans.When you think about a
domestic supplier, you think about customer service
staV. For every dozen or so customer service staV,
you need a supervisor and for every dozen
supervisors you need a manager. It does not appear
like huge economies of scale in operation there. So it
must be something to do with IT or systems.
Actually in 1996–97 when the domestic market was
emerging, there were big economies of scale in IT but
as of today, with the advent of new computing
systems and new software, we do not believe that
there are material economies of scale in the domestic
market. Clearly you would not set up to serve one
customer but we think there is a plug to be ﬁlled
between a few customers and the ﬁve million, and
therefore we would like to have the opportunity as a
business to challenge this paradigm that you need
ﬁve or six players to service the domestic market; we
really do not believe that.
Q672 Chairman: We will look at some of the
obstacles to that later on. Do either of the other two
gentlemen want to add anything to that answer?
Mr Bennell:The only other thing I would add is that
in the small business market there is a huge volume
of business transacted through brokers which you
just do not see in the domesticmarket at all. They are
out to get, on various bases, from the very reputable
to bordering on the disreputable, the best deal for
their customers.
Q673 Chairman: And their interest is their
commission?
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Mr Bennell:They get commission or a fee or they get
paid by either the supplier or the customer.
Q674 Chairman: Can I just ask about Ofgem and
regulatory issues. Do you think that the level of
regulatory protection is diVerent in diVerent
markets? Do you think Ofgem is giving enough
attention to the small business sector in its current
inquiry?
Mr Munday: Clearly there are diVerences between
the domestic market and the small business market.
There are some very necessary regulatory
protections in the domestic market for domestic
customers to deal with vulnerable customers, et
cetera. The business market is deemed initially to be
a buyer beware market; you have got informed
buyers and sellers. What we are beginning to see
emerging in the market is a series of practices which
are certainly making us think twice as to whether the
level of regulatory protection for customers is
appropriate in that market.
Q675 Chairman:We will deal with those practices in
more detail later.
Mr Munday: That is something that we would
encourage the regulator very much to take a much
more proactive stance in addressing.
Q676 Chairman: So in other words, your view is that
Ofgem is probably not giving enough attention to
the needs of the small business sector?
Mr Munday: Absolutely.
Q677MrWright: In terms of Ofgem, your company
Mr Munday, is an example of there not being a
powerful enough regulator in some aspects,
certainly in terms of competition. We talk about
switching in the domestic market where there is a
concern but certainly in the business sector it is
probably largely unheard of. What are your
concerns there in regard to Ofgem’s capabilities in
taking this forward?
Mr Munday: Ofgem in the past have really focused
their attention on the domestic market. They have
paid very little attention to the SMEs. They had
hoped that a competitive market will emerge there.
To a certain extent for a few years it looked like a
good market was going to emerge; unfortunately, it
has not. As regards their attention on switching rates
as a measure of competition, that is not one that we
believe is appropriate to use as the sole measure for
switching and we see very few stats available from
any source on the nature and level of switching in the
business sector, and that is a big cause of concern
for us.
Q678 Mr Wright: Are there any ﬁgures at all that
you are aware of?
Mr Munday: No.
MrPaul: I think one of the key indicators of the level
of switching is published in one of the market
leader’s annual accounts for 2007 which shows that
they renewed 95% of their SME contract customers
and that was at the same time as being rated as the
worst supplier for customer service in research
carried out by Datamonitor and energywatch in
2007.
Q679 Mr Wright: Mr Bennell?
Mr Bennell: I think this is very interesting. The SME
market is worth several billion pounds, quite a bit
more this week compared to what it was even two or
three months ago. There is just an amazingly low
choice in it. In any other non-utility market you can
think of that is worth that sort of money, yes, you
have got a few big players, yes, you have got middle-
sized players and, yes, you have got a horde of small
ones. They are not present in this market.
Q680 Mr Wright: What measures do you think
Ofgem should be taking to bring more competition
into the business market?
Mr Munday: There are issues on the wholesale
market in terms of the availability of product for
people like ourselves to service customers. That is a
major barrier. There are some contracting practices
where what I believe is happening in the market is
that the established players are, by and large,
reasonably comfortable with their market share,
they are looking for their bottom-line proﬁts, which
is a perfectly natural and rational thing for them to
do, and they are coming through to the thinking,
again which is right, is it better to retain a customer
or win a customer. Clearly it is a no-brainer and the
answer is it is better to retain a customer. The only
thing we are questioning is some of the techniques
that have been used to retain customers over the
last—
Q681 Chairman:Wewill come to that in more detail
in a little while. Just before I bring in LindsayHoyle,
one of our submissions, and I cannot ﬁnd it now,
lists the sorts of things that should be addressed in
considering whether a market is competitive or not.
If you are critical of switching rates, as many people
are, as a measure of competition, what measures of
competition do you think Ofgem should be using to
assess the competitiveness of the market?
Mr Munday: I do not think there is any one single
measure which is ﬁt for purpose. I think the variety
of products, the variety of players, the ease and entry
of players are all good monitors to use. What we
want from a competitive market is to know that the
customers are getting good value for money. How
can we tell that customers are getting good value for
money in this market? A normal indicator would be
customer satisfaction, and that is great, you can do
that, how a customer is feeling. Clearly in this
market customers are not feeling very happy. They
have the impression that they are being overcharged.
If you get that impression, how would you actually
test that? In a normal market you say what sort of
returns are the companiesmakingwho are providing
this service, and you see if that is proportionate to
the risk and the business that they are conducting.
Unfortunately, in the market structure we have you
cannot see from any of the businesses how much
money they are making out of their supply
businesses in electricity and gas or out of their
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generation businesses. Without clarity as to how
much money is being made in these markets it is
diYcult to turn round to a customer and say, yes,
you are getting good value for money and this is
why.
Chairman: You are warming to your theme, Mr
Munday. One of my colleagues wants to ask about
that particular issue at some length later. The answer
is there is no single measure of competition, it is a
basket of indicators you must look at and take a
value judgment as to what the competition is really
like in the market. MrHoyle wants a supplementary
I think.
Q682 Mr Hoyle: Just quickly on what you said
because customers believe that the market works
against them and works for the suppliers. Whether
we like it or not that is the general impression. What
I would say is the evidence we did have was that part
of the reason Vauxhall moved production abroad
was because energy costs were so high and that the
market did not work for them.
Mr Munday: Sorry, I am missing—
Q683 Mr Hoyle: The point being that they felt they
were being ripped oV; this is rip-oV Britain, and you
are part of the rip-oV. Is that fair or not?
Mr Munday: I do not thinkwe are part of the rip-oV;
I think we are part of the solution. What we want is
a level playing ﬁeld in the market so that we can
access the products—
Q684 Mr Hoyle: So you can make proﬁts.
Mr Munday: —to service customers in a manner
which is better than is being done by the incumbents.
What wewant to see in themarket is transparency of
the accounts and transparency of the market so that
people can actually see, yes, they are getting good
value for money and remove this myth of rip-oV
Britain because we think that is in the customers’
and the consumers’ best interests.
Mr Hoyle: So the bigger proﬁts is not a rip-oV?
Q685 Chairman: I am going to interrupt Mr Hoyle
here because I ought to put on the record the fact
that you supply between you less than 1% of
Britain’s energy and the other 99% comes from the
‘Big 6’, and you aspire to takemore andmore of that
99% by oVering a better deal?
Mr Munday: Yes.
Q686 Mr Oaten: But you cannot guarantee that if
you had more of the market you would be able to
cut prices.
Mr Munday: Presumably customers will switch to us
because there is a better service oVering or lower
prices and there will some attraction for them to
move, otherwise we would not grow market share.
Q687 Chairman: Can you give the Committee an
example of the kind of oVer that you make that
distinguishes you from the ‘Big 6’s’ oVer to their
customers?
Mr Munday:Certainly from BizzEnergy we are very
keen on smart meters. We were one of the ﬁrst
suppliers to move into the market in smart meters
back in 2004. That is something that we believe gives
the customer not only timely and accurate bills,
which people have a right to, but also information
about their consumption, against which they can
make real savings in their consumption. We have
been trying very hard for the last four years to
promote this market and get it oV but we feel like we
are all the time being pulled back by the industry not
wanting to change its systems and processes to allow
this to happen in a timely and eVective manner.
Q688Mr Hoyle: The truth of the matter is you want
a share of the market and you are saying “we are the
good guys” but the reality is you have entered this
market because you want to make money.
Mr Munday: I do not think there is anything wrong
with trying to make a reasonable return. It is
whether it is proportionate to what we are doing and
the value that we add to the overall mix.
Q689 Mr Hoyle: So the jury is out?
Mr Munday: Give us the opportunity to
demonstrate and we will be there.
Mr Paul: From Electricity4Business’s point of view
we have had a big focus on looking at the
operational costs of running a retail business and we
have invested a lot of time and money in making
those processes as eYcient as possible in taking a
large chunk of that cost out of our supply side so that
we can then oVer cheaper prices to our market.
Q690 Mr Bailey: To a certain extent I think the
answer to some of my questions has at least been
hinted at in what you have said already, but if I can
summarise the situation so far. You are small
independent producers who feel you can make an
oVer to SMEs which would be competitive in
comparison to the ‘Big 6’ suppliers. However, you
are blocked from entering the market by of a range
of practices that they have adopted which makes it
very diYcult for would-be customers to switch to
you. Could you give examples of the sorts of
practices that you feel are taking place which are
preventing that and perhaps some of the changes
that need to be in place to prevent it?
Mr Paul: I think one of the overall challenges that
you have as an independent supplier is not only
generation but obviously is access to the wholesale
market. We need to buy forward on the market and
we therefore need a liquid and deep wholesale
electricity market. Since NETA the wholesale
market has been declining. The aim ofNETAwas to
create a deep and liquid wholesale market and that
has not been achieved. The shape of the UK
electricity supply market has been moving away
from a wholesale market to one of vertical
integration.
Chairman: You are anticipating both the next lines
of questioning. We are going to ask you about the
wholesale electricity market next and then vertical
integration consequences, so itmore the practices we
are interested in.
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Q691 Mr Bailey: The working practices and
contractual arrangements that are adopted.
MrPaul:Obviously I am not here to complain about
competitors’ activities—
Chairman: Go on!
Q692 Mr Bailey: You will not have a better
opportunity!
Mr Paul:What would be useful is to explain some of
the barriers that we have had to jump over as a new
market entrant. One example is the practice of “new
customer only” pricing, where there are two prices,
a much higher price for your loyal customer base
and a reduced price for new customers. The one
thing that a new market entrant will not have is a
customer base to abuse, so as a new entrant you do
not have the ability to subsidise acquisition by
charging higher prices to your customers. That sets
a very high barrier for entry and requires very, very
deep pockets where youmay be looking two or three
years out before you can get a return from a
customer.
Q693 Mr Bailey: If I could summarise what you are
saying—and you would not put it as crudely but I
will—the ‘Big 6’ can ﬂeece their existing customer
base in order to make loss leader oVers to would-be
new customers?
MrPaul:Yes, it is not unique in thismarket, we have
seen it in the ﬁnance sector, we have seen it in the
insurance sector, but where you have dominant
players and you are trying to get a market structure
where new entrants come in, that does become a
huge barrier. We are not looking at small amounts.
We are looking at a diVerence in price of seven pence
a unit for a new customer to maybe 14 pence for an
existing customer.
Mr Bennell: I think as well there is a regulatory
practice (and it has been endorsed by the regulator
and put into a licence) that allows an incumbent
supplier when they receive notiﬁcation that they
have lost a customer, providing they have got an
appropriate contractual provision, to use that fact of
a loss to contact that customer to whom they had
probably oVered a high renewal price, to suddenly
oVer a much lower “save” price and to encourage
those customers to break their contracts with
whoever has taken their supply on. It is a very
unusual feature of the market and I really cannot see
how it is in customers’ interests that while that
customer may get a better deal, there are hundreds
of thousands of others that do not get that
opportunity, and it is just peculiar really. There is no
other business where your competitors can park
their tanks on your front lawn and pick your
customers oV as they are coming through the front
door.
Mr Munday: Just to follow on the theme, there are
some what we would call disingenuous contracting
practices to customers. For example, at the end of a
four-year contract a customer may have to give
notice that he wants to leave not before 120 days
before the end of the contract and not after 90 days
before the end of the contract otherwise he is going
to ﬁnd himself tied in for another period. In amarket
of shopkeepers and small oYces this seems to be a
practice which is not illegal but it does not quite feel
comfortable. Another practice which is linked to
Peter’s point is when a customer’s ﬁxed price
contract term ends, they will go on to an out-of-
contract rate which by its very nature will be higher
than the contract rate. The customer will sit there
probably quite oblivious to what is going on for
several months until suddenly he looks at his
accounts and ﬁnds, “I seem to be spending a lot on
electricity; why is that?” and he goes back and he
ﬁnds, “Blimey, I am paying over the odds. I will go
out and get a competitive quote for my electricity”.
So he goes out and gets a quote and ﬁnds he can save
some money. He then signs up with a new supplier
who then turns round and says, “Yes,Mr Customer,
you can go and take that deal but if you do I will
charge you these higher out-of-contract rates for the
period since your contract ended, but if you happen
to come with me on this now lower contract rate I
will waive those charges”. That does not instil a good
sense of customer service into the existing player,
does it? He is not strongly incentivised to look after
his customer. At the end of the day, nine times out
of ten that customer does not go to the new supplier;
it is retained by the old supplier. I do not think that
is doing the customer any good at all and it is
certainly not encouraging people like us to act in
the market.
Q694 Mr Bailey: You anticipated my question
which was to be on the contractual behaviour of the
‘Big 6’ in retaining their existing customer base and
how they could get away with it. Is there anything
that the other two would like to add in that sort of
area?
Mr Paul: I can give you some examples of some
ﬁgures to show how prominent this is. We lose up to
36% of our sales, so sales which we have for which
we have incurred the cost are then won back by the
incumbent supplier. It is a fairly unique market
thing, as Peter said, youwin a customer but you have
to tell the current supplier that you want to
transfer it.
Mr Bennell: They then physically block that
transfer.
Q695 Mr Bailey: They physically block it?
Mr Bennell: They prevent that transfer. That is a
practice that is now allowed under deﬁned
conditions by the licence.
Q696Mr Bailey: Just to ﬁnish oV, what can be done
about it? What would you recommend being done
about it?
Mr Munday: I think there needs to be lot tighter
regulation on this. We do need to change the rules
governing the objections. Where we can
demonstrate these practices are going on, the
regulator needs to take action very quickly. At the
moment it feels like a free option to suppliers to take,
although there is some talk of strengthening the
regulatory powers. That has not happened
eVectively as yet and it is still a problem to us.
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Mr Bennell: There is a lot of competition legislation
but it is not clear that it is applicable here. A lot of it
refers to dominance. What is dominance? If that
were to be clariﬁed and if some bigger players were
found to be dominant wemight see amarked change
in behaviour.
Mr Bailey: Do you think the fact that the ‘Big 6’ are
vertically integrated enables them to oVer deals such
as lower wholesale prices?
Chairman: I am going to rule that question out of
order because we are going to ask about that at some
length later otherwiseMarkwill have nothing to ask.
Q697 Mr Oaten: I understand exactly what you are
saying about the existing customer and having the
power to retain it but, presumably, if BizzEnergy
were trying to win some business oV
Electricity4Business, you would do exactly the same
thing in those circumstances, would you not?
Mr Munday: We need to behave and we want to
behave in a manner which does the customer service
and suits our reputation. We actually let customers
go. We decided a few years ago that we would take
the moral high ground on this and we would not
employ those practices.
Q698 Mr Oaten: Is that the same for the other
companies?
Mr Paul: We do not oVer any cheaper prices for a
customer to stay with us.
Q699 Chairman: So you value all your customers
equally?
Mr Paul: Yes.
Q700 Chairman: Unlike the ‘Big 6’ who value the
people who want to change and not the people they
have got as incumbent customers who have not had
the wit to seek an alternative supplier? You are being
used as a Trojan horse to drive down prices for those
people who are clever enough to want to switch?
Mr Paul: Correct.
Mr Munday: Which is not actually a sustainable
businessmodel for a new entrant supplier. I thinkwe
need to go and examine what we are up to.
Q701 Chairman: It is a miracle you have got 1%!
Mr Paul: There are diVerent prices depending on
which channels it is and so a ‘Big 6’ supplier would
have a diVerent pricing level for its direct channel
and then a diVerent pricing structure for its agent
and broker channel and I think we touched on this
earlier where some enticements are oVered for the
agent and broker not to act in the best customers’
interests. Some suppliers have a range of ten tariVs,
the bottom tariV, the cheapest one, having a low
commission rate; a higher top-end havingmaybe ten
times the same amount of commission payable for
the same supply period, so those agents and brokers
are not having to declare on what basis they are
putting forward this proposed price quote. They are
being encouraged to actually get the deal that earns
them the most commission.
Chairman: We are going to turn now to the two
issues which I think are at the heart of your concerns
about the structure of the market—liquidity and
vertical integration—and the transparency that
accompanies those issues. As we do, can I just
remindWelsh Power of their very striking comment:
“We believe that the market is fundamentally
broken and we need a more radical solution than
recent Ofgem initiatives”. That is quite a big
statement. If you feel we do not in our questions
address the fundamental aspects of that broken
nature of the market please feel free to add to them.
Mike Weir?
Q702 Mr Weir: I take it from the evidence that we
have already received that you believe that there is a
lack of liquidity in the electricity market?
Mr Bennell: Yes.
Q703 Mr Weir: How does that impact upon smaller
suppliers?
Mr Bennell: Quite simply we cannot buy what we
need to buy to deliver the power for our customers
when we need to. It does not matter whether you are
going out two years, or at the moment whether you
are talking about last weekend, there is a paucity of
power on oVer. You would expect in a liquid market
there to be lots of transactions which would provide
a good reference price for future transactions and for
the price that you could expect to pay. There are
many days when themain power products simply do
not trade. We looked at a six-month period and we
found that on half of the days roughly the main
power products simply did not trade, so there was no
price reference. Then when you look at the days
when it did trade most of the time there was no deep
and liquid trading. There were perhaps one or two
isolated examples, so it is a verymarginal thing at the
moment, and to say that it is reﬂective or
economically eYcient is just wrong. From our
perspective, it just has not delivered the objectives
that were set out for it when it was introduced ﬁrst
as NETA and then as BETTA, which was a level
playing ﬁeld and a deep and liquid market, and it
makes it very diYcult for us to run our business.
Q704 Mr Weir: What do you think is the reason for
that? Is it purely down to the activities of the ‘Big 6’
or it is because how the other independents work
as well?
Mr Bennell: If you go back to the opening of the
market, it actually started out somewhat better than
it is at the moment. It was quite promising early on,
but early on there were more participants than there
are now, there weremore generator participants and
there were more trading participants, and there was
much more ﬂexibility in terms of who was oVering
what and the terms on which things were oVered.
What has happened is that there has been a
consolidation in generation and a lot of the traders
have gone away, some of them for goodreasons,
others for less obvious reasons, andwe have now got
a market where most of the power, apparently from
our perspective, is not traded through the wholesale
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markets so it does not touch the sides of it. I think
that is down to the growth of vertical integration and
the demise of players.
Q705 Mr Weir: But when we asked Ofgem about
this, they reeled oV a whole list of new generation
being built, much of it outwith the ‘Big 6’, and I
think it quoted your own company Welsh Power as
building a gas-ﬁred station in Wales. Is there
independent generation coming into the market?
Will that make a diVerence to liquidity?
Mr Bennell: It is very, very tough to build a new
generating plant. We are doing Severn Power
because we meant it. As an independent generator/
supplier without an approved credit rating we have
to put our own cash up to do these things and there
are substantial amounts of cash involved. People
with credit ratings do not have to use cash, they can
do lots of these things, ie progress many projects. If
you look at the list of generators there is lots of stuV
on there that is not being built and will not get built,
so there are lots of people on there keeping their
options open. That has another knock-on eVect in
terms of the transmission capacity. There are some
big issues on the process for building new generation
as well. We would really like to build another two
plants but before we can move that on appreciably I
think our experience on the ﬁrst one shows that there
is more certainty that is needed there. It took us two
years to get generation consent. We are still waiting
for an associated pipeline consent for the Severn
Power project. We need the planning—
Q706 Mr Weir: What is causing that delay? Is it
Ofgem giving consent? What is the reason?
MrBennell:BERR consent, for one thing, and it just
seems to be driven by the fact there are no prescribed
timetables for dealing with this. There are lots of
people who are interested whose opinions are clearly
important but these processes seem to drag on and
on and on, and without an end stop it is just
uncertain. If you want to build a loft extension there
is a prescribed time for response. If you want to lay
a pipeline or build a power station it takes much
longer. Apart from that, one of the projects we
would like to build we have been given a date of 2022
from theNationalGrid for the connection of it. That
is after most of our parent board have retired. The
strange thing is that there is what we would call
“sterilised capacity” in that area so there is capacity
that is marked for another future project which is
unlikely to start for a considerable number of years
which we could use now and build that plant and be
generating. There is a Transmission Access Group
running, but I think we are seriously concerned that
some of the ideas that are being talked about, such
as the auctioning of capacity and the removal of
existing rights, would just make it impossible to get
bank ﬁnance for independent generators. I think
there is a reasonable list of plant there. Most of that
plant is ‘Big 6’-inspired. It would be very good to
have more independent generation. For that to
happen, more liquidity in the market would be
helpful as far as good price references are concerned,
more certainty on the consents process and the
planning, and something that is practical and
sensible on transmission rights. The National Grid
have a licence obligation to provide an eVective and
eYcient transmission service, and not being able to
do something until 2022 does not seem to be very
consistent with that. I cannot see any urgency behind
the steps that are being taken to put that right.
Q707MrWeir:But youwill get that same complaint
from some of the ‘Big 6’ who are trying to do, for
example, renewables and wind farms, they cannot
get connection to the Grid either. So is getting
connection to the Grid a serious problem in creating
any new sort of generation capacity?
Mr Bennell: Yes, it is.
Q708 Mr Weir: You mentioned auctioning of
generation. Do you think generating companies
should be obliged to trade a proportion of their
energy in the open wholesale market?
Mr Bennell: Ideally all the output from a generator
would be traded in the wholesalemarket. Unless you
have got this steady ﬂow of transactions you are not
going to get liquidity. It is certainly something to
which the Welsh Power Group would be happy to
subscribe.
Q709 Mr Weir: So do you think all generators
should be subject to that, not just the ‘Big 6’?
Mr Bennell: I would be quite happy for all
generators to be subject to that. I think it would help
liquidity and lack of liquidity is the root of many of
the problems that we have got at the moment where
the price reference that we all refer to refers to a very,
very small piece of the power that is actually traded.
Q710MrWeir:As amatter of interest, where do you
buy your energy from at the moment? Is it mostly
from the ‘Big 6’? Is it from independent generators?
Mr Paul: Electricity4Business buys it from the
international bank in an arrangement that we have.
The challenge that we have with that is that they will
give us a forward curve price that we can buy from
and buy the futures for that we require. However, we
have nothing to reference that price against, so we
have no way of judging how competitive it is, and so
the requirement in havingmore players being able to
oVer prices to the independents means that then you
can start choosing where you buy your supply from
and actually being able to reference whether it is
representing a fair price.
Q711 Mr Weir: Excuse my ignorance but when you
say international bank are you eVectively buying
through a broker then?
Mr Paul: No, an international trading house.
Q712 Mr Weir: What is the diVerence between that
and a broker?
Mr Paul: It is their job to buy all of the components
in order to make up that trade.
Q713 Mr Weir: It is eVectively a broker if they are
buying from the market and selling on to you.
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Mr Paul: Yes.
Mr Munday: BizzEnergy buy principally from a
commodity trader, a major up-stream player in coal
and gas. With reference to the ‘Big 6’, what has been
very diYcult over the last few years is actually that
they are, if I said not keen that would be a massive
understatement, and to try and get suitable trading
terms out of them to trade with us as new entrant
players has been exceedingly diYcult. In the seven
years that Bizz has been going we have only
managed to extract terms from one of the ‘Big 6’
players. Some of their oVers have been absolutely
laughable in terms of the reasons for not wanting to
do it. Some of them have been very honest and said,
“Wedo notwant to deal with you because all you are
going to do is compete against our supply business”.
Q714 Chairman:Hang on, that is quite big what you
said, Mr Munday, there.
Mr Munday: It is indeed.
Q715 Chairman: I think that is a bang to rights anti-
competitive issue?
Mr Munday: It is and if I could get it in writing or
prove it, it would be brilliant, but I cannot.
Q716 Mr Weir: Just going on from that, you are
buying from eVectively a broker or trading house, or
whatever, which presumably take commission on
what they sell to you?
Mr Munday: Yes.
Q717 Mr Weir: But presumably they are buying
from the ‘Big 6’ or someone else to sell on to you?
Mr Munday: The nature in which the product we
buy is constructed probably does come from one of
the generators but through a very indirect route,
through a complicated mechanism called the “dark
spread” where eVectively it is a mechanism of
swapping coal for power. Yes, ultimately someone
will have generated it but it is not in the guise that
you are thinking of it as a direct transaction.
Q718 Mr Weir: If you are getting energy within the
UK, presumably it is generated within the UK, by
and large, so it must be coming from one of the
‘Big 6’?
Mr Munday: Or one of the traders. The electrons
must ﬂow that way if you want to think of it in
those terms.
Q719 Mr Weir: So eVectively what is happening is
you are getting it from the ‘Big 6’ in a rather round
about possibly expensive way?
Mr Munday: Yes.
Q720 Chairman: Not necessarily from the ‘Big 6’ of
course. The ‘Big 6’ hint at the need to increase
liquidity in the wholesale liquidity market, to be fair,
but Centrica say, “What is the problem? There is
40% generated by independents with no supply base
and no contracts so what is the issue?” What is the
issue if 40% is independently generated by British
Energy—and we could discuss who might own
British Energy in the future—by Drax, by others?
Mr Bennell: Drax, for example, will only sell to a
rated counter party. That is a counter party with an
investment grade credit rating.We aremiles oV that.
Welsh Power Group are miles oV that.
Q721 Chairman: So that is a commercial decision
by Drax?
Mr Bennell: It is a commercial decision, yes, and it
follows waves of problems in the early part of the
2000s where lots of people went out of business, I
guess. The fact of the matter is that it is very, very
diYcult to ﬁnd people that are prepared to trade
with you and to supply you and, when you do, it is
very diYcult to ﬁnd any sort of liquidity in the things
that you are trying to buy. As far as price reference is
concerned, it can go on a transaction that happened
yesterday or possibly even the day before. It might
be a very diVerent transaction, it might be much
smaller, or it might be much bigger.
Mr Paul: I feel quite confused by that statement that
has been read out because the preliminary results in
2007 presented by Centrica gave four key objectives
that they had as a business and the third one was to
reduce risk through increased integration, so
perhaps you may want to—
Q722 Chairman: They do actually refer to
integration and Mr Oaten is going to ask about
integration next because there is a very interesting
quote from Centrica on vertical integration.
Mr Munday: There is an aspect of liquidity that is
worth touching on and that is the granularity of
trade. Peter touched on it with respect to Drax. The
wholesale market tends to trade in quite large
chunks of power. Small suppliers ﬁnd that these
chunks of power are actually far too big for them to
handle and what we want to trade in is one or two
megawatts of power rather than what happens
where Drax probably wants to sell 20 or 20
megawatts at a time because that is eYcient. They
have got 4,000 megawatts to sell in total so why are
they going to mess around with people like us who
just want to buy the odd one or two megawatts? It
is not necessarily an eYcient transaction for them to
trade with us. There is a big issue here not just about
the product but about the granularity of the product
and the timeliness of when it is available. As a
supplier what we need is to be able to sell to a
customer and buy from the market or buy from the
market and sell to a customer. It is a hand-to-mouth
existence.A generator, on the other hand,will decide
periodically, “I want to go to market and sell a load
of power”. That will be an independent generator.
The diVerence for me with the ‘Big 6’ is that every
day they are selling and competing against us with
the same customers, so they are actually transferring
power internally within their businesses through
some mechanism to actually feed it. For me all we
want to do is to be able to access the power on non-
discriminatory terms so that we can compete with
them in terms of cost to serve, innovation, and the
things that we are good at; retailing.
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Q723 Mr Weir: How are you going to do that? In
theory it sounds ﬁne but how are you going to do
that. You are talking about Drax selling large
amounts and presumably that is where the broker
comes in and they will buy the large amounts and
split it up into smaller amounts. Is that how it works?
I am struggling to understand how you work this
market and how you are suggesting you get this
energy from the ‘Big 6’ in the way you suggest.
Mr Bennell: Wewould like to see some fundamental
changes in the market. A requirement to sell your
output into the market would be very helpful.
Chairman:Weare going to get toMark’s question so
I had better bring Mark in because you are itching
to talk about vertical integration. Before I come to
that, can I just ask you a question which is that some
of the ‘Big 6’ have said to me, “These guys are just
whingers, they could invest in their own generating
capacity”. In fact, Welsh Power is doing that so why
do you not just build a few biomass plants and a few
CHP plants and get on with it?
Q724 Mr Hoyle: A couple of nuclear plants!
Mr Munday: There is one in my back pocket.
Q725 Chairman: There is a serious point here. One
of you does but the other two do not.
Mr Munday: When the market was originally
designed, it promised a level playing ﬁeld in
generation and supply. It also promised that you
would not have to enter both markets. If you think
of the characteristics of entering both markets, they
are indeed quite diVerent. For a retailer you need to
be good on customer service, computing systems, all
that sort of thing. To be a generator you have got to
be good at heavy engineering and you need big
ﬁnance. You can start a supplier with a relatively
small amount of money, £1 or £2 million something
like that gets you up and running as a supplier. For
a generator if you want to build a nuclear plant you
can all see the price, it is a completely diVerent type
of operation. Under the original market design
(which we are still working to because nobody has
refuted it) it promised separation of this because that
was thought to be to the best value of the consumer.
MrPaul:This is a very important question. Thewish
is to have a competitive market but with the
structure of the market the way it is at the moment,
to enter it you have got to not only build a
generation business you have also got to build a
retail business. Is that what we mean by a
competitive market? Or do we mean something
similar to the telecoms market as we have seen with
British Telecom where you can have retailers
entering the business without having to lay new
wiring.
Chairman: In other words, you do want to become
vertically integrated. We cannot hold you back any
longer; vertical integration, Mark Oaten.
Q726 Mr Oaten: Obviously there are a number of
barriers that you have outlined in terms of being able
to compete and to buy from the ‘Big 6’ and to get
into the market and one of the key ones that comes
across time and time again is the so-called
transparency issue and not actually understanding
the breakdown of what is going on. One of the
diYculties is with the ‘Big 6’ having these integrated
European accounts. You cannot, as I understand it,
break down where they are making proﬁt in relation
to generation and where they are making proﬁt in
relation to supply. I still do not get this, I do not get
why that transparency is going to help you guys.
What is it you are after and how is it going to help if
that was split out and you could see exactly what was
going on?
Mr Munday: Transparency itself is only part of the
solution. What we are interested in is getting good
value to the consumers. In order to do that, we are
sitting here today feeling that there is cross-subsidy
going on between generation and supply. We do not
have the tools to prove that.We cannot indicate that
that is going on because there is no information
available in the public domain to support that. For
me the ﬁrst step on understanding what is going on
in the market is to get some transparency. If there is
cross-subsidy going on then there is European
legislation that prohibits cross-subsidy between
generation and supply. Presumably the regulator or
theGovernmentwill actually enforce that legislation
and level the playing ﬁeld so that we can contest
the market.
Q727 Mr Oaten: Pause there for a moment. What
gives you the sense and suspicion that there could be
cross-subsidy taking place then?
Mr Munday: It is our daily lives. We are losing
customers left, right and centre to the ‘Big 6’ at prices
which are demonstrably below the current wholesale
market prices. This causes us a great deal of concern
but coupled to that there is a number of events which
give us even greater anxiety. Earlier this year
Centrica announced proﬁts of £545 million in their
supply business. That is absolutely ﬁne although it
caused a bit of a furore. A few weeks later Paul
Golby of E.ON stood up and said, “I am losing
money in supply and I expect to lose money for the
next 12 months”. So at the same time as he is losing
money in supply he is taking customers oV of us,
some of whom we have had for years, at below
wholesalemarket prices. That just leaves a very, very
nasty taste inmymouth. If you go to the latest news,
we strongly believe E.ON now are growing their
business very aggressively. They have put on many
hundreds of thousands of customers (some of them
ours) in the last few months and again we are
sensing, because of the feedbackwe get frombrokers
every day, that these are prices which are below the
current wholesale market price. Tie this in with an
admission that he is losing money; what conclusion
does it lead you to?
Q728 Mr Oaten: Do you think this is all of the ‘Big
6’ who are doing this? Do you think to some extent
there is an agreement and understanding between
the ‘Big 6’ that this can take place?
Mr Munday: I do not think I have got any evidence
to say that there is any degree of collusion going on
between the ‘Big 6’. At the moment it happens to be
E.ON who are doing it. Next month it could be any
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of the other ‘Big 6’. It is not always the same person.
It depends on whether they want to grow their
market share and what they want to do. They all go
through periods where the transactions that we see
and we face appear to be demonstrably below the
wholesale market.
Q729 Mr Oaten: So the cross-subsidy is not taking
place on a steady level, it peaks and troughs where
there is a need and a demand and the ‘Big 6’ move
around?
Mr Munday: They do move around. The E.ON one
has been particularly sustained for about two years/
two and a half years.
Q730MrOaten: So transparency would help expose
that and then regulation would come in, in your
judgment?
Mr Munday: Yes.
Q731 Mr Oaten: How would you like to see that
happen? What are you proposing?
Mr Munday: What I would like to see is clear
accounting separation of generation and supply and
the enforcement of the non-cross-subsidy
regulations on those. I would also like to see that the
accounts of these businesses are predicated against
open and transparent transactions through the
market so that we have got something substantive to
underpin the accounts. Unless you have an open
market to underpin the accounts, you couldmake up
any prices you want to put in them, so you need the
market to make it work.
Q732MrOaten: So just in summary, in part, you see
two advantages to this: the ﬁrst is that it would
expose any potential illegal behaviour; the second,
picking up a point that Graham Paul made earlier
on, it would help you understand when you are
trying to enter the market at what price and where it
is happening
Mr Paul: What is the true cost of wholesale
electricity is a fundamental requirement for us when
we are trying to negotiate a contract.
Mr Munday: It would also mean that when we are
buying in the market to sell to customers we are
buying at the same price as the other players and we
can actually compete on the things that we are good
at which is the innovation, cost to serve and
consumer services.
Q733 Mr Oaten: I have got one ﬁnal question. The
brokers are giving you this anecdotal evidence that
this is taking place?
Mr Munday: Brokers and some direct.
Q734 Mr Oaten: There are never any audit trails,
never anything that is written down, never any proof
that this is happening? There is nothing where
tangibly you can say to this Committee, “Here is the
evidence”?
Mr Munday: We are in the process of collating the
evidence to support this for the Ofgem price probe
and to the extent we are comfortable that the
evidence we have got is reliable it will be submitted
to them, and we can copy it to yourselves.
Q735 Mr Oaten: Can it be submitted to us as well?
Mr Munday: Yes.
Q736 Chairman: The comments you have just made
are about the SME sector of course. Scottish Power
in their evidence to us said “We judge that domestic
supply remains a loss-making activity”.
Mr Munday: I would absolutely agree with that.
BizzEnergy is, as I said earlier, keen to get into the
domestic market. We are sitting there ready to go
and at themoment prices are some 30% belowwhere
we can actually buy. That is good for the consumer,
so we are not going to knock that, but it makes it
very diYcult for a new entrant to come in and
compete.
Mr Bennell: It would depend on when the question
is asked of course because wholesale prices have
risen 30% or 40% since March.
Q737 Mr Weir: It is a devil’s advocate question
perhaps. I presume from what you are saying that
the cross-subsidy in generation subsidising prices to
the consumer business or whatever. If you got your
transparency, if this was outlawed, if you like, would
it lead to a rise in energy prices, especially as I am
sure if we ask the ‘Big 6’ they will say they are
absorbing much of the rising cost and not passing it
on to consumers?
Mr Munday: I do not think so. The proposals do
nothing to interfere with generation costs. The
proposals do nothing to interfere with customer
income. It just provides a degree of transparency in
the middle and it is part of the judgment as to
whether the industry is working well.
Q738MrWeir: If I understand it correctly, what you
want to do is to stop cross-subsidisation between the
two, in your view, to give you equal access into that
market at the same price, but that eVectively would
end the cross-subsidisation surely or would not
work, and therefore would lead to some rise in
energy prices, would it not?
Mr Munday: I do not think it will lead to a rise in
energy prices at all because you are not interfering
with generation costs. Why would prices go up?
Mr Bennell: If you stand back from this, you have
got a range of prices and the ones at the bottom tend
to be supported by the ones at the top, as we have
said.What we have got to drive to and what we have
got to ﬁx is this broken market. The transparency
will be helpful there but an actively trading market
where people have to sell what they are producing is
likely to lead to lower prices, particularly if there is
some prohibition on self-supply put with this as well.
Go back to the 1990s, there was a lot of concern
about concentration of ownership of generation.
Generators wanted to buy suppliers and the
Ev 110 Business and Enterprise Committee: Evidence
24 June 205 Mr Keith Munday, Mr Peter Bennell and Mr Graham Paul
regulator at the time put safeguards in place before
he would allow that, and there were disposals of
plant and there were prohibitions on self supply and
that led up to the better situation thatwe had around
the opening of the NETA market in 2002. What we
have seen since then is a concentration of that
ownership and liquidity and everything else in that
market going away. I would struggle to see how a
more liquid, a more eYcient and a better market
would lead to higher prices. It might lead to higher
prices for the very small number that are beneﬁtting
from this, but for a lot of people it would—and
certainly for us—open the competitive opportunities
that just are not there at the moment.
Q739MrWeir:Again being the devil’s advocate, the
‘Big 6’ will argue, I am sure, that they are keeping
downprices to consumers and absorbing some of the
cost of the rise in wholesale price. In a fully liquid
market are you arguing that competition for that
energy will push down prices? Might it not have the
opposite eVect?
Mr Bennell: If you are a supplier to the domestic
market you are unlikely to buy on the market today
for today or for next week. I think you are going to
have a portfolio of purchases that would take you
through because of the nature of that business. If
you have got a properly liquid market I believe the
average level of those costs is likely to be lower and
that will lead to lower over time average prices.
What we have got at themoment is a situationwhere
we have seen a very steep rise in wholesale costs,
particularly since the end of March this year on this
wholesale market, and I think that is the position
that you are referring towhere people are saying that
this increase is not being passed on. Absolutely that
has not been passed on yet, but this is not a six-
month business. If you win a domestic customer you
hope to service them for some years, you are going
to have customers coming and going and you will
build up your purchases accordingly.
Witnesses: Mr Sam Laidlaw, Chief Executive, Centrica; Mr Ian Marchant, Chief Executive, Scottish &
Southern Energy and Mr Rupert Steele, Chief Executive, E.ON UK, gave evidence.
Q743 Chairman: Gentlemen, thank you very much
indeed for coming in today. It is a slightly awkward
arrangement with the ‘Big 6’. We decided six at a
time was too many so we have split you into three
and three, using such logic aswe couldmuster for the
process. Thank you also for your written
memorandum which I appreciate. What I would
particularly like to ask you to do, as I always do, is
to introduce yourselves for the record and the
companies you represent.
Mr Marchant: I am Ian Marchant, I am Chief
Executive of Scottish & Southern Energy.
Mr Steele: Rupert Steele, Director of Regulation,
Scottish Power.
Mr Laidlaw: Sam Laidlaw, Chief Executive of
Centrica plc.
Mr Weir: That is fair enough but at the same time I
do not know anybody who is suggesting that prices
are going to come down in the near future on the
wholesale market.
Chairman: Take that as a comment and I will bring
in Adrian Bailey who has a supplementary to ask.
Q740 Mr Bailey: Picking up this issue of
transparency and accounting processes, I can well
understand, if you like, disaggregating the current
system which is integrated European accounting,
but given what has been said earlier about the fact
that the ‘Big 6’ may eVectively just have a marketing
ploy over a short period of time, I am not quite sure
how annual accounts, even if they were made more
transparent, could pick that up. Is the real answer
not preventing the suppliers from having contracts
with the transmitters, if you like, and being forced to
put all their production into an open market so that
you would have a really competitive and
transparent system?
Mr Bennell: I agree with that and a prohibition on
self-supply.
Q741 Chairman: That would be a total prohibition
on self-supply?
Mr Bennell: I think that would be the ideal outcome.
Mr Paul: It is a fairly radical—
Q742 Chairman: Of course the ‘Big 6’ argue that
their vertical integration gives them an ability to
protect their customers from volatility and changes
so they argue there that this self-supply business is
beneﬁcial for consumers; you say the opposite?
Mr Bennell: I say the opposite.
Chairman: I think on that note, unless there is
anything else you want to say, you have made your
major points, or at least I hope you have. If you ﬁnd
there is something you have not said you would like
to have said, please drop us a note. Thank you very
much indeed for coming; we really appreciate your
time.
Q744 Chairman: Mr Steele, we appreciate why your
Chief Executive was not able to turn up and we are
very grateful to you for standing in, thank you very
much. You must be about as popular as politicians
I suppose really, you three and your three colleagues
later! Give us the bad news ﬁrst: the BBC tells us that
power prices/gas prices will be up 40% later this year.
What do you reckon the increase is going to be?
Mr Laidlaw: Firstly, if I may just make a couple of
introductory observations about the context
because I think it is very important here. The UK
after 200 years of self-suYciency, ﬁrst in coal, then
oil, and then gas, is now over a ten-year period
moving very rapidly into import dependency so we
are buying our gas on international markets.
Unfortunately, this is coinciding at a time clearly
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when oil prices, coal prices and gas prices
internationally are moving up very sharply. It is also
coinciding unfortunately at a timewhen there is a far
greater realisation of the impact of climate change
and the need to meet a low-carbon economy. It is
also occurring unfortunately at a time of a global
credit crunch and possible recession, and that makes
it very tough for families with ﬁxed income in
particular when we have got food prices moving up
and we have got interest rates of course of moving
up, so we have a diYcult period. The reality is when
you look forward, the wholesale prices for gas move
directly as a result of oil because that is the way gas
is sold on the international market. We have not
made a decision yet, but it is clear that the current
prices, where we are buying our gas at over £1 a
therm, that at some point in the future gas prices are
going to have to move up.
Q745 Chairman: And by?
Mr Laidlaw: This is a competitive market and it is
very important, I think you would all recognise, to
keep it a competitive market and therefore until we
actually announce to all our customers what our
price moves are, whether they be up or down, you
would not expect us to comment.
Q746 Chairman: And to be fair, in your
supplementary evidence to this Committee you have
pointed out that you are not always the ﬁrst mover
so it is unfair to ask you to make the ﬁrst comment
anyhow. Do any of you want to hazard a guess that
the BBC’s 40% ﬁgure is right, a bit high, a bit low, or
are you all with Mr Laidlaw on commercial
conﬁdentiality?
Mr Marchant: It is not commercial conﬁdentiality.
Pricing in our market is eVectively driven by two
forces: input costs and competition. We can see
tremendous pressure on input costs and if you run
simple models of input costs plus margin you can get
the sorts of numbers the BBC will have come up
with. It is not diYcult to see how you can do the
maths but that is not how you will make a ﬁnal
decision on pricing; you look at what the
competitive landscape is. That is why I suspect you
will ﬁnd that none of the six of us will be prepared
to comment speciﬁcally. We do not have plans yet.
Unless something drastic happens, I can see that
prices in the whole industry will have to go up
signiﬁcantly because of the rise in input costs.
Q747 Chairman: I think that is a reasonable answer
and all we can expect in the circumstances.What this
Committee is most concerned about is that Britain
should be on a level playing ﬁeld with the rest of the
world, and certainly with Europe, so looking at Mr
Steele particularly because theoretically you are at
least as well if not better informed than your
colleagues, what about the rest of Europe? Will
increases in Britain be ahead of, behind or keep pace
with the rest of Europe?
Mr Steele: Much of Europe has a rather diVerent
and much less competitive structure to the energy
markets, and that tends to cause movements to
operate in diVerent ways. In some parts of Europe
there are price controls which may slow down
movements both upwards and downwards. It really
is very diYcult to compare precisely what will
happen there. It is certainly a problem that the
markets on the main part of Continental Europe are
not as competitive as we would like to see them.
Q748 Chairman:Wewill look at that a little bit later.
To be fair to you, Mr Laidlaw, I should give you the
opportunity to say what you said to us in writing as
well about the absolute price levels in the UK.
Mr Laidlaw: Thank you for raising it, Chairman.
The absolute price levels in the UK, compared to
certainly the EU15 gas prices, are currently—and
there was a BERR report on this that was published
in March—the lowest in Europe, some 45% below
the median and electricity prices are 30% lower than
themedian at the time that the report was published.
Obviously this is a moving feast. Some European
countries have since put up their prices; some UK
prices have gone up, but I think if you look over a
period of the last four or ﬁve years, there is no doubt
that UK prices have been below the rest of
Continental Europe. The diYculty we have now is as
we importmore gas fromContinental Europewe are
having to pay the imported price, which is an oil
price for piped gas, and for LNG we are having to
pay a price that actually is competitive with not just
the Atlantic Basin consumers—the US and
Europe—but also the Asian consumers, and their
prices have been very high.
Q749 Chairman: So you are not saying that the
reason our prices in the UK are lower is entirely due
to the nature of our markets, there are also
fundamentals underlying this issue, for example
perhaps the investment that our colleagues have
made in gas storage, generating capacity, addressing
green issues, greater investment in renewable
technologies, those kinds of things can also inﬂuence
the price diVerential?
Mr Laidlaw: The investments have certainly helped
and in the UK there has been over £10 billion of
investment going into gas importing infrastructure,
whether it has been pipelines or whether it has been
regasiﬁcation tunnels, in a competitive market. The
other thing that has helped historically is there has
been gas-on-gas competition because there have
been a number of independent North Sea producers
who have been competing to sell their gas into the
UK. As we move forward, there are fewer large
exporters and the gas-on-gas competition is being
replaced with the sort of contracts that the rest of
Europe buys their gas on which are oil-linked
contracts.
Chairman: I think that brings in Mr Hoyle.
Q750 Mr Hoyle: I think the British public’s view of
it all is that you are the fat cats of the energy market
or the fat cats of British industry; is that fair?
Mr Laidlaw: No, I certainly do not think it is fair. If
we look at the numbers, they are very clear. We are
probably the only company that actually separates
the supply margin, the retail margin if you like, and
over the last four years the average margin that we
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have had before tax in this business is 3.6%. I think
by any standards that is not a high margin. We need
to make a return in this business because we need to
invest in new sources of gas for the UK and we need
to invest in replacing our power generation ﬂeet in
the UK. Over 25% of our power generation ﬂeet in
the UK is going to have to be replaced over the next
ten years. That is clearly going to have a very
signiﬁcant cost. We will also of course have
additional cost if we are going to replace it with
renewables and low-carbon technologies, so there
needs to be a return in this business. I think by any
standards the returns in the supply business have
been, as they say, modest.
Q751Mr Hoyle: I think most people would describe
them as obscene proﬁts, but there we are. Can I just
take you on to how you actually buy the gas. How
do you do it? Is it the spot market or are you using
the forward market or long-term contracts?
Mr Marchant: Perhaps I could give Sam a break and
pick up that one if that is okay.
Q752 Mr Hoyle: Whatever; share it round.
Mr Marchant: We have no access to upstream gas.
We do diVer from most of our competitors.
Q753 Mr Hoyle: Is that all of you?
Mr Marchant: That is us.
Q754MrHoyle:Whowants to own up then to being
up-stream as well?
Mr Laidlaw: We have some up-stream gas
production. About 20% of the gas that we have to
buy for our customers comes from our own up-
stream gas production. Our up-stream gas
production is taxed. It has a windfall proﬁts tax on
it and it is taxed at 75%, so the reality is that in a
higher gas price environment, the amount of
additional revenue that we are making on the up-
stream by no means compensates for the amount of
additional cost.Wewill be spending this year over £1
billion more to buy our gas for the UK consumers.
Q755 Mr Hoyle: So it is heads you win, tails the
customers lose? It is one of those?
Mr Laidlaw: I think you misunderstood me. In a
rising market we are actually in a situation where
margins get squeezed. The reality is we are at the
moment for the next winter buying gas at £1 a therm
and after transportation and distribution costs we
are selling it at 60p a therm. That is not a sustainable
business model.
Q756 Mr Hoyle: So what you lose in the upstream
market you will gain in the downstream market?
Mr Laidlaw: No.
Q757 Mr Hoyle: So you are losing at both ends?
Mr Laidlaw: At the moment we are losing in the
downstream business.
Q758 Mr Hoyle: But you are making upstream?
MrLaidlaw:Wearemaking a bit more upstream but
the upstream piece is taxed at 75% and is a very small
part of our business.
Mr Marchant: We buy all of our gas on the open
market. We buy a mixture of short, medium and we
have some long-term contracts. The market is liquid
in the short to medium-term end. However, it is very
illiquid at ten-year plus and all of our long-term
contracts will expire by 2011-12. They are generally
indexed to oil as well. Basically for our residential
customer demand we have to buy all of that gas on
the market. We are a pure gas retailer.
Mr Steele:We are in the same position.We are a gas
retailer so we are facing this input cost of buying gas
at £1 a therm for new acquisitions of gas at the
moment. We do not have any of our own
production.
Q759 Mr Hoyle: So are you more exposed than Mr
Laidlaw?
Mr Marchant: We do not have the hedge that you
were describing.
Q760MrHoyle:We are getting to where I wanted to
be now.
Mr Laidlaw: It is a diVerent—
Q761 Mr Hoyle: Hang on, Mr Marchant is
answering this, Mr Laidlaw. We will come back to
what your disadvantages and advantages are.
MrMarchant: In the gas business we do not have the
hedge that you would expect to see of better proﬁts
out of an upstream business. We are a pure retailer.
Q762 Mr Hoyle: So you are more exposed?
Mr Marchant: On gas we are more exposed.
Mr Laidlaw: On power we are more exposed. We do
not have the structural hedge on power. It is a
competitive market; we start with diVerent asset
positions; some have more cover on power; some
have some cover on gas but, as I said before, the
percentage cover we have on gas is very small.
Q763 Mr Hoyle: What were your total proﬁts this
year?
Mr Laidlaw: Last year?
Q764 Mr Hoyle: Latest recorded proﬁts?
Mr Laidlaw: Latest recorded proﬁts for the group
worldwide after tax were £1.2 billion.
Q765 Mr Hoyle: 1.2 billion?
Mr Laidlaw: After tax.
Q766 Mr Hoyle: After tax, okay. Right. The other
argument is that, quite rightly, people believe that
the UK is becoming a gas lender of last resort to
Europe. I wonder outside European liberalisation
what can Ofgem do—and we talk about Ofgem as
the “toothless tiger”—to reduce the wholesale price
volatility? Is it possible or is it not?
Mr Marchant: It is very diYcult for anyone within
the UK environment, regulator or company, to
inﬂuence eVectively what is a global market. I do not
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think it is fair to characterise the UK as a gas lender
of last resort. We will have to import around 20% of
our gas requirements this year from somewhere. In
the summer we tend to be marginal exporters and in
the winter we tend to be heavier importers. The
reality is the way the UKplays. It is where the global
market volatility tends to play out most because we
have eVectively three sources of gas: we have
Continental Shelf gas, we have Norwegian gas and
we have LNG. It is one of the very few markets
where these three sources can play out a gas price
which then tends to echo around the world and then
back. Coming back to the very speciﬁc question
about what Ofgem can do apart from focus on
Europe, which is absolutely fundamental, I think
there is one thing they could do which is about
making sure that it is easy for gas storage facilities to
be built. I am thinking particularly about access
arrangements to the gas grids where the regime is
very, very complicated and it is based upon an
auctioning regime. I think that they could help gas
storage facilities be built in the UK. Gas storage is
naturally a dampener on volatility wherever it is
built.
Q767Mr Hoyle: Last year—and tell me if I have got
it wrong—the ﬁgure we got was that it went as low
as 13 pence per therm and then went right up to 60
pence per therm as we got near winter as demand
went up. The argument we keep having and you
keep claiming about what investment you have put
in, about LNG facilities, wonderful, marvellous, but
that is about getting gas in so you can sell it, but why
is it you are not investing on the part that will keep
the prices down and take the volatility out (and that
is what the Germans concentrated on) which is
storage? That is where you are failing the customers.
Mr Marchant: We are investing.
Q768 Mr Hoyle: How many days can you store for?
Mr Marchant: You asked whether we were
investing. We are investing in Aldbrough which is
the biggest storage facility being constructed in the
UK at the moment—
Q769 Mr Hoyle: At the moment.
Mr Marchant: —So we are investing.
Q770 Mr Hoyle: Okay, you are investing at the
moment but it has taken you years to come to it.
How many days of storage after this wonderful
investment has taken place will you have?
Mr Marchant: You can deﬁne storage in a number
of diVerent ways.
Q771 Mr Hoyle: However you want to deﬁne it.
Mr Marchant: If you take average UK demand
versus storage we have currently got 18 days in the
UK. That will go up by another 31 when all the
facilities we expect to get built—
Q772 Mr Hoyle: What timescale is that?
Mr Marchant: That is within the next ﬁve years
Q773MrHoyle:After all that wonderful investment
do you not still think you are failing your customers
when we talk about France at 122 days or Germany
at 90 days? We are exporting cheap gas in summer;
they store it for the winter; and what we do is buy at
the spike and rip our customers oV.
Mr Marchant: Absolutely that is not the case. I
believe that the UK has had the most ﬂexible gas
market—
Q774 Mr Hoyle: Had?
Mr Marchant: That is on the decline. However, we
will still have ﬂexible ﬁelds producing for many
years. The market has responded by delivering new
gas storage facilities as fast as both regulation and
physics allow. It takes some time to develop gas
storage facilities, up to ﬁve years, because basically
creating salt cabins takes time to dissolve things.
Q775 Mr Hoyle: Absolutely no argument with
you—it takes time, but you have had time. Why is it
that France has got 122 days, Germany has got 90
days—
Mr Marchant: They did not have the North Sea.
Q776 Mr Hoyle: It did not have the North Sea, so
therefore we should have been in a better position to
see what was happening.
Mr Laidlaw: If I may come in here just to build on
MrMarchant’s point. In looking at number of days’
storage and making those comparisons we have just
been making, the ﬂexibility that currently exists in
the North Sea ﬁelds has been excluded. What has
historically happened is that a number of ﬁelds have
been operated at low production in the summer and
high production in the winter. That is not included
in that storage deﬁnition. That has historically
provided the cushion. As those ﬁelds are
decommissioned and dismantled in the next few
years then there will be clearly an increasing need for
storage. Like Scottish and Southern, Centrica is very
much involved in moving forward new storage
projects. One of our big challenges has been the
planning applications for those projects; and we are
delighted to see the progress that the Government is
making on the planning bill. I think that is very
important if we are actually going to get new storage
facilities built.
Q777MrHoyle:Okay, so we canmatchGermany in
France in, what, eight years?
Mr Marchant: I am not sure that is the right thing to
do. We could signiﬁcantly overbuild storage if we
mandate it. You need to get the right level of storage.
Storage is not a cheap option. It costs signiﬁcant
sums of capital to develop these things. The fact is,
you need a ﬂexible gas system which would have a
range of diVerent storage facilities and a range of
diVerent import facilities, and a range of diVerent
contractual support for it.
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Q778 Chairman:Wewill have a chance to revisit this
issue with the next set of witnesses. There is a
concern about inadequate gas storage, and there is a
concern about the adequacy of the forward gas
market. That is what we take from this session?
Mr Marchant: The thing which causes me most
concern is the inability to contract long-term for gas
molecules, whether I am going to put them in the
storage in the summer and bring them out in the
winter, or ﬂoat them throughout the year. Up to
three or four years is ﬁne—beyond that the market
is very, very illiquid.
Q779 Mr Weir: Moving on to the liquidity of the
electricity market, we have heard a lot from the
smaller suppliers who say there is a lack of liquidity
within the market and that dulls the price signal for
investors. What are your comments on that? Do you
agree there is a lack of liquidity in the electricity
market?
Mr Laidlaw: Our experience would be that there is
less liquidity than there is in the gas market but,
nevertheless, for up to two years out there is
reasonable liquidity. It is not obvious to me that
actually a process of releases and mandated sales
would help here, because we would be in the
situation of selling out but having to buy back; and
buying back might actually increase the cost to our
customers.
Mr Marchant:We have tried to get some data on the
volume of trading in the electricity market versus
annual demand, and we think it trades around
between four and eight times—there are diVerent
data sources. Four times the UK’s annual demand
is trade—whereas gas it is ten to 15. Clearly the gas
market is more liquid; there is more trading going
on; but it is still four to eight. For our own company,
to give you a ﬂavour, last year we generated around
45 terawatt hours but we traded over 200. You can
see we are active in the market, balancing our
position and trading our position in short, medium
and long-term markets. The other thing is, you say:
is there a barrier to new entry in generation; of the
four gas projects that started last year, two of them
have non-Big 6 participants. One, Caron Energy is
being done completely by a new entrant; and
Marchwood is a project we are involved in where
50% is owned by ESB the Irish utility. New entrant
is still happening in generation.
Q780 Mr Weir: You talked about the amount that
you traded—how do you trade that energy? Do you
trade it directly with small suppliers; is it traded into
a market?
Mr Marchant: It is generally traded through
brokers, through screen activities.
Q781MrWeir:Have you traded directly with any of
the small suppliers? Is there any bar to doing that?
Mr Marchant: There is no bar to doing that. We
would and do trade with them. It is relatively small
but we do trade with them. There are no
counterparty restrictions that we place on anybody,
apart from on a credit basis.
Q782 Mr Weir: What restriction on a credit basis?
That was one of the complaints. If I understood
them correctly, they can only buy energy from the
Big 6 suppliers if they had some gold-plated credit
rating.
Mr Marchant: You do not need a gold-plated credit
rating, but you do need to have a credit rating. One
of the biggest issues I have faced in my time as Chief
Executive was a large loss when TXU eVectively
went bust late in 2002. That sharpened everybody’s
focus on credit in the traded markets. The practices
at energy are no diVerent than in general ﬁnancial
services. It is basically credit-rating dependent.
Mr Laidlaw: If I may just add to that too. 40% of the
generation capacity comes from independent
generators, so they do not have to buy from the Big
6 suppliers.
Q783 Mr Weir: One of the things being put forward
is that you should be forced to report more
information about where youmake your proﬁts—be
it in supply or generation. How do you feel about
that? The argument being, the more transparency
there is then the easier it is for them to get into the
market. Do you agree with that?
Mr Marchant: I think there is a higher level point. I
feel at the moment ourselves and Centrica have to
disclosemore than the other four because we areUK
quoted companies and have restrictions placed on us
and demands of shareholders that directly come to
us, rather than the other four that are subsidiary
companies. The risk when you demand increased
transparency is it disproportionately aVects two out
of the six players. That is the ﬁrst point. The second
point I would make is we do not run our proﬁt and
loss account on a generation business and a supply
business. We run an integrated basis. I do not see
monthly splits of proﬁts, so why should I create
something that I do not use for management
purposes? We report to the City, as we are required
to, on the basis on which we run the business. You
will be creating an artiﬁcial construct between two
businesses, and that is not how we run it.
Q784 Mr Weir: The argument is, if I understand it
correctly, that the Big 6 because of the vertical
integration are cross-subsidising between generation
and selling to the public and undercutting
independent suppliers. Do you accept that is
happening?
Mr Marchant: I seem to be accused simultaneously
of making too much money in supply and cross-
subsidising it in supply; so I am not quite certain
what the crime is.
Q785 Mr Weir: They are not mutually
contradictory!
Mr Marchant: Actually I think they are. If you are
saying new suppliers cannot make enough proﬁt
then I am, by deﬁnition, charging too little for
supply. The reality, sitting here today—that is
exactly what is going on. Supply is loss-making
under any deﬁnition with the increase in wholesale
prices. At present for this period of time supply is
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loss-making. If it was not for the fact that all of the
six are vertically integrated, prices to customers
would already be higher than they are now.
Q786 Mr Weir: I think the point we were making
was, there was a small proportion of potential
switchers that were being targeted with lower prices
when particularly business customers tried to switch
away from the Big 6 to the smaller suppliers. I take
it you are denying that?
Mr Marchant: We have grown our supply business
by 90%over the last six and a half years, andwe have
taken on every single customerwe could ﬁnd. Are we
targeting people who have not switched—
absolutely.
Q787 Mr Weir: That is a separate issue. What they
were saying was, if they had a customer who was
coming from you to them then you would target the
customer who was leaving you with a lower price
subsidised, if you like, on the generation side to keep
the customer.
Mr Marchant: If that is their case they should
produce the evidence to the regulator because they
have a prima facie case for predatory pricing. They
should put up or shut up. I do not mind if they try to
put up!
Q788 Mr Weir: The other point being put forward
was the idea that the Big 6 generators should be
forced to trade a proportion of their electricity on
the open market. What do you think of that? What
do you think the eVect would be if that was to
happen?
Mr Marchant: We already do. We do naturally.
Mr Steele: We trade three times our generation
volume on the open market. Mr Marchant has said
that he trades four times his generation volume on
the open market. What exactly is being asked for?
Q789 Mr Weir: What has been asked for is that a
proportion of all generation should be on the open
market; but you are saying you already do that?
Mr Steele: Yes.
Q790 Mr Weir: Do you accept Ofgem’s argument
that you are making windfall gains from the free
allocation of allowances under the European
Union’s Emission Trading Scheme?
Mr Steele: No, very simply. There are at least two
reasons for that. The ﬁrst reason is that it is not
enough simply to take the value of the allowances
and multiply it by the number of the allowances,
because the allowances have had a major eVect on
investment patterns because they encourage people
to make further investments in situations when
otherwise they would not happen. This eVect was
studied in a report written for BERR as part of the
Energy White Paper. That report concluded that
90% of the beneﬁt of the free allowances in Phase 3,
if there were any, would end up with consumers and
not with generators, because they would enhance
investment and reduce power station closures and,
therefore, leave the market less tight. On that basis
we think that the windfall barely exists. In addition,
such income as remains from the free allowances is
undoubtedly one of the things that is enabling us to
shield our customers from the very substantial input
cost rises we are currently facing.
Q791MrWeir:Your argument is that you have used
the money both for investment and to keep down
prices in the short-term. That again presupposes
then if not the ETS, we are looking at very large
increases in the future. Is that correct?
MrMarchant:That is quite likely. If there are no free
allocations in 2013 I would expect you would see a
further adjustment upwards in retail electricity
prices—absent everything else that will be going on
at that point in time, absolutely, yes.
Q792 Mr Weir: You say that it has not aVected it,
but each of the companies has shown fairly
substantial proﬁt rises over the last few years. It is
alleged that a lot of that is due toETS; you are saying
that is not. How do you explain, if you are keeping
down prices, that you are still having such rises in
proﬁts?
Mr Marchant: In the last ﬁve years we have more
than doubled our generation capacity; added 90% to
our supply customers; and the reality is 2002 one of
my competitors, who you will be seeing in the next
session, described the generation market as “bust”.
The reality is generation prices at that point were
below cash cost; and we have seen a recovery of
generation proﬁts; they are still below new entrant
levels; they are still below any assessment of what
would be needed to remunerate investment, but
there has been a recovery. In our case it is a basic rise
in proﬁts driven by two things: growth in the
business; and a recovery in generation proﬁts.
Actually the supply margins have been in number of
years negative, and between 2002 and 2008 they are
net down.
Mr Laidlaw: We have a slightly diVerent perspective
on carbon allowances. Clearly our position as a
generator with gas and renewables is that we have
much smaller carbon allowances. We do think that
they have actually created some distortions in the
market, and encouraged clearly coal-ﬁred
generation; and also the opportunities, as we have
heard, to cross-subsidise. We have been consistently
arguing for full auctioning; and we would certainly,
even in Phase 2, advocate that the Government
should take advantage of the opportunity to auction
up to 10% of the allowances rather than 7%, and use
that money to assist the vulnerable customers.
Q793 Roger Berry:Wehave had answers to diVerent
questions, in a sense. The question was: have there
been windfall proﬁts, as Ofgem has alleged? The
answer has been: maybe; or, it is not as big as that;
or we used the money for a good purpose. All of
which are actually related. The straight question: are
you saying that Ofgem, the regulator, does not know
a windfall proﬁt when they see it?
MrSteele:We think that on this particular issue they
have not considered all the factors generally.
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Q794 Roger Berry: Is it that there has been no
windfall proﬁt, or it is not £9 billion?
Mr Steele: What we are saying is that £9 billion is
certainly the wrong number because of these other
factors that I have mentioned.
Q795 Roger Berry: There has been a windfall proﬁt
but it is not £9 billion. What do you estimate it at?
Mr Steele: It is very diYcult to estimate whether
there is a windfall proﬁt at all and, if so, at what level
it might be, because you are dealing with some
imponderables. It is very clear to us that the £9
billion assessment, simply multiplying the value of
the allowances by the number of allowances, misses
both the investment eVect and the impact on
domestic prices.
Q796 Roger Berry:You are seriously saying that the
organisation that has this statutory responsibility
for regulating this industry cannot spot a windfall
proﬁt accurately, and cannot estimate the value of
that accurately? If they cannot do that how on earth
can they regulate the industry?
Mr Marchant:All I can say is, for my company there
has not been a windfall. I cannot comment on other
people’s decisions. I particularly cannot comment
on generator-only companies, rather than generator
and supply companies because the question should
be directed to them too. All I can say is, for my
company there has not been a windfall proﬁt.
Therefore the £9 billion is wrong.
Chairman: We have had one or two of the other
companies in to whomwe addressed this question in
the past as well. I think we will refresh our memories
about their evidence in that respect—bearing in
mind something you have just said.We have tomove
on because of time.
Q797 Mr Oaten: These are all massive ﬁgures we
have been talking about—can I home it right in now
to individual people and the suVering and diYculties
they are having at the moment, because as
politicians that is what we are here to represent, and
particularly to focus on the issue of prepaid meters.
I wonder if you could try and explain to me why it is
that, on average, if you are on a prepaid meter you
are actually paying around £145 a year, 17% more,
than if you are a customer who is paying by direct
debit. There does not strike me as being a level
playing ﬁeld there.
Mr Laidlaw: Let me have a go at that, and let me
start by saying I think it has now been well
established and certainly Ofgem’s statistics and the
Government’s statistics are that only 20-25% of
those people on prepayment meters are in fuel
poverty. Nevertheless we clearly need to do
everything we can to keep the costs down for
everybody on prepayment meters—which is one of
the reasons that earlier this week we actually
announced a new tariV for internet prepayment
customers which will reduce their bills. The reason
prepayment meters are more expensive is that they
are more expensive to serve. Typically the average
call volume on a prepaymentmeter—in otherwords,
the number of times a prepayment customer calls us
in—is about 70% higher than the average call
volume that we get for our normal cash, credit and
direct debit customers. We also have a large number
of outlets across the country from which we have to
go and collect the cash and service; and British Gas
has 35% more outlets per customer than anybody
else; so it is a very extensive network that has to be
supported. We also have a 24-hour call-out
capability, so that we can go on wind-on meters in
emergency situations and that has a cost. What we
are doing is also working on a new piece of
technology called “the energy point technology”
where people through a phone modem will basically
be able to add money onto their meter. That energy
point meter, we are rolling out 10,000 of them this
year, that will reduce costs and we have separated
out the prepayment business so that we can service
those customers better, reduce the costs of that
business; and we very much believe in a competitive
market you have to have cost-reﬂected pricing, so we
expect over time that diVerential to come down.
Q798 Mr Oaten: I understand your point about
extra cost, but it is not a viewwhich is shared entirely
by Ofgem. They say, yes, there are additional costs,
but the costs if you like would be around £85
diVerence; whereas the ﬁgures are coming out at
around £145 diVerence. Are you telling me that the
actual cost involved in managing the prepaid meters
are actually the total amounts taken up with the
additional costs? At the moment it is around 17%
higher. Can you say absolutely hand on heart that it
is 17% more to actually administer these?
Mr Laidlaw: I am pleased to say that what we are
working on is actually reducing the costs and also
reducing the tariV diVerential.
Q799 Mr Oaten: It is at the moment I am interested
in. It is now. It is not where you may be heading, it
is now. Is it the case that it is 17% more for you to
administer a prepaid meter over a direct debit
scheme, because that is the additional amount you
are charging? If it is not the case the only conclusion
I can draw is that you are making some additional
proﬁt out of this.
Mr Laidlaw: It is not as simple as that, because we
have gas meters, we have electricity meters and, do
not forget, we also have a large number of
prepayment customers who are on our essentials
tariV. We were the ﬁrst to launch a social tariV that
actually equalises everybody so there is no premium
for them over not just cash and credit but over the
direct debit discount number. We have 350,000
customers; we would like to have more customers;
andwe are hoping to targetmore with the help of the
DWP to actually increase that to 750,000. You
cannot just look at an average here; you actually
need to look at the individual components.
Mr Marchant: We have a slightly diVerent
perspective. Our diVerential is lower than that and
Mr Steele will point out that his is lower still. Within
the competitive market the six suppliers have taken
diVerent attitudes to prepayment meters. Scottish
Power have abolished a surcharge for both gas and
power; I believe EDF have abolished it for
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electricity; the other three have not. From our point
of view, because we seek for our tariVs to be as cost-
reﬂective as we can make them, we make less money
on a prepayment meter customer—deliberately less
money on a prepayment meter customer—than a
monthly direct debit. Our diVerential of about 12%
(just doing the maths here) is less than what we
believe the costs are. I am not saying they would be
17%, but they are more than 12%.
Q800 Mr Oaten: So it can be done? If you take the
political decision to do it, it can be achieved?
Mr Marchant: It can be. We took the view two years
ago, there as a great outcry about prepayment meter
surcharges; we all received letters from a number of
charities and a number of MPs; we took the view
then that that was whatwas required to help tomake
our contribution to fuel poverty. The sad thing is
that in Ofgem’s current view that abolition of
prepayment meter surcharges will not count as our
action towards social tariVs; therefore you might
ﬁnd that the three of us who have done something
move in the opposite direction.
Q801 Mr Oaten: We are going to come on to social
tariVs in a minute. Mr Laidlaw, would you say you
have got a little bit of catching-up to do compared
with some of your competitors?
Mr Laidlaw: We are the only one that has the
essentials tariV; and we do also have the most
comprehensive network; and we have the largest
number of prepayment customers.We have diVerent
demographics in a broader network so it is higher
cost.What I have said to you, and I repeat, is that we
are committed to reducing this diVerential.
Q802 Mr Oaten: In what kind of timescale do you
think we are looking at? If we were to look at this
ﬁgures in a year’s time—
Mr Laidlaw:— they will look better.
Q803 Mr Oaten: They will deﬁnitely look better?
Mr Laidlaw: Yes. Just to give you context here, we
have taken 25% of the cost out of our residential
supply business over the last two years, so we are on
a very clear mission to reduce costs wherever we can
but continue to provide service and provide value for
money to our customers.
Q804 Mr Oaten: Just on the costs, presumably with
prepaid there is no real credit risk involved; there is
no real collection risk involved on prepayments. I
am still not 100% clear why it costs so much to
manage it; because I would have thought it would
have almost been cheaper given those factors?
Mr Laidlaw: The meters themselves cost more to
rent as well. You have actually got a piece of
technology that is more expensive to rent and to
service.
MrMarchant:Youwould be surprised at the level of
transactions, the degree of care of maintenance with
these customers, the number of phone calls per
account, the number of call-out visits; and actually
there still are credit issues.
Q805Mr Oaten: If it is not eVective for you and it is
not being particularly eVective for them, why is it so
diYcult for some of these customers to actually get
away from meters and to switch to direct debit;
because the barriers are in place for doing that?
Mr Laidlaw: No, the switching rates amongst
prepayment customers are amongst the highest in
the industry. If you look at diVerent channels of
trade, whether it is direct debit, whether it is cash and
credit, or whether it is prepayment, the switching
rates on prepayment are some 30% higher than
general switching rates. Contrary to a general
perception that they are locked into prepayment
meters, all the evidence and history (and I am happy
to share a paper with you on this point) is that
actually the prepayment customers have switched
more than the average customer.
Q806 Chairman: The evidence you have given as a
supplementary shows that is more of a problem for
those on standard credit terms?
Mr Laidlaw: Correct.
Chairman: Where the fuel poverty is actually
concentrated we do not spend enough time talking
about. I know I am going to frustrateMark, but I am
going tomove on to Tony because he is asking about
switching particularly, and this is the time to pick up
extra issues.
Q807MrWright: It is recognised that probably 50%
of customers in the market regularly switch between
companies. What are you actually doing as
companies to be more proactive in pursuing the
other 50% and encouraging them to switch?
Mr Steele: Wewould love to ﬁnd them and get them
to switch to Scottish Power. We have every
opportunity to ﬁnd these customers—the diYculty is
ﬁnding them and getting then to take our products.
Q808 Mr Wright: Surely a lot of the products are
sold on the doorstep, by telephone, on the internet,
and indeed energywatch have got a speciﬁc site
which will tell people in a particular area which
company will sell the best electricity. On that basis
surely some people come to you; and you would also
go out into the market to ﬁnd them?
Mr Marchant: Absolutely. You have identiﬁed the
three key routes to market: doorstep; telephone; and
internet. There are other ways through to market
aYnity arrangements. For instance, we have a deal
with the British Heart Foundation where, if people
who support that charity sign up to us, we make a
donation, which has already totalled three-quarters
of a million pounds which we have given. It is a
competitive market and we are all trying diVerent
things to reach those customers who have not
switched. You have to recognise that there are a
signiﬁcant number of customers who have made a
conscious decision not to switch. I would like to feel
that the customers who have not switched from me
think that the package of service, product and price
that I oVer them is suYciently attractive that it is not
worth them switching. That is not to say I am not
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being competitive. We are trying everything we can.
I think our results show that we are being pretty
successful at that.
Q809MrWright: Is not one of the problems though
when it comes down to some of the selling
techniques, when you sell on the price, that in reality
the majority of customers do not really understand
how much they are actually going to save by
switching companies? The evidence suggests that a
third of those who switch actually switch
unknowingly to a higher tariV in any case. What
would you do in that particular case? How do you
sell your product and prove to your customer it is
cheaper?
Mr Marchant: Generally, because we have typically
been the cheapest supplier—certainly on the
doorstep we have been the cheapest supplier—we
have had the least of those sorts of problems. In fact
weworry about our losses on the same basis; because
unless someone is signing up for a particular internet
tariV or special deal most of our losses are probably
going to end up paying more. I share your concern.
What we do is we have an independent veriﬁcation
system where the salesmen will call our oYce and
they will speak to someone who has no incentive
whatsoever on sales to check that the customer has
understood what the process is doing, and that they
are comfortable that the package of price, service
and product they have selected is right for them. If
those people identify particularly a vulnerable
customer who was paying more they will tell them.
They would make sure that that was clear. That is
our position.
Mr Laidlaw: We have a similar process. We actually
launched the industry code on this to ensure best
practice, and to ensure that there was an
independent audit. I think you have to put this in
contest, in that there are currently around 100,000
customers switching aweek; this is one of the highest
churn rates in the energy business, certainly in the
world the highest rate. It is a higher rate of switching
than you see in telephony, than you see in ﬁnancial
services, insurances and a whole lot of other
products. There is switching. I think I have seen
numbers that suggest up to 70% of people have
switched, rather than 50%, on a single fuel. Some
people are just switching on one fuel, rather than
switching on both, and it is probably 55% on dual
fuel; but we still need to try and catch the remaining
30% or 45%, whatever the number is. We are doing
our best to do that through similar channels of sale.
I think everybody here is seeing the advertising that
we all do to make everybody aware that this is a
competitive market, and we will continue to do that
and capture customers oV other people.
Mr Steele:As far as our practices are concerned, our
doorstep sales agents are provided with sales aids
that show the comparison in pricing between
suppliers and identify the cases where people would
not make a saving. We expect our sales agents to
provide customers with a fair overview of the
situation, and we take disciplinary action against
those who do not.
Q810 Mr Wright: One of the evidence sessions we
have had before suggests, for instance, that Scottish
and Southern have cornered the market because
they delay the increase in the price of the fuel but
after, say, ﬁve or six months they catch up, so the
saving is only a six-month basis, on a short-term. Is
that policy speciﬁcally on the basis of trying to
capture the customer base, on the basis of
something cheaper?
Mr Marchant: We have what we call a “responsible
pricing policy” which says that we will be one of the
last to increase prices if we have to, and one of the
ﬁrst to reduce them if we can. Over the last four years
we have scored very well against that policy. Yes,
that is part of our deliberate policy to grow our
business. We are trying to strike a balance between
customers and shareholders; that is what underpins
our responsible pricing policy. We have grown by
90% over six years; 10% over the last year. A typical
customer joining us would have saved £400 over the
last four years; but that is not equally the same over
every month—some months you save more and
some months you save less, depending upon the
particular proﬁle of prices.Whatwe are aiming to do
is to oVer customers a long-term branded price
promise that means that they will over time see good
value out of the being an SSE customer.
Q811 Mr Wright: In reality, over a period of time,
the savings now are minimal. It may well be up to
£30 unless, of course, you switch on a duel fuel basis
and go to direct debit. Really the margins are very,
very minimal now, are they not?
Mr Marchant: You can save between £30 and £60.
Assuming you have already switched fuels, you
could save between £30 and £60, but that has been
over £100 on an annualised basis. It just depends
upon the period which you are looking at. We tend
to take an annual view of this, because people tend
to regard their power, their gas bills, on an annual
basis. Going back over the last years, those savings
have averaged £100 a year for the last four years: us
versus a sort of market leader.
Chairman: I want to move on to the social tariV
questions and will try and come back if there is time,
because they are all related issues.
Q812 Roger Berry: The Government recently
announced an agreement with the Big 6 companies
to increase spending on social tariVs, social
assistance. I think the ﬁgure for this year is an extra
£50 million. As I understand it, all that has been said
about the use of that money is that it will be targeted
at the poorest pensioners. Has it yet been decided
how that £50 million is in fact to be spent?
Mr Marchant: Each company makes its own
decisions. From our point, we have pledged to
quadruple the number of people on our energyplus
care social tariV, which is 20% below market price.
We are busy working on targeting for those. That is
the principal vehicle that we are using. Others will
have to tell you what they are doing with their share
of the money.
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Mr Steele: We are very supportive of the approach
that the Government discussed with us, and we all
agree we think it provides a really eVective way for
social action towork in themarket, workingwith the
grain of the market. We are still actually developing
the precise package of arrangements that we will be
doing. It will involve the rollout of our Carefree Plus
social tariV; almost certainly a great deal of activity
through the ScottishPower Energy People Trust
which has already helped 221,000 people in 91,000
households.Wewill be putting together a package of
measures within this framework.
Mr Laidlaw: We were the ﬁrst company to launch a
social tariV last year. We currently have about
350,000 customers on that social tariV. It costs us
£32 million. We want to do more; we were very clear
about that. Last year we had a target of getting to
over three-quarters of a million customers by 2011
on that. One of the issues has been actually working
with the DWP on getting good data; because the
eligibility for social tariVs is those who are on
various diVerent forms of Income Support.What we
have been keen to do with DWP is match our
computer systems with their computer systems, to
ensure that we really have good targeting. One of the
concerns has been that actually there are some £4.5
billion of unclaimed beneﬁts at the moment because
we do not have adequate targeting. One of the things
we have been very keen to ensure is that the targeting
is good and really goes to the most vulnerable
customers. In addition to our social tariV we also
spend £21 million on our Energy Trust which helps
those who are really having diYculties with their fuel
bill. We are also of course doing a lot through the
Carbon EYciency Reduction programme, the
CERT programme, to actually ensure that our
vulnerable customers and the fuel poor achieve
energy eYciency measures, loft insulation and
energy savings.
Q813 Roger Berry: I absolutely appreciate that in
themedium and longer term those kinds ofmeasures
are more eVective rather than simply increasing
beneﬁts. In relation to this £50million, Age Concern
and Help the Aged have said there is a very simple
way of helping the poorest pensioners, which is what
the Government has said this money is for, and that
is simply to give a £50 fuel voucher, eVectively a
rebate, to pensioners over 70 on Pension Credit.
With the winter fuel allowance the Government
knows exactly who these people, over 70 on Pension
Credit, are. A £50 rebate would spend the £50
million; it would be targeted at some of the poorest
pensioners.Why not do something as simple as that?
Why are we still waiting to know how this money
will in fact be spent?
Mr Marchant: In the discussions with the
Government we have talked about those sorts of
ideas. The Government knows who the people who
most need this help are—we do not. We know a
fraction of them and we generally know by accident,
maybe because they have written to anMP, anMSP
or a local councillor we have become aware of them.
The Government knows that, and we have said the
Government will be best able to target the help.
Q814 Roger Berry: Earlier you said each company
was doing their own thing?
Mr Marchant: That is the agreement that was
reached.
Q815 Roger Berry: How confusing for people. How
thoroughly confusing for customers.
Mr Steele: It is beneﬁcial I think that there is scope
for innovation. For example, we have a programme
about beneﬁt entitlement checks where, for every
pound we spend on that programme, some £20 of
additional beneﬁts are found for the customers
concerned. That programme is a valuable
programme that might be giving better value for
money than the programme you suggest. The
programme you suggest may be the right
programme. We are certainly going to consider the
proposal from Help the Aged; but we have to
remember that pensioners are not the only people
having diYculty with their fuel bills; there are
families and lots of other people as well. That is why
we are trying to have a balanced programme, rather
than necessarily spend all the funds available on
one group.
Q816 Roger Berry: I agree with you. There are
disabled people under 60; there are 750,000 children
who live in fuel poverty, you are absolutely right; but
the Minister’s statement said speciﬁcally that the
extra £50 million was to help the poorest pensioners.
I would have thought in these circumstances this £50
million is not a lot of money—whatever one thinks
about the windfall proﬁts or not, £50 million is not
a vast sum of money—but we were told it was to go
to the poorest pensioners. Surely Help the Aged and
Age Concern are right in saying a very simple way of
doing it, and telling people now what is going to
happen rather than the continuing uncertainty, is to
do something like this: to say to people, “Over 70 on
Pension Credit, you get £50 a year each”. Is that not
the simplest way of doing it? Why spend more time
debating an issue like that? Yes, I would like to ask
in a moment about non-pensioners.
Mr Marchant: I do not believe we are the right
people to be asking that question of.
Q817 Roger Berry: Why did you agree that it would
be left to you? Why did you not just say to the
Government, “Look, £50 million we can aVord it.
No problem. You tell us how to spend it”? Why did
you not say that?
Mr Marchant: We said, and each company is
diVerent, “We can support a voucher scheme”. We
said, “We’re not just going to write Government a
cheque, but we can support a voucher scheme”. We
said that. It is not easy to do. It is easier to say to do;
butwe said we felt a voucher scheme could have been
ready for this coming winter. You are talking about
a mass mail-out. Things like fraud and all sorts of
things need to be dealt with. It is easy to say—less
easy to do.We said back in February that it could be
done for the winter. For various reasons a diVerent
route was chosen. Therefore, we will play our part
in that.
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Q818 Roger Berry: The route was that it would be
left to each of the six, was it?
Mr Marchant: Yes.
Mr Steele: We said we would support a voucher
scheme as well in the discussions with the
Government; but, again, they eventually decided to
go for a route of leaving it to us to use our initiative.
In many ways that is a good result because it will set
lots of other ideas free; but wewould have supported
the voucher scheme if that is what they had chosen.
I think it is quite tight to change horses at this stage
and do it in a way that is resistant to fraud andworks
properly.
Q819 Roger Berry: Given the time, I think that is a
very simple, straightforward thing to do. I am
amazed it is still unclear what is going to happen,
apart from anything else. One ﬁnal question because
I know we are pressed for time. Mr Laidlaw
mentioned that Centrica had 350,000 customers
beneﬁting from social tariVs, with plans to increase.
Could each of you quickly tell me howmany of your
customers are currently fuel poor and what
proportion of those currently receive social tariVs?
Mr Marchant: The answer to the ﬁrst question is
that we have absolutely no idea, because we do not
know our customers’ income, we do not know our
customers’ housing situation or family
circumstances. We do not know how many of our
customers are fuel poor. All we can do is the same
statistical analysis that the Government does. That
is the ﬁrst point. The second point—how many
people do we help? Absolutely a fundamental
question is: what is a social tariV? This is where I
fundamentally disagree with Centrica’s position.We
believe passionately that a social tariV should be the
lowest tariV you oVer. British Gas’s Essentials tariV
on that score would not count. We have, on our
energyplus, 30,000 customers where we are charging
20% less than the standard rate, so it is signiﬁcantly
below any internet or special oVer that we see. We
think it makes a genuine diVerence. If I take British
Gas’s deﬁnition of a social tariV, 667,000 of my
customers I am deliberately cross-subsidising. For
three months this year every single one of my
customers was on a social tariV, because they were
paying less than British Gas’s Essentials tariV.
Fundamentally we are completely at odds on what a
social tariV is. For those members of the Committee
who have not signed the Early Day Motion on this,
I would encourage them to go and think about it! As
you can tell, I passionately believe if we are going to
help people who are fuel poor we should be helping
them properly.
Q820 Chairman: Mr Laidlaw has got to come in
now!
Mr Laidlaw: As Mr Marchant has already said, it
depends what snapshot in time you are looking at. If
you look back to last year when we were the ﬁrst to
reduce our prices, our prices for that group would
have been lower than anybody else’s. The reality is
that the internet tariV that MrMarchant is referring
to is a tariV that very few customers are on. The real
basis of comparison is our cash and credit
customers, who are some six million accounts, and
our direct debit customers who enjoy a discount.
Our Essentials tariV actually enables all our people
who qualify for that tariV to participate in the direct
debit discount tariV. That is the lowest signiﬁcant
tariV that we have. The outlier is an internet tariV
that we have very few customers on.
Q821 Roger Berry: Finally, does this not suggest
therefore that there should be a clearly deﬁned social
tariV, and that it should be mandatory so that
everyone knows precisely what the minimum
amount of support you should be providing is, and
how that minimum is actually measured? A bit like
the minimum wage—we know what it is; we know
how it is deﬁned; and it is mandatory. Why should
there not be a mandatory social tariV?
Mr Marchant: I do not believe there should be a
mandatory social tariV, because that will stiﬂe
innovation; but I do believe there should be a
mandatory deﬁnition of what qualiﬁes as a social
tariV, which is a diVerent point.
Q822 Roger Berry: How does it stiﬂe innovation? It
will help it.
Mr Marchant: No, because if you say a standard
internet tariV is X pence per unit, everybody has to
charge X pence per unit. It stiﬂes competition and it
stiﬂes innovation.
Q823 Roger Berry: The minimum wage does not
stiﬂe competition. You have competition for the
things that are not mandatory?
Mr Marchant: If you mandated that a social tariV
had to be the lowest that you oVered, I can support
that because that allows the market to innovate on
exactly what the social tariVs are, how they are
targeted, how they are structured; and it does not
distort competition in the main market. If you ﬁx a
mandatory social tariV you will absolutely stiﬂe
innovation in the vulnerable customer sector.
Mr Steele: Not only that, the way the Government
has agreed this with the industry in terms of a ﬁxed
target of money that we, if you like, have a
commitment to spend, that gives us an incentive to
be innovative and eVective in our marketing to go
and ﬁnd the people who can beneﬁt from these
tariVs. A mandatory social tariV which said we
basically had to sell at a loss to a particular group of
people would reverse those incentives, and actually
give us an incentive not to ﬁnd those people.
Q824 Mr Bailey: I just want to talk about the
consolidation of the industry, particularly with the
European dimension. Centrica in its evidence to us
said that it was very concerned with consolidation in
Europe. The question I have got is: why is
consolidation of the industry okay in theUKbut not
in Europe?
Mr Steele: Which consolidation do you mean? Do
you mean the consolidation that happened around
2002 when lots of companies went bankrupt, or
some other consolidation?
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Q825 Mr Bailey: Perhaps it would be easier if the
representative of Centrica could answer because it
was them who made the point in the submission?
Mr Laidlaw: The point we were making in the
submission is a function of the fact that the
European competitive landscape is very diVerent.
Switching rates in Europe are still very low. To give
you the most stark example—there are 20 million
customers in the UK who are supplied by French
andGerman suppliers in theUK;Centrica is still not
able to sell to a single retail customer in France or
Germany. You have situations where the markets
have not liberalised, and clearly continued
consolidation and the capture of monopoly rates by
those business enables them to build very strong
positions in which to penetrate the UK. The UK
market is very diVerent. The UK market has
liberalised; 40% of the generation is outside the Big
6. There are multiple diVerent suppliers and,
therefore, I think it is a diVerent landscape.
Mr Marchant: I think that the structure of the
industry in Europe is largely regional geographic
monopolies, and consolidation eVectively is a land
grab to those regionalmonopolies over a larger area.
That is the ﬁrst thing. EVectively it freezes more of
the market if you see consolidation in Europe. The
second half of your question—what about theUK—
you said consolidation would not be (inaudible); I
would challenge that. I believe that our current
generation supply markets are fully competitive. If
there was any move to consolidate either of those
markets through any transaction we absolutely need
to understand what the impacts on the issues we
have been talking about this morning are. I do not
think it is a slam-dunk that any consolidation would
get oV scot-free. I think there are some serious issues
that would need to be asked. That is why we have a
merger control process. That is why we have
regulatory investigators both at the UK and EU
Witnesses: Mr Andrew DuV, Chief Executive, RWE npower, Mr Vincent de Rivaz, Chief Executive, EDF
Energy and Dr Paul Golby, Chief Executive, E.ON UK, gave evidence.
Q828 Chairman: Gentlemen, we are running just a
little later than I had hoped so we will need to crack
straight on. Can I begin by thanking you for coming
to the Committee and thanking you for your written
evidence. Can I ask you to introduce yourselves,
perhaps starting with you, Mr DuV.
Mr DuV: My name is Andrew DuV. I am Chief
Executive of RWE npower.
Mr de Rivaz: My name is Vincent de Rivaz. I am
Chief Executive of EDF Energy.
Dr Golby: Paul Golby, Chief Executive of E.ON
UK.
Q829 Chairman: Gentlemen, I am going to begin
with a question I asked our last witnesses, I do not
expect to get a very diVerent answer from the answer
I got last time. To be honest, I rather expected their
answers. What is going to happen to energy prices
level. Absolutely right, because we need to make
sure that both our generation supplymarkets remain
competitive. I am not sure it is right to say that
consolidation in the UK would be okay. I think it
would absolutely need to be addressed.
Q826 Mr Bailey: You have partly anticipated my
other question, which was: would you favour any
further consolidation in the UK market? I would
gather that you would not?
Mr Marchant: I am not saying I am against it. I am
saying that each particular sort of consolidation
raises diVerent questions. Somemight be acceptable;
some would not be acceptable. You need to look at
the speciﬁc circumstances at the time. I think any
consolidation would require those questions to be
asked.
Mr Laidlaw: I would agree with that. I think you
have to look at the circumstances at the time. I think
the OFT in the past has studied the competitive
dynamics both in generation and in supply very
carefully and would scrutinise it very carefully. I
think the mechanisms are in place in this country to
ensure that there remains good competition.
Q827Chairman:Gentlemen, it is frustrating because
there is so much more I would like to ask. I would
like to question you particularly about physical
generation because I think you trade to balance your
positions not what the market really needs, for
example, an issuewemight discuss subsequently.We
are where we are, and we are over time already for
our next three witnesses. Thank you very much
indeed. If there are other issues you feel we have not
addressed, or issues which have arisen you would
like to clarify, further written notes are welcome but
urgently, please; we aim to get our report our quite
early in the summer.
Mr Laidlaw: I am gratefully for the time. Thank you
very much.
for the rest of the year, here and in Europe? Apart
from the fact they are going to go up, can you be
more speciﬁc?
Dr Golby: Let me start—I think it is very diYcult to
be more speciﬁc. We are facing a seismic shift quite
frankly, I think, in commodity prices. Since I came
into this industry in 1998–9 we have had a 14-fold
increase in the oil price; it has doubled over the last
12 months. We have seen other commodity prices—
oil, gas and coal—increase by about 60% over the
last four months. So it is not diYcult to see that the
pressure is upwards. I think what will happen will
very much depend on what happens to the forward
price over the next weeks andmonths. I do not think
I can be more speciﬁc than that.
Chairman: I think this Committee accepts, as we all
do, that energy prices are rising. We cannot deny
that reality and one of the fundamental reasons for
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it is other markets in the world, particularly in places
like India and China. We understand that. Our
concern is to make sure that the diVerent sectors of
themarket are getting the best possible deal they can
in the circumstance—domestic customers,
particularly those in fuel poverty, small andmedium
sized business and the large industrial users, because
there are diVerent issues for each of them—to
sustain a standard and quality of life or sustain your
business and sustain competitors in the UK. We
understand that. I think it is probably best we move
on to the one of the key determinants of that issue—
the wholesale gas market,
Q830MrHoyle:There was a report done by theDTI
back in 2005 and it suggested that 70% of the
physical volume in the UK is sold on long-term
contracts. There are other arguments that say it is
40%. It tells us that most of it is done on secretive
long-term contracts. To what extent do you buy
your gas on contract, as opposed to by the open
market?
Mr DuV: The physical gas market in the UK two or
three years out is very liquid, and trades at about ten
times the underlying size of the physical market. My
company purchases about 30% of its total gas
requirements through long-term contracts. There
are commercially conﬁdential aspects of that, but
not really very much. There is not much that is not
known about long-term contracts, because most of
them were negotiated in the expansion of gas
production in the North Sea back in the 1980s; and
many of them have been in the public domain as
companies have divested assets and divested
contracts in the years since. We buy a small
proportion of the gas, and my company is very
comfortable living for the vast majority of its
requirements in the open wholesale markets. They
are very liquid; delivery is secure; and there is a rich
diversity of major upstream suppliers fromwhichwe
can procure.
Mr de Rivaz: I conﬁrm that as far as EDF Energy is
concerned we are buying nearly all of our gas on the
open market.
Q831 Mr Hoyle: That is 99%?
Mr de Rivaz: Yes, it is important for the committee
to recognise the simple fact that, since the beginning
of 2007, the gas price on the wholesale market has
increased by 270%. It is a real challenge for
companies like ours to mitigate the impact of these
costs on our customers, which we are trying to do.
Q832MrHoyle: So you have no long-term contracts
in reality?
Mr de Rivaz: No.
Dr Golby: In the situation of E.ON, we purchase
about 70% of our gas requirements from the market
at market related prices; the balance of 30% do come
from ﬁxed-price long-term contracts; and those
long-term contracts have a combination of factors
inﬂating the prices: RPI; gas oil; heavy fuel oil; crude
or electricity prices. The long-term contracts which
are clearly a diminishing proportion of our portfolio
are linked to a whole series of indexes in terms of
their prices; but 70% comes from the short-term
market.
Q833MrHoyle: It is interesting—and I do not know
what you would like to make of this—Allan Asher,
Chief Executive of energywatch, told us that in his
opinion it was 70% of all gas coming from
mysterious contracts and he would regard them as
highly anti-competitive and needing to be exposed
and broken up. What would you like to say to that?
Dr Golby: I am not sure where he gets that
information. It is certainly not something that he has
shared with me. Certainly frommy point of view the
majority of our gas is bought in themarket atmarket
prices. I think Allan Asher actually identiﬁed that
the current levels of churn in the market at ten times
physical actually is an indication of a very liquid
market. I think that market is working.
Mr de Rivaz: We would not agree with the idea that
the wholesale gas market or the electricity market in
the UK are “opaque” as some say. It is clear there
are some ways to improve their liquidity. I think the
industry is working on that on the electricity side,
which is slightly less liquid than the gas market. It is
certainly not possible for us to accept the idea that
these markets are opaque and there are some
secretive deals which are made—this is not the
reality.
Q834 Mr Hoyle: I just wonder whether you will be
able to agree that gas producers are the same for the
UK operations as they are for the European
operations and why they do not purchase gas on the
open forward market. Have you any views on that?
If you look at the UK operations and the European
operations, how does that work? Is there a
diVerential between the two, between the UK and
European in the way the gas is bought?
Dr Golby: Take my sister company in Europe, we
probably buy more of our gas through international
sources from Russia, for example, and those
contracts I think again are reasonably transparent.
They are linked to crude oil prices, but so are the
majority of Russian gas prices; and increasingly the
nationalised gas companies around the world link
their gas prices to crude oil; it is a fact of life, I am
afraid.
Q835 Mr Hoyle: Do you think it should be broken?
Dr Golby: I do not know how it could be broken,
because increasingly it is the oil companies or the gas
companies owned by sovereign states. Whilst we
might try to persuade them that that is not any
longer valid, I think it is very diYcult for us to say to
the Russians, for example, “You must change the
way in which you decide to sell your gas”. I would
like to see it but I do not think it is very credible.
Q836 Mr Hoyle: So it is there to stay?
Dr Golby: I think so.
Mr DuV: I think it is important to say that in theUK
we are actually very fortunate in terms of the
diversity of access to gas that we do have. It feels
uncomfortable at the moment because as an
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importing nation we are vulnerable to global price
eVects in a way that we have not been for many
years. The UKNorth Sea still produces over 60% of
the gas that we need. The Norwegian sector of the
North Sea produces 40% of the gas that we need in
the UK. Pipeline capacity coming into the UK is
another 80%-odd. By this winter we should have 30-
35% capacity for LNG imports into the UK. None
of that protects us from price aVects, which I think
you are referring to; but it does ensure that we have
some negotiating leverage in our ability to source gas
from a variety of sources.
Q837 Mr Hoyle: What about storage capacity?
MrDuV: Storage capacity is something that needs to
be increased ideally. It is not as simple as a matter of
comparing UK storage capacity with, for example,
European storage capacity. We have a number of
things that make the UKmore robust. For example,
the amount of gas that comes from the North Sea
which is a ﬂexible sort of source, through contracts
which in many cases, and particularly our own, give
ﬂexibility that allow us to capitalise on the supply
ﬂexibility as a virtual kind of storage. One of the
things that would help a lot in the UK would be
greater transparency of production, not just from
our own sector in the North Sea but the Norwegian
side and pipeline transports. There have been times
in previous years, and particularly last year, when
for example supplies through the Norwegian
pipelines were very hard to predict and had quite a
signiﬁcant impact on prices in the UK.
Q838 Mr Hoyle: It would be fair to say that UK
customers are the losers by not having more
capacity. Presumably at peak times we are
vulnerable and we are paying the spike on the
market; yet some are exporting North Sea gas which
could go into storage in Europe and then be
exported back to us at a higher proﬁt. Does that not
seem ridiculous?
Dr Golby: Let me pick that up. Firstly, historically
we have not needed storage because of the North
Sea. I echo the points made about transparency if
production is important. I think at the moment we
have about 15 days’ storage in the UK. I think that
certainly has to double. My company is currently
investing up to a billion pounds into gas storage
facilities. One has started in Cheshire, and one we
hope to see planning consent for in East Yorkshire,
but these take time to bring on-stream. I might just
add, it is very pertinent at the moment that one
billion cubic metres of storage has already been
turned down at the planning stage; so it is not so easy
to get planning permission for gas storage. In terms
of your question about storage of gas in Europe, I do
not want to be provocative but that actually is a
market that is working; because 50% of the gas ﬁelds
in the North Sea are associated ﬁelds; and that
means that they produce oil and gas. At the time the
oil companies are trying to produce maximum oil—
which I think we all would like them to do at the
moment—they are producing gas during the
summer, which currently we cannot store in the UK
and yet that is sold to Europe and the European
companies sell it back at higher prices in the winter.
That I am afraid, whether you like it or not, is a
competitive market that is working.
Q839 Mr Hoyle: At the disadvantage of UK
customers where they see something they believe is
sovereign being exported and then being ripped-oV
when they buy it at a higher price because companies
have not invested in storage and they have let down
the people of the United Kingdom?
Dr Golby: Firstly, of course, the gas is sold by the oil
companies, so in that regard it is not sovereign. The
market did not respond to the gas storage situation
as quickly as I think any of us would have liked. The
pricing signals were not there, and that is where
improved transparency of production would be
helpful. I think that investment is going in now, but
we do need to see the planning consents coming
through so we can get ahead and build that storage.
Q840 Mr Hoyle: So we have got it right: the market
has failed the United Kingdom, and the bottom line
is they did not react quickly enough, and now what
we are trying to say is, “It’s down to planning
issues”.We should have been planning this ten years
ago when we could see what was going to happen?
Dr Golby: I do not think the market has failed. The
market is not perfect. The pricing signals were not
there at an early enough point in time, but the
market is now responding.
Q841 Chairman: What this Committee and its
predecessor said in 2001 was that the Government
should look at strategic gas storage, because it
identiﬁed this problem coming down the track to
meet us. That was a recommendation of this
Committee that was not acted on. In fact in the 2003
Energy White Paper again gas storage was not
pushed right up the agenda by the Government
either, so there has been a collective failure, has there
not? It was blindingly obvious to this Committee’s
predecessor that there was a problem emerging and
no-one managed to address it.
Dr Golby: We are addressing it. We have been
investing; we have been building a new gas facility
for the past two and a half years andwe have another
one in the pipeline.
Q842MrHoyle: Is the reality not that you canmake
more proﬁts by the way you deal with it, rather than
storing gas? There are bigger proﬁts to be made by
not creating storage?
Dr Golby: No, I do not believe that is the case. My
company does not have a lot of storage in the UK at
the moment, but companies which do have storage I
think they are quite transparent in their proﬁt and
loss accounts and which proﬁt they make from
storage. It is a proﬁtable business to be in.
Mr de Rivaz: I think globally the more you are
mitigating your risks as a company, the more your
customers are beneﬁting from such a risk policy.Gas
storage is part of mitigating our risks. We are
certainly better oV with gas storage than we would
be without; that is why we are all investing in gas
storage.
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Mr Hoyle: I do not think we quite see that, but I
suppose we all have diVerent opinions.
Q843 Chairman: Mr de Rivaz, may I just ask you,
this is quite a diYcult inquiry for the Committee
because we are hearing such contradictory and
diVerent things from diVerent people. Some people
told us the wholesale gas market is fundamentally
broken; there is no eVective forward trading. The
forward prices are determined by a very small
volume of trading gas, if any. Others say that
actually it is all hunky-dory, it is working perfectly;
it is marvellously competitive and we have not got a
thing to worry about. Others, like you, fall
somewhere in between, because I think it was your
evidence to us which said, “While the wholesale
market in the UK is competitive, there is still room
for improvement . . .” What improvements would
you like to see in the wholesale gas market?
Mr de Rivaz: I think it is a fair comment to say that
this market is not perfect and can be improved. I
think we have to be realistic, modest and recognise
the strengths and the weaknesses that we are all
facing in Europe in general and in the UKmarket in
particular. Certainly more visibility on the physical
ﬂows, for instance, would support a better market.
We have been promoting modiﬁcation to the uniﬁed
network code to make more information available,
and are doing everything to make information more
available, more reliable, more transparent and this is
going to improve this market. I think in the gas
wholesale market we are in a slightly better position
than in the electricity wholesale market, where we
are still, despite the fact liquidity has increased over
the last few years, hoping some improvement will be
made. We are also working on having some better
spot market indicators commonly shared for that
market to work even better.
Chairman: The wholesale gas market is of huge
fundamental importance to everything we are
talking about today, but we also want some of the
wholesale electricity market. I will move on now to
Adrian Bailey.
Q844 Mr Bailey: Ofgem estimated that in 2006-07
the value of the over-the-counter electricity market
was just £31 million, which is a tiny fraction of the
total generated. My question is: ﬁrstly, what
proportion of your purchases are made from the
open market; and, secondly, why is this market
appearing to become more illiberal in the UK but
more liberal in countries such as Germany and the
Netherlands?
Mr de Rivaz: I can only answer as far as the
electricity market is concerned. Basically we all have
the same objective, to be better vertically
integrated—maybe we can discuss that further. In
our situation with our own generation we are
producing ourselves about half of what we are
selling on the market; but globally it covers our
residential retail market. Having said that,
everything we are producing is sold on the wholesale
market. The generators are contributing, even if they
are vertically integrated, to the liquidity of the
market. My view is that we should be even more
vertically integrated. To have more intregration is a
good thing in this market, simply because I believe
that in doing that we are mitigating our risks, and in
mitigating our risks we are protecting our
customers.
Q845 Mr Bailey: I am sorry, are you saying that the
electricity that you generate is all sold on the open
market?
Mr de Rivaz: Yes.
Mr DuV: The electricity markets are not as liquid as
the gas markets. I would just like to re-emphasise the
transparency and liquidity are absolutely aspects of
this market that our company would like to see and
encourage. One of the problems is that during the
failure of a number of major companies in electricity
generation and supply in 2002-03, some liquidity
was lost to the power markets markets in the UK,
and perhaps there was also a collective loss of
conﬁdence there which did not help. I am referring
to the restructuring of British Energy, to the failure
of TXU, to the failure of Enron and so on; all of
whom were very helpful in stimulating liquidity
particularly in the power markets in the UK on
which we all depend. This company is very, very
supportive of trying to continue to build liquidity
back and it is doing so and has been improving for
the last two or three years; but perhaps one of the
barriers to improving liquidity, in the powermarkets
particularly, is the ability for companies to exit
positions close to real time without being left with
untradable physical positions. For that reason,
Npower is leading an industry group looking at
trying to create an exchange traded mechanism that
would allow a more diverse range of participants in
themarket to enter themarket safe in the knowledge
that positions could be cashed out eVectively, close
to real time, which would bring in banks, trading
houses and other independent players as well. As it
happens, the generating market is extremely
fragmented and the result is that a very large
proportion of the energy generated in the UK is
traded openly in the wholesale markets. In terms of
our position, we have to purchase from the open
market at least as much again as the energy that we
generate, and we run our generation businesses and
our retail businesses quite independently, and they
both trade independently with the market too,
therefore further stimulating liquidity. So, yes, I feel
less comfortable about power than about the gas
market, but all the signs are that liquidity is moving
into that market in the way that we would like it to
do, and it is certainly far better than any other
similar market that I know.
Q846 Chairman:Adrian, can I interrupt one second?
Mr de Rivaz, you said, I think, just now that all the
electricity generated is sold on the open market. Is
that the case?
Mr de Rivaz: Yes. We are not selling directly from
our plants to our customers; we are going through
the wholesale market.
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Q847 Chairman: Your written evidence says: “By
using a proportion of electricity that we generate in
order to meet part of our own demand, we are
reducing our customers’ exposure . . . ” There seems
to be a contradiction there.
Mr de Rivaz: It is not a contradiction, it is a fact that
globally in having half of our needs covered by our
own generation we aremitigating our ﬁnancial risks,
and that is a beneﬁt to our customers. Every day we
are trading on the wholesale market what we are
producing.
Q848 Mr Bailey: In 2006–07 the total wholesale
market, which is £31 million— how much electricity
did you generate in 2006 and 2007, in ﬁnancial
terms?
Mr de Rivaz: Can you say that again?
Q849 Mr Bailey: How much electricity did you
generate in 2006–07, because you have said it was all
traded on the wholesale market? We are told by
Ofgem that the total value of the wholesale market
is £31 million.
Mr de Rivaz: We have sold on the wholesale market
all the electricity we have produced, which is to the
tune of 25 terawatt hours, I think.
Q850 Mr Bailey: I am sorry?
Mr de Rivaz: Twenty-ﬁve terawatts, which we are
producing every day.
Q851 Chairman:This is very confusing. Adrian, I do
not want to take over your questioning, but your
written evidence says, again: “Generators, including
those who are part of vertically integrated
companies, must compete tominimise the cost of the
electricity they generate—essential to ensure their
supply business is able to sell competitively priced
electricity”. You are saying there is no point in being
vertically integrated; you run the businesses entirely
separately and your generation capacity ﬂogs it to
the wholesale market and the supply business buys it
back from the wholesale markets. I do not
understand that.
Mr de Rivaz: I am sorry, Chairman. I am saying that
vertical integration does not mean that we sell only
to ourselves; we sell into themarket andwe buy from
the market. That is what is happening every day.
Having said that, as a company, when we look at the
risks which exist in the retail market, or the
generation market, we are better oV in having a
business which is in both elements of the buying
chain, because in doing that we are limiting our
risks, our exposures, and in limiting our risks we are
limiting our costs, and that is beneﬁcial for our
customers. It is why in every country vertical
integration is a better solution than non-vertical
integration. It has been the case in the UK since the
beginning of the opening of the markets with more
and more vertically integrated companies, and it is
the case in other countries. You have, in Germany,
vertically integrated companies and a high level of
liquidity in the market. There is no contradiction
between vertical integration and liquidity on the
market. That is the point.
Q852 Mr Bailey: Surely, the issue is how many of
those vertically integrated companies have what are
eVectively “oV market” contracts between the
generators and the suppliers?
Dr Golby: Can I, maybe, tell you what we do in the
UK? That would help. Firstly, we are also
participating in the design project that Mr DuV
referred to in terms of trying to devise instruments
and systems to increase the liquidity of the UK
market. I think it is fair to say that the UK market
is not perfect, it trades at about three-times physical;
European markets trade at between six and seven-
times physical, so they are more liquid, and because
they have those instruments in place in NordPool
and EEX, for example, that means they get more
ﬁnancial players and people who do not have
physical positions trading in themarket place. So the
market is not perfect and we need to make some
changes to increase the liquidity. However liquidity
is increasing, I think it was independently conﬁrmed
by the Financial ServicesAuthority just recently that
it increased by 52% in 2006–07, so it is moving in the
right direction, but it is not perfect. In the case of my
own company, in the year to March 2008 we
generated 41millionmegawatt hours and we bought
in the market 92—so we are trading in the market
twice what we are producing.
Q853Mr Bailey:Can I turn it round—and you have
touched on this.What needs to be done in the British
market to make it more liquid? Possibly it is being
done in the German and Dutch markets, but what is
the lesson you have learnt for the British market?
Mr De Rivaz: As I think all three of us have said, we
are working to ﬁnd a sensible spot market index
providing a reference price that could be used as a
base for the ﬁnancial forward contract for the UK
market, and it is something which will improve
further existing liquidity. So it is all about having
tools which exist in other countries which provide a
higher level of liquidity. It is not a question of
vertical integration, it is a mechanism by which the
market is more eYcient—the wholesale market is
more eYcient.
Dr Golby: Could I say I think it is a very good and
detailed question. I am not an expert in this area but
perhaps I could come backwith a note to actually set
out precisely what we need to look at here, if that
would be helpful, Chairman.
Q854 Chairman: That is quite urgent.
Dr Golby: We can respond very quickly.
Q855 Mr Bailey: I think, Chairman, that would be
helpful and is necessary. To a simple layman such as
me, it seems to me that if you want a perfectly liquid
market all that you have to do is insist that
generators put all their production on the open
market for the suppliers to purchase from. What is
your opinion on that?
Mr DuV:Frommy experience—and I cannot say for
other companies—we are seeing that happening.We
have to buy, every year, 30 terawatt hours—that is,
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at least, between 5 and 10% of the UK market—
from the markets in order to cover our sales. So I do
not think there is, in the short term (by that I mean
one to two years forward) a major problem in
liquidity, although it can be enhanced, and we want
to see it enhanced. Beyond that, there is probably no
more to be said than to look at the speciﬁc reasons
why the market may be diYcult for certain players.
One of the issues is the ability to exit ﬁnancial
positions close to closure without being left with an
untradable physical position.
Q856 Mr Bailey: I have to say there is a signiﬁcant
body of disagreement with that. Can I move on in
terms of new entrants to building large-scale
generating capacity? It would appear that something
like 13 gigawatts of the 17 gigawatts of approved
projects are being built by existing vertically
integrated companies. What do you think needs to
be done to encourage new entrants into that?
Mr DuV: The biggest challenge for new build is just
the basic economics, at the moment. You are talking
about very large plant, with very long paybacks and
returns looking forward in the market that are not
very attractive. In fact, for the ﬁrst time in four or
ﬁve years we are starting to see, on a going forward
basis, returns that just about cover the cost of capital
for new entry for new build. So this is an issue for all
potential or would-be investors in this market.
Actually, the UK power generation market is pretty
fragmented and there are very healthy signs of
signiﬁcant amounts of new investment not just in
fossil plant but in renewables as well, from
independent non-integrated organisations.
Q857 Chairman:Where is the subsidy? It seems to be
there where new build comes from the independent
sector but where there is not, there is not.
Mr DuV: No, the evidence, I do not think, supports
that. We see Severn Power and ConocoPhillips
building KG plants on the east coast; we see Gas
France entering the market as a new entrant as well,
and many other new entrants looking at building
plant as well as existing generators in the UK.
Dr Golby: Could I add to that, Chairman? I think
there is a legacy issue here. It was only back in 2003
when this market was bust; the Government had to
rescue British Energy, TXU went bust (and my
company bought it) and other power stations ended
up with the banks. So there is a legacy of people
losing their shirts in thismarketplace. I am afraid the
recent credit crunch has not helped there; it is
increasingly diYcult for companies to raise ﬁnance
for these investments. Yes, vertical integration
helps—it helps manage the risk—but the fact of life
in this big ticket industry is that it is the bigger
companies that are more robust and able to invest
during these very diYcult ﬁnancial times. I have got
no suggestion as to how we help other parties also
invest—that is up to them—but I am sure that you
wouldwant the large companies to invest becausewe
are facing an energy crunch if we do not.
Q858 Mr Bailey: The cynic would say that it is only
the current vertically integrated companies and their
ability to rig themarket and to guarantee themarket
that gives them the ﬁnancial capacity to produce the
new generating capacity.What would your response
be to that?
Mr De Rivaz: First of all, I think the structure of the
market itself does not prevent new entrants from
building large-scale generating capacity, and today
more than 40% of the electricity generated in this
country is generated from outside the alleged ‘Big 6’.
I think it is very important that large companies like
ours are in a position to invest the billions that this
country desperately needs to have the lights on,
tackle climate change and, at the end of the day, have
more aVordable prices for all. I think the priority is
to be in a country which is encouraging investors to
invest in the long term, and if it is a new entrant, ﬁne;
if it is one of the existing large generators, ﬁne as
well. What is important is that new investment ﬂows
in this country.
Mr DuV: I think diversity is the key word when we
talk about energy supply and, particularly,
generation. I mean diversity not just in fuel type but
ownership as well, and a healthy, competitive
environment. The scale of the investment required in
this industry over the next ten years is absolutely
staggering, as a result of the age of much of our
infrastructure and the need to build climate-friendly
capacity in place ofmuch of the old dirty capacity we
have got. It is absolutely staggering. We simply
cannot aVord to discourage any investor in the
generation infrastructure in this country. I cannot
imagine that any group of participants or individual
participant could possibly have any concern about
the extent of the openness of the market to
investment. The concerns are about access to ﬁnance
and the scale of the investment that is needed. It
needs everything that we have got—in the short
term, in gas-ﬁred generation, because it is really only
the quick solution in the short-term, but in the
longer term, in renewables, in nuclear plant, in
carbon capture and storage technologies—to get this
country to still be in a secure energymarketplace and
still competitive in 10 years’ time, as it is today.
Q859 Mr Bailey: So you do not think that “dulling
market signals” (a quote from Drax) is
disincentivising new entrants into the industry?
Mr DuV:No, absolutely not. I do believe that we are
in a very diYcult transitional phase where the
forward returns visible currently barely cover the
cost of new investment but at a time when we know
that over the next ﬁve to ten years a signiﬁcant
amount of capacity is going to retire and is going to
be withdrawn from the market, and therefore one
has to take quite courageous decisions in order to
initiate new build projects, not least because the
returns are marginal in the current view but, also,
because the paybacks are so long. I really do not
understand the basis of the question; I think that this
country needs all the investment it canmuster in new
infrastructure, particularly in climate-friendly
generation, and it needs to be encouraging it from
whatever source.
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Mr Bailey: The basis of the question is that the ‘Big
6’ vertically integrated companies are acting in such
a way as they rig the market, which eVectively
prevents any other would-be entrant into the
generating—
Chairman: I think that has been comprehensively
denied by the witnesses.
Q860 Mr Bailey: With respect, the witness said he
did not understand the question, so I am just trying
to make it a little clearer. It is the allegation being
made by the industry and you are denying it.
Mr De Rivaz: We understand that people think that
the market is not competitive when all the evidence
is showing that it is an extremely competitive market
and, at the same time, there is a need for huge
investment which I think will be achieved both by
large, vertically integrated companies which have
the ﬁnancial strength to do it and, also, by new
entrants. There is nothing in the market which
prevents it.
Q861 Chairman: I was going to end with some
questions on your investment, and I will drop oV
those, but I have to say that I fondly imagined that
rising oil prices wouldmake investment in renewable
energy and nuclear much more attractive as a
proposition, and actually you would be quite bullish
about your investment. All you have said about
margins—and indeed EDF’s evidence makes the
point about very lowmargins on existing capacity—
is very bearish about the investment. So this
Committee’s concern in this inquiry is about prices,
and we are about to move to some of the pertinent
questions about our individual constituents and the
pain they are experiencing at present, but keeping
the lights on is actually very important, too. These
are two balancing issues we have to bear in mind
throughout this inquiry. I am getting rather mixed
messages today. Will we keep the lights on? Will the
investment be made? What could frustrate that
investment being made?
Dr Golby:Letme echo the point made earlier: we are
looking at billions of pounds of investment.We have
to replace a third of our generation capacity in the
next decade, and that probably doubles to 60% over
the next 20 years plus the investment to reduce
carbon. So this is a massive investment programme
in the UK—almost without precedent. We need
everybody who is able and wants to invest in the
United Kingdom to be part of that programme. So
I would welcome investment from new entrants. I
have got no concern there. I think your general point
is correct that if oil prices stay high or go even higher
investments in nuclear, renewables and other non-
oil related fuels become that much more attractive.
Mr DuV: This company is closing two of its three
coal-ﬁred power stations in the near future under
existing climate and environmental conditions—
that is about a third of our generation—and the
investment that we are going to bemaking to replace
that and to build what we believe the country will
need in the next decade to maintain security of
electricity supply means that we are looking at, in
every year for the next ten years, signiﬁcantly
negative cash ﬂows from our business and an
investment programme that is well over £10 billion
over that period of time. The challenges are large.
Part of the problem is that the UK is not alone in
needing to reinvest in its energy infrastructure
currently. Much of the rest of Europe is in the same
position, and access to turbines, to equipment, to
contractors and to machinery—we are in real
competition now and we are seeing the costs and
prices of procurement going up as a result as well, all
of which is making this a tough environment in
which to invest.
Chairman: So it is a challenge. I think we had better
leave it there because this is not an investigation into
investment, especially into prices, and people are
hurting out there and we need to discuss their
problems.
Q862 Mr Oaten: One of the groups that are hurting
are those customers that are on pre-paid meters. I
can be pretty brief here in terms of the questions.
First of all, could you all conﬁrm it is the case that
with your individual companies you are charging
prepaid meter customers around 17% more than
those that pay by direct debit? A “Yes”, presumably,
will suYce on that, from each of you, if that is the
case.
Mr De Rivaz: I think the answer is probably not the
same for all the companies. As you probably know,
we have been the ﬁrst supplier to align electricity
prepayment to existing credit prices. There are, and
Ofgem recognises it, clear additional costs for a
supplier to a prepayment meter payment option
rather than the standard kind of option. The actual
cost is to the tune of £65. As far as we are concerned,
for dual fuel prepayment customers, the prices have
just a gap of £29 per year. So there are diVerences
between the suppliers, and we have been, as I said,
the ﬁrst one to align our prepayment to credit
electricity prices.
Q863 Mr Oaten: So you are saying to me that
although it costs more to collect under prepaid you
are actually charging less than those additional costs
that you incur?
Mr De Rivaz:We did that for electricity prepayment
in the context of our overall policy for the most
vulnerable customers. We thought it was the right
thing to do.
Dr Golby: If I can add to that, ﬁrstly, just for clarity
of fact, prepayment and fuel poverty are diVerent
issues.
Q864MrOaten: I am not asking about fuel poverty.
We are all suVering here; it is not just the fuel-poor
who are suVering alone.
Dr Golby: Okay. Let me answer your speciﬁc
question. For the vast majority of our customers on
electricity prepayment it costs us an additional £45
for that service compared to monthly direct debit,
and we actually charge £35. So we are charging our
customers less than the additional cost of that
metering.
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Mr DuV: We charge, on a dual fuel prepayment
basis, almost exactly the cost for us to serve both
prepayment—
Q865 Mr Oaten: So someone is not telling us the
truth, in fact, because the ﬁgures from the
Government data are telling us that, in fact, it is
costing 17% but all of you guys are saying: “No, no,
it’s not that high, in fact, we are really just covering
our costs with this additional amount”. I am
confused. Who is telling us the truth here, or have
you changed practice in the last six months or so?
Mr De Rivaz: I am not qualiﬁed to comment about
what the others are doing. I think prepayment, at the
moment, is part of this inquiry looking at this
question, and hopefully it will help us to have the
answer to your speciﬁc question as to who is doing
what. What I can say is that, as far as EDF Energy
is concerned, on average we have the lowest price
diVerentials of the ‘Big 6’ energy suppliers between
prepayment and monthly direct debit prices for gas
and electricity. We have the lowest diVerential.
Q866 Mr Oaten: Then just accept this: despite the
fact that you are trying to narrow the gap there is still
a gap and it is the case that those on prepay meters
are paying more than other schemes.
Mr DuV: This is the real issue: that it costs
signiﬁcantly more to serve prepayment meters in
their current technology, and that is a problem for a
signiﬁcant proportion of our customers. The
solution, I think, is a technological one,
predominantly. I do not think you can ever eliminate
the diVerential cost to serving the two segments, but
I do think it is possible to signiﬁcantly reduce the
cost of prepayment through implementing, for
example, smarter meters—something that this
company has always promoted.
Q867 Mr Oaten: Here is a challenge. We got a
commitment from Centrica in the last session; when
asked the question: “Are you going to do more
about this?” they said: “Yes, we are going to domore
about this”, and when I asked the question: “Can
you come back here in a year’s time and say that that
diVerential will have been reduced?” the
commitment from Centrica was: “Yes, we will
attempt to do that”. Can you each also make that
commitment to try and reduce this gap, whether it is
through new technology or a pricing scheme?
Mr DuV: The problem is how fast you do it, and I
have to say here is an area where a stronger political
and regulatory lead would be very, very helpful, not
just in prepayment meters but, actually, in smart
metering across the entire UK estate. We have seen,
in other countries like Italy with a very, very strong
regulatory drive to mandate, the roll-out of smart
meters. I think they delivered it across the whole
country in about ﬁve years. If we reallywant tomake
a diVerence to the quality of data, to the way
customers are served and to the accessibility to
competition, then a much, much more rigorous
approach to rolling out smart metering, I believe is
the right approach.
Dr Golby: Could I just add that the answer to your
ﬁrst question is yes, and I will just build on what you
have just heard. Quite frankly, the industry, the
department and Ofgem have just been talking about
the roll-out of smart metering for too long, and if
there was one thing I would really like to see from
your Committee report it is a very clear direction
that we should get on with this, because, quite
frankly, we are using Stone Age technology here; we
know we can do better; we just need to agree the
process by which we roll it out.
Mr De Rivaz: If you ask me what I am going to do,
I have answered what I have already done, which
means that today we are, among the six big
suppliers, the company which has the lowest price
diVerential. So we have already done what you are
suggesting us to do.
Q868 Mr Oaten: So a mixed response: some of you,
in fact, will make a commitment to come back and
challenge us in a year but what you are also saying
is it is not just down to you; you are looking for some
government direction, and smart meters would be
the key to working with you to achieve that.
Dr Golby: Yes.
Q869 Mr Wright: Just moving across to people who
switch, which we recognise is about half of
consumers, Scottish and Southern have been very
successful in persuading people to switch to them; I
think, in 2002-07 8% of the customers who switched
switched to Scottish and Southern, and 5% in the
electricity market as well. You have not been so
successful in that area, so are you not really after the
people who switch, or have Scottish and Southern
got something that you have not?
DrGolby:Maybe I will pick up on that one.We took
a decision some two or three years ago to remove
people from doorstep selling because we did not feel
that was the right way to sell this product. As a result
of that changewe started to lose a signiﬁcant number
of customers. We since have reverted and built quite
a strong sales force in that area, and we are now
growing customers. So I think it is a response to that
type of situation. Themarket is very competitive out
there; people will switch, and you have to contact
them to switch. Having an active sales force along
with other channels—much as I personally dislike
that type of selling—is what, clearly, works in this
UK market.
Mr De Rivaz: The ﬁrst thing we have to say is that
according to Ofgem’s last statement, 9 million
accounts have been switched in 2007, which means
approximately 5.1 million households have
switched. So this market is dynamic, is highly
competitive, and each company is making its own
choice in terms of market share, reduced margins,
depending on their own ability and own strategy. If
a company, for instance (in this case, EDF Energy),
has a more strong organic growth strategy than a
very huge increase of its customer numbers it means
that in this context of churn rates, which are, let us
say, on average, 20%, to maintain or to slightly
increase our market share we need to be extremely
active to win new customers because we are, as all
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our competitors are doing, losing customers. The
simple fact that the churn rate is 20% means if you
have ﬁve million customers, to remain with the same
number at the end of the year, you need to win one
million customers. So each company is making its
own choice in this respect. This market is
extraordinarily dynamic and highly competitive.
The churn rates are very high and I think it is one of
the reasons we are saying that in the reality of this
market, because it is very competitive, the margins
are pretty slim.
Mr DuV: I would echo those comments. In 2002/03
we lost a signiﬁcant proportion of our customer base
while we were focusing on building systems and
consolidating platforms and getting our service
proposition rights so that we could sell eVectively.
Since then we have been fairly successful in
increasing our own market share through a
combination of the right proposition, product,
brand, promotion and the use of channels. The
challenge for any company is to get the right
combination of those things: brand, value,
proposition price and sales channel to grow one’s
own customer base at the expense of one’s
competitors, and I am pleased to say that we have
been successful in that in recent years.
MrWright:DrGolby, you said you did not like that
type of selling, so you went away from it and you
have gone back to it again. What would you say—
and this would be to all three of you—in terms of the
allegation in the Sunday paper where they said that
customers signed forms without revealing it was a
contract, exploiting people with poor English, lied
about standing charges and pretended to be from the
Electricity Board, leading to an investigation by
Ofgem? Is that what you are afraid of? Is that
something that you would dislike—that you have
not got control over people who actually sell a
product?
Q870 Chairman: I thinkMrDuV should answer that
question because it is his company that caused the
diYculties, and his company that is being
investigated. He must be pretty ashamed of what
happened.
Mr DuV: Let me say, yes, that this company very
much regrets the incident that was reported on then.
It is one of the great diYculties with managing
eVectively a direct sales channel, and in that incident
we were found to be caught short. That is why this
company has reacted very, very aggressively:
internal inquiries, changes of processes and very
much stronger controls to ensure that, to the best of
our possible ability, it cannot happen again. The
diYculty for us—not just us as a company but as an
industry—is that direct selling is perhaps the most
eVective mechanism of bringing the beneﬁts of
competition to the widest range of customers and,
particularly, those who do not, for example, have
access to internet tools, computers and so on. So it
is a very powerful force for competition and one that
has delivered over the years signiﬁcant beneﬁts to
customers in the UK. It does present very serious
challenges to us, in terms of controls, and we are
determined, through things like 100% veriﬁcation of
every sale, mystery shopping and controls of the way
that teams and customers are trained, to ensure it
does not happen again.
Q871 Mr Wright: In terms of the people that switch
then, it is proven fact that a third of those that switch
actually switched to a higher tariV than the one that
they left. Surely, that practice itself should be
quashed. What would you do, as a company, to
prevent that happening?
DrGolby:Letme tell youwhatwe are doing, because
when we re-established and rebuilt our direct sales
force we made sure that every single sales person has
a Pen Tablet—that is a small, hand-held computer.
Into that is programmed all of the available tariV
information, and so if we are not able to oVer a
customer a saving it is very clear and we say so, and
we move on to somebody else. So I would certainly
recommend across the industry that we ought to
adopt similar techniques and make sure we are very,
very transparent and probably even follow that up
with a formal written quotation, so people are
absolutely clear about what they are getting.
Mr de Rivaz: I agree with that. In 2002 we led the
industry in establishing a code of conduct in terms of
sales activity, and we are ﬁrmly sticking to this code
of conduct, which I think is the only way to behave
in this industry. There are many products available;
I think there are almost 50 products available on the
market for customers to be able to choose from.
Typically, I think, each of the suppliers has between
seven to nine diVerent products. Price is one of the
elements, and within price there are various
products possible—ﬁxed price, cut price—and there
are other products which are oVered to customers.
We, for instance, have been very successful in
oVering a product which we call Read, Reduce,
Reward, which is a strong signal given to customers
to encourage them to reduce energy. So the choices
to the customers are largely driven by prices, and we
are very open and transparent about it, but they are
able also to consider other aspects. That is the
beauty of the market—the customers have the
choice.
Mr DuV: I would say that it is absolutely essential
that customers understand precisely what it is that
they are signing up for, and that is why in our case
100% veriﬁcation of sale is the best way to ensure
they understand precisely the nature of the
agreement that they are entering into. It also gives a
strong control against any possible allegations of
mis-selling. However, I think it is also very
important to say that the industry has responded to
customer demands for a variety of products which
are not necessarily as you describe. For example, we
sell boiler maintenance as an oVer alongside an
energy contract. We have 350,000 customers who
pay a premium, quite consciously, for a green tariV
product. We have 160,000 customers who are in the
process of registering for long-term, ﬁxed-price deals
at a premium to the existing market price for long-
term security. So the market is responding, I think,
quite dynamically to the needs and demands of
customers in a variety of diVerent ways, and the
products that are being sold are not a simple
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homogenous product that you can only diVerentiate
on price; there are other issues that go into the
decision.
Q872 Mr Wright: Finally, one of the reasons
Scottish and Southern suggest that they are leaders
in the market to get new competition is the fact that
they have got a fair pricing policy. By implication
this would suggest that all of the other companies
have an unfair pricing policy. What would you say
to that?
Mr de Rivaz: My company, EDF Energy, has a fair
pricing policy, and I have not heard Mr Marchant
saying that the others were unfair.
Mr DuV: I certainly hope he has not. We have a fair
pricing, responsible pricing policy and a competitive
pricing policy.
Dr Golby: I cannot add to the comments that have
just been made.
Q873 Chairman: Before I move on to the last section
of questioning I want to come back to this question
of doorstep selling, because I was very struck by Dr
Golby saying he did not like it, and you lost control
of it completely at Npower. Is it really possible that
this vital tool to achieve switching can be done
ethically? You had a major management failure at
Npower, and it was a meltdown for your corporate
reputation as well. Can we be conﬁdent that the
measures you have put in place now, which have
been great for a year, will not be chipped away again
by enterprising salesmen after a quick commission
and we will be revisiting these problems again in a
year’s time?
Mr DuV: I think the answer is we have to be. Just
some context: complaints on selling have reduced, in
our company, by something like 90% since 2002.
This industry, I believe, bears favourable
comparison with any other industry that utilises
direct selling to access customers in this way.
However, it really does carry risk. As you said, this
was an illustration of the control challenges that it
presents and ones that we must adequately respond
to, to ensure that, as I said, the beneﬁts of
competition are available to everybody.
Q874 Chairman: I do not want to labour the point
as we are not inquiring into this subject, but I know
Lindsay wants to come in. Dr Golby, why do you
not like it?
Dr Golby: I think, with a product as critical to life as
the products that we sell, it just does not feel an easy
thing to knock on people’s doors or ring them over
the telephone to sell. That is just a personal, intuitive
view. That is the way, however, the industry works,
and that has proven to be the most eVective way of
persuading customers to switch. Therefore, we have
to be absolutely rigorous in the controls we put in
place and why we spend a lot of money with hand-
held computers so we can see exactly what our
salesmen are quoting to customers, and therefore
canmake as sure as possible thatmis-selling does not
take place.
Q875 Chairman: The simple thing is a telephone call
can be recorded but a doorstep conversation cannot.
Are not telephone sales preferable to doorstep sales?
Dr Golby: A doorstep conversation, if it is recorded
on electronic devices, as I have just said, where the
customer has a copy and we have a copy of exactly
what is being sold, I think, is equally as valid as a
recorded telephone conversation.
Q876MrHoyle:You are absolutely right; it is about
transparency. I think the biggest problem is that you
turn up on the door, you knock on the door and you
give them the Christmas present—which seems to be
all tinsel, all balls and all the latest wrapping paper—
but the problem is they are very disappointed when
they get the present because they really do not
understand what they have signed up to. So the
assurance has to be that that is not going to be the
case any more; it is going to be transparent and they
are going to understand the price. Is that right?
Mr DuV: Correct.
Q877 Mr Hoyle: So, in 12 months’ time, if you have
got it wrong, what do you do? Resign?
Mr DuV: I do not expect to get it wrong.
Chairman: Good question, Mr Hoyle. Is it a
resigning issue if you get it wrong again? There is no
answer to that. The silence speaks volumes. This is
an issue on which, if it goes wrong, we will be back
to visit again, I can assure you. We certainly will.
Q878 Roger Berry: May we turn to the signiﬁcant
problem of fuel poverty and social tariVs?Much was
made of the announcement that the ‘Big 6’ would
contribute an extra £50 million this year to spend on
social assistance. Fifty million, as you pointed out in
the context of this industry, is hardly a vast sum of
money. Has it been decided that the individual
companies will decide how to spend their share of
the ﬁfty million? Do you know now what you are
going to do? I do not want the details of what you
are going to do, but is it a uniform policy across the
‘Big 6’ or not?
Mr DuV: This company is committed to spending
around £52 million over the next three years. We
have already announced the simplest possible way of
targeting that aid to those most in need. It is a social
tariV, it is £125 discount per fuel on whatever tariV
the particular customer is on—£250 discount for
dual fuel, obviously—and we will target it at those
who most need it. That, we think, is the best
solution.
Q879 Roger Berry: How do you identify those?
Mr DuV: We identify those through our call
centres—people who contact us with diYculty
paying. We encourage people to contact us if they
are in debt and struggling to pay. We make it very
much part and parcel of the training programmes
that we put our call centres through and we
obviously publicise the availability. Further, we are
willing to take references not just from individuals
but, also, close family members and other
representatives to initiate contact.
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Q880 Roger Berry: Given that you cannot, for
obvious reasons, know who amongst your
customers are fuel poor and, therefore, you have to
respond to people, perhaps, phoning up and saying:
“Do I qualify for the social tariV?” do you not think
it might be better, as suggested byHelp theAged and
Age Concern, that the £50million could be allocated
to the poorest pensioners, very simply, by a £50
voucher to pensioners on PensionCredit over 70, for
example?
Dr Golby: Let me respond to that. Our main vehicle
is part of a tariVwhich we call StayWarm, which we
had already expanded three-fold before we agreed to
the additional funding with the Government. We
focused that at people we believe are the most
seriously aVected here (so people who probably are
spending up to 20% of their income on fuel rather
than the cut-oV of 10%), and that is, predominantly,
older people on beneﬁts and mentally or physically
frail. We have a tariV there which is quite deep and
targeted and that, probably, costs about £400 for
each of those customers. So whilst the Age Concern
comment, I think, is useful, if we are really going to
tackle this problem we have to do more than £50.
Q881 Roger Berry: Possibly more than £50 million
extra this year. In some statements we have been told
it is £225 million over three years, which is classic
treble-counting—whether it is on the part of the
Department forWork or Pensions or yourselves I do
not know, but £50 million extra this year. I take the
point that there are indeed others than pensioners
who are suVering very seriously, and you mentioned
disabled people under 60, for example, and the
three-quarters of a million children who live in fuel-
poor households. So I accept the case that there is an
important argument for giving them support as well,
but I am left with two questions. The ﬁrst question
is: the Government said this money was to be used
for the poorest pensioners. So my ﬁrst question is: is
that true or false?
Dr Golby: That is certainly the way we intend to
spend it.
Q882 Roger Berry: So you are focusing entirely on
the poorest pensioners?
Dr Golby: We are focusing predominantly.
Q883 Roger Berry: Predominantly.
Dr Golby: Predominantly.
Q884 Roger Berry: I have to say, I genuinely do not
know how customers can make sense of this. How
do customers ﬁnd out if they might be entitled to
something from this £50 million? You do not know
who the fuel-poor are. One of you relies, to some
extent, on people phoning up and saying: “I think I
might qualify”. You cannot have the information to
identify who are the poorest of your customers. I do
not know how you are working out who gets this
money. Can you help me on this?
Mr de Rivaz: Can I try to say something, because I
have been the last one to say something about fuel
poverty. My company has been the ﬁrst one a few
years ago to implement a social tariV, which is a
simple one, which is a 15% discount oV their energy
bills. I am pleased to see that others have been
following in our footsteps.
Q885 Roger Berry:May I ask for whom?Forgive me
interrupting, but 15% oV their bills sounds very
good. For whom?
Mr de Rivaz: We have been targeting, through
various channels with the help of social
organisations, people who have the responsibility in
society to—
Q886 Roger Berry: Welfare organisations like Age
Concern, and so on, do you mean?
MrdeRivaz:Yes, absolutely. The combination of all
these actions plus our own fuel poverty propensity
model to assess the likelihood of customers across a
customer base to be in fuel poverty has helped us to
target. I am not saying that we have reached all those
who are in need among our customers, by far, but we
have made this ﬁrst step, which is, I think, an
important one. The ﬁnal remark I would like to say
is that there has been a summit a few weeks ago with
the Government, the energy industry—a lot of
organisations—about this fuel poverty issue on the
back of the Government’s decision to increase the
suppliers’ contribution to it. I think we should rely
on this process, to look at all the options to deﬁne
before next winter what will be the practical ways to
spend eYciently this additional money. Beyond all
that, there is always the burning question in this
country about the beneﬁts of having a kind of
mandatory social tariV. I know that it is a point on
which I have a position which is diVerent frommany
of the suppliers. I do not think a mandatory social
tariV will prevent competition or would prevent
innovation. It will be the basic requirement for all; it
does not prevent anyone going further to oVer
innovative products in addition to that. This debate
has been here for years and years but fuel poverty
has not decreased in this country. So it may give
everyone the right signal to address this issue on a
level playing ﬁeld and discussed in the most open
way, I think it might be helpful.
Mr DuV: The approach to fuel poverty, currently,
was designed at the end of the 1990s in aworld where
energy costs were relatively low and declining in the
UK, and I thinkwas an entirely sensible approach to
delivering better lives to those most in need in the
community. We are going through an energy price
shock globally the like of which we have not seen
since the 1970s. I think it is right to question whether
that model is any longer suYcient to support that
particular group of vulnerable people in our society,
faced with the very, very real pressures that all of us
face going forward. I wonder whether a fresh policy
look at the whole approach is the right answer, so
that the necessary eVects of these very high energy
prices that we are seeing will drive the right signals
in behaviour in the way people who can aVord to
change the way they live their lives can do so while
protecting those in community who are least able to
respond to the challenges that this presents. Far
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fromdisagreeingwithmy colleague, I would support
a fresh policy look at this and consider whether the
piecemeal approach is any longer suYcient.
Q887 Roger Berry: So you think it is worth looking
at a diVerent tariV?
Mr DuV: Yes, I think so.
Q888 Roger Berry: That is two out of the six so far.
I have never understood the argument that says that
having amandatory social tariV destroys innovation
and competition, any more than a National
Minimum Wage destroys innovation and
competition. Dr Golby, are you open-minded on
this as well? Let us try and get three out of six!
Dr Golby: I am open-minded in the sense that, as I
said at the beginning, we have had a 14-fold increase
in the oil price since this policy was put into place. It
is not surprising that it is not working, and we really
need to have a fundamental look at it. The
Government periodically asking us to put some
more money into it, I think, is not the right way
forward. We need to stand back and have a real
look. However, this is diYcult to do in a competitive
market, and that is what you politicians have set up
here—a competitivemarket for gas and electricity. If
we are going to treat this problem seriously this is a
major redistribution of wealth, and we ought to be
open, honest and clear about it and get some very
clear direction from government, because
government are the people who actually have the
information that can target this. Whatever we do as
an industry, and we want to do something because
none of us feel comfortable being in this position,
they have the levers to pull here; we ﬁnd it more
diYcult to pull those levers.
Q889 Roger Berry:Howmajor it will be will, clearly,
depend on the sums of money involved, but in
principle—as with the National Minimum Wage—
this could either have an eVect or it could not have
an eVect, depending on where you set the level. As
with the National Minimum Wage, you have the
enormous advantages (a) that people knowwhat the
policy is and (b) they know what it includes. So just
as we know what we include in the National
Minimum Wage, in a social tariV we would know
what that would actually mean, and, thirdly, it
would be a level playing ﬁeld for everybody. Given
that, Dr Golby, do you not think there is a powerful
argument for making it clear to consumers, and
having a level playing ﬁeld and transparency, so that
instead of lots of diVerent social tariV schemes
people knew what the minimum requirement was?
Does that not appeal to you, to make progress from
a situation you have very adequately described as
being confusing?
Dr Golby: Clarity certainly appeals to me,
particularly if we are going to tackle this on a long-
term sustainable basis. Yes, I can subscribe to that if
that is the direction that government wants to go.
Can I make one further point here? Let us not run
away with the view that social tariVs are the only
thing we should be doing here. Yes, we must
alleviate this problem because it is just totally
unacceptable, but the real issue is the disgraceful
energy ineYciency of most of the housing stock in
this country. So rather than subsidising people to
waste energy we ought to be solving that problem.
Roger Berry: I entirely agree. Indeed, I echo every
part of that sentence, but we are talking about social
tariVs because you have got them, you are all saying
how good they are, you have signed up for another
£50 million, and so forth, and therefore it is a public
policy area that needs clariﬁcation. Obviously we
cannot, Chairman, but given that we have now got
three out of the six supporting the principle of a
mandatory social tariV, it is a shame we cannot get
the other three back on again.
Chairman: One was not against it last time.
Roger Berry: Fine—four out of six! This has to be a
major recommendation in our report, I think,
Chairman. I will rest my questions there.
Chairman: I am very grateful. There is just one
factual question Mark Oaten wanted to ask.
Q890 Mr Oaten: Very ﬁnally, a good indicator of
what kind of a messy situation we are in at the
moment would be just how many of your customers
are defaulting on their bills.What kind of percentage
increase have you seen in the last year for peoplewho
just cannot pay?
Dr Golby: I will come back with a written response.
This is an intuitive response. I think we have
probably seen our bad debts double in the last 12
months.
Mr de Rivaz: I will give you more precise answers.
We are doing two things. One is recognising that
there is a current challenge due to this diYcult
context, but we are trying to improve our bad debt
achievements in the company, so it is diYcult for us
to diVerentiate between what is the result of our
eVorts to reduce bad debt and what is the
consequence of the context which increased the bad
debt. I will give youmore details in written evidence.
Q891 Mr Oaten: So bad debt is up?
Mr deRivaz:Well, in our company I will not say bad
debt is up globally because we are acting—
Q892MrOaten: In theUKmarket, are more people
struggling now to pay their bills than they were a
year ago? Yes or no?
Mr de Rivaz: The answer is yes.
Q893 Mr Oaten: Fine. Next one.
Mr DuV: The answer is yes, and the response in our
case is to put in place some very, very targeted debt
relief measures for people who are struggling to pay
their bills and to encourage them to come and talk
to us.
Q894 Mr Oaten: Has it doubled as well for you?
Mr DuV: No, but I will have to come back to you
with a factual response to that question.
Mr de Rivaz: What is true is that our EDF Energy
Trust Fund, which has been given £7 million of
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funding for customers who are under the huge
impact of having high debt, is highly successful, and
there are more and more requests from customers to
use the possibilities of the fund we are funding.
Chairman: What all six of you have been highly
successful at is using this opportunity to promote
your own particular competitive advantage in the
market. I am impressed by that. Sadly, I have not
had the opportunity to ask Dr Golby whether I
should take his ﬁxed price tariV to lure me away
from you,Mr deRivaz, having leftMrDuV a couple
of years ago! We might explore that later,
afterwards. There are a million things we would like
more detail about but this has been a fascinating
session. We are grateful to you. I think you have
demonstrated a sensitiveness and awareness of the
challenge, and we look forward to seeing what you
report.We have onemore sessionwith the European
Commission on Thursday. Thank you very much
indeed.
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Q895 Chairman: Good morning, gentlemen, and
thank you very much indeed for giving up your time
to talk to the Committee. I think I would like to
introduce my colleagues to you, ﬁrst of all, so that
you understand who we are in the room, and I will
ask you to do the same thing. My colleague here is
Brian Binley and he will be asking you questions
towards the end, over there is TonyWright who will
be asking you the ﬁrst questions after mine, and
Adrian Bailey is over here. My two colleagues here
are Clerks to theCommittee, who are responsible for
the working of the Committee and writing our
Report, and you will not, I expect, be hearing from
them. Gentlemen, can I ask you to introduce
yourselves.
Mr Hilbrecht: Thank you very much for having us.
My name is Heinz Hilbrecht and I am the Director
for Energy Markets and Security of Supply in the
Directorate General for Transport and Energy of
the European Commission. I have to apologise for
Eric Van Ginderachter, who was scheduled to be
here from DG Competition, but he had a tragedy,
his mother died yesterday, so he apologises that he
cannot be here today. In his place, I am happy that
Philippe Chauve, to my right, is here and also
Ricardo Cardoso fromDGCompetition, and I have
with me from my Directorate, on my left, Matti
Supponen, working on electricity and Jan Gerrit
Westerhof, who is also working on electricity and
gas, in particular.
Q896 Chairman: Thank you very much indeed. I
think you understand what we are doing as a
committee; we are looking at fuel prices, in
particular, in the UK, though obviously that has a
relationship to every other issue aVecting fuel,
including security of supply and investment, but I
thought you would probably want to begin by
explaining to us progress on the third package,
where you think things are at and, in particular,
what the prospect of getting that package is before
the end of the Parliament.
Mr Hilbrecht: Yes, we are quite happy that both the
Council and the Parliament have taken up the
discussion on the third package on energy with the
view of achieving a ﬁnal decision still within this
mandate of the European Parliament, in other
words, before the Parliament will go into recess next
summer for the elections.We had, particularly under
the Slovenian Presidency, very intense discussions in
the Council and the Parliament and the rapporteurs
have been very active. We have now come to some
propositions in Council on which the Energy
Council has found broad agreement. In the last
meeting earlier this month, there was a lot of
discussion, as you know, about ownership
unbundling where, from the Commission side of
course, we always underlined that our strong
preference would be full ownership unbundling. But
our proposal also included a second-best option, the
independent System Operator, because we knew
from the beginning that it would be very diYcult to
ﬁnd complete agreement with all Member States on
ownership unbundling. In the end, we managed to
have consensus in the Council which includes a third
option, the Independent Transmission Operator
(ITO), where the mother company can still be the
owner of the transmission, but will have to fulﬁl our
strict requirements with regard to the independence
of the management and very strict control by the
regulator involved. This of course is not the ideal
solution, we have to accept that, but at a certain
point in time, I think, in the busy discussions, we
were faced with the question whether we cut oV
there, so to speak, or have an agreement now.
Because, if we did not have agreement, (the countries
opposing it had a blocking minority) before the
Parliament goes into recess and it would have taken
the discussion probably to 2010 and 2011 and we
would have easily lost four or ﬁve years. Therefore,
we preferred to have a second-best solution, but
which, nevertheless, is, I think, an enormous step
forward. It makes the independent operation of the
transmission system operator, even under the ITO
solution or the third option, much clearer than it is
now and it will add also another important element,
in particular, with regard to the co-operation across
the board of the transmission system operators and
also with regard to the better co-operation of the
regulators. Many regulators today are not strong
enough, so we have asked that there will be strict
minimum requirements with regard to the powers
and the independence of the national regulators. The
package will create also a mechanism where the
national regulators can better co-operate at the
European level to close the regulatory gap which
exists today and for which all the regulators, in
particular, deplore. The Parliament has achieved
already a vote on the electricity part 10 days ago and
they will vote on the gas part next week. On the
electricity side, the Parliament has opted for full
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ownership unbundling. This is, in some aspects,
diVerent from the Counter-compromise, also as
regards to the powers of the Agency, that is the new
mechanisms for the national regulators to co-
operate at the European level. The Parliament wants
to give more decision-making powers to the Agency,
in particular, the Agency would be empowered to
take binding decisions on the establishment of a
European Grid Code, something on which the legal
services of the Commission and the Council are
much more hesitant. Under the present institutional
arrangements, we cannot delegate such powers to an
Agency, but such decisions must be taken by the
Commission under the so-called “comitology
procedures”. The Parliament is also opting for more
stringent consumer protection. They want to have
better rules, in particular, with regard to a customer
charter in order to make it binding, whereas we, for
the time being, think that this sort of charter should
be a recommendation toMember States, and should
be left more to the subsidiarity level. I think these are
the major areas for the second reading. It remains to
be seen how the Parliament will vote next week on
ownership unbundling for gas. It is too early to say
exactly whether they will also go for full ownership
unbundling, but the chances are that they will
accept, or that they can accept, possibly a third
option for gas, which will not be as demanding for
gas as for electricity. We will then go into second
reading and we hope that we will have a ﬁnal
package adopted, if everything goes well, if not fully
by the end of the year, perhaps in the ﬁrst quarter of
next year.
Q897 Chairman: Thank you for that comprehensive
answer, and that is clearly very encouraging. What
further liberalisation would you ideally like to see in
a properly liberalised European energy market?
Mr Hilbrecht: I think we will have made quite an
important step forward with the third package
which will cover the ground to a large extent, and it
remains to be seen then later whether that package is
suYcient as a framework for the Europeanmarket. I
am sure that we will have to look into the
functioning of the ITO-model/third option and to
have an analysis done in four or ﬁve years’ time of
the package, in particular, as those countries who
are pro unbundling want the Commission to analyse
whether the third option really is suYcient or not.
We will also see whether the co-operation of the
regulators is working suYciently well and whether
the co-operation of the transmission system
operators is really eYcient. But, for the time being, I
think we would rather have quite a sound package
and we will be looking forward to seek advice from
all the stakeholders over the next years. It is however
too early to say whether we need to go in some years
time for a fourth package, I would not say this
today, that remains to be seen.
Q898 Chairman: So this is going to be the most
signiﬁcant development and we are likely to see
further changes in the next four or ﬁve years?
Mr Hilbrecht: Yes, possibly.
Q899 Chairman: You would probably say this is a
question for British ministers rather than the
Commission, but what beneﬁts, do you think, will
ﬂow to theUnitedKingdom from the third package?
Mr Hilbrecht: I think, and hope, that we will come
back to this a little bit later today, but we are now in
a situationwhere, froma point of energy security, we
realise that individual Member States are in a
situation where they have diYculties in reacting in
an appropriate and fast manner if the markets are
separated along national lines. To have a common
energy market provides an additional level of
security for all Member States, including the United
Kingdom. If you have problems with the supply of
gas or electricity, allMember States beneﬁt and have
an additional security level if they can rely also on a
quick reaction by the delivery of gas and electricity
from other Member States. If we want to increase
energy security, I think we all have an interest in
having a common market which is functioning
across the 27 member countries. Of course I think
theUnitedKingdomhas always been an advocate of
ownership unbundling and of having a functioning
market. The United Kingdom and also other
Member States should therefore welcome that we go
in this direction. Ownership unbundling is not a
panacea, but it is a necessary condition, not the only
condition, but a necessary condition for a
functioning common market, and the UK should
therefore welcome the third package even though
this step is perhaps not as fast and as big as one
would have wanted from the beginning.
Chairman: Well, that is a very helpful opening, for
which I am grateful, thank you. I am now going to
hand over to my colleague, Tony Wright, who will
ask you questions on the oil-gas price link and gas
trading.
Q900 Mr Wright: Could I just, ﬁrst of all, mention
the energy sector inquiry that you held last year, and
one of the respondents estimated that the annual
costs to the EU of gas prices remaining linked to the
price of oil could, under certain assumptions, be
extremely high, and a value of around ƒ50 billion
was mentioned. It considered that this indicates that
the price beneﬁts to the EU consumers of
introducing gas to gas competition would be likely
to be signiﬁcant, so what is the rationale for linking
the price of oil and gas in the European contracts?
Mr Chauve: Goodmorning. First of all, I would like
to come back to the history of this. Why did we have
it in the ﬁrst place? You have to remember that at the
beginning, when gas started to be on the market, it
was seen ﬁrst as an alternative to oil and there was
very little oVered on the market, very few producers
and very few buyers, and, in the lack of a market,
they agreed on the mechanics of the price which was
as achievable to them as possible, looking at the
references in the supply contracts, which were fuel
oil and other oil product prices. Now, these have
evolved to some extent, but evolved only in a few
markets, in the UKmarket, and there have been for
quite a number of years a large number of producers
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and buyers, but in most other markets there is a
limited number of suppliers upstream with a limited
number of wholesale buyers upstream, and between
them there is a consensus that, in the lack of a global
worldwide market, they would prefer to stick to an
oil-gas price link using fuel oil and other oil product
prices to price their contracts which are rather long-
term contracts. It is not the case in the UK.Whereas
the oil-gas indexation is 80% on the Continental
European market, in the UK it is more like 30%.
Why is it so? It is because in the UK there is a liquid
gas market to some extent, very clearly liquid in the
short term, a bit less maybe on the forward market,
and this allows market participants to have other
indices to price their contracts against, and the
reason thus for this oil-gas pricing is mainly
historical, to put it in a nutshell, and mainly because
there is a lack of liquidity in most markets, except
maybe in the UK.
Q901 Mr Wright: So that is one of the reasons why
our prices of fuel have gone up signiﬁcantly in the
UK. Does the demand for this linkage come from
the producers or is it demanded by the consumers or
the governments?
Mr Chauve: The answer is that basically the
wholesalers and the producers prefer this oil-gas
price link because of, they argue, the need to have
some long-term certainty and some stability, but the
other participants in our sector inquiry were usually
not in agreement. Most of the regulators and the
traders usually argued that this was a sign of a lack
of competition and some other regulators and
customers were arguing that there should be a price
link to the gas market fundamentally. Now, given
what I said earlier, it is a bit of a chicken and egg
situation because, so long as you do not have a liquid
market, you will not have an index which people can
use, but, when you do not have an index, then you
use this oil-gas price link. The bottom line, I think,
is that you need a suYcient number of suppliers to
have liquidity and to create an independent gas
market with the relevant price and then gradually
the gas price will be used as the reference in the
supply contracts, even if they are somewhat long-
term.
Mr Hilbrecht: If I may add a sentence, I think what
Philippe has said is absolutely right. The problem is
that on the upstream side the producers and
wholesale suppliers have an interest in long-term
contracts and, traditionally, the price is placed in
relation to oil. Now we see globally that this is
shifting as we have more and more suppliers coming
in and as we have a more diverse situation from the
supply side. If you only have gas traded under long-
term contracts, for example, then of course you
cannot expect that you will have a lot of liquidity in
the market. If you have also LNG, Algerian gas and
so on, then you have more sources and you will have
also more liquidity in the market and then you get a
more reliable spot price also. For the time being, you
cannot really blame people that they use other
indices than a gas to gas price and say, “Well, we do
not have much gas traded and, therefore, there is a
lot of volatility in the market and we do not know
whether the gas price is a reliable indicator”. But we
see movements that this is slowly changing, and the
UK indeed is probably a leading factor. it will be
interesting to see whether the NBP price will, and
can, develop and be generally considered by the
market as more reliable for setting the price. We
have seen that some Norwegian gas contracts just
recently, I think, take the NBP price as the reference
and are no longer only related to the oil price. So
there is movement in the market, but again more
liquidity is needed. The more liquidity in gas, the
more reliable that people will feel the gas to gas price
can be.
Mr Cardoso: I just wanted to add two further points
to this oil indexation question. Firstly, I think that
there is one fundamental aspect which must be kept
in mind, that oil indexation is inherently linked to
the long-termness of contracts. It is only because you
have long-term contracts that you then need oil
indexation because, if you had a short-term one or a
two-year contract, you could conceivably always ﬁx
the price, so it is only when you have producers who
need the certainty in a 30-year contract to justify
their investment and to get bank funding that you
then go on to say, “Yes, we need a long-term
contract and, secondly, it needs to be indexed to oil
because that is the only conceivable way we could
price it”, or at least in half that was the case.
Secondly, what we found in the sector inquiry was
that oil price indexation is not uniform across
Europe, so it is not entirely correct to say that every
single long-term contract in Europe is indexed to oil,
no, because you get the indexation to oil, and yes, it
is the majority, but you also get a high proportion,
up to, say, 20–30%, which can be indexed to things
like coal, to electricity, to general inﬂation rates or
even, in some cases and I believe this is a growing
case, they are starting to be indexed even to hubs in
the European market, although that probably can
only be for Zeebrugge, which is a Belgian hub linked
to the NBP, or for the TTF, which is a Dutch hub
which is also growing and evolving.
Q902MrWright:Did I hear you correctly earlier on
when you said that in the European market only
30% is on ﬁxed-term contracts as opposed to 80% in
the UK market?
Mr Chauve: No, what I said is that in the
Continental market 80% is very much linked to oil
and oil product indices, whereas in the UK market
indexation is only 30% to fuel oil and oil-related
products, the rest being NBP and sometimes other
indices, maybe sometimes even coal indices, so the
ﬁgure I gave was 80% for the Continental market,
but 30% for the UK market.
Q903 Mr Wright: Just explain then, in terms of the
oil-gas linkage, does that actually have an eVect on
the security of supply, and could the link be broken,
in your opinion, between the oil and gas prices?
Mr Hilbrecht: It depends really from what point of
view you look at security of supply, and the picture
is not totally black and white there. If I am a buyer
of gas and I have a reliable supplier, of course I could
say that it is an advantage for my security of supply
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situation if I know that I will get my gas on a long-
term contractual basis indexed to oil. So far so good,
but what happens if I have a supply disruption, if
something happens when the demand increases then
I have a problem, as has happened in the UK, for
example, a couple of years ago? The market is not
able to respond quickly enough if you do not have
suYcient liquidity in the market. If you have a
market, as we have seen it in the past, which is, to a
large degree, dominated by those long-term
contracts indexed to oil, you lose the ﬂexibility of the
market to respond quickly to supply disruptions or
any other problem which may occur. Then you have
a security of supply problem. Under normal
circumstances, the security of supply problem is not
so evident, but in times of change it becomes clear
that the market, as we have seen in the past, is not
suYciently secure. Therefore, you need over time to
provide more and more liquidity in the market. I
think that is also the reply to your question about
what can we do to do it better. We need to develop
the hubs in Europe, and Mr Chauve already
mentioned that there are a number of other hubs
now emerging in Europe, for example in France, in
Austria, in Germany, in the Netherlands. The more
diversity of supply and the more liquidity we have,
the more ﬂexible we will be to react in times of crisis
and in times of disruption and the more energy
security we will get.
Q904 MrWright:You have actually pre-empted my
next question which is on the gas trading and
obviously in terms of the hubs, so you have answered
that in terms of the progress that there has been, but
how does the UK’s national balancing point hub
compare to the other countries and how can gas
producers be encouraged to trade a greater
proportion of their output in the openmarket rather
than on contracts?
Mr Chauve: First of all, the UK is very good at
analysing itself and it is always wondering whether it
is good enough, at least in this ﬁeld, and there is a
huge diVerence between the UK market and other
markets. As we have shown already in the sector
inquiry, the liquidity and the size of the trade in the
UKmarket is so much bigger, more than eight times
bigger, than in the second-largest trading markets in
Europe that it cannot be compared even to the
others; it is in a completely diVerent league. Despite
the development of the other markets which are
rapidly growing, but from a much smaller state, the
UK remains by far the largest traded market in the
EU.
Mr Cardoso: Just in terms of the size that we are
talking about, when we did the sector inquiry, we
looked at the size of the diVerent hubs and at the
time the TTF, which is the Dutch hub, over the
period 2003 to the end of 2004, traded a total volume
of six billion cubic metres. Now, just to show you
how this market is growing, this year every single
month, it has traded a volume of over four billion
cubicmetres permonth, whereas the other six billion
were over two years. However, just so that you see
how small this is compared to the NBP, in 2006, the
NBP had a volume of 650 billion cubic metres, so
yes, the European hubs are growing, but they are still
pygmies next to the NBP.
Chairman: Thank you very much indeed for that
very helpful answer. I am now going to hand over to
my colleague,Adrian Bailey, who is going to ask you
about the link between European and British energy
prices and about the working of wholesale
electricity markets.
Q905 Mr Bailey: We have had evidence given to us
by industry that during the summer, when demand
is lower in Britain, we export gas to the Continental
market because the price is higher. However, in the
winter, when demand exceeds supply, the price rises,
but we do not get a corresponding inﬂow of gas from
the Continent to bring the price down. Now, on the
surface, it would appear that the price mechanisms
are not working properly. Would you agree with
that and, if you do, why do you think gas producers
in the rest of Europe are not taking advantage of
higher UK prices?
Mr Chauve: This was also referenced during our
debate with the UK authorities and we too have
actually been investigating it during the course of the
sector inquiry at the end of 2005 because the issue
became, over the last ﬁve or six years, most acute in
the winter of 2005–06 when there were really very
high gas prices in the UK, much higher than on the
Continent. We investigated the reasons why, as you
said, there were not as many ﬂows of gas from the
Continent to the UK as could have been expected.
The ﬁrst reason that must be discarded is that it is
not the interconnector itself which is at stake, and
this is shown by the price of the Belgian Zeebrugge
hub, which has followed, during the whole period,
the UK gas prices, so the gas price in Europe would
be exactly as high as the UK price in that period, so
the issue is not the interconnector itself. The issue is
more on theContinent itself wherewe found out that
there were quite a number of physical, contractual
and capacity limitations on the network, on the
transport network of gas on the Continent, which
prevented some gas from ﬂowing into the UK. This
is an issue which does not only aVect the UK, but it
is a more broad issue that we are trying to tackle in
the whole of the Continent in many diVerent
markets. There is a problem of a lack of suYcient
capacity, constraints either through physical limits
that can only be changed by investment, but also
sometimes through contractual limits which have
prevented the gas from ﬂowing. As you have seen,
we have a number of cases which are targeting such
possible capacity hoarding situations. Now, this is
not the only issue, we have found out, that was
holding back ﬂows. There is another issue, that the
spectrum of the quality of gas which is allowed to get
on to the UKmarket is smaller than the spectrum of
the quality of gas which it is possible to have on the
Continent, and it is not an issue of the same size as
the previous one, but this is an issue which could be
solved possibly by having a blending station which
would allow some other sources of gas to also go
through the pipeline and get into the UK. One other
possible issue which we have investigated, and
Ev 138 Business and Enterprise Committee: Evidence
26 June 2008 Mr Heinz Hilbrecht, Mr Philippe Chauve, Mr Ricardo Cardoso and Mr Jan Gerrit Westerhof
clearly is it not an issue of the companies notwanting
to take advantage of a business opportunity, in this
case an arbitrage opportunity, but actually our
investigation revealed that there were business
constraints, so it is not that they did not want to do
it, it is that they did not have enough interest to do
it, and they actually might have expected to need the
gas for other reasons, and I will give you a very
concrete example. When the price of the gas rises,
including in the UK, it is mainly because the market
participants expect the winter to be very cold, the
coming winter. Now, when they expect the winter to
become very cold in the UK, it is rarely the case that
only the UK remains cold during that winter and it
will be also the case that it will be cold on the
Continent, at least nearby, and that means that the
operators in those regions will have exactly the same
expectations as the UK operators and will say,
“Maybe I can seize this short-term opportunity now,
but, as we need the gas during that winter and I don’t
have enough to do this plus have the gas later in the
winter for my own needs, then, rather than pay
dearly during the winter for getting additional gas, I
will keep it now in my storage”.
Mr Hilbrecht: It has something to do, I think, again
with the problem which we raised earlier about the
liquidity of the market. A lot of gas is bound by
longer-term contracts. If I may add a sentence also
on gas quality for your information. We have now
started to discuss the issue of gas quality standards
with the European standardisation body, CEN.
CEN has created a working group already to see
whether a European gas quality standard can be
worked out to avoid the problems particularly
related to a narrower band of gas quality in the UK
compared to the Continent. This work will take
several years to come to fruition, provided that it can
really be implemented on a cost-eYcient basis.
Mr Chauve: If I can add one point also, there are
other factors which aVect also these possible ﬂows
between the Continent and the UK, especially the
Norwegian producers who have now a pipeline
Langeled linking to the UK and they still have these
pipelines linking to France and Belgium. In eVect,
they are the best arbitrators between the two
markets and they can decide to send their gas to one
or the other market, depending on the prices. We
witnessed that even yesterday when more inﬂux of
Norwegian gas had a dampening eVect on prices in
the UK, so there are a number of positive elements
to this, but there is more to be done.
Mr Cardoso: I just wanted to add one more remark
regarding your question because you made the
speciﬁc reference to the winter of 2005–06 which is
also the winter we looked at in the sector inquiry. I
think it is important to note that this was a very cold
winter and, if I remember correctly, it was one of the
ten coldest winters in France since 1950, so thewhole
of Europe was a bit short on gas and, furthermore,
there were several cold snaps, particularly late in the
winter, which was unexpected and by then there was
not that much gas left in storage. Finally, and this
was probably one of the worse things for the UK in
terms of pricing, there was a ﬁre at the Rough
storage, which is the main UK storage site, which
knocked it out at the end of the winter. If you
compare that to the winter of 2006–07, there, on the
contrary, you would say that both the UK and the
Continent were over-supplied, so there was gas
available and there were lower prices and, if you
look on a historical price basis, the average traded
price for gas in March 2007 was at about the same
level as the average price for gas in March 1996.
Therefore, clearly the weather has an eVect, but
there are congestions in the pipelines whichmay also
prevent it, and then there are also the secondary
issues in terms of whether companies are able to for
strategic reasons and sometimes for legal reasons,
because in France, for example, suppliers must
maintain the gas in storage for a one-in-50 winter by
law, so there are several constraints on suppliers
where they may want to supply gas, but they are
unable to.
Q906 Mr Bailey: Thank you, you have given a very
comprehensive reply. Given that the European gas
prices tended to set a ﬂoor forUK gas prices, but not
necessarily a ceiling, and that the UK draws a large
proportion of its gas supply from the UK
Continental Shelf, you would reasonably expect gas
prices to be lower in the UK than in Europe, but this
is not so. Now, I think I would summarise, I hope
fairly, what you have said, that there are capacity
and infrastructure reasons, contractual reasons and
also quality of gas reasons why we have not had
quite the inﬂow that you might expect. Would you
expect this pattern to continue in the future, even
though themeasures you have taken are designed, at
least in part, to address that?
Mr Chauve: If you are looking for advice for a
business proposition, I am not sure we are the best-
placed people for that, but it is a fair question. In
addition to the reasons that we have mentioned,
there is a very fundamental evolutionary aspect of
the UKmarket that will be looked at, which is when
the UK market has turned from a gas-exporting
market only a few years ago, a very large gas
exporter, to when it may become a very large gas
importer.When you get to this position the pipelines
can ﬂow in two ways, although sometimes they are
not in the right place, but there the big diVerence is
also that when you are also a producer, you store it
where you produce. When you are an importer you
are so afraid not to have your gas you have a lot of
storage capacity, and there is a huge diVerence
between UK markets and other markets, and when
you look at the percentage of storage capacity and
then the consumption, in the UK it is about 4%. In
similar size markets like France, Germany or Italy,
it is 20%, so there is a big gap to be closed in the UK
in order to meet certain changes, such as changes
which occur seasonally, and that would make a
signiﬁcant diVerence in terms of prices. In that
respect we see positive development. A lot of
companies are starting to build storage facilities in
the UK but, as I said, the size of the investment to be
made is quite signiﬁcant. Another important aspect
is to look again at the evolution of prices. What will
be the eVect of LNG prices, because as the UK
becomes a net importer it involves also more LNG,
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and that means that the price of LNG on world
markets will have an impact on theUK prices? Also,
if you look at the prices of the diVerent sources of
gas, the cheapest are on the Continental Shelf for the
UK, then you have the Continental Europe prices,
then the LNG and then the storage oV-shore, and,
obviously, the more you need gas the further up the
ladder you will go and the higher the prices, and the
prices will also be higher if the world energy markets
become tight. As we have seen very recently, it was
diYcult for the UK to import more energy because
there was a lot of demand on the Asian side.
Mr Cardoso: Let me just add something. In terms of
understanding how important global LGN has
become, in July of last year there was a major
earthquake in Japan which knocked out the
Kashiwazaki Nuclear Power Station, which was one
of the biggest nuclear power stations in the world.
Consequently, the Japanese had to dramatically
increase the amount of LNG they had to purchase
on world markets, and this pushed up Asian and
world LNG prices, moved some of the free LNG
ships back onto the Asian market rather than the
European or the American, and I think one of the
results, which we see in the UK even today, is that
over the past year there have been very few
companies bringing LNG to the UK market, for
example, and this is because the prices of LNG are
at around in Asia between $15 to $19 per million
British Thermal Unit, which is equivalent, I might
add, to more or less where the Winter 2008 forward
NBP prices are right now.
Q907Mr Bailey:Could wemove on to the wholesale
electricity markets? Again, evidence that we have
received so far would indicate that the UKmarket is
becoming illiquid, largely because of oV-market
contracts by the vertically integrated suppliers and
transmitters. Why do you think liquidity in the UK
electricitymarket is falling, whereas inGermany and
the Netherlands it is rising and, supplementary to
that, what do you think are the best ways of
increasing liquidity in the wholesale electricity
market?
Mr Hilbrecht: I do not know whether DG TREN
has a good view on that, because we have actually
not really analysed it in much detail. I think it is a
fact that, unlike in gas, there is not a high level of
electricity trading in the UK. On the Continent,
particularly in Germany but also now going over to
France with themerger of the power exchanges, also
in the Netherlands and the Nordic countries, the
power exchanges are getting stronger and stronger.
The inﬂuence of the power exchanges is getting
bigger and, therefore, you have more mobility in the
market, whereas spot trading in the UK is very
small.
Mr Chauve: If I can add a few words, we looked at
the issue during the sector inquiry because we were
a bit puzzled. Basically, the trading multiples or the
relation between consumption and electricity traded
forward was 1.5 in the UK, it was 5.5 in Germany
and the Netherlands—so a very big gap between the
two—and we looked at vertical integration—the
fact that the big generators were usually teaming up
with large retail businesses that would have used
their energy directly for retail instead of using it in
the wholesale market—whether that was not a
reason, and we could not assume that it was really a
determining factor. It was probably contributing but
maybe not signiﬁcantly enough to be sure that it was
the main driver. We can ask ourselves today, three
years down the road. It is still the same situation and
the operators have still been able to compete rather
ﬁercely on the retailmarket in theUK, so it probably
comes from the fact that the operators themselves
prefer to deal bilaterally. If they prefer to deal
bilaterally, I would encourage you to ask them why
they prefer to deal bilaterally instead of trying to
deal with standard contracts. Maybe it is because of
the structure of the UK market where there is very
limited possible trading on the spot market, and that
is a very important element for operators to be able
to cover their needs at the last moment; whereas, as
was just said, on the Continental market there is a
suYciently large spot market in order to cover
your needs.
Q908 Mr Bailey: Based on your experience on the
Continent, what do you think we could you do here
in the UK to rectify this?
Mr Hilbrecht: I think there are two issues. First of
all, I think the UK should try to promote a liquid
day-ahead market. You are very short on the
liquidity side. The success we have seen in theNordic
market, and in Germany in particular, shows that it
is really important to provide more liquidity in
electricity. Secondly (and this is the other aspect of
the package we talked about in the beginning), one
needs to improve interconnections between the
Member States. The UK is not a particularly good
point in case. We have within the EU an informal
objective of a 10% interconnection rate—the
interconnection rate giving the relation between
import capacity and installed domestic generation
capacity. For the UK it is about 3% only. That
means you are not suYciently interlinked with the
Continent to make it possible to have a better
exchange of electricity which would increase the
liquidity in the UK market otherwise and also
improve your security situation. I think it is a
legitimate point.
Chairman: Thank you very much. I now move for
the last two questions to my colleague Brian Binley,
who will ask you about the EU Emission Trading
Scheme and the so-called windfalls to generators
and then about European market consolidation in
the energy sector.
Q909 Mr Binley: Good morning, gentlemen. I had
the privilege to share a meeting with a number of
colleagues on Monday and Tuesday in both the
Parliaments and the Commission, so it is nice to talk
to you again on these subjects. You may know that
Ofgem has raised concerns that the large energy
companies are making windfall proﬁts from the free
allocation of permits under Phase II of the EUETS
(the European Union ETS project). Can I ask
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whether you believe that is true and, if you do,
whether you think there is any action that should be
taken and, if you do not, tell me why not?
Mr Hilbrecht: There is no doubt that there are
windfall proﬁts, and from a commercial point of
view I think it is pretty much defendable that a
company which receives an ETS certiﬁcates for free
treats them as opportunity costs and prices them in.
That is quite normal. From a competition point of
view, the only question is whether the “pricing in” is
acceptable at a 100% level or whether pricing in at
such high level reﬂects a dominant position. The
German competition authority has done some work
on that. As far as I know nobody there disputes that
these certiﬁcates which have been given for free have
been priced in. The Commission has proposed that
in the next stage of the ETS system (as of 2013) those
certiﬁcates should be auctioned and not be given for
free anymore to the energy generation sector and we
hope that the Council and Parliaments will accept
these proposals.
Q910 Mr Binley: Thank you very much for that.
Mr Chauve: I would not comment on the
competition aspect. As has been said, it is,
unfortunately, cost. It is rational business
behaviour. The bottom line of the problem is that
they were given for free—that is what is at the root
of windfall proﬁts. There have been a number of
measures taken by a number of Member States. For
example, some Member States have granted much
less to their electricity companies in the second phase
than they granted previously, so these operators are
short and can have so-called windfall proﬁts only for
the few that they have obtained for free; some of
them have also introduced some levymechanisms. It
remains to be seen how acceptable or eYcient these
are, but there are a number of ways to look at these
things and I would advise you to look at what other
Member States are doing.
Mr Hilbrecht: Can I add another sentence? The
Commission has also proposed that 20% of the
auction revenues should be used to support
renewable energies or addressing social aspects of
vulnerable consumers, and also we hope that some
amount of money will be used to realise a number of
carbon capture and storage demonstration projects.
In some countries, like in Germany, for example,
they have now taken the position that because of the
windfall proﬁts the companies should give back
some of that windfall and realise these
demonstration projects without any additional
funding support. This position is not shared by
many of the companies. It remains to be seen
whether we are going to use the ETS system also to
enhance alternative energy sources and CCS.
Mr Chauve: I thinkwhat is important is also tomake
consumers understand that the purpose of this is to
make electricity more expensive, to ﬁrst, if possible,
switch to less expensive sources, but, equally, they
should actually use less electricity, and that is one of
the key aspects of the Commission, that you have
more eYciency in the use of electricity.
Q911 Mr Binley: Thank you. Some might call that
social engineering, but I will leave that at this
moment! My concern, however, is that you are
telling me that some Member States are, in fact,
adding to the market by their own actions, and that
is interesting. You will know that the total windfall
is reckoned to be nine billion sterling. I know that
you will not want to interfere in our local domestic
scene, but there is a view that we should be taxing
windfall proﬁts. Do you have anything to say
about that?
Mr Hilbrecht: No, I think it is a matter of
subsidiarity.
Mr Binley: I thought you would say that. Quite
right.
Q912 Chairman: Entirely right. Thank you very
much!
Mr Hilbrecht: Of course, as Philippe said, the whole
objective of having an ETS system is to have an
eVect on the market, and you are having an eVect on
the market if the prices reﬂect the costs of the ETS
speciﬁcally. Whether you have a windfall depends
on how you attribute the ETS certiﬁcates in the ﬁrst
place: we think they should be auctioned. In the
meantime, what do you do with the windfall proﬁts
is a matter which, I think, is solely up to you.
Q913 Mr Binley: It is an answer I expected, Sir.
Thank you. Can we move on to the question of
market consolidation? I do not need to tell you of the
consolidation which we have all seen over recent
years. Can I ask you whether you believe the level of
market concentration across Europe is impeding
progress towards further liberalisation?
Mr Chauve: First of all, one of the key conclusions
of our inquiry was to show that concentration was
one of the biggest hurdles to competition, but we
have to accept that the very ﬁrst reason for
concentration is legacy. We have started, especially
in gas, with quasi monopolies. So it is not because of
consolidation that we have concentration in many
markets, and even monopolies in some markets, it is
because of the legacy and the fact that competition
was introduced without having several operators, as
was done, for example, in the UK with CEGB and
what happened as a follow-up, particularly in IT.
The only country to have done something similar,
but not even to the same scale, is Italy. There is now
consolidation. The good news is that some of it takes
place across borders, like what we have seen in the
E.ON case buying Endesa or Iberdrola and Scottish
Power where the operators are linking across
borders. Where there is a worry is when
consolidation is taking place within a market,
especially an EU Member State, and we have been
addressing these cases in a very determined manner.
In some cases we have forced divestitures. For
example when E.ON was created a number of
subsidiaries were divested, but in some cases when it
is simply not possible to accept a merger, we have
even prohibited. That was the case. When EDP and
GDP the electricity and gas incumbents in Portugal
wanted to merge. So we are looking very closely at
the consolidation process. When it creates a
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problem, we are addressing it, including, if
prohibition is needed. And, last but not least, I
would like to mention the fact that if operators are
too big and if they abuse their power, we are
determined to face it. This is what we are doing in the
E.ON case currently inGermany, the operator being
dominant and where we have concerns that they
have abused their dominant position to raise
electricity prices, we are in the process to accept
commitment by E.ON to divest, for the ﬁrst time in
European history, a signiﬁcant part of its assets,
between one-ﬁfth and one quarter of its generation
assets, including a key base load and very ﬂexible
plants, so that it cannot any more use its market
power to the detriment of consumers. So we are
looking at the consolidation process, and even if
operators are dominant, we are determined to
address this and deconcentrate, if need be, in order
to avoid the problems recurring.
Mr Hilbrecht: May I add a sentence on a more
general level to what Philippe has correctly said. We
think that competition in the Common EU Market
will develop on two levels, and those developments
should now come through. First of all, the big
companies will discover, and they are already
discovering it more and more, the European
dimension of the market. They go across the
national borders into other markets which will
enhance competition at that level. As long as it does
not reinforce their position in their home market, I
think it is a development which is welcome. The
second level of competition which we see is at the
level of niche players, smaller companies, coming up
on the renewable side, for example, developing new
markets, beneﬁting also from the better and more
liberal market conditions which we create through a
European framework. Whether this will in the end
again lead to a furtherwave of consolidation of these
smaller companies, whether they will be picked up
by the bigger ones remains to be seen. Hopefully our
competition colleagues will look at that and watch it
very carefully. Nevertheless, there are for the time
being two developments at two diVerent levels
which, I think, show that increased competition is a
real possibility in Europe.
Q914 Mr Binley: So what you are telling me is that,
in the main, you consider consolidation to be not a
bad thing at this moment, depending on the type of
consolidation, but you are keeping your eye on the
situation. However, you do talk about small players
com ing into the market. We have had evidence to
suggest that, in fact, it is becoming more and more
diYcult for small players to come into the market.
Would that be your concern on a European level, or
should it just be a concern about the British market?
Mr Chauve: I am not sure what exactly you mean by
the small players. If you mean small players on
generation at a wholesale level, or on the gas side if
there is no room for small players, but on the
electricity side there are smaller players on the
generation market, on the generation wholesale
market. Even after consolidation in the UK, there
are still quite a number of smaller players.
Q915Chairman:Can I just clarify.We have evidence
of new energy suppliers vertically in the market
place. They cannot access power supplies to sell to
customers.
Mr Chauve: That is retail then. Okay; sorry. Clearly
it depends on each market. The issue on the retail
market is access to the energy sales, but it is not only
in the UK that you have problems. There are much
worse situations, I can tell you, for example, in
Germany, where in order to enter the retail market
you have to face hundreds and hundreds of diVerent
distribution operators with diVerent rules, diVerent
tariVs, diVerent delays, diVerent procedures, and
that makes it a nightmare when you are not one of
the really big operators because it requires huge
entry costs to start up a retail business. So it happens
not only in the UK, and in the UK the situation in
that respect is much better. Lastly, what we have to
face is that the retail markets are not markets where
there is a huge margin, unlike in other network
sectors like telecom where innovation has provided
new products, created the scope for more services,
higher priced services. At this stage they have limited
innovation and that creates a more limited scope of
competition. So we are aware that at the retail level
there are problems for competition, but, in general,
this is better addressed at national level because the
markets are mostly national and usually even much
smaller than national. These should be addressed by
the national regulators and competition authorities
because sometimes also the practices of the
authorities are creating hurdles for the smaller
operators.
Q916 Mr Binley: Thank you. Just a ﬁnal point. Is
there a case for requiring European companies to
disaggregate their accounts by country so that
potential new entrants can see where the proﬁt-
making opportunities lie?
Mr Chauve: I do not see how we could request this
at this stage. If there is a real case of extension of
dominance, meaning leveraging a dominant
position on a given market to ensure one’s place on
another market, maybe we would look at this, but
that is not what we have heard, and any new entrant,
to be frank, in retailmarkets usually at the beginning
makes losses, even the big ones and the small ones,
everyone entering makes losses, because, as I said,
you have entry costs to start with. So I am not sure
that if you had a loss-making business of a big
operator entering a new market we would ever be
able to say this is bad behaviour. It is the nature of
this business. Only after some point you can break
even. So I do not see as we could go that far. There
are also accounting rules which may allow you to
disaggregate certain businesses, and then when the
companies are publicly listed it is up to the
shareholders to make their rights respected.
Mr Cardoso:Can I add one thing to that? That is not
the way that companies that decide to enter amarket
do it. Most of the time a new entrant will look at
where he is going to get gas or electricity, what the
ﬁnal retail price is, whether there are regulated prices
which might impeach and inﬂuence selling on the
market and make a proﬁt, and based on that he
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makes a qualiﬁed decision onwhether hewants to go
forward with it or not. I will not give you the idea
that they are looking at the retail margins country by
country and then deciding; it is more a case of,
“Where do I have gas? Can I transport it? Can I
sell it?”
Q917 Chairman: Can I pursue that one last time for
the Chairman. Put at its crudest, there is a suspicion
among some parts of the emerging small and
medium-sized enterprise supply sector, the people
who want to supply small businesses in the UK—we
are not typically talking about the domestic sector—
that the vertically integrated companies allow their
generators to make large proﬁts, sell their interests
too expensively to their supply companies and,
therefore, those who wish to operate as retailers are
denied the opportunity to make a proﬁt out of the
retail operation. That is putting it rather crudely. Do
you share that concern?
Mr Chauve: It is diYcult to reply to this without
looking at each and every individual operator.What
we can say in general is that, clearly, the most
proﬁtable business in this sector is on wholesale
markets, not on retail markets. As I said earlier,
retailmarkets have usually smallermargins and even
the bigger operators are usually organised with
diVerent proﬁt centre for wholesale and retail. I
suppose, it is true in the UK as well as on the
Continent, including for electricity where they have
their own generation, unlike in gas where sometimes
they have to buy the gas. Even if they have a lot of
generation, they just sell at arms’ length to their
retail business what they have as generation, because
they have a diVerent proﬁt centre for the wholesale
market compared to the proﬁt centre for the retail
market. Indeed, they have made, in many cases,
signiﬁcant amounts of money, but usually it comes
from the wholesale market, not from the retail
market. That is in general terms what I can answer. I
cannot answer to you on the prospects for individual
companies.
Q918 Chairman: That has been very helpful. That
concludes the questions we wanted to ask you. Is
there anything you feel you have not had the
opportunity to say or you feel we should have asked
you before we terminate the session?
Mr Hilbrecht: Thank you very much. We have said
what we wanted to say and wish you good success
for your work.
Q919 Chairman: Thank you very much. We really
are a grateful for your trouble. There will be a
transcript prepared of these proceedings. The line
has been very clear, by the standards of these things.
Nevertheless, I suspect our ladies who have been
responsible for maintaining the transcript have
found it more diYcult than usual, so I hope you will
be able to check it with particular care when we send
you a copy of the draft. Gentlemen, thank you very
much indeed. Your help has been invaluable.
Mr Hilbrecht: Thank you very much. Goodbye.
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Written evidence
Letter by the Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR)
I amwriting to provide the Committee with further information on certain points which were raised when
I attended your meeting on 31 January.
Electricity Traded
According to estimates made by the Financial Services Authority, between 1 August 2006 and 31 July
2007 984.8 GWh of electricity were traded.
Gas Storage
There are currently nine gas andLNG storage projects that have already gained consent and are awaiting,
or are in the process of, construction. Completion of these facilities would lead to an additional 920 Mcm
(Million cubic metres) of gas equivalent of LNG in tank storage, and 1,850 Mcm of underground gas
storage.
With one exception (which is targeting full capacity in 2018), if these projects proceed according to their
commercial plans they will come online between 2008 and 2015. This would constitute a 57% increase inUK
gas storage by 2015.
There are also a number of projects, some at a conﬁdential stage prior to public application for planning
permission and some already in the planning system, with the potential to increase total storage capacity
well in excess of this.
Delays at LNG Import Terminals
As the Committee knows, commissioning of both the Milford Haven LNG import terminals has been
delayed into 2008. As I said to the Committee, my Department’s assessment is that the delays have not had
a major impact on our gas supplies and prices this winter.
Effect of Price Rises on Numbers in Fuel Poverty
Energy price rises witnessed in 2008 to date will clearly result in upward pressure on numbers in fuel
poverty. My department takes this issue very seriously and we recognise that we need to know the real
impact of price movements, taking into account all signiﬁcant variables and the distribution of fuel poor at
any one time. My department is revising and improving its forecasting method for estimating the eVect of
the most recent price changes on fuel poverty and will complete this work shortly. This will enable us to
make more conﬁdent estimates until we receive the full results of surveys that allow us to calculate the
authoritative numbers. Given this, I do not want to make any guesses now about the eVects of recent
price changes.
Fuel Poverty and Disability
In 2005 there were estimated to be 97,800 households in England including a disabled person under the
age of 60 and living in fuel poverty.
EU Comparisons
Committee members pointed out that a graph which I presented to was titled inaccurately with respect
to its content. I attach another version of the graph with a detailed breakdown on domestic retail gas prices
across the EU, which gives a clearer illustration of the point.
I hope this letter provides the information that you require. I have noted the announcement of your
enquiry into possible anti-competitive behaviour in the UK’s energy market. I and my department are of
course ready to assist in any way.
Ev 144 Business and Enterprise Committee: Evidence
10.00
9.00
8.00
7.00
6.00
5.00
4.00
3.00
2.00
1.00
.00
P
en
ce
/K
W
h
Ju
l-9
8
Ja
n-
99
Ju
l-9
9
Ja
n-
00
Ju
l-0
0
Ja
n-
01
Ju
l-0
1
Ja
n-
02
Ju
l-0
2
Ja
n-
03
Ju
l-0
3
Ja
n-
04
Ju
l-0
4
Ja
n-
05
Ju
l-0
5
Ja
n-
06
Ju
l-0
6
Ja
n-
07
Ju
l-0
7
O
ct
 -0
7 
(e
)
Note: Chart does not include Greece and Finland
as they do not provide price data to Eurostat
Austria
Belgium
Denmark
France
Germany
Ireland
Luxembourg
Netherland
Portugal
spain
sweden
UK
EU 15
Domestic gas prices (including taxes in the EU
for medium consumers since 1998
15 February 2008
Memorandum submitted by BERR
Summary
This memorandum responds to the Committee’s call for evidence.
Section 1 gives an overview of current domestic market conditions including pressures on prices, and
other relevant issues.
Section 2 addresses EU and international markets and action to improve levels of competition in them.
Section 3 addresses regulatory issues and notes current Ofgem reviews on aspects of the markets.
Section 4 provides an update on action to reduce and alleviate fuel poverty.
Introduction
1. As set out in last year’s Energy White Paper, we face two principal long term challenges in energy
policy:
— tackling climate change by reducing carbon dioxide emissions within the UK and abroad; and
— ensuring secure, clean and aVordable energy as we become increasingly dependent on imported
fuel.
2. Global competition for energy resources is growing, and so is the UK’s reliance on international
resources. We cannot isolate ourselves from international markets; rather we need to work to improve the
competitiveness and transparency of those markets, to increase the diversity of our energy sources, and to
encourage the investment needed to bring those sources into play.
3. Within the domestic markets we need to ensure that competition continues to deliver beneﬁts for all
consumers. We need to maintain, and where appropriate develop, the frameworks within which our
competitive markets operate, to ensure that we meet all of our energy policy goals.
4. This memorandum summarises BERR’s views on the UK energy markets in their global context, the
regulatory framework in the UK, and fuel poverty, noting ongoing Government activity where relevant.
Section 1: Competitive Energy Supply Markets
5. We believe that energy supply is best delivered through competitive markets. By giving clear price
signals to market players, and promoting activities that reduce costs and risks, competitive markets are the
best way of maintaining secure and sustainable energy supplies, increasing eYciency and improving services
for customers.
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6. Ofgem is responsible for the regulation of the GB energy markets. Ofgem’s principal objective is to
protect the interests of consumers, by promoting eVective competition wherever appropriate.
7. Since liberalisation, the UK’s competitive energy markets have delivered highly reliable, aVordable
supply, improvements in eYciency and productivity, and large investments in infrastructure to build up a
diversity of supply sources. While the UK’s exposure to movements in global energy prices has increased as
its self-suYciency in fossil fuels has declined, competition continues to work in the interests of UK energy
consumers.
8. In January 2008 the Oxford Economic Research Associates (OXERA) published research conﬁrming
that the UK’s energy market remains the most competitive in the EU and G7. OXERA monitors the
competitiveness of the energy market by assessing a range of factors, including the market shares in
generation and supply, the separation of transmission from generation and supply, and the availability of
regulated third party access to gas and electricity transmission and distribution networks.
9. However, rising prices for consumers have recently given rise to concern about how well the markets
are working. In response to this, Ofgem announced on 22 February 2008 that it had launched a probe into
the gas and electricity supply markets, including whether competition is working well for all energy
customers.
10. We welcome this action by the independent regulator in response to public concern. It is important
that all appropriate measures are used to monitor and promote competition in the markets. Ministers have
recentlymetwithOfgem to discuss these issues, andwill continue to do so. In particularwewelcomeOfgem’s
concern with ensuring that the beneﬁts of competition are available to all consumers.
11. We are deeply concerned by the impact of higher energy prices on people on low incomes. Ongoing
measures to reduce and alleviate fuel poverty are described in Section 4 of this Memorandum.
12. Ofgem has previously reviewed the wholesale markets, for instance in the Gas probe 2004–06, which
identiﬁed some imperfections, and has worked with the European Commission to ﬁnd remedies. Ofgem
undertakes regular analyses of the operation of the domestic markets, and publishes Domestic Retail
Market Reports (the last in June 2007).
13. The same six vertically integrated companies compete in the domestic gas and electricity markets. A
number of parties exited the domestic electricity supply market in 2002; there has been no further signiﬁcant
consolidation in that market since then. Indeed, companies that previously held a monopoly position in
speciﬁc regions (or, in British Gas’s case, the whole country) have tended to lose overall market share. In
comparison, the industrial and commercial supply sectors are characterised by larger numbers of competing
companies.
Company1 Gas market share Electricity market share
% %
BGT 47 22
Eon 13 19
SSE 13 18
RWE npower 12 16
Scottish Power 9 12
EDF Energy 7 14
14. DiVerent suppliers will employ diVerent purchasing and pricing strategies but operate within many
of the same external conditions. Overall, competitive pressures in the market mean that companies that
charge higher prices compared to other players lose market share. Many consumers have switched supplier
and their ability to do so, even if they choose not to, has helped to create competitive pressure on suppliers
to improve the price and service they oVer to customers. Even with the latest price increases, there will be
opportunities for customers to save by switching suppliers. However, not all consumers (particularly those
on low incomes) are in a position to switch easily or at all—and this issue is returned to in paragraph 67 of
this Memorandum.
15. In the non-domestic supplymarkets energy suppliers oVer several products to help customersmanage
the risk of increasing andmore volatile wholesale prices, including interruptible contracts. Products are also
being oVered providing improved energy management.
16. To protect consumers we need competitive energy supply markets, but it is also essential that energy
companies can operate successfully and proﬁtably, rewarding investors and making further major
investments year on year to renew and extend infrastructure. The current trading environment can be
challenging, with rising wholesale prices, environmental obligations, and volatile margins. These markets
are by their nature cyclical, with periodic strategic decisions needed on investment. We need companies in
this sector to take these decisions with conﬁdence.
1 Table ﬁgures are taken from Ofgem’s Domestic Retail Market Report, June 2007 (% of customers as of March 2007).
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17. We note below that energy companies are already making large investments in major infrastructure
developments for gas import and storage, to meet demand and provide greater protection against price
shocks and delivery interruptions. In addition, about a third of the United Kingdom’s electricity generation
is due to be retired over the next two decades, and we will need new generation to replace it. Network
infrastructure needs to be maintained and renewed, and to develop alongside the generation mix.
18. The Government is committed to maintaining and developing the good environment for energy
investment that we have established. Ofgem is reviewing regulation of networks to ensure that conditions
are right to encourage necessary investment. We are also introducing fundamental changes to the planning
system, aVecting major energy infrastructure developments among other projects, to ensure that proper
scrutiny is undertaken within a timescale which does not deter investment unnecessarily.
Energy prices
19. Ofgem’s analysis has identiﬁed underlying cost pressures as the biggest factor in recent increases in
retail energy prices. Global energy demand continues to rise, particularly demand from developing
countries. Global fossil fuel prices have been on an upward trend over the last 12 months, reaching record
levels, driven mainly by strong demand growth andUtight production and reﬁning capacity.
20. In the UK, wholesale gas year-forward prices have increased by more than 50% and coal prices by
more than 85% since January 2007. These increases in fuel prices have put pressure on electricity wholesale
prices which have increased by 85% in the same period. Environmental regulation, commercial decisions by
suppliers, and transportation charges also impact on prices.
21. High fossil fuel prices impact on retail energy prices, though the relation between them is complicated
by long term contracts and suppliers’ individual buying and pricing policies. BERR’s internal analysis
suggests that wholesale prices make up, respectively, around 50% and 45% of retail prices for domestic gas
and electricity customers, and around 70% and 91%of prices for (average sized) industrial gas and electricity
consumers. It is therefore not surprising that large increases in the underlying costs can also translate to
substantial increases in end-user prices.
22. Domestic competition alone cannot protect UK consumers from all the eVects of the rising global
demand for energy resources. Because the UK is interconnected with the Continent and the global market
through pipelines and LNG trade, UK gas prices are increasingly linked to those in the rest of Europe and
the world. Daily variations inUK gas prices depend signiﬁcantly onmany other variables, but the long term
trend in UK wholesale gas prices is similar to that on the Continent.
23. EUwholesale gas markets are currently working imperfectly, with a strong link to the price of oil and
oil products, bundled and non-transparent gas transportation and supply, and a predominance of rigid
long-term supply contracts. This means that arbitrage is not working as it should: European gas ﬂows do
not always respond to price signals. Action to improve the competitive functioning of EU and other
international markets, and the UK’s access to them, is described in Section 2 below.
24. Electricity generation in the UK is more reliant on fossil fuels than in some other EU states.
Therefore, our electricity prices can be more sensitive to rises in their global prices. In 2007, electricity
produced from coal-ﬁred generation was 37% of total electricity supplied.
25. Some network costs have also increased, adding to prices. Charges for gas transportation have risen
in 2007–08. These reﬂect higher pension management costs, higher costs of gas lost in transportation
(because of the higher value of gas), and necessary investment in the maintenance and development of the
networks (speciﬁcally the mains gas network). However UK network costs remain relatively low in
comparison with those in other EU states.
26. As we noted initially, aVordable prices and security of supply are not the only goals of our energy
policy. This Government has taken the lead in the EU and globally in developing cost-eVective policies to
move towards a lower-carbon economy. Our environmental policies within the energy markets—the EU
Emissions Trading Scheme, the Carbon Emissions Reduction Target (CERT), and the Renewables
Obligation (RO)—all have an impact on prices, and the overall impact has risen this year.
27. The Government is committed to the EU 2020 Renewables Target, which requires the EU to obtain
20% of its energy consumption from renewables sources.UIn the summer, the Government will launch a full
consultation on what more the UK should do to increase renewable energy use and meet its share of the
EU target.Wewill work hard to ensure that we take themost cost-eVective approach tomeeting our targets.
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Section 2: UK and International Markets
Global markets
28. For many years, the UK has beneﬁted from its indigenous reserves of oil and gas. As the North Sea
matures and UK oil and gas production both decline, we will become increasingly dependent on imported
energy. By 2010, net gas imports could be meeting around a third of UK annual gas demand, potentially
rising to around 80% by 2020. To adapt to new conditions and ensure continuing secure and aVordable
supplies, we need new import and storage infrastructure, and we need improvements in the way the
international markets function.
29. Our competitive markets have previously delivered investment in networks and supply routes, giving
the UK access to resources and an enviable record of reliability. This continues: in response to developing
import demand, there are now nine gas and LNG storage projects in the UK that have already gained
consent and are under construction or awaiting it. Completion of these facilities will lead to an additional
920Million cubic metres (Mcm) of gas equivalent of LNG in tank storage, and 1,850Mcm of underground
gas storage. These projects could constitute a 57% increase in UK gas storage by 2015.
30. This investment will put the UK gas market in a stronger position to deal with present and future
risks to diVerent international supply sources. Access to the LNGmarket in particular will allow for greater
ﬂexibility to respond to shocks. It is important that this record of positive investment continues to meet our
developing energy needs in the future.
31. We must also make further progress in establishing fully competitive and transparent international
markets. This will enable companies to get fair access to the energy resources we need. EVective markets
will ensure that the world’s ﬁnite resources are used in the most eYcient way and ensure that we make the
transition to a low carbon economy at least cost. Further liberalisation of EU energy markets is an
important part of this.
32. UK and Continental gas prices and ﬂows are increasingly aVected by the wider international energy
market. As noted above, gas prices are inﬂuenced by global oil prices, both directly through oil price-linked
contracts and also indirectly where oil and gas are substitute fuels (eg electricity generation and heating).
In the future, it is likely that gas prices will also be inﬂuenced by coal prices, which is a key substitute in the
power generation and industrial sectors.
33. Trade in Liqueﬁed Natural Gas (LNG) is forecast to increase internationally. The UK participates
in this market through the import facilities at the Isle of Grain and at Teesside and, looking forward,
through the LNG import terminals atMilford Haven, which are expected to commission this year. Supplies
of LNG to the UK are currently sourced from Algeria, Qatar, Egypt and Trinidad & Tobago. At present
LNG prices are high, in part due to high demand in Japan (following problems with their nuclear power
ﬂeet) and Turkey (due to low volumes of piped gas imports). Over time themore global and liquid the traded
LNG market becomes, the greater the access for the UK to more diverse sources of supply.
34. Russia dominates gas supplies into Europe, currently accounting for some 25%.Whilst the UK is not
directly dependent on Russian gas and has a diverse range of supply sources and import routes, tightness
in the Continental gas market can aVect the UK ﬂows and prices. There are some concerns about the level
of investment in Russian gas production given the decline of their existing large gas ﬁelds and forecast
growth in European and world demand. We are working with the EU to launch the Partnership and
Cooperation Agreement which we can use to encourage a more stable regulatory environment for overseas
investment in the Russian energy sector.
35. Similar concerns also exist around investment in the Middle East and North Africa. The UK is
working with the International Energy Forum to investigate barriers to investment and encourage their
reduction.We are also working with the International Energy Agency and the EU, in particular the EUGas
Coordination Group, to consider cross-border security of supply issues and the state of the global gas
market.
36. Further, we are promoting diversiﬁcation as a key component of an eVective EU external energy
policy. As part of this we are working to create conditions in Turkey and the Caspian states that will favour
the construction of the Nabucco pipeline, to carry gas from the Caspian to Europe.
EU markets
37. As noted above, EU wholesale gas markets are currently working imperfectly. The Government is
committed to working for transparent, liberalised energy markets in the EU. Transparent markets would
ensure that gas prices better reﬂect market fundamentals and respond more ﬂexibly to the supply/demand
balance, and would make a substantial contribution to ensuring security of supply, both in the short and
the long term.
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38. Completing liberalisation of the internal energy market is one of the key objectives of the Lisbon
Economic ReformAgenda, which focuses onmaking the EUmore competitive. TheCommission published
the results of a sectoral inquiry in January 2007 stating that:
(a) further unbundling of transmission businesses from non-network activities would remove any
incentive to discriminate in favour of particular supply businesses;
(b) regulators did not always have the powers or independence to ensure competition. The solution
suggested was to give them the necessary powers and independence, along with a duty to promote
the internalmarket. It was noted that there was a lack of coordination of activities on cross-border
issues and it was suggested that there should be an Agency to ensure such cooperation;
(c) the markets displayed a lack of transparency. New obligations to make public some types of
operational information were proposed.
39. In September 2007 the Commission bought forward their proposals for legislation, and these are now
being considered by the Council and European Parliament. It was agreed at the Energy Council on 28 Feb
that eVorts would be made to reach agreement on the package at the June Energy Council. The relevant
issues for competition and regulation are summarised here.
40. Unbundling: This is the proposed separation of transmission businesses from other businesses in
companies that are currently vertically integrated. It is needed to prevent vertically integrated companies
from discriminating in favour of their own supply and production/generation businesses, to the
disadvantage of competitors. While there is already a degree of separation required by EU legislation, more
has been judged necessary.
41. The Commission is proposing that the same company should either no longer be able to own both
transmission network assets and businesses in the competitive arena (“ownership unbundling”); or,
alternatively, that the operation of transmission networks so owned should be carried out by an entity
independent of the network owner (this is the “Independent SystemOperator” or “ISO”model). Ownership
unbundling would be signiﬁcantly more eVective in preventing discrimination than even the strongest ISO,
as it would remove all commercial incentive for network companies to favour particular supply or
generation businesses.
42. France and Germany, along with some other Member States, oppose the Commission’s proposals
and have put forward an alternative form of unbundling. This consists of a number of measures to
strengthen current requirements for legal unbundling (ie unbundling that would allow transmission
businesses to remain within a vertically integrated group). The Government believes this falls short of the
Commission’s stipulation that any such alternative must provide a similar level of protection against
discrimination by vertically integrated companies as its own proposals and should involve structural
measures.
43. National regulators: National energy regulators independent of the industry were established by the
2003 EU energy liberalisation package. However the limited remit given to many regulators by national
governments has restricted their eVectiveness. Intervention by national governments in regulatory decisions
increases the risk that market rules are not applied equally and transparently, so frustrating eVective
competition. The Commission has therefore proposed widening regulators’ duties (including for the ﬁrst
time a duty to cooperate in developing the internal energy market) and increasing their independence from
governments.
44. The Government welcomes the Commission’s proposals. Regulators should be independent of
Government and havewide-ranging duties and powers and suYcient resources to carry out their duties. This
is important to ensure regulation is stable, transparent and predictable so that market players have the
conﬁdence they need to invest.We also support the regulators having a duty to promote the internalmarket,
in addition to their national duties.
45. Agency for the coordination of energy regulators (ACER): The Commission has proposed the
establishment of an Agency to oversee the coordination of eVorts to encourage the investments needed to
establish an integrated European grid in electricity and gas and to simplify and enhance cross-border
trading.
46. While the Government welcomes the proposals for this Agency for greater cooperation between
national regulators, particularly on cross-border issues, we would want to see the powers of regulators
strengthened in the Agency model proposed so that they can collectively take binding decisions on deﬁned
cross-border issues. This is essential for the transparent, predictable and stable regulatory framework
needed to encourage investment in an integrated European grid in electricity and gas.
Section 3: Regulatory Oversight of the UK Energy Supply Markets
47. Healthy competition is essential to protect consumers and drive innovation. The recent report of the
House of Lords ad hoc Committee on the Regulators noted that most witnesses agreed that Ofgem and its
predecessor regulators had helped to achieve a successful transition to fully competitive gas and electricity
markets and brought signiﬁcant beneﬁts to consumers.
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48. BERR and Ofgem are in close contact with regard to energy prices and the competitiveness of the
retail energy markets. However it is important that the Regulator is independent of Government, and seen
to be so, to ensure that the regulatory process is free from political interference, and to avoid creating
unacceptable levels of uncertainty in the markets.
49. We have full conﬁdence that Ofgemwould respond to any evidence of anti-competitive behaviour by
taking strong and eVective action. Ofgem has a record of using its competition powers, for instance in its
recent decision to impose a large ﬁne for a breach of competition law that restricted the development of
competition in the domestic gas meter market.
50. Ofgem announced on 22 February 2008 that it has launched a probe into the energy markets in
electricity and gas for households and small businesses, in response to public concern about whether the
market is working eVectively, stating that customer conﬁdence is vital for a well-functioning market. Ofgem
also cited its own concern about the increased volatility of wholesale prices the impact of European and
other global energy market developments. However Ofgem states it has not to date seen clear evidence that
the market is failing.
51. This detailed probe will investigate whether the market is working well for all customers, not just
groups using particular payment methods. The probe will be carried out under Ofgem’s Enterprise Act
powers. The European Commission will collaborate with Ofgem in the probe to ensure Ofgem has full
information on other European energy markets. As noted above, we welcome this action by Ofgem.
52. Ofgem will also continue ongoing work on tariVs for pre-payment and standard credit customers,
among other areas. Ofgem will discuss ﬁndings at a Fuel Poverty summit in April, which Ministers will
attend.
53. In addition, we welcome Ofgem’s inquiry into the regulatory regime for energy networks (announced
on 6 March 2008). This will examine how best to provide reliable, well-run networks with good service at
reasonable prices amid growing investment challenges. Ofgem has stated that this should not be considered
as a statement that the current framework is not working, but that the markets now face new challenges and
these should be addressed. Issues considered in the review will include: how to adapt the regulatory
framework in line with government proposals for 2020, proposals for greater power network
interconnection in Europe, a greater emphasis on small-scale distributed generation, and growth in gas
imports. Ofgem has stated that there can be no change to the regulatory regime without full consultation.
54. Ofgem has also launched a code governance review to determine whether there are weaknesses in the
way the codes are governed, preventing industry and consumers from gaining full value from the
arrangements.
55. We are satisﬁed that Ofgem’s primary duty is appropriate for the independent regulator of the
competitive energymarkets, and we do not believe there is a compelling case to amend or add to it. However
we recognise that national and global conditions in the energy sector continue to develop, and we believe
that it may be appropriate to update Ofgem’s statutory social and environmental guidance. We plan to
publish a public consultation on this shortly. It will reﬂect our expectations forOfgem’s role in ensuring that
the beneﬁts of the competitive markets are available to low income and vulnerable consumers, in facilitating
switching among those groups, and in meeting overall sustainability goals.
Section 4: Fuel Poverty
56. The Government has a statutory target that, so far as reasonably practicable, it should seek an end
to fuel poverty for vulnerable households by 2010 and for all households by 2016. We continue to work
towards these goals.
57. Fuel poverty is inﬂuenced by a range of factors. The most prominent drivers are fuel prices, level of
household income and the energy eYciency of a dwelling. The Government’s strategy for alleviating fuel
poverty is centred around:
— Programmes to improve household energy eYciency measures and eYcient heating systems.
— Maintaining a competitive energy market, ensuring the market works for the less well oV, and
encouraging industry initiatives to combat fuel poverty.
— Continuing action to tackle poverty and increase incomes through the take-up of all beneﬁts.
58. Since 2000 the Government has spent around £20 billion on tackling fuel poverty across the UK.
These measures have helped to ensure that the number of households in fuel poverty in 2005 was
signiﬁcantly below the number in 1996.
59. However, more recent rises in fuel prices have had a signiﬁcant impact, oVsetting to some extent the
success of these measures. The latest estimates produced by BRE for the Fuel Poverty Advisory Group
Annual Report show that in 2007 approximately 2.9 million households were in fuel poverty in England (of
whom 2.3 million were deﬁned as vulnerable). However it should be noted that this projection does not take
into account energy eYciency improvements to dwellings since 2005, an area extremely diYcult to model
statistically, and thus is likely to represent an upper bound of the actual level.
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60. In the light of the eVects of higher fuel prices, we have decided on further actions, which were
announced in Budget 2008. A summary of ongoing and new initiatives to alleviate fuel poverty is
provided below.
Warm Front
61. Since its inception in June 2000, 1.6 million households have received assistance through Warm
Front, which oVers a range of insulation, heating improvements and energy advice. Between 2000 and 2008
the Government will have committed £1.6 billion to Warm Front, providing support to vulnerable
households across England. Similar schemes operate in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Looking
ahead, the Government has announced an ongoing commitment to the Warm Front Scheme of just over
£800 million during the next Comprehensive Spending Review period.
Carbon Emissions Reduction Target (CERT)
62. The Carbon Emissions Reduction Target (CERT) will have a focus on low-income and elderly
customers through a priority group obligation. The targets for overall lifetime carbon dioxide savings under
CERT will be roughly double that of the Energy EYciency Commitment (EEC, which ran between 2005
and 2008). Energy suppliers will be required to meet 40% of their carbon saving target by installing free of
charge energy eYciency measures to a priority group of low-income and elderly customers (aged 70 and
over). The eVect of this increased activity together with the Warm Front funding announced mean that
spending on energy eYciency and other measures in low-income, elderly and disabled households is
expected to rise, by £680 million to around £2.3 billion compared to the previous spending period.
Decent Homes Programme
63. The Decent Homes Standard is a minimum standard below which homes should not fall in England
and the Government aims to have 70% of vulnerable households in decent homes by 2010. The majority of
local authorities and registered social landlords are carrying out work well in excess of the thermal comfort
standard, with 90% planning to install both cavity wall insulation and loft insulation even where the
standard only requires only one of those. Progress on thermal comfort means that the number of social
sector homes in England failing on this criterion has more than halved since 1996.
Area based approaches
64. Warm Front and the Energy EYciency Commitment are also supported on a local basis. This has
enabled us in 2007–08 to award funding of over £6 million to 50 projects across England under the auspices
of the Community Energy EYciency Fund. The projects being supported are designed to promote
innovation and look at a whole house approach, with the aim of providing a cost eVective way of delivering
measures to households on a local basis, drawing together support from the Warm Front and energy
suppliers’ activity through the Energy EYciency Commitment/Carbon Emissions Reduction Target. The
projects supported are expected to help assistance to be delivered to around 600,000 households in England
over the next three years.
Access to the gas network and alternative technologies
65. We have also been exploring the role of alternative technologies in alleviating fuel poverty and
looking at ways to encourage gas distribution network companies to provide connections to deprived
communities oV the gas network, as gas is the cheapest form of heating. As part of the post-2008 Gas
Distribution Price Control, Ofgem consulted on measures that would incentivise companies to provide
connections to deprived communities currently oV the gas network. This is likely to beneﬁt up to 360
communities in Great Britain.
66. The Design and Demonstration Unit within BERR has successfully developed a model for the
provision of gas connections to deprived communities by independent gas transporters. The Unit has also
developed models to provide lower-cost household energy from renewable and other new technologies for
those deprived communities where gas connections are not economically viable. These approaches are
currently being piloted in deprived communities in the North-East and Yorkshire.
Ensuring access to the competitive market
67. The Government has been working with Ofgem to enable the fuel poor to use the competitive energy
market to their advantage by switching to suppliers oVering the lowest tariVs. Ofgem is currently working
with the Citizens Advice Bureaux to help vulnerable customers to switch to a better tariV and is conducting
research into barriers that might prevent the fuel poor from switching supplier. Looking ahead the
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Government will also be joining Ofgem at the Fuel Poverty summit in April that will bring together key
players to consider what steps can be taken to deliver support to vulnerable households to help them take
advantage of the oVers the market may oVer.
Energy supplier social programmes
68. In the Energy White Paper, published May 2007, the Government challenged energy suppliers to
deliver a proportionate programme of assistance to their vulnerable customers. The energy companies
responded by increasing the level of assistance provided to vulnerable customers from £40 million to £56
million beneﬁting around 700,000 households. These measures were estimated to take 70,000 households
out of fuel poverty across Great Britain.
69. We welcome these steps but, given recent rises in energy prices, vulnerable households need further
help. Together with the energy companies and Ofgem we will draw up an action plan to achieve a fair
programme of assistance for vulnerable households. Our aim is to increase the level assistance from £56
million a year to a £150 million a year. The Government is prepared to legislate as necessary to require
energy companies to make a fair contribution.
Tackling tariV diVerentials
70. Households that use prepayment meters and typically pay around £55 more a year for their energy
than customers paying by standard credit and £144 more than those who pay by direct debit. It is not clear
that these diVerentials simply reﬂect the extra cost to companies of servicing prepayment meter customers,
nor is it clear whether prepayment customers are being given enough information about other cheaper
payment methods. We have therefore asked Ofgem and suppliers to develop proposals to ensure
prepayment meter users are treated more fairly. If suYcient progress in not made by next winter the
Secretary of State for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform is prepared to use his statutory powers
to reduce the diVerential between prepayment meters and other forms of payment.
Increasing incomes
71. A wide range of action has been taken across Government in tackling poverty through improved
incomes. Signiﬁcant progress has been made in tackling pensioner poverty and work is ongoing to tackle
the challenge of child poverty. Key actions include the introduction of Pension Credit and the introduction
of Tax Credits for families.
Winter Fuel Payments
72. The Government introduced theWinter Fuel Payment in 1997, speciﬁcally to help older people, who
are particularly vulnerable to the eVects of cold weather, with their winter fuel bills. The Winter Fuel
Payment helped to keep 11.7million households in theUKwarm in the winter of 2006/07. If counted against
fuel bills this would remove one million households from fuel poverty in the UK. In addition to our
commitment to payingWinter Fuel Payments at their current rates (£200 for households with someone over
60, £300 if over 80) for the lifetime of this Parliament, in Budget 2008 we have announced an additional one-
oV payment of £100 to over-80s households and £50 to over-60s households in winter 2008–09.
Beneﬁt Entitlement Checks
73. Improving the income of households has a major role to play in reducing fuel poverty. There is a
commitment across Government to encourage people to claim all of the beneﬁts to which they are entitled.
Since 2003 we have oVered beneﬁt entitlement checks to those households who contact Warm Front for
assistance but at the time of doing so are not in receipt of one of the qualifying beneﬁts. This assistance was
extended in 2005 to oVer beneﬁt entitlement checks to all under Warm Front, whether or not they are in
receipt of a qualifying beneﬁt when they apply for the Scheme. These checks result in an average increase
in potential income of around £1300 a year for those found to qualify for additional support.
Memorandum submitted by Association of Electricity Producers
1. The Association represents a wide range of electricity generating interests embracing well over 90% of
the UK’s electricity production. The membership includes all the major electricity companies and a wide
range of other enterprises from PLCs to small family-owned businesses. Virtually every generating
technology used commercially in the UK—from coal, gas and nuclear power to a wide range of renewable
energies—is represented in the Association.
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General Comments
2. The Association has supported strongly the development of markets for the production and sale of
electricity and for gas, which is an important fuel in the power generation sector. Since it was formed in
1987,2 it has seen the introduction of the Electricity Pool of England and Wales and the abolition of the
Pool in favour of the New Electricity Trading Arrangements (“NETA”) and later the extension of NETA
from England andWales to Great Britain (“BETTA”). The electricity wholesale market is now mature and
even detailed modiﬁcations to market mechanisms are less frequently proposed than was once the case. The
available evidence on market competitiveness does not support changes to the existing market frameworks.
3. It is vitally important that investors in the electricity generating industry should have conﬁdence in
the electricity and gas markets. This is a prerequisite for securing the massive new investment which is
necessary to replace ageing power stations and thereby maintain security of supply and deliver the low
carbon power generation that the climate change agenda requires. Conﬁdence is derived from a market
framework that is seen to work and from clear and stable public policy which minimises political and
regulatory uncertainty and hence risk.
4. Clarity and stability, however, have not been strong features of energy policy in the last 10 years.
During that time, there have been three fundamental reviews of energy policy, eachwith a diVerent emphasis
in terms of its outcome:
— Review of fuel sources for electricity generation 1998;
— Energy Policy Review 2003; and
— Energy Policy Review 2006.
5. There has been an extensive programme of environmental legislation relating to clean air measures
(largely EU-driven) and to the climate change agenda and recently, rumours of a “windfall tax” to fund
measures to alleviate fuel poverty. In addition, there has been a constant stream of regulatory measures and
proposals.
6. The Association hopes that this review (and the parallel investigation by Ofgem) does not lead to
proposals for fundamental change. The industry is poised to make very large investments in new power
stations and it could be very damaging if potential investors were to be confronted with new political and
regulatory risk.
Response to Specific Issues Raised by the Committee
Whether the current market structure encourages eVective competition in the retail markets for gas and
electricity
7. The Association does not feel competent to comment on the retail market.
Whether there is eVective competition in the wholesale markets for gas and electricity
8. Competition in the wholesale electricity market is highly eVective. There are no barriers to entry other
than cost. Risk, however, is real and in recent years, whenwholesale prices fell dramatically, companies went
out of business in the generating sector. Despite this, it is still possible to build a business in this market and
there are examples of that within the membership of the Association.
9. The chart below shows the percentage share of generation capacity owned by speciﬁc companies or
types of company in Great Britain. It clearly illustrates the general growth in diversity (and hence
competition) in the wholesale electricitymarket since the originalmarket liberalisation and the large number
of signiﬁcant and distinct entities currently in active competition with each other.
2 It was formed as Association of Independent Electricity Producers in 1987 and changed its name to Association of Electricity
Producers in 1995, by which time there was very little state ownership from which to be “independent”.
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10. The government has itself commented on the eVectiveness of competition in theUKmarket. The 2007
Energy White Paper remarked that “To date, the UK has beneﬁted from one of the most competitive and
reliable electricity markets in Europe with “cost-reﬂective” prices” (para 5.1.5, p126).3 In addition to
BERR and Ofgem, a range of other bodies have described the UK wholesale electricity market as
competitive:
— Oxera’s Energy market competition in the EU and G7: preliminary 2006 rankings (October 2007,
prepared for BERR) places the UK ﬁrst with a score of 8.3 for the electricity market with the UK
electricity wholesale market ranking among the leading markets.4
— The European Commission in its decision exempting electricity generators in Great Britain from
the Utilities Procurement Directive (2004/17/EC) with eVect from 8March 2006, following advice
from Ofgem, determined that generation “is directly exposed to competition on markets to which
access is not restricted”.5
— DGEnergy and Transport’s report on the implementation of the internal market in eachMember
State (SEC(2006) 1709), issued as part of the 10 January 2007 Energy Package, comments that in
Great Britain “for electricity, there would appear to be a suYcient range of companies to suggest
that the market is both competitive as well as being open to new entrants”.6
— DG Competition’s Energy Sector Inquiry Final Report (SEC(2006) 1724, 10 January 2007)
presents a range of indicators pointing to the competitiveness of the UK market. For example, it
comments that “It can be seen from Table 32 that the markets in which most information is
published (eg Nord Pool and the UK) are generally perceived as more competitive than those
where little information is published” (para 575, p 190), although the UK has the top score of 38
out of 49 issues on which information is published compared to the highest Nord Pool member
Denmark with a score of 31.7
— As the International Energy Agency’s Energy Policies of IEA Countries. The United Kingdom
2006Review states (p 117): “Overall the UK electricity market appears to be competitive and there
are numerous market players ready to respond by investing in new generating capacity according
to the needs of the market”.8
3 See http://www.berr.gov.uk/ﬁles/ﬁle39569.pdf
4 See http://www.berr.gov.uk/ﬁles/ﬁle44272.pdf
5 See http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2006/l 076/l 07620060315en00060008.pdf
6 See http://ec.europa.eu/energy/energy—policy/doc/10 internal market country reviews en.pdf
7 See http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/sectors/energy/inquiry/full report part2.pdf
8 See http://www.iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/2006/unitedkingdom2006.pdf
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11. Prices, of course, have fallen and risen. Price increases have been in response to rising fuel costs (gas
prices increased by 83% and coal prices by 97% between February 2007 and February 2008) and
environmental legislation has played a part, too. It would not be surprising if prices rose further in response
to fuel costs, investment costs in power stations and network charges and generating businesses’ response
to ever-tightening environmental legislation.
The implications of growing consolidation in the energy market
12. The market remains open and competitive and to date, the OYce of Fair Trading has been content
to clear mergers between companies. Consolidation can reduce the risks for the players aVected and it can
result in cost savings.
The relationship between the wholesale and retail markets for electricity and gas
13. The Association is not directly concerned in the retail market, but it would expect to see retail prices
driven up by wholesale market price increases given the proportion of wholesale costs in retail prices (see
Ofgem factsheet 66,9 15 January 2008), albeit tempered by the competition in both sectors. As noted in
Paragraph 11 above, wholesale electricity price increases have, to a large extent, been determined by fuel
price increases and the costs of environmental legislation.
The interaction between the UK and European energy markets
14. The Association continues to support the opening of European energymarkets as something that will
help to sustain the competitiveness and security of the UK industry and is engaged in the discussions that
arise from that—regulation, cross-border trading, environmental issues, etc. However, the UK cannot
expect the beneﬁts of increased linkage to the single European market (for example, in terms of security of
supply) without also being aVected by the prices which prevail upon that market. In fact, the interaction
today goes farther than the relationship between the UK markets and the wider European energy markets.
Many fuel prices are set globally.
The eVectiveness of regulatory oversight of the energy market
15. The Association is not always in agreement with the decisions and positions taken by the industry
regulator as Ofgem has a tendency to micro manage issues. That said, Ofgem is generally supportive of
market-orientated solutions to problems, which tends tomake regulationmore predictable andwhich stance
aligns with the policy of the Association. We should be concerned if there were to be radical changes to the
regulator’s remit. Ofgem’s remit, of course, is already much wider than the oversight of the competitive
wholesale market. It regulates the monopoly networks for example and its decisions in that area have an
eVect on the competitive market—in operating costs generally and in opportunities for investment.
Progress in reducing fuel poverty and the appropriate policy instruments for doing so
16. The Association is aware of the government’s concern about this issue and of the engagement of some
member companies with energy retail interests in the debate about what to do about it. It does not have a
view on this matter except that the issue appears to be primarily a matter of social policy, rather than
energy policy.
7 April 2008
Memorandum submitted by Alan Barton
THE PRICE OF OIL
As long ago as 1997 worrying trends in oil pricing began to show themselves. Since the start of the oil
business in the late 19th century the natural law of supply and demand had determined the value of this
extraordinary hydrocarbon at any moment in time and this appeared not to be the case any longer.
With the advent of new technologies in the early 80s it became possible to establish oil futures exchanges
and transmit electronically live prices for months ahead from the exchange to screens in oYces worldwide.
The earliest and most signiﬁcant of these was the Mercantile Exchange in New York, closely followed by
what became it’s satellite, the International Petroleum Exchange in London.
9 http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/Media/FactSheets/Documents1/energy%20prices%20jan08.pdf
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The eVect on the oil business itself was dramatic in that the price on the screen more or less set the price
in the physical market but with it came another more destabilising development. Computer programmes
had been written to use past market data to deﬁne market trends and to use this “sign language” to develop
trading strategies. The ﬁnance houses concerned saw this technology as being applied to the new
commodity—oil. This meant that the oil price could be set without any reference to the situation in the
physical oil business itself.
These trading strategies became known as Technical Analysis and the conditions existing in the real world
as the Fundamentals. So diverse were the two that the editor of the house magazine of the IPE, the Pipeline,
decided that it would be appropriate to publish a piece on Technical Analysis versus Fundamentals. I wrote
the section on Fundamentals but at my request it did not bear my name because of the possible conﬂict of
interest with my employers.
My item, copy of which is attached, set out a brief history of oil pricing with particular reference toOPEC,
of course, and the perils of Technical Analysis. My ﬁnal paragraph prophetically expressed concerns about
the eVects these changes would have and my view that the possible result could be “unjustiﬁable price
increases for consumers”. This, of course, is exactly what happened.
Over the last few years there has not been any problem with the availability of oil and this cannot be why
we have seen such an exorbitant increase. Prices of around 100 dollars per barrel are symptomatic of a crisis
in supply that has simply not existed. The main reason fo this unnatural paradox has been that large
international ﬁnancial institutions came to see in the oil futures markets the possibility of big proﬁts by
trading in this new and largest “commodity” in the world. There was no need to have any knowledge
whatsoever of a barrel of oil itself, the main game being to proﬁt from price movements, up or down, the
objective being to buy and sell, or the other way round, in order to gain from the diVerence. The absolute
price was not really relevant. Furthermore, additional change (“volativity” is the technical description)
could be generated by building into the price the possible eVect of events which may or may not take place
in the future such as military actions, strikes, adverse weather, etc. Hence the going price, ultimately paid
by the consumer, includes a diVerential for the possible eVect on supplies which have not taken place and
might never occur. On top of this there has been an explosion in the growth of derivatives for all types of
oil deals that are freely available in the unregulated OTC (over the counter) market.
A house of cards has been created.
Meanwhile, today OPEC sits on the fence. When asked about the huge increase in price they say it is due
to “speculators”. In fact they are telling the truth in that the OPEC power on pricing has been overtaken
by the forces of the futures market. Most members are happy to receive the greatly enhanced income
although the largest ones, especially Saudi Arabia, are probably concerned about the long term eVect of the
resulting damper on demand, the boost it provides to renewable alternatives and the way it scrambles the
economics on long-term investments. It is possible that the biggerOPEC countries would bewilling to accept
a price around 30 dollars.
Thewave spreads to other forms of energy especially natural gas where prices are linked to oil by formulae
contained in the contracts. The oil and gas companies reap staggering proﬁts and when questioned simply
point to the “market”. For most of the oil companies this is hiding behind a falsehood. They know that the
“market” is not the real market at all and that the price is set by a few ﬁnancial “traders” pushing buttons
in New York but they are happy to quietly make their billions without any blame. Some of them assist in
the process using futures in a big way for hedging, thereby providing liquidity, the lifeblood of the futures
market. One huge oil company does not use futures at all preferring to ride the waves while another
speculates in it and has received many ﬁnes for price ﬁxing. For the gas companies these immense proﬁts
are truly windfalls. While not part of the primary reason for the price inﬂation they are well aware of it and
how they beneﬁt by association with a pricing system they know to be unreal. In a letter published in the
Daily Telegraph a year or so ago the author who I happen to know is a highly experienced gas man, pointed
out that the true landed cost of gas in the UK was between 10 to 20p per therm versus a wholesale price at
the time of 67p.
The political eVect is even more disturbing. The massive ﬂow of petrodollars has revitalised Russia and
given countries, many unfriendly to the west, increased ﬁnancial muscle to use as they see ﬁt. One of the
reasons the US attacked Iraq was not about oil itself (Iraq never interfered with the ﬂow of oil to the US
and other western markets) but the money it generated for Saddam. The imposition of sanctions did not
stop this and huge sums continued to be transferred illegally back to Iraq by oil traders, mostly American,
some of whom were unmasked after the invasion and prosecuted with at least one jail sentenced passed.
Iran, a long standing price hawk in OPEC, which is currently at odds with the west over nuclear matters,
and the backing of terrorists has been gifted for years huge increases in oil revenues.
It is so ironic that the country where the damage is the greatest, the USA, has it’s source at home on it’s
doorstep—the “Merc” in New York.
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Action can and must be taken to change the situation if only for the sake of national and global
economies. Furthermore, unless steps are taken an escalation of conﬂict in one form or another appears
inevitable.
March 2008
Letter by BizzEnergy
Introduction
Set up in 2000, BizzEnergy is the largest independent energy supplier in the UK. The company is aiming
to make a complex market sector simple by challenging the industry norm and developing innovative,
ﬂexible and eYcient ways to serve customers across the UK.
The company’s aim is to deliver the highest quality service to small and large customers, and to lead
market innovation. Examples of this innovation include BizzEnergy aiming to become the ﬁrst electricity
supplier to allow its customers to fully serve and control their accounts online, and BizzEnergy being the
market leader in implementing Smart Meters as part of our supply contract.
BizzEnergy welcomes the opportunity to submit a brieﬁng paper on energy prices to the Business
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Select Committee prior to the evidence session with Malcolm Wicks,
Minister of State for energy, and looks forward to further engaging with the Committee on this important
issue in the future.
Energy Market Overview
As the Committee will be well aware, theUK energymarket is dominated by BritishGas, Npower, E.ON,
Scottish and Southern, Scottish Power and EDF, with few opportunities for newmarket entrants. The “Big
6” share about 99% of the energy market and current low levels of fragmentation in the energy marketplace
give these large utilities great power to dominate market developments and to prevent new entrants from
gaining a foothold. Independent energy suppliers in theUKhave approximately only 1%of theUK’s energy
market share. BizzEnergy believes that this ﬁguremust grow in order for theUK’s energymarket to develop
and customers to beneﬁt.
The current lack of competition and regulation has not escaped the observation of industry watchdogs. In
September 2006, for example, energywatch demanded a full inquiry into energymarket competition stating:
“Major problems with electricity generation and upstream gas supplymean theUK energymarket
is anything but competitive . . . There needs to be increased competition in Gas and Electricity
markets. A licence obligation, backed by eVective regulatory monitoring and enforcement could
achieve this”.
While industry watchdogs have clearly outlined the situation, there has thus far been little action to either
address the lack of competition in the marketplace or increase Ofgem’s regulatory powers.
Energy Prices
BizzEnergy is very concerned about the level of price rises in the wholesale market, especially at a time
when it appears that there is a signiﬁcant element of ‘super proﬁt’ being made by the generators as a result
of Carbon Allocations.
BizzEnergy, at present, only supplies SME customers under term contracts. The prices included in these
contracts are set against the wholesale market prices at the time of the contract being agreed. This is the case
because BizzEnergy sources its energy wholesale from the market. Therefore, the recent price rises in the
UK are embedded within BizzEnergy’s contracts.
One of the biggest concerns facing companies like BizzEnergy is that with the “Big 6” having their own
power stations, with direct access to energy sources (electricity or gas), this leads to market inconsistencies
and aids the anti-competitive structure of the market. By restricting access to these supplies, the wholesale
prices of energy on the market can be massively aVected. The liquidity of the wholesale market is currently
very poor and sporadic due, in part, to this level of vertical integration. As a matter of practice, vertically
integrated suppliers are likely to contract with their own generation before trading in the market, thus
removing vital liquidity from the energy market. This has a direct impact on independent energy suppliers
such as BizzEnergy and its potential new customers.
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The Government’s recent announcement in support of an increase in the use of nuclear power is an
important development ensuring greater diversity of supply. However, unless the problems in the wholesale
market caused by the dominance of vertically integrated energy companies, are addressed, then the
opportunity to diversify may be lost as new entrants will be reluctant to come into a market which does not
have a fully-functioningwholesale market for their product. This in turnmay delay the development of new-
build nuclear facilities as the incumbents will be under no competitive pressure to bring on stream new
nuclear supply in a timely fashion.
The global demand for nuclear power means that new companies are emerging to meet this demand. It
is important that theUKmarket is not foreclosed to these companies because of market entrance diYculties
and inherent anti-competitive market structures. New energy generators will have to use existing suppliers
to get product to market. However, large suppliers will probably rather build their own generation facility,
but in their own time.
In the current energy market, a consequence of the current distortion of wholesale pricing is the absence
of a reliable price benchmark. Without this, and with the nature of ﬁnancial reporting of energy companies,
it is diYcult to determine what proﬁts are being made and by whom. If this lack of transparency continues,
how can the public—or indeed regulators—have conﬁdence that UK energy customers are getting a fair
deal?
Liberalisation of the retail markets was intended to address the issues arising from vertical integration by
increasing competition in the generation and the supply of energy. However, the combination of
liberalisation and changing the trading arrangements has, in fact, favoured the development of large,
vertically integrated suppliers. As a result, barriers to market entry either stop entry altogether or require a
new entrant to ally itself with one of the existing players.
While there is some choice, it must be stated that most oVerings are “similar shades of grey, not vibrantly
diVerent”. Some observers state that electricity markets are working well because 1 in 5 customers (mainly
domestic) switch suppliers in the UK. However, just because customers switch does not indicate that there
is the right level of healthy competition. While there may be some retail competition, there is not suYcient
wholesale competition. Additionally, although the UK gas and electricity markets still measure highly for
competitiveness against other EU Member States, as prices have increased dramatically the signiﬁcant
ﬁnancial advantages for consumers of switching suppliers are steadily being eroded.
BizzEnergy calls for:
— Clear and eVective regulation from Government that will limit the negative impact of vertical
integration in the UK energy market. In the current environment where no one seems willing to
challenge the prevailing wisdom that markets are better than regulation, one of the unintended
consequences of liberalisation is that the market is taking the easy option and passing the higher
costs on to consumers.
— New rules onmarket transparency. The problem of concentration is undeniablymade worse when
dominant companies are not required to reveal basic supply information to smaller market
players.
— Licencing separation. This would increase market transparency and increase market conﬁdence.
Conclusion
Clearly, competition beneﬁts not only suppliers but also consumers. Increased competition and an end
to the privileged position held by certain suppliers would oVer higher quality and more varied services to
energy users at lower prices. This would lead to a well functioning competitive market, which would ensure
suYcient investments in power plants and transmission networks thereby helping to avoid interruptions in
power supplies and protecting security of supply. An increased degree of transparency would, additionally,
minimise distortions in themarket, and thus, themarket would bemore robust, and ultimately, the customer
would be better served.
BizzEnergy thanks the Chair of the Committee for the opportunity to provide this brieﬁng paper to the
Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Select Committee, and would welcome any further enquiries
from members on the issues raised.
23 January 2008
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Memorandum submitted by BizzEnergy
POSSIBLE ANTI-COMPETITIVE BEHAVIOUR IN THE UK’S ENERGY MARKET
BizzEnergy
1. Set up in 2000, BizzEnergy is the largest independent energy supplier in the UK. The company is
aiming to make a complex market sector simple by challenging the industry norm and developing
innovative, ﬂexible and eYcient ways to serve customers across the UK.
2. The company’s aim is to deliver the highest quality service to small and large customers, and to lead
market innovation. Examples of this innovation include BizzEnergy aiming to become the ﬁrst electricity
supplier to allow its customers to fully serve and control their accounts online, and BizzEnergy being the
market leader in implementing Smart Meters as part of our supply contract.
3. BizzEnergy welcomes the opportunity to submit written evidence to the Business and Enterprise Select
Committee Inquiry into Possible Anti-Competitive Behaviour in the UK’s Energy Market, and looks
forward to further engaging with the Committee on this Inquiry as it progresses. BizzEnergy is available to
provide supplementary written evidence to the Committee, and would welcome the opportunity to provide
oral evidence in due course.
Introduction
4. As the Committee will be well aware, the UK energy market is dominated by British Gas, Npower,
E.ON, Scottish and Southern, Scottish Power and EDF, with few opportunities for new market entrants.
The “Big 6” share about 99% of the Domestic and smaller end of the SME energy market and current low
levels of fragmentation in the energy marketplace give these large utilities great power to dominate market
developments and to prevent new entrants from gaining a foothold. Independent suppliers of energy in the
UK have approximately only 1% of the UK’s energy market share. BizzEnergy believes that this is an
unnaturally low share and that ﬁguremust grow in order for theUK’s energymarket to develop and achieve
meaningful diversity and for customers to beneﬁt.
5. The current lack of competition and regulation has not escaped the observation of industry watchdogs.
In September 2006, for example, energywatch demanded a full inquiry into energy market competition
stating:
“Major problemswith electricity generation and upstream gas supplymean theUK energymarket
is anything but competitive . . . There needs to be increased competition in Gas and Electricity
markets. A licence obligation, backed by eVective regulatory monitoring and enforcement could
achieve this”.
6. While industry watchdogs have clearly outlined the situation, there has thus far been little action to
either address the lack of competition in the marketplace or increase Ofgem’s regulatory powers.
7. The UK energy market was originally designed around the separation of generation and supply; with
the primary premise that parties could enter the market as either generators or suppliers and not necessarily
both. Current trading arrangements have, however, given rise to vertical integration, which those who are
vertically integrated arguemakes for eYcient and eVective riskmanagement and lower costs to the customer.
However, the cost of this is the loss of liquidity, transparency and competition in the market—major
conditions required in order to ensure a robust, liberalised and eYcient market.
8. In addition to this, while proﬁts within some sections of the energy industry appear to be excessive, it
is very diYcult to judge whether this is the case. Company accounts normally provide a strong, reassuring
and robust commentary to all stakeholders but this is not possible in the UK due to the international nature
of two thirds of the “Big 6”.
9. This paper provides details of BizzEnergy’s position and its response to the terms of reference for the
Business and Enterprise Select Committee Inquiry into the UK energy market.
Answers to Inquiry Questions
1. Whether the current market structure encourages eVective competition in the retail markets for gas and
electricity
10. Whilst BizzEnergy believes that the basic UK energy market design is sound, the natural outcome of
the drivers from such a design is consolidation and vertical integration. As a result of this, the market then
looks to ﬁnd an equilibrium and, as such, the existence of ﬁve or six players each with approximately 20%
market share all similarly structured, tends to reduce the stimulus for competition.
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11. These large players therefore, by necessity, adopt a systems-based approach to customer service and
products—ﬁtting customers to standardised products rather than bespoke solutions. Smaller suppliers are
more commercially ﬂexible and should be able to service customers’ requirements more precisely. This
oVsets the beneﬁts of scale and sustains the competitive market.
12. A further tendency for markets in this position is to:
— Increase barriers to entry.
— Develop sophisticated customer retention strategies restricting the ability of customers to switch.
— Introduce increasingly complex trading arrangements.
13. An eVective market design needs to have transparent costs and prices in order to stimulate and
encourage both competition and new entry. Unfortunately, the current design does not have the required
level of transparency and therefore does not stimulate eVective competition for either generation or supply
from a new entry perspective.
14. Two thirds of the market players have integrated European ﬁnancial accounts and it is therefore
impossible to identify what proﬁts are being made from the UK. Further, these accounts do not reliably or
eVectively separate generation or supply proﬁts, so even if UK accounts were to be published a new entrant
would need to enter both sides of the market to access any available margin with conﬁdence.
15. The current market design was supposed to facilitate entry into generation or supply separately and
not require parties to enter both. Bizz is, therefore, concerned that the current structure does not encourage
eVective competition as per the original market design.
16. An obligation to report segmented gas and electricity supply business accounts will further remove
the ability of larger players to cross-subsidise their activities.
17. We are also mindful that security of supply is a big issue and that alternative market arrangements
as laid out in Appendix 3 may be worth some consideration.
2. Whether there is eVective competition in the wholesale markets for gas and electricity
18. Vertical integration, as it exists in the UK, reduces the need for the vertically integrated players to
use the wholesale market. Each company has suYcient generation to supply their domestic and SME
customer base. Larger I&C customers are generally supplied on market related shorter term, index type
transactions.
19. Companies, therefore, naturally tend to hedge their sales from their own generation ﬁrst and then to
the extent that there is a need to trade in the market. Thus, liquidity in the wholesale market is focused on
the ﬁrst season. Liquidity beyond this point is poor and declining (See Appendix 2).
20. To give a speciﬁc example of this, BizzEnergy seeks to beneﬁt customers by oVering them a choice of
contract length of up to four years. We are risk adverse and wish to hedge out any liability incurred in the
wholesale markets. The best products for us to use are a combination of baseload power (24 hours a day)
and peak power (7.00 am to 7.00 pm weekdays). These products do not, however, trade reliably in the
market. Peak power does not trade out beyond the ﬁrst year, and contracts for two and three year baseload
rarely trade. Bids and oVers are always available in the market, but the spreads are usually large and the
prices on oVer usually signiﬁcantly more than the retail margin, and the prices at which trades can be
transacted frequently bear little or no relation to the oVers that are beingmade to customers by the vertically
integrated players.
21. The issue for new entrant generation is that in the absence of a reliable, deep and liquid market they
will be forced to sell their output to one of the vertically integrated players on a long term contract, thus
further depriving the market of any new liquidity.
22. A further issue with the current wholesale arrangements is “cashout”. This is themechanism bywhich
any imbalance in a player’s contractual position is settled. The mechanism for “cashout” is extremely
complex, and is recognised as such by the regulator. The prices are supposed to represent the energy costs
of settling the imbalances, but these are widely acknowledged to be polluted with other costs such as system
operation costs. The impact of this pollution is increased costs on smaller parties and non-vertically
integrated parties which has the eVect of distorting competition. OFGEM is carrying out a review of this,
but has been doing so on and oV for some years, and the industry awaits its ﬁndings.
3. The implications of growing consolidation in the energy market
23. BizzEnergy is frequently concerned by vertically integrated players making oVers to customers below
the (apparent) wholesale market level, making it exceedingly diYcult to compete. Proving the existence of
predatory pricing is diYcult and complex. However, we did note a statement fromEON in the FT inMarch,
“the company had lost money on its retail business last year and expected to do so again this year”. This
was an eVective admission of cross subsidy and underlines the diYculties faced by smaller players trying to
enter the market who cannot subsidise their accounts in this fashion.
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24. The main issue—from BizzEnergy’s perspective—is the lack of transparency of energy suppliers’
accounts and the loss of a common reference price against which to judge and measure the performance of
the generation and supply arms of the vertically integrated businesses. This inhibits the opportunities to
enter the market for new entrants, which we believe should be a concern to regulators, the Government and
most importantly public conﬁdence.
4. The relationship between the wholesale and retail markets for electricity and gas
25. Whilst BizzEnergy cannot comment in detail as we are not active in the gas market, there can be seen
a lag between price movement in the wholesale market and published tariVs (see Appendix 5).
5. The interaction between the UK and European energy markets
26. BizzEnergy has found the barriers to entry in most European countries insurmountable. However,
the recent passing of an anti cross-subsidy law in Holland makes the Netherlands market attractive and we
are actively considering setting up in that country in the next year.
6. The eVectiveness of regulatory oversight of the energy market
27. As a natural outcome, when a market matures into a position of considerable integration and
consolidation, we would expect to see the need for increased regulatory scrutiny and advocacy of consumer
positions. The current trend, however, appears to be the reverse, with light touch regulation and the
abolition of the consumer advocate energywatch being prime examples.
28. BizzEnergy believes that OFGEM is a generally eVective body, but that it has areas where its activities
are restricted. For example, it appears to take a literal interpretation of the highly complex industry rules
rather than a general and purposeful interpretation. Thus, parties may be carrying out operations that have
the eVect of inhibiting competition, but are still compliant with poorly drafted industry rules.
29. In order to change, OFGEMmust compete with companies who, due to the nature of their size, have
considerable resources. The presence of the Competition Commission and the appeals process creates an
additional hurdle for OFGEM to clear if any substantive changes are to be made against the views and
interests of the incumbents. This, by its nature, slows down the speed and eVectiveness of the Regulator.
30. To date, OFGEM has used relatively simple measures of competition to assess the eVectiveness of
the market, for example numbers of customers switching. We believe that this is too simple for a mature
market and that other more eVective measures should be developed. It rarely issues any information on
competition in the business markets, and it seems to make information available on domestic markets no
more frequently than once a year, which is inadequate.
7. Progress in reducing fuel poverty and the appropriate policy instruments for doing so
31. BizzEnergy is not an active supplier of domestic customers, although we are looking to enter the
market later this year. Fuel poverty is a serious concern and we do not believe that the current deﬁnition
adequately captures the extent of the issue in the UK.
32. For example, in its annual report published in March 2008, the Fuel Poverty Advisory Group said
more than 2.3 million of the most vulnerable households in England alone are now forced to spend at least
10% of their income to heat and light their homes.
33. We, therefore, believe that some urgent work is required to identify those who need assistance and
fall within the real fuel poverty bracket. Fuel poverty, in our view, is not just related to pre-payment meters
nor to the level of disposable income spent on fuel.
34. Energy prices will be minimized, and therefore fuel poverty reduced, in the longer term by ensuring
competitive energy supply markets prevail. Speciﬁc market segments may require innovative products and
service arrangements, and these are most likely to emerge when there are no barriers to market entry or
prohibitive requirements upon continued market operation. Ultimately fuel poverty is a social issue that
requires a political solution; it should not be tackled primarily through legitimising more cross-subsidy in
a market that already manifests insuYcient transparency.
Conclusion
35. Vertically integrated parties (with more than 10% market share in supply) should be obliged to
transact through an open market any volumes that they transfer between their generation and supply
businesses. They should be obliged, by licence, to separate their generation and supply business accounts
and operate them in a sensible manner, as if they were a standalone business [Market in Financial
Instrument Directive].
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36. In addition, they should be obliged to separate UK licensed activity accounts and make them
independently available as if they were a standalone business. Segmenting accounts between supply and
generation may not be suYcient for the introduction of due visibility within the “Big 6”. It may be necessary
to go further and separately account supply activities between:
— Gas and Electricity.
— I&C and smaller customer markets.
— For smaller customers, those activities where they have been historically dominant and otherwise.
37. This approach allows vertical integration and economies of scale, but establishes an openness and
viability of the underlying nature of transactions. OFGEM has indicated that they believe I&C and gas
markets are national whilst the supply of electricity to smaller customers is still a regional market and so
this approach will reinforce their market overview.
38. BizzEnergy calls for:
— Clear and eVective regulation from Government that will limit the negative impact of vertical
integration in the UK energy market. In the current environment where no one seems willing to
challenge the prevailing wisdom that markets are better than regulation, one of the unintended
consequences of liberalisation is that the market is taking the easy option and passing the higher
costs on to consumers.
— New rules onmarket transparency. The problem of concentration is undeniablymade worse when
dominant companies are not required to reveal basic supply information to smaller market
players.
— Licensing separation. This would increase market transparency and increase market conﬁdence.
39. Competition does beneﬁt consumers. However increased competition and an end to the privileged
position held by certain suppliers would oVer higher quality and more varied services to energy users at
lower prices. This would lead to a better functioning competitive market, which would ensure suYcient
investments in power plants and transmission networks thereby helping to avoid interruptions in power
supplies and protecting security of supply. An increased degree of transparency would, additionally,
minimise distortions in themarket, and thus, themarket would bemore robust, and ultimately, the customer
would be better served.
40. BizzEnergy thanks the Chair of the Committee for the opportunity to provide this written evidence
to the Business and Enterprise Select Committee, and would welcome any further enquiries from members
on the issues raised. Additionally, Bizz would happily provide oral evidence to the Committee as part of the
ongoing Inquiry.
APPENDIX 1
STATEMENT PREPARED BY DEEPAK LAL OF ECLIPSE ENERGY
FOR BIZZENERGY
The below is an excerpt from a BizzEnergy-commissioned article by Eclipse Energy.
What is wrong with the power market?
The market is dominated by six big players. Such market concentration is anti-competitive and it is
deterring new entry into the market. It is also making the market opaque to the detriment of independent
players and customers. We need to borrow ideas from other markets to address the short-comings of the
power market.
Conventional wisdom?
The changes that we would like to see in the power market are based on conventional wisdom. Some of
this wisdomhas appeared in the principles underpinning theMarket in Financial InstrumentDirective 2004/
39/EC (MIFID) regulations. The objective of MIFID was to create an open competitive market in the
ﬁnancial services industry to safeguard the interests of stakeholders and consumers. The impact of MIFID
is to enhance the:
— competitive landscape;
— transparency of the market;
— market liquidity; and
— protection of customers.
Whilst the details of MIFID are speciﬁc to the ﬁnancial services market, the objectives are common to
manymarkets. Indeed, the wholesalers in the energy market are not dissimilar to the brokers in the ﬁnancial
services market in terms of meeting the needs of their customers through the traded market. Many power
market commentators will be making similar points because the underlying objectives are broadly the same.
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What needs to change in the power market?
The competitive landscape is such that the powermarket is dominated by six vertically integrated players.
The Hirschmann-Herﬁndal Index (HHI) is a commonly used index that provides a measure by which it is
possible to judge whether there is eVective competition in a market. The HHI for retailing power in the UK
shows that the market is far too concentrated. An Ofgem report on the domestic retail market put the HHI
at about 1765 in March 200710 and this level of concentration is undermining competition. New entrants
ﬁnd it hard to challenge the dominance of the incumbents. Further market consolidation (such as the
takeover of Scottish Power by EDF) is not in the interests of the end-consumer. The question is whether
speciﬁc action should be taken to reduce market shares of the big six.
The concentration of market shares in retail is inevitably going to have an impact upstream in both
trading and generation activities. This is evident by the poor level of liquidity in the wholesale market.
The big six players are ensuring that the market is opaque by doing bilateral deals. Such deals are not
visible to the rest of the market. The most insidious deals are those done between the diVerent divisions of
the same company, particularly between the generation and retail divisions. The lack of transparency here
means that independent players, particularly in the retail market, are at a serious disadvantage because they
do not know whether they can procure energy on the same terms as the retail divisions of the big six. The
current arrangements also allow the existing players to arbitrarily move proﬁt margins between the two
divisions to the disadvantage of competitors.11 Enhanced reporting through a separation between the
accounts of the retail and generation divisions and an obligation to treat all trading counter parties equally
is likely to make a signiﬁcant diVerence to the creation of a fair competitive environment.
MIFID has shown the way by expecting better reporting on deals to safeguard the market and the
interests of the stakeholders in the market. Further, a “best execution” obligation under MIFID has put an
onus on the service provider to demonstrate that the service provider is getting the best prices for its clients
which implicitly requires audit trails to demonstrate compliance with the obligation. In addition, under
MIFID, a Systematic Internaliser is a ﬁrm that may execute orders from its clients against its own book.
Such players are required to meet the requirements for trading transparency.
The bilateral deals between the big six players and also between the various divisions of the big six players
are having amajor impact on the lack of trading liquidity. The lack of liquidity and transparency is deterring
new entrants into the market which is compounding the impact of market concentration. Vertical
integration in-itself may not be a bad attribute of the market. Indeed, vertical integration might be
encouraged, but only if it is coupled with transparency and liquidity. The alternative is the break-up of
vertical integration companies as a means to force transparency and liquidity into the market.
Enhancements to the competitive environment in the power market would have a major impact on
customer protection. We believe that the interests of the customers are best served by transparent and fair
competition between suppliers backed up by the supply licence conditions to ensure that suppliersmeet their
reasonable social obligations.
It has been a long-standing goal that there should be light-touch regulation in the power market and that
the accepted view was that regulation was a poor substitute for robust competition. Light-touch regulation
can only follow when there is conﬁdence that the competitive market is working. The lack of transparency
undermines the conﬁdence in the workings of the market amongst the customers, the industry players, the
regulator and the government.
10 The HHI has been consistently above this level since 2002.
11 Some commentators have challenged the proﬁts made by industry players as excessive and detrimental to the end-consumer.
We do not believe that making proﬁts in a competitive market is acting against the interest of the consumer. What we are
concerned about is making proﬁts in a non-transparent way.
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APPENDIX 3
ALTERNATIVE MARKET FOR NEW PLANT
There is now an urgent requirement to commence construction of a new generation of low carbon power
stations to replace the current coal and ageing nuclear stations retiring between 2015 and 2020. The only
two realistic options available to provide suYcient electricity to meet the nations needs are nuclear or fossil
fuel plant with carbon capture and storage. Both these solutions are highly capital intensive compared to
CCGTs and developers are understandably looking for government assurance and guarantees on market
prices before risking the capital investment required. Unfortunately such assurances tend to reinforce the
current oligopoly and make competition from new entrants more diYcult.
BizzEnergy is very anxious that no plant shortage develops as plant shortages will only contribute to
higher retail prices. Our position is simple, we need a market based solution which kicks start the
construction of new plant whilst maintaining liquidity in the whole sale markets and increasing opportunity
for new entrants in both supply and generation.
Such criteria could be easily met by the introduction of capacity tickets to be auctioned by NGC for the
ﬁrst 5000MWof new low carbon plant. Tickets would be open to developers with sites capable of achieving
planning permission and auctions held regularly in tranches up to the 5000MW limit. It might be fair to
exclude companies from European countries where access to energy markets remains restricted.
Once commissioned, NGC would trade the output from the new stations via the exchanges. If the output
receipts exceed the price of the capacity tickets the surplus would go toward reducing the BSUOS cost. If
below the sumof ticket andmarginal costs, BSUOSwould be increased to cover the total cost. It is envisaged
these capacity tickets would last between 8 to 12 years to provide developers with conﬁdence to commence
construction.
The requirement to trade all the output from the new stations (around 30TWh) would improve the
liquidity in the wholesales market and give a clearer indication of future market prices to allow new low
carbon plant to be constructed.
APPENDIX 4
FOR INFORMATION ONLY
The HHI
EVective competitive markets are predicated on having suYcient competing actors. The risk of market
dominance is a major issue in most competitive markets. A commonly used index for measuring market
dominance is the Hirschmann-Herﬁndal Index (HHI). The market share (%) of each market participant is
squared and summed to produce a score on the index.
— 100,000 is a monopoly.
— 1,800 and above is a highly concentrated market and in the USA, a merger leading to a score
greater than 2000 would probably be challenged.
— A score of 500 to 1,000 is deemed a highly competitive industry.
Retail power HHI
Ofgem carried out a review of the HHI for the non-domestic retail market in November 2005. The HHI
score in the electricity market decreased from 1695 in November 2003 to 1575 by the end of 2004. The
implication is that the market was not as competitive as the regulator may have wished.
Figure 1 charts the changing HHI scores for the domestic market. The data were taken from an Ofgem
report on domestic retail competition in June 2007. The ultimate source of the data was the Distribution
Network Operators.
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Figure 1
HHI NATIONAL MARKET SHARES IN DOMESTIC ELECTRICITY MARKET
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Source: Ofgem report
The process of market consolidation has lead to an increase in the HHI score in electricity as the big
players take over more businesses. The HHI is high and it has been reasonably stable in the 1,700 to 1,800
range for some time. A reduction in the value of the index is desirable and any increase would be a signiﬁcant
cause for concern. Over the period from December 2002, the market share of the independents outside of
“Big Six” retailers has hovered between 0 and 1.5%. It shows that over a sustained period of time, themarket
is not conducive to new entry.
Based on the HHI scores, it seems that the retail market in electricity supply is too concentrated and new
entry into the market might be desirable.
APPENDIX 5
WHOLESALE VERSUS RETAIL PRICES
Trends in baseload (year ahead) wholesale gas prices and household price increases since September 2004
are demonstrated below:
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Trends in baseload (year ahead) wholesale electricity prices and household price increases since
September 2004 are demonstrated below:
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Memorandum submitted by BP
Introduction
1. Many of the issues covered by this Inquiry—such as those appertaining to the retail gas and power
markets—are beyond the scope of BP’s activities. Accordingly, we limit the majority of our comments to
the wholesale market, and in particular the area of gas supply.
2. In addition, many of the comments made by BP in its memorandum of 9 December 2004 to the Trade
and Industry Committee are still relevant and applicable in our view; and the Committee may wish to refer
to this document in their deliberations. This memorandum updates and qualiﬁes the points made previously
where necessary.
UK Gas Prices
3. The fact that gas and electricity prices have risen signiﬁcantly in recent years has led to understandable
concern, with many consumers claiming that they are both unjustiﬁably high as well as a reﬂection of a
failure in the operation of the market. However, we would maintain that the UK wholesale gas market
continues to operate eYciently, and that the price increases we have witnessed are consistent with the known
internal and external inﬂuences.
4. Such inﬂuences can be grouped under two key themes, namely:
— the decline in UKCS production and concerns over security of supply which are both key drivers
for UK gas price movements; and
— the pace of European liberalization, and the continuation of oil price linkage in European gas
prices with its impact on the UK market.
5. In the last ﬁve years, the share of UK gas which is imported has risen from 2% in 2003–04 to what is
predicted to be around 39% in 2008–09 ie increasing by a factor of twenty. The proportion of imports will
continue to rise at around 5% per annum as UKCS supplies decline (see Appendix). This increased reliance
on imports creates both concern over security of supply and means that the UK must compete for supplies
with European and other world markets where gas prices are linked to oil prices.
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6. Other points discussed in our previous submission are still relevant. For example, and in brief,
— suppliers of gas to the residential market, driven by the need to obtain certainty of prices over time
(in contrast to constant spot price ﬂuctuations) have had an impact on the forward market;
— when there is increased concern over security of supply in forward winter periods, the consequent
change in forward purchasing behaviour will have a disproportionate eVect upon future price
movements;
— in terms of “prompt” prices (ie where gas is delivered on or immediately after the speciﬁc day of
an agreement), a strong correlation exists between supply and demand fundamentals and the
prices agreed for the day or day ahead. This is supported by a deep and liquid market, and does
not reﬂect either market manipulation or market failures; and
— the lack of gas-to-gas competition in Continental Europe, linked to the indexation of gas contracts
to the price of oil, has led to further volatility and has contributed to a general lack of conﬁdence
in the gas market’s ability to both register and react to reliable supply/demand signals.
7. We continue tomaintain, therefore, that taken as a whole theUKmarket has beenworking eVectively.
And as we highlighted in 2004, additional comfort is provided by the very signiﬁcant number of material
investment projects planned or under construction. These include:
— Interconnector expansion, thus increasing the UK’s import capacity;
— Isle of Grain LNG import terminal;
— Milford Haven (Qatar Petroleum/ExxonMobil) LNG import terminal;
— Milford Haven (Petrol’s) LNG import terminal;
— Langeled pipeline;
— Ormen Lange gas; and
— BBL pipeline—Netherlands to the UK.
8. The number and complexity of these projects is very diYcult to reconcile with allegedly inaccurate
market signals. What is even clearer than four years ago, however, is the need to diVerentiate between
capacity and commodity. Whilst new facilities bring additional capacity, it is a separate issue as to whether
additional commodity (gas) will ﬂow into the GB market.
The European Gas Market
9. It has been apparent since 2000 that Continental Europe is a major driver for the movement of UK
gas prices. Most long-term contracts in Europe remain indexed to oil, and high oil prices provide incentives
to capitalise on the arbitrage opportunities associated with selling UK gas into Europe, and from European
buyers seeking cheaper UK gas to meet their demand needs (see Appendix).
10. Whilst liberalisation of continental arrangements began some while ago, these developments remain
ongoing. The emerging spotmarkets at Zeebrugge encourage a gradually deepening liquidity, but the reality
of an inter-connected network of continental trading hubs remains a distant goal, and signiﬁcant barriers
to liquidity remain, including diYculties in securing economic access to continental storage facilities; gas
quality speciﬁcation issues; and issues associated with access to transportation.
11. But while lack of progress in this area remains a source of regret, it is still doubtful whether it is having
the eVect on UK competitiveness which is sometimes alleged. There are perceptions that UK consumers are
at a disadvantage to their continental European competitors regarding their gas price. There is some
diYculty in obtaining like for like comparisons but both Gas Strategies data (see Appendix) and BERR’s
Energy Trends and Quarterly Energy Prices show that the UK is reasonably well placed in comparison to
continental Europe.
12. One of the beneﬁts of a liberalised market is that there is greater transparency in pricing. That is one
of the reasons why consumers will beneﬁt from full implementation of the Second Gas Directive in all EU
Member States and from the development of the EU Third Package.
13. We reiterate the improvements which BP advocated in our previous memorandum:
— full legal unbundling of transportation and supply businesses, with customers enjoying the
freedom to select service provision for supply independent of the provider of transmission and
distribution services;
— the equivalence of transmission and distribution services, when provided by a regulated entity to
a third party; and
— the freedom of Parties to source supplies from any other party and sell services to any other party.
14. But it has become necessary now to add that the pace of European liberalisation remains slow. The
second Gas Directive is still not fully implemented in all Member States almost ﬁve years after its
introduction. Furthermore the EU’s Third Package of energy measures is still under development and even
once implemented it is unlikely that it would be before 2010 that any of the resulting Directives would
actually take eVect in Member States.
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15. Thus, the beneﬁts of liberalisation remain in terms of greater transparency. But other realities remain,
which is why liberalisation does not, per se, lead to lower prices. Rather it gives consumers the freedom to
choose suppliers, encourage the development of new products and services while allowing the market react
more quickly to changes in supply/demand fundamentals.
Conclusions
16. It has been clear for many years that the UK supply demand balance has been changing
fundamentally. The transition from supply surplus to a greater reliance on imports of gas is bound to
necessitate higher consumer prices, despite the various infrastructure enhancements coming on stream.
Moreover, it must be remembered constantly that an enhanced infrastructure does not of itself guarantee
that additional gas will arrive in the UK market.
17. BP continues to believe there is no fundamental ﬂaw in the UKmarket, nor any manipulation. Prices
have been responding as might be expected. The eVect of greater gas import dependence will be to increase
supply diversity which in turn can enhance security of supply.
18. There remains some nervousness, reﬂected in forward prices. However, attention should be given to
the growing linkages in world gas prices which have becomemore pronounced in recent years. In particular,
LNG—which now forms an important part of theUK gas supplymix—is inﬂuenced by world LNGmarket
signals as evidenced over recentmonths byAsia attractingLNGcargoeswhichmight otherwise have arrived
in the UK. Within the EU, the Spanish market has also been prepared to pay a premium to attract LNG
cargoes. In a world in which LNG is currently in relatively tight supply, the willingness of other competing
markets to pay a premium for LNG naturally puts upward pressure on GB gas market prices. Looking into
the future, growth in world LNG production is predicted to be steady and no step change is predicted.
19. Additionally one observes in the worldwide arena growing concerns about securing suYcient supply
fromproducer countries, with anecdotal reports of some producer countries applying a longer term strategic
view to how they intend to permit production of gas resources. Such sentiments are likely to put upward
pressure on market gas prices.
20. The UK is seen as an attractive market for investment as evidenced by the signiﬁcant capital projects
either mooted or in progress. However, the UK can no longer exist in “splendid isolation”; and a fully
liberalised Europe is necessary to ensure ongoing security of supply. We remain supportive of OFGEM’s
determination to discuss these issues with the European Commission.
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APPENDIX
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Figure 4.2B - UKCS Annual Forecast & Import Requirement
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Industrial Gas Prices
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Memorandum submitted by Dr Gail Bradbrook
I would like to raise the issue of the increased prices for “green energy consumers”— I get my electricity
from Good Energy company and previously from Ecotricity. I have been prepared to pay higher prices to
support a growing renewables market. However we have recently been subject to higher prices with the
reason given being “increased wholesale prices.
I quizzed Good Energy a few times and read their FAQs before being conﬁdent this wasn’t proﬁteering
on their point—however the ﬁrst point I would like to make is that it does lead to mistrust of the green
companies and could be a reason why people leave or don’t join.
I now believe that the major energy suppliers are not really making a distinction between the renewables
and fossil fuels and this leads me to conclude that:
— the renewables market is not a “real” market;
— that people already paying higher prices for fossil fuels are subject to further increases at the whim
of the fossil fuel suppliers;
— that the opportunities for growth and disctinction for the renewables market are being lost; and
— that these are extremely signiﬁcant points in the face of climate change.
I don’t have the ability to investigate and prove the above, and also believe that is a role for Ofgem.
A Brief Introduction About You
I am a consumer and have no other aYliations that are signifcant here.
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Factual Information you would like the Committee to be Aware Of
As above and as stated believes rather than concrete knowledge.
Any Recommendations that you would like the Committee to Consider including in its Report
Actions are taken to ensure the renewables energy market is vibrant and protected from fossil fuel
increases investigation and consultation into the pricing of renewables, particularly ensuring that smaller,
green energy companies cannot be bullied by bigger suppliers or that renewable products owned by larger
suppliers are genuinely that and not a front end mostly for proﬁteering.
March 2008
Memorandum from British Energy
Summary
— TheUK requires a stable energy policy and regulatory framework that balances security, diversity
and care of the environment with competitive markets and price stability. This in turn will
encourage the much needed industry investment required to underpin security of supply. In light
of this we do not consider there to be a need to signiﬁcantly amend the regulator’s remit through
changes to its statutory duties.
— Since the introduction of NETA the wholesale electricity market has seen relatively lower liquidity
with trading largely focussed on the ﬁne tuning of short-term positions. This has contributed to a
more volatile wholesale market where relatively low levels of trading activity can result in
signiﬁcant swings in market prices.
— Liquidity issues are widely recognised by the industry and there are a number of initiatives
currently underway which are looking to address them. BE welcomes these initiatives and
continues to actively participate in the development of proposals that have the potential to
introduce more liquidity into the market.
— One of the key themes the UK’s energy policy is attempting to address is to improve the
environmental performance of the overall energy system. Whilst we fully support this theme there
is a need for an increased emphasis on reducing the regulatory compliance costs in respect of
environmental measures. We consider there is scope for simplifying the regulatory provisions
without undermining the eVectiveness of dealing with the environmental issues. There also needs
to be better focus on ensuring that measure introduced are consistent and both cost-eVective and
aVordable.
— We actively support the opening of the European market and believe the development of genuine
competitive European gas and electricity markets will help to sustain the competitiveness and
security of the UK industry. However, real progress is slow and potentially hindering the
development of more competitive wholesale markets across the EU.
— In the context of fostering a competitive single European energy market, it would be neither
appropriate nor eYcient for there to be signiﬁcantly diVerent, more complex or more burdensome
arrangements in the UK. Regulatory decisions need to be closely co-ordinated with neighbouring
jurisdictions. Consequently, when proposals are presented to modify the existing UK market
arrangements it is important that consideration is given to the eVect such changes will have on the
integration of the UK market with other European markets.
Introduction
1. A FTSE 100 company, British Energy Group plc is the UK’s largest producer of electricity and the
lowest carbon emitter of all the major UK electricity generators. We produce around one sixth of the UK’s
electricity requirements and employ about 6,000 staV. British Energy owns and operates eight nuclear power
stations and one coal-ﬁred power station in the UK. Of British Energy’s nuclear power stations, seven are
AGR power stations and one is a PWR power station with a combined capacity of about 9600MW.
Eggborough Power Station, our coal-ﬁred power station in Yorkshire, has a capacity of about 2,000MW.
During the year ended 31stMarch 2007, British Energy’s power stations produced total output of 58.4TWh.
2. Our electricity production is sold via a number of routes to market, including through structured
trades, through the electricity wholesale market, and through the company’s direct supply business, British
Energy Direct Limited (BEDL). BEDL only supplies industrial and commercial electricity customers in
Great Britain, and it is one of the largest suppliers of electricity in that sector, supplying around 29TWh to
over 1650 customers across 9,365 sites in 2006–07. The Group also has a trading division that is responsible
for arranging the wholesale sale of the Group’s electricity output as well as providing trading risk
management and balancing services to the Group.
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3. British Energy plays a major role in helping the UKmeet its emissions targets. In 2006–07 our nuclear
stations avoided the emission of 33.7 million tonnes of CO2 (MtCO2) that would otherwise have been
emitted had the same output been generated by fossil fuel stations. This is equivalent to removing around
half of the cars from the UK’s roads.
Overview
4. The electricity industry is a capital intensive industry characterised by long-term investment and planning
horizons. There is currently a requirement for a signiﬁcant and sustained investment programme in the UK
infrastructure including new generating capacity to ensure on-going security of supply. With this in mind
there is clear need for a stable political and regulatory framework in order to encourage the investment
required to deliver this.
5. Ofgem has recently announced a parallel investigation into the electricity and gas markets following
expressions of consumer and public concern over the competitiveness of the markets. We welcome this
announcement and will be actively participating in its investigations. There is clearly some considerable
overlap between the issues that fall within Ofgem’s investigation and this inquiry. Consequently, we
recommend that the BERR Committee should review the ﬁndings of Ofgem’s investigations before
ﬁnalising its own conclusions and recommendations. To do otherwise would be potentially ineYcient and
counter-productive.
6. As our primary operations are within the GB electricity market the views expressed below
predominantly relate to this market.
Whether the current market structure encourages eVective competition in the retail markets for gas and
electricity
7. BE does not operate directly within the retail markets for domestic customers in either gas or electricity
and is not therefore well placed to comment on this issue.
8. The Group is however licensed to supply electricity to any non-domestic customers within Great
Britain through its subsidiary BEDL. The top end of the industrial and commercial sector of the electricity
supplymarket where we predominantly focus our direct supply activities is a highly competitive, lowmargin
market sector. It is characterised by generally well informed customers who are highly price sensitive and
overall has high levels of customer switching. This degree of competition has brought real beneﬁts to
consumers in terms of vigorous competition on price, quality of service and responsiveness and innovation
on contract forms and terms.
9. It is acknowledged that the UK has one of the most developed liberalised energy markets in Europe
with energy prices relatively competitive withmany EUmarkets. The EuropeanCommission (“EC”) as part
of its recent energy sector inquiry and the development of the 3rd Energy Package has been investigating
national market structure issues and their potential to restrict competition. However, in the main the EC
did not identify any signiﬁcant concerns with the existing UK energy market structure. In particular, the
EC has greatly focused on the issue of network ownership unbundling with a view to promoting eVective
competition in generation and supply markets. However, unlike in most European countries, this is not a
signiﬁcant issue in Great Britain since National Grid, its transmission system operator, is fully unbundled
from generation, distribution and supply activities. Although some electricity distribution companies are
part of vertically integrated groups consisting of both generation and supply activities these businesses have
been ring-fenced and are subject to regulatory conditions designed to promote eVective competition. These
regulatory provisions appear to be working eVectively as we are not aware of any evidence of discriminatory
behaviour having been identiﬁed.
10. Notwithstanding the above, we do have concerns with the development of competition in the
provision of metering services across the whole electricity supply market. It is clear that competition in this
section of the market has not developed as Ofgem anticipated when deciding to open up this sector of the
market. Indeed, many incumbent metering service providers are now starting to withdraw from oVering
their services to BE and other independent suppliers. Thismay have an adverse eVect on supply competition.
This situation could be exacerbated by some of the current proposals on Smart Metering. In particular we
do not support the ERA’s proposals to create regional franchises to implement the roll-out. Instead, we have
been advocating a solution for the mass introduction of smart metering which works within the current
competitive market framework and which, amongst other beneﬁts, would remove these competition
concerns.
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Whether there is eVective competition in the wholesale markets for gas and electricity
11. Since the introduction of the new electricity trading arrangements (“NETA”) in England &Wales in
2001 (extended toGreat Britain in 2005—“BETTA”) the wholesale electricity market has seen relatively low
liquidity. This was conﬁrmed in the EC’s interim sector report from 2006. The wholesale generation market
is increasingly conﬁned to the role of a secondary balancing mechanism where trading is largely focused on
the ﬁne tuning of short-term (within day/day ahead) positions as opposed to the trading of longer term
positions. This has contributed to a more volatile wholesale market where relatively low levels of trading
activity on the longer-term forward curve, (both in terms of the number of and volume covered by trades
executed), can result in signiﬁcant swings in market prices. These factors, combined with the continued
absence of any meaningful traded derivatives market, make it more diYcult for independent power
producers or suppliers to trade their output or requirements and manage market risk eVectively.
12. Vertical integration has been a natural reaction of the major market participants to the inherent risks
they face following the introduction of NETA. Under the trading arrangements prior to the introduction of
NETA (the Pool) market participants and even pure ﬁnancial traders were better able to mitigate wholesale
electricity price risk by signing contracts-for-diVerences that used a single wholesale price as a reference
price. Under these arrangements, generators generally sold their output at the reference price and retailers
bought their requirements at a separate selling price in which the reference price was the main element. Both
parties could hedge their risks by signing contracts to hedge themselves against variation in the reference
price.
13. Such contracts are no longer available to manage risk. Under NETA market participants no longer
have a single reference price but instead sell their forecast output through bilateral contracts. Their physical
exposure is limited to the risk associated with the (dual) prices assigned to “imbalances”, ie to the diVerences
between contracted sales (or purchases) and actual output (or consumption). This complex (and deliberately
punitive) dual cash out pricing regime makes it diYcult for participants to be sure of their price exposure
and hard to devise eVective hedging against a variation in two separate imbalance prices.
14. The level of market liquidity is also aVected by the signiﬁcant demands for credit. Under the Pool,
credit risk was eVectively spread across the wholemarket.UnderNETA, the uncertain risks faced bymarket
participants through contract default tend to drive contract counterparties to require high levels of security
from sellers in the form of collateral/bank guarantees etc. The combination of the lack of ﬁnancial hedging
products and credit arrangements provides strong drivers for market participants to become vertically
integrated in order to better manage these risks.
15. The issues highlighted above are widely recognised in the industry and there are a number of
initiatives currently underway which are looking to address them. For example, the Power Trading Forum
of the Futures and Options Association is looking to establish a reliable day-ahead index which may
encourage more liquidity and the development of a range of ﬁnancial products for hedging and trading
purposes. AlsoOfgem is currently undertaking a review of the balancingmarket cash-out regime with a view
to potentially amending the rules used to set prices on imbalances. We welcome both these developments
and will continue to participate actively in the development of proposals that have the potential to introduce
more liquidity into the market.
The implications of growing consolidation in the energy market
16. As highlighted above, vertical integration is largely a response to the market structure and the risks
faced bymarket participants underNETA/BETTA. Similarly, horizontal consolidation can lead to “netting
out” of imbalances, and thus also potentially improve the ability to manage the risks faced under NETA/
BETTA. Of course, high market concentration can have adverse eVects on competition, which need to be
balanced against eYciencies. The UK merger control regime relies on the OFT and the Competition
Commission to perform this balancing exercise.
The relationship between wholesale and retail markets for electricity and gas
17. As highlighted above, we currently are not directly involved in the retail supply to domestic customers
and therefore have little experience to base any views on the relationship between the wholesale and retail
markets. With respect to the industrial and commercial sector of the supply market in which we operate
there is traditionally a strong and increasingly direct relationship between end user and wholesale market
prices. Customer prices in this market sector are well correlated to wholesale prices—indeed many more
customers are actively choosing to enter in to contracts where prices are indexed to market prices thereby
directly exposing them to wholesale price ﬂuctuations.
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The interaction between the UK and European energy markets
18. It is recognised that the UK has one of the most developed liberalised energy markets in Europe.
However, European energy markets together with EU regulatory and competition policy is having an
increasingly important impact on the UK’s energy markets and consumers. There is therefore a clear need
for the UK to participate in the development of European policy in energy markets in order to inﬂuence the
way in which this develops.
19. We continue to support actively the opening of the European market and believe the development of
genuinely competitive European gas and electricity markets will help to sustain the competitiveness and
security of the UK industry. In particular, we are playing an active role in discussions on regulation, cross-
border trading and environmental policy issues. Further, we fully support Ofgem in its role in Europe in
particular through its participation in CEER/ERGEG12 where it is clearly engaged in promoting and
developing competitive energy markets and eVective network regulation across the EU.
20. Although some developments have occurred in Europe (eg increased transparency in gas market
information in some European markets), real progress is slow. This is hindering the development of more
competitive wholesale markets across the EU. For example, as part of the ultimate move to a competitive
single European energymarket, proposals to develop well functioning regional markets are being discussed.
However, real progress on a number of signiﬁcant issues in respect of the UK, France and the Republic of
Ireland (FUI) regional market has been diYcult. If an eVective FUI regional market is to be developed and
UK competitiveness is to be maintained, a number of barriers to trade need to be addressed such as the
compatibility or consistency of trading/balancing arrangements, diVerences in transmission charging,
transparency of market information and the removal of the potential for discrimination from all market
sectors.
21. In the context of fostering a competitive single European energy market, it would be neither
appropriate nor eYcient for there to be signiﬁcantly diVerent, more complex or more burdensome
arrangements in the UK. The EC in a report in early 2007 on the internal market commented that “Britain
can no longer be regarded as an isolated, self suYcient market for electricity and gas. Regulatory decisions
need to be strongly co-ordinated with neighbouring jurisdictions. If not there is a continuing risk that
inconsistent regulatory frameworks will create perverse incentives for energy companies”. Consequently,
when proposals are presented to modify the existing UK market arrangements it is important that
consideration is given to the eVect such changes will have on the integration of the UK market with other
European markets.
The eVectiveness of regulatory oversight of the energy market
22. Experience with electricity markets is still evolving and conditions in the British electricity market are
changing all the time. Some regulatory oversightmay be desirable to ensure that changingmarket conditions
do not harm consumers’ interests. However, competition might also be hampered by inappropriate
regulation. For example, although lower prices can be in the interests of consumers and could potentially
increase the competitiveness of UK businesses in the short-term, simply lowering prices should not become
an aim in itself. Signiﬁcant interventions in the market should therefore only be contemplated when the
regulatory authorities have demonstrated a clear beneﬁt to consumers. Given the speciﬁc features of the
electricity market, the demonstration of clear beneﬁts requires objective empirical analysis and cannot be
justiﬁed merely by reference to abstract theories of the market and of competition. Such ideologically
motivated interventions would lead to uncertainty about future regulation, undermine investor conﬁdence
in the market and hence hinder the delivery of the required investment in new generating capacity needed
to underpin security of supply.
23. Government quite rightly takes no role in the day-to-day operations of Ofgem. However, whilst we
fully support this independence it is vital that the decisions of Ofgem do not fundamentally conﬂict with
overriding Government policy—particularly given the important role Ofgem plays in helping to deliver the
Government’s energy, social and environmental objectives. There is therefore a question of how best to
ensure there is a coherent policy and regulatory framework against which market participants can make
business decisions, whilst maintaining Ofgem’s independence from Government. At the very least, eVective
scrutiny of how and to what extent Ofgem’s policies are consistent with and complement the framework of
energy policy set by Government is required.
24. One of the key themes the UK’s energy policy is attempting to address is to improve the
environmental performance of the energy system. Whilst we fully support this theme there is a need for an
increased emphasis on reducing the regulatory compliance costs in respect of environmental measures. We
consider there is scope for simplifying the regulatory provisions without undermining the eVectiveness of
dealing with the environmental issues. For example, the prevailing Emission Trading Scheme (ETS)
addresses environmental damage from CO2 emissions by way of a cap-and-trade system. Such a system
allows the authorities to set the optimal level of emissions whilst also creating market-based incentives to
minimise the cost of achieving that level. By contrast, some other arrangements are very complex and, in
BE’s view, unnecessarily complicated and costly. For example, the Renewable Obligation (RO) aims to
12 CEER—Council of European Energy Regulators; ERGEG—European Regulators’ Group for Electricity & Gas.
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reduce CO2 emissions from electricity generation, even though they are already capped by the EU ETS.
Moreover, it mandates a method for emissions reductions (renewable energy) which carries a signiﬁcantly
higher cost per tonne of CO2 abated than current and forecast prices in the ETS.
25. Similarly, many energy eYciency policies, such as the EEC/CERT and CRC, amount to “double
regulation” of emissions and impose a regulatory rather thanmarket-based choice of methods for emissions
reductions. Finally, interactions between policies can create unintended consequences contrary to cost-
eVective reduction of CO2 emissions. For example, the separate targets for renewables and energy eYciency
risk creating uncertainty about future prices for CO2 emissions and energy production. We consider that
the compliance costs of the EU ETS and similar market-based systems are likely, in the long run at least,
to be lower than for more complex regulatory solutions.
26. Notwithstanding the above, we do not consider there to be a need to signiﬁcantly amend the
regulator’s remit through changes to its statutory duties. Britain requires both an energy policy and a
regulatory framework that balances security, diversity and care of the environment with competitive
markets and price stability. The continuing challenge for Ofgem is to develop an energy regulatory
framework that satisﬁes the public interest test by striking the right balance between these priorities whilst
operating in accordance with best regulatory practice. As part of this, it is important that the regulatory
authorities explain in full how they intend to balance their (potentially conﬂicting) priorities when making
regulatory decisions, in order to create a stable and more predictable environment for new investment.
Progress in reducing fuel poverty and the appropriate policy instruments for doing so
27. Aswe have already indicatedwe are not directly involved in the supply of electricity or gas to domestic
consumers and do not therefore have any direct relationshipwith customers that are aVected by fuel poverty.
Our primary activity is the generation and trading of electricity where we contribute to and actively promote
a fully competitive electricity wholesale market. Competition is the best form of constraint on electricity
prices. Consequently, we make a positive, albeit indirect, contribution to addressing fuel poverty through
competition.
28. Notwithstanding the above, we do acknowledge that fuel poverty is amajor issue that requires careful
consideration.However, we believe fuel poverty is a public policy/government social policy issue rather than
amarket/regulatory one. As such this issue should be addressed via appropriate and properly targeted social
policy instruments such as the beneﬁts/taxation regime as opposed to interventions in the electricity and gas
markets. Any attempts to do the latter will potentially distort the energy markets and thus have an adverse
eVect on investor conﬁdence at a time when there is a need for a large scale investment programme in
infrastructure including new generating capacity to address a looming capacity gap. This in turn could lead
to customers and tax payers paying more in the long run.
29. If the Government wishes to use energy policy or the liberalised energy markets to deliver its social
policy objectives then this is a diVerent model than the one that is currently in place and understood by
market participants and investors. Consequently, any signiﬁcant change such as this should bemade explicit
so that the additional implications faced by market participants can be fully assessed.
April 2008
Memorandum submitted by Roger Brocklehurst
1. Executive Summary
Myrecommendation is for the setting up of a new “not-for-proﬁt” national energyDistribution company,
whichwould act as a consolidator for locally-basedCombinedHeat andPower (CHP) and renewable energy
schemes operated by the public sector, local authorities, registered social landlords (RSLs) and social
enterprises.
2. My Background
For more than 10 years I have been involved at Board level with social housing and am currently an
independent Board member of Downland Housing Association and of BHT, two RSLs within the AYnity
Sutton Group (52,000 residents).
Prior to that, I had run an England-wide charity for seven years following on from 30 years in banking
and corporate ﬁnance.
The views expressed in this paper are essentially personal and should not be taken as representing those
of any organisation, with which I am, or have been, connected.
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3. Factual Information
(a) The current debate on climate change is leading to the promotion of CHP where there is an
economic demand at local level for heat and power, in order to save energy and reduce CO2
emissions. (CHP also reduces the “transmission” loss-of-energy eVect from which electricity
supplied via the National Grid suVers).
(b) The Government with EU encouragement has put in place a number of measures to support and
encourage the development of CHP.
(c) There are already 1500 CHP Units in the UK and it is estimated that by 2010 over 10% of total
electricity will come fromCHP schemes. (I have not been able to ascertain the breakdown by sector
of ownership of CHP plants currently in operation).
(d) Local authorities are becoming increasingly involved in the promotion of CHP both as operators
for their own needs and through planning conditions attached new housing, industrial estates etc.
Notable examples of local authority involvement here include London and Aberdeen.
(e) Housing Associations, ie RSLs, are becoming involved as planning consents for the development
of larger estates of aVordable or mixed tenure homes will often include the provision of CHP.
(f) Currently a major barrier to the installation of CHP units is the gap between the “export” price
obtainable for generating surpluses that are sold on to the Grid and the “import” price paid for
supplies bought in via the Grid.
(g) CHP operators individually are essentially small players in terms of potential supply of surplus
energy to theGrid: a more collective approach would strengthen their ability to negotiate on price.
(h) In an era of escalating energy prices, RSLs are only too well aware of the problems of fuel poverty
facingmany of their tenants. Recent estimates indicate that fuel poverty (ie households where over
10% of income goes to meet energy costs) aVects 3.5M homes in the UK, and every 1% increase
in domestic fuel prices forces another 40,000 households into fuel poverty. RSLs therefore already
have a very real interest in better energy conservation in the design and refurbishment of their
housing stock, but also now in the direct supply of energy to those tenants where CHP units are
being installed.
4. Recommendation
My recommendation is for the creation of a new not-for-proﬁt energy distribution company operating
across the UK, whose role would be to:
1. act as an aggregator/consolidator for all locally-based CHP schemes and/or renewable energy
projects operated by its members from amongst:
(a) the public sector;
(b) local authorities;
(c) RSLs; and
(d) Social enterprises.
2. establish a Distribution Network organisation, so that it can sell back to those members
temporarily “in deﬁcit” the surplus energy produced by other members.
3. explore the possibility of block energy agreements to supply RSL tenants on better terms than
currently available to them as retail consumers. (Many tenants are stuck on pre-payment meter
tariVs).
The company would be set up as a “social” business with the intention that surpluses would be returned to
members or reﬂected in lower “import” and/or higher “export” prices than would be obtainable by operator
members going to the market on an individual basis.
This recommendation has been put to Ofgem as a submission under their recent review (“Review of the
regulatory regime for energy markets: Distributed Energy Ref:295/07—March 2008), as changes will be
needed to reduce/remove the barriers to the creation of a new mechanism along the lines suggested above.
The purpose in establishing such an organisation is as follows:
— to increase signiﬁcantly the rate of investment in CHP and renewable energy schemes;
— to encourage such schemes to invest in surplus capacity, and in higher eYciency units, reducing
reliance on the national grid and the demand for new power station capacity;
— to achieve a better balance between the export and import prices currently obtainable by CHP
operators;
— to create a new credible force within the current marketplace, that is dominated by six major
privately-owned utility companies;
— to ensure that any proﬁts are returned to members or reﬂected in lower import prices, for the
beneﬁt of RSL tenants/residents;
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— to secure economies of scale and other eYciencies across the CHP sector; and
— to reduce fuel poverty amongst social housing residents.
If the Government is serious in its commitment to a competitive energy market, to the provision of a
secure and environmentally-sustainable supply, and to its drive to tackle fuel poverty, then it should give
the proposal outlined above its full consideration.
March 2008
Letter submitted by Centrica
Thank you for your letter of 11 January regarding information you are gathering for the evidence session
with the Energy Minister on 31 January.
As you will be aware, British Gas recently announced that it would be increasing gas and electricity prices
by 15%. We are ﬁrmly committed to supporting our vulnerable customers especially during times of rising
energy prices and as evidence of this we have deferred the price increase for 340,000 customers on the
Essentials social tariV until 1Marchmeaning that none of these customers will see a price increase until after
the winter period. Essentials oVers up to 750,000 of our most vulnerable customers the equivalent to our
monthly direct debit rates—our lowest standard oZine gas and electricity tariV—irrespective of payment
method. It represents a ﬁnancial commitment from British Gas of £32 million per annum.
To oVer further help for up to 25,000 of our most vulnerable customers, British Gas has also launched a
Winter Protection Package, Winter Warmer, which includes a credit of up to £90 and free insulation. We
are also investing a further £13.45 million in the British Gas Energy Trust over the next four year, which
helps consumers with debt problems, taking the total committed by BritishGas to the Trust to £21.3 million
since 2004.
A new report from energywatch last week found that “British Gas has and will have made the most
signiﬁcant voluntary commitment to measures to reduce the impact of fuel bills on its vulnerable customers”.
The report concluded that British Gas’s ﬁnancial commitment to helping its vulnerable customers was
“nearing double the level that would be expected from its market share.”
It is important to recognise that as the UK becomes increasingly dependent on international and more
expensive sources of energy we can no longer rely on cheap energy prices. The increasing environmental
costs arising from the Renewables Obligation and the Carbon Emissions Reduction Commitment are also
placing an upward pressure on domestic prices.
Since British Gas reduced its retail gas prices by 20% in the spring of 2007, wholesale energy prices have
risen sharply and the forward gas price for 2008 has increased by 51% and the forward electricity price by
61%. In addition the price charged to British Gas to transport and distribute energy will rise by 7% whilst
CERT and RO costs are expected to add around £31 and £12 respectively to an annual customer’s bill.
Unfortunately we had no choice but to pass on these costs in part to our customers. The last time British
Gas tried to absorb all of the increase in wholesale energy prices it made an operating loss of around £200
million over a 12 month period. In the last six months of 2007, higher wholesale gas prices have reduced
British Gas operating margins to just 1% after tax.
It is important that British Gas generates sound proﬁts in order to fund future investment in securing
future gas and power supplies for our customers. We invested around £900 million in 2007 alone and we
will invest around £2 billion between now and 2009. We have also invested in our customer service, with a
£430 million commitment in a new billing system which will enhance the customers’ experience and lower
our operating costs to make us more competitive. Our internal costs reduced by £140 million in 2007 and
we are committed to a further £60 million reduction in 2008.We are also committed to roll out smart meters
providing theGovernment creates the right market conditions for the roll out to happen. Smart meters oVer
the opportunity for energy suppliers to make a step change in the services we oVer customers, for example
in the provision of accurate bills and the availability of real time consumption information. We would be
happy to brief the Committee on this issue at a later stage.
Even with the recent price rises, our customers’ bills will still be below 2006 levels. UK prices also remain
competitive compared with most other European countries. Average UK electricity prices including taxes
are the ﬁfth lowest amongst the EU 15. Britain’s gas bills are also still amongst the cheapest with the UK
average gas price the second lowest in the EU 15. Belgium gas prices have recently risen by 25%.
Going forward, we continue to call for faster progress on liberalising energy markets in Continental
Europe which is important in helping break the link between gas prices and high oil prices and which feed
through toUK prices as we import more gas from the Continent.Within the energy sector, the Government
estimates suggest that insuYcient liberalisation of EU gas markets will cost European energy consumers an
estimated £40 billion in 2007. A recent study by Copenhagen Economics estimated that market opening in
electricity could reduce prices in the EU 15 by 13%. We welcome the third package of energy legislation
brought forward by the European Commission and we are calling for full ownership unbundling as part of
the package to improve transparency and access to networks.
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You also invited us to comment on the Government’s decision on nuclear power. We welcomed the
Secretary of State’s announcement on 10 January which gave the go ahead to the construction of a new ﬂeet
of nuclear power stations. We believe that new nuclear will play an important role due to its low carbon
intensity and its contribution to the diversity of fuel sources in the UK generation ﬂeet. Centrica is already
considering the economic case for new nuclear power, reﬂecting the value we have gained from sourcing
nuclear generated electricity in recent years. We will also continue to invest in other forms of low carbon
technology such as oVshore wind and we remain committed to our role in the gas market which could see
further gas exploration and storage.
23 January 2008
Memorandum submitted by Centrica
CENTRICA’S SUBMISSION TO THE BUSINESS AND ENTERPRISE SELECT COMMITTEE
INQUIRY INTO THE UK’S ENERGY MARKET
Centrica plc (Centrica) was formed in February 1997 when the former British Gas plc was demerged to
form BG Group plc and Centrica. In Great Britain, Centrica trades under its brand names, British Gas,
Scottish Gas and Nwy Prydain. It is the UK’s largest energy supplier, supplying around 10 million gas and
6 million electricity customers in the domestic sector and has around 950,000 supply points in the non-
domestic sector. It also owns upstream gas production and power generation assets to support its supply
businesses.
Centrica is pleased to submit written evidence to the Business and Enterprise Select Committee inquiry
into the UK’s energy market. We trust that both this inquiry and the investigation into the energy markets
announced by Ofgem on 21st February will reassure and satisfy consumers and opinion formers that the
UK energy market is working in the best interests of customers.
Our submission covers the areas outlined in the Business and Enterprise Select Committee press release
of 5 February 2008, principally:
1. Whether the current market structure encourages eVective competition in the retail markets for gas
and electricity;
2. Whether there is eVective competition in the wholesale markets for gas and electricity;
3. The implications of growing consolidation in the energy market;
4. The relationship between the wholesale and retail markets for electricity and gas;
5. The interaction between the UK and European energy markets;
6. The eVectiveness of regulatory oversight of the energy market; and
7. Progress in reducing fuel poverty and the appropriate policy instruments for doing so.
1. Competition in the UK Retail Energy Market
1.1 The UK gas and electricity supply markets are characterised by the presence of six large retail
suppliers to the domestic market, British Gas, Scottish and Southern Energy, Eon, Scottish Power
(Iberdola), EdF Energy and npower (RWE) and a number of smaller niche players (for example, suppliers
oVering electricity from renewable sources eg Good Energy). Centrica is the smallest of the six companies
by market capitalisation with four of the competitors being part of very large integrated European utilities.
1.2 In the non-domestic market, where competition was introduced much earlier than in the domestic
market, there are more players. In this market, we have seen some new players independently enter the
energy market in the last three years such as Utilita, Smartest and Bizz Energy.
1.3 The presence of six major competitors in the domestic market is capable of supporting eVective
competition. All these suppliers operate in a highly competitive market. When measured against the usual
indicators of competitiveness, namely pricing, product innovation and switching, the UK’s energy retail
market emerges well. Indeed, as recently as 30th January 2008, research by independent energy consultancy
Oxera for the Government concluded that: “the UK energy market is the most competitive in the EU and
G7”, and that “creating an open and competitive energy market has meant that UK consumers have
consistently beneﬁted from amongst the lowest energy prices in Europe.”13
13 The BERR press release can be found at:
http://www.gnn.gov.uk/environment/
fullDetail.asp?ReleaseID%348951&NewsAreaID%2&NavigatedFromDepartment%True
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Pricing and product innovation
1.4 UK energy prices are still cheaper than prices in many EU Member States that have been slow to
liberalise their markets. The graph below shows that the UK domestic gas price (excluding taxes) for
medium consumers was the lowest in the EU 15 and 30.1% lower than the median price.14
ESTIMATED AVERAGE DOMESTIC GAS PRICES FOR MEDIUM CONSUMERS15
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1.5 In electricity, the UK price, excluding taxes, was the seventh lowest in the EU 15 and 17.0% below
the median price as shown in the graph below.
ESTIMATED AVERAGE DOMESTIC ELECTRICITY PRICES FOR MEDIUM CONSUMERS16
IN THE EU AS AT 1 JANUARY 2008
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1.6 Competition in the retail energy market has also delivered an increasing range of new and innovative
products and services as suppliers compete to keep customers by oVering products such as ﬁxed/capped
prices and green oVerings. Around 4.2 million UK households have chosen new ways to buy their energy
which range from on-line, ﬁxed and capped rate products to green energy and low-price protection packages
for fuel poor customers. For example, 2.4 million customers on ﬁxed term, ﬁxed price contracts were
protected from British Gas’ most recent price increase.
1.7 Most suppliers are coming forward with green tariVs for customers whowant to cut carbon emissions
and this is also an area which has attracted entry from specialist green suppliers in response to growing
consumer awareness of the need to cut carbon emissions. Nearly 350,000 customers in Britain have chosen
a green tariV.
14 BERR, Quarterly Energy Prices, March 2008
15 Medium consumers for gas are deﬁned in the BERR report as having an annual consumption of 23,260 kWh per annum
16 Medium consumers are deﬁned in the BERRreport as having an annual consumption of 3,500kWhper annumofwhich 1,300
kWh is at night.
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1.8 British Gas oVers its customers two green tariVs, Future Energy and Zero Carbon, both backed by
electricity from renewable sources and with a contribution into the non-proﬁt British Gas green fund, which
supports UK schools in reducing their CO2 emissions and development of new renewable technologies and
resources. Additionally, Zero Carbon contains carbon oVsetting.
1.9 On-line tariVs have also been introduced, originally as a niche product, and now oVer the lowest
prices and by doing away with paper bills, on-line tariVs also bring environmental beneﬁts.
1.10 Suppliers are also being increasingly innovative with energy eYciency packages. British Gas, for
example, introduced an Energy Savers Report to help customers save money when energy bills were rising
in February 2006. Over 1.7 million customers have completed a report which gives an energy rating for the
home and oVers simple advice as to how to improve the energy eYciency of the home (eg by installing energy
eYciency measures or by behavioural changes) which could lead to savings of £175 per annum on the
average energy bill.
1.11 Additionally, suppliers are also seeking to extend and improve on existing service to the beneﬁt of
consumers. For example, British Gas has separated out its prepayment meter customer segment to become
a separate unit so we can focus on the needs of that customer segment and better tailor our processes and
costs. One of our ﬁrst steps has been to trial the new EnergyPOINT device. This device which is easy to
install and use allows customers to top up their prepayment credits at any time from their own homes saving
them a trip to retail payment outlets (such as the Post OYce). 10,000 EnergyPOINT units are to be trialled
in customers’ homes and should be made more widely available from May 2008.
Switching rates
1.12 As a consequence of this innovation and competition in the market, annual rates of switching are
high. In excess of 100,000 domestic consumers are switching supplier each week, with over 4 million (some
20% of customers) switching in 2006 alone.17 This is in comparison with only 9.2% domestic electricity
customers who have switched in Germany and only 1.3% of total gas volumes (no customer ﬁgures
published)18.
1.13 Contrary to the perception that prepayment customers do not switch as much as other segments,
prepaymentmeter switching has been growing since 2005 and is now themost active switching segment. Our
own research shows us that for the three month period up to January 2008, customer defection levels for
our gas prepayment business were 79% higher than for our overall gas customer base. This is 30% higher
than for the same period last year. Our research also shows that for the three month period up to January
2008, customer defection levels for our electricity prepayment business were 77% higher than for our overall
electricity customer base. These ﬁgures are 45% higher than for the same period last year.
1.14 This consumer appetite for switching has led to the growth in the number of switching internet sites
in recent years, which now stands at 12. Sites such as uSwitch advise customers on the best deals and oVer
customers signiﬁcant savings on energy bills if they switch to a cheaper supplier.
1.15 The exceptionally high switching rates that we have seen in the UK since the market opened are
reﬂected in the changes in market share. In the ten years since competition was introduced, British Gas has
seen itsmarket share for gas reduce from100%pre competition, to around 46% currently as other companies
have built market share. Conversely, the introduction of competition in electricity has meant that British
Gas has been able to build an electricity base from zero to a current market share of around 21%.
1.16 In our view, the levels of switching and the range of new and innovative products and services
available in the market place from a range of suppliers, indicate eVective competition at the retail level.
2. Competition in the Wholesale Gas and Electricity Market
Wholesale gas market
2.1 In the last ﬁve years, there have been signiﬁcant changes in the UK’s energy markets with the decline
of North Sea gas reserves and an increased dependency on gas imports. By 2015, the UK market will be
importing as much gas as it produced in 2007.
2.2 The UK competitive market has responded well by bringing on signiﬁcant new investment with 24
companies from 11 countries currently investing over £10bn in the UK energy market. New capacity has
taken the form of new pipelines (eg Langeled capable of bringing nearly a quarter of UK peak requirements
from Norway), enhancements to existing interconnectors with continental Europe (eg Interconnector UK)
17 Ofgem Domestic Retail Market Report June 2007
18 Monitoring Report 2007 published by the Federal Network Agency, November 2007
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and new LNG facilities built (eg Isle of Grain). Centrica’s own gas purchase contracts with Statoil and
Gasunie have helped underpin the investment case for new infrastructure, especially Langeled andBBL.The
major new gas import facilities in the UK are illustrated below.
MAJOR NEW GAS IMPORT FACILITIES19
Tampen link to FLAGS:
Langeled pipeline:
27 BCM capacity
BBL:
16 BCM capacity
(3 BCM expansion planned)
IUK:
25.5 BCM reverse flow (vs. initial 8.5 BCM)
Isle of Grain LNG:
4.4 BCM from 2005
+ 8 BCM by end 2008
+ 6.7 BCM by 2010/11
Milford Haven LNG:
Dragon 6 BCM by Oct 2008
South Hook 10 BCM by Oct 2008
4 BCM capacity
2.3 Importantly though, this new capacity has not necessarily translated into the same volumes of gas
ﬂowing into the UK. LNG is becoming a global gas market with increasing arbitrage opportunities between
the European, American and Asian markets and the Asians are presently paying the highest prices for spot
LNG. These market conditions have meant that UK LNG terminals have often been left idle this winter.
The addition of Langeled and the Tampen Link Spur to add to Vesterled has led to the UK being exposed
to much greater producer arbitrage. Total and individual ﬂows from these supply sources into the UK are
highly variable and diYcult to predict given the lack of transparency in continental European markets. Of
particular concern though has been the absence of gas ﬂowing through the Interconnector from continental
Europe, even when gas price diVerentials between the UK and Europe would indicate that gas should ﬂow.
19 Slide produced by Centrica
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2.4 This unpredictability of ﬂow of physical gas to theUKhas led to signiﬁcant volatility in the wholesale
gas market and has contributed to rising wholesale gas prices. For example, prices in early 2007 fell to a low
of 13 pence per therm and then rose by 47 pence to a high of 60 pence per therm at the end of the year with
huge intra day volatility.
2007 UK DAILY WHOLESALE GAS PRICES20
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2.5 The dwindling North Sea reserves and the current supply constraints and volatility are compounded
by the fact that the UK has the lowest level of gas storage capacity of any major EU economies, at around
5% of its annual demand. Even with the current planning reform proposals, the situation will take several
years to improve. There are a number of storage projects in the pipeline including the recently announced
plan by Centrica and its partners to look at the feasibility of converting the Bains gas ﬁeld into the UK’s
ﬁrst new oVshore storage facility for over 25 years.
2.6 There is no indication or suggestion that the increase in UK wholesale market prices has been driven
by anti-competitive behaviour. On the contrary, there have been numerous independent inquiries into the
UK’s energy market since 2001 including by the EU Commission, BERR (formerly DTI) and Ofgem and
all have concluded that the UK market is fully competitive21. However, there are problems deriving from
the largely unliberalised European energy markets which have a distorting eVect on the UK market. This
subject is discussed in more detail in section 5 of our submission.
2.7 Webelieve theUKwholesale gasmarket is generally operating eVectively. There is good transparency
of information with regular and timely notiﬁcations of UKﬁeld outages and gas ﬂows. By contrast, we have
concerns about the limited transparency in continental European gas ﬂows and transparency could also be
improved for the volumes of Norwegian gas ﬂowing into the European market.
20 Slide produced by Centrica
21 These include: DTI November 2001—Consultation into concerns about gas prices and possible improvements to market
eYciency; March 2002 European Commission Investigation into the operation of the IUK gas pipeline; Nov 2003 Ofgem
investigation into wholesale gas price rises; Nov 2003—FSA investigation into price ﬂuctuations; November 2004—Gas
Probe into ﬂows of gas from Sean ﬁelds; June 2005 EU Competition Directorate sectoral inquiry into EU’s gas and
electricity markets
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2.8 Liquidity of the market has also improved after a period of decline when a number of traders exited
the market. Recent signs of improvement include award of 10 new supply licences and 20 new shipper
licences to banks and other new entrants in the last 12 months.22 As the graph below shows, liquidity for
the early part of the year in 2007, January—April, was at its highest level to date.
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2.9 We have, however, observed that there is a lack of long-term liquidity. This could relate to the
relatively recent reduction in reliability in some of the assets in the North Sea due to age with outages and
uncertainties aroundwhen ﬂowswill resume.We believe that this uncertainty, together with the signiﬁcantly
greater price volatility in the UK has contributed to producers’ (physical players) reluctance to sell further
out. In addition, the nature of trades has also changed with much of the current traded gas relating to
ﬁnancial positions/spark spreads (ie arbitrage between diVerent fuels) rather than physical positions.
2.10 However, even non-physical players are reluctant to trade out much into the future. This reluctance
could be eased if the uncertainty and hence risk was reduced by increased transparency and thus
predictability of European and Norwegian gas ﬂows. This in turn could reduce volatility in the wholesale
market, easing producers’ concerns about similar trades and thereby creating a virtuous circle. This point
is expended upon in more detail in section 5 of our submission.
22 Ofgem
Business and Enterprise Committee: Evidence Ev 185
Wholesale power market
2.11 The wholesale power market diVers from the wholesale gas market in that the power market has
limited interconnection. It is also characterised by a greater degree of vertical integration where a company
participates through the entire value chain from generation to supply. Despite this degree of vertical
integration, it is important to note that over 40% of the generationmarket is held by independent generators
without signiﬁcant residential market positions. The generation market shares are shown in the chart
below.23
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2.12 The market is also characterised by a close linkage between gas wholesale prices and electricity
prices. This is because gas-ﬁred generation accounts for 40% of UK electricity supplies and with gas-ﬁred
generation at the margin for signiﬁcant periods of time, electricity prices are driven in large part by UK gas
prices and therefore are aVected by the increases in wholesale gas prices. This is illustrated in the graph
below.24
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24 Slide produced by Centrica
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2.13 Vertical integration through asset ownership and/or by contract is a natural reaction to power price
volatility as it helps companies to manage wholesale price volatility and provides greater certainty in
customer prices. As a result, all the six major energy retailers are vertically integrated to a certain degree,
though as the chart below shows, Centrica is the least vertically integrated of all suppliers. In fact, the level
of “internal” generation cover varies between about 40% and 100%with the average at around 60%–70%.25
-
20
40
60
80
G
en
er
at
io
n
M
ix
D
em
an
d
G
en
er
at
io
n
M
ix
D
em
an
d
G
en
er
at
io
n
M
ix
D
em
an
d
G
en
er
at
io
n
M
ix
D
em
an
d
G
en
er
at
io
n
M
ix
D
em
an
d
G
en
er
at
io
n
M
ix
D
em
an
d
EDF EON RWE SSE SPW CNA
Annual VOLUMES
TW
h
0%
25%
50%
75%
100%
%
 in
te
gr
at
io
n
Renewables Gas Coal Residential SME I&C % integration
2.14 This means that the majority of the six must source additional generation from the market. This is
done through trading on the BETTA market as well as other bilateral trades and contracts. Centrica
welcomed the introduction of the BETTA electricity reforms in 2005 as it created a competitive wholesale
market with a common set of trading rules, so that electricity could be traded across Great Britain. We
believe that BETTA has played an important role in creating a level playing ﬁeld for all generators and
reduced barriers to entry.
2.15 A key indicator of healthy state of the UK market is the extent to which there is signiﬁcant new
investment including by Centrica (at Langage) and independent power generator Welsh Power (with their
800!MW gas-ﬁred power station at Uskmouth). There is also signiﬁcant plant at the planning/permitting
stages such as Barking Power’s 400MW plant extension and in addition, companies have plans for future
build including Eon (at Grain, Kingsnorth). Of course, this is in addition to the numerous renewables
developments to build onshore and oVshore wind farms including Centrica’s own investments (eg Lynn and
Inner Dowsing which are at the ﬁnal stages of construction).
2.16 It is vital that investors in the electricity generating industry should have conﬁdence in the electricity
and gas markets. For this to happen they need clear and stable public policy which minimises political and
regulatory risk. The industry is poised to make very large investments in new power stations in the very near
future and it could be very damaging if potential investors were to be confronted with new political and
regulatory risk.
2.17 We hope that this review (and the parallel investigation by Ofgem) does not lead to proposals for
fundamental change. However, if the Committee were looking for one area where improvements could be
made, it would be around the free allocation of carbon emission allowances to the power generation sector
under the EU Emissions Trading Scheme. Centrica has lobbied both the Government and the EU for the
past four years to fully auction allowances on the grounds that this free allocation of allowances distorts the
market in favour of polluting incumbents and raises the barrier to new entrants. Whilst the Government
decision to auction 7% of the allowances under Phase 2 of the scheme which began this year, is a step in the
right direction, we would have preferred that the Government had opted for the 10% limit allowed under
the EU rules and ultimately full 100% auctioning. As long as free allowances exist, gas ﬁred generators like
Centrica are placed at a competitive disadvantage compared to coal producers such as Drax and SSE.
25 Slide produced by Centrica
Business and Enterprise Committee: Evidence Ev 187
3. Implications of Growing Consolidation in the Market
3.1 In the UK, there has not been much consolidation in recent years since the wave of changes of
ownership in the electricity sector which gave rise to the present structure. Such consolidation as has
happened was subject toUKmerger control and was only cleared once a thorough competition analysis had
been carried out. Centrica itself experienced the thoroughness of this process upon its acquisition of the
Rough gas storage facility from Dynegy which was considered by the OFT and then by the Competition
Commission.
3.2 To our mind, it is not the consolidation which has taken place within the UK to date which should
be a cause for concern but instead the continuing consolidation across Europe within markets where
competition is still extremely weak and where such consolidation reduces the number of potential
competitors in other European countries. It is also of concern that such consolidations may not necessarily
be subject to the same level of detailed scrutiny by other national competition authorities as we have
experienced in the UK.
4. The Relationship Between the Wholesale and Retail Markets in Gas and Electricity
4.1 Wholesale price volatility has an inevitable and profound eVect onUK retail prices given that around
50% of the customer’s bill is the cost of the commodity. The remainder is largely ﬁxed costs such as
transportation and distribution costs which have risen by 7% or £14 alone this year and metering costs.
Increasingly Government levies are an important component of the bill with the costs of the Renewables
Obligation and theCarbonEmissionsReduction Target adding around £10 and £38 per annum respectively.
4.2 The chart below demonstrates how much of the retail gas price is made of the wholesale price and
transportation and transmission costs. In our experience, the net margins made by the retail supply business
for gas are at best a few pence per therm but the commodity price is over 40 pence per therm.What therefore
really drives gas prices in our view is not retail margins, which have been consistently modest, but wholesale
price movements26.
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4.3 By way of example, BritishGas’s average net margins over the last 6 years have only been 3.6%which
is much lower than in many other industries.
4.4 We have responded to signiﬁcant movements in wholesale gas prices and lastMarch and April (2007)
we announced two price reductions totalling 20%. However, very sharp increases in the wholesale cost of
gas from spring onwards reduced British Gas’s margins to just 1% and with wholesale prices at their current
level British Gas would have been loss making in 2008 without our January tariV increase.
4.5 It is vital that Centrica as a group remains proﬁtable in order to fund the billions of pounds we need
to spend to secure vital sources of gas and power for our customers and to remain competitive in the future.
By 2015, the UK will be importing around 75% of its gas from overseas27. We have to be able to fund the
acquisition of new assets and contracts to ensure that gas is available to our customers in the years ahead.
4.6 Acquiring and buildingmore upstream gas and power capacity to reduce exposure to volatile markets
is a key strategic priority for Centrica. We already have plans in place to invest £2-3 billion upstream from
2007–2010, but it is clear we will need to invest billions more in low carbon power generation by 2020 on
26 Slide produced by Centrica
27 Gas Transportation ten year statement 2007, National Grid p.37
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top of this. This will includemore renewables andmore storage capacity and possibly new nuclear and clean
coal power plants with carbon capture and storage, all of which can cost up to 3 or 4 times as much to build
as gas ﬁred generation.
5. The Interaction Between the UK and EU Market
5.1 As mentioned in section 2 of our submission, the UK market is increasingly linked to the energy
markets in continental Europe.
5.2 Since the construction of the Bacton-Zeebrugge interconnector, the UK gas market has eVectively
become more linked to a wider North West European gas market. As a result higher oil prices which
typically set the gas price in Europe have fed into UK market prices as more gas is imported from Europe.
5.3 A report byGlobal Insight inAugust 2005 explained the implications of the oil-gas linkage as follows:
“The lack of eVective liberalisation in continental gas markets and the predominance of long-term
supply contracts have maintained the pricing of gas on an oil indexed basis across Europe. The
persistence of this pricing link, which has meant that the level of European gas prices are generally
isolated from underlying supply and demand dynamics, is the primary source of costs to the UK
from its interaction with a less liberalised market. We have estimated that for the coming year
(2006), this could cost end users of gas as much as £10 billion”.28
5.4 Moreover, gas ﬂows from the continent to the UK have been highly variable and diYcult to predict
given lack of transparency of information in EU markets. For example, gas ﬂows information is currently
published at less than 40% of the pipeline interconnection points in Belgium,Germany and theNetherlands.
Contrast this with the UK National Transmission System, where inﬂows at the various terminals and sub-
terminals are now made available every twelve minutes.
5.5 This unpredictability of ﬂowhas contributed towards aUKanxiety premium. For example, inWinter
2005/6 despite UK spot prices being as high as 200 pence per therm within day, we could not rely on
European gas to ﬂow into theUK.As recently as quarter four of 2007, InterconnectorUK imports remained
low despite high gas price diVerentials.
5.6 A recent example of this was Saturday 29 March, when there were relatively low levels of demand of
around 300 mcm and prices peaked at 60.5 p/th on the OCM within day balancing market. Despite the
within day market trading at more than a 5p premium to the forward month there were still no increase in
ﬂows from Europe coming through the Interconnector.
5.7 We believe that major continental suppliers have secured gas under long-term contracts at oil-linked
prices, which eVectively take precedence over gas being made available to the UK. The UK then becomes
the swing destination for Norwegian gas with this supply acting like a supplier nomination contract. Our
increasing import dependence means that the traditional gas on gas competition enjoyed in the UK as a
result of a diversity of upstream gas suppliers is being superseded by oil-linked contracts from national oil
companies within which the ﬁnal destination of the gas can be varied.
5.8 In the last 100 days since 1 October, the Interconnector has exported more gas to Europe than it has
imported, despite the wholesale price on occasions being over 3p/therm higher here than on the continent.
Indeed, despite there being a!3p/therm diVerence in the wholesale gas price in theUKcompared to Europe
at times, the Interconnector has not ﬂowed into the UK at any higher than 26% capacity. In comparison,
its highest export ﬂow was around 66% on 16th October.
5.9 Until there is a well-functioning competitive wholesale gas market in North West Europe, players on
the continent will use the UK as a gas supplier of last resort at short notice but may not be able or willing
to provide the reciprocal service to the UK in response to price signals. In this way, the UK suVers from
being the gas bank for North West Europe.
5.10 This situation is caused by physical and contractual congestion on the continent, limited co-
ordination of “open season” processes, secondary continental markets that are hardly functioning as well
as varying security of supply standards in continental Europe.
5.11 In this context we acknowledge the eVorts of the European Commission who have been vigorously
pressing for competitive energy markets in the form of ownership unbundling. This is opposed by some
European Governments who are reluctant to accept this critical step in the transition to more competitive
markets.
5.12 We have seen some encouraging signs such as the decision by Eon to divest their electricity
transmission business in Germany which should give greater transparency and potentially improve access
by third parties to key infrastructure. However, there remains strong opposition, led by France and
Germany, to enforced ownership unbundling, and numerous obstacles to the realisation of the internal gas
market in particular.
28 “The UK Gas market—impacts of interactions with the wider European gas market”, Global Insight, August 2005
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5.13 The French and Germans have pushed for a so-called “Third Way”. This is inadequate as it does
nothing to address the serious concerns highlighted by the European Commission’s lengthy recent
investigation into the energy market. These proposals even fall far short of how the European regulators
group, ERGEG, recently suggested that the existing second package legislation should be implemented.
5.14 EVective unbundling of transmission, with ownership unbundling being the cleanest and most
eVective solution, is key to unlocking many of the current problems but it will not be enough. Unless there
are strong and independent energy regulators whose powers extend to promoting competition in the
wholesale and retail markets, there will not be suYcient conﬁdence to ensure a properly competitive retail
market.
5.15 Centrica warmly welcomes the package of reforms proposed by the European Commission late last
year. We agree with the Commission that the necessary reforms also include increased market transparency
to bring European information up to the very high levels found in the UK market, adequate access to gas
storage and eVective separation of distribution from supply, the latter not having had the attention it
deserves.
5.16 Whilst it is important to implement these changes in electricity, it is even more critical in gas,
particularly for the UK. A country can, if required, increase its own generation using a diversity of
technologies. However, as gas import dependency grows, most countries are increasingly dependent on
cross-border ﬂows to access the signiﬁcant volumes of gas just outside Europe’s borders. The best guarantee
of adequate gas supplies from Europe into the UK is ownership unbundling of the gas transmission
networks on the continent.
6. The Effectiveness of Regulatory Oversight
6.1 Economic theory demonstrates, and competition authorities regard, competition as providing the
best protection for consumers leading to better service, lower prices and/or a wider range of products or
services. In the energy sector, given the monopoly nature of networks this must be coupled with soundly
based price controls of network infrastructure, which accounts for amajor proportion of the retail price. On
network regulation in general, Ofgem has fulﬁlled its responsibilities in a broadly satisfactory and rigorous
manner. It continues to develop a strong incentives based regime in this area as a proxy for competition.
Whilst additional eVorts are required in some areas, for example, cost of capital and gas quality, overall we
support Ofgem’s approach in this area.
6.2 In the retail energy market, Ofgem’s regular reviews of the domestic market in the UK (for which all
suppliers are required to provide information to Ofgem) continue to ﬁnd competition in the retail energy
market to be eVective. This has been the case since Ofgem undertook analysis of the market which resulted
in total removal of retail price controls over six years ago. Those price controls were removed because
competition was found to be eVective and capable of protecting consumers.
6.3 Since then the Competition Act has acted as the deterrent to anti-competitive behaviour underpinned
by its strong information request powers coupled with the threat of signiﬁcant penalties. Ofgem has
exercised those powers in relation to a number of matters within the energy market.
6.4 Additionally, on each occasion that there has been consolidation in the energy market, this has been
subject to analysis of the eVect on competition at the time as part of the merger control process. Having
been through the process itself, Centrica regards that process as robust and thorough. However, a separate
consequence of the acquisition ofUKenergy retailers by European companies is thatCentrica is now unique
among the six major suppliers to the UK market in the level of segmental detail disclosed in its published
accounts. To varying degrees, our competitors aggregate their operating performance by regions, market
sectors and across the value chain with the result that it is not readily possible to determine their downstream
supply margins in the UK market.
6.5 A number of activities within the energy market are licensed—with licence conditions supplementing
competition law by setting out requirements relating to, amongst others, standards of service and customer
protection. As with competition law, compliance with these licences is underpinned by the threat of
investigation and penalties for non-compliance. The recent review by Ofgem of the supply licences to
simplify them and make themmore relevant to today’s market conditions was an exercise we welcomed and
supported. The review was a natural one to undertake given the nature of established competition in the
market.
6.6 In addition to competition law and the licence framework, there are a number of industry
arrangements which support the competitive market—these are subject to separate governance
arrangements and/or self regulation. In our view, some of the industry arrangements supporting the UK
energy markets are complex and can be costly to operate for existing suppliers as well as potential new
market entrants. Ofgem is currently reviewing the nature of industry governance in this area and we believe
that is an appropriate exercise of its regulatory oversight. In this area, it is our view that aspects of the
industry arrangements have become overly complicated especially in the electricity market, where for
example 25 separate data ﬂows are required to complete a customer transfer. However, we believe it is
important to also recognise that whilst complex, some aspects of the arrangements reﬂect the complexities
of market design rather than any undue or intentional barrier. The governance processes themselves are
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becoming suVocated by the burden of maintaining over 10,000 pages of documentation and as a result
partiesmay be deterred from initiating change proposals that would be of beneﬁt to themarket. Governance
arrangements also diVer sharply between codes, principally as a product of history rather than design.
6.7 Increased levels of self governance would be a positive step forward, particularly in areas where there
is lower materiality, risk or contention. However, the issues of access and transparency would need to be
properly addressed ﬁrst. In addition, an enduring right of appeal to Ofgem must be in place for all matters
that relate to industry arrangements.
6.8 In this area, we believe that the regulatory oversight should assist in ensuring that industry
arrangements are proportionate and not over-complex. Given the presence of eVective competition in the
market, we believe that this is an appropriate focus for Ofgem.
7. Progress in Reducing Fuel Poverty
7.1 Much progress has beenmade in reducing the numbers in fuel poverty from1996when numbers stood
at around 5.1 million29. However, with higher energy prices and lower disposable income, the number of
households in fuel poverty has been rising with the Fuel Poverty Advisory Group estimating that around
2.9 million people in England are in fuel poverty in 2007 of which 2.3 were vulnerable.30 The Government’s
target to eradicate fuel poverty amongst vulnerable households by 2010 looks increasingly challenging.
7.2 Fuel poverty is part of a wider problem of poverty and social exclusion which has been exacerbated
by above inﬂation increases in the prices of many foodstuVs and other essentials. Poverty is an issue for
government and requires a focus on increasing the incomes of those most critically aVected and improving
housing. However, energy suppliers play their part through Government schemes such as the Carbon
Emission Reduction Commitment (CERT), and through suppliers’ own corporate social responsibility
(CSR) activity.
CERT
7.3 Energy suppliers currently oVer a range of programmes through the Carbon Emissions Reduction
Target (CERT) programme to support the fuel poor. Under CERT, vulnerable households are eligible for
free insulation and energy eYciency advice from their energy suppliers. TheGovernment is anticipating that
2.5 million insulation measures will be installed in vulnerable households during the CERT period from
2008–2011 under a doubling of the previous programme. This could potentially save householders up to
£200 per year on their fuel bills, a signiﬁcant saving for a vulnerable household.
British Gas voluntary initiatives
7.4 British Gas is ﬁrmly committed to playing its part by helping its more vulnerable customers through
voluntary programmes as part of our corporate social responsibility agenda and since 2002 we have helped
over 1.3 million fuel poor customers.We contribute themost of all the energy suppliers towards fuel poverty
measures. In fact, around £7 in every £10 spent by energy suppliers on vulnerable customers initiatives is
spent by British Gas.
7.5 A recent report from energywatch reviewing the six main energy suppliers’ voluntary initiatives for
vulnerable and fuel poor customers found that “British Gas has and will have made the most signiﬁcant
voluntary commitment to measures to reduce the impact of fuel bills on its vulnerable customers”. In
addition, the report found that at 0.49%, British Gas already contributes the largest proportion of turnover
of all suppliers with the next highest, EdF at 0.16% and npower and SSE at 0.07%.31
7.6 Energywatch has calculated that if all other energy suppliers matched British Gas’ spend as a
percentage of turnover, another £72.3million would be spent on fuel poverty.
7.7 British Gas’ Essentials social tariV is the largest on the energy market and oVers up to 750,000 of our
most vulnerable customers access to our lowest standard rates which is monthly direct debit. We also
delayed our recent price rise for 350,000 of our Essentials customers until after the worst of the winter
months.
7.8 In addition, we have also extended our ﬁnancial commitment to the British Gas Energy Trust for a
further four years, bringing our total investment in the Trust to £21.3 million. The Trust provides grants
and advice on energy eYciency to help customers in debt pay their utility bills.
7.9 This winter we have also oVered 25,000 of our most vulnerable elderly customers an additional
support package. This initiative includes free loft and cavity wall insulation, a credit of up to £90 and advice
for customers on how to manage their energy use and ﬁnances.
29 Fuel Poverty Advisory Group, Sixth Annual report for England, published March 2008
30 The ﬁgures quoted are for England only and are estimated. The latest year for which actual ﬁgures are available is 2005.
According to the Government’s UK fuel poverty strategy, ﬁfth annual progress report numbers in fuel poverty in 2005 were
2.5 million overall of which 2 million were vulnerable.
31 “Proportionality of social tariVs and rebates paper for energwatch”, Cornwall Energy Associates (Jan 2008)
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7.10 This commitment is in addition to an extensive programme of activity with our charity partners
which include Help the Aged and Save the Children. For example, British Gas and Help the Aged are now
in their eighth year of their strategic partnership to support the elderly and address winter deaths.More than
£7 million has been invested in improving the lives of 1.9 million people.
2008 Budget proposals
7.11 In the Budget statement of the 12th March, the Chancellor announced that he wants suppliers to
increase their spend on social tariVs from £50million to £150million per annum.He also stated that 5million
customers on prepayment meters should be given “a fairer deal.”
7.12 This announcement reﬂects aworrying tendency towards short-termﬁscal interventions or now even
the suggestion of price controls for certain groups of customers in what is held to be a competitive market.
Such intervention is contrary to the spirit of liberalised markets and could undermine investor conﬁdence
and even risk jeopardising construction of the critical generation and gas supply infrastructure we need. The
announcement also comes at a time when the Government has recently reduced its spending on fuel poverty
by cutting the budget forWarmFront which it acknowledges to be its mainweapon for tackling fuel poverty
by 20%.
7.13 We remain opposed in principle to any form of social tariV mandation; however, if legislation is
brought forward and social tariVs are introduced in the Energy Bill we believe that our Essentials social
tariV, referred to above, should be used as the industry standard. At the time of writing, discussions are
ongoing between Government, Ofgem and energy suppliers in an attempt to reach a voluntary solution.
Prepayment meter equalisation
7.14 With regard to prepayment meters it is important to note that prepayment is not synonymous with
fuel poverty, as only 25% of customers on prepaymentmeters are deemed to be fuel poor. Prepaymentmeter
customers incur a higher cost to serve for suppliers through higher rental charges for the meters themselves,
collecting cash payments, providing a 24/7 contact service and managing higher call volumes. According to
Ofgem ﬁgures, there can be as much as a £85 cost to serve diVerential for prepayment meter customers
compared to direct debit and around £65 diVerence for standard credit.32 We believe this additional cost
does not include the higher switching rates and therefore cost to serve of prepayment customers above.
7.15 Since the majority of fuel poor customers do not use prepayment meters, equalising prepayment
meter tariVs to monthly direct debit would actually mean that the majority of the fuel poor customers—
those not on prepayment meters—would end up paying more for their energy. This is because it would
become more costly for energy suppliers to oVer such low direct debit and standard credit prices as they
currently do if they were forced to oVer the same price to prepayment customers also (given the higher costs
of serving prepayment meter customers).
7.16 Ofgem has raised this as a concern and has estimated that equalisation would make the 3 million
monthly direct debit and standard credit customers who are fuel poor worse oV, while only beneﬁting the
small proportion of fuel poor customers that are on prepayment meters better. We would also give serious
consideration to curtailing our targeting of prepayment meter customers for new business as these would
simply drive higher losses.
7.17 In addition we believe that equalisation of prepayment prices to on-line direct debit is the wrong
benchmark as our on-line product is a niche product with only 120,000 customers. If British Gas was
compelled to equalise prepayment meter prices in this way, it is likely that we would stop providing the on-
line tariV, which, if other suppliers followed, would threaten the business model for switching sites.
7.18 As mentioned above, British Gas’s Essentials social tariV already equalises tariVs for vulnerable
customers on pre payment or cash/cheque payments to our lowest oZine direct debit tariV.We have 350,000
Essentials accounts to date and are committed to increase this to 750,000 by 2010. We are happy to have
further discussion on the potential to rollout Essentials as a model for the industry standard.
7.19 Ofgem is currently conducting a review of price diVerentials and we are feeding into this process.
They are also holding a summit on fuel poverty in April to which we will be contributing. We believe that
this is the most appropriate forum for a proper and considered dialogue around the best and most
appropriate way to help the fuel poor so that suppliers and Government resources can be targeted at those
who need it most.
32 Ofgem, Domestic Retail Market Report, June 2007, pg: 28-29
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Role of Government
7.20 Identifying vulnerable and fuel poor customers has always been a challenge for the industry and it
is keen to share more data withGovernmentDepartments to help improve targeting. Currently there is huge
wasted eVort and cost associated with searching for these customers and without access to beneﬁts data to
more accurately target eligible households these costs will escalate substantially. We have been attempting
to work with the Department for Work and Pensions to achieve a greater level of access to its beneﬁts data
to enable us to better target the fuel poor. If successful, this will help to ensure that a greater proportion of
the money invested in addressing fuel poverty goes to providing ﬁnancial assistance rather than to funding
targeting and marketing initiatives by suppliers which are currently ineYcient.
7.21 Government aid could also be more eYcient if better targeted. A recent study undertaken by the
London School of Economics on behalf of the British Gas Help the Aged Partnership shows that individual
pensioners could be losing up to £50,000 on beneﬁts over a lifetime by not claiming their entitlement. These
beneﬁts currently sit in the Government’s pot of £4.5 billion unclaimed beneﬁts for older people, but 1 in 3
pensioners are not aware of who to turn to for help and advice on how to access these entitlements which
could amount to between £5,000 and £50,000 per individual over a lifetime.
7.22 Currently everyone over the age of 65 receives an annual payment of £200 increasing to £300 for
the over 80s, irrespective of income. This contribution goes some way to cover the annual cost of energy
bills but often is not used to pay energy bills. We believe that winter fuel allowance should be paid directly
to suppliers so that we can oVset this against their energy bills.
Conclusion
Centrica believes that both the UK’s retail and wholesale markets are operating competitively and are
working in the best interests of customers. With amongst the cheapest energy prices in the EU, high rates of
switching and suppliers oVering a wide range of innovative products and services, the presence of six major
competitors in the retail market is more than suYcient to sustain eVective competition.
The UK’s competitive market has responded to declining North Sea gas reserves by bringing on
signiﬁcant investment in new sources of gas. However this new capacity has not translated into equivalent
gas volumes, leading to signiﬁcant volatility in the market and rising wholesale gas prices. This has been
compounded by the relatively low levels of gas storage in the UK. Increases in wholesale gas prices have
also contributed to high electricity prices.
Wholesale costs account for around 50% of the customer’s bill; therefore volatile wholesale markets have
had an inevitable impact on consumer prices. Centrica has been quick to pass on reductions in wholesale
costs to consumers. However it is vital that the company remains proﬁtable in order to fund the billions of
pounds needed to secure vital sources of gas and power for our customers.
We do, however, have continued concerns about the limited transparency in continental gas ﬂows. The
UK’s market is increasingly linked to continental energy markets and a lack of transparency about
continental gas ﬂows has added to an anxiety premium in the UKmarket. In addition, lower than expected
ﬂows from Norway has exacerbated the problem.
Although we welcome the progress the European Commission has made to date in pressing for
competitive EU energy markets, eVective ownership unbundling with strong and independent energy
regulators remains crucial to ensure competitive retail markets in the UK. The limited consolidation in the
UK’s energy market has been subject to rigorous scrutiny by the competition authorities, which is in stark
contrast with the continent, where entry into the market remains diYcult.
In these diYcult times for the energy market, we remain ﬁrmly committed to playing our part in helping
the Government meet its increasingly challenging fuel poverty targets. British Gas contributes the most of
any supplier to voluntary initiatives and our Essentials social tariV is the largest on the energy market.
We remain opposed to any moves by Government to mandate social tariVs and believe that any short-
term ﬁscal intervention in the market is contrary to the spirit of liberalised markets. We also believe that
any move to equalise prepayment tariVs rates could have an adverse impact on fuel poverty as only 25% of
prepayment meter customers are fuel poor.
Going forward some form of data-sharing with Government remains crucial to ensure that those eligible
can access the help available to them in the most cost-eVective way.
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Supplementary evidence submitted by Centrica
1. British Gas typically moves ﬁrst when prices increase
It is not true to say that the ﬁrst mover is typically British Gas. In the last four years, the only time when
we have “moved ﬁrst” was in 2007 when we were the ﬁrst to reduce prices and the only supplier to reduce
them twice—by a total of 20%.
Recent evidence shows that we have not led on price increases. For example:
— 2008: npower announced ﬁrst on 4 January, then Edf 15 January, then British Gas.
— 2006 half 2: Scottish Power led 22 June, Edf followed on 24 July; British Gas were third to move.
— 2006 half 1; Scottish Power led 9 February; Edf followed 15 Feb; British Gas were again third
to move.
— 2005; Powergen moved ﬁrst 21 July, Edf followed 29 July, British Gas moved third.
— 2004; Powergen and Edf again both announced before British Gas.
2. UK liquidity compared to Europe
According to Gaselys (a French owned energy trading company) around 90% of European gas liquidity
comes from the UK. We have, however, observed that there is lack of long-term liquidity. This may be due
to the fact that signiﬁcantly greater price volatility in the UK has contributed to producers’ reluctance to
sell further out.
The UK power market is not as liquid as gas but it is still amongst the most liquid. Though on some
measures it is likely that the German market might appear more liquid than the UK, the markets are not
directly comparable. In the UK, the only link to other countries is through the France-GB Interconnector,
which is 2,000MW (the GB-Ireland Interconnector could be considered an additional 400MW). Contrast
this with Germany which has over 17,500MW of interconnection with eight diVerent countries.
In order to get a fair comparison of liquidity betweenUKandGermanmarkets these signiﬁcant structural
diVerences would need to be considered and would certainly make the UK power liquidity picture look
much more favourable than the initial numbers would suggest.
3. We are increasingly becoming dependent on global sources of gas
In 2007, approximately 27% of UK gas had to be imported to meet demand. This year, we expect it to be
nearer 40%. The UK is no longer a “gas island”. We are increasingly interconnected via pipeline and LNG
so that the UK wholesale market gas price (and the pricing of gas supplies contracted on a market index
base linked to oil) is more and more inﬂuenced by the wider European/global supply, demand and pricing
position.We would support the decoupling of oil and gas in European contracts which is adversely aVecting
UK wholesale prices and leading to higher prices.
4. Beneﬁts of vertical integration
Vertical integration through asset ownership and/or by contract is a natural reaction to power price
volatility as it helps companies to manage wholesale price volatility and provides greater certainty in
customer prices. As a result, all the six major energy retailers are vertically integrated to a certain degree,
though Centrica is the least vertically integrated of all suppliers. Despite this degree of vertical integration,
it is important to note that over 40% of the generation market is held by independent generators without
signiﬁcant residential market positions.
5. Switching amongst prepayment meter customers
Contrary to the perception that prepayment meter customers do not switch, recent evidence from Ofgem
indicates that in 2007 prepayment meters customers switched at least as much as those that pay by direct
debit, while standard credit customers switched less frequently. The ﬁgures are as follows:
Gas Electricity
Direct Debit 21% 21%
Prepayment 23% 20%
Standard Credit 13% 12%
This trend of prepayment meter customers actually switching more than others is entirely backed up by
our own data.
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6. Prices in Great Britain are systematically rising much more quickly than in Europe
According to the BERR’s latest Quarterly Statistics, the estimated average domestic gas prices including
taxes in the UK for medium customers as at 1 January 2008 were the lowest in the EU 15 and were 45.3%
lower than the median.
Similarly, the estimated average domestic electricity price including taxes in the UK for medium
consumers as at 1 January 2008 was the second lowest in the EU 15 and was 33.6% lower than the
median price.
Whilst these ﬁgures do not take account of the retail price increases earlier this year, neither does it include
European price increases. In Germany, where energy bills are already amongst the highest in Europe, gas
prices are set to rise 20% this year whilst the electricity price is expected to grow by a minimum of 10%.
24 June 2008
Supplementary evidence from Centrica
1. UK/EU Price Comparisons
In our original written submission to the Select Committee, we referred to BERR’s Quarterly Energy
Statistics published in March 2008. Quarterly Energy Statistics covers estimated gas and electricity prices
to UK and EU domestic and industrial consumers. BERR have recently updated this document to include
estimates of prices between January and June 2008. This can be summarised as follows:
— For gas, BERR Quarterly Energy Prices (published 26 June 2008) show that estimated average
domestic gas prices, including taxes, in the UK for medium consumers from January to June 2008
were the lowest in the EU 15 and were 45.1% lower than the median.
— For electricity, BERR Quarterly Energy Prices (published 26 June 2008) show the estimated
average domestic electricity price including taxes in the UK for medium consumers for January to
June 2008 was the 5th lowest in the EU 15 and was 12.5% below the median price.
2. Action to Address Prepayment Meter Differentials
— British Gas is the only supplier to have created a standalone business to focus on prepayment
customers and we fully intend to pass improvements in our operating costs through to our
customers to allow us to close the diVerential between cash/cheque and prepayment.
— British Gas currently has 2.3 million prepayment meter customers. Our priority is to oVer these
customers improved service in a number of diVerent and unique ways. For example, British Gas
operates its own 24 hour contact centre service for customer emergencies with dedicated, trained
customer service advisors to ensure continuity of our prepayment customers’ supply. No other
energy supplier currently oVers this service.
— We have up to 35% more pay outlets than our competitors—for many customers convenience/
access to outlets is important.
— We are innovating and we have launched the ﬁrst online prepayment tariV which will see
prepayment dual fuel prices fall by 6% compared to oV line prepayment prices. For customers
moving to this online tariV will see an average dual fuel bill fall from £1,143 to £1,073, a saving
of £70.
— Our Essentials tariV is the largest social tariV in the UK and allows eligible customers to equalise
their prepayment prices with our lowest standard tariV—Monthly Direct Debit. This equates to
an average saving of around £161.
— Centrica also believes that prepaymentmeter customers will beneﬁt from the introduction of smart
meters and that the improved functionality of smart meters will remove prepayment diVerentials.
— We expect that smart metering and the introduction of new e-payment and website technology
should sweep away high cost to serve practices such as cash collection costs, payments to retail
outlets within today’s high prepayment meter model.
— British Gas is uniquely trialling 115 electricity prepayment meters in Manchester using e-payment
technology. Results from this trial show consumers prefer e-payment facility and a reduction in
cost to serve.
— We want to use our experience from this trial for our general smart meter programme.
— However, we believe more work needs to be done to perfect and improve on the technology and
systems and we see the roll out to prepayment meter customers as an integrated part of a wider
universal roll out.
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— Ultimately we want our meters to be switchable between prepayment and credit which we believe
will grow the prepayment meter market with customers choosing to take a range of value added
oVerings.
3. EU Emissions Trading Scheme and Windfall Profits
— The table below shows the total allocation of free allowances that each of the six energy suppliers
are scheduled to receive over Phase II of the EUETSwhich runs from Jan 2008 toDecember 2012.
It clearly shows that Centrica beneﬁts least from the allocation of free allowances. It is also
important to note a couple of key points:
— “Proﬁt” is only made for Phase II as we are expecting full auctioning from phase III for generation
sector—Centrica has been calling for full auctioning for a number of years. We were also calling
for the auctioning of the maximum 10% of allowances allowed under Phase II of the scheme. The
Government has stated only 7% will be auctioned.
— Centrica would support the revenues from the 7% auctioning of allowances under Phase II and
from the 100% from Phase III being recycled to support low carbon and fuel poverty objectives.
The CBI estimate the sale of the 7% auctioned EU ETS allowances would raise £1.6 billion.
FREE ALLOWANCES UNDER EU ETS
Value of Free Allowances (£m)
Ph II allocation (kt/yr) Annual average phII Total phase II
Centrica 4,765 98 492
E.on 13,434 277 1,386
EdF 10,956 226 1,130
RWE 12,321 254 1,271
Scottish Power 10,029 207 1,035
SSE 13,795 285 1,423
Total for big 6 65,300 1,347 6,737
Total in Power sector 104,000 2,146 10,730
Note: calculations are based on current carbon price of ƒ25/t and an exchange rate of 1.25.
— Centrica receives comparatively low allowances as a result of its ownership of clean sources of
power generation. These are supported by its gas-production assets. Centrica experiences a high
incidence of additional “windfall” taxes on the value of gas produced by its principal ﬁelds which
are subject to a higher tax rate of 75%. Its clean power generation therefore comes at an additional
tax price not shared by the rest of the industry.
“WINDFALL” TAXES SUFFERED (£’M) 2008–12
PRT SCT Total %
Centrica 1,271 501 1,772 89
E.on 8 111 119 6
EdF 0 0 0 0
RWE 13 76 89 5
Scottish Power 0 0 0 0
SSE 0 0 0 0
Total for big6 1,292 688 1,980 100
Total in Power sector
Note: Figures for windfall taxes (ie those in excess of the UK statutory
corporation tax rates for large companies) have been obtained form published
Wood Mackenzie data and estimates.
— We believe that it is important that talk about windfall taxes on proﬁts is seen in the context
outlined above. Centrica will be investing £1 billion per annum in new gas and power assets in the
next three years and it is vital that this investment is not undermined especially at a time when the
UK is facing a generation gap as a result of the closure of coal and nuclear ﬂeets.
7 July 2008
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Memorandum submitted by Chemical Industries Association
Summary
The Chemical Industries Association is pleased to have the opportunity to make a submission to the
Committee and highlight our continuing concern over the high and volatile prices prevailing in UK
wholesale energy markets.
We represent around 150 of the mostly larger producers in the chemicals sector, which in 2006 had a total
turnover of around £57 billion and a trade surplus of £7Ubillion. Further details are in the Appendix at the
end of this submission.
Below we provide a background section explaining the main features of UK energy markets, and then go
on to consider speciﬁc issues of concern to our members.
In summary, we conclude that fundamental market characteristics provide scope for anti-competitive
behaviour in UK energy markets. These include the fragmented nature of supply, lack of storage capacity
and lack of transparency in some key import sources, all of which add to market nervousness and volatility,
which in turn encourages speculation. Suppliers have little motivation to secure extra physical supplies of
gas on a long term basis, since they may lose contracts with customers; conversely customers feel they are
oVered little choice of contract. There is an uneasy stalemate and most contracts are tied to the spot price.
Vertically integrated suppliers have a vested interest inmaintaining high prices. Longer term contracts could
beneﬁt both sides.
The proximity to a Continental market run on very diVerent principles is costing the UK dear. While the
Continent has a large element of long term contracts and some price predictability thanks to a system of
retrospective adjustment to an index based on a basket of oil product prices, the UK works on a short term
basis and industrial customers are forced to rely mainly on spot buying. The same vertically integrated
suppliers largely control ﬂows of gas between the UK and Continental markets. While the UK is open to
Continental buyers, the Continent is largely closed to the UK.
Our members are ﬁnding instances of less competitive behaviour: there is a tendency for fewer competing
tenders at contract renewal, and these vary little. They sense themarket may be beingmanipulated at certain
times—instances appear in paragraph 15 below. They cannot directly access cheaper Continental gas to ship
back themselves.
Background
1. We ﬁrst outline in paragraphs 2–10 below why the question of energy prices and security is so
important to the chemical industry, why gas in particular is a focus of concern, and why we believe features
of the present market arrangements lead to less than satisfactory competition and can leave customers less
than well served.
2. The UK chemical industry operates in ﬁercely competitive global markets. The industry is also global
in ownership, with over 65% of CIA’s membership being foreign “headquartered”. Investment decisions are
therefore mostly made overseas. Any signiﬁcant imbalance between the UK business climate and other
markets can lead to the loss of UK trade and investment.
3. Key “building block” products are made using raw materials purchased at global prices and are sold
as commodities likewise at global prices. Companies compete on the eYciency of the conversion processes,
which are frequently energy intensive. Gas also serves as a raw material for fertiliser manufacture.
Intermediate products are widely used by downstream speciality chemical companies, who thus indirectly
feel the eVects of high energy prices, even if their own operations are less energy intensive. Finished products
of the industry are used as industrial components, for example in automotive manufacture, as process
enablers, for example in textiles and paper manufacture, and as consumer products such as detergents,
paints and pharmaceuticals. Access to internationally competitively priced energy and gas as a feedstock is
therefore vital to the viability of the UK chemical industry. Consequently the members of this association
take an exceptionally keen interest in energymarkets and employ skilledmanpower and devote considerable
senior management time to energy purchasing.
4. Crude oil and reﬁned products are easily transported. There is a true global market and essentially
common prices apply (disregarding local taxation diVerences.) The same is not true of gas, whose delivery
depends on expensive pipeline infrastructure or liquefaction facilities at source (LNG—liqueﬁed natural
gas) and specialised ships to transport LNG to purpose built receiving terminals. Globally, signiﬁcant price
diVerences occur, and access to the transport infrastructure is vital if competition is to be given full rein. In
the UK a large proportion, around 40%, of electricity generation is also dependent on gas, underlining the
importance of a competitive gas market.
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5. As North Sea reserves are slowly being exhausted, the UKmarket is becoming increasingly dependent
on imported gas. The main import routes are pipelines from Norway (Langeled and Vesterled), the
Netherlands (BBL), and Belgium (Interconnector). LNG can be imported at Isle of Grain; additional
facilities at Milford Haven are nearing completion. Existence of import capacity does not, however,
guarantee a ﬂow of gas. While Langeled, Vesterled and BBL have ﬂowed consistently, almost no LNG has
come through Isle of Grain in 2008, and net inﬂows along the Interconnector have been negligible—from
1 October to mid-March they averaged only 1.1 million cubic metres (mcm) per day, compared to UK
demand of about 325 mcm. It has been a long standing concern that gas has not ﬂowed to the UK from the
Continent via the Interconnector when market prices suggested it should. Conversely, the Interconnector
has sometimes exported gas from the UK even while gas was being taken from storage tomeet UK demand.
6. UK gas demand has a strong seasonal component, as demonstrated by the following chart33:
Daily UK gas demand
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There is a large variation in summer and winter demand, almost entirely due to changing heating
requirements for domestic and commercial premises. Industrial process use, in contrast, is quite stable.
Unfortunately the UK is not well supplied with storage capacity—the main “long term” storage facility,
Rough, can provide only 45 mcm per day (less than 15% of average winter daily demand) for 70 days.
Drawing on “medium term” storage can double this daily ﬂow, but for fewer than 20 days, since Rough
represents around 80% of storage by volume. Consequently the UK needs a large seasonal increase in
imports just when the rest of Europe has maximum demand. Our storage capacity is manifestly inadequate
given our present and expected increasing future dependence on imports.
7. Suppliers are not required to hold any physical gas in store; all assume they can “go to the market” if
needed. If contracts with users are linked to the “spot” price, the shipper runs no risk. Supply and demand
will ultimately balance as demand is choked oV by higher prices—and with disastrous consequences for
industrial customers, who help to provide the euphemistically named “demand side response”. Forward
contracts are either unavailable or have such a large risk premium that chemical industry users cannot aVord
to buy/use gas at that price, and of necessity rely largely on spot-linked contracts. When prices spike they
are forced to reduce or even cease production.
8. Many suppliers are part of a larger vertically integrated energy company. Despite “Chinese walls” the
shippers do not always have an obvious interest in trying to win market share if this involves increasing
supplies to the market and thereby reducing the price of the commodity their parent produces.
9. All in all the combination of uncertain supplies from the Continent and of LNG, and the UK’s limited
storage capacity, create a sense of nervousness in the wholesale gas market which is reﬂected in high forward
price premiums and frequent spikes in spot prices whenever the UK is hit by a spell of severe weather, or
if there is reported or rumoured interruption to supplies, for example damage to pipelines. Against such a
background it becomes easier to create perceptions of shortage which lead to higher prices to the beneﬁt of
integrated suppliers.
10. Because of the high proportion of gas ﬁred generating capacity, any increase in the wholesale gas price
feeds directly through to electricity prices.
33 Data from National Grid Monthly Reports.
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Specific Issues of Concern to our Members
11. Market transparency
Despite improvements in recent years, transparency in markets remains less than ideal. This applies in
particular to conditions in Norway, and the reasons for ﬂow variations along the Langeled and Vesterled
pipelines are not clear.Much of the Continental European system remains opaque; volumes of gas in storage
are not readily obtainable, certainly not on a timely basis. Flow capacity constraints within Europe are not
always known. This serves to increase uncertainty and volatility in the UK market.
12. Impact of interface with Europe
The principal linkwith theUKmarket, the Interconnector, does not always behave in amanner consistent
with price diVerentials in the markets. There is an uneasy meshing of the UK’s liberalised market with the
much less free market on the Continent. Gas prices there are often linked to an index based on a basket of
oil products, and adjusted every six months in arrears. Many suppliers on the Continent operate in the UK
market too, but their relative priorities are unclear. In practice they determine ﬂows of gas—in both
directions—through the Interconnector. Their motivations for not taking advantage of the opportunity to
sell gas at a higher price in the UK are likewise unclear, since the precise forms of contract with Continental
customers are not known. There may be penalties for failure to supply; stocks in storage appear to be
guarded until later in the winter. However, they are free to take gas from the UK market, and frequently
do, even in our winter, as our own stored gas is being drawn down.
Views recently expressed by Centrica’s chief executive, Sam Laidlaw, reﬂect these concerns. Speaking at
a conference in Amsterdam on 5UMarch, he commented that the UK was in danger of becoming a “gas
lender of last resort”. He observed that some governments in Europe were reluctant to open up their energy
markets, which had led to insuYcient gas ﬂows to Britain. Without further liberalization of European
markets, “Europe will continue to use the UK as a main source of gas at short notice, but may not be willing
to provide gas to the UK when the UK needs it”.34
Major gas consumers are further frustrated by being unable to use spare import capacity through the
Interconnector if they attempt to buy gas on the Continent to use in the UK. Many have manufacturing
operations in Europe and know they can buy gas more cheaply there, but ﬁnd that the charge to bring such
gas back to the UK precisely oVsets any gain from the price diVerential, despite the marginal cost of
transporting gas through the Interconnector being very low (around 1p/therm.).
13. Contracts available
Lack of choice in contracts is a major issue.Members report that when they put up their supply contracts
for renewal, the number of replies has tended to fall in recent years. For major industrial users the wholesale
price of gas represents around 95% of the delivered cost, and suppliers diVerentiate themselves only on the
remaining 5%. Even here variations are small.
14. Low utilisation of import capacity
It is frustrating for consumers to see import facilities not being used even when UK prices are high.
OFGEM is aware of concerns over the lack of use of the Isle of Grain facility, which as observed above, has
essentially been unused so far in 2008. Third parties ﬁnd access extremely diYcult to arrange, and OFGEM
appear so far to have been thwarted in their eVorts to secure better access.
15. Members’ examples of unsatisfactory market features
In response to a CIA questionnaire undertaken to assist the formulation of this submission, responses
included:
— “Lack of storage, and high level of speculation around supply problems, be they real or perceived,
or possibilities that may or may not occur, result in the price being far too sensitive in the UK.
This inevitably results in inﬂated higher market prices and unstable conditions. Traders/Market
reactions to these ‘problems’ seem quite disproportionate to the reality and there is a real sense of
‘playing the system’ at the expense of the end consumer”.
— “No competition between suppliers (even when several oVers are received), since diVerentiating
factors between suppliers operate on less than 5% of the total contract cost, thus resulting in no
motivation for changing supplier. No long term oVers means no visibility either for industry or for
the supplier and thus impossibility for long term investments”.
— “It’s broken—too volatile, too much speculator involvement, too inﬂuenced by non-UK energy
companies who exploit our market freedom, whilst defending their home market rigidity”.
34 As reported by Bloomberg news agency, 5 March 2008.
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— “There are too many players who can manipulate market prices without having to suVer the
consequences of buying daily energy. Why does the Bacton pipeline [from Belgium] frequently
ﬂow counter intuitively (why when Rough fell over did Germany & France accelerate ﬁlling
already adequate storage and prevent gas ﬂowing to the UK)? Why do within-day Norwegian
ﬂows to Easington change suddenly at sensitive trading slots? How many bull runs on the gas
market are triggered by speculators? How few gas trades are made by industrial buyers? How
frequently does electricity generation switching fuels to/from gas accelerate market swings? How
often does the UK’s lead in energy/carbon markets reform disadvantage UK manufacturing eg
electricity generators were able to pass through all their EU ETS exposure (leading to a step
increase in costs by 7%?35)”
16. Ranking of issues
When asked to rank the order of importance of various factors inﬂuencing UK market competitiveness,
this was the result:
1% Lack of UK storage
Lack of access to Continental markets
3% Lack of pre-contracted LNG
Inadequate transparency of Norwegian gas ﬂows
Access arrangements at LNG terminal
These are the issues we would ask the Government to address.
17. Damage to UK industry caused by present state of UK energy market
CIA asked members what steps they were taking to mitigate the impact of high energy prices. All are
endeavouring to be more eYcient in their energy usage, but other more worrying measures were mentioned
too. Responses included:
— “Greater focus and eVort on gas/electricity purchasing activity (we have no choice and this is an
additional cost to our business), continuous energy eYciency, production shift overseas”.
— “Not only have we shifted manufacture from UK and mainland EU to Asia, we are losing
signiﬁcant parts of our US & Australian markets to Asian manufacturers with higher carbon
footprints”.
— “Our company has clearly been shifting production and investment overseas, becoming every day
a smaller and smaller industrial and energy player in the UK”.
We could add here that climate change measures which disproportionately aVect UK (and possibly other
EU) manufacturers, for example being forced to buy allowances at auction, rather than receiving a free
initial allocation under the Emissions Trading System, can only accelerate the exodus.Moreover, auctioning
has no impact on the incentive to reduce emissions: however allowances are acquired, their value at the
margin remains the same when the cap is ﬁxed.
Conclusions
18. Any anti-competitive behaviour taking place in UK energy markets is being facilitated by
fundamental market characteristics. These include the fragmented nature of supply, lack of storage capacity
and lack of transparency in some key import sources, all of which add to market nervousness and volatility.
This in turn encourages speculation. Suppliers have little motivation to secure extra physical supplies of gas
on a long term basis, since theymay lose contracts with customers; conversely customers feel they are oVered
little choice of contract. There is an uneasy stalemate and most contracts are tied to the spot price. Longer
term contracts could beneﬁt both sides. Vertically integrated suppliers have a vested interest in maintaining
high prices.
The proximity to amarket run on very diVerent principles on the Continent is costing theUK dear.While
the Continental market has a large element of long term contracts and predictable price levels (at least over
six months, given the retrospective adjustments), the UK works on a short term basis and industrial
customers are forced to rely mainly on spot buying. The same vertically integrated suppliers largely control
ﬂows of gas between the UK and Continental markets. While the UK is open to Continental buyers, the
Continent is largely closed to the UK.
35 One member’s direct experience. The impact in percentage terms will vary according to the carbon price, the extent to which
this is passed on (and evidence so far suggests usually in its entirety) and the “base” level wholesale electricity price. At a
recent presentation to a BERR/DEFRA meeting, another member estimated that EUETS Phase 3 could add as much as
ƒ20–ƒ25/MWh to UK electricity prices.
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APPENDIX
CIA Credentials
The CIA is the leading representative and employers’ body for the UK chemical industry, with 150
members at over 200 manufacturing sites. Some sites produce bulk chemicals by energy intensive processes;
others make smaller volumes of speciality chemicals. Almost all depend upon energy inputs at some stage
of their operations.
Turnover of the UK chemicals sector in 2006 was £57 billion (including merchanted goods). It accounted
for 1.5% of UK GDP and almost 12% of manufacturing’s gross value added. [Source: OYce for National
Statistics (ONS), Annual Business Inquiry.] It employs some 185,000 highly skilled people directly and
supports several hundred thousand jobs throughout the broader economy. The chemical industry typically
contributes an annual surplus of £5 billion to the UK’s balance of payments [Source: ONS]. The industry
is global both in terms of markets and ownership, with over 65% of CIA’s membership being foreign
“headquartered”. Any signiﬁcant imbalance between the UK business climate and other markets can
therefore lead to the loss of UK trade and investment.
The industry is one of the most energy intensive sectors of the economy, and accounts for 22%36 of total
industrial energy consumption. Gas is also used as a feedstock for making many chemical products,
including fertilizers. The industry’s annual combined energy and feedstock bill amounts to an estimated
£2.5 billion.37 The industry has an excellent record of improving energy eYciency. As part of its ongoing
commitment to energy eYciency, the CIA is part of a negotiated Climate Change Agreement with UK
Government to deliver an aggregate improvement in eYciency of 34% between 1990 and 2010. A signiﬁcant
proportion of these improvements have already come from additional Combined Heat and Power (CHP)
plants and the chemical industry now generates over 30% of its own electricity requirements, most of which
is from CHP.38
27 March 2008
Memorandum submitted by the Citizens Advice Bureau
Executive Summary
1. Citizens Advice is very pleased to be able to contribute to the select committee’s timely inquiry into
the uncompetitive character of the energy market and energy prices. Our comments focus predominantly
on part of the inquiry which deals with “progress in reducing fuel poverty and the appropriate policy
instruments for doing so.” In particular, we consider the impact that rising energy prices have had on CAB
clients, who are often among themost vulnerablemembers of society, and the consequent growth in the level
of fuel debts.
2. The recent anouncements made in the 2008 Budget statement were very welcome since they heralded
a determination to secure a narrowing of the diVerential between fuel prepayment meters and other prices,
an increase in the Winter Fuel Allowance, and plans for a signiﬁcant increase in fuel suppliers’ social
programmes. The three-fold increase in the amount spent on social programmes by suppliers—from £50
million a year at present to at least £150million per year over the period ahead—oVers the potential tomake
major progress in tackling fuel poverty. Yet to truly make a diVerence it will be imperative that this increase
in spending is overseen to ensure that it is spent in the most eVective ways.
3. In our view the interventions announced in the Budget statement are overdue and very much required.
Citizens Advice has for some time called for more action to help those on low incomes who are struggling
to cope with rising fuel bills, for example by calling on fuel companies to equalise the diVerence in tariVs
between prepayment users and direct debit customers.
4. CAB evidence shows that many people are struggling to heat their homes and that a broad and
sustained programme of remedial measures is taken to tackle this problem and supplement the
announcements made in the recent Budget. This should comprise:
— extension of theWinter Fuel Payment to other vulnerable groups who currently are excluded from
the scheme;
— a comprehensive beneﬁt take-up campaign be launched—this approach has a proven track record
in delivering signiﬁcant beneﬁts to large numbers of people in fuel poverty in themost cost-eYcient
manner; and
36 Source: BERR “Energy Consumption in the United Kingdom”, as updated July 2007, Chart 4.2.
37 Extrapolated from 2004 input-output data from the OYce of National Statistics.
38 Source: BERR, Digest of UK Energy Statistics, Chart 5.2 (electricity usage) and Table 6.8 (CHP output).
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— an increase in the funding of theWarm Front programme, plus resolution, as a matter of urgency,
of the signiﬁcant problem of funding shortfalls for Warm Front and the consequent need for top-
ups from eligible consumers, which currently undermines the impact of the programme.
Introduction
5. The Citizens Advice service provides free, independent, conﬁdential and impartial advice to everyone
on their rights and responsibilities. It values diversity, promotes equality and challenges discrimination. The
service aims: to provide the advice people need for the problems they face; and to improve the policies and
practices that aVect people’s lives.
6. The Citizens Advice Bureaux (CAB) network is the largest independent network of free advice centres
in Europe, providing advice from over 3,200 outlets throughoutWales, England and Northern Ireland. We
provide advice from a range of outlets, including GPs’ surgeries, hospitals, community centres, county
courts and magistrates’ courts, and mobile services both in rural areas and to serve particular dispersed
groups.
7. In 2006/7, the CAB service dealt with 5.7 million enquiries on the whole range of issues bureaux give
advice on, including 1.7 million on debt.
8. The CAB service has seen a signiﬁcant increase in inquiries on fuel issues over recent years. In 2006/07
we received 60,000 new enquiries speciﬁcally about fuel debts—an increase of 33% on the previous year.
In addition, the service dealt with 47,000 enquiries about a range of other fuel matters, a 74% increase on
2005/06.
The Impact of Rising Prices on Consumers
9. The recent spate of large price rises announced by all the major fuel suppliers means that consumers
have seen massive rises in their annual energy bills, with energy prices currently about 50% above their 2003
levels in real terms. Such hefty price rises are hitting vulnerable people and those on low incomes particularly
hard, especially since they have been accompanied by rises in other essential expenditure—rises which show
no sign of slowing, for example water and sewerage bills are set to rise by an average of 5.8% for the average
household fromApril 2008 while council tax bills will increase on average by 4.0% in England in 2008–09.39
10. Beneﬁt income and wages have failed to keep pace with such increases and their impact can be seen
in the signiﬁcant rise in the number of enquiries relating to fuel debt and disconnection dealt with byCitizens
Advice Bureaux. Annual statistics released by Citizens Advice for 2006-7 reveal that many hundreds of
thousands of people are increasingly struggling to meet their day-to-day living expenses, with problems
relating to gas and electricity debt shooting up by 33% on the previous year. More recently, new ﬁgures
released by Citizens Advice about debt problems dealt with in the ﬁrst twomonths of 2008 reveal continuing
increases in problems relating to basic essentials such as gas and electricity, water, telephone and council
tax debts.40
11. In addition, energywatch found that a comparison of the same three-month period in 2004 and 2007
shows there has been a 64% rise in consumers owing more than £600 on their electricity bills and an 19%
rise in consumers owing more than £600 on their gas bills.41
12. Large price rises have reversed some of the progress previously made in eradicating fuel poverty, with
the Fuel Poverty Advisory Group’s (FPAG) annual report 2007 stating that “it is likely that in 2007 there
were about 2.9m households and 2.3m vulnerable households in fuel poverty in England—the highest levels
for nearly a decade.”42
13. The increased ﬂow of individual cases reported byCABx describing how clients are struggling tomake
ends meet demonstrates the diYculties faced by people on low ﬁxed incomes in attempting to cope with
massive rises to their fuel bills:
A CAB in Buckinghamshire reported that their client, a man with long term physical and mental
health problems, came to the CAB for money advice since he had a number of priority debts to
sort out. The client is in receipt of short term, lower rate incapacity beneﬁt of £59.20 per week but
his ongoing payments for gas, electricity and water account for approximately half his weekly
income. Since it is diYcult for him to meet essential expenditure and have suYcient available
income to oVer creditors, he has made the decision to not use his gas heating as he says he cannot
aVord to pay this and his other priority commitments.
A Lincolnshire CAB reported a case in which their clients, a young couple in their twenties in
rented accommodation with good jobs and a 2-year-old child, had been managing to repay debts
which they had previously accumulated. However, the spate of recent household fuel rises have
39 Oral Statement by John Healey MP, Minister of State for Local Government, Department for Communitites and Local
Government, 27 March 2008
40 Many more seek help with mortgage arrears—new Citizens Advice ﬁgures, Citizens Advice, Press Release, 18 March 2008
41 Serious energy debt taking toll of consumers, energywatch, Press Release, 25 January 2008
42 Fuel Poverty Advisory Group—Sixth Annual Report, 2007, p.4
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tipped the balance of their precarious ﬁnances and pushed them into a state where they cannot
aVord to maintain their repayments at current level. As a consequence they are sinking deeper
into debt.
A Leicestershire CAB client, a disabledman in his ﬁfties, came to the bureau for assistance because
he was extremely worried about paying his electricity bill. His electricity supplier had increased
their prices by 34% in the last year, meaning that the client was now unable to aVord regular
electricity payments andwas facedwith the prospect of getting into debt or self-disconnecting from
his electricity supply.
A CAB in Buckinghamshire reported that their client, a man with long term physical and mental
health problems, came to the CAB for money advice since he had a number of priority debts to
sort out. The client is in receipt of short term, lower rate incapacity beneﬁt of £59.20 per week but
his ongoing payments for gas, electricity and water account for approximately half his weekly
income. Since it is diYcult for him to meet essential expenditure and have suYcient available
income to oVer creditors, he has made the decision to not use his gas heating as he says he cannot
aVord to pay this and his other priority commitments.
A CAB in the East of England saw a disabled client who was living in fuel poverty. The client was
in receipt of Disability Living Allowance (DLA) and Income Support and relies on storage heaters
to heat her home. Her total cash income is approximately £70 per week. Out of this she is paying
throughout the year in excess of £30 per week on her electricity. If she did not haveDLA she would
ﬁnd it diYcult to aVord any heating to speak of at all. The client felt that she had to choose between
being cold and being hungry.
Policy Responses to Fuel Poverty and Rising Prices
14. The government has set itself the extremely challenging target of abolishing fuel poverty for vulnerable
households by 2010 and for all households by 2016—we would argue that it needs to give itself the tools to
give it a ﬁghting chance of meeting this target.
15. As we state above, we welcome the measures contained in the recent Budget statement including the
rises in the Winter Fuel Payment, the commitment to reduce the diVerential between prepayment meters
and other means of payment and plans for a signiﬁcant increase in fuel suppliers’ social programmes.
16. We recommend a number of complementary measures: extending eligibility for the Winter Fuel
Payment; launching a comprehensive and sustained beneﬁts take-up campaign; and increasing the funding
for Warm Front and reviewing the way it currently works in order to overcome present shortcomings.
Extending Eligibility for the Winter Fuel Payment
17. Citizens Advice welcomed the increases in theWinter Fuel Payment, as announced in the 2008 Budget
Statement. These increases will certainly be welcomed by pensioners. However, it is important to note that
while theWinter Fuel Payment is highly valued by many pensioners it is a very poorly targeted beneﬁt, with
all pensioners—regardless of income—entitled to it. It is therefore understandable that proposals for more
targeted use of this money to alleviate fuel poverty has been advanced, for example the Fuel Poverty
Advisory Group (FPAG) has suggested discontinuing Winter Fuel Payments for higher rate tax payers,
which would free up over £200m pa which could be used to fund increases in theWarm Front programme.43
In our view, this proposal has much to recommend it provided that such a change to a system based on
means-testing does not adversely aVect levels of take-up among eligible pensioners.
18.We also recommend that consideration is given to extending eligibility towinter fuel payments to other
groups whomay live on low beneﬁt incomes and struggle to aVord their fuel bills. Such groupsmight include
people under 60 years of age including disabled people, people with a long-term illness, and households with
young or disabled children. This measure would provide help to such groups in the short-term. Over the
longer term it would be preferable to look at raising levels of beneﬁt income, or perhaps consider uprating
beneﬁt levels more closely to fuel prices.
Launching a Comprehensive Benefits Checking Service
19. The government should consider proper funding for holistic beneﬁts advice, whichwould allow people
to claim beneﬁts currently unclaimed as well as providing information about getting a better energy deal,
helping with energy eYciency measures etc. Government research has shown that “income improvements
were the most important factor in reducing fuel poverty”, with 61 per cent of the reduction in fuel poverty
since 1996 attributable to improvements in incomes.44 Funding holistic beneﬁts advice is therefore the most
eYcient way of tackling fuel poverty and this exercise would go a long way towards putting extra money in
people’s pockets and enabling them to pay their bills with dignity.
43 Fuel Poverty Advisory Group—Sixth Annual Report, 2007
44 The UK Fuel Poverty Strategy—3rd Annual Progress Report 2005, Defra and DTI, p.27
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20. Citizens Advice Bureaux already provide a great deal of advice to clients when helping them to resolve
their problems. In 2006–07 bureaux dealt withmore than 5.7m problems, helping approximately twomillion
clients. Additional funding for holistic beneﬁts advice would enable bureaux to supplement this with
proactive beneﬁt take-up campaigns, targeting people who may not visit bureaux and who may be unaware
they are missing out on beneﬁt income that they are entitled to. Information about the impact that such
campaigns can have and the key factors necessary for successful campaigns is provided in Serious beneﬁts—
the success of CAB take-up campaigns, (Citizens Advice, April 2003).
21. Such eVorts are very much needed, with oYcial estimates suggesting that up to four in 10 pensioners
entitled to pension credit are not getting the extra cash they are due, and that as much as £2.5 billion went
unclaimed in the ﬁnancial year 2005/06, the most recent year for which ﬁgures are available.45 The amount
of Housing Beneﬁt and Council Tax Beneﬁt not being claimed is also large, and take-up of these beneﬁts
has actually declined in recent years.
22. Recently three Citizens Advice Bureaux have started to work in partnership with Ofgem, the energy
regulator, to pilot a campaign to (i) make sure people are getting the best deal for their energy and; (ii) to
provide information about what help is available from the energy industry and government for people
struggling to pay gas and electricity bills. This work is particularly focussed on encouraging people with
prepayment meters to exercise their ability to switch supplier to get a better deal. The pilots are targeted at
frontline workers (eg CAB advisers and housing association advisers) who can spread the message to people
they deal with as part of their everyday work, as well as to customers themselves.
23. Learning from these small-scale pilots is likely to be invaluable in coordinating eVorts to target a range
of help and assistance with aVordability of fuel to third-parties and customers.
Increased Funding for Warm Front Programme Plus Review of Current Operation
24. In the Comprehensive SpendingReview it was decided to cut the annualWarmFront budget by nearly
25% for the period 2008-2011. The decision to cut one of the government’s principal means of tackling fuel
poverty in England was deeply regrettable at a time when rising fuel prices have pushed the numbers of
people living in fuel poverty to their highest for almost a decade.
25.WarmFront annual expenditure should, in the 2008–11 period, be restored to at least its 2007–08 level
of £350m per annum. The Fuel Poverty Advisory Group (FPAG) has suggested a number of sources where
funding for this expenditure, and we would encourage government to look closely at the options outlined.
26. Although very supportive of theWarm Front programme in principle, many Citizens Advice Bureaux
have reported diYculties experienced in the operation of the scheme. This issue was debated in Parliament
on 3March 2008 and the problems highlightedmirrormany of those experienced byCAB clients. In general,
the problems with Warm Front relate to the costs quoted by authorised contractors for carrying out work,
the failure of the Warm Front grant to cover the cost of work required and the consequent need for
applicants to ﬁnd substantial sums to ‘top-up’ the grant. The following cases highlight these diYculties:
A CAB in the West Midlands reported that their client, aged 69, came to the bureau as his boiler
stopped working in December 2007 and he had no hot water or heating during the coldest months
of the year. The client had received independent estimates for a replacement boiler andwas advised
that the cost would be between £1,300—£1,700. He was then told by a friend that he might be
entitled to a Warm Front Grant to assist with payment. The client therefore made an application
to Warm Front and was informed that he had qualiﬁed for a Grant of £2,700. Given that he
expected the grant to easily cover the cost of the new boiler, the client also asked for replacement
radiators as his were over 20 years old. The client was sent a letter fromWarm Front, stating that
the total cost of the work recommended would be £3,821.81, meaning that the client needed to pay
£1,255.36 towards this ﬁgure.
A CAB in County Durham reported a case in which their client, aged 63 and in receipt of pension
credit, received aWarmFront grant for the cost of installing oil-ﬁred central heating worth £4,000.
However, the total cost of the work was £6,960.67 so the client was expected to ﬁnd the excess of
£2,960.67 before the work could be carried out. The client could not aVord to pay nearly £3,000
and so had to continue living in an inadequately heated home. The client contacted a local heating
company that informed her that in their estimation the work should cost approximately £4,000.
AMiddlesex CAB’s client reported a distinct diVerence between the prices quoted by local heating
engineers and the Warm Front approved contractor. The client, a widowed female, aged 79 and
in receipt of Pension Credit, was awarded a Warm Front grant of £2,700 but the cost of the work
was £3,460.63, with the balance to be paid by client. The client was unhappy with this quote as she
had also obtained quotations from local companies, the highest of which was £3,100. The client
was also understandably concerned that the Warm Front approved contractor was based almost
300 miles away in Sunderland, and she might therefore experience problems contacting them if
anything were to go wrong with the new boiler.
45 Source: Department for Work and Pensions Income Related Beneﬁts Take-Up Estimates 05/06
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27.Alongwith other consumer organizations, CitizensAdvice has highlighted the inadequacy of the grant
and the consequent need for eligible customers to ﬁnd large sums of money before the work can be carried
out, for some considerable time. Improvements have not yet materialized and a number of Citizens Advice
Bureaux now report that they may soon start to think twice before referring clients to apply to the Warm
Front programme. Citizens Advice recommends that a solution is found as a matter of urgency to the
signiﬁcant problem of funding shortfalls forWarmFront, and the consequent need for top-ups from eligible
consumers, which currently undermines the impact of the programme.
April 2008
Memorandum submitted by Corona Energy
Corona Energy (Corona) welcomes the opportunity to comment to the Business, Enterprise and
Regulatory Reform Committee on possible anti-competitive behavior in the UK’s energy market. Corona
is a shipper and supplier in the UK Industrial and Commercial gas market and also oVers a range of energy
services including an industry leading AMR service.
Corona relies on liquid wholesale markets to ensure the prices it can oVer its customers are as competitive
as possible and therefore welcomes the Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Committee’s interest
in this area.
Corona also welcomes the investigation into possible anti-competitive behaviour in the UK’s supply
markets. While Corona does not have any evidence of anti-competitive behaviour it recognises the
importance of eVective competition to ensure consumers have access to fair prices and to be an incentive
for good service.
Following a number of recent appeals of GEMA decisions, Corona are interested in the views of the
Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Committee on the eVectiveness of regulatory oversight of the
energymarket. Corona are particularly interested to knowwhether the Business, Enterprise andRegulatory
Reform Committee believe the level and complexity of regulation has inadvertently become a signiﬁcant
barrier to entry to the energy markets.
If the committee would like to discuss the issues raised in this response in greater detail then please contact
Richard Street (details above) who will be happy to help you.
26 March 2008
Memorandum submitted by Drax Power Limited
Summary
1. Observations of the operation of the electricity wholesale market suggest that the hedging behaviour
of the vertically integrated companies operating in the electricity market may be dulling or masking market
price signals leading to market ineYciency. Such ineYciency has the potential to have an impact on
investment decisions, which holds implications for security of supply. Analysis of the proposed generation
capacity new build would appear to support the suggestion of market ineYciency.
2. Power prices are driven by a number of factors, however, the more recent price increases witnessed in
the electricity wholesale market are a reﬂection of the increases in the input costs of power generation. It is
worth noting that generators do not achieve the spot prices in the market; generation businesses are hedged
over a period of time and therefore achieve a variety of prices.
3. In a market characterised by vertically integrated companies there may be a tendency for businesses
not to compete aggressively, but instead to maintain relatively stable market shares. Analysis of the relative
market shares of the six largest vertically integrated companies appears to uphold this theory on behaviour.
Introduction
4. Drax Power Limited (“Drax”) is the operating subsidiary of Drax Group plc and the owner and
operator of Drax Power Station, the largest, cleanest and most eYcient coal-ﬁred power station in the UK.
With a capacity of some 4,000MW, Drax Power Station is nearly twice the size of the next largest power
station in the UK. Drax sells its electricity through the electricity wholesale market of Great Britain, and at
current output levels meets some 7% of the UK’s electricity needs.
5. Drax is pleased to have the opportunity to participate in the Committee’s inquiry into energy prices.
As a generation-only business operating solely in the wholesale market, Drax should like to provide some
context to the inquiry by oVering observations on the general functioning or eYciency of the electricity
wholesale market, the price increases witnessed in that market and the implications for competition in the
electricity supply market.
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Efficiency of the Electricity Wholesale Market
6. In determining whether the wholesale market operates eYciently and testing that electricity prices are
a true reﬂection of the costs of both fuel and capacity, it is necessary to understand the functioning of the
market and this necessarily demands some consideration of the industry structure.
7. The electricity market is characterised by six large vertically integrated players, who between them
account for some 58% of the total generation capacity on the system or 69% of the price-setting plant (gas,
coal and oil) (with a controlling interest, through full ownership, part ownership or tolling contracts in 74%
of the price setting plant) and together these companies supply some 85% of the total demand. In the early
years of the privatised electricity sector, vertical integration was recognised by both the regulator and the
Government as a potential source of concern and at odds to the rationale for the restructuring the electricity
market. Indeed, policy decisions were taken during this time which prevented the then twomajor generating
companies from owning supply businesses.
8. The “anti-vertical integration” policy was relaxed following the forced divestment of coal-ﬁred plant
owned by the same two generating companies. However, the existence of Standard Licence Condition 12b,
which essentially prohibits cross subsidy between licensed activities, for example the activities of generation
and supply, is evidence that the concern surrounding vertical integration remains today.
9. Observations from the electricity wholesale market are that the vertically integrated companies tend
to hedge their supply positions by allocating their own generation to the smaller commercial and domestic
customer market. Given this natural hedge, the vertically integrated companies do not have to go to the
market to contract for power other than in spot and short-term markets. Therefore, volumes of power
traded in themarket in themediumand long-term are reduced, so reducing liquidity in thewholesalemarket.
10. Locking out both generation and supply volume from the contested market carries the risk that the
true value of generation is never revealed leading to ineYcient operation of the market as a whole. By
allocating their own generation to their supply businesses, the vertically integrated companies may not be
putting these power transactions in the most eYcient place and the costs of this ineYciency are, in eVect,
passed on to the end customer.
The Impact of Market Inefficiency on Investment Decisions
11. Investment decisions rely on the medium and long-termmarkets for price signals. A further potential
consequence of an ineYcient market, therefore, is the impact on investment decisions in the generation
market, which ultimately holds consequences for security of supply.
12. Analysis46 of the proposed new generation capacity in Great Britain reveals that 13GW of the 17GW
of approved projects are being built by the vertically integrated companies. More interestingly is that
“incentivised generation capacity”, such as renewable and CHP generation, is being built by a mixture of
the vertically integrated companies and a number of smaller companies. Whereas, the building of “non-
incentivised generation capacity”, that is the large conventional new builds, is noticeably dominated by the
vertically integrated companies or joint ventures involving the vertically integrated companies.
13. It is the “non-incentivised generation capacity” which one would expect to be driven by market price
signals, therefore, there is a suggestion that vertical integration is dulling market signals. If this were not the
case wider market entry/new build would surely be observed.
14. If greater volumes of power were to be traded in the market, liquidity in the market would improve
and so the market would tend towards ﬁnding the true value of generation. A market with high and regular
liquidity should be encouraged, only thenwill the price signals become eYcient and only thenwill themarket
see prices truly reﬂect the fundamentals of supply and demand.
Electricity Wholesale Market Prices
15. Power prices are driven by a number of factors: the underlying commodity prices, for example, gas
and coal prices; the margin on the system, that is, the relative level of generation to demand; market
sentiment, that is, the market’s reaction to information (which is more pronounced in less liquid or thin
markets); and the physical positions taken by the individual market players.
16. Recent power price movements, however, are clearly linked to gas price movements and so the
increases experienced in gas prices have fed directly through to power prices. The price of coal has also risen
dramatically over the last year—some 90% from the start of 2007 to the end of the year. It should also be
noted that the price of carbon allowances for delivery in Phase II of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme has
risen by 45% on last year. These, amongst other factors, were responsible for the reported lower earnings
of Drax Group plc in 2007 compared to the previous year.
46 Power Station Tracker, Power UK, pp 5–39, 29 January 2008
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17. From the highs of early Summer 2006, power prices in the wholesale market fell until Spring 2007,
since when they have been steadily increasing. It should be noted, however, that although power prices have
been increasing not all power over the period would have been traded at these higher levels. Generators do
not achieve the spot prices in the market; generation businesses are hedged over a period of time and
therefore achieve a variety of prices.
Implications for Competition in the Electricity Supply Market
18. With electricity prices being a function of fuel and capacity margin, any business owning generation
capacity would only do so if the market covered its long-term ﬁxed costs, as determined by the margin over
and above its fuel costs that it can achieve in the wholesale market.
19. With vertical integration there is a danger that the margin may appear in another part of the supply
chain suggesting generation capacity has reduced value; equally true is that the margin attributable from
supplying retail customers could appear in another part of the supply chainmaking it appear that the supply
business is not proﬁtable.
20. The obvious danger for any business in amarket which displays such characteristics is that it becomes
out of step with the rest of the market, losing or gaining market share quickly without the ability to hedge
itself which in turn leads to less predictable revenues and costs.
21. As a consequence, in order to avoid ﬁnancial unpredictability, there may be a tendency for businesses
not to compete aggressively, but instead maintain relatively stable market shares. Although it is claimed by
some that the electricity supply market of Great Britain is competitive, it is surprising that no single supplier
has broken out of the pack and taken a larger market share than the others. To illustrate this point, the chart
below shows the market shares held by the six largest vertically integrated suppliers.
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Conclusion
22. In conclusion:
(a) It is suggested that the hedging behaviour of the vertically integrated companies eVectively locks
out both generation and supply volume from the contested market carrying with it the risk that
the true value of generation is never revealed. This in turn leads to ineYcient operation of the
market as a whole, the costs of which are passed on to the end customer.
(b) A potential consequence of an ineYcient market is the impact on investment decisions in the
generation market, which ultimately holds consequences for security of supply.
(c) Analysis of the proposed new generation capacity reveals that “non-incentivised generation
capacity” build, that is the large conventional new builds, is noticeably dominated by the vertically
integrated companies or joint ventures involving the vertically integrated companies. If themarket
was operating eYciently and prices reﬂected the fundamentals of supply and demand, one would
expect to see wider market entry/new build.
(d) Price increases witnessed in the electricity wholesale market are a reﬂection of the increases in the
input costs of power generation. Although it should be noted that generation businesses are
hedged over a period of time and therefore achieve a variety of prices.
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(e) Analysis of the relative market shares of the six largest vertically integrated companies appears to
suggest that there may be a tendency for businesses not to compete aggressively, but instead to
maintain relatively stable market shares.
March 2008
Supplementary memorandum submitted by Drax Power Ltd
Introduction
1. Through its operating subsidiary Drax Power Limited, Drax Group plc (“Drax”) owns and operates
Drax Power Station, the largest, cleanest and most eYcient coal-ﬁred power station in the UK. We are a
generation-only company, with no business interests in the end user supply market. With a capacity of some
4,000MW, Drax Power Station is nearly twice the size of the next largest power station in the UK and we
sell all our output through the electricity wholesale market of Great Britain, and at current output levels
meet some 7% of the UK’s electricity needs.
2. As a power generation business operating in commodity markets, we are exposed to the prices of
power, coal and carbon. There are many factors that drive the prices of these commodities, including the
weather. Forward power and gas prices are highly correlated, with gas strongly inﬂuenced by and indexed
to oil which has seen dramatic price increases over the last 18 months. Coal prices too have hit record highs,
driven by tight markets for both coal and freight, especially in the Paciﬁc Basin caused by strong demand
from China and India, combined with some production and logistical issues in Australia and Indonesia. It
is important to note that the eVects we are seeing, in terms of increasing UK power prices, are being driven
by long term global growth and demand factors. Drax sits at the end of this long and interrelated commodity
market chain.
3. Further to giving oral evidence to the Committee on 3 June, Drax should like to submit the following
clariﬁcation on its answers to the questions raised during the session concerning market structure eVects.
Vertical Integration
4. Drax believes the current market rules and arrangements for trading power place the right incentives
on market participants to deliver an eYcient wholesale market. However, price transparency is critical. In
the absence of price transparency market price and price signals are dulled.
5. Whilst we are not against vertical integration per se, our concern is that the hedging behaviour of the
vertically integrated companies limits participation in the wholesale market as signiﬁcant volumes of power
are transacted between the generation and supply businesses of each of the vertically integrated companies.
The eVect is that these trades are not visible to the wholesale market, which essentially forecloses
competition in the contested part of the wholesale market. It is our contention that this brings ineYciency
to the wholesale market.
6. It is imperative that there is clear separation between the generation and supply businesses and price
transparency for all power trades to ensure that the true value of generation is revealed.
Vertical Integration and Liquidity
7. As an independent, generation-only company selling its entire output into the traded power market
we are an important market participant. Through our activity in the wholesale market, we provide a clean
indicator of price which assists in the discovery of the value of generation. If the vertically integrated players
were also to trade all their generation output through the wholesale market and satisfy their supply
requirements in the same way we would have a much deeper, more eYcient and more liquid market.
8. Again, it is our view that vertical integration per se is not the problem, and therefore forced divestment
as a remedy is not necessarily required. A potential solution would be to require all vertically integrated
companies to take all their physical requirements to the open market and/or oVer the same terms to
counterparties that they oVer themselves internally.
Vertical Integration Investment Effects
9. It is the market spreads, that is, the diVerence between the price of power and the cost of fuel (or cost
of generation) that signal new entry. The current spreads are too low to signal new entry and with no long
term hedges available in the market, for example, through long term power purchase agreements, there is
little incentive to invest in major, capital intensive new build projects.
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10. Given that there are power plants currently being built there must be some other driver at play.
Analysis of the approved projects reveals that it is the vertically integrated companies that dominate the new
build sector. It is interesting to note that companies would be expected to come to the market seeking long
term contracts before taking the risk of building. We have not seen this activity which again suggests other
factors are at play.
11. New entrants or independents are unable to put in place long term hedges due to market illiquidity.
The vertically integrated companies, however, have the additional long term hedge through the inertia of
their domestic customer base.
Market Consolidation
12. It is Drax’s view that the sale of British Energy to one or more of the vertically integrated players
would have a signiﬁcant detrimental impact on wholesale market liquidity if no conditions were attached.
13. British Energy produces around 17% of UK electricity, a large proportion of which underpins
volumes for the wholesale market. Removing volumes from the wholesale market would lead to a critical
decline inmarket liquidity and in the extremewould place at risk the ability of the independent players to sell
output. In short, the reportedwholesale market would diminish and price signals would be even less reliable.
Conclusion
14. In conclusion:
a. the current market rules and trading arrangements provide the appropriate incentives to deliver
an eYcient electricity wholesale market;
b. whilst not against vertical integration per se, there is concern that the hedging behaviour of the
vertically integrated companies limits participation in the wholesale market, forecloses
competition and brings ineYciency to the electricity wholesale market;
c. clear separation between the generation and supply businesses of the vertically integrated players
and price transparency is critical to ensuring that the true value of generation is revealed;
d. forcing all the power trades of the vertically integrated players through the wholesale market
would deliver a much deeper, more eYcient and more liquid market;
e. the hedging behaviour of the vertically integrated players masks price signals and deters new entry
into the independent sector of the generation market; and
f. further consolidation in the market resulting in the removal of power trades from the wholesale
market would lead to a critical decline in market liquidity and in the extreme would place at risk
the ability of the independent players to sell output.
23 June 2008
Memorandum submitted by eaga plc
RESPONSE TO THE BUSINESS ENTERPRISE AND REGULATORY REFORM COMMITTEE
TO INVESTIGATE POSSIBLE ANTI-COMPETITIVE BEHAVIOUR IN THE UK’S ENERGY
MARKET
Specific Questions for Consideration
Below is eaga’s response to the question raised by the enquiry. Where a question is asked in the call for
evidence and not listed below, eaga has no views.
Progress in reducing fuel poverty and the appropriate policy instruments for doing so
In considering the usefulness of Government policy instruments for reducing fuel poverty eaga’s response
will focus on the following:
— Warm Front;
— Local area based initiatives;
— Carbon Emissions Reduction Target (CERT);
— Energy Performance Certiﬁcates;
— Decent Homes Standard;
— Winter Fuel Payments; and
— Energy company voluntary schemes and initiatives.
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Warm Front
eaga has delivered the current phase of theWarm Front Scheme across England since 2005, and has been
at the heart of the Scheme’s development, implementation and delivery since its inception in June 2000.
The Scheme is the Government’s primary tool for tackling fuel poverty at a national level. Help provided
by Warm Front means the most vulnerable households in England can stay warm, through the installation
of eYcient central heating and energy eYciency measures such as loft and cavity wall insulation. The
improvements lift families out of fuel poverty due to average bill savings of almost £300 per year. These
measures also mean householders need no longer risk ill health because their homes are cold and damp.
Warm Front is a central part of the Government’s pledge to eradicate fuel poverty in vulnerable
households in England by 2010. By signiﬁcantly reducing the carbon footprint of the homes we improve, it
is also helping deliver the UK’s climate change commitments.
We strongly believe that, in an era of rising energy prices, there should be greater coordination of Warm
Front, CERT, Trust Funds, Local Authority discretionary funds and other sources of help to ensure that
the most comprehensive range of services are delivered in each low-income home treated.
Warm Front has been a very successful scheme in a number of ways:
— It has reduced fuel bills for low income customers by an average of almost £300 every year or 30%.
Of course, this is an average ﬁgure, meaning a substantial amount of people save far more.
— The Scheme currently ﬁts or repairs a heating system every minute of every working day.
— It has reduced CO2 emissions in a very cost eVective way, indeed the Scheme was independently
ranked as Defra’s third most cost-eVective carbon saving instrument in the domestic sector.
— The Scheme has helped more than half a million homes in the last two years alone.
As the Fuel Poverty Advisory Group, of which eaga is a member, have already raised, the question of
resources for fuel poverty programmes is important. In light of this, there is a concern that the 2010 and
2016 statutory targets for reducing and eradicating fuel poverty will now be missed. On the subject of
resources for fuel poverty, we note the Fuel Poverty Advisory Group’s most recent annual report said:
“The cut in Warm Front is, to put it mildly, diYcult to understand—given the programme’s
success and given the still more pressing need, in the wake of the price increases, to improve the
energy eYciency of homes and heating systems. The programme has been cut when fuel poverty
is at its highest level for nearly a decade”.47
Warm Front’s Beneﬁt Entitlement Check service is another extremely important tool in moving
households out of fuel poverty. By improving beneﬁt take-up while delivering energy eYciency measures we
reduce fuel bills in conjunction with improving income, making a real diVerence to the lives of people on
low incomes. Last year some 55,000 people received Beneﬁt Entitlement Checks, and in 2006–07, 22,761
Beneﬁt Entitlement Checks were carried out under the Scheme (39% were subsequently found eligible for
Warm Front). The average increase in income was thus increased weekly by £26.51 and annually by £1,378
per client.48
The Warm Front Scheme has been extremely successful in reducing fuel poverty through installing
traditional measures. This success could be underlined if the Scheme was opened up to other technologies
and energy eYciency options, such as external cladding, that would better enable it to assist residents of
“hard to treat” homes.
A key area for consideration in the inquiry should be the next step for fuel poverty programmes, the most
logical of which is the introduction of renewable technologies, such as air source heat pumps and solar
thermal heating. This could facilitate market transformation in the renewables sector through guaranteed
volumes, supply and economies of scale.
In addition, these options have potentially greater potential for carbon savings, and would be important
for Government climate change targets. They would also provide solutions to lack of heating in hard-to-
heat homes oV the gas network. Of course, the associated question of how the introduction of said
technologies might impact on resource requirements should also be considered.
Local Area Based Initiatives
The most widely known local area based initiatives for tackling fuel poverty are Warm Zones.
Warm Zones are a targeted programme that are intended to provide appropriate assistance to
householders in privately owned, rented or social housing. The Warm Zones broker funds and grants from
a wide range of sources to deliver beneﬁts such as energy eYciency, carbon savings, fuel poverty reductions,
beneﬁts advice, health improvements, ﬁre and home security, employment skills and training.49
47 FPAG Annual Report 2007, p 12.
48 The UK Fuel Poverty Strategy 5th Annual Progress Report 2007, p 15.
49 http://www.cse.org.uk/pdf/pub1028.pdf, http://www.warmzones.co.uk/c what is warmzones.html
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eaga continues to work in partnership withWarm Zones and is exploring other local area based solutions
to fuel poverty, including work on projects under the ‘Community Energy EYciency Fund’ (CEEF) banner.
We believe many of these projects will play a valuable role in continued eVorts to reduce fuel poverty levels,
while recognising that they serve in an ancillary role to a national programme like Warm Front.
Carbon Emissions Reduction Target (CERT)
While we recognise the vital nature of ensuring energy suppliers play a large and active role in improving
domestic energy eYciency, we have some concerns with the apparent increased reliance on CERT from
Government.
There has been a shift from Government-funded programmes such as Warm Front to the beneﬁts
provided under CERT through energy supplier programmes. This means customers, including those on low
incomes, consequently bear a greater share of the costs as a result of this reliance on the CERTmechanism.
This is potentially detrimental for those in or near to fuel poverty.50 eaga would question the growing
reliance on CERT to provide energy eYciency measures when these instruments are primarily intended to
reduce carbon consumption, as opposed to cutting fuel poverty.
Government suggestions that expenditure on energy eYciency will increase over the next four years, while
accurate, do not acknowledge that the cost of some elements of this equation will fall on consumers.
Additionally, it is hugely important that themeasures provided by CERT are not as comprehensive as those
delivered byWarm Front and do not include heating options, the most meaningful in tackling fuel poverty.
Nonetheless, the obligation on energy suppliers to focus a signiﬁcant amount of energy savings in low
income, vulnerable householder groups will also remain. This means that, as well as funding continued
growth within the “able to pay” market, signiﬁcant opportunities for further interaction with schemes such
as Warm Front will continue to develop and expand.
In addition, the Government has conﬁrmed that innovative measures such as external wall insulation will
receive substantially greater incentives under CERT than was the case with EEC. This further underlines
the importance of companies like eaga being able tp provide the volume of improvements necessary if the
Government’s 2010 target is to be achieved. The size, scale and structure of the CERT obligation provides
signiﬁcant opportunities for eaga to use its experience to ensure maximum beneﬁts for householders.
Energy Performance Certiﬁcates
Energy Performance Certiﬁcates will identify issues in existing housing stock for new purchasers and
should over time drive up energy saving initiatives by house owners to help sell their property. This
behavioural shift is to be welcomed and eaga are positioned at the heart of driving this initiative forward,
with considerable resource delivering EPCs on the ground.
However, this will be a slow process and will not impact where it is most needed: those private homes held
by the more elderly in our society with little capital saved to invest in energy eYciency.
An appropriate focus must be maintained on improving existing housing stock. Even by 2050 it is
estimated that over 60% of all UK buildings will pre-date 2006 regulations.51 Their standards must be
improved—they are the key tomeetingGovernment carbon emissions targets. The emissions of these homes
can be substantially reduced by improving the thermal eYciency of the building itself, alongside improving
the eYciency of heating systems.
Providing energy eYciency measures to existing housing is an extremely cost-eVective method for lifting
people out of fuel poverty, and for making substantial carbon savings. Existing homes account for a clear
majority of the 150 million tones (a 27% share) of the UK’s carbon emissions that housing is responsible
for.52
The Decent Homes Standard
The Decent Homes Standard has been extremely successful in delivering energy eYciency improvements
to social housing. However, more remains to be done in ensuring that thermal comfort standards set under
Decent Homes are properly aligned with mainstream programmes. It is important to remember that despite
only 20% of housing stock being social housing, it includes over one third of those in fuel poverty.
50 FPAG Annual Report 2007, p 14.
51 “Transforming Existing Buildings: The Green Challenge”, Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors, 2007.
52 Stock Take, Sustainable Development Commission July 2006; Review of Sustainability of Existing Buildings DCLG 2006.
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Winter Fuel Payments
We acknowledge the importance and usefulness of the annual Winter Fuel Payment in alleviating
seasonal pressures on the fuel costs of pensioners.
However, it is critical in tackling fuel poverty that an appropriate balance is struck between capital
investment and revenue expenditure, with a view to implementing the most sustainable policy solutions.
Whilst we recognise there may be apparent political diYculties in doing so, we would suggest that
targeting the payment to those in greatest need would be a more eVective use of resources. The funding this
would save could more than restore funding to key fuel poverty programmes.
Energy company schemes and initiatives
The Government has recently announced a voluntary agreement with energy suppliers to move a
theoretical 100,000 homes out of fuel poverty. While this is to be welcomed, it is a small step when recent
fuel price increases have already pushed far in excess of that number into fuel poverty.
eaga would welcome a mandatory scheme requiring suppliers to meet agreed targets for assisting their
most customers using the most appropriate means—primarily through robust (mandatory and regulated if
necessary) social tariVs, and real energy eYciency improvements, delivered through measures not currently
catered for in mainstream programmes (eg solid wall insulation).
May 2008
Letter by EDF Energy
Thank you for you letter of 11 January and your invitation to submit evidence ahead of the Business,
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Committee session on January 31 with the Minister for Energy,
Malcolm Wicks MP.
As one of the UK’s largest energy companies, EDF Energy is keen to engage in this process. In response
to your speciﬁc questions, I am pleased to provide the following evidence.
1. If you have increased prices what steps you have taken to mitigate the impact on vulnerable groups and if
you have not raised prices, whether you expect to raise prices for your retail customers in 2008?
EDF Energy has worked hard to mitigate the eVect of rising costs for our most vulnerable customers. We
were the ﬁrst energy supplier in 2006 to introduce a social tariV, Energy Assist, which currently oVers our
fuel poor customers a 15% discount on their bill. 50,000 customers in receipt of that tariV will therefore
continue to pay us discounted prices. We also oVer those customers free beneﬁt entitlement checks to ensure
that they wre receiving all the income assistance for which they are eligible, in order to help them meet their
energy bills.
Wewere also the ﬁrst energy supplier to set up an independent trust fund, the EDFEnergy Trust, to which
we have already donated nearly £7 million and which has made awards to around 8,000 households
experiencing problems with energy and other household debt. This has been very eVective and we have
found that 12 months or more after receiving a grant, over 70% of households have remained free of debt.
Although only a small proportion of our customers using prepayment meters are fuel poor, they do tend
to be lower income households. We have developed a responsible approach to these customers and we were
the ﬁrst energy supplier to align our electricity prepayment prices to those of our standard tariV and were
also the ﬁrst to oVer those prepayment customers the peace of mind of a ﬁxed price tariV.
EDFEnergy’s Fixed Price 2010 tariVwill enable customers to ﬁx their prices until 31 July 2010. This oVers
protection and security in a volatile market. EDF Energy is alone in the industry in making this available
to prepayment customers. There is no cancellation fee or penalty should the customer want to come oV this
product at a later date.
EDF Energy has also helped to establish a LondonWarm Zone with Newham Borough Council in 2001.
This delivers intensive door-to-door assessments of households to identify vulnerable households where
energy eYciency can be improved and provides support for customers to claim beneﬁts for which they are
eligible. The success of this scheme has seen it extended across East and West London so that more than
40% of London Boroughs are now covered.
In addition to our voluntary initiatives, energy suppliers also have a mandatory social obligation from
Government: an obligation to deliver 40%of the supplier energy eYciency obligation, CERT, to households
in a priority group. However, the blurring of this social obligation with a carbon reduction target creates
ineYciencies for both objectives, and we believe that a separation of the carbon and social obligations would
have a greater impact on both. Whilst the opportunity to achieve this for CERT has now passed, we are
keen to see this separation in place for 2011.
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2. If you have increased or plan to increase prices, what is the scale of the increases you have announced or
anticipate and what are the underlying reasons for your strategy?
With eVect from the 18 January, EDF Energy has announced an increase in our gas and electricity prices,
with electricity rising by 7.9% and gas by 12.9%. This will impact a typical dual fuel customer by just over
£1.92 per week.
Raising our prices is one of the biggest decisions that we have to make and is not taken lightly. However,
we have had to increase our prices because of three factors. Firstly, thewholesale price of energy has doubled
over the last year. Secondly, the distribution costs of transporting and metering energy have also risen.
Finally, there have been signiﬁcant cost increases frommeeting our environmental obligations, including
a major expansion of the Government’s Energy EYciency obligation on suppliers [CERT), which we fully
support, but which has doubled from 2008. Even so, in arriving at our decision, we are very mindful of the
competitive nature of the market; there is no automatic entitlement to recover the extra costs that we incur.
Our price increase is applied in an equitable way to all our tariVs and we have been careful to ensure that
this does not penalise our prepayment customers.
3. The Government’s decision on nuclear power
You also requested comments on the Government’s decision on nuclear power and on the likely
implications for investment in a new generation of nuclear power stations, and on investment in other
conventional and renewable generation capacity.
EDF Energy welcomes the Government’s announcement as a major step in opening a new era of energy
policy. It will enable nuclear power, as part of a diverse energy mix including renewables, gas, clean coal,
and greater energy eYciency, to continue in the future to make a major contribution to the three key
challenges of security of supply, climate change and aVordability of UK energy supplies.
Most of the current nuclear and coal capacity will close over the next 15 years, leaving a prospective
capacity gap of at least 15GWby the end of 2015 and at least 33GWby 2025. At the same time the challenge
of climate change will continue and increase.
The Government’s decision following its extensive consultation is therefore timely. We are pleased that
the Government recognises the need for facilitative action in respect of a number of issues. These include
assessment of current new reactor designs, the availability of suitable sites, the need for a robust long term
carbon price signal and the streamlining of the planning system. There is also a need, which is being
addressed by the Energy Bill, for clear arrangements for the operators of new nuclear power stations to set
aside funds to pay for the cost of decommissioning and of managing the waste produced by these plants.
Wewill be working with theGovernment and oterh interested parties to ensure that these issues are resolved
in a timely way, so that the right framework for investment can be put in place.
EDF Energy has announced that it is keen to take part in building up to four new nuclear stations.
Contingent on the Government’s decision we have been working for nearly two years on plans to
commission the ﬁrst of these by 2017, using the EPR design. Following the Government announcement we
are stepping up our plans to deliver.
We expect to achieve this in partnership with others. This will be a UK project and it will be delivered
with British skills and companies. It will be a project to meet the needs of energy users in this country. In
implementing these plans, EDF Energy will also draw on the experience of EDFGroup, the world’s largest
nuclear operator with 58 plants. By drawing on this experience and working in partnership with others we
are conﬁdent that new plants can be built and run safely and economically without subsidy—covering all
the costs associated with construction, operation, decommissioning and waste disposal.
Throughout this new phase we are committed tomaintaining openness and transparency both now and in
the future. At the heart of this is our unreserved commitment to safety, already proven by our track record.
EDF Energy has committed to reduce the carbon intensity of our electricity generation activities by 60%
by 2020. Based on the current generation of our ﬂeet, that represents almost 12 million tonnes annually by
2020. This measure formed part of EDF Energy’s “Climate Commitments”, which represent the biggest
package of environmental initiatives launched by any major UK company.
As part of our commitment to a diverse mix, EDF Energy and our aYliates will be investing in 1.000MW
of UK renewable energy production by 2012. In this regard, we have recently received consent for a 90MW
oVshore wind farm at Redcaron Teesside.
We have also recently received consent for a new 1300MW gas CCGT plant at West Burton. This is due
to be commissioned in 2011 and will make an important contribution tomeeting the needs of our customers.
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I hope this information is helpful to the process of your inquiry.Wewill of course be very happy to provide
any further detail you require. If we can be of any further assistance, now or in the future, please do contact
my colleague Kaa Holmes on 020 7752 2179 who will be able to assist.
24 January 2008
Memorandum submitted by EDF Energy
ANTI-COMPETITIVE BEHAVIOUR IN THE UK’S ENERGY MARKET
Summary of EDF Energy’s Position on Competition in the UK Energy Market
1. Many studies have found theUK energymarket to be competitive and an independent study on behalf
of BERR has found the UK energy market to be more competitive than those in the rest of Europe. As a
result, customers beneﬁt from prices that are lower than the European average. They also have the
opportunity to easily switch supplier or products, demonstrated by the fact that more than 13 million
electricity and 11million gas customers (half of the total) have taken advantage of this opportunity since
market opening in 1998, and a range of new products from existing and new suppliers in the market such
as green tariVs.
2. The vertical integration of the market, where companies operate generation and sell direct to
customers, has brought many beneﬁts to customers. Energy suppliers have become vertically integrated to
manage the risk associated with price volatility in the wholesale markets and customers therefore beneﬁt by
paying prices that are much less volatile at the retail level. High levels of competition between these suppliers
ensure that margins remain slim and prices competitive.
3. The interests of the companies are closely aligned with those of customers. Both want low carbon,
diversiﬁed, aVordable and secure energy sources. Contraction in the credit market has highlighted the value
of having companies with strong balance sheets to make the substantial investment required to renew the
UK’s energy infrastructure and secure low carbon and aVordable energy supplies over forthcoming years.
We build on these positions in response to each of the questions posed by the Committee.
1. Whether the current market structure encourages eVective competition in the retail markets for gas and
electricity
The current market structure is encouraging a very high level of competition for customers between the
large energy suppliers and also between the larger suppliers and smaller suppliers, particularly in the area
of new product oVerings to the market.
The National Audit OYce (“NAO”) report of 26 March 2008, entitled Protecting consumers? Removing
retail price controls (“the NAO Report”), found that conditions for competition have developed in the gas
and electricity supply markets and that Ofgem has taken action to help consumers take advantage of
competition, for example, by ensuring that they can switch easily between suppliers.53 The overwhelming
majority of consumers now have the power to exert competitive pressure on suppliers.54 The evidence for
the level of competition can be seen in the high level of customers switching supplier (demonstrated in section
1.1 below) and the numbers of customers switching to new products (demonstrated in section 1.2 below).
Suppliers who have been able to keep their prices low have gained signiﬁcant market share in recent years
(demonstrated in section 1.3 below). All suppliers are also seeking to compete onmore than just price alone,
making signiﬁcant eVorts to improve levels of customer service, which has resulted in a fall in complaint
levels (as demonstrated in section 1.4 below).
This high level of competition has meant that energy suppliers have not been able to pass on the full cost
of wholesale price increases and other costs to customers. Margins in the market are very slim and this is
reﬂected in UK prices being lower than the European average (demonstrated in section 1.5 below).
1.1 Customer Switching
There is a high level of awareness among customers that they are can switch supplier. The level of churn,
the proportion of existing customers who change suppliers, in a year, has been growing in recent years and
has reached a very high level by comparison with other industries.
53 Summary, Conclusion, section 3, page 5.
54 Summary, Conclusion, section 4, page 6.
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Source: BERR January 2008
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While the proportion of gas customers switching supplier has increased from around 16% to 18% in the
last three years, the proportion of electricity customers switching has increased even further, from around
16% to over 20% in the same period. BERR reported that 1.34 million electricity accounts changed supplier
in Q3 2007.
Customers say that they ﬁnd it very easy to switch their supplier. This is supported in the NAO report,
which refers55 to research by the National Consumer Council in 2005 reported in Switched on to Switching,
as demonstrating that 95% of energy consumers who switched supplier found it easy to do so.
Research by Mori illustrated in the chart below demonstrates that switching energy supplier is thought
to be easier than switching some other service providers and only a small number of customers found the
process diYcult.
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Energywatch has facilitated the process of switching energy supplier by accrediting companies that oVer
price comparison services. Currently 12 companies are accredited by energywatch to provide these services
under their “conﬁdence code” scheme.
Ofgem has also recently begun a campaign with the Citizens’ Advice Bureau to raise awareness amongst
its advice workers of the ability to save costs by switching energy supplier and of how to obtain the best
deal.56
1.2 Innovative Products
The NAO Report recognises57 that the main area of innovation in the retail energy markets has been the
introduction of a range of new tariVs. EDF Energy has participated actively in the introduction of
innovative tariVs, introducing its own range of ﬁxed price, green, and online tariVs.
Customers are now being given new options when choosing tariVs from a wide range of new products
being oVered in the market.
55 Summary, Detailed ﬁndings, section 5.d, page 7.
56 Referred to in the NAO Report, Part Three, section 3.27, page 26.
57 Part Two, section 2.16, page 18.
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New tariVs include internet based tariVs and price guarantee products, such as ﬁxed or capped price
tariVs. Both of these new types of product have become popular with customers, as illustrated in the
charts below.
NUMBER OF PRODUCT ACCOUNTS SIGNED UP TO PRICE GUARANTEE TARIFFS IN
MARCH OF EACH YEAR
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Green products have been growing in popularity in recent years, and as at April 2007, around 215,000
customers were registered on these tariVs. While at present this only represents a small proportion of the
electricity supply market, we are seeing steady growth in demand and expect it to increase signiﬁcantly in
the future.
Source: Organic Life
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Smaller suppliers have shown themselves to be very competitive in the market for green products, having
captured a signiﬁcant share of this new market.
EDF Energy was also the ﬁrst energy company to oVer a new tariV to our customers that rewards them
for using less energy.OurReadReduceReward tariV launched inMay 2005 currently has 276,000 customers
who are rewarded in loyalty points through the Nectar scheme for reading their own meter on a quarterly
basis. Energy usage can be tracked online and if energy use reduces from one year to the next bonus points
are earned.
1.3 Changes in Market Share
The chart below shows how active competition in the domestic supply market has led to signiﬁcant
changes in several companies’ market shares. Centrica in particular has lost energy market share, as
customers have switched to other suppliers to take advantage of lower prices and higher standards of
customer service.
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1.4 Customer Service
Price and innovation are not the only diVerentiating feature of energy services, however, and all
companies are seeking to improve their quality of service.
The chart below produced by energywatch shows that suppliers have been improving quality of service,
reﬂected in the reduction in complaints received, although, as is publicly known, British Gas has suVered
particular problems relating to a new IT system in the last two years.
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1.5 Prices and comparison with European Energy Prices
Despite the increases in costs experienced by the energy industry within the UK (see answer to Question
4), the high level of competition has ensured that domestic prices have remained competitive. Downward
pressure on EDF Energy’s prices caused by customer switching has had an impact on its prices to all
customers, including those customers not actively engaged in the market. EDF Energy’s approach to
smoothing prices to protect customers from volatile wholesale prices has resulted in prices that are
competitive, and it has in fact made lower proﬁts in an attempt to provide this protection—see below,
section 4.
The following charts created by Ofgem illustrate that UK energy prices remain low compared to many
parts of Europe.
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1.6 Conclusion to question 1
In conclusion, it is clear that the current market structure encourages eVective competition in the retail
markets. In addition to competitive prices customers are being oVered improved quality of service and new
products more suited to their own needs. The success of the market is reﬂected in the high numbers of
customers that are actively engaged in it by changing their energy supplier, a process that customers ﬁnd
easy to undertake.
2. Whether there is eVective competition in the wholesale markets for gas and electricity
A number of investigations, including those conducted by BERR and the European Commission, into
the wholesale energy market within the UK have found it to be competitive, and signiﬁcantly more
competitive than many other wholesale energy markets in Europe.
The electricity and gas wholesale markets have a large number of participants and liquidity remains high
in the gas market, and is improving in the electricity market (demonstrated in section 2.1 and 2.2 below).
Signiﬁcant increases in the cost of gas and coal, and the introduction of a price for carbon (demonstrated
in section 2.3 below) have driven increases in wholesale electricity prices since 2005.
While the six vertically integrated suppliers do each operate electricity generation portfolios, they also
purchase electricity from the wholesale market. In addition, vertically integrated players compete to
minimise production costs, so that they can oVer competitive retail prices to customers (demonstrated in
section 2.4 below).
2.1 Participants in the market
There are a large number of participants in the wholesale electricity market; we estimate that there are 42
currently active players, comprising a number of generators, smaller suppliers, upstream energy companies
(such as the large oil companies), dedicated traders and ﬁnancial institutions. Around half of the electricity
generated in the UK is generated by the six vertically integrated suppliers and many of the other generators
directly supply industrial and commercial customers and some smaller suppliers also generated their own
electricity. In its factsheet on the UK energy market the European Commission states that “Ownership of
generation is rather diverse, with the UK having the lowest generation sector concentration in the EU”.
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Generation Capacity as May 2007
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In gas there is even greater participation of parties in the wholesale market. The European Commission
UK energy factsheet states “The wholesale market is highly competitive consisting of many oVshore
producers and importers.” EDF Energy, EON, SSE, Scottish Power, Centrica and RWE purchase the
majority of their gas from the wholesale market in which there are 245 licensed shippers.
2.2 Market Liquidity
In its most general sense, liquidity is a measure of the number of times a given volume of a commodity
or contract for a speciﬁed delivery date is traded between parties. It is sometimes argued that high levels of
liquidity demonstrate that a market is competitive.
The UK gas wholesale market is often considered as a highly liquid market, with the same physical gas
traded many times over. Liquidity has increased signiﬁcantly since the market was liberalised in 1996.
In the electricity market, liquidity grew steadily in the ﬁrst ﬁve years after liberalisation to 2001 but then
decreased signiﬁcantly after 2002 as a result of the market makers such as El Paso, Dynegy, and Aquila etc
leaving themarket and with the demise of Enron and TXUholdings. However, since 2007 we are now seeing
a marked increase in liquidity in the market.
EDF Energy believes that the market would beneﬁt from greater liquidity and we support the
development of the Futures and Options Association “Market Design Project” which EDF Energy expects
to promote power market liquidity. The ﬁrst stages of this project will be the development of a central
clearing service for the trading of prompt power (which is power traded close to the time of demand) and
a robust spot market index. A spot market index should make it much more possible to develop a power
futures market, and may lead to the development of a day-ahead auction.
This recent improvement in liquidity is highlighted in the ﬁndings of BERR’s annual review, conducted
by Oxera, of the competitiveness of the UK energy market compared with other European markets. The
latest report, which gives preliminary results for 2006 states, that: “the UK remains the most competitive of
the electricity markets evaluated. The competitiveness of the UK electricity market has in general remained
unchanged (with a score of 8.3/10), other than an increase in wholesale market liquidity”. On gas the report
also states “A series of factors have been in play driving increases in the UK’s gas market competitiveness
from 8.2 to 8.5. In particular, the wholesale liquidity ﬁgure has increased from 100% to 240%.
2.3 High Wholesale Prices
Since 2004 wholesale gas prices have become highly volatile and have increased signiﬁcantly relative to
pre 2004 levels. This has been driven primarily by high and volatile international oil prices. Electricity
wholesale prices have also increased signiﬁcantly since 2004. This is primarily a result of the high volatile
wholesale gas price, and more recently as a result of rising international coal prices. In addition, since 2005,
the introduction of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-ETS) has meant that the cost of
carbon is now included within the electricity wholesale price.
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The graphs below show the changes in wholesale coal and gas prices between 2003 and 2008. Gas prices
increased signiﬁcantly between 2003 and 2005, with prices falling at the end of 2006 but then rebounding
strongly from September 2007 and remaining high. Coal prices remained relatively stable until the middle
of 2007, but have since increased signiﬁcantly.
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There has also been a signiﬁcant and prolonged increase in the price of oil since 2005. Even though the
UKdoes not maintain an oil related pricing system for wholesale gas traded at theNational Balancing Point
(NBP), gas prices here are not decoupled from oil. This is because the UK gas market is increasingly linked
to those in Europe, where traded gas prices are generally still directly oil indexed in some way (due to the
absence of liquid and competitive gas markets). This means that as we import more gas (as continental shelf
reserves fall) gas prices in the UK will still tend to move in line with the price of oil.
2.4 Wholesale Market Exposure of the Six Vertically Integrated Companies
Gas Market
EDF Energy like four of the other major UK suppliers has very limited gas reserves of our own. To meet
our customers’ demandwe buy gas in the wholesale market through amixture of long, medium and shorter-
term contracts struck with upstream companies. We are very much a “price taker”, and must compete with
other suppliers to secure supplies.
As an energy supplier to the domestic market we have to absorb considerable day to day volatility in
wholesale gas prices so that it does not fall on our customers in the prices they pay.
Electricity Market
The six vertically integrated suppliers all have their own electricity generation, but are all also active in
the wholesale market. Around half of GB electricity generated is by generators other than the six vertically
integrated suppliers, and we believe all of the six have greater electricity demand than they are able to meet
from their own generation.
The chart below highlights the level of demand compared with own generation and Power Purchase
Agreements (PPAs) which are longer-term contracts to secure generation fromother companies. The ﬁgures
for EDF Energy are compared with an estimated average for the ﬁve other suppliers.
Ev 222 Business and Enterprise Committee: Evidence
COMPANIES’ OWN ELECTRICITY GENERATION AGAINST DEMAND
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Purchasing from the Wholesale Electricity Market
All of the six vertically integrated companies are therefore exposed to wholesale market prices, and
compete with other suppliers to purchase electricity. Each supplier will have a diVerent strategy for
purchasing electricity from the wholesale market, based on its view of future energy prices and the level of
risk they are willing to accept. This is known as a “hedging strategy”, which a supplier will keep conﬁdential
as it seeks to gain advantage in the market.
Own Generation
By using a proportion of electricity that we generate in order to meet part of our own demand, we are
reducing our customers’ exposure to the electricity wholesale market.
This market structure does not reﬂect a lack of competition between generators. Generators, including
those who are part of vertically integrated companies must compete to minimise the cost of the electricity
they generate—essential to ensure their supply business is able to sell competitively priced electricity.
As discussed in section 2.3, electricity generators are exposed to gas and coal wholesale price markets—
wedo not have signiﬁcant reserves of gas or coal. Changes in fuel prices will aVect the six vertically integrated
energy companies in diVerent ways, depending on the mix of generating plant that companies operate and
their fuel hedging strategy. Companies are competing with each other on these factors.
The six large suppliers all have signiﬁcant generation portfolios, but the type of plants they operate vary.
EDF Energy for example, operates two large coal ﬁred power stations and one smaller gas ﬁred station,
whereas Centrica’s portfolio consists entirely of gas ﬁred power stations. Therefore when coal prices are very
high relative to gas prices, EDF Energy’s overall cost of generation is likely to be higher than Centrica’s.
In addition, as mentioned previously, costs will also be inﬂuenced by when the companies purchased in
the wholesalemarkets the fuel they need to run the power station (hedging strategy). In a rising pricemarket,
a company that has locked in a ﬁxed price contract for delivery of coal in the following year will beneﬁt in
comparison to a company that has not secured suYcient reserves and is now exposed to the latest coal prices.
The competitive market structure described above means that individual vertically integrated companies
will incur very diVerent average costs when securing electricity for their customers. This is known as their
weighted average cost of power (WACP).
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Each company’s WACP will have a direct impact on its need and ability to increase or decrease prices,
with some suppliers needing to change prices at a diVerent time to other suppliers, albeit driven by the same
underlying trends in coal and gas prices. As noted in section 1, the extent to which they can actually vary
prices is limited by the competition in the market. This means that proﬁtability can fall even when retail
prices are rising.
The graph below shows the suppliers’ diVerent pricing strategies showing the broad trends in fuel costs
but very diVerent timings and size of price changes, depending on their own generation portfolio and
hedging strategy.
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Potential Improvements to the Wholesale Market
While the wholesale market in the UK is competitive, there is still room for improvement, and EDF
Energy has been active in arguing for a number of measures that would make it easier for smaller suppliers
and generators to be active in the market. We have introduced a change proposal58 to the electricity
Balancing and Settlement Code. The change aims to encourage parties to contract ahead of the delivery date
to cover customer volumes, thus helping the system reduce any imbalance between supply and demand. The
proposal has been widely supported by smaller suppliers and generators, and is awaiting a decision from
Ofgem. In gas we have pushed for greater transparency in the gas market.We proposed a change that forced
the gas network operator to publish after the day gas ﬂows to large users of gas.59 We as a company are
therefore fully committed to improving the UK’s wholesale energy markets.
2.5 Conclusion to question 2
The UKwholesale markets for electricity and gas are regarded as among the most competitive in Europe.
There are many participants in these markets in addition to the large six suppliers, and all six suppliers need
to purchase electricity and gas in addition to their own generation, to meet the customer demand. There are
indications that the wholesale markets are becoming more liquid, but improvements can still be made to
make it easier to trade in the market. EDF Energy has been leading eVorts in the industry to make these
improvements.
While the six vertically integrated suppliers do operate large electricity generation portfolios, they also
purchase electricity from the wholesale market. In addition, vertically integrated players must compete to
minimise production costs, so that they can oVer competitive retail prices to customers.
3. The implications of growing consolidation in the energy market
Consolidation has been the natural result of companies responding to pressures in the market, and the
emergence of a truly national market for electricity and gas (demonstrated below in section 3.1).
The exposure to volatile wholesale costs and the high level of competition in the retail market
(demonstrated in sections 1 and 2) has driven companies to seek to grow in order to absorb these risks.
At the same time, the level of investment needed to replace the UK’s energy infrastructure has grown
rapidly (discussed below in section 3.2). Large companies that are able to manage the risks in the market
are better placed to make these investments themselves, and can also support investment from others
through Power Purchase Agreements (longer term contracts). Independent investors who have such
58 BSC Modiﬁcation 211.
59 See Uniform Network Code Modiﬁcation 121.
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agreements with large companies are better placed to secure ﬁnancing for their investments. The UK is not
alone in seeking to renew its energy infrastructure. The IEA forecasts that $20 trillion of investment will be
needed worldwide by 2030. The European Commission estimates that nearly a trillion Euros of investment
will be needed in Europe alone and this estimate was made before the new stretching targets for renewable
energy were agreed. The UK will be competing with other countries for the ﬁnancing of energy
infrastructure and the resources to build that infrastructure. Large companies with a dedicated presence in
the UK will strengthen the country’s ability to secure the required investment and resources.
3.1 Creating a national market
The consolidation in the market has transformed what were once regional electricity supply companies
and one national gas company into a number of electricity and gas supply companies that compete
nationally for customers. As illustrated in answer to question 1, these companies compete ﬁercely with each
other and have the structure and size to provide their customers with protection from the volatility
experienced in the wholesale markets for gas and electricity, a protection considered by the NAO to be
important.60
The creation of the national market is reﬂected in the growing market share of entrants and in the
declining market share that energy suppliers have in what would historically have been their regional bases.
MARKET SHARE OF NEW ENTRANT SUPPLIERS (MARCH 2007)
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3.2 Investment in Energy Infrastructure
Much of the UK’s energy infrastructure will need to be replaced over the next twenty years. Many power
stations will be reaching the end of their lives and will need to be replaced. Changes to our sources of gas,
as the UK continental shelf reserves decline, create new challenges to ensure import facilities and storage is
suYcient for our needs. In transmission and distribution networks older equipment needs to be replaced and
the nature of the networks is evolving to meet new patterns of demand and to connect diVerent types of
generating technologies.
60 NAO Report, Part One, section 1.4, page 11.
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The chart below shows the likely closure scenarios for existing coal, oil and nuclear power stations within
the UK.
UK OIL, COAL AND NUCLEAR POWER STATION MINIMUM AND CENTRAL CLOSURE
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This challenge is also an opportunity. By replacing the older high carbon emitting infrastructure with new
low carbon technologies the UK has the opportunity to reduce our carbon emissions quite rapidly.
However, this opportunity will require very large amounts of investment and resources over timescales that
are short in energy infrastructure terms. And this is needed in the UK at the same time as much of the rest
of the world.
EDF Group has announced that its investment plans for 2008 to 2010 have increased to ƒ35 billion.
Within the UK EDF Energy plans to invest nearly £500 million in each of next two years—10% of annual
turnover—on a new gas-ﬁred power station CCGT, renewables, improving existing plant and customer
service. As the largest electricity distribution network operator we are also investing more than £300 million
a year on improving and expanding the network.We are furthermore planning to invest in four new nuclear
power stations to be commissioned from 2017—a £10 billion programme. Other companies are also
planning energy infrastructure investment.
This level of investment requires a large company with a strong balance sheet that is able to negotiate
eVectively with the providers of essential equipment and services, who are experiencing unprecedented
global demand. Consolidation has created companies with the ability to deliver the energy infrastructure
the UK needs for the future, without compromising expansion by other players.
4. The relationship between the wholesale and retail markets for electricity and gas
Vertically integrated companies look to achieve their proﬁt margin across both the diVerence between
supply costs and retail prices (the retail margin) and the diVerence between generation costs or upstream
gas costs and wholesale gas or electricity prices (the generation margin). In order to deliver the required
investment in new UK electricity generation capacity, and in gas infrastructure, vertically integrated
companies need to make suYcient margin to justify this investment. However, looking at the proﬁt margins
made across both of these areas we can see that the level of proﬁt has been low in recent years.
In section 2, we highlighted the level and volatility of costs in the wholesale markets. In addition to this
increase in energy costs, energy companies have also incurred increases in other costs, such as network
charges, metering costs, and the cost of Government environmental policies. However, the competitive
nature of the market means that suppliers are unable to pass the full impact of these cost increases on to
customers (demonstrated below in section 4.1), leading to very low and sometimes negative retail margins.
Therefore, energy companies are looking at margins in the generation business to decide whether of not
to invest in new plant. EDF Energy has undertaken analysis based on publicly available information that
demonstrates that while margins have risen they are still too low to justify the level of investment in new
generation that is needed within the UK (demonstrated in section 4.2 below).
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4.1 Increasing costs
Unlike certain industries, including the petrol retail industry, electricity and gas suppliers do not change
prices on a weekly or even daily basis in order to reﬂect underlying energy input costs.
The graph below shows how, in the petrol retail industry, monthly average prices at the petrol pump
closely follow crude oil prices and petrol spot prices.
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By contrast, in the energy industry, suppliers absorb volatility and smooth prices to domestic customers
as far as possible. The industry has been criticised for being quick to raise prices when wholesale costs rise
but slow to reduce prices when costs fall. The analysis below shows this to be incorrect, and demonstrates
that by smoothing retail energy prices, the companies have actually saved their customers signiﬁcant
amounts of money.
The graphs below compare EDF Energy’s standard credit tariV (exclusive of VAT) for gas and electricity
against the cost increases experienced within the market between Jan 2003 and Feb 2008.
While the fact that energy costs have increased is well known, it should also be noted that the other costs
listed have also increased over the period. In fact, in February 2008 costs associated with using gas
transmission and distribution networks and metering were 30% higher than they were in January 2003. The
costs included in the total are:
— Energy costs.
— Industry Costs: Network costs, Metering costs.
— Regulatory Costs: The cost of complying with the Government environmental initiatives.
— Renewable Obligation (RO) and the Carbon Emissions Reduction Target (CERT).
The analysis in the charts below includes these costs but does not include our own operational costs. The
charts also do not incorporate a likely hedging strategy whereby gas would have been bought more than
four quarters in advance. In this way the charts actually present amore positive picture thanwas experienced
by suppliers during, for example, late 2007 and early 2008 when some suppliers were publicly reporting
substantial losses in their retail businesses.
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Gas: Costs vs Retail Prices
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Electricity: Costs vs Retail Prices
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Source: EDF Energy analysis. Electricity and gas costs for each month are calculated by taking the average
price of gas for delivery in the next four quarters. This approach is taken because suppliers purchase gas and
electricity in advance.
The graphs clearly demonstrate that suppliers’ costs have increased signiﬁcantly over the period. EDF
Energy and, according to Ofgem analysis, other suppliers, have not passed through the full level of cost
increases to customers and proﬁt margins have been squeezed. In fact, our analysis shows that for a typical
EDF Energy customer taking both electricity and gas over this period, we passed on in excess of £150 less
than would have been justiﬁed by the underlying cost increases. This demonstrates the pressure of
competition in the retail markets and that EDFEnergy’s approach to smoothing volatile prices has resulted
in fair prices to its consumers.
This analysis is supported by the conclusions drawn by Ofgem in their Domestic Retail Market Report
(June 2007) which looked just at the increase in wholesale costs and stated that with regard to the period
Jan 2003 to June 2007)“. . . on average, suppliers passed through less than the full increase in the wholesale
costs to domestic customers over the period. This saved the average [dual fuel] customer £116”.
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EDF Energy’s Recent Price Increase
EDF Energy’s recent tariV increase was partly a response to an increase in wholesale costs, but also due
to a signiﬁcant increase in “other costs”, as discussed earlier.
Electricity prices for an average EDF Energy customer increased by £28 per annum and gas prices by £72
per annum. The graphs below show how this is broken down between the various cost elements. It should
also be noted that the bill increase did not cover the full actual increase in energy costs which rose by more
than 50% in 2007.
Electricity Bill Increase
£12
£4
£12
Industry Cost Increases
Regulatory Cost
Increases
Energy Cost
Contribution
Gas Bill Increase
£30 £32
£10
Industry Cost Increases
Regulatory Cost
Increases
Energy Cost
Contribution
Source: EDF Energy analysis.
4.2 Margin Needed for New Investment
One of the margins on which energy companies can potentially earn a proﬁt is from the sale in the
wholesale markets of the power they generate.
The gap between wholesale prices and the costs of generation (fuel and carbon costs) is called the
generation spread. There is trading in the wholesale markets at diVerent time horizons:
— the prompt spread refers to same-day trading; and
— the forward spread refers to trading at longer time horizons, up to three years ahead.
Companies themselves will trade in wholesale markets, in order to keep their costs low and compete
eVectively on retail prices. Their exact strategy for trading is commercially conﬁdential.
There are diVerent names for the generation spreads for coal (“dark”) and gas (“spark”). In either case,
the spread can be measured as either the gap between wholesale prices and energy costs only (the “dirty”
spread) or energy plus carbon costs (the “clean” spread). This distinction has been relevant since the
introduction of the requirement on generators to buy some carbon allowances (the European Union
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Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). The Phase 1 allocation of allowances covered only a proportion of
historic capacity, amounting to 80% for gas and 70% for coal in the case of EDF Energy, so purchasing of
additional carbon allowances has added to generation costs.
The charts below show both clean and dirty spreads for gas and coal respectively.
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The generation spread needs to be suYciently high to provide a return on investment in higher
environmental standards for existing capacity, and even higher for investment in new capacity, where there
also needs to be a contribution for depreciation.
In the case of coal, we estimate the break even return even before covering depreciation and providing an
incentive for new investment is more than £10MWh and, depending upon future depreciation and
investment, the requirement is around £20/MWh. The chart shows that before 2005 many coal plants were
eVectively not worth keeping open for much longer. Clean spreads rose to a peak in 2006 but have since
fallen sharply, to a level barely above the minimum required for further investment.
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In the case of gas, a smaller margin is required as the capital investment and operating costs are lower in
a gas power station than for coal. However, gas generators too have consistently earned a margin too low
to justify investment (below £10MWh).
In practice the picture is slightly less stark because all generators would seek to use hedging strategies—
trading in the wholesale markets on diVerent timescales—to ensure they were not exposed to the full impact
of increases in gas and coal costs. However, far from making an excess margin on generation, spreads have
been too low for generators to earn a reasonable return on investment.
4.3 Conclusions to question 4
The analysis in this section has indicated that while wholesale costs have risen, the full cost of these rises
have not been passed on to customers by the six large suppliers. Competition in the retail market has ensured
that prices are kept low even in the face of increased costs.
It is not just fuel costs but also carbon costs which have risen. The EU ETS introduced the requirement
to purchase carbon emission permits. The scheme gave a proportion of the allowances to emit carbon free
to generators provided that the stations stayed open. These permits have a market value, but without free
allowances it would otherwise have been diYcult for a number of power stations to have sustained the level
of investment required to meet statutory and environmental requirements and remained open. A reduction
in generation capacity would have resulted in a less competitive generation market and the potential for
higher prices. This shows that the vertically integrated energy companies have not been earning highmargins
as a result of the free carbon permits that have been given to them under the EU ETS, and margins are still
below the level that would justify new investment in these technologies.
Generation spreads overall remain too low, despite recent increases, to justify the signiﬁcant new
investment in capacity required in the UK.
5. The interaction between the UK and European energy markets
The level of interaction between the UK and European gas markets has increased in recent years,
predominantly as a result of the decline in gas supplies from the UK continental shelf. It is gas where the
impact of European energy markets is greatest, but the gas market also has an impact on the electricity
market, as gas is one of the fuels used to generate electricity.
In electricity there is a 2GW interconnector (about the size of a coal-ﬁred power station) with France
which gives a limited interconnection with the European energy market, although more interconnection is
in the planning stage.
Historically the UK has been self suYcient in gas owing to the UK Continental Shelf, and until 2005 the
UK was a net exporter of gas. As the UKCS has declined the UK has turned to alternative gas sources to
meet its demand, with the UK now importing gas from sources such as Norway, Holland and Algeria.
The key infrastructure linking the UK with other gas markets are:
— Langeled/Vesterled: Connecting St Fergus in the UK to Norway, the Vesterled pipeline was
connected into the Norwegian system in 2001.
— UK: Interconnector UK. Completed in 1998 linking Bacton in the UK to Zeebrugge in Belgium.
— BBL: Linking Bacton in the UKwith Balgzand in the Netherlands, this pipeline was completed in
December 2006.
— Isle Of Grain: A converted LNG storage facility, capable of importing 13mcm/day of gas into the
UK. Capacity is held by BP and Sonatrach—Algerian. Currently a second phase of capacity is
being constructed, with a third phase due to come on line in 2011.
— Excelerate Energy: Excelerate developed a facility for the supply of LNG gas direct from a ship,
with connections at Teeside.
— Milford Haven: Currently there are two LNG terminals under construction at Milford Haven at
Dragon and South Hook which are due to come on line in either 2008 or 2009.
The UKmarket will increasingly be more integrated with the European and world gas markets as the UK
continental shelf reserves decline. This will continue to increase the extent to which the UK gas market
interacts with markets elsewhere. Prices will continue to be inﬂuenced by what happens not just in Europe
but also in the rest of world as LNG imports increase.
The UK market is therefore inextricably linked to the rest of Europe—and this interaction will increase
in the future. This means that the creation of a single, competitive European market is crucial to how the
UK market will develop. EDF Energy and the wider EDF Group supports the European Commission’s
eVorts to create an integrated liberalised market. The “third package” of legislation proposed by the
European Commission is an important step towards achieving more competitive energy markets elsewhere
in Europe. There are a number of conditions that are needed:
— eVective unbundling of transmission companies;
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— clear, strong and predictable regulation at both the national and EU level to provide the right
framework for investment, supplemented by eVective coordination of regulators through the
proposed Agency to deal with regional and cross-border issues;
— greater coordination between the transmission companies in the way they operate their networks
and plan investments; and
— incentives for transmission companies to maximise the amount of capacity that is made available
to the market.
An agreement on the third package in the coming months is crucial for the future development of the
UK market.
The UK wholesale energy market is also aVected by what happens in the global commodity markets for
coal and oil. As explained in section 2.3, coal and oil prices inﬂuence what happens in the UK wholesale
energy market, which means we are not isolated from price rises elsewhere.
6. The eVectiveness of regulatory oversight of the energy market
The UK energy market has been closely monitored and regulated by the independent regulator, Ofgem.
In addition to this constant oversightmany other organisations regularly review the operation of themarket,
including BERRand the European Commission. The independence of the regulator is seen by the European
Commission as a strength of the UK energy market. It said “the OYce for Gas and Electricity Markets
(Ofgem) has a high level of powers and independence from both the industry and the relevant Ministry” in
‘Prospects for the internal electricity and gas market’ (published January 2007).
Ofgem
Ofgem reviews the operation of the domestic market annually in its Domestic Retail Market Report,
which reviews all aspects of competition including cost and price increases and interactions between the
wholesale and retail markets.
Ofgem also investigates complaints of anti-competitive behaviour under its Competition Act powers, and
has conducted a number of investigations in recent years.
It is also worth noting that Ofgem has consistently reported a steady increase in the development of
competition in the gas and electricity retail markets. In fact the retail market was thought competitive
enough to remove price controls even when only 36–37%of customers had switched. Ofgem has consistently
concluded that the market is competitive.61 In their most recent survey in 2007 Ofgem concluded:
“Our analysis shows that all segments of the market remain highly competitive and not just for
customers who pay by direct debit or online. The key ﬁndings are:
— Vigorous price competition between the big six suppliers for all customers—the spread
between prices has shrunk and the most expensive suppliers have been forced to
become more competitive to stem customers losses
— Suppliers are innovating to retain and win customers—there has been rapid growth in:
ﬁxed and capped price deals that shield customers from rising wholesale prices;
cheaper online deals; and green tariVs. They now account for roughly 20% of the
market.
— Customer service is improving: suppliers are investing huge sums to improve their
systems and ﬁve suppliers have cut the number of unresolved complaints.
— Annual customer switching rates are at the highest in four years”.
(Domestic Retail Market Report Ofgem 169/07 2007 p1)
BERR Reviews
BERR also reviews the level of competition annually and has a Public Service Agreement target to:
“Ensure the UK ranks in the top three most competitive energy markets in the EU and G7 in each year”.
A report is produced annually by OXERA on behalf of BERR, the latest version of which conﬁrms that the
UK is the most competitive energy market in the EU and the G7.
We think this ongoing scrutiny of competition over the lifetime of the market has been strong, and
regulatory oversight has been detailed and constant.
61 DomesticRetailMarketReport—March 2006, July 2006 (RefNo110/06)DomesticRetailMarketReport—September 2005;
February 2006 (Ref No 23/06); Domestic Retail Market Report—June 2005, February 2006 (Ref No 24/06).
Ev 232 Business and Enterprise Committee: Evidence
7. Progress in reducing fuel poverty and the appropriate policy instruments for doing so
EDFEnergy has led the industry in responding to fuel poverty, as was recognised byOfgem in its analysis
of industry social responsibility initiatives represented in the chart below. But the energy industry alone
cannot solve fuel poverty. Government has an essential role to play as fuel poverty is at heart a poverty issue
that needs to be tackled from an income perspective as well as an energy cost perspective. It is also
Government that has the information with which to identify who is fuel poor. Energy companies do not
have the information with which to target vulnerable customers andmust rely on imperfect estimations and
self identiﬁcation by customers.
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY SPENDING BY THE SIX LARGE ENERGY SUPPLIERS
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InFebruary 2008EDFEnergy enhanced our activities in this area yet furtherwith the launch of our Social
Commitments. We committed to the following:
1. Provide a long term social tariV for our most vulnerable customers through to 2012 by extend our
existing Energy Assist TariV which gives a 15% discount to its 55,000 most vulnerable customers
for a further year—until 31 March 2009. This social tariV has already been recognised by
Energywatch as the most generous in the industry.
2. Customers on the company’s social tariV also continue to receive free energy eYciency advice and
practical measures to reduce their energy usage, as well as access to the EDF Energy Trust Fund
and a free Beneﬁts Entitlement Check.
3. By 2012, EDF Energy is also planning to help educate 2.5 million young people in the UK on the
sustainable use of energy. As the ﬁrst Sustainability Partner of London 2012, EDF Energy will
support London 2012’s education programme and will help schools understand and address their
own use of energy, to reduce their climate change impact and reduce their running costs. The
education programme will be supported by the EDF Energy Green Fund to deliver renewable
technology projects for schools together with available public funds.
4. Manage the supply chain to help ensure that our suppliers meet agreed ethical standards and, in
particular, comply with the UN Global Compact.
5. Lead the industry in protecting vulnerable customers from the adverse aVects of power cuts.
6. Build on our ambition to achieve Zero Harm in our workforce by promoting health and safety
awareness for children, community groups and our customers.
7. For our employees, attaining the gold standard for our approach to diversity and inclusion and
increasing training opportunities to develop a range of new skills.
These commitments represent the one of the biggest packages of social initiatives launched by any major
British company.
We are happy to work with the government in detailed consultations in coming months to understand
what can be implemented on a longer-term basis tomeet the government’s target of eradicating fuel poverty.
Everyone wishes to see fuel poverty eradicated, and to do this in a sustainable, robust and fair way we
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support a mandatory requirement on energy companies to provide a form of social tariV. This must be
accompanied by ﬁrm commitments from Government to provide the information required to identify the
fuel poor as well as tackling the wider social and income aspects of fuel poverty.
1 April 2008
Supplementary evidence from EDF Energy
During the oral evidence I gave to your Committee last week I promised to provide a note giving more
details about bad debt. I would in addition like to clarify some of the evidence I gave in relation to vertical
integration and risk.
On the ﬁrst point, it is obviously not a surprise that bad debt increases when prices rise. EDF Energy has
nevertheless been working hard to reduce bad debt levels, and to mitigate the impact of price rises. We were
the ﬁrst company to introduce a trust fund, overseen by independent trustees, to help customers most in
need: to date the trust has awarded £7 million to some of our most vulnerable customers. However, we have
still seen an increase of 7.6% in the amount of customer indebtedness over the last twelve months, and we
currently predict around a 10% increase in bad debt this year compared to 2007.
On the second point, relating to vertical integration, some of the confusion stems from written evidence
given to the Committee by Ofgem, which stated that the value of trades in the wholesale market was only
£31 million in 2007. This ﬁgure was cited in questioning by Adrian Bailey MP. Unfortunately this appears
to be a typographical error on the part of Ofgem, whose evidence is quoting from an FSA report that in fact
estimates the market value of such trades to be £31 billion.
As we have said to the Committee, vertical integration is a way of reducing risk, and thereby reducing our
customers’ exposure to volatility in the wholesale gas and electricity markets. Asmembers of the Committee
highlighted, it is for example beneﬁcial to the UK to have more vertical integration in gas through the
building of gas storage. Similar beneﬁts arise from vertical integration in electricity, by reducing ﬁnancial
risks.We do not have to sell directly fromour electricity generating plants to customers to realise this beneﬁt.
It is important to be clear, however, about the diVerence between the physical supply of electricity from
a generator to a customer and the volume of electricity traded in the wholesale market. When I was asked
whether all of the electricity that EDF Energy generates is sold on the wholesale market, I said yes. I wish
to clarify this by making clear that we trade the equivalent of all of electricity we generate, and in fact much
more besides: in 2007 we generated 26TWh in 2007 and traded 124TWh.
We trade to source electricity for our larger industrial and commercial customers, to hedge our generation
position, balance and “shape” the mismatch between the electricity we generate and our customer demand,
and to adjust for volume changes arising from events such as abnormal weather. It is this traded volume
which determines liquidity in the market, not the extent to which there is a transaction between our plants
and our customers or other customers.
The beneﬁt to customers of vertical integration is that vertically integrated companies are able to manage
the volatility between the wholesale and retail markets, thereby reducing the cost to our customers. Of
course, when the primary costs of fuels rise as they have done over the past few months, the margins in both
wholesale and retail markets are squeezed and retail price increases are inevitable—but companies will all
try to avoid raising prices for as long as possible to maintain a competitive oVering in the market.
I said to the committee that this market is not perfect and can be improved and that we have to be realistic
and modest and to recognise the strengths and weaknesses that we are all facing in Europe in general and
the UK market in particular.
There are a number of factors that can explain why trading multiples in the UK are not as high as in the
Nordpool and in Germany. A key factor is the existence of an exchange that can facilitate ﬁnancial trading
in futures, allowing market participants the ﬂexibility to trade non-physical positions. These exchanges also
oVer a clearing service for Over The Counter (OTC) trades which reduces the counter party risk for market
participants. As I said to theCommittee, EDFEnergy is supporting eVorts to create such an exchangewithin
the UK. The experience of Germany and theNordpool holds valuable lessons for the UK and demonstrates
that more vertical integration does not reduce liquidity. In the German market there are only four major
vertically integrated players, but considerably more liquidity than in the UK.
1 July 2008
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Memorandum submitted by Electricity4Business
Introduction
Electricity4Business is a UK-based ﬁrm and the only energy supplier in the UK that is dedicated to the
SME (Small andMedium Enterprise) sector. The company was set up to take advantage of the deregulated
energy market and currently has around 34,000 customers.
Despite being a fast growing and innovative company, we believe that much more can be done to ensure
genuine competition in the energy market and the best possible deals for SMEs. Many of our senior staV
have moved across from the “Big Six” ﬁrms to take on and address some of the criticisms currently being
leveled at these companies including cost, transparency and customer service. With 60 years of combined
experience in the utilities industry between them, we can therefore provide a great deal of insight and
understanding of the issues and challenges of operating successfully in the UK energy market.
Whether the current market structure encourages eVective competition in the retail markets for gas and
electricity
It is well documented that all six big energy suppliers have announced signiﬁcant price rises since the start
of the year. In early January, Npower put prices up for its electricity customers by 12.7%, while its gas price
rose by 17.2%. That same month, EDF put up electricity tariVs by 7.9% and gas prices by 12.9%. British
Gas increased gas and electricity prices by 15%. Scottish Power increased gas bills by 15% and electricity
bills by 14%, and E.ON put up gas bills by 15% and electricity tariVs by 9.7%. Scottish and Southern Energy
was the last to make the move with an average 14.2% increase in electricity bills, and a 15.8% lift in gas
charges for domestic customers coming into force on 1 April.
In justifying these increases, BritishGas, EDF andNpower highlighted the fact that wholesale prices have
increased signiﬁcantly in the last year. EDF states that gas prices rose by 117% and electricity prices by 90%
between February 2007 and February 2008.
However, this ignores the fact that Britain’s energy companies are producers or generators aswell as being
retailers. As producers they proﬁt when wholesale prices are high, as retailers they proﬁt when wholesale
prices are low. This helps to explain how British Gas was able to report annual proﬁts of £571 million at its
residential arm in February 2008, up from £95 million in 2006.
Ofgem regards the numbers of consumers switching supplier as the key measure of competition in the
market. It suggests that four million out of 36 million energy account holders switched supplier in 200762.
This may be true, but the fact remains that half of consumers and 65% of pensioners have never switched
supplier63. In addition, almost six million people on prepayment meters cannot switch using an online
comparison site and two million people cannot switch because they are in debt to their supplier. With so
many consumers unable to switch supplier it is therefore wrong to suggest that levels of switching amounts
to eVective competition.
There are additionally speciﬁc reasons why our target customers, SMEs, are not automatically switching
away from big six energy suppliers in response to these signiﬁcant price increases. Small businesses often
have a lower level of knowledge of the opportunities open to them from energy supply competition,
especially when the use of diVerent brands by some of themajor suppliers can confuse, leaving themwith the
perception that there is more competition in the market than is actually the case. They also have diYculties
obtaining and evaluating oVers from competing suppliers, given a perceived non-comparability of terms and
a general lack of transparency. This means that their awareness and understanding of a recent shift to ﬁxed
price, ﬁxed term contracts is low, leading to a greater tendency to contract disputes around invalid transfers.
Small businesses that do want to switch away are also sometimes confused by the varying cancellation
requirements of the major energy suppliers (examples of which are outlined below).64
Supplier Cancellation Notice Requirements
British Gas (British Gas Business/Scottish Gas/ Written notice at least 90 days prior to the end of
Electricity Direct/Enron/Scottish Has Business) the initial contract.
EDF Energy (SWEB Energy/Seeboard Energy/ Written notice at least 28 days prior to the end of
London Energy) the initial contract.
Npower (Midlands Electricity/Yorkshire Electricity/ Written notice at least 90 days prior to the end of
Northern Electric) the initial contract.
E.ON “Powergen” Notiﬁcation of cancellation can be given during the
(Economy Power/Norweb, Eartern Electricity/East “Review Period”. The Review Period is deﬁned by
Midlands Electricity/Independent Energy) E.ON as:
62 Source: energywatch press release, 5 February 2008
http://www.energywatch.org.uk/media/news/show release.asp?article id%1084
63 Ibid
64 Source: Electricity4Business competitor market research.
Business and Enterprise Committee: Evidence Ev 235
Supplier Cancellation Notice Requirements
“The Review Period is a period of not less than 14
days from the date of our written notiﬁcation.
Written notiﬁcation will be not less than 30 days
before the end of the Fixed Price Period”
Notiﬁcation can be given by:
Letter
Fax
E-mail
Scottish & Southern Energy (Swalec/Southern Written notice not less than one calendar month
Electric/Scottish Hydro Electric/Atlantic Gas & before the end of the initial contract.
Electricity
Scottish Power (SP Manweb/South of Scotland Written notice at least 60 days prior to the end of
Electricity) the initial contract.
Electricity4Business would also like to bring to the Committee’s attention:
— The loss leader pricing strategies being adopted by the big six energy suppliers as they seek to retain
and win back SME customers.
— Delaying tactics being employed in order to enable Win Back activity.
— The manipulation of the role of third party intermediaries.
Loss leader pricing strategies
Research conducted by the business intelligence company Datamonitor shows that the major energy
suppliers are oVering signiﬁcantly lower rates to existing customers than new customers. This strategy relies
on a high number of existing customers choosing not to switch away from a current supplier, even when
the price increases sharply. When customers are responding negatively to the price increases, suppliers are
providing a “save” oVer designed to keep them from switching as demonstrates65 in the table below. Whilst
Electricity4Business support the principles of the table below actually “save” oVers encountered are
considerable lower than those in the table. Indeed, the large energy suppliers are oVering rates to new
customers at below cost price, on the basis that this revenue can be recuperated in the medium to long term.
The supplier has little risk in setting massive uplifts at renewal—knowing they have the protection of “win
back” and “price match” should the customer decide not to accept the increase. “Win back” is subsidised
by the high renewal prices of the majority of the suppliers’ customer base.
Low Medium High use
use use
Existing customer
Default oVer 32% 15% 8%
“Save” oVer 16% 8% 4%
New customer
1st year "5%
2nd year 5%
3rd year 10%
Delaying tactics
Electricity4Business is aware that some of the big six energy suppliers are abusing clearly deﬁned rules and
using delaying tactics in order to win back customers who have decided to switch to Electricity4Business.
Examples include: informing customers wishing to switch away that their transfer date is too early (when
correct); preventing customers from moving due to outstanding debt owed to the existing supplier (even
when there is no debt) and claiming not to have received termination notices, even though this is deemed
to be received on posting by the customer.
The below tables provide additional insight into these activities. The ﬁrst table is a break down of the
percentage of Electricity4Business transfer requests blocked by existing suppliers. Supplier 1 prevents 36%
of all Electricity4Business transfer requests. When this information is compared with the second table, it is
apparent that Supplier 1 also scored the lowest customer satisfaction rating in a recent industry
comparison survey.
65 Source: Data Monitor research January 2007.
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ELECTRICITY4BUSINESS TRANSFER REQUESTED % BLOCKED BY SUPPLIER66
SOURCE: E4B
Supplier % Blocked
Supplier 1 36%
Supplier 2 13%
Supplier 3 12%
Supplier 4 8%
Supplier 5 8%
Supplier 6 6%
SME POWER CUSTOMER SATISFACTION LEAGUE TABLE, 200767
Rank Billing Service Price Average
Supplier—6 1 82% 81% 82% 82%
Supplier—4 2 78% 78% 78% 78%
Supplier—2 2 78% 76% 79% 78%
Supplier—3 4 78% 77% 76% 77%
Supplier—5 5 76% 77% 76% 76%
Supplier—1 6 76% 72% 74% 74%
The manipulation of the role of third party intermediaries
Third Party Intermediaries (eg agents, brokers and comparison sites) hold great inﬂuence within the
energy industry and are estimated to be responsible for 50% of all switches. This is largely due to the fact
that they have access to Contract Renewal Dates and so can target their communication with customers
accordingly. Rewards available to Third Party Intermediaries can be substantial—up to £700 on a single
sale of £3,500.68 They operate in an industry that is completely unregulated and, as such, there is no
safeguard against unscrupulous behaviour.
This lack of accountability results in some Third Party Intermediaries being incentivised by suppliers not
to act in the best interests of customers. This is typically achieved through the use of Market Up TariV
Products and Commission Based TariVs. Market Up TariV Products are those for which the Third Party
Intermediary is a given a base unit price from the Supplier and can add their own cut on top. Commission
BasedTariVs applywhen the Supplier presents the Third Party Intermediarywith a product butwill increase
the commission payable depending on the price paid by the customer. This provides a clear disincentive for
Third Party Intermediaries to achieve the lowest possible price for the customer and can be demonstrated
by the information below, which shows three diVering commissions oVered by Npower to its Third Party
Intermediaries. The bulk of the ﬁrst year’s additional revenue secured by the Third Party Intermediary from
the customer is passed back to the intermediary in commission. Note also that the amount of energy being
purchased by the customer remains constant on each table.
In Table 1, if the amount paid by the customer is £3,069 per annum the commission for the Third Party
Intermediary will be £45.69
In Table 2, if the amount to be paid by the customer is £3,291 per annum the commission for the Third
Party Intermediary will be £226.
In Table 3, if the amount to be paid by the customer is £3,570 per annum the commission for the Third
Party Intermediary will be £452
66 Source: Electricity4Business internal analysis of transfers blocked 2007.
67 Source: Data Monitor research 2007
68 Source: Electricity4Business internal competitor market research.
69 Source: Electricity4Business internal market research.
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Whether there is eVective competition in the wholesale markets for gas and electricity
Electricity4Business refers the Committee to text we endorse contained within the discussion paper
produced in March 2007 by energywatch, entitled “How energy markets are failing consumers”70 Page 16,
paragraph 3.1.1
Liquid wholesale markets are important to supply competition as they allow suppliers and, in some cases,
customers to source bulk energy. After a surge in the late 1990s, wholesale market activity in Britain has
declined as the major players have bought their way to scale. Key factors behind this have been: the exit of
independent trading and supply companies; the decline of merchant plant models; and vertical integration.
Vertical integration through asset acquisition is eVectively being used as a trading strategy by major market
participants.
Electricity trading volumes have declined since 2003, as the commission’s reports have highlighted.
(Energywatch is referring here to the European Commission’s preliminary report of its Sector Inquiry under
Art 17 Regulation 1/2003 on the gas and electricity markets issued
on 16 February 2006 and repeated in its ﬁnal report on 10 January 2007).
In evidence to the House of Lords in 2004, a representative of Centrica commented on wholesale gas
trading, saying that “physical trading . . . is a small, 15–20% portion of the total physical volume being
delivered into the UK at the moment; and then there is paper trading, where the gas is traded many times,
and that is perhaps 5–10 times the total physical volume.”
Since then, in its “Ensuring eVective and eYcient forward gasmarkets” report for theDTI inMarch 2005,
Global Insight suggested that 70% of the gas landed in Britain was subject to long-term contracts. The
balance, 30%, was available for forward trading. Its analysis also suggested that the majority of this gas was
traded in the immediate run up to its delivery, rather than months or seasons ahead. Therefore, forward
curve prices are posted based on very limited trading activity to the extent that while it characterised the
spot gas market as “functionally liquid” it believed the forward market to “suVer from a lack of liquidity
by global standards”. Its arguments suggest that the forward curve is not a robust indicator of future
wholesale costs for gas suppliers—and electricity market liquidity is even lower. But Ofgem has not
challenged the appropriateness of forward curves that are not ﬁt for purpose.
70 http://www.energywatch.org.uk/uploads/How energy markets are failing consumers March 2007.pdf
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The implications of growing consolidation in the energy market
In August 2007, energywatch released a Small Business Electricity Consumers Satisfaction Survey
Report71 which highlighted many of the problems that aVected this group of customers.
The report ﬁnds that small business customers:
— Do not understand the complexities and risks of associated with being a non-domestic energy
customer as their understanding is likely to be modelled on being a domestic consumer;
— By contrast, do not beneﬁt from many of the protections aVorded to domestic consumers such as
price comparison services, cooling oV periods, industry codes of practice on selling, supply
transfers and 28-day contracts;
— Are frequently unhappy with respect to inaccurate billing tied to estimate reading; issues with
information provision; slow responsiveness; pressure from suppliers in a range of areas and
contact issues when dissatisﬁed.
Electricity4Business is concerned that further consolidation in the energy market would only serve to
exacerbate these existing problems for small businesses which are caused by a lack of genuine retail and
wholesale competition in the energy market.
Furthermore, theDTI’s 2006EnergyReview indicated that by 2025 energy demand in theUKmay exceed
the available supply by 30%, but research by LogicaCMG has subsequently suggested that a decade earlier
the energy gap could already be 23% at peak times72. This highlights that the gap is widening far quicker
than anticipated, and will have a signiﬁcant impact on UK business and households. Based on the research
LogicaCMGhas estimated that by 2015, the impact onGDP could be £108 billion or £3,700 a year for every
working adult in the country. The report also shows that it is not just the winter months that will be aVected.
If the eVects (or assumed eVects) of climatic change continue, longer hotter summers will mean that
electricity consumption through the hottest months will increase as more air conditioning and cooling
systems are used.
Electricity4Business believes that these challenges will only be overcome by a competitive and dynamic
market for energy in theUKand that increased consolidationwill hinder our collective eVorts in this regard.
It is also worth noting that indicators of impending market consolidation:
— the interest in Centrica from the Russian energy giant Gazprom;
— market speculation regarding EDF acquisition of Iberdrola (owners of Scottish Power);
— British Energy—acquisition by one of the big six
This could leave UK business energy supply in the hands of a few foreign businesses with the potential
to operate as a cosy oligopoly—this is not the free market that businesses should have access to.
The relationship between the wholesale and retail markets for electricity and gas
Electricity4Business would like to draw the Committee’s attention to this paragraph on page 17 of the
energywatch discussion paper, “How energy markets are failing consumers”.
Feedback from independent market participants suggests that this fall in traded market liquidity is
making it more diYcult for suppliers to source wholesale energy for onward sale to customers. They claim
it is not only more diYcult to buy wholesale energy but the markets have becomemore unpredictable as the
exit of operators with a trading background has led to a decline in the quality and volume ofmarket activity.
This, they argue, makes wholesale markets inherently more volatile.
Our experience at Electricity4Business conﬁrms these fears expressed by energywatch and we regard this
wholesale market volatility as a signiﬁcant commercial barrier to our company and to genuine retail
competition in the sector of the market in which we operate.
The interaction between the UK and European energy markets
Electricity4Business refers the Committee to the “ﬁve main barriers to a fully functioning internal energy
market” outlined by the European Commission in its the preliminary report of its Sector Inquiry under Art
17 Regulation 1/2003 on the gas and electricity markets issued on 16 February 2006 and in its ﬁnal report
on 10 January 2007.
It is our belief that each of these ﬁve barriers—market concentration, vertical foreclosure, market
integration, (lack of) transparency and (complexity of) price formation—is now clearly present in the UK
energy market.
71 http://www.energywatch.org.uk/uploads/satisfaction report.pdf
72 http://www.logica.co.uk/mind!the!gap!-!white!paper/400008094
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Below, for information, is additional detail on how and when the European Commission believes these
barriers can prevent an internal energy market from operating as it should:
— Market Concentration
At the wholesale level, markets generally maintain the high level of concentration of the pre-
liberalisation period.
— Vertical Foreclosure
Lack of liquidity and limited access to infrastructure prevent new entrant suppliers from oVering their
services to the consumer.
— Market integration
Cross-border sales do not presently exert any signiﬁcant competitive pressure.
— Transparency
There is a lack of reliable and timely information on the markets—normally the lifeblood of healthy
competition.
— Price formation
More eVective and transparent price formation is needed in order to deliver the full advantages of market
opening to consumers.
The eVectiveness of regulatory oversight of the energy market
It should be clear from the remainder of this submission that Electricity4Business regards the existing
regulatory oversight of the UK energy market as inadequate. In January, Ofgem asserted that the UK
energy market is sound73 and reported to the Chancellor that there was no evidence of collusion or price
ﬁxing.However, Electricity4Business agreeswith a range of other stakeholders includingBritish Energy (the
largest independent electricity generator), energywatch, other small independent energy suppliers,
academics, Unison and theNational Right to Fuel Campaign that there are structural features of themarket
which constrain the extent of eVective competition. The focus on collusion is a red herring, as even if it can
be proven that there is no collusion, that alone does not dictate that the existing regulatory regime is
suYciently robust.
Electricty4Business joins energywatch and others in calling for the energy market to be the subject of an
inquiry by the Competition Commission who could consider:
— Whether the reduction from more than 20 suppliers to six, or less, concentrates the market in too
few hands.
— Whether suppliers with electricity generation or gas production interests, or with long term
contracts with independent generators, have excessive information and control over the market.
— Why £10 billion investment in gas infrastructure failed to smooth out volatility in gas supply?
— Why small suppliers have either been forced out of the market or struggle to survive?
— Why new entry is regarded as nigh on impossible?
— Whether the above issues create a comfort zone for the Big Six suppliers which limits eVective
competition and consumer beneﬁts.
Progress in reducing fuel poverty and the appropriate policy instruments for doing so
Electricity4Business is aware that the Government is currently considering levying a windfall tax on large
energy suppliers to combat growing fuel poverty amongst vulnerable people following the latest energy price
rises. We would endorse such a plan. The latest ﬁgures show that more than four million people are fuel
poor74—spending more than 10% of their income on energy bills. We would also urge the Committee to
consider that many small businesses do not generate substantial proﬁts for their owners and that fuel
poverty can be the result of an increase in the costs of fuel for an individual’s business, as equally as if these
costs were related to domestic consumption.
March 2008
73 Source: Ofgem press release, 16 January 2008
http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/Media/PressRel/Documents1/Ofgem%202.pdf
74 Source: energywatch press release, 15 January 2008
http://www.energywatch.org.uk/media/news/show release.asp?article id%1078
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Memorandum submitted by Energy Action Scotland
Introduction
Energy Action Scotland (EAS) is the Scottish charity with the remit of ending fuel poverty. EAS has been
working with this remit since its inception in 1983 and has campaigned on the issue of fuel poverty and
deliveredmany practical and research projects to tackle the problems of cold, damphomes. EAShas worked
with both the Scottish Government and the UK Government on energy eYciency programme design and
implementation.
EAS welcomes the opportunity to submit written evidence to the Business, Enterprise & Regulatory
Reform Committee Inquiry into possible anti-competitive behaviour in the UK’s energy market. EAS is
primarily concerned with the impact of energy regulation policy on the fuel poor, low income and other
vulnerable consumers and this response concentratemainly on aspects of the inquiry which are likely to have
an impact on these customers in Scotland.
Fuel Poverty in Scotland
The Scottish Government is required by the Housing (Scotland) Act 2001 to end fuel poverty, as far as
is practicable, by 2016 and plans to do this are set out in the Scottish Fuel Poverty Statement. The number
of Scottish households living in fuel poverty dropped from 738,000 (35%) in 1996 to 286,000 (13%) in 2002.
Half the reduction was due to increases in household income, 35% to reduced fuel prices and 15% to
improved energy eYciency of housing.75 The most recent ﬁgures from the Scottish House Condition Survey
Key Findings 2005/06 Report show an increase to 543,000 households living in fuel poverty in Scotland in
2005/06, representing 23% of the total.
According to ﬁgures produced by Communities Scotland,76 for every 1% rise in fuel prices an estimated
8,000 more households would go into fuel poverty. EAS estimates that there are currently 700,000
households, almost one in three, in fuel poverty in Scotland. This signiﬁcant increase in fuel poverty is widely
accepted to be due to the dramatic increases in domestic energy prices and the additional price rises
announced recently will exacerbate this situation.
EAS believes that the ScottishGovernment’s target on the eradication of fuel poverty can bemet but only
if signiﬁcant additional resources are directed into fuel poverty initiatives and therefore EAS is calling on
the Chancellor of the Exchequer and Scottish Ministers to use the extra VAT revenue generated by energy
price rises to boost programmes aimed at ending fuel poverty.
Specific Issues that EAS would like the Committee to Consider:
Whether there is eVective competition in the wholesale market for gas and electricity
EAS does not accept that the competitive market is operating eVectively, particularly for vulnerable
customers, and is pleased to note that Ofgem has said that it is considering ways to help address this issue.
In the consultation document on its Corporate Strategy for 2008–13 Ofgem stated that Britain’s energy
market is the most competitive in Europe, but EAS does not believe that this is a relevant comparison given
that the European energymarket is not yet fully open to competition. Indeed it would appear that the impact
of the European energy market on British energy consumers is mainly negative. EAS does not believe that
the market can provide all the answers for vulnerable and fuel poor consumers particularly at a time when
high energy prices are pushing more consumers into fuel poverty.
EAS recognises Ofgem’s primary duty is to protect the interests of consumers by promoting competition
and its secondary duty is to pay particular attention to the needs of vulnerable consumers. Many vulnerable
consumers are either unable or unwilling to take advantage of the beneﬁts of competition; it is therefore
essential for Ofgem to continue to use regulation in order to safeguard the interests of these consumers. EAS
is pleased to note that this issue has been acknowledged by Ofgem in its Sustainable Development Report
for 2006. EAS would like the committee to consider whether the current duties of Ofgem should be changed
to ensure that there is a stronger focus on the needs of vulnerable consumers, until such time as fuel poverty
targets have been met. Indeed EAS suggests that this should become Ofgem’s primary duty.
The conventional wisdom is that customers who receive poor service will switch to another supplier but
EAS does not accept this assumption, particularly as many vulnerable energy consumers in Scotland are
unable to switch suppliers irrespective of the level of service they receive. Figures77 produced by
energywatch state that there are 228,000 households with dynamic teleswitching meters in Scotland.
Consumers with these meters ﬁnd it diYcult to switch suppliers as most suppliers’ systems are not able to
incorporate data from these meters. In addition to this, research78 carried out by Ofgem shows that pre-
payment meter customers are less likely to switch suppliers than consumers who pay by other methods and
acknowledges that the competitive market has not worked for these customers.
75 Fuel Poverty in Scotland: Further Analysis of the Scottish House Condition Survey 2002
76 Fuel Poverty in Scotland: Further Analysis of the Scottish House Condition Survey 2002
77 “Working for Scottish Consumers” Factsheet—energywatch
78 Ofgem Factsheet 67: “Prepayment meter customers and Fuel Poverty” 27 June 2007
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Fuel poor customers, particularly those who have pre-payment meters or who are in debt, have not been
able to take full advantage of the beneﬁts of competition andEAS is pleased to note that Ofgemwill monitor
switching levels amongst disadvantaged groups. The National Audit OYce (NAO) Review stated that there
is a lack of easily accessible, trustworthy, relevant, understandable and comparable information for
customers wanting to switch suppliers. Tim Burr, head of NAO said “Ofcom, Ofgem and Postcom need to
be vigilant, and be prepared to use their powers when necessary, to ensure genuine competition is present
and that it is working to serve consumers”.
Response to Specific Questions from BERR Committee:
Progress in reducing fuel poverty and the appropriate policy instruments for doing so
EAS is concerned that fuel poverty targets, which had originally appeared to be realistic, will not be met,
mainly because of the unexpected rise in energy prices over recent years. Ofgem has a key responsibility in
relation to ensuring that fuel prices are no higher then necessary. In addition to this raising household
income and improving the energy eYciency of housing has an important role to play in the eradication of
fuel poverty. The Carbon Emissions Reduction Target, which comes into eVect in April 2008, will also be
an important instrument for the improvement of energy eYciency in housing.
The following graph shows that the rise in fuel prices has pushed all pensioner households (2 adults of
pensionable agewith no children) living in a standard 3 bedroom end terrace house, and in receipt of Pension
Credit, into fuel poverty irrespective of payment method for fuel. Only those households paying by monthly
direct debit are not in fuel poverty, but only if their annual fuel bill is less than £950.
Rise in Total Annual Fuel Prices for a Standard 3 Bed End Terrace
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Social Tariffs:
EAS recognises that energy companies have introduced various products in an eVort to assist vulnerable,
low income, and fuel poor customers but it is often diYcult to distinguish some of these products as social
tariVs, particularly if they are more expensive than other products which are available from the same
supplier. EAS believes that social tariVs should be lower than any other tariVs available from the company
and targeted speciﬁcally at low income and vulnerable customers. Some utilities have set up trust funds but
these vary enormously in eligibility criteria and are poorly targeted at the fuel poor. EAS considers that in
the short term Ofgem should focus primarily on putting pressure on energy suppliers to introduce products
to assist vulnerable, low income and fuel poor customers who may be struggling to pay their energy bills.
EAS recommends that Ofgem continues to put pressure on suppliers to develop social tariVs and other
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) initiatives until such time as fuel prices have returned to 2002 levels.
In addition to this Ofgem should audit suppliers’ CSR initiatives and social tariVs to ensure that they are
indeed eVective.
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Winter Fuel Payments:
EAS recommends that eligibility for the Winter Fuel Payment should be extended to include other
vulnerable groups whomay be in fuel poverty such as low income families with young children or household
members who are disabled or chronically sick. There should also be a regional weighting for theWinter Fuel
Payment the further north households are located, to reﬂect the longer heating season and therefore higher
heating costs for households in Scotland.
Pre-payment Meters:
Pre-payment meter tariVs oVered by power suppliers should not be set at a higher rate than the other
tariVs oVered; the fuel poor, vulnerable and those on low incomes should not penalised for not having access
to cheaper payment methods such as Direct Debit.
Targetting FUel poor Households:
EAS supports the “ﬁnd and ﬁx” approach advocated by Ofgem for targeting help to fuel poor customers
and the partnership initiative which is bringing suppliers, voluntary agencies and the Pension Service
together.
Suppliers should be required to communicate with their customers much more proactively and eVectively
than they do at present. There are various services available which have been designed to assist vulnerable
customers, such as the Priority Services Register and Fuel Direct, and these should be publicised more
widely.Many customerswith pre-paymentmeters are often unaware of the amount of debt they are repaying
and there is a need for improved communication between suppliers and customers about their ability to
repay fuel debts. Any debts that have accrued as a result of delays by the supplier in recalibrating pre-
payment meters should be written oV.
Conclusions:
EAS recommends that pre-payment meter tariVs should not be set higher than other tariVs oVered by the
supplier, that a minimum standard should be set for social tariVs, that the eligibility for Winter Fuel
Payments should be extended to include other vulnerable groups and that fuel suppliers should improve
their eVorts to target fuel poor customers.
EAS believes that improving energy eYciency provides themost sustainable solution to fuel poverty while
also helping to meet Government’s targets on reducing carbon; therefore EAS recommends that
Government should signiﬁcantly increase investment in energy eYciency measures. It is estimated that the
recent across-the-board energy price increases could bring the UK Treasury an additional £175 million
through VAT. This extra VAT revenue should be used exclusively to tackle fuel poverty in the four UK
countries.
April 2008
Memorandum submitted by Energy Information Centre Ltd
As the UK’s leading independent consultancy to industrial, commercial and public sector energy users,
EIC was established in 1975 and was purchased by Broadfern in 2007. Both companies have considerable
experience in the energy sector, representing approximately 1,300 clients with a combined annual energy
procurement spend of £1,250 million in 2007.
As such, we welcome the opportunity to comment on the issues raised insofar as the above investigation
is concerned.
Overview
Many of our clients have been in repeated contact with us over the last few days and weeks to express
their concern following the extent of gas and power price increases. In addition as the immediate term impact
of the prevailing situation on the energy market, the recently published Energy Bill has set out the medium
to long-term roadmap for the UK’s energy mix, which will have major implications for the future of the UK
economy and its businesses.
Recent weeks andmonths have seen energy price increases back in the spotlight of the mainstreammedia,
as suppliers have sought to increase gas and power tariVs for their domestic users. While such customers
will keenly feel the impact of these increases, they are well below those experienced by their industrial and
commercial counterparts.
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Aswell as being subject to greater movement in terms of absolute price direction, business customers have
also faced considerable underlying market volatility and—while some customers have the ability, by choice
or by circumstance, to deal with this variation in prices—others are not in a position to do so.
While a proportion of this volatility is due to market fundamentals and the need to guarantee that the
supply-demand balance is met, some is due to uncertainty and technical trading in the market, while the
long-standing ineYciencies of the energy sector as a whole continue to add further potential for price
variation.
1. Whether the current market structure encourages eVective competition in the retail markets for gas and
electricity
The process of consolidationUthat has been seen in the UK energy sector over the last decade has
eVectively reversed the process of privatisation and deregulation, at least as far as energy supply is
concerned. The introduction and development of vertical separation and ownership unbundling has proven
successful in terms of network operation, although even here consolidation has emergedwith the integration
of the post-privatisation National Grid and Transco into the current transmission network operator.
However, there is an argument that such a consolidation of gas and electricity network operators has
brought with it economies of scale and advantages in terms of planning and system management that more
than outweigh any negative consequences. In the case of energy supply, such natural monopoly beneﬁts do
not exist, and the question is whether the evolution of the sector has been to the beneﬁt of customers.
From a situation of vertical separation in the wake of privatisation with a wide range of companies
undertaking roles as generators, suppliers, local network operators, etc, the mergers and takeovers seen in
the past decade have resulted in a small number of companies that have diVering levels of vertical
integration.
This has led to the dominance of the so-called “Big Six” within the domestic supply market (British Gas,
E.ON, EDF Energy, npower, Scottish and Southern Energy and ScottishPower), with industrial and
commercial customers and public sector organisations more able to draw on suppliers beyond this group
(eg Gazprom, Corona, Bizz Energy).
From a theoretical standpoint, this represents a shift away from an imperfectly competitive energy supply
market in the latter part of the 1990s to one that more closely represents an oligopoly with a competitive
fringe. This fringe in turn comprises companies of diVering sizes that are seeking to establish themselves
within that oligopoly.
Therefore, there is the question of competition withinUthe oligopoly and that within the fringe. While
competition within the fringe would appear to be well established, the extent of competition within the
oligopoly is less apparent. Furthermore, competition within the oligopoly appears to be basedmore on non-
price factors, while that of the fringe is more focused on price (see Question 3).
2. Whether there is eVective competition in the wholesale markets for gas and electricity
As stated in the response to Question 1, the process of vertical integration in the energy sector has meant
that there are fewer participants, and this has in turn hadUmajor adverse consequences for the depth of
liquidity in the wholesale market. This has resulted in a situation whereby the majority of trading seen for
both gas and electricity is in the prompt and near curve contracts, with little activity seen in the more distant
periods. As such, this raises the question of how reﬂective trading prices are of actual market interest and
the underlying value of the commodities involved.
The presence of companies across the value chain—either as upstream gas producers and shippers/
suppliers, or as electricity generators and suppliers—means that there is inevitably a large degree of internal
trading within a company and across the diVerent operational entities, albeit governed by accounting
separation. However, this means that a large proportion of the gas and electricity that is produced for
consumption within the UK market is not traded openly on the wholesale market, and hence remains
opaque to the majority of participants.
As such, the wholesale market is only a small subset of the total traded energy market, but the prices that
are set in that market govern the prices paid by virtually all consumers within the UK. Against this
backdrop, there is the need to ensure greater wholesale market liquidity in a bid to ensure that prices are
both transparent and representative of the underlying supply-demand balance for the commodities traded.
Instances of deliberate market manipulation are thankfully rare in the UK energy sector, but there will
always be the suspicion that a highly concentrated and vertically integrated energy sector has the potential
for such behaviour.
The issue of eVective competition within the wholesale and retail energy markets is also governed by the
relationships between the two. While EIC’s view to this is covered in the response to Question 4, it should
also be pointed out that there are still high levels of informational asymmetries across the respectivemarkets.
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This has been improved considerably in recent years—notably in the case of gas through the implementation
of Uniform Network Code Modiﬁcation 006—although there is still a considerable advantage held by gas
producers and generators.
This level of asymmetry is also reﬂected in terms of market behaviour and the extent of any demand side
response.While this has also been encouraged in recent years through new and innovative product oVerings
by suppliers, this has been relatively slow and has in some cases only emerged after repeated pressure from
customers and their representatives. It is unclear whether, in the case of gas, the planned reform to the
interruptible supply regime from 2011 will improve this situation, although initial indications from
customers are ambiguous.
3. The implications of growing consolidation in the energy market
Based upon the assessment that economies of scale are such that a minimum of ﬁve million accounts is
needed to eVectively compete within the domestic supply market, the argument is whether there has been
competition to assume dominance having already achieved what is seen as a “satisfactory” customer base.
In recent years, there has been greater focus on retention of existing accounts by suppliers rather than an
aggressive pursuit of expansion, with eVorts to increase service and non-price factors the objectives.
Competition on price has been focused more on ensuring appropriate ﬁnancial performance rather than
aggressive price cuts in a bid to bolster market share, although this is due in part to the repeated escalation
in wholesale market prices.
In essence, the competitive strategy adopted by suppliers—certainly in terms of their domestic supply
businesses—has been more defensive than oVensive. The situation in the non-domestic supply business has
been more varied, notably with regard to product innovation and contractual pricing, with competition
more evident due to the greater number of potential suppliers.
It is the experience of EIC that the approach of suppliers to contracting with end users varies across
suppliers and on a case-by-case basis depending upon the customer in question. Inevitably, there are clients
that are attractive to suppliers in terms of their volume or load proﬁle, or potentially through some other
non-market speciﬁc factor such as the prestige of being associated with that client. However, as with the
domestic market, there has been an increasing focus on non-price factors with a more defensive strategy of
retention frequently being the primary objective of suppliers, rather than growth.
One of the primary criteria used by suppliers in the wake of the collapse of Enron and Worldcom and its
associated fallout has been credit compliance. In this climate, suppliers have refused to quote for sites with
which they have previously had a long-standing and successful relationship on the grounds that they do not
meet their revised credit criteria. As such, recently implemented risk management practices have also
aVected a willingness to compete for the business of certain end users.
To conclude, the general decrease in the number of suppliers has inevitably meant that there is less
competition in the energy supply market, and while a more concentrated structure is certainly more
conducive to collusion, such an outcome is not a forgone conclusion. The nature of the energy sector in
recent years has also meant that the larger suppliers (ie those in the oligopoly group rather than the fringe)
have adopted a more defensive business strategy, reﬂecting rising wholesale costs and the need to defend
margins.
As detailed in the response to Question 3, similar challenges exist in the wholesale market, where a
structure has emerged that does not promote either competition or transparency. However, it does promote
investment certainty and long-term commitments to infrastructure and supply projects, resulting in a
delicate balancing act in order to preserve energy supply security.
4. The relationship between the wholesale and retail markets for electricity and gas
The response by most consultees to this particular issue will inevitably focus on the domestic market, and
whether companies fully pass on the increases and decreases seen in the wholesale market to their consumer
base. In summary, domestic customers will experience the underlying wholesale market movement, but this
will be on a lagged basis of between three and six months and will not reﬂect the full extent of the change
in wholesale prices.
By contrast, non-domestic customers are subjected to greater wholesale price volatility and do not always
have the beneﬁt of the mass media or elected oYcials to champion their cause. In the case of the recently
announced domestic tariV increases at the start of 2008, this followed months of continued diYculties for
industrial customers and the UK economy in general.
Clearly non-domestic customers have greater options open to them in terms of managing their energy
price risk compared to their domestic counterparts, but the risk itself is exponentially greater for non-
domestic customers and necessitates a high level of time, skill and resources.
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As such, while suppliers will continue to stress the need to make a proﬁt on their domestic supply
businesses, households should continue to think themselves fortunate that—despite the increases that will
be seen in their gas and electricity bills in 2008—they have not been forced to ensure the rollercoaster ride
of their industrial and commercial counterparts.
5. The interaction between the UK and European energy markets
This is assessed on a commodity-speciﬁc basis as follows.
Gas
The main problem faced by the UK gas market is its deregulated standing next to its peers of Continental
Europe, which remain largely uncompetitive despite the requirements of European Union legislation
requiringmarket opening by the start of July 2007. Thismismatch ofmarket structures means that deliveries
of gas through the UK’s import infrastructure—deliveries on which the country has become increasingly
reliant since 2004—do not always respond to prices.
This is primarily as a result of the contractual and regulatory structures that exist—for example, those
related to the access to pipeline infrastructure needed to transport gas. This is just one of the issues that have
been highlighted in recent years by the European Commission, and while we are glad to see that it is an area
that the government is keen to champion—both directly and indirectly—the extent of progress in this area
has been disappointing at best.
While the Commission is hopeful of addressing this problem by 2009, a longer-term problem facing the
UK gas market in its relationship with those of Continental Europe is the practice of oil indexation of gas
supply contracts. This is a practice that the UK successfully moved away from in the early years of gas
market deregulation, transitioning to a system whereby gas prices were determined by gas market
fundamentals. However, the use of such pricing clauses on the Continent remains a long-standing
arrangement that incumbents in the sector have little interest in changing, frequently with the implicit or
explicit backing of the relevant government.
As such, the increasing reliance of imports from the Continent has meant that the UK has eVectively
reverted back to this method of charging for wholesale gas, meaning that gas prices are eVectively not based
upon market fundamentals, but are instead dependent uponUthe ebb and ﬂow of the global commodity
markets. With oil prices at close to record nominal high levels, the issue of oil indexed pricing needs to be
addressed as a matter of urgency to ensure that gas prices do indeed reﬂect fundamentals.
Electricity
The greater push towards low carbon energy sources and renewable generation is a key facet of the
broader objective of reducing greenhouse gas emissions in order to mitigate the eVects of climate change.
As such, this should be a key objective of responsible government and policy making, but the challenge for
theUK and the EuropeanUnion is to ensure that businesses are not punished for the actions of their leaders
in this regard given the potential absence of a similar commitment from other nations.
One of the main challenges to the expansion of renewable generation is the delays associated with their
development. In the case of onshore wind, these include connection agreements, the negotiation of planning
agreements and compliance with planning conditions. Against this backdrop, it is the responsibility of
government to ensure that the planning regime works to the beneﬁt of companies and does not subject them
to undue and unnecessary delay—problems that have prompted some developers to abandon their plans for
the projects.
However, it should be remembered that renewables are not in a position to fully service the country’s
energy needs, although the potential for such a development is a possibility for the future. InUthis light,
governments should remain reasonable and prudent in ensuring their nation’s energy needs are met, and
should make decisions on their generating mix accordingly and in a manner that ensures security and
diversity of supply.
Ultimately, there is a cost to ensuring that energy needs are met—both in the immediate term and in the
long-term—and also a price to be paid if the energy mix does not have an adequate degree of ﬂexibility and
contingencies associated with it.
Emissions trading
Overall, the cheapest unit of energy that one can have is that saved through greater eYciency. As such,
this is a key area that needs to be pushed at all levels of the economy—notably the domestic sector.
Businesses have too long shouldered the burden—and cost—of reducing greenhouse gas emissions while the
contribution from domestic customers has failed to match expectations. This is an inequity that must be
addressed as a matter of urgency.
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The European Commission’s “20 20 by 2020” emission reduction and renewable energy plan represents
a major challenge for the member states of the European Union, notably given the obligations on biofuels
and road transport. For their merit, the expansion of biofuels needs to be undertaken in a socially
responsible manner, and it will be a core obligation of the European Commission to ensure that such fuels
are indeed sustainable and do not ultimately cause greater long-term problems.
While political responsibility and a desire for strong leadership on emission reduction is important, targets
on emissions and renewables must be undertaken in a manner that is achievable and do not compromise the
needs of businesses and consumers.
The plan to have the lion’s share of emissions come from the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS)
is a welcome move, provided that the reforms to the scheme are undertaken in a clear and coherent manner.
The prospect of a single EU-wide cap on emissions from 2013–20 provides long-term stability for business
(as do the provisional details of the scheme beyond 2020), but the planned use of allowances as a means by
which to redistribute income among nations must not result in implicit state aid to certain nations, nor
should it unduly penalise certain member states at the expense of others.
On the issue of penalties, the proposals requiring non-EU trading partners to purchase allowances in
order to sell their products within the EU—assuming that a long-term global emission reduction policy is
not agreed—must be implemented in a transparent manner and in full accordance with international trade
law. European business needs to compete on a fair global playing ﬁeld and not be dragged into a trade war
and arguments on protectionism—regardless of the best intentions of the EU.
6. The eVectiveness of regulatory oversight of the energy market
The early years of the post-privatisation era for both gas and electricity were characterised by an
increasingly hostile and adversarial relationship between energy companies and their respective regulators.
In the case of the gas sector, this saw British Gas face scrutiny from both the OYce of Fair Trading (OFT)
and theMonopolies andMergers Commission (MMC), while the electricity sector sawNational Power and
Powergen criticised by sectoral regulator OVer over their conduct and be repeatedly threatened with a
referral to the MMC.
In recent years, the relationship between the regulatory authorities and energy companies has become
more conciliatory in tone, although this has not stopped investigations being undertaken by groups
including Ofgem, the Financial Services Authority (FSA) and the (then) Trade and Industry Select
Committee (TISC) into the operation of the energy sector.
The main question that should be considered is whether regulatory action and its consequences is a
credible threat for energy companies, as opposed to how eVective regulation has been. Regulators should
serve as guardians of the market and customers, rather than reactive entities that are called into action, and
they should also have appropriate tools and resources at their command.
For example, the challenge that existed in the early years of post-privatisation within the UK electricity
sector was that the market structure itself was conducive to behaviour that was not always in the interest of
consumers. This resulted in a situation whereby OVer made repeated threats of anMMC referral to the two
primary competing generators (National Power and Powergen) but did not carry this threat out. As such,
and as has been subsequently demonstrated by academic research into this period, the credibility of this
threat declined over time as it was made and not actioned.
Therefore, the ﬁrstUcriteria ofUany regulator is that it must be ready to act decisively against any potential
anti-competitive behaviour, and that the companies under its remit must be faced with the potential for
substantial and wide-ranging penalties as a consequence of this behaviour.
The second criteria is that it must be wholly independent of the companies that it monitors in order to
avoid regulatory capture, ie when the regulator—intentionally or otherwise—becomes the advocate of the
relevant companies. This is far from evident inUthe UK, although there have been questions over the
independence of regulators in some of the markets of Continental Europe, where companies—directly or
through state involvement—are essentially protected by the regulator in order to preserve the status quo.
This is an area that must be addressed as part of the process of market deregulation within the EU (see
Question 6).
7.Progress in reducing fuel poverty and the appropriate policy instruments for doing so
EICdoes not have a comment tomake on thismatter insofar as the domestic sector is concerned, although
it should be pointed out that non-domestic customers have increasingly faced their own equivalent of fuel
poverty in response to rising energy costs and the inability to fully pass these on to their customers.
As such, the percentage of total costs contributed by energy spend must be considered as a priority for
all consumers—not just domestic. This is particularly the case for those industrial customers that face
international competition for their goods and services, with some of their peers—even thosewithin theEU—
still subject to regulated energy rates below the corresponding market rate.
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Conclusion
In conclusion therefore, the main challenges facing business customers relate as much to the broader
energy sector as to speciﬁc industries and their end users.
Firstly, the need for a coherent energy policy, which it is hoped that the Energy Bill will provide. However,
with much of the Bill being of the “hurry up and wait” stance of further consultations, these must be
concluded in a swift and eYcient manner such that the uncertainty that has dogged the energy sector for
some time is addressed. Overall, the Energy Bill is a welcome step, but its policymeasures need to be adhered
to—after all, the 2007White Paper on energy was the third such document from the UK government in less
than 10 years.
Secondly, and on a related point, the need for a coherent energy policy must sit alongside the requirement
that it is also consistent. There has been a tendency in recent years for energy policy to become reactive rather
than proactive, to the extent that some policies have descended into knee-jerk reactions to prevailingmarket
conditions or attempts to grab headlines. The recent example of windfall taxes on oil companies and power
generators illustrate this—private companies are in the business of making proﬁts and it should not be the
business of government to determine what is an “acceptable” level of proﬁt. The role of government should
be to create a framework within which these businesses can re-invest their proﬁts in infrastructure, not seek
a short-term gain and one that may adversely aVect the long-term health of the sector.
Thirdly, in terms of ensuring an appropriate framework within which energy supply companies can
operate, there is an urgent need for a balance to be struck betweenUthe UK’s deregulated structure and the
comparatively uncompetitive structure of most of Continental Europe. The two main consequences of this
for the UK are the absence of a fully traded gas market on the Continent—due to the traditional retention
of oil-linked gas supply contracts—and a lack of complete third party access to network infrastructure. Both
of these serve as a barrier to entry and a route by which to maintain the status quo, and while the European
Commission’s commitment to address both is welcomed, this rhetoric needs to be backed up by policy.
Finally, business customers have been seen in recent years as a source of greenhouse gas emission
reductions while simultaneously shouldering a heavier burden in terms of higher energy bills. Against this
backdrop, domestic customers have faced comparatively less pressure in terms of environmental policy
obligations while also having more vocal support from politicians and the media when energy prices
increase. As such, it could be argued that domestic customers have had a “free ride” at the expense of their
business counterparts, and although industry is not averse to meeting its obligations in terms of emission
reduction or paying justiﬁed energy price increases, there is a need for a more equitable distribution of the
burdens resulting from national and international policy commitments.
Given EIC’s long-standing presence in the UK energy sector, we trust that you will consider these
comments appropriately, and we would welcome the opportunity to discuss them further with you at your
convenience at a future date.
March 2008
Memorandum submitted by Energy Intensive Users Group
1. EIUG represents the energy intensive sectors of UK manufacturing industry (steel, chemicals, paper,
cement, glass, ceramics, aluminium, industrial gases, etc.) that compete in internationalmarkets and depend
on secure, competitive energy supplies to remain in business.
2. Energy supplies represent a high proportion of our members’ operating costs—especially the variable
costs. Energy purchases account for around 25% of production costs for steel and paper manufacturing,
40% for aluminium smelting and certain chemical processes and up to 70% for the production of industrial
gases. These industries share a strong commercial interest in the eYcient use of energy in order to remain
competitive, and in most cases are also subject to Climate Change Agreements that require continuing
attention to be given to energy eYciency.
3. Energy intensive industries in the UK currently purchase around £2.4 billion gas and £5.2 billion
electricity per annum. Around 70%–80% of the cost of industrial energy supply is typically attributable to
the wholesale cost of gas and electricity.
4. Energy intensive industries are highly exposed to international competition and increasingly operate
under international ownership. The continuing presence of these industries in the UK depends on the faith
of international investors that UK energy supplies will, in the long run at least, remain internationally
competitive. Our members are therefore much more concerned about relative energy costs (ie the extent to
which UK energy prices diVer from those of our competitors) than the absolute cost of energy (rightly a
concern for others, with regard to fuel poverty).
5. UK energy prices have risen substantially in recent years, as they have worldwide—though the
increases in UK wholesale prices have been particularly dramatic (see charts 1 and 2 appended to this
memorandum). There has clearly been a step change in the price of oil, gas and coal on the international
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markets (and carbon, within the EU) which has unavoidable implications for the price at which gas and
electricity can be sold in the UK. But this development does not explain why the wholesale prices of gas,
and especially electricity, have become so much higher in the UK than in most of the rest of Europe.
6. Wholesale energy prices are dynamic and volatile, so quoting a single ﬁgure to describe the extent of
the UK/EU competitiveness gap is not straightforward. Account needs to be taken of seasonal factors, as
UK gas prices tend to trade at a premium to continental prices in winter (when the UK is import dependent)
and a discount in summer (when exporting and continental prices eVectively put a ﬂoor on UK summer
prices). There is no obvious reason why UK prices be expected to trade a premium on an annual basis,
however, especially considering the liberalised nature of the UK market and the price-supporting inﬂuence
of oil indexation elsewhere. This last factor is important—sales of gas to industry remain indexed to oil
products in continental markets, so comparisons with hub price data (equivalent to the UK NBP) may not
accurately reﬂect the competitiveness position as far as industrial users are concerned.
7. EIUG disagrees with BERR’s assertion, as recently as January this year, that the UK energy markets
are the most competitive in the G7/EU. This can only be true in a most narrow of senses, eg the extent to
which the market is theoretically open to new entrants, or that consumers are able to switch suppliers.
Important though these factors are, the test that really matters to consumers is whether prices are
competitive—and on this test, for industrial consumers at least, the market is failing. We also urge caution
in interpreting BERR data on energy supply prices, which is by its nature historic and so (unlike market
data) more useful in painting a picture of what things might have looked like up to six months ago than what
they actually look like now, or are expected to look like a year or more ahead. Industry contracts ahead
for its energy supplies and is therefore relatively well placed to see what is coming—and the current pricing
situation, unfortunately, looks worryingly similar to that of two years ago. We recognise however that it is
perhaps unrealistic to expect oYcial UK or EU price survey data to adequately reﬂect the competitive
position for the very largest of industrial consumers, where pricing arrangements tend to be more individual
in nature and transparency is often lacking.
8. EIUG recommends that the Committee pays particular attention to forward year-ahead wholesale
prices, which tend to be the price base suppliers refer to when quoting for typical annual industrial supply
contracts. On this basis, as of April 2008, UK gas prices are around 5% above those in continental Europe
(and higher still than in the USA) and UK electricity prices are around 30% higher than those in France or
Germany (see charts 1 and 2 appended to this memorandum).
9. In an attempt to avoid locking in costs at potentially uncompetitive levels, some industrial consumers
opt to receive gas supplies at a ﬂoating rate indexed to day-ahead prices, or with the option to ﬁx at the
market price at any point during the contract period. Such supply contracts tend to provide lower costs on
average compared with ﬁxed price deals, but with the downside of signiﬁcant additional risk to the
consumer, and are not therefore suitable for all businesses. Indexed supply prices are inherently more
volatile and, as events two years ago conﬁrmed, may turn out to be higher than would have been available
under a ﬁxed price deal.
10. It is worth recalling what occurred during the last occasion when the UK faced a sustained
competitiveness gap, somewhat larger than at present, in the run up to winter 2005-06. Day-ahead gas prices
rose to record levels on the wholesale market as gas supplies ran perilously low, forcing a number of energy
intensive manufacturers to cut or suspend production on cost grounds (for three months, in the case of one
major feedstock user). By the end of that winter, with storage stocks already low, a ﬁre broke out at the
Rough gas storage facility andNationalGrid issued its ﬁrst ever “Gas BalancingAlert”, warning themarket
to reduce demand as the UK came within 24 hours of having to ration gas to industry. ONS data later
conﬁrmed that around 100,000manufacturing jobs were lost in the 12months to the following autumn, with
energy prices cited as a key factor—ie “demand destruction” had occurred. Wholesale prices fell the
following year, perhaps leading some to conclude that problems in the UK’s energy market were largely
over, having arisen as a result of an temporary coincidence—namely that the UK found itself still
completing essential import infrastructure just at the time it started becoming a net importer of gas, and was
unlucky enough to do so when EU energy markets, then still assumed to be moving towards full
liberalisation, remained largely unreformed.
11. EIUG believes there is an inadequate level of competition within the UK energy markets, which has
come about for a number of reasons, listed in the paragraphs below. We suspect that a combination of
inadequate competition, high worldwide fuel prices and energy interventions arising from government
action (or inaction, in the case of past prevarication about nuclear power) is suYcient to explain why current
price levels have become uncompetitive by international standards. We are sceptical that recent price
increases can be blamed on anti competitive behaviour but if others have evidence to the contrary, or it is
thought necessary in order to restore public conﬁdence in the markets, we would support a referral to the
Competition Commission to settle the matter.
12. The current structure of the electricity market discourages eVective competition. There has been a
persistent trend in recent years towards further consolidation and vertically integration—there are few
independent players left, especially retailers. The extent of internal contracting is the primary reason for the
very low liquidity in the forward power markets. Money is largely being made at the wholesale end of the
market, especially by generators that have been handed an opportunity to make windfall proﬁts, at the
expense of consumers, as a result of free allocation of allowances under the EU emissions trading scheme.
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Wenote that “green” spark spreads (allowing for the price of carbon) have alsowidened considerably, above
continental levels, but that this may be consistent with the acknowledged need for new build in the near and
medium term to replace considerable capacity of nuclear and non-LCPD-compliant coal plant scheduled
for retirement. Consolidation has partly been driven by credit issues and the increasing regulatory burden,
both economic and environmental, all of which have tended to disadvantage smaller players. The
complexity and overhead costs associated with code structures (BSC, CUSC) is now a major barrier to new
entrants and smaller players, including auto-generators and demand side participants, and we believe it
should be a clear objective for Ofgem and others to make these simpler andmore accessible. We also believe
that, absent compensatory reforms elsewhere, any attempt to reduce competition bymerger among the “big
six” producers should be most strongly resisted.
13. EIUG has had longstanding concerns about the operation of the wholesale gas market. The UK is
increasingly dependent on imported supplies, including now LNG which is already a key marginal source
of supply. If National Grid forecasts are correct, LNG may need to provide 40% of our supplies within the
next ten years. We believe it was a mistake to grant exemption from regulated third party access
arrangements at LNG terminals. The lack of adequate arrangements at the existing Isle ofGrainTerminal—
and those in the process of being constructed at Milford Haven—is a barrier to their use that has worrying
implications both for the price of gas in the UK and security of supply. We are not aware that a third party
has yet managed to make use of spare capacity at the Isle of Grain terminal (which has remained largely
unused this winter) and, given the current limited notice period for spare berthing slots, it is doubtful
whether this can be expected to occur. The UK remains also at a disadvantage in being able to make use of
attractively priced LNG or other imported gas during periods of low demand periods due to our relatively
low levels of gas storage. The lack of storage capacity is one reason whyUKwholesale prices are so volatile,
and also appears to be a partial explanation for the extent of the risk premium in forward prices, which seems
set to remain an issue for the foreseeable future. There has however been an improvement in market
transparency as a result of Mod 006 (publishing close to real time information on sub-terminal ﬂows)
improving information access to the beneﬁt of market eYciency.
14. The interaction between UK and EU energy markets remains a matter of concern. Despite
encouraging proposals from the Commission last year, and signiﬁcant movement by a number of member
states, we remain unconvinced that continental energy markets will be fully liberalised within the near
future. Continuing political resistance from a small but signiﬁcant group of member states to the full
unbundling of their energy grids from production and supply is a matter of record, so it is still far from clear
that the majority view in support of the Commission’s proposals will prevail. Absent substantial reforms on
unbundling, combined with strong independent energy market regulation at both national and EU level,
prices are likely to remain divergent. The continued lack of common contractual terms with respect to
continental gas supplies—in particular the complete lack of an oil-indexed option in the UK, or the
alternative to it elsewhere in Europe, even when supplied by the same company—also remains a concern.
The brutal truth is that there is no immediate prospect of UK companies or energy consumers enjoying
reciprocal access to continental supplies of the sort we have already granted to our continental competitors.
This leaves the UK in a vulnerable position—increasingly import dependent, subject to external shocks
through physical interconnnection to continental markets, but unable to access continental gas storage or
network infrastructure to help secure our own supplies.
15. EIUG does not support the imposition of a windfall tax on energy suppliers, generators or gas
producers. If problems are thought to have arisen because of market failure, then that is the issue which
needs to be addressed, ideally by referral to the Competition Commission. If problems have arisen because
of government failure (windfall proﬁts arising from free allocation of power sector emissions allowances,
overly generous subsidies to onshore wind generators, etc.) then the relevant policy failures themselves need
to be addressed. Taxing energy producers or suppliers would do nothing to address the problem of
uncompetitive industrial energy prices. The imposition of a windfall tax, or even the threat of it, raises the
cost of capital for investment in UK energy supply—and the cost of this, ultimately, would fall on
consumers.
16. EIUG submitted evidence to the Trade & Industry Committee’s 2004–05 inquiry into fuel prices,
concluding: “Industrial consumers in the UK are therefore facing a substantial competitiveness gap in the
cost of both their gas and electricity supplies. Energy intensive industries are most at risk if this
competitiveness gap is allowed to persist.” Regrettably, this statement does not require updating.
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APPENDIX
ENERGY PRICE CHARTS
Chart 1
GAS PRICES—WHOLESALE, YEAR-AHEAD (p/therm)
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Chart 2
ELECTRICITY PRICES—WHOLESALE, BASELOAD, YEAR-AHEAD (ƒ/MWh)
Source: EnergyQuote
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Supplementary evidence from the Energy Intensive Users Group
1. The comments below and attached charts should be read in conjunctionwith the writtenmemorandum
from the EIUG submitted in April 2008.
2. UK energy prices have risen signiﬁcantly in the last three months, largely in response to the worldwide
increase in the price of oil and coal. However, the diVerential between UK and European gas and electricity
prices has also increased, and hence also the level of competitive disadvantage faced byUK industrial energy
users. As of July 2008, UK gas prices are around 16% above those in continental Europe and UK electricity
prices are around 38% higher than those in Germany on a year-ahead basis.
3. The level of competitive disadvantage in gas is greatest during the winter periods, and in percentage
terms has now reached levels comparable with those experienced during the problematic winter of 2005–06.
Forward market data for the next two years shows this is not a transient phenomenon (see charts 1 & 2
appended to this memorandum).
4. It was suggested in oral evidence from Ofgem that forward gas prices should not be of great concern
to large industrial users since a relatively large proportion of their gas is bought under indexed contracts,
typically linked to day-ahead or month-ahead prices, and hence they are relatively unexposed to market
prices a year or more ahead. As we stated in our original evidence, it is the fact that forward prices are
persistently uncompetitive that has left large industrial users with little option but to purchase much of their
gas in this comparatively risky way. The Committee should be aware that this form of purchasing is not an
option for all large users, and ismuch less prevalent in electricity supply (where the competitive disadvantage
for large consumer is currently even greater than it is for gas).
5. We question whether high global LNG prices are an adequate explanation for the current high level
of UK gas prices. TheUS is at least as dependent on LNG imports as the UK, yet US forward market prices
are substantially below those in the UK (see Chart 1). LNG continues to be delivered to the US—yet little
if any is coming to the UK. We remain concerned to understand why UK suppliers do not appear able to
deliver to the UK market in a similar manner and at similar prices to the US. In particular, we believe that
Third Party Access arrangements at Isle of Grain require independent investigation.
APPENDIX
ENERGY PRICE CHARTS
Chart 1
Wholesale Gas Prices
Forward market:  UK NBP v European oil-indexed v US Henry Hub (pence/therm)
Source:  Energy Purchasing Specialsists (UK) Ltd
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Chart 2
Wholesale Electricity Prices
Forward market: Uk v Germany - Baseload (£ per MWh)
Source:  Ineos/Heren
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Memorandum submitted by Energy Networks Association (ENA)
Energy Networks Association (ENA) is the trade association for UK energy transmission and
distribution licence holders. It acts in the interest of the energy ‘wires and pipes’ sectors to achieve excellence
in both its internal services and relationships with stakeholders. It is funded by the UK’s electricity and gas
transmission and distribution companies. It’s Members and Associates are asset owners and operators
including CE Electric, Central Networks, Chubu Electric, EDF Energy, ESB, Guernsey Electricity,
Independent PowerNetworks, Jersey Electricity,Manx Electricity, National Grid, NetworkRail, Northern
Gas Networks, Northern Ireland Electricity, Scottish & Southern Energy, Scotia Gas Networks, Scottish
Power, Tepco, Wales & West Utilities and Western Power Distribution.
We are grateful to the Committee for the opportunity to provide a brief outline of how the provision of
gas and electricity network infrastructure essential in delivering energy to the public is met within the overall
costs of the customer energy bill.We hope that our submission can put in context how diVerent factors come
together to determine the ﬁnal cost of this infrastructure. We believe that by providing this information
members will be more ideally placed to better understand the full process that leads to ﬁnal the energy bill
that is delivered through the nation’s letter boxes.
General Context
How much of a typical household’s energy bill is attributable to transmission and distribution?
Transmission Distribution
Electricity 4% 17%
Gas 2% 20%
Source: Ofgem Fact Sheet 66: 15.01.08 Updated Household Energy
Bills Explained
What is the money spent on?
The money raised from the consumer is spent to ensure a safe, secure, reliable and eYcient system.
Examples of the type of operational and capital expenditure are those made to ensure the resilience and
reliability of the network. These can range from replacing cast iron piping and other components of old
networks to vegetation management to minimise the potential disruption to energy supplies during storms.
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Who makes the decision on how much is spent by the companies?
Over the course of setting a new ﬁve year price control package, there are bilateral discussions between
the network companies and the regulator, Ofgem, (and its consultants) to make an assessment of the
necessary level of eYcient investment. Ofgem will ultimately set an overall allowed revenue for each
company based on assumptions about eYcient levels of capital and operational expenditure. It is then for
the companies to decide how best to utilise those allowances to deliver the necessary network performance
over the ﬁve year price control period.
The Regulatory framework that has been in place since 1990 (based on the ‘RPI-X’ approach) has been
very successful in encouraging eYciency, thereby reducing charges substantially in real terms, whilst at the
same time delivering signiﬁcant improvements in supply reliability.
Customers’ Bills Down
In real terms the reduction in network charges have been:
–Electricity distribution "50% since 1990.
–Electricity transmission "41% since 1990.
–Gas transportation "41% since 1994
Source: OFGEM
Quality Up
Meanwhile the quality of service delivererd by the electricity distribution companies has risen signiﬁcantly
since 2001:
15% reduction in number of customer interruptions
19% reduction in the average duration of interruptions
Source: OFGEM—Figures exclude severe weather events
Why does regional variation in the cost of transmission and distribution exist?
Regional variations in electricity and gas distribution charges occur throughout
the whole of the UK. DiVerences in distribution costs reﬂect the cost of maintaining the gas and electricity
networks in diVerent areas. This can be due to the diVerent mix of customers in each area, the historical
development of the networks and the topography they cover.
For example, there is a need for a higher number of assets per customer to supply customers in some
regions with a strong concentration of rural areas (see Figure 1 below). This will tend to increase the costs
to the company and hence network prices. The graph below shows that network length per customer is
higher for WPD’s and SSE’s north of Scotland area. Network investment is ultimately funded through use
of system charges. Hence customers in these areas are paying a higher proportion of the network cost than
customers in densely populated areas. Conversely, for EDF’s London network the ratio is at its highest and
therefore the amount of network per head is smallest, ie the cost is spread over more customers. However,
this wll not necessarily mean that London’s prices are the cheapest as there will also be other important cost
considerations, not least the need to underground a substantial proportion of the network in such urban
areas.
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In other areas changes in the economic landscape have altered patterns of demand to which the networks
have to adapt. In the West Midlands for example the network was originally designed to meet the demands
of the large engineering industry which has now virtually disappeared.
Transmission charges also vary by location. Locational charging in electricity is designed to incentivise
generation to locate near demand and demand to locate near generation. This is judged to be more
economically eYcient as it reduces transmission losses and hence the transportation cost of energy
(ﬁnancially and environmentally),
DiVerences in regional gas and electricity distribution costs as reﬂected in a typical household customer’s bill
Gas Electricty
Annual Annual
Distribution Distribution
Component Component
NGG East Midlands £92.90 SPN £44.54
WWU North Wales £93.25 CN E £48.20
NGN North East £94.91 CN W £51.39
SGN Scotland £95.04 LPN £51.70
NGG East £98.51 EON £52.11
SGN southeast £98.79 YEDL £59.46
WWU South Wales £99.66 SEPD £60.56
NGG North West £99.78 UU £60.64
NGN North £100.47 Manweb £63.18
WWU South West £103.06 NEDL £67.99
NGG West Midlands £105.06 South West £69.30
SGN Southern £110.95 South Wales £71.61
NGG London £114.57 SPD £79.43
GB Average £100.53 SHEPD £87.81
GB Average £61.99
Assumptions
Applicable to domestic electricity (gas) customers from April (October) 2007
Electricity consumption 3300 kwh pa on a domestic unrestricted tariV
Gas consumption 18000 kwh pa as an EUC1 customer (73200 kwh pa)
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How do you explain discrepancies between the regional variations in gas and electricity distribution costs and
the regional pricing polices of some energy retailers?
The process by which regional variations in the cost of distributing gas and electricity is arrived at is
transparent and open to scrutiny.
Some of the recent regional price rises by energy retailers have been attributed to the variation in costs
of gas and electricity distribution and transmission.
ENA can only comment on the element of regional price variation directly related to gas and electricity
distribution and transmission. Any diVerential beyond these stemming from the retail oVering is beyond
our scope to explain.
April 2008
Letter by the Energy Retail Association
EVIDENCE SESSION WITH MINISTER FOR ENERGY, 31 JANUARY
The Energy Retail Association (ERA), formed in 2003, represents the electricity and gas suppliers in the
domestic market in Great Britain. The ERA works closely with government, NGOs, charities and other
organisations in England, Scotland and Wales to ensure a coordinated approach to dealing with the key
issues aVecting our industry and theBritish consumer. Themain energy suppliers operating in the residential
market in Great Britain are members of the association—British Gas, EDF Energy, RWE npower, E.on,
ScottishPower, and Scottish and Southern Energy. Our members represent over 99% of the domestic
market; the remainder is comprised of niche suppliers such as green energy and internet-based providers.
The ERA’s aim is to improve continually customers’ experiences with their electricity and gas suppliers.
This means that when we meet with our members, we lead on high level policy issues such as tackling fuel
poverty and protecting vulnerable customers; delivering energy eYciency schemes; developing standards on
operational matters eg billing and doorstep sales.
Since its inception, the ERAhas improved industry performancewhen dealing with customers in the areas
of customer transfers, doorstep sales (leading to the establishment of the EnergySure accreditation scheme)
and billing (with the creation of the Code of Practice for Accurate Bills and theUEnergy Ombudsman).
The ERA operates within strict guidelines. Our activity is not related to matters aVecting competition
between ourmembers, and the ERA is not a forum for discussions as to energy prices or other commercially
sensitive matters. Nor are ERA members of staV privy to any information of this nature. As a responsible
trade association representing a highly competitive industry we take legal guidance to ensure that our
activities do not breach competition law or any other regulations.
22 January 2008
Memorandum submitted by Energy Retail Association
The Energy Retail Association (ERA), formed in 2003, represents domestic electricity and gas suppliers
in Great Britain. All the main energy suppliers operating in the residential market in Great Britain are
members of the association—British Gas, EDF Energy, npower, E.ON, ScottishPower, and Scottish and
Southern Energy.
The ERA is pleased to submit written evidence to the BE Select Committee inquiry into the UK energy
market. We have limited our responses to the following areas of the Committee’s inquiry:
— whether the current market structure encourages eVective competition in the retail markets for gas
and electricity;
— the eVectiveness of regulatory oversight of the energy market; and
— progress in reducing fuel poverty and the appropriate policy instruments for doing so.
In this response we aim to present a comprehensive picture of the retail market with a level of detail that
demonstrates the diversity of oVers and range of consumers that are catered for. We will support this with
independent evidence sourced through desk research. In order to represent the retail energy market in
context we have provided some background information on the dynamics of the market.
The ERA evidence submitted here is intended to be factual and a comprehensive report on all the areas
of the inquiry in which we are qualiﬁed to comment. For completeness we have included some additional
comments, which due to their topical nature are likely to be raised in other submissions.
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Whether the current market structure encourages eVective competition in the retail markets for gas and
electricity
1. Background to Changes in the Market
Key points:
— We are no longer an energy island with domestic UK Continental Shelf gas and oil reserves.
Therefore, the price we pay is aligning itself with our EU neighbours whose Governments face
similar pressures to control rising prices.
— Britain continues to have some of the cheapest gas and electricity in Europe.
— All energy retailers purchase from the same wholesale and primary fuel market and are, therefore,
aVected by the same wholesale price volatility. This means they face similar movements upwards
or downwards in their costs at broadly the same time. However, actual price movements will also
be inﬂuenced by suppliers’ individual strategies.
— Purchasing strategies are based on securing future national supply and meeting current and
projected future demand.
— Britain’s dependence on gas-ﬁred generation makes our need for competitive gas supply even
greater.
1.1 Since the gas and electricity industries were opened to competition over ten years ago Britain’s energy
retailers have operated in an increasingly globalisedmarketplace. This has begun to present some signiﬁcant
challenges. A series of global events have led to record wholesale gas prices; these include:
— Increased demand in China and India.
— High wholesale European gas prices, which are linked to the global oil market.
— Instability in oil producing nations leading to record prices.
These increases have, in part, been passed on to UK consumers through the retail price.
1.2 We are no longer an energy island with domestic North Sea gas and oil reserves. The price we pay is
aligning itself with our EU neighbours whose governments face similar pressures to control rising prices.
There remains a challenge to create a more competitive market in many EU countries and to improve the
transparency of the market operations. Nevertheless, the result of having the most competitive market in
the world (see Section 3.1 below) is that Britain continues to have some of the cheapest gas and electricity
in Europe.
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1.3 Against this volatile background, the UK energy marketplace is adapting and changing. In order to
cushion consumers from volatility in high wholesale prices energy retailers have hedged their costs.
However, eVorts to hold back from passing on some costs are becoming unsustainable due to external
market pressures. For the ﬁrst time theUKhas become a net importer of natural gas; in future gas will come
from areas such as North Africa, the former Soviet Union and the Middle East, as well as from Norway
and Holland. The costs of imported gas and other fuels are determined by world markets and these factors
will inﬂuence the costs of all suppliers.
1.4 The fall in UK gas production, coupled with rising demand for gas, has been an additional factor
behind rapidly increasing wholesale gas prices. Over the past 18 months, all UK gas retailers have been
forced to increase their prices to customers as a result of the higher commodity costs set on the open global
market. The higher cost of gas and coal has also inﬂuenced the wholesale price of electricity.
1.5 The situation is not exclusive to Britain. There have been price rises in many other EU states as the
impact of world markets has been felt. InGermany, according to a poll by the Financial Times on 7 January
2008, rising electricity prices are topping the list of concerns for German consumers this year where
electricity bills have increased by 50% since 2000.
2. Wholesale versus Retail
Key points:
— Energy is not the only commodity aVected by a global economic downturn.
— Other products eg food, transport and water are facing similar price pressures.
— Volatility in the wholesale oil markets is due to political and economic factors beyond the control
of any one nation.
— Energy suppliers have, to varying degrees, been able to delay the impact of highwholesale prices by
adjusting their energy purchasing strategies and making eYciencies elsewhere in their businesses.
— Retail prices have come down as well as gone up.
2.1 Around half of a typical domestic energy bill is made up from wholesale costs and over the last ﬁve
years consumers have seen double digit rises in both gas and electricity. The juggling act performed by
energy retailers between cushioning wholesale price increases to protect retail prices will be made all the
more diYcult by the cost impact of a raft of environmental regulations due to be implemented in the UK.
This is in addition to the requirement for large scale investment in energy infrastructure and the increased
cost of the Carbon Emissions Reduction Target, which is estimated to be at least £38 per fuel. The graph
below from Ofgem shows the factors that make up a domestic energy bill and the increasing cost of
environmental levies.
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2.2 Unlike petrol pump prices, our energy prices do not ﬂuctuate frequently because energy retailers
attempt to smooth the peak and troughs. It can be some months, depending on individual circumstances,
before retail prices are caught by the wash of the volatile upstream prices. Similarly, as and when wholesale
prices have retreated from these record levels, there has been a delay before those ripples reach retail prices.
2.3 A further criticism raised by some observers is that energy suppliers appear to raise their prices in line
with each other. All energy retailers purchase from the same wholesale and primary fuels market and are,
therefore, aVected by the samewholesale price volatility.While there is some variation in timing and amount
of any price adjustments, depending on companies’ positions and strategies, the broad commonality of any
movements reﬂects the strength of competition and the consequences in terms of customer losses for any
company charging signiﬁcantly more than its rivals.
2.4 The energy retail market in Britain continues to be deﬁned by highly competitive and dynamic service
providers who continue to innovate to increase their market share. In real terms, the competitive market is
keeping prices lower for British consumers: the prices they pay for energy remain lower than before market
deregulation.
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3. Indicators of competition
Key points:
— Britain has the most competitive market in Europe (Oxera, January 2008) in which 55% of gas and
electricity consumers have switched supplier.
— Only 25% of consumers have never switched either gas or electricity supplier.
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— 400,000 consumers are active and switch each month. Of the remainder, some will have switched
and switched back, some changed one fuel, but not the other and some will have changed tariVs.
— Energy consumers have access to the widest range of products provided by energy retailers tomeet
the requirements of an increasingly engaged market.
— Suppliers are developing markets to promote energy services packages.
— Smart meters will prompt innovation that will shift consumer buying habits from being based
purely on price.
3.1 The principal feature of Britain’s energy market is consumer choice. A report by Oxera in January
this year heralded Britain as having by far the most competitive energy market in the EU and G7 countries
over the period 2004 to 2008.
3.2 One indicator is the switching rate of 55%, which is far higher than Sweden at 32%; the second most
competitive market in Europe. Ofgem records state that 100,000 consumers switch supplier each week.
However, it is likely that the actual switching rate is even higher in Britain because many consumers switch
tariVs without changing supplier. This is not just an indication of a dynamic market, but also that many
consumers are happy to stay with their existing supplier and choose instead to change tariV or payment
method to get the best deal for their individual circumstances. According to MoneyExpert.com’s switching
index for household products in Q1 2007 the energy market was more dynamic in terms of switching levels
than markets in:
— broadband;
— home insurance;
— landline and mobile telephone services;
— credit cards;
— car insurance;
— bank accounts; or
— mortgage providers.
3.3 Research by BroadbandChoices.com, a price comparison site, showed that the ﬁgures for consumers
switching providers for their broadband services was just 13% in 2007, prompting the comment that
broadband service providers had “something to learn from the energy industry”.
3.4 The UK (with the exception of the smaller system in Northern Ireland) and Scandinavian countries
are the only European states that can claim to have achieved intense competition, as demonstrated by
switching rates that far exceed the other EUmembers. Austria, Denmark, Germany,Netherlands and Spain
oVer switching opportunities to some degree and Belgium, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg and Portugal have
also alreadymet the EU’smarket opening requirements. However, it is crucial to note that in other countries
the opportunities to switch are not always reﬂected by the numbers of consumers actually switching. For
example, Germany andAustria have a switching rate of 6%. TheNetherlands is one of the better performers
with around 12% of the population switching energy provider.
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The UK has Europe’s most competitive energy retail market: electricity
switching penetration by market
3.5 British consumers exercise much more power over the market than in many other EU states and this
also impacts on the prices that companies are able to charge. Price is a key factor dictating the ﬂexibility of
the market and decisions by companies to increase retail energy prices have to be balanced against the
potential loss of market share.
3.6 Competition for consumers has driven innovation and better customer service. A variety of diVerent
oVers are available to consumers indicating a degree of product diVerentiation. Energy retailers oVer price
caps, bills without a standing charge, dual fuel discount, andmany non-price related beneﬁts, such as a single
bill or electronic billing. A number of energy retailers have diversiﬁed into other services and oVer bundled
services, including the supply of energy and telecoms with an option of paying just one bill, for example.
3.7 AYnity partnerships with large retail brands in other sectors continue to be an important feature of
the market. Customers are rewarded through bundled oVers of products by loyalty points. Energy
companies on the other hand beneﬁt from better customer retention and a means of attracting new
customers. The introduction of capped and ﬁxed price products by energy suppliers as wholesale prices rose
protected many customers from increased prices. Moreover, consumers can now choose to have their retail
price indexed to the wholesale market which may provide good value over the long term.
3.8 However, price remains the primary diVerentiator. This means that any new product must be cost
eVective to produce and competitively priced to attract consumers. No matter how good the product if
consumers consider the price in anyway excessive the product will not sell. A current example is the niche
market inmicrogeneration technology which, due to its high cost has not achieved the critical mass required
to enable economies of scale.
The eVectiveness of regulatory oversight of the energy market
4. EVectiveness of Regulation
Key points:
— Doorstep sales complaints have fallen by 97% since the EnergySure Code was put in place by
industry.
— Switching complaints dropped by 60% after the completion of the Customer Transfer Programme
led by the ERA.
— Energywatch has recorded a 70% reduction in overall complaints in the last ﬁve years.
— The Billing Code and Energy Supply Ombudsman are voluntary schemes established by industry.
— Self regulatory schemes are independently audited and enforced.
— The Debt and Disconnection Safety Net was reviewed by Ofgem in 2006.
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— Ofgem reduced the number of supply licence conditions as a response to conﬁdence in the industry
to self-regulate.
— Existing regulation must be proportionate to risk eg consumer protection, health and safety.
4.1 The ERA’s members operate in a regulated and customer-facing environment, which naturally leads
to close monitoring of the industry by Government and the regulator, which have a responsibility to protect
the interests of consumers. Regulation must be proportionate in order to allow the competitive market to
function eVectively and to enable suppliers to innovate.
4.2 As an example of the ability of the industry to self regulate where appropriate, in 2003 the ERA took
ownership of the Code of Practice on Face to Face Marketing of Energy Supply. The voluntary Code, now
known as the EnergySure Code, sets standards by which energy suppliers can be judged. Persistent failure
to observe this EnergySure Code will lead to a withdrawal of using the EnergySure “badge”. The Code aims
at the same time to help customers understand the service and behaviour they can expect from EnergySure
Code Members. The Code is independently audited on an annual basis by KPMG. Whilst it has no legal
force, it provides a means for self-regulation in the competitive energy market and aims to assist the
realisation of the beneﬁts of competition. Annually, Code members approach approximately 35 million
people about switching their energy supplier, and fewer than 1 in 100,000 approaches results in an
energywatch complaint about direct selling. Since its launch complaints to energywatch about doorstep
sales practice have fallen by 97%.
4.3 The ERA aims to work with the industry on issues where consumers can beneﬁt from suppliers
working for the common good where there is no competitive advantage. The establishment of a “safety net”
for debt and disconnections set out a framework for debt recovery and protects vulnerable households from
disconnection. In January 2008Ofgem published an independent review of the operation of energy suppliers
debt recovery processes. It concluded:
“Disconnections are down signiﬁcantly from the record levels seen in 2001. It is reassuring to see
supplier’s progress in improving debt and disconnection procedures overall since Ofgem’s last
industry-wide review in 2005”.
(Debt and Disconnection Review 07/08, 25 Jan 2008)
4.4 In July 2006, in response to recommendations following a supercomplaint against the industry, the
ERA established the Energy Supply Ombudsman to oVer a redress scheme for consumers unable to resolve
billing disputes with their energy supplier. The scheme is entirely industry funded and since its launch has
been extended to include all types of complaints. In accordance with the Consumer, Estate Agents and
Redress Act 2007 the Energy Supply Ombudsman will become the Energy Ombudsman with eVect from 1
April 2008 and its remit will be extended to networks businesses.
4.5 Since the introduction of competition in the gas and electricity supply markets, the industry has
matured and developed signiﬁcantly. Customers now have a wide choice of supplier and/or supply oVers,
indicating a high level of product innovation and diVerentiation within the market. In Ofgem’s Domestic
Retail Market Report (June 2007) they highlight that their research has shown that less than 3% of
customers think switching is too diYcult or say they are unaware that it is possible to switch. A National
Consumer Council report Switched on to Switching (2005) found that 95% of energy consumers found the
switching process “very easy or fairly easy”.
4.6 We believe that it is vital that the supply licence provides a level playing ﬁeld on regulatory obligations
for all suppliers, regardless of size or whether a new entrant or not. Such diVerentiation would simply serve
to distort competition. We support the view that all regulation must be non-prescriptive, proportionate and
developed with a clear and realistic strategy for implementation. Ofgem recognises that regulations that are
drafted without due regard to the impact on business will be ineVective and lead to compliance problems.
4.7 As an industry, we acknowledge Ofgem’s right to enforcement through energy and competition
legislation. However, as the market matures a key advantage to oVering added value to consumers will be
retailers’ ability to innovate. It is important that burdensome and disproportionate regulation is avoided so
that there continues to be innovation in the market.
Progress in reducing fuel poverty and the appropriate policy instruments for doing so
5. Fuel poverty and social programmes
Key points:
— Fuel poverty is an eVect of three factors colliding—low income, poor housing and the price of fuel.
Energy suppliers have nothing to do with the ﬁrst two, and the third is largely driven by world
energy markets.
— Nevertheless, energy suppliers have engaged in a number of initiatives aimed at relieving fuel
poverty. These have included the signiﬁcant spend on improving insulation standards for the
priority group in EEC/CERT, as well as other voluntary programmes assessed by Ofgem at £56
million a year.
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— The Government has challenged suppliers to raise this contribution towards £150m a year over
the survey period.
— Social tariVs form part of a package of measures and cannot be viewed in isolation where the issue
of fuel poverty is multi-faceted.
— The increased CERT charges present a signiﬁcant challenge and Government must help suppliers
to identify and target low income households.
5.1 Energy suppliers are not the architects of “fuel poverty”. People in fuel poverty often have multiple
debts and there is a challenge for the Government to oVer joined-up services to address all of the problems
vulnerable people face managing their energy bills and keeping their homes warm. This requires long term,
sustainable strategy.
5.2 An underlying cause of increasing fuel poverty is higher primary fuel costs and investment
requirements in generation and gas import capacity, leading to higher wholesale costs. Such rises greatly
exceed margins in energy supply and have to be passed through to consumers. Energy suppliers are
intermediaries, and their part in alleviating fuel poverty is focussed on a number of special schemes including
the CERT programme (which is improving energy eYciency, especially of potentially fuel poor households)
and social initiatives. This is a substantial area of work, which is making a real diVerence.
5.3 According to Ofgem the price of fuel makes up 15–20% of the overall eVect. In supporting the
Government in eliminating fuel poverty the main contribution that energy companies can make is to
maintain pressure on fuel prices, to promote energy eYciency improvements, and to ensure that there is
ﬂexibility in a competitivemarket to enable vulnerable customers to beneﬁt from competition and the special
services and tariVs available to them.
5.4 A social tariV should be seen as one part of a toolkit of measures that suppliers can deliver according
to the needs of their customers and according towhat provides themost help. Othermeasures include winter
rebates, price freezes, trust funds, boiler upgrades, free insulation, beneﬁts entitlement checks, partnership
schemes with charities, local authorities and health services and energy eYciency advice. All these schemes
oVer ﬂexibility in how they are implemented by suppliers.
5.5 Legislating for a social tariV could become a complex intervention in the market, restricting rather
than promoting innovative and sustainable schemes. On the other hand a contribution per customer from
each supplier (as set by Government) wouldUenable assistance to be providedUin an equitable manner. If the
Government chooses this option it must be speciﬁc about what it expects suppliers to achieve and that its
expectations are realistic. It should also be recognised that taking the social tariV option may remove a
segment of society, albeit temporarily, from access to choices in the market. This degree of ﬁnancial
exclusion may be appropriate for some, but there is currently no guidance on who should qualify.
5.6 Identiﬁcation remains a huge challenge for energy companies and Government, whether it is oVering
free insulation or targeting welfare support. Means-testing is fraught with diYculty because people do not
self-diagnose. Many people in need do not identify themselves and energy suppliers rightly have only the
minimumdetails about their customers’ personal circumstances. This needs to be resolvedwithGovernment
before any further schemes are launched. The Government must interrogate its data and devise a means of
sharing this and overcoming any data protection issues.
For example, this winter 250,000 elderly gas and electricity customers are beneﬁting from oVers
of free insulation and heating systems under a joint government/industry scheme that is being
funded by energy suppliers. This is the second year that energy suppliers have funded a winter
initiative to provide free insulation to 250,000 pensioners on beneﬁts in England, Scotland and
Wales. Over a ﬁve week period a coupon was sent to targeted households identiﬁed using beneﬁts
data held by Government. This was a joint initiative involving energy suppliers, Eaga the
Department of Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform and Department of Work and
Pensions. Customers responding to a freephone helpline or completing a couponwere oVered tariV
advice and information about their energy supplier’s social welfare schemes that range from trust
fund payments to winter rebates. Households in England were also oVered Warm Front grants to
improve their heating systems. The scheme is branded under theGovernment’s winterKeepWarm
Keep Well campaign. The scheme will measure the extent that energy eYciency measures can be
accurately targeted using data on beneﬁts claimants held by the government. Industry experience
is that on average £1,500 is under claimed by each household every year.
5.7 Energy suppliers oVer more practical help to low income families than any other business sector. This
raises the question of accountability when external factors drive adverse outcomes, as in the case of tackling
fuel poverty. Energy companies are not qualiﬁed to develop and deliver social welfare programmes and
should not have to substitute for public services.
6. Pre-payment meters
Key points:
— Prepayment meters (PPMs) operate on a similar principle as “pay as you go” mobile phones.
— This enables customers to manage their energy spend more eYciently.
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— The majority of PPM customers are low income, but not fuel poor.
— Of the customers who pay for their energy with a PPM, a minority of 20% are fuel poor.
— Ofgem state that 75% of fuel poor customers pay by standard credit or direct debit and only 5%
of pensioners (who account for 50% of Britain’s fuel poor) use PPMs.
— Most customerswho use PPMs do so because it enables households on low incomes to budget their
energy use.
— Ofgem research (factsheet 67) published in June showed that the majority of PPM customers are
happy to pay in this way.
— PPMs are also often used in rented accommodation or holiday lets.
— Some PPMs are installed by energy suppliers when a customer has diYculty paying their bills, to
help them manage their spend.
— In 2007 Ofgem research indicated that the proportion of prepayment customers who had switched
was below the average for the market as a whole. However, switching rates for prepayment
customers were slightly above those for standard credit customers.
— The majority of pre-payment customers are not in debt.
— Suppliers use PPMs as an alternative to disconnections.
6.1 There has been much attention focused on prepayment (PPM) energy customers over the last few
years and this has led to some misunderstandings. Prepayment meters operate on a similar principle as “pay
as you go” mobile phones and enable customers to manage their energy spend more eYciently. A feature
of a pay as you go option is that the cost is often higher than an online oVer. In the same way mobile phone
calls and texts are more expensive for pay as you go oVers and there is a sometimes a minimummonthly top
up requirement. In energy most PPMs work with a swipe card or key, which customers use to buy their
energy in advance at a local corner shop, garage or Post OYce, and then charge their meter.
6.2 Suppliers incur additional charges from meter provision and maintenance, and prepayment meter
infrastructure. As with pay as you go mobile telephones, the cost of servicing PPMs is higher, and
historically, users’ tariVs have often reﬂected this. Ofgem indicates that on average each PPM costs an
additional £60 compared to standard credit customers and £85 compared to direct debit customers.
6.3 Of the total of 26 million electricity meters and 20 million gas meters in the UK, there are currently
3.5 million electricity PPMs and 2.2 million gas PPMs. The majority of PPM customers are not fuel poor.
In fact Ofgem ﬁgures state that of the customers who pay for their energy with a PPM, a minority of 20%
are fuel poor. Furthermore, 75% of fuel poor customers pay by standard credit or direct debit and only 5%
of pensioners (who account for 50% of Britain’s fuel poor) use PPMs.We are concerned about any proposal
to intervene on prepayment tariV rates, without a clear principle of seeking to focus help on those in greatest
need. Aside from the cost to all consumers, including the majority of fuel poor who do not use PPMs, the
proposed intervention will beneﬁt those who use prepayment meters in second homes, holiday cottages,
rented property and student accommodation.
75% of fuel poor
customers pay by SC
or DD
PPM
customers
fuel poor
vulnerable
customers
80% of PPM
customers are not
fuel poor
Source: Ofgem Domestic Retail Market report, 2005
6.4 A feature of a competitivemarket is the ability of suppliers to vary their service oVers. Every supplier’s
customer base diVers, and companies have decided on an individual basis how to charge their customers.
Companies ensure in a variety of ways that they are oVering appropriate products for customers on PPMs.
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Some energy suppliers have chosen to reduce or equalise their tariVs with standard credit tariVs. However,
others consider that equalising tariVs would disproportionately aVect the 3 million fuel poor customers who
do not use PPMs. According to Ofgem’s Domestic Retail Market published in June 2007 if the cost of
servicing PPMs was recouped across all customers, every bill would go up by approximately £14 per year.
6.5 In response to concerns about disconnection levels the ERA established a new protocol in 2004 under
what is known as ‘safety net’ procedures. The scheme has been successful in ensuring that no households
identiﬁed as vulnerable have been disconnected in over three years. The number of disconnections last year
was 5000. This is down from 17,000 four years ago. However, the commitment to reduce disconnections has
led to suppliers recovering debt in other ways. Consequently the number of prepayment meter installations
has increased.
6.6 PPMs are used to recover debt accrued where this is the best option for the customer. For those
customers who are repaying debt, most repay it at less than £3 a week. The rates at which they can repay
debt are tailored to the customer’s needs. For example, a customer need only pay £2.85 week of debt on a
PPM if they are on beneﬁts. However, a signiﬁcant number agree to a higher repayment rate in order to be
clear of a debt. Provided a PPM is not carrying a debt of more than £100 a consumer could switch to a
supplier with a better deal. Anecdotally, suppliers have indicated that prepayment users are currently
amongst the most active switchers compared to other forms of payment. This conﬁrms ﬁgures in Ofgem’s
2007 retail market report that show PPM user switching levels are higher than those on standard credit
tariVs.
6.7 There is particular concern about old style token meters because they cannot be adjusted remotely,
so require a home visit to recalibrate themwhen prices change. Suppliers are complying with the new license
conditions concerning the timely recalibration of token PPMs, and are making signiﬁcant progress. This
style of meter will be phased out by 2009 when the current replacement programme is complete. Suppliers
are taking measures to ensure that the number of token PPMs accruing debt is falling. In June the number
of token PPMs accruing debt was around 115,000—down from 409,000 when Ofgem ﬁrst took action in
December 2006.
6.8 All suppliers who reduced PPM prices following recent price cuts conﬁrmed that the decreases will
be backdated on meters when they are recalibrated and that customers will beneﬁt from lower prices from
the date on which they were introduced.
6.9 Despite the poor image PPMs score consistently high marks in customer satisfaction surveys. This
was supported by a survey of consumers carried out by Ofgem last June. Some people prefer the pay as you
go option as it means that they can budget precisely their energy use.
Additional comments
7. A future low carbon economy
Key points:
— Energy suppliers have accepted that a business model based on selling a ﬁnite resource, such as
gas, in ever-growing quantities is not sustainable.
— The supplier obligation challenge for energy companies is to reduce carbon emissions from
upstream generation and increase energy eYciency downstream.
— There is a cost associated with developing a low carbon economy.
— The next 20 years could see a new era of energy generation.
— Government has a signiﬁcant role to play in helping energy suppliers to promote new attitudes to
energy use.
— The success of new technology depends on creating consumer demand. This is currently
undermined by perpetual negative messaging based on misinformation and misunderstanding.
7.1 In the Energy Review in 2006, the Government signalled an ambition for a low carbon economy.
Energy suppliers support this ambition and have committed to a major reform of the energy market. The
supplier obligation beyond 2011 will mean that suppliers need to diversify their product oVers and reduce
carbon emissions upstream and increase energy eYciency downstream based on sustainable business model.
Companies agree that there is more that can and should be done through traditional approaches (such as
the insulation measures supported by CERT) and believe that future policies could continue to encourage
these opportunities.
7.2 The suspension of the 28-day rule, allows suppliers to sign longer term contracts with their customers,
This will enable energy suppliers to invest in higher cost products, such as new technology, advanced
appliances and microgeneration etc, because they can recover the cost over a longer period and have the
certainty that their capital investment is not lost by the consumer switching away. If more consumers opt
for a longer contract with their supplier switching rates may slow, but the competitive environment will be
deﬁned by an even wider range of innovative products being brought to market.
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7.3 An essential feature of this new market structure will be the advent of smart meter technology to 26
million homes throughout Britain. Smart meters are two-way communication devices that have the
potential to revolutionise the way that consumers manage the amount of energy they use, the cost of their
energy and their impact on the environment. They are the next generation of electricity and gas meters. A
national roll out of smart meters could bring about the end of estimated bills and meter readings, and
provide customers and energy suppliers with accurate information on the amount of electricity and gas being
used. They will also provide the platform for the development of a much greater choice in energy tariVs and
services for homes across the country. Smart meters will empower customers to make choices on howmuch
energy they use.
7.4 Suppliers will install two-way communication systems that display accurate real-time information on
energy use in the home to the consumer and back to the energy supplier. In addition, Smart meters enable:
— Automatic and actual meter readings that will bring an end to estimated bills.
— Flexible tariVs that measure consumption over set time periods.
— Capability for selling energy back to the supplier which will facilitate microgeneration technology
(eg solar panels or wind turbines).
— The samemeter for electricity (and gas, subject to cost) will be used for all customers, whether they
are pre-payment or credit, and regardless of supplier.
— Suppliers could diVerentiate their tariVs and services through oVering alternative means of
displaying energy consumption—eg through handheld devices, mobile phones, the internet or via
digital TV.
— Improved accuracy of forecasting energy demand at diVerent times of the day.
7.5 The Energy Retail Association is calling on the Government to provide a clear mandate to roll- out
SmartMeters across Britain. This mandate is essential if this huge project to replace 45millionmeters across
every home in the country is to be completed within 10 years at a reasonable cost. Without the mandate it
would be impossible to ensure that every energy customer in the country has a smart meter ﬁtted. The
industry would also be unable to take their current discussions further and to work together to buy and
install smart meters, which would result in a signiﬁcant increase in both cost and time.
31 March 2008
Letter submitted by energywatch
1. A Sound Market?
BERR and Ofgem have asserted that the GB energy market is not only sound but is the most competitive
market in Europe. In fact they only recently dropped the “most competitivemarket in theworld” boast when
the Australian State of Victoria achieved a higher proportion of consumers switching supplier.
Ofgem has protested to the Chancellor that there is no evidence of collusion or price ﬁxing and that they
invited anyone with information to the contrary to come forward.
However, the focus on collusion is a red herring. Only the Sunday Times has raised that possibility.
However a broad range of other bodies—British Energy (the largest independent electricity generator),
energywatch, small independent energy suppliers, academics, Unison, theNational Right to Fuel Campaign
and others—have maintained that there are structural features of the market which constrain the extent of
eVective competition. No accusation of collusion, but observations that:
— In the 10 years since competition was introduced the number of active suppliers has dropped from
20 ! to only 6. Market Concentration.
— In that 10 years the big six suppliers have re-established interests in electricity generation and gas
production. This degree of Vertical Integration and the existence of long term contracts with
electricity generators eVectively forecloses the market to new entry and therefore stiﬂes real
competitive pressure.
— It is argued that thesemarket structure issuesmean that suppliers don’t need to compete vigorously
on low prices because they do not need to fear the price competition that a new entrant would
provide. Given that all the big six are in this comfort zone they know that it is none of their interest
to buck the trend and cut prices dramatically. Collusion is just not needed in the energy market.
British Energy are quoted in the Sunday Times as saying that the control of the big six suppliers over
energy trading “increasingly forecloses the market to new entrants”.
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What’s the point?
The very characteristics that led to a competition investigation by DG Competition in Brussels exist here
(although in a lesser form). The market has changed out of all recognition over the decade of competition.
Consumers have less choice, there is no new entry, vertical integration ties up all electricity generation in
long term contracts, there is very little transparency in the market.
2. Fear of the Competition Commission
energywatch has called for a reference to the Competition Commission to enable it to carry out aMarket
Investigation into the GB energy market. A Market investigation is a tool available to regulators and
government where there is evidence that features within the structure of a market is inhibiting active
competition. Peter Freeman the Chair of the CC has made the following points in speeches over the past
couple of years.
The purpose of market investigations [from comp commission] is to enable the competition
authorities to take an in-depth look at markets where competition is thought to be not working well,
but where the problem does not at ﬁrst sight appear to emanate from the dominant position of a single
ﬁrm or the existence of hard core cartels. They are meant to be detailed and thorough and to apply
a cure rather than a punishment. In their deployment of decision-making and remedy imposing powers
they are probably unique to the UK.
Despite the CC’s powerful armoury of regulatory and competition enforcement powers, its
involvement in regulated sectors in recent years has been minimal. Whatever the justiﬁcation . . . the
fact is that regulators are not making references to the CC for market investigations nor are they or
regulated companies using the CC to resolve licensing or price control issues.
September 2006. Bath
“This relative dearth of regulatory cases has caused us some concern (we query if the threat of a
Competition Commission reference from a regulator can act as a ‘credible threat’ if that reference
power is very rarely—if at all—used) . . .”
May 2007. Edinburgh
What’s the point?
The CC is a critical element in BERR’s aspiration to have the best competition and consumer policy in
the world. They are the experts inmarket structure and competitive forces. Ofgem openly acknowledges that
it spends 75% of its time and energy on the monopoly network industry (ref its evidence to the House of
Lords inquiry into economic regulators). It either cannot or will not apply itself to fundamental questions
about market structure. Given that there is a body set up to do exactly that, why will Ofgem or BERR not
make a reference to the CC? Has the Minster discussed the energy market with the Competition
Commission?
3. Switching not a Sufficient Measure
Ofgem regard the numbers of consumers switching supplier as the key measure of competition in the
market. Last year they claim that 4 million out of 36 million energy account holders switched supplier.
However, half of consumers have never switched supplier, 65% of pensioners have never switched
supplier, 6 million people on pre payment meters cannot switch using an online comparison site, 2 million
people cannot switch because they are in debt to their supplier, hundreds of thousands of consumers are on
radio controlled meters and cannot switch for technical reasons (dynamic teleswitching meters).
Switching is not only more limited than some maintain, research from the University of East Anglia have
established that around one third of all consumers who have switched, did so to a worse tariV. Of course,
every consumer who has switched in recent years has done so to escape punishing price rises not to make
meaningful savings.
What’s the point?
The numbers not as healthy as they appear at ﬁrst and they hide real barriers to switching and actual
detriment for those who do switched. There is contestability in this market. But it’s hard to claim that it
amounts to eVective competition for all. Is the minister content that a glance at the latest switching ﬁgures
is suYcient scrutiny over a market that delivers essential services to consumers and where that service is
being priced out of the reach of many low-income consumers.
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4. Government Fuel Poverty Strategy
Government will not meet its 2010 target for eradicating fuel poverty from vulnerable households.
Around 4 million households across the UK are considered to be in fuel poverty, where they are required to
spend 10% or more of their income to heat their home. The price of energy has the biggest impact on the
level of fuel poverty, and price rises seen since 2003 to date of 74% for gas and 55% for electricity have seen
the number of fuel poor households double.
The pillar of the UK Fuel Poverty Strategy dedicated to, “continuing action to maintain the downward
pressure on fuel bills” seems to have been abandoned. Government said that it would use the Energy Bill to
give itself a power to require companies to provide social tariVs if they didn’t act themselves. It has not done
so. It has said in the 2nd reading of the energy bill that it prefers to see companies bring forward voluntary
and innovative solutions.
In stark contract, the company that has done the least on social tariVs has itself argued for a mandatory
scheme. Npower wrote to Ofgem on 24 September last year and said:
“At present, government is encouraging the delivery of a social action solution within a voluntary
framework. It is doubtful whether this is the most eYcient approach and it is also seemingly
inconsistent with a market framework. We believe that the interest of the fuel poor is best served by
a mandatory social tariV and this is the only means by which the Government’s 2010 and 2016
objectives can be achieved. There is no obvious reason why these targets will be delivered within a
competitive retail market”.
A recent energywatch report shows that suppliers are currently spending 0.11% of their combined
£24 billion turnover on social tariVs and bill rebates—the measures that oVer direct assistance with the cost
of energy to fuel poor households. The measures currently available only reach the equivalent of 1 in 15 fuel
poor energy accounts. If energy suppliers fulﬁl their White Paper commitments the proportion of industry
turnover invested in social tariVs and rebates will increase to 0.25%.
What’s the point?
BERR has identiﬁed one lever to dampen price rises for those in or at risk of fuel poverty—the power to
require social tariVs. It has chosen not to use that lever. Since government challenged suppliers, through the
EnergyWhite Paper, to do more to help their low income consumers, one company has declared that it will
launch a social tariV. Little else has happened. On what evidence has BERR based its decision not to take
the power to require companies to develop social tariVs? What percentage reduction to the price of energy
needs to be made for the 2010 target to be met?
22 January 2008
Memorandum submitted by energywatch
BUSINESS AND ENTERPRISE COMMITTEE: INQUIRY INTO POSSIBLE
ANTI-COMPETITIVE BEHAVIOUR IN THE ENERGY MARKETS
Executive Summary
1. energywatch welcomes the Business and Enterprise Committee inquiry into possible anti-competitive
behaviour of the energy markets. Our response focuses on the fuel poverty and competition elements of the
terms of reference.
Fuel poverty
2. To mitigate the impact of punitive prices on fuel poor households, Government must take the powers
necessary to oblige suppliers to oVer social tariVs in accordance withminimum standards. Standards should
include a stipulation that a supplier’s social tariV represents a rate lower than any other rate available to its
other customers, regardless of the eligible customer’s payment method.
3. To address the inequities faced by prepayment meter consumers:
— BERR to take steps to abolish prepayment premiums that are shown to be non-legitimate and
ineYcient.
— Ofgem to reinstate obligation on suppliers to provide annual statements to prepayment meter
consumers and to specify that these provide pricing transparency, including: comparison of cost
with other paymentmethods oVered by supplier and breakdownof component costs that underpin
the diVerential. The statement should also oVer a comparison with competitors’ prepayment
meter terms.
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— “Health warning” on till receipts at charging points such as shops and post oYces, which state that
prepayment meter is most expensive payment method, unless supplier can demonstrate otherwise.
— A condition of doorstep acquisition of prepayment meter consumers should be that the acquiring
supplier guarantees in the contract a better per unit deal at time of acquisition than their current
supplier oVers.
— Priority given to prepayment meter consumers in smart meter roll out.
— Provide greater access for prepayment meter consumers to switch through price comparison
services.
Competition
4. energywatch believes there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that a feature, or combination of
features, prevents, restricts or distorts competition in the GB energy market. We believe the threshold set
under the Enterprise Act 2002 for the Secretary of State for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform
or Ofgem to refer the GB energy market to the Competition Commission (CC) has been met.
5. energywatch recommends that the GB energy market be referred to the CCwithout delay for a full and
independent investigation. TheCC is the only bodywith the necessary powers, competence and resources to:
— Demand access to the relevant commercially sensitive and conﬁdential information held bymarket
participants.
— Investigate the extent to which any feature or combination of features prevents, distorts or restricts
competition in the GB energy market.
— Determinewhether any feature or combination of features of theGB energymarket has an adverse
eVect on competition.
— Quantify the level of detriment to gas and electricity consumers in GB created by higher prices,
lower quality, less choice or less innovation.
— Decidewhat remedies need to be put in place to ensure that theGB energymarkets are competitive
and can function eYciently and eVectively.
6. energywatch believes that consumers have been and continue to be detrimentally aVected by the lack
of eVective competition in the GB energy markets. We are concerned that:
— Consumers pay prices above the competitive level putting aVordable energy beyond the reach of
many households.
— An estimated half a million households have been put into fuel poverty as a direct result of the
price increases in 2008 alone.
— The near doubling of average domestic energy bills since 2003 has beenmirrored in a 100% increase
in the number of vulnerable households in fuel poverty.
— Prepaymentmeter consumers pay up to £456more per year for their energy than consumers paying
by online direct debit.
— Small businesses are frequently locked in to higher priced contracts.
— Business consumers’ international competitiveness has deteriorated.
— Production has fallen contributing to over 100,000 manufacturing job losses.
— Investment has been cut back and investor conﬁdence is now under threat.
— Lack of supplier and generator/production diversity negatively impacts innovation, delivery of the
environmental and carbon agenda and security of supply.
— Customer service levels are deteriorating rather than improving with consumer contacts with
energywatch increasing by nearly 50% between 2004–05 and 2007–08.
7. energywatch believes the key features of the GB energy market that need investigation by the CC are:
— The supply markets are highly concentrated and consumers are vulnerable to abuse of market
power. The regional supply markets are dominated by two suppliers with British Gas and the
incumbent electricity suppliers controlling at least 60% of each of the domestic supply markets.
— The electricity market is dominated by six vertically integrated ﬁrms inhibiting competition in the
retail and wholesale markets.
— Firms adopt similar supply and trading policies reducing wholesale market liquidity and leaving
consumers vulnerable to abuse of dominance.
— There has been no scale new entry in the 10 years since liberalisation due to high barriers to entry
including credit policies, complex industry codes and information transparency. This can
negatively impact prices, quality, choice and innovation.
— There is a lack of strategic storage inhibiting our ability to store summer priced gas as an
alternative to high priced gas during winter.
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— Where othermeasures are considered insuYcient, separation of vertically integrated ﬁrms through
divestment of plant or function.
8. energywatch believes there are remedies that the CC could put in place to help ensure there is eVective
competition in the GB energy markets including:
— Requirements for ﬁrms to trade minimum gas and electricity volumes through the “over the
counter” markets to enhance liquidity and address concerns about the move towards long term
“oV market” contracting and self supply.
— Enhanced reporting and disclosure requirements for ﬁrms to aid transparency and price discovery.
— Greater transparency on gas ﬂows from Europe and the North Sea including ﬂows from outside
of our current jurisdiction.
— Creating incentives for investment in strategic storage to ensure GB can beneﬁt from access to
lower priced gas.
— Measures to reduce search and switching costs for consumers particularly for domestic consumers
paying by prepayment meter and small businesses.
Outline
9. This paper sets out why energywatch believes there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that
competition is not working eVectively in the GB energy markets, most clearly evidenced in the electricity
market. It outlines the features of the market we believe need to be investigated in a full and independent
market investigation by the CC.
10. In preparing our submission, we have reviewed in detail the experience of two groups of consumers
who face particular problems in the energy markets—prepayment meter consumers and small businesses.
We have analysed retail and wholesale prices in GB and undertaken comparative analysis of prices across
Europe. We have also tested our concerns about the lack of eVective competition in the GB energy markets
and the need for a CC investigation with academics, industry commentators and market participants. We
provide three energywatch commissioned papers to support our submission:
— Cornwall Energy Associates, Why the British energy markets in gas and electricity require a
competition investigation, April 2008. Update of our 2007 analysis of the aspects of the supply
market that act against the best interests of consumers and our 2004 review of competition in the
business market.
— DominicWhittome,Competition Report on the GBGas and PowerMarkets, March 2008. Analysis
of the uncompetitive aspects of the wholesale markets drawing on almost 50 interviews with
market participants and other interested parties.
— Dr Philip Marsden (British Institute of International and Comparative Law), It is time for an
Energy Market Investigation by the Competition Commission, April 2008. Analysis of recent CC
investigations and the role of the CC.
Background
11. energywatch is the statutory independent watchdog representing gas and electricity consumers inGB.
We help domestic and business consumers with their complaints against energy companies, provide them
with advice and information about themarket and act as an advocate for their interests to energy companies,
government and regulators.
Introduction
12. GB energy markets are failing to meet the needs of GB consumers. We have seen energy bills double
over the past ﬁve years yet service levels have deteriorated rather than improved. Prices are not determined
on the basis of eVective competition and there is distrust in the way prices are set.79 We are continually told
that we have the most competitive market in Europe yet our electricity prices remain amongst the highest
in Europe. Some of our most vulnerable consumers are not able to access the cheapest tariVs in the market
as they pay by prepayment meter. The price increases we have seen this year alone mean an estimated extra
half a million households are now in fuel poverty. Small businesses ﬁnd themselves locked into higher priced
contracts due to complex contractual arrangements and business consumers more generally are concerned
about their lack of choice due to the low number and type of contract oVers. Our international
competitiveness has deteriorated and we have seen signiﬁcant job losses.
13. energywatch believes there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that competition is not working
eVectively in theGB energymarket. This undermines consumer conﬁdence and creates consumer detriment.
energywatch recommends that the GB energy market be referred to the CC for a full and independent
79 EuropeanCommission,Competition: energy sector inquiry conﬁrms serious problems and sets out way forward, press release
16 February 2006.
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investigation.80 A CC market investigation is necessary to unpick the complexities of the structure and
competitiveness of the GB energy market that previous reviews, probes and investigations by the regulator
and others have failed to do. The CC can put in place the remedies necessary to help ensure GB consumers
beneﬁt from eVectively functioning and competitive energy markets.
14. energywatch supports markets with fair and healthy competition combined with protections for
consumers who are vulnerable or have little chance of inﬂuencing a market’s competitiveness or a supplier’s
willingness to trade fairly. We believe vigorous competition should drive ﬁrms to deliver higher quality,
increased choice, greater innovation and lower prices to the beneﬁt of all consumers. Consumers need to be
conﬁdent that they are and will be well served by the market. Conﬁdent, informed and empowered
consumers are a critical driver of economic change. We believe signiﬁcant reform is required to ensure that
prices are determined on the basis of eVective competition.
Competition Commission
15. TheCChelps ensure healthy competition between companies for the beneﬁt of companies, consumers
and the economy. We believe the CC is the only body with the necessary powers, competence81 and
resources to undertake a full and independent review of the GB energy market. The CC can82:
— Demand access to the relevant commercially sensitive and conﬁdential information held bymarket
participants.
— Investigate whether any feature or combination of features prevents, distorts or restricts
competition in the GB energy market.
— Determinewhether any feature or combination of features of theGB energymarket has an adverse
eVect on competition.
— Quantify the level of gas and electricity consumer detriment in GB created by higher prices, lower
quality, less choice or less innovation.
— Considerwhether competition is restricted due, in part, to limited ability or incentive for consumers
to search or switch between suppliers.
— Decidewhat remedies need to be put in place to ensure that theGB energymarkets are competitive
and can function eYciently and eVectively.
Features
16. We set out below the key features of the GB energy markets that we believe are a concern and need
investigation by the CC.
Consolidation, concentration and market shares
17. We have seen considerable consolidation in the GB energy markets since liberalisation. There has
been no scale new entry and 20 suppliers83 have exited the market since 2000 so there are now eVectively
six dominant ﬁrms. These ﬁrms are vertically integrated, control over 99% of the domestic supply markets,
dominate the business supply markets84 and own six of the nine power generators. There is a real threat of
further consolidation and vertical integration.
18. On a national level, the combined domestic gas and electricity supplymarkets are highly concentrated
with a Herﬁndahl-Hirschman Index (HHI),85 the most commonly accepted measure of market
concentration, of nearly 2,000. Looking more closely at competition across consumer groups, we see even
greater levels of concentration. The domestic gas retail market has an HHI of around 2,800. The regional
domestic electricity markets are dominated by two ﬁrms—BGT and the incumbent electricity ﬁrm—and
80 It is important to note that the threshold for making a reference to the CC under the Enterprise Act 2002 is based on there
being reasonable grounds for suspecting” competition is not working eVectively (Section 131). The threshold is not based on
the provision of hard and absolute evidence. It is part of the role of the CC in undertaking an investigation to gather, analyse
and validate information and evidence so that it can answer the questions it is obliged to determine under statute (Section
134) namely whether there has been an adverse eVect on competition and whether remedial action should be taken.
81 The CC has s special utilities panel, made up of CCmembers expert in the energy and related sectors. Most usually the panel
deals with water, electricity, gas and energy code modiﬁcations but these members would clearly be involved in any market
investigation into the energy sector, thus ensuring an expert and thorough review.
82 Section 134 of the Enterprise Act 2002 and OFT, The Interface between Competition and Consumer Policies, OECDGlobal
Forum on Competition 2008.
83 Appendix 2—Why the British markets in gas and electricity require a competition investigation.
84 Ofgem data for January 2008 shows that the six vertically integrated ﬁrms control over 95% of the business electricity supply
market. The corresponding data for gas was not available as Ofgem does not regularly monitor the business market.
85 HHI is a commonly accepted measure of market concentration used by economists. It is the sum of the square of each ﬁrm’s
market share and therefore takes account of the relative size and distribution of the ﬁrms in amarket. TheHHI increases as the
number of ﬁrms decreases and the disparity in size between ﬁrms increases. As noted by the OFT, the USMerger Guidelines
characterise as “highly concentrated” a market with an HHI of over 1,800.
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haveHHIs in the range of 2,500 to 6,500.Research suggests that electricity suppliers who remained vertically
integrated with their local distributor have retained a higher market share than those where these functions
have been undertaken by separately owned companies.86
19. These levels of concentration suggest the six dominant ﬁrms have considerable market power. Where
this is exercised, the prices charged to consumers will be above the competitive level. We believe the CC
should investigate the extent to which consumers have paid higher prices as part of a market investigation.
Prices
20. Domestic gas and electricity bills have risen by 109% and 70% in the past ﬁve years.87 These increases
equate to a combined average bill in excess of £1,00088 meaning aVordable energy is beyond the reach of
many households. This year alone the six dominant ﬁrms have increased domestic prices by up to 15% for
electricity and 17% for gas putting an estimated half a million households into fuel poverty.
21. The spread in prices varies across payment methods. For example there is only a £26 annual
diVerence—a mere 50 pence per week—in the prices the dominant ﬁrms charge for dual fuel paid by direct
debit but £107 by prepayment meter. The diVerence in price between payment types is signiﬁcant.
Prepayment meter consumers can pay up to £456 more89 for their energy compared to consumers paying
by online direct debit.
22. It is often stated that the GB energy market is the most competitive market in the EU.90 The
expectation is that energy prices should be lower in GB than in the rest of the EU. However, domestic
electricity prices in GB excluding tax are not the most competitive in Europe and are amongst the most
expensive.91 Business consumers have been hit by even more signiﬁcant price increases than domestic
consumers as contract rates oVered by suppliers are more closely related to forward market prices. This has
had a detrimental impact on their international competitiveness putting investor conﬁdence at risk.
23. energywatch recognises there is upward pressure on prices from the delivery of the environmental and
carbon agenda, this makes it all the more important for the wholesale and retail elements of our energy bills
to be competitive.
Coordinated eVects
24. Given certain market conditions ﬁrms may realise that it is in their mutual best interest to “cease to
compete” and sustain high prices today rather than face the threat of ﬁerce competition tomorrow. If this
behaviour is maintained without explicit agreement then the resulting impact on competition is called
“coordinated eVects”.92
25. energywatch considers that the conditions necessary for coordinated eVects to emerge and be
sustainable are present in the GB energy market.93 This means the market is susceptible to abuse of
dominance and consumers will pay more than the competitive level for their energy. An analysis of the
domestic supply markets suggests:
— Awareness of competitor behaviour: there is a high degree of market concentration so ﬁrms are
aware of each others actions. Prices are transparent—contract terms including price are available
on demand under the supply licences and there are a range of price comparison services where ﬁrms
can readily access comparative price information.
— Costly to deviate from prevailing market behaviour: it is in a supplier’s interest to act in a similar
way to competitors. Prices charged to domestic consumers can change quickly so any deviation
from the prevailing market behaviour can be punished. The prevailing strategy in the domestic
supply markets appears to be “risk minimisation” in that the dominant ﬁrms seek to be neither
signiﬁcantly better nor signiﬁcantly worse than their competitors.
— Weak competitive constraints: there has been no new scale entry and there is no evidence of a
“competitive fringe” inﬂuencing behaviour of the dominant ﬁrms. It is not clear that the dominant
ﬁrms actively compete across all consumer groups and regions. For example no supplier has ever
actively marketed to consumers in Scotland with dynamic teleswitching and some suppliers do not
86 Davies and Price, Does ownership unbundling matter? Evidence from UK energy markets, November 2007.
87 energywatch analysis of supplier’s announced headline price changes between 2003 and 2008.
88 This is expected to be a low estimate of an average bill as it is based on a conservative estimate of electricity consumption.
89 On average consumers paying by prepayment meter pay £255 more than consumers paying by online direct debit. It is not
clear that the diVerential reﬂects eYcient or legitimate additional cost to supply.
90 Forward projections of energy market competitiveness rankings—Prepared for the Department for Business, Enterprise and
Regulatory Reform, Oxera, 10 December 2007. The Oxera analysis is based on a high level analysis of structural features and
fails to consider key factors such as liquidity in the wholesale markets or competitiveness of price.
91 Based on analysis of data provided by Energy Advice Limited January 2008.
92 Ofgem, Domestic Competitive Market Review, 2004.
93 Competition Commission, Market Investigation References: Competition Commission Guidelines, June 2003.
Business and Enterprise Committee: Evidence Ev 273
allow consumers paying by prepayment meter to switch through price comparison services. With
respect to the business supply market, business consumers tend to have only two or three contract
oVers to choose from.
26. The CC would need to undertake a more detailed analysis of the existence and eVects of coordinated
behaviour in the domestic supply and wider GB energy markets.
Switching
27. Though energywatch does all it can to encourage switching, we believe it is a gross error to view
switching as hugely successful and many consumers who have switched have ended up paying more. After
10 years of liberalisation around 50% of consumers have never switched and this increases to 65% for
consumers over the age of 60.
28. The regulator has argued there has been considerable switching and this is direct evidence of
competition. We do not agree that switching is a suYciently good barometer for healthy competition and
is not a theoretically sound basis for a regulator to determine whether there is eVective competition.
29. There have always been problems with the switching data as it can be inﬂated by involuntary and
mis-selling transfers and fails to identify multiple switchers. Switching to new entrants appears to have been
moderate and tends to reﬂect the introduction of dual fuel oVers. Some consumers are unable to switch due
to debt blocking,94 others state they are very unlikely to switch95 and some state that they will never
switch.96 Further survey evidence shows97 that switching is often ill-advised and consumers have ended up
on a worse deal.
30. Search and switching costs are a particular problem for prepayment meter consumers and for small
businesses due to the application of complex contractual arrangements by suppliers, a lack of clarity on
terms and conditions and a lack of comparative price and service information.
Elasticity of demand
31. Gas and electricity are “necessity goods” and consumers have little choice other than to use energy
as and when they require it. In general, the demand for energy might be considered relatively inelastic, the
quantity of energy demanded does not change signiﬁcantly with a change in the price.98 There is a low cross
elasticity of consumption between fuels—there are eVectively no substitutes. It is unlikely that a domestic
consumer would change from gas to electricity for heating particularly as gas accounts for 40% of electricity
production and would require considerable investment by the consumer. It is unlikely that consumers could
survive without electricity and still function in the modern world. Energy is also essential to the day to day
functioning of the vast majority of businesses, even if it is not a key input into making a good or delivering
a service. These factors make consumers particularly vulnerable to dominant ﬁrms being able to extract
monopoly rent.
Vertical integration
32. energywatch notes there may be economic rationale for vertical integration. However, it must also
be recognised that vertical integration can have a negative impact on supply competition and inhibit the
development of eVective and healthy wholesale markets. The detrimental eVects of vertical integration ﬂow
from the likelihood that a vertical structure will empower ﬁrms to behave in ways that may be damaging to
competition.
— Monopoly proﬁts: it can allow ﬁrms to extract monopoly proﬁts from the market as a result of
control throughout the supply chain.
— Cross subsidy: it can facilitate cross subsidy between the generation and supply business and
between diVerent groups of consumers.
— Price discrimination: a vertically integrated ﬁrm can oVer diVerent prices for the same product even
when the generation costs are basically the same.
— Barrier to entry: a vertically integrated ﬁrm can deter new entrants by eVectively increasing the
costs of entry throughout the supply chain.
94 Malcom Wicks stated during the fuel poverty adjournment debate 8 January 2008 that “If people are concerned that they
are being charged too much, considering switching is very important, but I think that I know enough about this subject to
recognise that switching is easier said than done for some of the most vulnerable people, particularly if there is a record of
debt payments”—Hansard column 23w.
95 Accent, energywatch Information and Advice Survey, June 2005—55% of consumers are “very unlikely” to change their gas
or electricity suppliers in the near future.
96 ORB, 2007 Energy Consumers Survey, 2007—14% consumers stated they would never switch.
97 Wilson and Price, Do Consumers Switch to the Best Supplier, July 2007—amongst electricity consumers who had switched
suppliers exclusively for price reasons only up to a ﬁfth had switched to the supplier oVering the greatest saving and up to
one third had switched to a deal that had left them worse oV.
98 A change in the price level may aVect diVerent households diVerently as demand increases with income but at a decreasing
rate—Price, EVect of Liberalizing UK Retail Energy Markets on Consumers.
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— Vertical foreclosure: a vertically integrated ﬁrm can limit the supply of wholesale products and
reduce liquidity in the wholesale markets.
33. Despite repeated concerns being raised with the regulator,99 it has failed to undertake any open or
comprehensive review of the eVects of vertical integration on the GB energy markets and consumers.
34. Through a market investigation, the CC can demand access to the relevant commercially sensitive
and conﬁdential information that would allow it to determine whether vertical integration has had an
adverse eVect on supply and wholesale competition and to quantify any associated detriment to non-
vertically integrated ﬁrms and consumers.
Liquidity
35. energywatch believes the failings of the GB energy market can be most clearly seen in the wholesale
markets. Diminished wholesale market liquidity can seriously aVect the retail markets.
36. There has been a shift away from trading through the “over the counter” GB wholesale markets,
particularly in electricity, in favour of “oV market” contracts. There is a lack of visibility about these
contracts and there is no transparency of the terms and conditions for other market participants. A lack of
transparency will beneﬁt the incumbents and undermine new entrants.100 We have seen reduced liquidity in
the wholesale markets and this has had a detrimental impact on price discovery. Illiquid markets, where
there is limited trading and price is formed on the basis of a few or even a single transaction, are usually
considered to be volatile and do not necessarily reﬂect the true market value.
37. Volumes that are being traded in electricity appear to be heavily skewed to shorter durations,
particularly in the front quarter or season. The volume traded is only three times physical consumption—
considerably below the ten times level said to evidence a healthy market and means liquidity is signiﬁcantly
less that markets such as Germany and the Netherlands that have deregulated more recently. Entrants
advise that there is a mismatch between the wholesale products on oVer and the volume and shape they
require to meet the needs of their customers. There are few independent counter-parties to trade with and
where there are volumes, the integrated players insist that monies are posted in advance because they say
they are concerned with the credit status of small players in volatile markets. The dominant ﬁrms reference
the forward market when changing consumer prices yet they are not exposed to these prices for signiﬁcant
volumes as they are vertically integrated. There is no transparency of transfer prices.
38. The wholesale gas market is considered to be more liquid than the electricity wholesale market.
However, a signiﬁcant proportion of gas is subject to long term contracts and the remaining 30% is primarily
traded in the run up to delivery rather than months or seasons ahead.101 Forward curve prices are therefore
based on limited trading activity and may not be a robust indicator of future costs.
39. The regulator often presents prices from thewholesale forward curves to be representative of supplier
costs despite the dominant ﬁrms being vertically integrated and without having analysed transfer prices or
the impact of reduced liquidity in the wholesale markets.
40. Through a market investigation, the CC can demand information from ﬁrms about their trading
strategies and obtain copies of their long term contracts under which the majority of gas and electricity are
bought and sold to determinewhether these have constrained new entry. TheCC can also access information
about their actual costs of supply to determine whether consumers have and continue to pay more than the
competitive level.
Cash-out
41. energywatch believes there is an urgent problem with the cash-out arrangements that needs to be
remedied. Market participants have compared the risk of exposure to penal cash-out prices to “playing
russian roulette”—in that it may be possible for a smaller player to manage exposure to prices in ﬁve games
out of six but it is the prices in that one game in six that can undermine the business and could lead to a ﬁrm
exiting the market.
42. The imbalance settlement or cash-out arrangements are an important part of the wholesale trading
arrangements. Problems with cash-out rules harm consumers who are ultimately exposed to the costs
resulting from higher wholesale prices, contract risk premia and use of system charges. The dual cash-out
99 For example responses toOfgemproposals to remove the restrictions on self supply licence condition in 2002 and consultation
on a non-domestic supply competition review in 2006. The Public Accounts Committee 2003 report on the New Electricity
Trading Arrangements recommended that “Ofgem should take seriously the risk that vertically integrated companies may
exploit their position and Ofgem should adapt its competition analysis of the wholesale market and retail markets to reﬂect
the new reality of the market”.
100 EuropeanCommission,Competition: energy sector inquiry conﬁrms serious problems and sets out way forward, press release
16 February 2006.
101 Global Insight, Report for DTI on Ensuring EVective and EYcient Forwards Gas Markets, March 2005—70% gas landed
in Britain subject to long term contracts. The report characterised the spot markets as “functionally liquid” but believed the
forward market to “suVer from a lack of liquidity by global standard”.
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arrangements are complex and can act as a barrier to entry particularly where they produce artiﬁcially high
or volatile cash-out prices. They also make it diYcult for new ﬁrms to invest in technology to help deliver
the environmental and carbon agenda.102
43. The regulator has stated there ‘is a proven defect with the current [cash-out] arrangements, namely
“system pollution”.103 energywatch is concerned about the level of detriment consumers have borne and will
continue to bear fromdefective cash-out arrangements.104 It is unclearwhether the changes to industry codes
that are currently being progressed will address all non-energy actions which may be detrimentally
inﬂuencing cash-out prices, for example ability to inﬂuence prices behind a constraint in certain periods.
44. These arrangements would beneﬁt from an independent investigation by the CC. The CC would be
able to determine the extent to which complexmarket rules constrain new entry and quantify any associated
detriment to consumers.
Storage
45. We have relatively low levels of gas storage capacity compared to European peers.105 Investment in
GB storage is expected to double capacity by 2015. However, investment appears to bemore geared towards
small and medium range storage rather than long range storage. Long range storage allows for low priced
gas (typically in the summer in GB) to be injected to provide an alternative source to high priced gas
(typically in winter in GB) particularly during periods of unexpectedly high demand. Long range storage
should be viewed as an asset that can be used to capture volumes of gas at lower prices as well as better
ensuring supply continuity in more testing times.
46. Given our increasing dependence on gas imports and storage, it is important to ensure that the third
party access provisions cannot be used to limit market opportunities for other ﬁrms and create a barrier to
entry. Further, it is important to ensure there is greater transparency of information on ﬂows from Europe
and the North Sea including ﬂows from outside of our current jurisdiction.
47. As part of a market investigation, the CC could identify real barriers to investment, review the need
to create incentives to invest in strategic storage and consider the potential for market rules on access to
storage to create a barrier to entry.
Conclusions and Recommendations
Fuel poverty
48. Tomitigate the impact of punitive prices on fuel poor households, Governmentmust take the powers
necessary to oblige suppliers to oVer social tariVs in accordance withminimum standards. Standards should
include a stipulation that a supplier’s social tariV represents a rate lower than any other rate available to its
other customers, regardless of the eligible customer’s payment method.
49. To address the inequities faced by prepayment meter consumers:
— BERR to take steps to abolish prepayment premiums that are shown to be non-legitimate and
ineYcient.
— Ofgem to reinstate obligation on suppliers to provide annual statements to prepayment meter
consumers and to specify that these provide pricing transparency, including: comparison of cost
with other paymentmethods oVered by supplier and breakdownof component costs that underpin
the diVerential. The statement should also oVer a comparison with competitors’ prepayment
meter terms.
— “Health warning” on till receipts at charging points such as shops and post oYces, which state that
prepayment meter is most expensive payment method, unless supplier can demonstrate otherwise.
— A condition of doorstep acquisition of prepayment meter consumers should be that the acquiring
supplier guarantees in the contract a better per unit deal at time of acquisition than their current
supplier oVers.
— Priority given to prepayment meter consumers in smart meter roll out.
— Provide greater access for prepayment meter consumers to switch through price comparison
services.
102 New entrants are likely to be exposed to a greater extent to imbalance charges due to forecasting errors arising from lack of
historic consumption data, less mature forecasting processes and less portfolio diversiﬁcation—see Ofgem cash-out review
meeting presentation of 26 September 2007.
103 Ofgem open letter on BSC modiﬁcation proposals P211 and P217.
104 Ofgem cash-out reviewmeeting presentation of 26 September 2007—Cash-out prices are estimated to have been detrimentally
aVected by between 7% and 9%. 9% average increase in system buy price and up to 7% decrease in the system sell price.
105 Storage capacity:UK˜ 4% of gas supply and equivalent to about 14 days of supply—Italy, Germany and France have in excess
of 20% and upwards of 50 days—Netherlands has 11% even though it has high level of indigenous supply.
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Competition
50. energywatch considers the threshold set by the Enterprise Act 2002 for the Secretary of State for
Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform or Ofgem to refer the GB energy market to the CC for
investigation has been met. We believe there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that a feature, or
combination of features prevents, restricts or distorts competition in the GB energy market. energywatch
recommends the GB energy market be referred to the CC for a full and independent market investigation
without delay.
51. The CC can investigate and determine whether any feature or combination of features of the GB
energymarket has an adverse eVect on competition. TheCC can also determine what action should be taken
to remedy, mitigate or prevent adverse eVects on competition or any detrimental eVect on consumers.
energywatch proposes that consideration be given to:
— Mandatory trading: ﬁrms to trade a deﬁned level of output through the over the counter wholesale
markets to enhance liquidity.
— Regulatory reporting requirements: ﬁrms to submit information to the regulator on purchase costs
to ensure only eYcient cost pass through.
— Disclosure requirements: ﬁrms to publish trading data including prices and segmented ﬁnancial and
operating data about their electricity and gas production and retailing operations to aid price
discovery.
— Simplifying market rules and entry requirements: a fundamental make-over of the market rules
(including cash-out and third party access) to ensure smaller and low carbon operators can access
markets and consumers fairly.
— Information transparency: greater transparency of information on gas ﬂows from Europe and the
North Sea.
— Investment incentives: creation of investment incentives for long term strategic storage.
— Reduced search and switching costs: introduction of standard terms and conditions and a
conﬁdence code for price comparison services for small businesses.
— Market monitoring: regular business market monitoring by the regulator.
— Price controls: reintroduction of supply price controls for certain consumer groups if alternative
measures are unsuccessful.
— Separation of vertically integrated ﬁrms: if other measures are considered insuYcient divestment
of plant or function.
Annex A
PROGRESS IN REDUCING FUEL POVERTY AND THE APPROPRIATE POLICY
INSTRUMENTS FOR DOING SO
1. The Warm Homes and Energy Conservation Act (2000) obliged the UK Government to publish and
implement a strategy for reducing fuel poverty and to set targets for the implementation of that strategy. The
resultant UK Fuel Poverty Strategy saw the Government set itself binding deadlines for the eradication of
fuel poverty in all vulnerable households by 2010; and in all remaining households by 2016.
What is Fuel Poverty?
2. Fuel poverty arises when three factors—poorly insulated energy ineYcient dwellings with sub-optimal
heating systems, low disposable household income and the price of fuel—conspire to put thermal comfort
beyond the reach of the household aVected.
3. The UK Fuel Poverty Strategy classiﬁes households as fuel poor if they would need to spend in excess
of 10% of household income to maintain a satisfactory heating regime.106 For some fuel poor households
the cost of warmth can rise to 20, 30 or even 40% of income. For many low-income households, spending
10% of their income on heating remains an aspiration.
4. The lived reality of fuel poverty is cold, damp homes and the human manifestation of fuel poverty is
respiratory illness, depression and heart disease, increased risk of strokes and other cold-related ill health;
all of which contribute to the UK’s high rate of excess winter deaths.
106 A satisfactory heating regime is deﬁned as 21)C in the living room and 18)C in other occupied rooms, as recommended by
the World Health Organisation.
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Price and the UK Fuel Poverty Strategy
5. The UKFuel Poverty Strategy recognised that if it were to achieve its stated targets, actions to address
the three causal factors of fuel poverty would be required. Most signiﬁcantly for this inquiry, a key pillar of
the Strategy was built on “continuing action to maintain a downward pressure on fuel bills, ensuring fair
treatment for the less well oV, and supporting the development of energy industry initiatives to combat fuel
poverty”.
High Prices have Single-handedly Undermined the Strategy
6. Since 2003 the escalating cost of domestic gas and electricity has single-handedly undermined the
progress that was being made towards meeting the Government’s targets. The reality of competition
thereafter has seen suppliers chasing competitors’ prices ever upwards. The collapse of the Strategy’s price
focused pillar has left a debilitating policy vacuum at a time when action on the actual price that fuel poor
households are paying for their gas and electricity is essential. However, Government have declined to take
decisive steps to ensure fuel poor households can access energy at the most aVordable prices in the market;
relying instead on repeated appeals to suppliers to volunteer assistance.
The Reality of High Prices for Low-income Consumers
7. energywatch research published in December 2005107 found that:
— most consumers perceive their energy bills to be rising rapidly and feel that this is having an impact
on their household ﬁnances;
— organising their ﬁnances to be able to spend enough to stay warm is the top priority for most
consumers of all ages and income levels, although this may not always be achieved; and
— consumers on low incomes will cut back their expenditure in other areas and budget for their gas
and electricity use in order to maintain some level of warmth.
8. More recent research has shown that price increases in the period since have exacerbated the situation
further. In 2006 the not-for-proﬁt Home Heat Helpline, the supplier sponsored advice line, published
research on the diYculties that single parents experienced with the cost of energy. This revealed that three
quarters (73%) of the single parents polled admitted they set their heating at a lower temperature to save
money. Over half (55%) also said they heat only selected rooms to reduce their bills.108
9. A survey published by Help the Aged in November 2007109 established that:
— One ﬁfth of elderly people spend their winters in one room to reduce heating costs.
— 2.2 million have turned oV their central heating.
— 1 million cut back on food expenditure in order pay heating bills.
10. Similarly, research undertaken for energywatch in 2007 found that almost a ﬁfth (18%) of energy
consumers say they currently ﬁnd it diYcult to pay their energy bills. This ﬁgure rises to 28% of consumers
with an income under £11,500.
Competition Losers
11. The competitive energy market has shown itself to be ill-equipped to recognise and serve the needs
of low-income consumers. They are frequently expected to pay more for the gas and electricity they use and
are disproportionately aVected by the industry’s more negligent practices, such as debt arising from late
token meter recalibration.
Prepayment Meters
12. Prepayment meters (PPMs) present the most vivid example of punitive and discriminatory pricing
policies in the energy market. There is a strong correlation between the use of prepayment meters and low-
income; and when fuel poverty is measured on the “basic income” deﬁnition110 Government data shows that
around a third of the fuel poor pay for their electricity through a PPM. This consumer segment live on a
107 See:
http://www.energywatch.org.uk/uploads/How well does the Priorty Services Register serve priority consumers.pdf
108 Home Heat Helpline, Single Parents Fell the Strain, July 2006:
http://www.energy-retail.org.uk/media/press/2006/july06 01.html
109 1 in 5 older people live in one room of their home to keep warm and save costs in winter, Help the Aged, November 2007:
http://press.helptheaged.org.uk/ press/Releases/ items/ 1!in!5!older!people!live!in!one!room!of!their!
home!to!keep!warm!and!save!costs!in!winter.htm
110 Government reports fuel poverty ﬁgures in two ways: the ﬁrst includes housing supplements such as Housing Beneﬁt and
Income Support for Mortgage Interest as income and is referred to as the full income deﬁnition, while the second excludes
housing supplements from discretionary spend and is known as the basic income deﬁnition.
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budget, are forced to budget their energy use, yet are left paying the market’s premium prices. Where a
consumer is using a PPM for both gas and electricity they will on average pay £255 more per annum than
a consumer using direct debit, online only tariVs.
13. energywatch analysis has shown that three of the six major suppliers do not accept PPM consumers
seeking to switch to them via price comparison sites and in some instances will seek to vet PPMusers wishing
to switch. Agreements between the other three suppliers and price comparison sites to facilitate PPM
switching are limited. This means that this highly promoted and commonly used route to market is closed
in great part to PPM users. These practices suggest further discrimination against this consumer segment
and limits their options to door step sales agents or suppliers’ call centres, which can both present additional
problems.
14. The accelerating trend of suppliers installing PPMs to recover debt means that close to 1million PPM
users (c 1 in 6) are eVectively chained to both their current supplier and this punitive payment method. On
average 1,000 prepayment meters per day were installed to recover debt in 2007.
Limitations of Switching
15. Ofgem’s 2007 review of suppliers’ voluntary initiatives111 restated its view “that competition is the
most eVective way to ensure customers are protected from high prices”. Such an outlook is at odds with
the experience of the 2 million plus households that have become fuel poor as a direct result of escalating
energy bills.
16. This view is also at odds with the Sustainable Development Commission which concluded that
switching supplier “is not a particularly helpful or appropriate method of reducing low-income household
fuel bills and thatmore proactive steps need to be taken to protect low income and vulnerable consumers”.112
Interestingly, the view appears to be increasingly at odds with recent statements by Energy Minister,
Malcolm Wicks:
If people are concerned that they are being charged too much, considering switching is very important,
but I think that I know enough about this subject to recognise that switching is easier said than done
for some of the most vulnerable people, particularly if there is a record of debt payments.113
17. In a number of instances switching can provide a saving and hence play a role in making energy more
aVordable. energywatch has pioneered projects to actively help low-income consumers make the switch to
a better deal wherever that is possible. However, these projects have given energywatch unique ﬁrst-hand
experience about the realities of switching for low-income and vulnerable groups. It has taught us that
switching is at best only a partial answer and that in some cases it’s not the answer at all. Switching to a
more advantageous deal is not as straightforward as its most enthusiastic champions advocate. When the
factors that may hinder the process of switching for vulnerable and low-income consumers are taken into
account, the picture becomes even more complicated. A paper that discusses the diYculties vulnerable and
low-income consumers can face in switching is attached at Appendix 1.
18. Analysis has highlighted the diYculties that low-income and vulnerable consumers can face:
Switching is most prevalent among higher social groups, particularly the professional and managerial ABs.
Some of the groups least likely to switch are the state-supported social group E, those aged 65!, those in rented
accommodation and PPM users.114
19. It must also be recognised that in a high price environment where the average bill exceeds £1k per
annum,115 the least expensive deal does not equate with aVordable energy for those on low-ﬁxed incomes.
It is also somewhat academic to point to the best deals in the market and use these as the basis on which to
calculate the savings that are available to low-income consumers. Personal circumstances, ﬁnancial
exclusion, market place exclusion and any combination thereof will mean that in reality, the lowest priced
oVer—internet only direct debit tariVs—are beyond the reach of those consumers who would beneﬁt the
most from them.
111 Ofgem’s Review of Suppliers’ Voluntary Initiatives to Help Vulnerable Customers, August 2007:
http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/Sustainability/SocAction/Suppliers/CSR/Documents1/Review%20of%20suppliers%
20voluntary%20initiatives.pdf
112 Lost in Transmission—The role of Ofgem in a changing climate, 2007, see:
http://www.sd-commission.org.uk/publications/downloads/SDC ofgem report.pdf
113 Malcolm Wicks, Fuel poverty adjournment debate 8 Jan 2008, Hansard, column 23w.
114 Ipsos Mori Switching Rates for Vulnerable Consumers, report for Ofgem, March 2007,
http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/Sustainability/SocAction/Publications/Documents1/Switching Rates for Vulnerable Customers
Report.pdf
115 This is expected to be a low estimate of an average bill as it is based on a conservative estimate of electricity consumption.
Business and Enterprise Committee: Evidence Ev 279
Progress against Targets
20. Between 1996 and 2001 when the Strategy was published fuel poverty declined from around 7.5
million households to 3.5 million. The introduction of initiatives heralded in the Strategy contributed to
continuing year on year reductions in the years 2001–03, with the global UK ﬁgure declining further to 2.75
million in 2002 and then to 2.5 million in 2003 (on the basic income deﬁnition). Appendix two provides
Government data on trends in the level of fuel poverty.
21. In England reductions in fuel poverty were attributed to the following116:
— 61% attributable to improvements in incomes.
— 22% attributable to energy price reductions.
— 17% attributable to energy eYciency improvements.
22. This shows a benign price environment prior to 2003 actually making a positive contribution to
reductions in fuel poverty, much as the Strategy had envisaged. However, since 2003 escalating prices have
outstripped income growth and outpaced the rate at which energy eYciency and heating improvements can
be installed in fuel poor dwellings.
23. The Government’s 2007 Annual Progress Report on the UK Fuel Poverty Strategy concedes that its
2010 target to eradicate fuel poverty in vulnerable households will not now be met and estimates that up to
1.3 million vulnerable households will still be in fuel poverty in 2010.117
Insufficient Government Response to Impact of Escalating Prices
24. Signiﬁcantly, the Energy White Paper formally set out a challenge to suppliers to develop adequate
programmes of support, with the implication being that if this did not happen, legislation could be used to
ensure all suppliers oVered adequate programmes of support.118
25. Following the White Paper, energywatch commissioned Cornwall Energy Associates to examine the
adequacy of those initiatives that directly related to the actual cost of energy paid by fuel poor households,
namely social tariVs and bill rebates. This review was undertaken in line with the methodology that BERR
had indicated it would use to assess suppliers’ responses to the White Paper challenge. The ﬁndings of the
report exposed the great variability in suppliers’ commitments:
— The six major suppliers are currently committing an estimated £28.1 million—or 0.11% of the
domestic supply industry’s £24.6 billion turnover—to social tariVs and bill rebates.
— If and when suppliers fulﬁl the commitments made to government, the industry will invest £62.5
million, or 0.25% of its estimated turnover, in social tariVs and bill rebates.
— For individual suppliers this ranges from British Gas committing 0.49% of its turnover to a mere
0.079% of turnover for npower and Scottish & Southern Energy.
— British Gas has committed to making assistance available to 4.7% of its consumer base, while for
npower and Scottish & Southern this ﬁgure is 0.79% and 0.34% respectively.
— Only Scottish and Southern Energy and EDFEnergy oVer social tariVs that cost less than the best
deal they oVer in the open market.
— The commitments made by British Gas will equate to 71% of the total industry assistance oVered,
while its market share represents just 33%; whereas npower has an 11% market share but has a
social package commitment that will represent 4% of the total.
26. energywatch estimate that if suppliers fulﬁl the commitments they have made in light of the White
Paper, social tariVs will be available to, at best, only 1 in 6 fuel poor energy accounts. A full summary of
ﬁndings is presented at Appendix 3.
27. Despite it being readily apparent that the White Paper challenge has not forced suYcient progress
from suppliers, the Government has hesitated in obliging suppliers to do more, passing up the clear
opportunity to use the Energy Bill to at least take the relevant reserve powers. However, increasing pressure,
has seen the Government use the Budget to lay down another challenge to suppliers:
There is common agreement on the need to do more. Energy companies currently spend around £50
million a year on social tariVs; the Government would like to see that ﬁgure rising over the period
ahead to at least £150 million a year. Acting with the companies and Ofgem, the Government will
draw up a plan for voluntary and statutory action to achieve that. To underpin this as necessary, the
Government will legislate to require companies to make a fair contribution.119
116 UK Fuel Poverty Strategy: 3rd Annual Progress Report 2005:
http://www.berr.gov.uk/ﬁles/ﬁle10717.pdf
117 UK Fuel Poverty Strategy: 5th Annual Progress Report 2007:
http://www.berr.gov.uk/ﬁles/ﬁle42720.pdf
118 Energy white paper: meeting the energy challenge, May 2007, para. 2.1.21:
http://www.berr.gov.uk/energy/whitepaper/page39534.html
119 Budget Report 2008, chapter 4, para. 4.34:
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/7/2/bud08 chapter4.pdf
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28. Based on the expertise it has developed on the role that eVective social tariVs could play in mitigating
the impact of high prices on fuel poor households, it is the ﬁrm view of energywatch that the Government
has to now take the powers necessary to oblige suppliers to oVer social tariVs in accordance with minimum
standards. This would:
— Provide a policy response to the escalating prices and ensure that the Government’s fuel poverty
strategy has an eVective action in relation to the cost of energy to fuel poor households.
— Ensure fuel poor households have access to the most aVordably priced energy, thus mitigating the
detrimental impact of rising prices and discriminatory pricing.
— Complement investment in and eVorts on raising incomes and the provision of energy eYciency
and heating measures; ensuring a more coherent approach to tackling fuel poverty in the process.
Energywatch has advocated that social tariVs should be oVered as an integral part of an energy
assistance package, which also comprises energy eYciency and beneﬁt entitlement elements.
29. Following a consultation exercise with a range of stakeholders, energywatch last year published a
comprehensive set of recommendations which highlighted the minimum standards required and how social
tariVs could work with the grain of a competitive market. A summary of these recommendations is provided
in a brieﬁng paper at Appendix 4.
APPENDIX 1
VULNERABLE CONSUMERS AND SWITCHING
energywatch discussion paper for Ofgem Social Action Strategy Review Group
12 December 2007
Who is a Vulnerable Consumer?
Vulnerable consumers are not a homogenous unit. There is a range of vulnerabilities that—either
individually or in combination—act as barriers to the consumer’s engagement with the energy market.
Consequently, there is no one size ﬁts all strategy to stimulate switching. A range of tailored approaches are
required to promote and, more importantly, enable switching amongst diVerent vulnerable groups.
That said, one facet of vulnerability that frequently occurs in combination with and exacerbates others
in the energy market context, is the need to survive on low or ﬁxed incomes and the distinct barriers that
arise from this.
Ensuring low-income, vulnerable consumers can identify and then successfully secure the greatest savings
available to them in the market can play an important role in reducing bills in a high price energy
environment. However, stimulating switching amongst this segment remains a signiﬁcant challenge. As the
Ipsos Mori Switching Rates for Vulnerable Consumers120 report for Ofgem noted earlier this year:
Switching is most prevalent among higher social groups, particularly the professional and managerial
ABs. Some of the groups least likely to switch are the state-supported social group E, those aged 65!,
those in rented accommodation and PPM users.
120 http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/Sustainability/SocAction/Publications/Documents1/Switching Rates for Vulnerable Customers
Report.pdf
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Key Elements to Effective Switching
Switching entails more than a simple transaction between the consumer and the chosen supplier. In
reality, for a consumer to engage in an advantageous switch, the presence of the key elements discussed
below is required. The absence of any of these will likely leave the consumer either locked out of the market,
or in a position where the deal they choose proves to be less than advantageous (leaving the consumer
disillusioned by the process):
(1) An awareness and understanding that the market in energy exists, that changing supplier is an
option in this market and that switching is potentially advantageous to the consumer in terms of
bill savings and/or improved customer service; or can lead to a product that better reﬂects the
consumer’s conscience (ie switching is to a green supplier).
Those close to the industry tend to take it for granted that there is a universal awareness of this,
but as the work of energywatch’s Priority Consumer Team with elderly consumers last winter
revealed, a number of consumers still believe they are being supplied by the long defunct gas and
electricity boards.
The Prepayment Meter Customer Workshop undertaken for Ofgem by Mori earlier this year
revealed a low-awareness amongst PPM users of the premium they were paying:
Participants were shown evidence that on average annually prepayment meter customers pay
more than direct debit, or occasionally standard credit customers. Many participants were
surprised by this. In fact, only 3 of 20 gas PPMcustomers and 7 of 28 electricity PPMcustomers
knew theirs was not the cheapest method of paying; many simply did not know.121
(2) Once the awareness and understanding of the energy market is in place, the consumer then has to
display a willingness/conﬁdence to engage with that market, to acquire appropriate information,
calculate whether a better deal is available and resolve and have suYcient conﬁdence to act on this
information.
Brand awareness and familiarity appears to play a key role in whether a consumer has the
conﬁdence to switch or not, especially for elder consumers. For many, the comfort zone may seem
a rational place to stay.Many of those consumers who turned to energywatch for assistance during
its “Are You Missing Out?” switching campaign last winter would have realised the greatest
savings by switching to Ebico. However, because this brand is largely unknown, many consumers
were unwilling to opt for this supplier.
Frequent price changes can also inhibit conﬁdence in switching—especially where the savings
available are less signiﬁcant. They reinforce a common consumer perception that although a
supplier may appear to oVer a good deal in the present, that could well change in a fast moving
price environment.
Brand awareness and familiarity and the perception of changing prices also came through strongly
in Mori’s research for Ofgem into the experiences of PPM users:
Still other participants are sceptical about switching supplier because they do not have the
information to be able to discern between an energy deal that is good for them and one that is
not. For instance, participants say they know the diVerence between the quality of a product from
Asda compared with Waitrose, but energy companies do not have a brand personality or image
that they know about or can relate to. So in that sense, participants say they ﬁnd it hard to
compare the beneﬁt of choosing one supplier over another. There is also some feeling that costs
for suppliers are all much the same.
(3) Personal circumstances need to be such that the consumer has the means to assess, obtain and then
utilise the dealmost advantageous to them.This relates to a range of abilities and capabilities being
in place. These include, but are not limited to:
The ability to deduce which oVer is in consumer’s best interests from available information
(ie reasonable literacy and numeracy skills and a working understanding of English).
Financially “included”: ie a bank account with a direct debit facility that the consumer has
suYcient funds to use with conﬁdence (ie no risk of unexpected payment pushing consumer
into overdraft territory), no debt to previous supplier and a credit history that demonstrates
“dependability” to new supplier.
Ready access to the Internet and ability to use it eVectively: the internet represents the primary
source of information on which to make switching decisions and the gateway to best value
tariVs. Forthcoming energywatch research indicates that only 11% of social class DE use the
internet as a source of switching related information.
121 http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/Sustainability/SocAction/Publications/Documents1/
Prepayment%20meter%20Customer%20Workshop.pdf
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(4) Availability of price and service information on which to base switching decisions that is free of
charge, impartial, clear, accurate and easy to access. In addition, search costs (accessing,
processing and acting on the information) should beminimal—otherwise a consumer’s willingness
to switch will be exhausted. The inability to switch through price comparison websites, for
example, will undoubtedly increase the search costs faced by PPM users who seek a better deal.
(5) Routes to market/gateway to best tariVs must be universally open to all consumers (ie not be a ﬁlter
device by which suppliers skim oV more aZuent consumers).
The experience of energywatch suggests that major suppliers are discriminating against PPM
consumers by refusing to accept them via price comparison sites. This leaves this consumer
segment at the mercy of either aggressive doorstep sales agents or suppliers’ call centres, which as
Mori’s PPM research for Ofgem also demonstrated, can put consumers oV switching.
(6) A commitment from suppliers to facilitate the free, unimpeded movement of consumers in the
market (between payment methods and tariVs and between suppliers).
The experience of PPM consumers suggests that this is not always the case. The debt assignment
protocol has notworked, price comparison sites are closed doors to PPMconsumers, and suppliers
can be resistant to recruiting PPM consumers in certain regions (especially token meter
consumers). This suggests a dearth of contestability in the PPM market, which in turn shields
suppliers from competitive pressures on pricing in this arena andmakes the stasis of the status quo
a commercially attractive proposition. As a result PPM users are left captive to the resultant price
premiums and with limited “escape” routes available to them.
It is also clear that supplier innovation has focused on developing online direct debit tariVs that
deliver lower cost energy to more aZuent consumers. This has left those consumers who are living
on the tightest budgets and are compelled by circumstances to budget energy expenditure through
a PPM, as the group least likely to enjoy access to what are eVectively the market’s budget tariVs.
Without supplier commitment to the unimpededmovement of consumers, any project to help low-
income, vulnerable consumers become eVective switchers will struggle (and the premium prices
they pay will be maintained).
(7) An independent arbitrator for consumers to turn to when attempts to switch stall; when consumers
are dissatisﬁed with the handling of the transfer; or when consumer expectations on which the
decision to switch was made are unmet.
What can make Switching Difficult for Vulnerable Consumers?
Conclusions of University of East Anglia research122 on the switching decisions of electricity consumers
found that amongst consumers who had switched suppliers exclusively for price reasons:
Only 8–19% of consumers switched to the ﬁrm oVering the highest surplus and, in aggregate,
switching consumers appropriated only between 28% and 51% of the maximum gains available to
them . . . . . . (and) that 20–32% of switching consumers appear to have lost surplus through their
choice of supplier. These consumers lost an average £14–35 per year in increased bills, apart from any
other switching costs they may have incurred.
This suggests that switching to a more advantageous deal might not be as straightforward as its most
enthusiastic champions have advocated. When the factors that may hinder the process of switching for
vulnerable consumers are taken into account the picture becomes even more complicated.
For vulnerable and low-income consumers some or all of these key elements are frequently absent,
eVectively meaning that they either remain locked out of the market or that the switching process is short
circuited. In particular, the absence of the key abilities and capabilities listed under personal circumstances
can cause acute barriers to switching in general, and more so in relation to accessing tariVs that oVer the
greatest savings.
122 Do Consumers Switch to the Best Supplier? University of East Anglia Centre for Competition Policy, July 2007.
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The Work of energywatch on Switching
Over the last seven years energywatch has been active in oVering a range of services and undertaking a
range of activities that have helped empower consumers to successfully attain a better deal in the energy
marketplace:
Campaigns such as the Energy Smart initiative undertaken jointly with Ofgem have raised
consumer awareness of the competitive energy market, the right to switch and the potential
beneﬁts that can accrue from participation in the market.
Through its media and publicity activity energywatch has consistently raised consumer awareness
of the energy market and, with considerable eVect, has not shied away from pinpointing
overpriced, underperforming suppliers that consumers should leave behind.
energywatch has also provided consumers with a source of accessible and impartial pricing
information on which switching decisions can be based. It has also introduced the Conﬁdence
Code, to reassure consumers when using accredited price comparison sites. Both are discussed in
further detail below.
energywatch has also been eVective in the role of independent arbitrator. At the micro-level it has
resolved individual consumer grievances that have arisen from the switching experience. At the
macro-level energywatch has taken the evidence presented by its caseload to stamp out the root
causes of the barriers that have deterred eVective switching—doorstep mis-selling and erroneous
transfers being two high proﬁle examples. This in turn has helped increase consumer conﬁdence to
switch and forced suppliers to address a number, if not yet all, of their practices that have impeded
eVective switching.
Pricing Information and the energywatch Confidence Code
energywatch’s price comparison service has provided an impartial facility for consumers to view and
compare the diVerent prices on oVer from electricity and gas suppliers. This service has helped make
consumers aware of their rights as energy users and the choice of suppliers available to them.
The 28 factsheets, available from the energywatch website and in hard copy, compare annual bills for the
major suppliers for three diVerent energy usage levels—low, medium (average) and high. There are
guidelines which sit behind the factsheets to ensure that suppliers featured are treated equally, and so that
prices are comparable.
In relation to external price comparison sites, the energywatch Conﬁdence Code is a set of nine
requirements that participating online price comparison services must meet and which aim to ensure that
consumers can fairly compare prices from all major suppliers. The Code ensures accredited internet price
comparison sites deliver impartial, accurate and reliable information to the millions of energy consumers
looking to save money by comparing and switching energy supplier. Although participation is voluntary,
there are currently twelve service providers that have recognised the beneﬁt of gaining accreditation. In
order to be compliant with the Conﬁdence Code, sites participate in a rigorous, independent audit process
to ensure that consumers can have conﬁdence in the services they provide.
A recent survey conducted byYouGov for energywatch, found that 60% of respondents advised that they
had used price comparison sites to check domestic gas/electricity prices. Overall, 79% of consumers said that
they would be more conﬁdent using a price comparison site endorsed by energywatch.
energywatch recently completed its review of the ﬁrst ten months of the Code’s operation and carefully
considered all the points raised by the accredited service providers, consumers, suppliers and other interested
parties during this time. energywatch proposed that further modiﬁcations were needed to the Conﬁdence
Code and Code Guidance, to ensure that it remained relevant, robust and transparent in today’s market.
The results and decision paper are nearing publication.
Helping Vulnerable Consumers
The initiatives listed above have undoubtedly assisted the generality of consumers. However, from the
outset energywatch has been conscious of the challenge posed in reaching and assisting low-income,
vulnerable consumers. This segment of consumers has been the least likely to approach energywatch for
assistance, either for advice, or for help when things have gone wrong.
energywatch originally sought to overcome this by taking advice and information to the consumer
through broad reach out activities which delivered generic messages to vulnerable groups. This approach
was necessarily constrained in the number of consumers it could reach. Its use of targeting was limited and
the approach fell short of oVering bespoke messages and services tailored to the speciﬁc vulnerable groups
encountered.
It became clear that this approach was only partially successful in accessing those consumers who most
needed our help. It was also clear that the reach out activities were not capturing the experiences of low-
income vulnerable consumers in a systematic way that would enable us to change the way we worked to help
them more eVectively.
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After a reassessment of its strategy for vulnerable and low-income consumers, energywatch introduced
its Priority Consumer Team in 2005. This team has, in a short space of time, made signiﬁcant headway in
developing successful pathways to a range of vulnerable, low-income consumers. The team’s approach has
been based on developing strong partnerships with awide range of trusted intermediaries who, through their
core activities, have access to and a dialogue with otherwise hard to reach consumers. Through their
partnership with the Priority Consumer Team these agencies are able to bolt on an energy dimension to their
core work and in doing so take themessage to those consumers whowould not normally reach energywatch.
The intermediaries have then been able to link vulnerable consumers back to energywatch where assistance
is required. The Priority Consumer Team have then been able to oVer a holistic service by, in addition to
delivering its own service, linking upwards to those agencies who are able to oVer further relevant assistance:
typically Eaga, the DWP/Pensions Service, and in a number of instances suppliers’ voluntary initiatives.
The Priority Consumer Team registered approximately 5,000 people for free services via their supplier
between April 2006 and March 2007. Approximately 8,000 vulnerable consumers received direct support
by being referred on for energy grants and funding support, energy audits and beneﬁt checks.
Helping Vulnerable Consumers Switch Effectively
Last year (2006), in face-to-face interviews around the country, the Priority Consumer Team identiﬁed
many older consumers on basic state pensions who could not aVord to heat and power their homes, but were
reluctant to switch energy supplier. Some of these consumers were paying too much for their energy and a
number had a very low-awareness of the energy market. It was also apparent that older people mistrusted
supplier information and were left confused by pricing information.
In response, energywatch’s Priority Consumer Team devised a switching service to encourage older
people to participate in the energy market that could deliver bespoke information. Its “Are You Missing
Out?” campaign provided older people and their families with a hotline to call and speak to a member of
the Priority Consumer Team. The campaign was promoted through local media and partner agencies. Once
consumers made contact the team sourced the best possible deals based on actual consumption. After
looking at every tariV to see where savings could be made and wrote to the consumer setting out the top
three savings. This allowed the consumer to make an informed choice, based on independent information,
in their own time. If the consumer was already with the cheapest supplier the team looked at other ways
they could save energy. In addition to providing a pathway by which low-income older consumers could
participate in the energy market, this campaign was invaluable in generating strategic intelligence which
energywatch has used to highlight the barriers that low-income consumers can face when looking to switch.
Headline ﬁgures from the “Are You Missing Out?” campaign include:
— Close to 1,400 price comparisons were conducted, highlighting average annual savings of £115.15.
— 238 consumers transferred, achieving an average annual saving of £177.28.
— 198 consumers were already on the cheapest deal, with the cheapest supplier.
— 936 of consumers could save money by changing either their tariV or supplier with an average
saving of £139.50.
— The range of savings highlighted was £4–£974.
Key Findings and Recommendations from the “Are You Missing Out?” Included
Likelihood to switch increases in line with potential savings:
— Of the consumers for whom it was identiﬁed that savings of £51–£100 were possible (the majority
of consumers who contacted the Priority Consumer Team)—there was a 21.7% transfer rate.
— Within the £251–£300 saving bracket there was a 36.8% transfer rate.
— Within the £451–£600 saving bracket there was a 50% transfer rate.
The campaign proved extremely time and resource intensive, leaving the Priority Consumer Team
struggling tomaintain its targeted response time (not least after a briefmention of the campaign in a national
newspaper caused an unexpected wave of calls). It is likely that resultant delays in providing the bespoke
information will have eroded the willingness of consumers aVected to engage further in the process.
Key to providing a bespoke price comparison service is cooperation from consumers’ current suppliers
in providing historical meter readings. The team spent a disproportionate amount of time trying to source
this information, despite suppliers being made aware in advance of the campaign that this would be
required. The teamwas successful though in agreeing a referral pathway with SSEwhich enabled it to obtain
necessary information by email. Unfortunately, despite requesting a similar referral pathway with other
suppliers this did not materialise.
Internet Access: the majority of consumers contacting the team did not have internet access, or were not
comfortable in accessing online accounts which oVered the best deal.
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Preparing for the Post-energywatch World
energywatch continues to push for its successor body, the new National Consumer Council, to carry
forward and build upon a number of these initiatives and also to adopt the PriorityConsumerTeam.Despite
this pressure and also negotiations with a range of agencies, it remains unclear which bodies will pick up
where energywatch will leave oV. This has a number of ramiﬁcations that will need to be resolved in the
coming 10 months:
(1) Related energywatch initiatives could potentially be dispersed across diVerent agencies—none of
which will have the clear remit (or equivalent resource) energywatch has had for undertaking work
of this nature.
(2) Resource intensive initiatives may be scaled back or dropped.
(3) Consumers seeking arbitration in relation to switching grievances will have no clear path of advice
or redress.
(4) Partnerships established by the Priority Consumer Team that have been successful in reaching
hard to reach low-income, vulnerable consumers could lose the energy dimension.
(5) The already limited support available to encourage and assist vulnerable consumers in their
engagement with the energy market will be eroded.
(6) The continuous and close scrutiny of suppliers’ behaviours in relation to switching will diminish.
Wider Issues
As the headline ﬁgures from the “Are You Missing Out?” campaign have shown, even with intensive,
bespoke advice and the availability of energywatch support, only around 1 in 6 vulnerable consumers
(primarily low-income elderly consumers in this instance) switched supplier. Although this ratio appears to
increase as the savings on oVer become greater, half of those who could have realised a saving in excess of
£450 still chose not to even attempt switching supplier. This poses some fundamental questions on what else,
short of forced switching, can be done.
As stated earlier, the crucial role played by personal circumstances and the consumer’s abilities and
capabilities therein (and the limitations these place upon a consumer’s ability to access better tariVs) should
make us cautious about simplistic assumptions that switching to the best deal is an option available to all
vulnerable consumers. Scratching below the surface can reveal fundamental underlying problems that either
need to be addressed before the consumer is in a position to switch to a more advantageous deal; or are
entrenched to the point that the vulnerable consumer is unlikely to ever be able to switch to the deals that
are theoretically available to them.
Also, if we are serious about including vulnerable, low-income consumers in the energy market, and
increasing the proportion of this segment that switch to more advantageous deals, the market itself must
oVer products that are more responsive and amenable to the circumstances of this segment. It must:
(1) OVer payment methods that reﬂect the needs of low-income, vulnerable consumers to budget
without charging the penalty premium that PPMs currently attract. Options could include a
weekly direct debit system, priority access to smart metering for PPM users, and looking at new
“stored value” technologies and the potential these have for enabling some low-income, vulnerable
consumers to manage their accounts using mobile telephones.
(2) See a genuine commitment from suppliers to permit the free movement of consumers in the energy
market. This would require full cooperation with those agencies that are helping vulnerable
consumers access the best deals and a willingness to share historical consumption data with
those agencies.
In this respect, there is also a clear need to develop an eVective, straightforward mechanism that
can replace the Byzantine and ineVectual debt assignment protocol.
(3) Ensure switching gateways—primarily the price comparison websites—are available for use by all
consumers, including PPM users. They should not act as a ﬁlter by which suppliers can skim oV
more aZuent consumers.
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APPENDIX 2
TRENDS IN THE LEVEL OF FUEL POVERTY
HISTORIC AND PROJECTED NUMBERS OF HOUSEHOLDS IN FUEL
POVERTY IN ENGLAND, 1996–2016
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Figure 2.1.1 Historic and Projected Numbers of Households in Fuel
Poverty in England, 1996-2016
Source: DTI, 2007.
— Positions in 2005 and 2006 are based on the modelling of the impact of income, energy prices
movements and energy eYciency measures on the number of vulnerable households in fuel poverty.
— Positions from 2007 to 2016 are based on modelling and show central, low and high price scenarios.
These are based on the fossil-fuel price assumptions published at the same time as the White Paper.
Source: UK Government Energy White Paper, May 2007
http://www.berr.gov.uk/energy/whitepaper/page39534.html
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NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS IN FUEL POVERTY IN THE UK, 1996–2005
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Source: 5th Annual Progress Report 2007
http://www.berr.gov.uk/ﬁles/ﬁle42720.pdf
NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS IN FUEL POVERTY (MILLIONS)
1996 1998* 2001 2002* 2003 2004 2005
England 5.1 3.4 1.7 1.4 1.2 1.2 1.5
(5.5) (4.0) (2.3) (2.0) (1.5) (1.5) (1.8)
Scotland 0.7 — — 0.3 0.4 0.4 —
— — — — — — —
Northern — — 0.2 — — 0.2 —
Ireland — — — — — — —
UK About 6° About 4² About 2° About 2® About 2 Aboput 2 About 2°
Estimate (7°) (5²) (3°) (2²) (2°) (2°) (3)
Figures in brackets do not include Housing Beneﬁt/ISMI as part of income
* Figures for England in 1998 and 2002 are estimates based on movements in energy prices, incomes and
energy eYciency
Source: Fuel Poverty Monitoring—Indicators 2007
http://www.berr.gov.uk/ﬁles/ﬁle42702.pdf
APPENDIX 3
SUMMARY OF CORNWALL ENERGY ASSOCIATES’ REPORT ON THE
PROPORTIONALITY OF SUPPLIERS’ SOCIAL TARIFFS
The Energy White Paper challenged the big six energy suppliers to oVer adequate and proportionate
programmes of assistance to those in most need. To assess suppliers’ responses to this challenge,
energywatch commissioned Cornwall Energy Associates to independently examine whether the
commitments they havemade are proportionate and adequate when compared against each other. Cornwall
Associates have found that the industry’s contribution to social tariVs represents a sub-zero percentage of
turnover and that commitment and investment varies signiﬁcantly at the supplier level. A copy of the full
report is available at:
www.energywatch.org.uk/uploads/Proportionality of suppliers social tariVs 13 January 2008.pdf
This review has deliberately focused only on those initiatives that have a direct impact on the cost of gas
and electricity to fuel poor consumers—social tariVs and bill rebates. It therefore excludes trust funds,
beneﬁt entitlement checks etc, but it should be noted that the suppliers who come out well in this report also
perform well in comparisons of these additional programmes.
The methodology used by the consultants reﬂects the measures that BERR are likely to use in assessing
suppliers’ responses to the Energy White Paper—primarily the cost to the supplier as a proportion of
turnover, cost per meter supplied by the company, and the beneﬁt to the recipient relative to suppliers’ open
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market tariVs. Using these metrics ensures that the comparisons between supplier and the gulf in
performance that results is not merely a reﬂection of market share. As you will see, this approach has been
eVective in revealing the disparity between those who do most and those who do least.
The report’s key ﬁndings are presented below:
Analysis of Current Social Tariff and Rebate Offerings Combined shows that:
The supply industry as a whole commits 0.11% of its estimated £24.6 billion turnover to social tariVs and
rebates. At the supplier level this ranges from British Gas committing 0.18% of turnover to its Essentials
social tariV to RWE npower committing less than 0.003% of turnover to its First Step social tariV (prior to
its new rebate and the widening of its First Step social tariV becoming available).
When the “costs” to the companies are divided by all the gas and electricity accounts they serve (described
as “cost £/meters” supplied in the tables) this ranges from £1.04 for British Gas down to £0.02 for RWE
npower.
The average beneﬁt to gas and electricity social tariV recipients (excluding rebates) ranges from £181 per
annum (gas and electricity) for Scottish & Southern’s Energyplus Care to £98 for British Gas’s Essentials.
Although E.ON UK’s Staywarm arrangement comes in at £424, the report was unable to make direct
comparisons with the other social tariVs and highlights where further information is required from E.ON
UK in relation to Staywarm.
The coverage of tariVs and rebates expressed as a proportion of each supplier’s customer base ranges from
1.74% for British Gas to 0.04% for RWE npower (again, E.ON UK is highest at 2.28%, but this is skewed
by the 160k recipients of its £10 Age Concern Cold Weather Payment).
Analysis of Social Tariff and Rebate Offerings if and when Suppliers Fulfil the Commitments
Made following the Energy White Paper shows that:
In response to the Energy White Paper, suppliers have committed to increasing the availability of social
tariVs. If suppliers manage to achieve these targets then the commitment of the supply industry as a whole
will increase to 0.25% of its estimated £24.6 billion turnover. The increase will be mirrored at the supplier
level if suppliers fulﬁl their commitments, but with a gulf remaining in the proportion of turnover each
supplier commits to these initiatives. If targets are fulﬁlled British Gas will be committing 0.49% of its
turnover to its Essentials social tariV, while RWE npower and Scottish and Southern Energy will be
committing just 0.07% of their respective turnover to their tariVs and rebates.
When the “costs” to the company are divided by all the gas and electricity accounts they supply then
BritishGas will be contributing at £2.77 per customer account reducing to £0.32 for RWEnpower and £0.31
for Scottish and Southern Energy.
In terms of beneﬁt to social tariV recipients (excluding rebates), the range remains the same, but will
include the introduction of Scottish Power’s social tariV at £109.28
The number of recipients of tariVs and rebates expressed as a proportion of each supplier’s customer base
increases with a range running from 4.67% for British Gas to just 0.34% for Scottish and Southern Energy
if and when all commitments are fulﬁlled.
If the commitment each supplier has demonstrated is measured against their respective market share the
disparity that exists is further emphasised:
Current Target
Social Social
Market Package Market Package
Share commitment Share commitment
British Gas 33% 59% 33% 71%
EDF Energy 11% 13% 11% 6%
RWE npower 14% 0% 14% 4%
E.ON UK 16% 21% 16% 10%
Scottish and Southern Energy 16% 1% 16% 6%
Scottish Power 11% 5% 11% 4%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
Business and Enterprise Committee: Evidence Ev 289
Performance against BERR’s May Benchmark
BERR have indicated that they will review supplier performance against the averages in place at May
2007 when the White Paper was published. The energywatch review shows that on the key measures
analysed, both RWE npower and Scottish and Southern Energy remain below the benchmark. (NB: since
the report was ﬁnalised RWE npower has indicated at its recent price rise that it will increase the value of
its Spreading Warmth rebate, but by the same token British Gas has recently announced it will oVer a new
£90 rebate to c.25k customers).
The report considers what the world would look like if underperforming suppliers met this benchmark
and forecasts that it would result in an additional commitment of between £3 million and £3.68 million
depending on the measure used. It also forecasts that if the other ﬁve suppliers matched British Gas in
oVering assistance to 4.67% of their customer base this could result in a doubling of the number of accounts
(not households) eligible for social tariVs—from the current combined target of 930k to 2.29 million. If all
suppliers at least match the May 2007 average the number would increase to 1.37 million accounts
(energywatch estimate that 4 million fuel poor households translates as 6.4 million energy accounts, taking
account of an estimate of the number of fuel poor without access to gas).
APPENDIX 4
ENERGYWATCH BRIEFING ON SOCIAL TARIFFS
JANUARY 2008
Context
The accelerating cost of energy since 2003 means that social tariVs have an urgent and essential role to
play in helping address the impact of high prices on low-income households. Price rises are solely responsible
for the reversal of progress towards the Government’s fuel poverty targets. The limitations and disparities
of the current approach to providing social tariVs—reliant on pressuring suppliers to develop products
voluntarily, as part of their corporate social responsibility activity—are now clear and the government must
use the Energy Bill to require suppliers to oVer social tariVs in accordance with minimum standards.
Social Tariffs would Bolster the UK Fuel Poverty Strategy
The government’s 2001 UK Fuel Poverty Strategy was built on three pillars, each of which sought to
address the three factors that conspire to cause fuel poverty: energy ineYcient homes with sub-optimal
heating systems, the low level of income on which the fuel poor subside, and the cost of energy to fuel poor
consumers. The pillar reliant on “continuing action to maintain the downward pressure on fuel bills”123 has
long since crumbled. As Malcolm Wicks felt it reasonable to predict in 2007: “the era of cheap energy has
gone for ever”.124
Price increases have outstripped income growth and outpaced the rate at which energy eYciency and
heating improvements can be installed. The net eVect has been an increase in fuel poverty, with the 2007
EnergyWhite Paper observing that UK fuel poverty was back at the 4 million household mark—double the
2004 ﬁgure and a return to pre-Strategy levels.
The Problem(s) with a Voluntary Approach to Social Tariff Provision
The lack of any framework or guiding principles onwhat constitutes ameaningful social tariV has resulted
in a situation where, despite reference to “social tariVs” becoming a staple in the narrative of stakeholders,
suppliers have been free to appropriate the term as they see ﬁt and apply it to a divergent range of tariV
oVers. Research has shown that a number of currently available products see recipients of “social tariVs”
actually paying more than the openmarket tariVs available to other, more aZuent consumers with the same
supplier in most cases.
energywatch is concerned that the status quo is riddled with inconsistency: inconsistency in the nature of
assistance oVered, inconsistency in the level and quality of assistance oVered, inconsistency in entitlement,
and inconsistency in the length of time for which the product is available to recipients.
123 The UK Fuel Poverty Strategy, November 2001:
http://www.dti.gov.uk/energy/fuel-poverty/strategy/index.html
124 Malcolm Wicks, Hansard, 23 January 2007, column 399WH.
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Concerns of this nature are not limited to the “fuel poverty lobby”—both EDFE, British Gas and RWE
npower have expressed similar views:
British Gas will review its Essentials tariV model in March 2009. In the meantime it will be seeking
agreement with other suppliers and stakeholders for industry-wide introduction of social tariVs to
broadly common standards which would allow social tariV customers the same choice in the market
as other customers.
British Gas press release, 08.02.07
There should be a common industry approach to oVering assistance to the fuel poor. This would bring
beneﬁts such as clarity to consumers, particularly vulnerable ones, and also to those assessing the
eVectiveness of social programmes. In addition, it would create a level playing ﬁeld which all suppliers
would compete equally within this market segment.
We believe that after establishing the agreed deﬁnition, scale and structure, all suppliers should be
required to participate in the scheme. Having led the industry in oVering a social tariV we are
disappointed that all industry colleagues have not followed suit, indicating that the competitive market
needs adjusting.
Levels of beneﬁt available, and eligibility for beneﬁts should be deﬁned by Government.
EDFE response to energywatch social tariV consultation, January 2007
At present, government is encouraging the delivery of a social action solution within a voluntary
framework. It is doubtful whether this is the most eYcient approach and it is also seemingly
inconsistent with a market framework. We believe that the interest of the fuel poor is best served by
a mandatory social tariV and this is the only means by which the Government’s 2010 and 2016
objectives can be achieved. There is no obvious reason why these targets will be delivered within a
competitive retail market.
RWE npower response to Ofgem’s Five Year Strategy, September 2007
The Energy White Paper and Ofgem’s Review of Suppliers’ Initiatives
The Energy White Paper125 noted the commitment that certain suppliers had demonstrated in relation to
assisting their fuel poor consumers. Signiﬁcantly, it also challenged suppliers who had done little in this
respect to develop adequate programmes of support, with the implication being that if this did not happen,
legislation could be used to ensure all suppliers oVered adequate programmes of support. This challenge has
been eVective in driving diVering degrees of improvement from suppliers (most notably ScottishPower’s U-
turn on social tariVs). The White Paper also tasked Ofgem with evaluating and comparing suppliers’
voluntary measures.
The subsequent Ofgem review declined to rank the quality of suppliers’ initiatives, to declare which
suppliers are oVering proportional assistance, to highlight best practice, or to examine the eVectiveness of
each initiative. Also, despite the intention expressed in the EnergyWhite Paper—that Ofgemwould evaluate
each company’s Corporate Social Responsibility measures to see exactly how these compare, drawing attention
to the most eVective initiatives and highlighting where improvements are needed—the Regulator has neither
drawn attention to the most eVective initiatives nor highlighted where improvements are needed. This lack
of diVerentiation has granted it the space to underplay the gulf in performance and in so doing present the
voluntary approach as an eVective response.
Ofgem’s review also advocated competition as the best way to ensure fuel-poor consumers are protected
from high prices. Interestingly, the Sustainable Development Commission’s recent report (Lost in
Transmission—The role of Ofgem in a changing climate) concluded that switching supplier “is not a
particularly helpful or appropriate method of reducing low-income household fuel bills and that more proactive
steps need to be taken to protect low income and vulnerable consumers”. The barriers to this consumer segment
switching—frequently lack of access to direct debit and the internet—are well established.
Reliance on the voluntary approach also carries an inherent risk of “backsliding”, either where suppliers
renege completely on commitments—especially if rising wholesale prices put the bite on voluntary
initiatives; or where the best scale back their activities, causing a levelling down rather than the desired
levelling up.
The frustrations voiced by BritishGas and EDFE, both of whom have declared they will review their own
activities, the disparities in supplier commitment highlighted by energywatch’s own work, and that the
status quo hands a competitive advantage to those who do least, all point to a strong likelihood of
backsliding unless the government intervene to level up the performance of those suppliers who do least.
125 Energy White Paper 2007, paragraph 2.1.21.
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The energywatch View (and Review)
Because Ofgem’s review failed to bring the disparities between supplier performance and the resultant
lack of proportionality to the fore, energywatch commissioned Cornwall Energy Associates to examine the
adequacy of each supplier’s social tariVs andwhether thesewere proportional when compared to each other.
This review was undertaken in line with the methodology that BERR is likely to use. The Cornwall report
exposes the pronounced gulf between what suppliers are committed to oVering meaningful assistance and
reinforces the case for the Secretary of State taking powers in the Energy Bill.
This report has shown that if energy suppliers fulﬁl the commitments made to government, the industry
will invest 0.25% of its estimated turnover in social tariVs and rebates—the initiatives that oVer direct
assistance with the cost of energy to fuel poor households. For individual suppliers this ranges from British
Gas committing 0.49% of its turnover to a mere 0.079% of turnover for npower and Scottish & Southern
Energy. British Gas is committed to making assistance available to 4.7% of its consumer base, while for
npower and Scottish & Southern this ﬁgure is 0.79% and 0.34% respectively. The commitments made by
British Gas will equate to 71% of the total industry assistance oVered, while its market share represents just
33%; whereas npower has an 11%market share but has a social package commitment that will represent 4%
of the total.
BERR has indicated that its own assessment will examine whether suppliers’ social package are at or
above the average in May 2007 when the White Paper was published. Energywatch’s ﬁndings are that
npower and Scottish& Southern (who oVer a generous social tariV, but on a very limited scale) remain below
even this level. If all suppliers met at least this average, social tariVs and rebates would be available to the
equivalent of 1 in 5 fuel poor accounts. If suppliers matched the commitment shown by British Gas this
ﬁgure would rise to 1 in 3.
A copy of the full analysis is available at:
www.energywatch.org.uk/uploads/Proportionality o suppliers social tariVs 13 January—2008.pdf
energywatch Recommendations: Minimum Standards for Maximum Impact
energywatch advocates that the Secretary of State takes powers in the Energy Bill that will enable him to
require suppliers to oVer social tariVs in accordance with minimum standards. This will preserve the
momentum created by the Energy White Paper challenge and even out the divergence in suppliers’
commitments. Social tariVs represent the clearest way of addressing the Fuel Poverty Strategy’s failure in
relation to pressure on prices and, if mandatory, will ensure that all suppliers make aVordable energy
available to a signiﬁcant number of those consumers for whom the high cost of energy has presented the
greatest challenge.
Valid concerns exist over whether social tariVs can be accurately targeted and the extent to which they
would distort the market. The accurate targeting of any non-universal welfare mechanism is diYcult, but
that does not mean it is impossible. As the more progressive energy suppliers are demonstrating, there are
ways and means of identifying and reaching households in most need. The White Paper’s commitment to
facilitate data sharing with the DWP will undoubtedly reﬁne this process further.
In relation to market distortion, if the social tariV is indexed at a set rate against each supplier’s open
market rates (Scottish& SouthernEnergy’s 20%against the recipient’s existing tariV, for example) andmade
available on a scale that is relative to a supplier’s market share this should not be an issue as the obligation
will fall fairly across all suppliers and reﬂect their overall competitive position.
The social tariV model that energywatch has recommended would be built on, but not limited by,
minimum standards. Our proposals go with the grain of competition rather than work against it, with the
use of targets on suppliers forcing them to compete for a group of consumers that have hitherto been largely
excluded from the market. Targets would also ensure that no supplier is unduly disadvantaged by such an
obligation.
Social tariVs oVered in isolation will not eradicate fuel poverty and neither should they be expected to do
so. That is why the proposals put forth by energywatch would see social tariVs form an integral part of an
Energy Assistance Package, with the package creating the vehicle for ensuring that the three underlying
causes of fuel poverty are tackled.
A full copy of the energywatch report and recommendations on social tariVs—A Social Responsibility?—
is available at:
http://www.energywatch.org.uk/uploads/A Social Responsibility the energywatch consultation on
the nature of social tariVs in the energy market report and recommendations 9 May 20071.pdf
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Annex B
MARKET SHARES AND CONCENTRATION
Not printed here.
Annex C
LESSONS FROM CC INVESTIGATIONS AND CASE LAW
Purpose
This annex considers:
— the ﬁndings of two key merger control judgements by the Court of First Instance relating to
collective dominance;
— the CC’s investigations of coordinated eVects and consumer detriment; and
— the application of these cases and investigations to the GB energy markets.
Case Law Analysis of Collective Dominance
The Airtours v Commission judgement identiﬁed three conditions necessary to establish collective
dominance (see paragraph 62):
— Knowledge of others adopting the common strategy: Each member of the dominant oligopoly must
have the ability to know how the other members are behaving in order to monitor whether or not
they are adopting a common policy. It is not enough for each member of the dominant oligopoly
to be aware that interdependent market conduct is proﬁtable for all of them but eachmembermust
also have a means of knowing whether the other operators are adopting the same strategy and
whether they are maintaining it. There must be suYcient market transparency for all members of
the dominant oligopoly to be aware, suYciently precisely and quickly, of the way in which the
other members’ market conduct is evolving.
— Incentive to maintain the common strategy: The situation of tacit coordination must be sustainable
over time. There must be an incentive not to depart from the common policy on the market. It is
only if all themembers of the dominant oligopolymaintain the parallel conduct that all can beneﬁt.
For a situation of collective dominance to be viable, there must be adequate deterrents to ensure
that there is a long term incentive in not departing from the common policy. Each member of the
dominant oligopoly must be aware that highly competitive action on its part designed to increase
its market share would provoke identical action by others, so that it would derive no beneﬁt from
its initiative.
— Inability of competitors to jeopardise the outcome of the common strategy: The foreseeable reaction
of current and future competitors, as well as of consumers, will not jeopardise the results from the
common policy.
The Impala v Commission (Case T-464/04) judgement appears to lower the test for proving collective
dominance (see paragraphs 251 and 252) by stating that:
— Collective dominance may be established indirectly: In certain circumstances, collective dominance
may be established indirectly on the basis of what may be a very mixed series of indicia and items
of evidence relating to the signs, manifestations and phenomena inherent in the presence of a
collective dominant position.
— Collective dominance may be demonstrated through pricing data: Close alignment of prices over a
long period, especially if they are above a competitive level, together with other factors typical of
a collective dominant position might, in the absence of alternative reasonable explanation suYce
to demonstrate the existence of a collective dominant position, even where there is no ﬁrm direct
evidence of strong market transparency, as such transparency may be presumed in such
circumstances.
Market Investigation Information Gathering
The Competition Commission procedures126 highlight that information gathering, analysis and
validation is a key part of the investigation. The CC requires access to detailed information regarding the
companies and markets in question to make its statutory decisions on the competition and remedies
questions. The CC collects information in a variety of ways including:
— Letters and questionnaires to the main parties in an investigation and sometime to third parties.
— Press notices, advertisements and website requesting information.
126 Competition Commission procedures
http://www.competition-commission.org.uk/our role/how investigate/procedures.htm<information
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— Publicly available sources of information.
— Surveys can be commissioned to provide evidence about a particular market.
— Visits to the main parties to gain a ﬁrst-hand experience of the workings of the company and
industry in question.
— Commissioning of expert advice.
— Hearings with the parties.
Market Investigation Analysis of Coordinated Effects
The Competition Commission provisional ﬁndings report on the supply of groceries in the UK considers
the three conditions necessary for coordinated eVects to emerge and be sustainable (see paragraph 33 and
Section 7 of the provisional ﬁndings and paragraphs 3.53 to 3.73 of the Competition Commission guidelines
on market investigation references):
— Awareness of competitors’ behaviour: The market is suYciently concentrated for ﬁrms to be aware
of the behaviour of their competitors, and for any signiﬁcant deviation from the prevailing
behaviour of a ﬁrm to be observed by other ﬁrms in the market. Where prices are transparent any
deviation from the prevailing behaviour will be clear.
— Costly to deviate from prevailing market behaviour: It must be clear that the consequences of
deviating from the prevailing market behaviour would be costly and the threat of future price cuts
provides a punishment mechanism for a “cheating” ﬁrm. It will be in a ﬁrm’s interest to go along
with the prevailing market behaviour rather than seek to deviate from it. In many cases, the mere
fact of the interdependence and hence strong likelihood of a matching price cut may be enough to
create a disincentive.
— Weak competitive constraints: The competitive constraints resulting from the actions of non-
coordinating ﬁrms are weak and would not jeopardize the expected outcome of coordination. A
low barrier to entry, a strong competitive fringe and countervailing buyer power might all serve
to disrupt coordinated behaviour. The extent to which fringe ﬁrms act as a competitive constraint
will in part depend on the number and size of fringe companies, their cost and proﬁt margin and
their scope to expand output in relation to their current level and the output of the core oligipolists.
With respect to possible coordination strategies, the Competition Commission noted in its provisional
ﬁndings that (Section 7):
— Coordination is more likely to emerge if competitors have similar views of what actions would
make coordination work: for example, setting prices around a focal point.
— Retailers could, in principle, seek to coordinate on large numbers of the products.
— In practice, coordinated action over a vast number of prices would be diYcult to achieve.
— A coordination strategy that might potentially be easier to implement would be to focus
coordination on a subset of products.
With reference to the supply of groceries in the UK, the Competition Commission notes that (see
paragraph 34 to 37 and Section 8):
— There is evidence that suppliers facilitate the exchange of information on retail prices charged by
rival retailers. Given the presence of the necessary conditions for co-ordination in grocery
retailing, we consider that this exchange of information on retail prices would assist retailers in
establishing terms of tacit coordination on a small number of products.
— There is a trend of consolidation among upstream intermediaries in milk and other sectors,
particularly in fresh produce. Further consolidation may be a cause for concern if it means that
coordination is more likely to emerge in other product categories.
— While there is no direct evidence of tacit coordination at present, we are concerned that, given the
structure of the grocery retailing market, such behaviour could occur in the future.
The Competition Commission provisionally found that a combination of one or more features prevent,
restrict or distort competition in certain local markets for the supply of groceries (see paragraphs 47 to 49
and Sections 5, 6 and 9):
— A signiﬁcant number of local markets have high levels of concentration and these high levels of
concentration have persisted over a number of years.
— The control of land in highly-concentrated local markets by incumbent retailers acts as a barrier
to entry, by limiting entrants’ access to potential sites for new stores.
The Competition Commission also found (see paragraph 50 and Section 9) that the exercise of buyer
power by certain grocery retailers and symbol groups with respect to their suppliers of groceries, through
the adoption of supply chain practices that transfer excessive risks and unexpected costs to those suppliers, is
a feature of the markets for the supply of groceries by all grocery stores, which prevents, restricts or distorts
competition in connection with the acquisition of groceries by those grocery retailers and symbol groups.
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Application to the GB energy markets
Table 1 considers whether the conditions necessary for facilitating coordinated eVects may be present in
the GB energy market with particular reference to the domestic gas and electricity retail markets.
Table 1
HIGH LEVEL COORDINATED EFFECTS ANALYSIS
Condition Analysis
Awareness of — Firms are well aware of their competitors’ behaviour.
competitors’ — Products essentially homogenous and there is a high level of interaction.
behaviour — The domestic gas and electricity retail markets are highly concentrated
with six ﬁrms supplying more than 99% of the market.
— Supply licence condition 22.7 states “If a person requests a copy of any
form of Domestic Supply Contract that the licensee may oVer under
paragraph 22.2, the licensee must send a copy of that form of contract to
that person within a reasonable period of time after receiving the request”.
Supply licence condition 22.4(b)(i) requires a Domestic Supply Contract to
identify the charge for the supply of gas or electricity and the charge for
any other good or service to be provided.
— There are a number of price comparison services that allow users to
compare prices across suppliers quickly and easily. There are also a
number of ﬁrms that provide pricing databases and analysis.
— Suppliers issue press releases announcing changes in prices and there is
considerable media coverage concerning price.
Costly to deviate — Suppliers are aware that it is in their interests to act in a similar way.
from prevailing — Five of the main six suppliers increased their prices in January or February
market behaviour 2008. Headline price increases for domestic consumers ranged from 12.9 to
17.2% for gas and 7.9% to 15% for electricity. The remaining supplier
increased its prices in April 2008 by up to 15.8% for gas and 14.2% for
electricity. Charts 1 and 2 show movements in gas and electricity prices
across the last ﬁve years.
— Price diVerentials vary across tariVs. There is a £13 annual diVerence in the
dual fuel direct debit oVering of ﬁve of the main six suppliers—this is
equivalent to 25p per week. There is only a £26 annual diVerence across the
six suppliers equivalent to 50p a week.
— Energy prices can change quickly so that suppliers not complying with
prevailing market behaviour can be punished.
Weak competitive — No scale new entry—entrants control less than 1% of the domestic supply
constraints market.
— The domestic gas and electricity markets have been characterised by
supplier exit rather than entry so entry does not provide competitive
constraint.
— Suppliers appear to be seeking to move together within a short period of
time of each other and in parallel. This is a kind of “risk minimisation
strategy” where they do not seek to be particularly better or worse than
their competitors.
— There does not appear to be any strong competitive constraint that impacts
the strategy adopted by the dominant six suppliers.
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Chart 1
CUMULATIVE INCREASES IN DOMESTIC GAS PRICES 2003 TO 2008
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Source: energywatch analysis of suppliers headline price increases as reported in the press
Chart 2
CUMULATIVE INCREASES IN DOMESTIC ELECTRICITY PRICES 2003 TO 2008
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energywatch considers that the conditions necessary for coordinated eVects to emerge and be sustainable
are present in the domestic gas and electricity supply market. This means the market is susceptible to abuse
of dominance and consumers will pay more than the competitive level for their energy. The CC would be
able to undertake a more detailed analysis of coordinated eVects in the domestic supply and wider GB
energy market as part of a market investigation.
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Market Investigation Analysis of Consumer Detriment
Excessive prices
In Store Cards the OFT referred the supply of store card services to the Competition Commission
following its conclusion that there are features of the sector, both in the supply of store card credit to
consumers and in the supply of store card services to retailers, that appear to prevent, restrict or distort
competition.127 In paragraph 1.13 of its report the OFT stated that “there is insuYcient competition to ensure
that consumers get good value from store cards and that such lack of competition may lead to increased proﬁts
for retailers and store card providers”.128 For the OFT then, the possible harm to consumers resulting from
the perceived lack of competition in this sector revolved around the concept of value for money. The idea
of “good value” brings to mind the deﬁnition of an “unfair price” in the case United Brands Co. v
Commission; it concerns a price that is “excessive in relation to the economic value of the product
supplied”.129 In other words, the OFT formulated the possible consumer detriment in this sector in terms
of unfair or excessive prices for consumers.130 In its investigation the Competition Commission tried to
quantify this consumer detriment by comparing the prices actually paid by cardholders who pay interest
and insurance charges on store cardswith the prices theywould have paid had these reﬂected costs, including
the cost of capital.131
Subsequent market investigation references submitted to the Competition Commission have also
concerned the impact of (weak) competition on prices paid by consumers; see for example Supply of
Liqueﬁed PetroleumGas132 or Northern Ireland Banking.133 In the former case the OFT suspected that “the
high switching costs [between diVerent gas companies in the market for the supply of domestic bulk liqueﬁed
petroleum gas] may form a barrier to entry, so that competition is restricted and many consumers face higher
prices overall than they would in a similar market without switching costs”.134 In the latter case, the OFT held
that the conditions for a referral were met as high levels of concentration, signiﬁcant entry barriers, price
parallelism and consumer inertia appear together to result in limited price competition and weak switching
competition between the big four banks in Northern Ireland.135 Both investigations are ongoing.
In HomeCollected Credit136 the Competition Commission actually attempted to quantify the overcharge
suVered by customers in the relevant market; according to the CC customers suVered from “substantial
overcharging”:
[overcharging] may have amounted to as much as £100 million a year over the last ﬁve years across
the whole market, which would imply that a home credit customer pays over £25 too much for an
average loan, or £9 per £100 borrowed, and that home credit lenders have been able to earn more than
£500 million in proﬁts in excess of the cost of capital in the last ﬁve years.137
This case thus highlights that the Competition Commission: (i) considers overcharging as a form of
consumer detriment; and (ii) is willing to quantify the extent of the overcharge when possible. Home
Collected Credit also demonstrates that the CC will consider the eVects of weak competition on particular
categories of consumers as well as consumers in general. Indeed, on the facts before it the Competition
Commission expressed its belief that the overcharge may have more of an eVect on single mothers under 35:
Home credit customers were more likely than the population as a whole to be female, to be under 35,
to have young families, to fall into socio-economic groups D and E, to live in a low-income household
and to live in housing rented from a local council or housing association.138
127 Store Cards, OFT Reference to the Competition Commission, 18 March 2004.
128 Emphasis added.
129 United Brands Co. v Commission [1978] 1 CMLR 429, at paragraph 235.
130 At paragraph 6.1 of the reference, the OFT underlined its suspicions that excess prices were being paid by some consumers
for certain store cards: “the provision of store card credit may not be working well for consumers. It is possible . . . that the
diVerence between the interest charged on store cards and other credit cards is not fully explained by the oVsetting beneﬁts
and the diVerences in the cost of providing these services”.
131 See Paragraph 1 of Annex 9.1 of the Competition Commission Report, available at:
http://www.competition-commission.org.uk/rep pub/reports/2006/509storecards.htm
132 Supply of Liqueﬁed Petroleum Gas, Market Investigation Reference, 5 July 2004.
133 Northern Ireland Banking, Market Investigation Reference, 26 May 2005. See also: Home Collected Credit, Market
Investigation Reference, 20 December 2004.
134 At paragraph 3 of the OFT Reference (emphasis added).
135 See paragraph 75 of the OFT Report.
136 Home Collected Credit, Market Investigation Reference, 20 December 2004.
137 Ibid, Competition Commission News Release, 27 April 2006, available at:
http://www.competition-commission.org.uk/inquiries/current/homecredit/index.htm,
at p 1. It should be noted that these ﬁndings are only provisional and that the Competition Commission intends to discuss
them further with home credit companies before making its ﬁnal conclusions on the matter: ibid.
138 Ibid at p 2.
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Non-price factors
In Home Collected Credit signalled how the Competition Commission will also consider diVerent forms
of consumer detriment where relevant:
We shall determine whether any eVect on advertisers or users [ie consumers] in the form of higher
prices, lower quality or less choice of goods and services, or less innovation has resulted from, or may
be expected to result from, any adverse eVects on competition in the relevant market or markets.139
Indeed, if the Competition Commission decides that there is an adverse eVect on competition it must
“take action to ‘remedy, mitigate or prevent’ the adverse eVect on competition and to ‘remedy, mitigate or
prevent any detrimental eVects on customers’ so far as those eVects have resulted from the adverse eVect”.140
By deﬁnition “any detrimental eVects” must also include those detrimental eVects which cannot be classed
solely as eVects on the prices paid by consumers.
In the provisional ﬁndings on the supply of groceries investigation, the Competition Commission
recommends a number of competition policy solutions, including the introduction of a “competition test”
when local planning authorities are assessing planning applications for new large grocery stores, and A
requirement on grocery retailers to lift existing exclusivity arrangements that have been in place for more
than ﬁve years, where these have been identiﬁed as a barrier to entry by a competing retailer in areas of
high concentration. In addition, however, the Competition Commission has recommended remedies that
go beyond what competition law itself could do: namely that the Department for Business, Enterprise and
RegulatoryReform amend the LandAgreements ExclusionOrder so that agreements which restrict grocery
retailing should no longer beneﬁt from exclusion from the Competition Act.141
Application to the GB energy markets
energywatch considers some of the key features that led the OFT to make recent market investigations
references to the CC are also evident in the GB energy market. Table 2 provides a high level analysis of
these features and some of the areas of consumer detriment that the CC has considered in recent market
investigations. energywatch believes that these issues need further investigation along with a quantiﬁcation
of the associated consumer detriment as part of a GB energy market investigation by the CC. Although
energywatch has only limited information gathering powers, the CC would be able to demand access to the
all the relevant commercially sensitive and conﬁdential information held by market participants.
Table 2
HIGH LEVEL ANALYSIS OF CONSUMER DETRIMENT
Feature Analysis
Unfair or excessive — Prepayment meter consumers can pay up to £456 for their energy than a
pricing consumer paying by online direct debit. Ofgem has estimated that the
additional cost to serve a prepayment meter is estimated to be no more
than £85 although this was based on limited information. It is not clear
that this estimate is based on eYciently incurred costs ie costs will be
higher where is no incentive on the ﬁrm to become more eYcient if it is
conﬁdent that it will be able to recoup the cost from a captive consumer.
— Firms reference increases in wholesale prices linked to the forward curve
when increases retail prices. Forward prices are not a robust indicator of
future costs as they are based on limited trading activity and the level of
vertical integration means that the dominant ﬁrms are not exposed to these
prices for signiﬁcant volumes. There is no transparency of transfer prices.
High switching costs — Small business consumers face signiﬁcant search and switching costs due to
the application of complex contractual arrangements by suppliers, a lack
of clarity on terms and conditions and a lack of comparative price and
service information.
— Survey evidence demonstrates that domestic consumers also face high
switching costs—amongst electricity consumers who had switched
suppliers exclusively for price reasons only up to a ﬁfth had switched to the
supplier oVering the greatest saving and up to one third had switched to
deal that had left them worse oV.
139 Classiﬁed Directory Advertising Services, Market Investigation Reference, 5 April 2005, Competition Commission, Issues
Statement, Paragraph 17 (emphasis added).
140 Northern Ireland Banking, Market Investigation Reference, 26 May 2005, at paragraph 83 of the OFT Report (emphasis
added). See also Section 138 of the Enterprise Act 2002.
141 Competition Commission, Provisional Decision on Remedies.
http://www.competition-commission.org.uk/inquiries/ref2006/grocery/provisional decision remedies.htm
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Feature Analysis
Consumer inertia — Survey evidence found that 55% of domestic consumers are “very unlikely”
to change their gas or electricity suppliers in the near future and that 14%
consumers stated they would never switch.
High level of — 6 ﬁrms control over 99% of the domestic gas and electricity markets and
concentration 95% of the business electricity market.
— The combined gas and electricity domestic supply markets have a national
HHI of nearly 2,000. The national domestic gas market has an HHI of
2,800 and the regional electricity markets are estimated to have HHIs of
2,500 to 6,500.
Signiﬁcant barriers — There has been no new scale entry to the GB energy markets.
to entry — Entrants advise that there are high barriers to entry including lack of
liquidity in the wholesale markets, dominance of vertically integrated
players, lack of independent counterparties to trade with, information
asymmetry, credit policies of the dominant ﬁrms, complex industry codes
and cash-out arrangements.
Price parallelism — Suppliers tend to change prices within similar ranges and timeframes.
Charts 1 and 2 show how headline prices have changed across the last ﬁve
years.
— Conditions for coordinated eVects to emerge and be sustainable through
time are present in the domestic supply markets.
Annex D
TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR A CC MARKET INVESTIGATION
Purpose
This annex:
— considers the four criteria the OFT considers need to be met before deciding to make a reference
to the Competition Commission; and
— sets out possible terms of reference for a GB energy market referral to the CC.
Appropriateness of a Reference
To make a CC reference there must be “reasonable grounds for suspecting that any feature, or
combination of features, of a market in the UK for goods or services prevents, restricts or distorts
competition in connection with the supply or acquisition of any goods or services in the UK or part of the
UK” (Sections 131 or 132 of the Enterprise Act 2002). Where this threshold is met, the OFT (or the relevant
sectoral regulator) has discretion as to whether to make a reference or not.
The OFT has set out four additional criteria that would normally have to be met before it would decide
to make a reference142:
— proportionality—the scale of the suspected problem, in terms of its adverse eVect on competition,
is such that a reference would be an appropriate response to it;
— availability of remedies—there is a reasonable chance that appropriate remedies will be available;
— alternative powers—it would be more appropriate to deal with Competition issues identiﬁed by
applying the Competition Act 1998 or using other powers available to the OFT; and
— undertakings in lieu—it would not bemore appropriate to address the problem identiﬁed bymeans
of undertakings in lieu of a reference.
These four factors are considered below in relation to a GB energy market referral.
Proportionality
energywatch recognises that a reference to the CC would impose a substantial burden on the businesses
aVected, particularly in terms or management time, and have considerable recourse implications for the CC
itself. However, energy is a necessity product for domestic and business consumers and represents around
3.5% of expenditure for the average household and more than 10% of income for the fuel poor—for some
142 OFT, Market investigation references: Guidance about the making of references under Part 4 of the Enterprise Act (OFT
511), March 2006.
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fuel poor households the cost of warmth can rise to 20, 30 or even 40% of income. The energy sector
represents about 4% of UK GDP but is a required input to the other 96%. The beneﬁts of remedying any
adverse eVects which might be found to exist in the GB energy markets would, therefore, be expected to
outweigh these costs.
Availability of remedies
energywatch believes there is a reasonable chance that appropriate remedies will be available. Some
possible remedies are considered in Annex E.
The CC has a wide range of discretion and the necessary powers to adopt a wide range of measures
designed to remedy identiﬁed defects in the market. The CC can:
— Make a signiﬁcant and direct change to the structure of a market (eg through divestment and
unbundling).
— Change the structure of the market indirectly (eg through reducing barriers to entry or search and
switching costs).
— Direct ﬁrms to discontinue certain behaviour (eg giving adequate notice of price changes and the
timeframe in which a change of supplier can be made) or to adopt certain behaviour (eg more
prominently displaying prices and other terms and conditions of sale).
— Restrain the way in which ﬁrms would otherwise behave (eg the imposition of a price cap).
— Monitor (eg requirement to provide the regulator with information on prices or proﬁts).
Alternative powers
Competition law is more usually applied to vertical agreements that restrain competition rather than
integrated ﬁrms. Concerns about ﬁrm conduct relate to the process of competition between ﬁrms across GB
as a whole and are not merely isolated local matters.
Undertakings in lieu
energywatch is not aware of speciﬁc undertakings that would remove the need for a market investigation
reference.
energywatch considers that a market investigation reference would be the most appropriate route for
addressing the concerns raised about the features of the GB energy market that appear to be preventing,
restricting or distorting competition in the market.
Terms of Reference
The Secretary of State for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, in exercise of his powers under
Section 132 of the Enterprise Act 2002, hereby makes a reference to the Competition Commission for an
investigation into the supply of gas and electricity in Great Britain (GB).
The Secretary of State has reasonable grounds for suspecting that a feature or a combination of features
of the GB energy market or markets prevents, restricts or distorts competition in the supply of gas and
electricity in GB.
For the purpose of this reference the expression “GB energy market”:
— Includes the wholesale and retail markets for gas and electricity in GB.
— Excludes the gas and electricity networks in GB.
Issues
The key issues for consideration in a GB energy market investigation appear to be:
Market structure
— How the level of concentration has changed over the past few years and how it might be expected
to change in the future.
— Whether the level of concentration has an eVect on the conduct of some or all of the ﬁrms in the
GB energy markets.
— Whether the level of concentration might be indicative of any features of the market that might
prevent, distort of restrict competition.
— Whether horizontal concentrations, vertical integration or contracting strategies has reduced
competition or created ineYciencies.
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Barriers to entry
— What new entry has there been over the past few years and what can be expected in the future.
— What were the key reasons for ﬁrms exiting the market over the past few years and what can be
expected in the future.
— What the barriers are to new entry and expansion.
— Whether incumbent ﬁrms beneﬁt from economies of scale or scope and information asymmetries.
Conduct
— Whether ﬁrms compete fairly and vigorously.
— Whether movements in price are consistent with eVective competition.
— Whether ﬁrms compete on price and whether other aspects such as service and quality are also
important.
— Whether there is any variation between regions in how products are oVered or promoted or in the
application of charges and whether any variation might be due to the extent of local competition.
— Whether service quality as measured by customer satisfaction, mistakes, complaints or adherence
to industry codes and redress schemes is at a level consistent with active competition.
— Whether there is a lack of innovation or choice.
— Whether there is suYcient transparency or gaps in information ﬂows.
— Whether there are conditions present that facilitate coordinated eVects.
Remedies
The CC can determine what action should be taken to remedy, mitigate or prevent adverse eVects on
competition or any detrimental eVect on consumers. Consideration may be given to:
— Mandatory trading.
— Enhanced reporting and disclosure requirements to aid price discovery.
— Simplifying market rules and entry requirements.
— Greater transparency of information on gas ﬂows.
— Investment incentives for long term strategic storage.
— Reducing search and switching costs.
— Regular market monitoring of the business sector.
— Reintroduction of supply price controls for certain consumer groups if other measures are
considered insuYcient.
— Divestment of plant or function if other measures are considered insuYcient.
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Supplementary evidence submitted by Energywatch
WHY THE BRITISH MARKETS IN GAS AND ELECTRICITY REQUIRE A
COMPETITION INVESTIGATION
AN ENERGYWATCH DISCUSSION PAPER
1. Introduction
1.1 Purpose
Exactly a year ago energywatch set out some thoughts in a discussion paper How energy markets are
failing consumers.143 The paper followed analysis of aspects of the domestic energy markets in Great Britain
(GB) that we thought were acting against the interests of consumers. At that time the concerns centred
mainly on whether markets were competitive enough for the fall in wholesale prices being seen then to be
passed through to consumers and so alleviate rising fuel poverty and declining industrial competitiveness.
A dominating theme of the paper was the energywatch view—which we continue to hold—that many of
the problems acknowledged by regulators with regard to the development of competitive gas and electricity
markets on mainland Europe are shared by our domestic markets.
Energywatch is pleased that the earlier paper stimulated discussion that has led to an increase in political
awareness of the dysfunctionality of energy markets and the problems faced by British consumers.
Now 12 months on the position the industry ﬁnds itself in has changed, and the concerns are diVerent
against a background of prices that are once again rising.Mostmajor suppliers, in contrast to last year when
price reductions were slow to be announced and slower to be implemented, have moved extremely quickly
since the turn of 2008 to levy and implement increases in their household prices. But although the
circumstances and symptoms diVer, the underlying malady is the same—our energy markets are not
properly competitive and are continuing to fail consumers.
Energywatch believes British policy makers and regulators urgently need to focus on these deﬁciencies.
We welcome the decision of the Business & Enterprise Select Committee in February 2008 to investigate key
aspects of market design and industry competitiveness. Ofgem has also announced that it is to investigate
the retail markets under its Enterprise Act 2002 powers, although disappointingly it has already said in
advance of its investigation it does not consider there to be evidence of abuse.
1.2 Structure
This second discussion paper addresses the issue of how the markets are working in 2008. It starts by
setting out in chapter 2 a summary of pricing developments in the sector over the past ﬁve years or so, a
period which has seen vigorous cycling of fuel and energy prices, and it looks at the eVect on the bills paid
by both household and business consumers. It then sets out the key arguments in support of Energywatch’s
case that current markets for electricity and gas embody now (as they did a year ago):
“a feature or combination of features of a market in the UK for goods or services [which] is, or
appears to be, signiﬁcantly harming the interests of consumers’ (Enterprise Act 2002)”.
The basis for making a Competition Commission referral (Section 131/132 of the 2002 Act) is where the
enterprise secretary or sectoral regulator (in this case the Gas and Electricity Markets Authority, usually
referred to as Ofgem) has “reasonable grounds for suspecting any feature or combination of features
prevents, restricts or distorts competition”. The commission then determines whether a feature or a
combination of features, structural or conduct, of the GB energy markets has any adverse eVects on
competition (AEC) and decide whether action can be taken to address the AEC or any detrimental eVect
on consumers. Section 134(5) explains that detrimental eVect on consumers means higher price, lower
quality, less choice or less innovation.
The paper is then structured around the main issues raised in the Business & Enterprise Select
Committee’s terms of reference but reordered and grouped. They are:
— whether there is eVective competition in the wholesale markets for gas and electricity (chapter 3);
— the relationship between wholesale and retail markets and the implications of growing
consolidation in the energy market (chapter 4);
— whether the current market structure encourages eVective competition in the retail markets for gas
and electricity (chapter 5);
— the eVectiveness of regulatory oversight undertaken by Ofgem (chapter 6).144
The paper concludes with recommendations, set out in chapter 7, addressing:
143 First Energywatch brochure 2007.
144 The terms of reference also include the status of fuel poverty. A separate discussion paper will address the deteriorating
position with regard to this.
Ev 306 Business and Enterprise Committee: Evidence
— the scope of issues we think the committee should address and require referral to the Competition
Commission; and
— energywatch’s options and proposals for rectiﬁcation of the deﬁciencies we have identiﬁed.
energywatch believes there is a clear evidential basis to substantiate allegations that the gas and electricity
markets are not functioning as intended and that consumers are suVering as a consequence. We maintain
that a referral to the Competition Commission is necessary. We urge the select committee to endorse this
course of action and invite the enterprise secretary or the energy regulator to initiate the process urgently.
2. Context
This chapter considers developments in the gas and electricity markets that have impacted on consumer
prices. It summarises the price changes that have occurred and then looks at the impact on bills in the
diVerent retail markets.
2.1 A volatile market
For over 15 years, British policy makers, regulators and energy companies have maintained that British
energy markets—the self-proclaimed most competitive energy markets in Europe—have delivered
signiﬁcant beneﬁts for consumers. And for a while price reductions, entry by new participants and product
and service innovation did seem to bear out this message, especially given the parlous state of competition
in many mainland markets.
But suppliers argued for a while that domestic consumers, who did not beneﬁt from awholesale electricity
price collapse in 2001–03, were lucky because the full eVects of a traded market that saw a ﬁrst wave of large
price increases and record high prices between 2004–06 were not passed onto them. This argument has been
extended by them to explain why price reductions when they did occur from early 2007 were delayed and,
when price cuts were introduced, why they did not fully reﬂect the magnitude of the reductions in wholesale
prices that occurred.
The large suppliers who dominate markets to domestic consumers continue to imply that they are fully
or signiﬁcantly exposed to these wholesale prices, despite their ownership of production assets and the
existence of extensive legacy fuel supply arrangements that have allowed them to avoid at least some of the
higher costs being seen in traded markets. But these higher costs are again referenced as the main
justiﬁcation for a second wave of double digit price increases seen by consumers since the turn of the year.
Figure 2.1
ANNUAL GAS, ELECTRICITY AND OIL PRICES, 2002–08
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But one constant is that these large companies making supply to retail markets in Britain have virtually
all recorded growing proﬁts through the period whether wholesale prices have been high or low. Since 2005
they have also been the beneﬁciaries of “free” carbon allowances, despite the fact that the nominal cost of
these allowances seems to have been passed through in full to consumer prices, creating windfalls and record
proﬁts, and even the regulator has called for another windfall tax following an earlier one that was levied
by government in 1998.
energywatch acknowledges that wholesale gas and electricity markets have undergone profound change
since the turn of the decade as global commodity markets have cycled aggressively. The price path of the
key annual contracts is shown at Figure 2.1, together with the corresponding Brent oil price. 2006 was a
particularly turbulent year, with then record oil prices compounded by local concerns over security of
supply.
2.2 Impact on domestic consumers
Reﬂecting this price volatility the year 2006 saw 14 major retail price increases levied by the largest
suppliers, usually termed the Big Six,145 who supply all but a handful of the 47 million household electricity
and gas accounts in Britain. Subsequently in response to rapidly falling wholesale prices they belatedly
proposed general price cuts in 2006–07, but many consumers had to wait until winter was over to get them.
The reductions introduced during 2007 oVered only a brief respite. Since the beginning of this year all of
the Big Six have reversed out these reductions, and they have increased their prices signiﬁcantly. RWE
npower led the way. The companies all reference rebounding wholesale prices but also new and rising
environmental costs as themain reasons for the latest increases. In the case of electricity these increases have
more than oV-set the reductions made last year.
The price changes to domestic consumers since 2004 are shown at Appendix 1. The changes that have
occurred this year so far are shown at Table 2.1.
Table 2.1
HOUSEHOLD PRICE CHANGES LEVIED BY BIG SIX
SINCE 1 JANUARY 2008
(%) Electricity Gas EVective date
RWE Npower 12.7 17.2 04 Jan 2008
EDF Energy 7.9 12.9 18 Jan 2008
British Gas 15.0 15.0 18 Jan 2008
Scottish Power 14.0 15.0 02 Feb 2008
E.ON UK 9.7 15.0 08 Feb 2008
SSE 14.2 15.8 01 Apr 2008
Source: Company media statements
These increases have led to a combined average household bill now exceeding £1,000, as shown at
Table 2.2, with combined increases in excess of 55% over the past three years based on the latest
Energywatch data. But there are indications from analysts that suppliers have been earning increasing
returns on their supply businesses. Under the old price controls administered by Ofgem up until 2002 they
were allowed a 1.5%margin, and in the early days after these controls were lifted returns rose to around 4.5%
reﬂected perceptions of higher risk.146 Since then, while some suppliers have claimed occasionally negative
margins, at times earnings have been as much as 30% on their retail businesses.147 The current consensus is
that even now margins for those with the lowest prices could be running at over 6%.
Table 2.2
AVERAGE ANNUAL DOMESTIC FUEL BILLS 2005–08—STANDARD
CREDIT SUPPLY
2005 2006 2007 2008 Change
(March)
Gas £386 £473 £552 £632 64%
Electricity £285 £338 £383 £405 42%
Total £671 £811 £935 £1,037 55%
145 British Gas (Centrica), EDF Energy, E.ON UK, RWE npower, Scottish and Southern Energy and Scottish Power.
146 The new electricity trading arrangements in England and Wales, Second report of session 2003–04, House of Commons Public
Accounts Committee (1 December 2003), page 11.
147 Financial Times, 1 February 2007.
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Source: Data for 2005 to 2007 is from Berr. That for March 2008 is from
Energywatch. Both sources are based on a medium user consuming each year
3.3MWh of electricity and 20.5MWh of gas.
These recent trends are summarised by company at Tables 2:3 and 2:4148 for electricity and gas
respectively.
Table 2.3
HOUSEHOLD ELECTRICITY PRICE CHANGES LEVIED BY BIG SIX (ANNUALISED)
Company 2005 2006 2007 2008 Period
Changes EVect Changes EVect Changes EVect Changes EVect Changes EVect
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
British Gas 1 9.4 2 33.5 2 "16.3 1 15.0 6 40.5
E.ON UK 1 11.9 2 29.9 1 "5.0 1 9.7 5 51.5
EDF Energy 2 18.0 2 13.1 0 0.0 1 7.9 5 44.0
RWE Npower 0 0.0 3 39.6 1 "3.0 1 12.7 5 52.6
Scottish and Southern 1 6.7 2 19.1 1 "5.0 1 14.2 5 37.9
Scottish Power 1 12.0 2 18.8 1 "5.5 1 14.0 5 43.3
Average 1 9.7 2 5.7 1 " 5.8 1 12.3 5 45.7
Source: Company statements, calculations by Energywatch
Table 2.4
HOUSEHOLD GAS PRICE CHANGES LEVIED BY BIG SIX (ANNUALISED)
Company 2005 2006 2007 2008 Period
Changes EVect Changes EVect Changes EVect Changes EVect Changes EVect
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
British Gas 1 12.4 2 37.1 2 "19.5 1 15.0 6 42.7
E.ON UK 1 7.2 2 47.3 1 "16.0 1 15.0 5 52.5
EDF Energy 2 19.7 2 36.5 1 "10.6 1 12.9 6 64.9
RWE Npower 0 0.0 3 53.2 1 "16.0 1 17.2 5 50.9
Scottish and Southern 1 9.1 2 32.3 1 "12.0 1 15.8 5 47.1
Scottish Power 2 7.7 2 34.6 1 "16.5 1 15.2 6 39.4
Average 1 9.3 2 40.2 1 "15.1 1 15.2 6 49.9
Source: Company statements, calculations by Energywatch
As a result of these price changes, the advantages liberalisation has brought to UK149 household
consumers have been eroded over the last three years:
— between 2004 and 2007, for example, average UK gas prices to household consumers (excluding
taxesmeasured by Eurostat) increased by nearly three quarters (72%)150, nearly double the increase
of 41% seen across peer EU nations151; and
— household electricity prices have risen 50% in the UK compared to 15% in the same nations over
an equivalent period. The extent of the disparity in increases is such that 2007 UK prices were
within 2% of the average for this peer group of nations: in 2004 they were a quarter below.
More up to date comparative data from January 2008 is shown at Figure 2:2 for electricity and at Figure
2:3 for gas. It shows the same key ﬁnding of UK electricity prices now being above the average of key EU
nations once artiﬁcial distortions from taxes are excluded.
148 The ﬁgures in these tables diVer compared to Table 2.3 because the data in that table is not annualised.
149 Where available the paper uses GB statistics. Otherwise UK data has been given.
150 Eurostat data for domestic consumers.
151 Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Ireland and Italy.
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Figure 2.2
AVERAGE DOMESTIC ELECTRICITY PRICES ACROSS KEY EU NATIONS
(EXCLUDING TAXES)
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Figure 2.3
AVERAGE DOMESTIC GAS PRICES ACROSS KEY EU NATIONS (EXCLUDING TAXES)
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2.3 Impact on business consumers
Business consumers have been hit by even more signiﬁcant price increases as contract rates oVered by
suppliers are more closely related to the forward curve, which is a key reference point for the ﬁxed annual
contract price and for shorter-term “ﬂoating” indices used by suppliers. Over the past four years they have
seen their international competitiveness deteriorate markedly.
Eurostat ﬁgures for 2007152 show that UK electricity prices to business were 3% above the EU-15 level
having been 30% lower just three years previously. For gas the change is such that UK prices for 2007 were
12% above the EU-15 level in 2007 having been 15% below in 2004.
The consequences of high energy prices for them have been:
— reduced production, which in turn has been a signiﬁcant contributor to over 100,000
manufacturing job losses153; during 2005–06 this reduction occurred at a time of global expansion
elsewhere;
— switching to more environmentally harmful fuels;
— some high proﬁle facilities have shut down like Britannia Zinc’s smelter and Imerys china clay; and
— a sharp reduction in UK manufacturing investment even before the current slow-down.
3. Barriers to Effective Wholesale Competition
This chapter addresses the issue of whether and, if so, what are barriers to eVective wholesale competition.
It critiques features of current market operation against criteria and characteristics established by the
European Commission in a recent inﬂuential report on the energy sector. In particular we identify particular
problems in the British electricity sector that seem to be having a particularly detrimental eVect on the
operation of downstream markets.
3.1 The European Commission’s ﬁve barriers
In February 2006 the European Commission highlighted in its interim sectoral report154 ﬁve barriers it
believedwere inhibiting eVective energymarket competition across Europe, especially at the wholesale level.
Attention in Britain triggered by the report tended to focus on the way the development of competition is
being constrained in Europe and the possible consequences for consumers here through limitations and
distortions on our own markets, especially via access to the gas interconnector, which links Bacton in
Norfolk to Zeebrugge in Belgium.
The barriers and their primary characteristics they identiﬁed—which they considered widespread on
mainland Europe—are summarised in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S FIVE BARRIERS TO COMPETITION
Barrier to Summary of view from interim sector report
competition Electricity Gas
Market concentration Most wholesale markets remain At the wholesale level, markets
national in scope with high levels generally maintain the high level of
of concentration in generation, concentration of the pre-
which gives scope for exercising liberalisation period.
market power.
Vertical foreclosure Vertical integration of generation, Lack of liquidity and limited access
supply and network activities has to infrastructure prevent new
remained a dominant feature in entrant suppliers from oVering
many electricity markets. their services to the consumer.
Market integration The low level of cross-border trade Cross-border sales do not presently
is insuYcient to exert pressure on exert any signiﬁcant competitive
(dominant) generators in national pressure.
markets.
Transparency There is a serious lack of There is a lack of reliable and
transparency in the electricity timely information on the
wholesale markets that is widely markets—normally the lifeblood of
recognised by the sector. healthy competition.
152 Eurostat data for business consumers.
153 Source: OYce for National Statistics as reported by BBC News—http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/4797419.stm
154 European Commission Competition DG, ENERGY SECTOR INQUIRY PRELIMINARY REPORT, 16 February 2006.
This can be accessed at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/sectors/energy/inquiry/index.html.
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Barrier to Summary of view from interim sector report
competition Electricity Gas
Price formation Price formation is complex, and More eVective and transparent
many users have limited trust in price formation is needed to deliver
the price formation mechanisms. the full advantages of market
opening to consumers.
But energywatch believes that each of these ﬁve barriers is an important factor in the current failure of
the competitive wholesale energy markets here in Britain to meet the needs of all consumers.
The commission’s ﬁve barriers are relevant for the reasons set out below:
— market concentration—the increasing search for scale by a diminishing number of players has
become the single most deﬁning characteristic in the British energy supply markets. As a
consequence wholesale markets are thin or “illiquid”, with modest volumes being traded;
— vertical foreclosure—smaller players and recent entrants are leaving the market because of an
inability to source wholesale product from major established players. As the charges levied for
uncontracted trades (or “cash-out” prices) are penal,155 choosing to forego contracts for injections
and oVtakes does not represent a viable option for competing in the market place. The illiquidity
of the electricity wholesale market combined with these penal cash-out prices has created a
position of “double-jeopardy” for downstream players, who are exposed to systematic and
disproportionate risk compared to the Big Six who are heavily integrated;
— market integration—all of the Big Six have integrated production and supply businesses that
primarily focus on dual fuel propositions to direct debit consumers in the retail markets. Since
2001, they have become not only larger but also more integrated, with commercial relationships
between energy production and supply being particularly opaque;
— transparency—energywatch-originated uniﬁed network code modiﬁcation 006, whose
implementation has brought much greater visibility of oVshore gas ﬂows and terminal deliveries
onto the mainland. But there is not publication of information in other areas, such as supply
business proﬁtability and the terms of trade with upstream aYliates and, it would seem there is no
regulatory interest in this key information; and
— price formation—wholesale prices are formed in markets much less liquid than envisaged when
the current market designs for centralised trading were implemented, especially in the electricity
sector and especially beyond the front seasons that are traded. The use of the forward curve by all
the large suppliers in setting transfer prices and oVers to consumers means down-stream prices
reﬂect the implied costs of marginal trades on the open markets. These pricing practices have
enabled the full pass through of carbon costs and helped maintain oil-gas and gas-electricity price
linkages, even though the acquisition costs of the suppliers are very diVerent.
In all cases these factors work against non-integrated players in the British market, and have contributed
to both generators and suppliers exiting the market. Going forward they have also created signiﬁcant
barriers to entry.
We set out our arguments in each of these areas in more detail below, with speciﬁc reference to the
electricity sector.
3.2 Market concentration
The British market has become much more concentrated since full competition was introduced, fuelled
by the economies of scale of mass domestic retail markets but also by strong incentives to integrate that arise
from the market structures. Vertical integration through asset acquisition is eVectively being used as a
trading strategy by virtually all the major market participants. This trend has led to three particular
outcomes, all of which have been detrimental to the functioning of the wholesale markets. The observations
we make apply equally to gas as well as electricity, but the degree of the problem is much more manifest in
the electricity sector:
— ﬁrst ownership of production assets has become more concentrated, and many independent
generators have left the market or been swallowed up by the incumbents since 2000 resulting in
signiﬁcant horizontal concentration;
— second there have been a number of supplier failures and acquisitions. At the same time supplier
exits have not been counter-balanced by any signiﬁcant new entry over the same period; and
155 Both gas and electricitymarkets in Britain have been designed to provide incentives for participants to be in balance, meaning
they should endeavour to be fully contracted for their outputs as a generator or consumption as a supplier. Any uncontracted
trades are subject to imbalance or “cash-out” charges, and these tend to reﬂect the costs of short-term peaking energy, which
is expensive. During periods of high demand or supply uncertainty, these cash-out prices can be several times the value of
traded prices for the underlying commodity.
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— as a consequence of the ﬁrst two factors generation has reintegratedwith supply causing signiﬁcant
vertical concentration, which has led to a failure to create the hoped for levels of market liquidity,
especially in electricity.
3.2.1 Contraction in independent generation
The British generation market saw signiﬁcant new entry over the 1990s fuelled by the “dash for gas” and
plump pool prices set by generators. “Asset-light” strategies were initially preferred whereby suppliers were
able to contract with generators on a long-term basis for ﬁrm power. But the collapse in power prices in
2001–02 in part triggered by surplus generation led to the exit of many merchant plant operators and the
failure of some over the next two years. Examples are shown in Appendix 2. Several realised huge losses on
recent investments through ﬁre sales, while some went into administration or left their assets with the banks.
At the same time the integrated players were relatively indiVerent to this price collapse as they tended to
have high levels of contract cover in place or had a route to market through their supply businesses.
Since 2003–04 alone we estimate that the volume of independently-owned generation, excluding nuclear
and long-term arrangements with the Big Six, has dropped from 70TWh out of annual GB supply of around
330TWh or so to less than 25TWh on an annualised basis. These developments made wholesale markets
thinner and inherently more volatile.
3.2.2 Supply consolidation
A parallel development has been the loss of independent supply. Outside of a small, niche “green”
electricity sector, householders’ choices are restricted to the Big Six as they have absorbed the business
activities of smaller competitors that have left the market or which have been acquired. During 2005–06 in
particular several small players exposed to high and volatile wholesale prices went out of business. Supplier
failures since 2000 are shown at Appendix 3. In all less than 1% of residential consumers now receive their
electricity or gas supply from someone other than the Big Six.
And in the business markets there has also been a notable reduction of choice as suppliers have exited the
business supply markets. Statoil and BP, prior to its full withdrawal from the market, both developed and
then disposed of businesses serving smaller and medium gas users. In electricity the exiting suppliers have
tended to focus on segments of the business markets.
It is to be expected that some enterprises will fail during periods of high and volatile prices, especially
given the increasing diseconomies of scale in supply. But the combination of wholesale prices that fell
dramatically from early 2007 and inﬂated consumer prices presented the biggest potential opportunity for
new entrants seen since competitive markets started. Despite rhetoric fromOfgem about simplifyingmarket
entry and licensing procedures, entry remains a complex, expensive and time-consuming process. A range
of new licensees have emerged in the gas sector though as yet few have started actively trading; in electricity
there has been negligible new activity. In turn this has meant that the incumbent players see no realistic
competitive threat from new entry on any scale.
3.2.3 Vertical reintegration
The adjunct to the exit of players in both generation and supply is the signiﬁcant increase in vertical
integration. In the energy markets vertical integration has meant that a market can now be eVectively
foreclosed with a few long-term contracts, and the position is not signiﬁcantly diVerent in Britain than it is
in continental Europe in this respect. This characteristic means remaining smaller players and new entrants
cannot compete fairly or eVectively. And because most independent generators have now been acquired by
the larger players, the few remaining independent suppliers must buy from a scale player or from volatile
short-term spot markets if they wish to avoid being “cashed-out”.
As a consequence electricity trading activity outside of the Big Six is largely dependent on them making
volumes available to their competitors, which the market structure disinclines them from doing. This arises
because they wish to hold control of spare capacity in eVect to help themselves self balance or because they
would prefer to do business with other large players, and their credit policies reﬂect this preference.
Anecdotally they often cite credit policies for refusing to trade with less substantial players.
A further eVect is that wholesale markets are much less liquid. This is important to competition as they
allow suppliers and, in some cases, consumers to source bulk energy. After a surge in the late 1990s,
wholesale electricity market activity in Britain has declined as a result of exit of independent trading and
supply companies and the disappearance of merchant plant.
We consider the issue of poor market liquidity and its implications further in section 3.3.
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3.2.4 Less diversity
Foreclosed markets mean consumers miss out on the beneﬁts of competition brought by diverse and new
players. The advantages that arise from new entry are not only price related:
— smaller suppliers are often new entrants and keep larger players on their toes through more
innovative oVerings and services. They also enable issues about market entry to be kept under
closer focus and barriers to entry to be tackled;
— environment—some smaller players are active in green and energy service markets. Energy service
companies are emerging that actively pursue low carbon programmes and bespoke consumer
oVerings;
— security of supply—small suppliers broaden the sharing of the funding burden, in particular
facilitating the participation of venture capital providers. On both the generation and supply sides
they have introduced a number of innovative ﬁnancing techniques. A further factor is that
commodity-based energy markets introduced in the UK depend on liquid traded markets to
enable reliable price discovery and thus facilitate proper investment decisions in new capacity, and
these smaller players enable more diverse participation in these markets where they are enabled
to work eVectively; and
— innovation—small suppliers introduce innovation, and a wider diversity of commercial oVerings
for all types of consumer.
At a time when the Government is promoting diversity of supply through its policies, it is perverse that
market structure actively deters diversity of participant.
3.3 Vertical foreclosure
Both electricity and gas markets have created strong incentives for parties to balance their supply with
their production, which has reinforced drivers to vertical reintegration on a huge scale, reducing access to
markets by smaller players. Above all this reintegration in industry structure has had a signiﬁcant impact
on market liquidity.
3.3.1 Market liquidity
The European Commission’s interim sector report from 2006 noted: “The UK is the only market in the
comparison where traded volumes [of electricity] have signiﬁcantly declined during the last two years. This
is often ascribed by respondents to ongoing vertical reintegration of the industry, ie the trend to bring
independent generation and supply businesses into a single operation under the same ownership”.156 The
point is illustrated by Figure 3.1, which is extracted from the report.
Figure 3.1
TRENDS IN OTC ELECTRICITY MARKET LIQUIDITY
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156 European Commission’s Preliminary report electricity (February 2006), page 113.
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Data from the UKFinancial Services Authority (FSA) shows that this trend increased in the year to July
2006, with liquidity in UK power falling a further 6%.157 Activity in the markets it regulated increased in its
latest report: electricity volumes were up 52% to 985TWh and gas volumes up 109% to 437bn therms in the
year ending July 2007.158 Although these increases appear impressive, the volume of electricity traded is only
three times physical consumption—some way below the ten times level said to evidence a healthy market
and means liquidity is still signiﬁcantly less than markets such as Germany and the Netherlands that have
deregulated more recently.
This unhealthy position is reinforced by data reported by one of the Big Six, and shown in Table 3.2. The
data, from annual Factbooks produced by RWE,159 shows that its trading volumes almost halved over a
three year period, during which volumes traded on the wider wholesale power market also fell to about a
third their previous level. Overall this source shows a similar level of market activity measured as a ratio of
physical demand as the information from the FSA. Further analysis on behalf of smaller suppliers shows
that typically aggregate volumes of reported seasonal contract trades scarcely exceeds the physical amount
of power consumed during these six month periods.
Table 3.2
A VIEW OF ACTIVITY IN THE WHOLESALE POWER MARKET
Change
(TWh) 2003 2004 2005 2006 (06 on 03) %
Total trading volume 2,500 1,900 1,469 750 "70.0%
RWE trading volume 501 356 203 272 "45.7%
RWE physical output 38 31 31 31 "18.4%
GB demand 317 316 322 322 1.6%
Trading/demand ratio 7.9 6.0 4.6 2.3 *
Poor UK market liquidity in electricity has been accompanied by a period where wholesale prices have
become much more volatile. Energywatch believes the two are directly related and reinforcing, as major
players respond by further integrating their upstream and downstream operations and acquire competitors
to ensure they can balance production with supply to limit their exposure to wholesale prices. In turn this
response limits even further the volumes available for wholesale trading.
These modest levels of liquidity are not helpful to major consumers or independent suppliers either as the
opportunities to trade reduce and they therefore tend to be more exposed to short-term price ﬂuctuations.
The volume of electricity traded on a very short-term basis reported by the London Energy Brokers
Association160 has ﬂuctuated in the range 2–3TWh on an annualised basis since 2005. Most recently there
has been a reduction in volumes on a monthly basis of a third for the November-February winter period of
2007–08 compared with just a year earlier. Ofgem also recently found quantities of day-ahead trading to be
particularly thin in GB compared to other liberalised markets.161
Volumes that are being traded are also heavily skewed to shorter durations, typically much less than a
year and particularly relating to the front quarter or season. Data on this is hard to distil because trading
is fragmented across a number of exchanges and brokers, but anecdotal evidence suggests that what trading
there is is “lumpy”. There is also a mismatch in terms of the wholesale products on oVer both in terms of
shape and volume relative to the annual contracts that suppliers enter into. It can be almost impossible for
non-integrated players to access the volumes they need and the “shape” (or the load proﬁle) of their
commitments. In the past there were many more independent counter-parties with whom to trade and
contracts for structured products such as “load shape 44”162 were in demand, but often there are no longer
volumes of these products available.Where there are volumesmade available, larger players often insist that
monies are posted in advance because the credit risk is no longer socialised as it was under the pool and the
scale players are concerned about the credit status of non-scale players in volatile markets.
While there is much more trading in the gas market, there are still important questions for policy makers
and regulators that need to be addressed. In its Ensuring eVective and eYcient forwards gas markets report
for DTI in March 2005, the consultancy Global Insight suggested that 70% of the gas landed in Britain was
subject to long-term contracts. The balance, 30%, was available for forward trading. Its analysis also
suggested that the majority of this gas (as we have already seen occurs with electricity) was traded in the
157 FSA report 2006.
158 FSA report 2007.
159 RWE fact book 2007.
160 www.leba.org.uk/ This organisation produces indices based on aggregated trades for periods up to a week ahead reported
by its ﬁve members.
161 Day-ahead traded volumes as a percentage of demand in 2006 were: GB 8.5%,Netherlands 15.8%, Germany 16.6% and
Nordpool 63%. The data was presented at a cash-out review meeting in February 2007.
162 A typical week-day load shape, with equal base and peak hours, is a crude proxy for the needs of smaller suppliers and a
benchmark product. For the 17 months from October 2003 to March 2005 the four components required for a 1-year load
shape 44 were traded on the same day on 22 occasions; for the 2-year product this happened on only 2 occasions and for the
3-year product not at all.
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immediate run up to its delivery, rather than months or seasons ahead. As a consequence forward curve
prices were posted based on very limited trading activity to the extent that, while the consultant
characterised the spot gas market as “functionally liquid”, noting it believed the forward market to “suVer
from a lack of liquidity by global standards”.163
These arguments provide further evidence that the forward curve is not a robust indicator of future
wholesale costs for gas suppliers—and electricity market liquidity is even lower.
3.4 Market integration
As we have seen, consolidation has become a real feature of British energy markets and this has given
rise to six large vertically-integrated players who eVectively monopolise supply to domestic consumers. In
electricity they have as a consequence eVectively opted out of wholesale power trading for a signiﬁcant part
of their operations, and they increasingly seek to lock in wholesale volumes of gas by entering into long-
term contracts for gas supplies or in some cases acquiring their own gas production assets.
Figure 3.2 illustrates this point for electricity, and compares aggregated settlement data for suppliers for
the year ending March 2007 with published data on generation production.
Figure 3.2
A “BALANCED MARKET”
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The ﬁgure shows total retail sales below the line to both domestic and business consumers. However it
does not distinguish between sales to domestic and business consumers. Apart from Centrica, all of the Big
Six are “net long” with their generation volumes exceeding domestic sales, and a strong dynamic in the
market has been to make sure that domestic sales can be sourced from in-house generation, a phenomenon
we call the “balanced market”. Again, apart from Centrica, all have access to coal generation and, in some
cases, other fuel sources. They are not wholly exposed to the gas and carbon prices that have become the
key driver of forward power prices. In fact the great surge in coal consumption at power stations over the
2005 and 2006 period was one direct consequence of their desire to avoid a gas price exposure.
There are two implications ﬂowing from these observations:
— comparing electricity sales volumes of the major suppliers with output from their power stations
shows the major players are targeting their in-house generation output at their “sticky” small
business and domestic consumers who are paying the published tariV rates; and
163 Global Insight report.
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— their ability or willingness to compete in the business markets depends on any surplus volumes
they have after allowing for supply to their domestic consumers, and traded volumes and their
contract price oVers at any particular time reﬂect market prices irrespective of whether they are
exposed to them in whole or in part.
These implications and their impact on the retail markets is discussed further in chapter 5.
3.5 Transparency
Despite the relatively good transparency in the British real-time market compared to Europe, European
regulators through Ergeg have shown164 there are areas where transparency in the British market remains
poor. There are important aspects of wholesale market functioning that are inhibiting visibility of
participant actions, which hinders and distorts understanding of integrated operations.
Energywatch believes that given the level of vertical integration in the market, disclosure requirements
are inadequate. Further there is no systematic reporting by activity to Ofgem and no meaningful reporting
in turn to the widermarket.Given the ability of the Big Six to set their own terms of trade, especially through
transfer prices they set themselves, there is a need for urgent consideration of these issues.
3.6 Price formation
Issues of market dominance and transparency reinforce each other when it comes to wholesale price
formation but they impact on market participants in diVerent ways. Current market structures mean
independent suppliers and purchasers in both gas and electricity wholesale markets are price takers; they
must pay whatever rates are on oVer as the demand they supply is largely inelastic. In contrast, the
companies which provide them with energy do their best to mitigate their exposure to these markets by
purchasing assets or, in the case of generating fuels, seeking to trade on diVerent terms. Nevertheless the
concept of the “forward curve” is central to both sets of trading counterparties.
3.6.1 Forward curve
At any point in time both electricity and gas will have a unique value, reﬂecting fundamentals such as the
underlying costs they are referenced against, the balance between supply and demand and also the sentiment
of those buying and selling. The price at any particular point in time will vary also according to the point
of delivery. Thus the price for gas will depend on the point at which it is to be consumed. Market reporters
thus quote prices for the annual gas contract in 2008 reﬂecting views on its average cost over the year, and
this is likely to have a diVerent price from the 2009 contract. Likewise the average price for the contracts
over either of those years will have diVerent underlying seasonal prices (summer, winter), and the prices of
seasonal contracts in turn will have diVerent values to the component monthly contracts, and so forth.
Reﬂecting these diVerent delivery times price reporters conventionally quote a forward curve, which
shows at any particular point in time the traded price for contracts in that commodity across the range of
delivery times. A key variable for each point on the forward curve is the volume of trades that occurs for
each quoted contract. This facet of trading is termed “liquidity”. A liquid market is one where there is a
meaningful volume of trading, which in turn usually enables a representative traded price to be reported.
Conversely an illiquid market is one where there is limited trading taking place, and the price is likely to be
formed on the basis of a few transactions or even a single trade. In turn illiquid markets are usually
considered to be volatile and the price discovered does not necessarily reﬂect the market value.
Limited market liquidity is a key feature of the current energy landscape, and for electricity the situation
is especially poor and has deteriorated over recent years. But this trend has occurred at the same time as the
prices it produces have becomemore important for setting consumer prices. Large user prices in the business
markets in particular are usually based on the traded year ahead price derived from the forward curve, to
which the supplier adds grid charges, taxes and its proﬁtmargin, unless the consumer opts to link their prices
to shorter-term measures in the expectation the price will fall closer to delivery.
But as we have seen from recent announcements of price rises, the Big Six reference movements in the
forward curve in setting their retail prices. This is important not because the suppliers are necessarily
exposed to these prices for signiﬁcant volumes but because the wholesale forward curve, for electricity in
particular, is essentially used as a reference price for transactions between diVerent operations of these
integrated companies. As a result prices to consumers are not necessarily related to the company’s costs of
production. While the major players conduct limited forward trading, reﬂected by declining liquidity, they
still use the forward curve it produces as the indicator of costs when they want to change prices.
164 www.ergeg.org/portal/page/portal/ERGEG HOME/ERGEG PC/ARCHIVE1/GGP Transparency
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Unfortunately ﬁnancial reporting by the Big Six is insuYciently transparent to make deﬁnitive judgments
on thesematters, andwe believe this lack of disclosure of trading between aYliates and of transfer represents
amajor failing that needs to be addressed.Until recently Centrica’s accounts showed that the average selling
price for its upstream gas exceeded its average purchase cost for supply onto domestic consumers.165 This
position suggests Centrica has decided to price its equity gas at the forward curve while purchasing from
others at lower non-forward curve related terms. Figure 3.3 illustrates this point, though unfortunately it
stopped reporting this information in late 2006.
Figure 3.3
CENTRICA’S REPORTED AVERAGE WHOLESALE GAS SELLING PRICE AND AVERAGE
COST OF GAS FOR SUPPLY TO HOUSEHOLD CONSUMERS
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3.6.2 Other wholesale pricing matters
There are two further points about current wholesale market pricing that Energywatch believes are
damaging the British market and further distort the wholesale price setting process. Expressed as questions
they are:
— why should wholesale power prices be linked to gas prices (and in turn gas to oil); and
— why should new carbon costs be passed through at marginal cost in power prices?
Power-gas linkage
The “spark spread” relationship166 between wholesale gas and power prices is long-established, with gas
remaining the fuel of choice for new investments in power generation. A threshold of about £10/MWh of
electricity prices over gas prices is usually seen by developers as the minimum margin required for
commercial pay back in new generation plant using gas as a fuel. Spark spreads have scarcely attained those
levels over recent years, theoretically making new investment in gas generation unviable.
165 Centrica ceased publishing its weighted average supply costs for gas and electricity eVective from reporting its 2006
preliminary results, removing one of the most important indicators in a sector which is becoming progressively more opaque.
166 The spark spread is the theoretical net income of a gas-ﬁred power plant from selling a unit of electricity, having bought the
fuel required to produce this unit of electricity. All other costs (operation and maintenance, capital and other ﬁnancial costs)
must be covered from the spark spread.
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Figure 3.4
SPARK SPREADS
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While poor returns have undoubtedly squeezed some in the independent generation sector, we think the
commercial dynamic is more complex than this. Many gas-ﬁred stations in (and outside) Big Six ownership
have long-term fuel supply contracts priced using other price indicators. Centrica’s LTI167 is the best known
variant, and it reported its Industrial and Wholesale business selling signiﬁcant volumes at average prices
below 30p/therm during 2005–06. If all of this gas were burnt in base-load CCGTs at this rate, it would ﬁre
approximately 6.5GW (equivalent to 26% of capacity) at around £15/MWh.
We have no means of knowing if it all is, but on the other hand we do not believe that all other gas burnt
in power stations is priced at market prices, especially given some of the valuations put on such contracts
in power station acquisition transactions over recent years. Coal and nuclear generation, which together
account for over 50% of power production in 2005, have diVerent economics, and at least until recent when
coal prices have soared, these generators have been similarly earning bumper returns from a market regime
driven by high market gas prices.
In short there is signiﬁcant circumstantial evidence that power producers have been able to earn extensive
windfall proﬁts as a result of the real relationships between costs and prices even before the impact of carbon
pricing is taken into account.
Carbon windfalls
The EU emissions trading scheme was implemented in January 2005. Free carbon allocations of a half
to 70% of their requirements under it have earned windfall proﬁts for generators. They have been able to
pass through the full marginal cost of carbon into power prices. The view from the City is that full pass-
through occurs where the wholesale power market is not competitive.
The costs that consumers bear as a result of this were estimated to be in excess of £1 billion a year in 2005
and 2006, and Ofgem has recently noted that British generators will be making a further windfall of ƒ9
billion over the second phase of the scheme between 2008–12.
We comment further on this issue in chapter 4.
4. Linkage between Wholesale and Retail Markets
In this chapter we consider the importance of wholesale prices in setting retail prices. It also examines
new environmental costs that are impacting on suppliers and their consumers. The relationship described
by suppliers between wholesale costs and retail prices is now a major concern to Energywatch, and the
convergence between suppliers’ prices, pricing structures and product oVerings is also an issue we are
worried about.
167 Long-term interruptible (LTI) arrangements were marketed by the then British Gas plc to power station developers in the
early to mid 1990s for supplies up to 15 years with prices formulas linked to changes in energy prices and inﬂation.
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4.1 Construction of the retail price
Irrespective of how a tariV to supply electricity or gas to a householder is presented, in preparing it
suppliers will assess separately the diVerent costs in the supply chain, namely:
— fuel, including what the supplier pays for the wholesale energy, which in turn includes producer
proﬁts, any costs of carbon permits for power generators and gas storage;
— the suppliers’ own costs of servicing the consumer, including metering and its proﬁt margin;
— charges for using the delivery networks of transmission and distribution, from production facility
to the consumer’s meter;
— the costs of complying with regulated obligations to stimulate renewables and energy eYciency
activity; and
— value added tax (VAT).
Below we comment brieﬂy on these elements.
4.1.1 Fuel costs
Suppliers secure bulk volumes of fuel for their consumers’ requirements. The wholesale cost they pay will
be determined by the commercial arrangements they have in place to secure that energy. These arrangements
may involve:
— production from assets owned by upstream aYliates. This option is a particularly important one
in electricity where the Big Six ownmore than half of British generating capacity as well supplying
the vast majority of household consumers;
— long-term contracts with producers. Many gas ﬁelds have been developed as a result of “life-of-
ﬁeld” contracts with suppliers. These arrangements typically pre-date the liberalised era when it
was customary for bulk gas prices to be indexed to changes in other indicators such as oil prices.
Other contracts for gas and electricity—especially the most recent and those for imported gas—
may include rates linked to published wholesale market indicators. In electricity some long-term
“tolling” arrangements are in place where the supplier pays the generator an operating fee plus
separately itemised fuel and, as necessary, carbon costs; and
— shorter-term purchases—for periods running from days to low numbers of years—of energy at
rates linked to published wholesale market or trading exchange indicators or “over-the-counter”
transactions facilitated by brokers.
4.1.2 Suppliers’ own costs
Suppliers’ own costs of serving their consumers include their administrative and service functions, as well
as managing the cashﬂows in their businesses. Suppliers also incur external costs for metering equipment
and meter reading, though some suppliers carry out these activities themselves.
4.1.3 Network use of system costs
The delivery of energy through the gas and electricity networks to consumer meters is not competitive,
and a number of companies operate monopoly services transmitting and distributing energy around the
country. Network use by producers and suppliers is provided on a regulated non-discriminatory, open
access basis. This framework means that network operators cannot deny a reasonable request from a
licensed supplier for access and must oVer fair and transparent terms. Transmission and distribution
network use of system charges are published and based on principles approved byOfgem, with the regulator
also periodically setting the total allowed revenues that the network operator can earn.
4.1.4 Regulated obligations
Suppliers also face two speciﬁc additional on-costs from regulated obligationswhen they choose to service
the domestic market:
— the Renewables Obligation (RO) for electricity; and
— the Carbon Emissions Reduction Target (Cert), which from 1 April 2008 will replace the Energy
EYciency Commitment (Eec), for both electricity and gas.
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The RO obliges suppliers to buy a certain amount of the electricity they supply to consumers from
qualifying renewable power sources or pay a “buy-out” charge. A similar obligation exists for energy
eYciency but on both gas and electricity sales, with suppliers having to demonstrate they have implemented
measures that have enabled consumers to reduce consumption. The shift from the Eec to the Cert will see
the basis of this obligation change to carbon reduction from energy savings.
Suppliers endeavour to pass on to consumers their costs in complyingwith theRO andCert/Eec, although
there is no legal obligation on them to do so.
4.1.5 Value Added Tax
Electricity and gas consumption by household consumers attracts Value Added Tax (VAT) at the rate
of 5%.
Figure 4.1 shows a breakdown of the average household electricity bill in Great Britain for amedium user
supplied on standard credit terms. Fuel and the suppliers’ own costs account for 70% of the bill, with the
next highest component being network costs at 19%.
Figure 4.1
BREAKDOWN OF AVERAGE HOUSEHOLD ELECTRICITY BILL MARCH 2008
VAT, £19
Fuel and 
suppliers 
own costs, 
£283
Regulated 
obligations, 
£27
Networks, 
£76
Source: Analysis of Energywatch pricing data for a 3,300kWh standard supply on standard credit terms
Figure 4.2 repeats this calculation for gas.
Figure 4.2
BREAKDOWN OF AVERAGE HOUSEHOLD GAS BILL MARCH 2008
VAT, £28
Fuel and 
suppliers 
own costs, 
£410
Regulated 
obligations, 
£16
Networks, 
£135
Source: Analysis of Energywatch pricing data for a 20,500kWh standard supply on standard credit terms
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4.2 Representing fuel price movements
As we have seen a feature of Britain’s traded wholesale markets for electricity and gas is their volatility
and their sensitivity to international commodity prices for oil, gas, carbon and coal. Comparing household
price increases with movements in the year-ahead forward price for the appropriate fuels shows that
movements in the former can and have lagged the latter, as shown at Figures 4.3 and 4.4. These charts also
show that wholesale prices reached their previous peak in the early summer of 2006, while household prices
appear to have peaked in the late winter of 2006–07. This cycling suggests a six- to nine-month lag, and this is
sometimes explained by the companies as representing suppliers committing to forward purchases to secure
winter supplies.
But:
— in electricity ﬁve of the Big Six (Centrica is the exception) are “long in generation” compared to
expected domestic demand, and the gas and coal for their power stations will not necessarily be
secured at prices directly related to forward curves; and
— in gas many of the major players have to some extent access to long-term contracts, which are
again priced at historic rates that have risen perhaps by inﬂation but which have not risen in
real terms.
Many of these arrangements for fuel supply are long-term and were put in place in the 1990s. As they
lapse, their volumes are muchmore likely to be replaced by arrangements where there is a closer correlation
of prices to forward curves. This shift may explain why over recent months there appears to have been a
quicker pass-through of forward curve price changes into household rates. But even so, Energywatch is very
concerned that internal transfer pricing arrangements mean the supply operations of the Big Six must pay
forward curve-related prices for their energy, while their upstream production counterparts proﬁt by any
diVerence between these levels and what is actually paid for fuel in bulk.
Figure 4.3
TRENDS IN BASELOAD (YEAR AHEAD) WHOLESALE GAS PRICES AND HOUSEHOLD
PRICE INCREASES SINCE SEPTEMBER 2004
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Figure 4.4
TRENDS IN BASELOAD (YEAR AHEAD) WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY PRICES AND
HOUSEHOLD PRICE INCREASES SINCE SEPTEMBER 2004
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4.3 Importance of fuel costs
The assessment shown at Table 4.1 suggests that average householder bills increased by 2.7p/kWh
between 2004 and 2007. Generators fossil fuel costs increased by 0.69p/kWh over the same period, about
one quarter of this level. While we do not know the commercial positions of individual companies, the shift
away from gas to coal in the generation mix during 2005–06 and a subsequent reversal is a matter of record.
It suggests that generators havemanaged their fuel requirements tominimise the impact on their costs, while
at the same time prices paid by consumers have increased by an altogether diVerent factor. This disparity
between costs, prices and proﬁts is illustrated at Table 4.1, and this issue needs to be investigated.
Table 4.1
AVERAGE HOUSEHOLD PRICES AND GENERATOR FUEL COSTS 2000–07
Calculated average
Average domestic Average domestic fossil fuel cost for
(p/kWh) bill (£) bill (p/kWh) generation DiVerence
2000 257 7.79 1.23 6.56
2001 245 7.41 1.36 6.05
2002 236 7.17 1.27 5.90
2003 230 6.98 1.30 5.68
2004 230 6.98 1.46 5.52
2005 251 7.59 1.84 5.75
2006 290 8.78 2.16 6.62
2007 320 9.68 2.15 7.54
Change 2007 on 89 2.70 0.69 2.01
2004
Base data fromDTI with further calculations by Energywatch. Figures on costs of fossil fuel generation for
2007 are for the ﬁrst nine months of the year only. Average domestic bill is UK-wide and for a standard
supply of 33MWh on standard credit terms.
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4.4 Carbon windfalls
The ﬁrst phase of the EUEmissions Trading Scheme (ETS) commenced on 1 January 2005 for three years,
and 1 January 2008 saw it move into its second phase. The ETS is a “cap and trade” scheme designed to
reduce emissions of carbon dioxide emissions frommajor producers, including power generators. Producers
must present enough allowances or permits every year issued under the scheme to match their emissions
of carbon dioxide. Scheme participants received an allocation of these allowances based on their historic
production at no cost while the basic principles of the new arrangement were tested. Allocations to
generators have been cut back under phase 2 but still cover the majority of expected emissions. Individual
generators have had to purchase extra permits at market rates to ensure their overall holdings which they
surrender match their emissions.
But independent research168 has highlighted the pass-through by generators into their wholesale selling
prices of their full marginal costs of carbon, despite the signiﬁcant free allocations. The authors suggested
that this pass through was at levels “around the marginal intensity of coal plant, implying possible over-
recovery of true marginal costs by the industry”. Further they suggested the combination of free allocations
with full pass-through of marginal costs transferred approximately £800mn/year from UK consumers to
power generators over the period 2005–07.
Historically, there has been minimal regulatory scrutiny of forward energy markets, even though Ofgem
has recently acknowledged the windfalls being accrued through the full pass-through of carbon costs by
generators. It went as far as suggesting that generators would make a further ƒ9 billion windfall gain as a
result of phase 2 of the EU ETS.169
Energywatch thinks this pass-through underlines the ability of large, integrated players to disengage from
the traded wholesale markets but to signal prices to retail consumers from a forward curve that reﬂects
marginal costs to which they largely are not exposed.We are also perplexed as to howOfgem can assert that
markets are functioning properly when the marginal carbon cost is being charged in full despite extensive
free allocations. It is also acquiescent to the full costs being passed through in transfer prices and be charged
in full to retail consumers.
4.5 New environmental costs
On announcing their recent price increases a number of suppliers have drawn attention to the increasing
costs they face of complying with the RO and the Cert (see Section 4.1.4):
— EDFEnergy said “The doubling of the energy eYciency programme, now called the Cert will, cost
our consumers up to £100 million per annum over the next three years”;
— BritishGas said that the typical household consumer would be paying £31 each year of compliance
costs for the Cert and £12 each year for the RO; and
— RWE Npower said: “The spend to meet the government’s energy eYciency targets (now called
Cert) has doubled andNpower will be spending around £300million on energy eYciencymeasures
for consumers over the next three years”.
There is an increased commitment by suppliers for spending on energy savings with the Cert. But, the
new scheme is not introduced until 1 April 2008, meaning that as the price changes announced by all three
companies predate this point. So Energywatch is concerned that, by moving early, most of the Big Six
suppliers will eVectively have been charging their consumers the costs of a scheme that is not yet in force.170
Likewise there is an increase of 9% in the cost to consumers of the RO that takes eVect from 1 April, as a
result of a higher target from that date although its impact on bills was at the time of raising prices for ﬁve
of the companies much less marked.
5. Barriers to Effective Retail Competition
Energywatch believes that levels of true competition in retail markets for gas and electricity is greatly
exaggerated by British policy makers and regulators, and real distortions in the market are being ignored.
This chapter addresses:
— our contention that there remains considerable regional market power;
— the dominating characteristic for suppliers to target certain types of consumer but not others;
— the limited usefulness of switching data as a measure of eVective retail competition;
— arguments that factors other than costs are relevant in setting consumer prices; and
— barriers to competition in retail markets.
168 Implications of the EU emissions trading scheme for the UK power generation sector, a report to the Department of Trade and
Industry, IPA Energy (November 2005).
169 Ofgem press release, February 2008.
170 Scottish and Southern Energy will not, as their price rise came into eVect from 1 April.
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5.1 Domestic competition
A decade after the ﬁrst household gas consumers gained the right to choose their supplier competition
for domestic consumers remains strongly focused between the local electricity supplier—or rather in many
cases the company that acquired that organisation—and the privatised successor of the British Gas Board.
In the gas sector the same players monopolise the domestic market, and ﬁve of the same six companies have
shares between 7–13%, with the largest supplier still retaining almost a 50% share.
With over eight years of competition in the domestic electricity markets, a similar picture applies. The
latest published Ofgem ﬁgures at March 2007 show the Big Six have market shares between 12–22%, with
relatively stable market shares.
The Ofgem ﬁgures are shown at Tables 5.1 (electricity) and 5.2 (gas) respectively. This snapshot of
progress, most recently taken in June 2007 to reﬂect the position at end March 2007 and which we think is
taken too infrequently in a volatile marketplace, suggests a picture of continuing retail market
concentration.
Energywatch also believes this national overview conceals the unevenness of competition among diVerent
regions and consumer categories. Competition is sometimes not as vigorous and widespread as is claimed
by Ofgem, and competition has not beneﬁtted some consumer classes at all.
5.1.1 Regional markets
The domestic retail markets have strong regional characteristics, and the dominant players are the
successor companies to the pre-liberalisation electricity and gas incumbents. Five of the six whose core
business originated in electricity retain high levels ofmarket share in their original licensed areas (“in-area”),
with much lower levels of consumer success outside of these historic supply areas (“out-of-area”). And as
we will see it is in these historic areas that they seek most aggressively to acquire new gas consumers.
The latest ﬁgures from Ofgem171 showed that in March 2007 in six of the 14 electricity supply regions in
Britain the home supplier still holds more than half the market, and in some cases considerably more. Berr
data also shows that in four of the 12 gas regions British Gas retained more than half of the consumers at
the same date. Data comparing regional switching levels for both fuels is summarised172 in Figure 5.1.
Table 5.1
SHARES OF THE HOUSEHOLD ELECTRICITY MARKET
Electricity June 2005 September 2005 March 2006 March 2007
British Gas 22% 22% 22% 22%
E.ON UK 21% 20% 20% 19%
EDF Energy 13% 13% 13% 14%
RWE npower 15% 15% 15% 16%
Scottish and Southern Energy 16% 16% 16% 18%
Scottish Power 13% 13% 13% 12%
Others 1% 1% 0% 0%
Source: Ofgem
Table 5.2
SHARES OF THE HOUSEHOLD GAS MARKET
Electricity June 2005 September 2005 March 2006 March 2007
British Gas 53% 53% 52% 47%
E.ON UK 14% 14% 13% 13%
EDF Energy 5% 5% 6% 7%
RWE npower 9% 9% 10% 12%
Scottish and Southern Energy 9% 10% 10% 13%
Scottish Power 9% 9% 9% 9%
Others 0% 0% 0% 0%
Source: Ofgem
171 Electricity data fromOfgem’s domestic retail market report March 2007. Gas data from Table 2.5.1: Percentage of domestic
gas consumers by region by supplier type and Table 3.5.1: Percentage of domestic gas consumers by region by supplier type
for the ﬁrst quarter of 2007. Quarterly energy prices (December 2007).
172 Figures on retained market shares by historic incumbents are separately provided for direct debit, standard credit and
prepayment terms but unfortunately not on an aggregated basis. We have derived the single regional ﬁgures for gas and
electricity shown in Figure 5:1 from this data. Also, unfortunately, the gas and electricity supply regions reﬂect historic
industry structures and are therefore not contiguous. However, we believe there is enough cross-over to make comparison
between fuels valid and worthwhile.
Business and Enterprise Committee: Evidence Ev 325
Figure 5.1
PROPORTION OF CONSUMERS WHO HAVE NOT SWITCHED BY REGION—MARCH 2007
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Source: Electricity—Ofgem March 2007. Gas—Berr ﬁgures with further calculations by Energywatch.173
The information at Figure 5.1 highlights two further points:
— some areas of relatively low switching by electricity consumers are characterised by high switching
of gas consumers. Examples include South Wales, Southern England and the North of Scotland.
The owner of the three respective incumbent electricity suppliers is Scottish and Southern Energy;
and conversely,
— some areas of relatively high switching by electricity consumers are characterised by low switching
of gas consumers. Examples here are the West Midlands, North West and North East.
These two points would seem to underline the point that the main competitive dynamic is based around
dual fuel (combined electricity and gas oVerings) between the successors to the previous local state gas and
electricity boards.
In Energywatch’s opinion this situation does not indicate vigorous and healthy competition in a national
market withmultiple national suppliers. Rather it underlines the regional nature of household energy supply
competition and the prevalence of strong legacy relationships.
If the electricity market was looked at on a regional basis, it remains highly concentrated. The published
information at the regional level is current at April 2005, but it shows regional measures of market
concentration are in the range 3,000–5,000 in all but one instance which is signiﬁcantly higher, as illustrated
at Figure 5.2. Analysis suggests the regional position has not changed signiﬁcantly since.
173 The Berr ﬁgures for electricity tend to overstate the degree of switching as they focus only on one licence, the “legacy PES”,
rather than all the licences traded by the major players. This is especially relevant to E.ON UK and RWE npower and using
Berr data rather than Ofgem can lead to a signiﬁcant understatement (up to 15% in some areas). For example, E.ON UK
appears to add all new household accounts to its East Midlands licence even if they may be located in Eastern or the
North West.
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Figure 5.2
REGIONAL DOMESTIC ELECTRICITY HHIs—APRIL 2005
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HHI refers to the Herﬁndahl-Hirschman Index, a commonly accepted measure of market concentration
used by economists. It is calculated by squaring the market share of each ﬁrm competing in the market and
then summing the resulting numbers. It therefore takes into account the relative size and distribution of the
ﬁrms in a market and approaches zero when a market consists of a large number of ﬁrms of relatively equal
size. The HHI increases both as the number of ﬁrms in the market decreases and as the disparity in size
between those ﬁrms increases.
Markets in which the HHI is between 1,000 and 1,800 points are considered by the US Department of
Justice to bemoderately concentrated, and those in which the HHI is in excess of 1800 points are considered
to be highly concentrated. Transactions that increase the HHI by more than 100 points in concentrated
markets presumptively raise antitrust concerns under the Horizontal Merger Guidelines issued by the U.S.
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission.
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/testimony/hhi.htm
The national values for the domestic electricity market has ﬂuctuated between 1,700 and 1,800 since
December 2002, and based on the latest Ofgem data was at just over 1,760 at March 2007.
The gas market does exhibit less of a regional deﬁnition of markets than electricity, but because of the
focus on dual fuel propositions some of the regional marketing typical of electricity is shared with gas.
5.1.2 Consumer diVerentiation
Looking at pricing data routinely published on the energywatch website, there are a number of other
noticeable factors as well as the prevalence of regional markets that suggest signiﬁcant distortions have
existed in the retail sector:
— competition remains most vigorous for direct debit consumers;
— inmany cases some competing suppliers do not try to beat the incumbent price, with typically only
one out-of-area supplier competing aggressively at any one time;
— prepayment consumers generally see the least good oVers with wide diVerentials over direct debit
and standard credit consumers, especially in gas;
— as we have noted incumbent prices for the non-traditional fuel are usually muchmore aggressively
priced than for the traditional fuel, implying the incumbent can rely on retention despite not being
the cheapest provider for its traditional fuel;
— two-tier pricing whereby a supplier will oVer diVerent levels of prices between in-area and out-of-
area still seems to be prevalent despite the removal of the supply price controls, with some suppliers
oVering cheaper tariVs out-of-area than in-area; and
— some suppliers adopt speciﬁc regional strategies and sectoral strategies depending on their overall
supply positions at any particular point in time.
For dual fuel accounts there have been relatively attractive deals for direct debit monthly payment
consumers, though there are growing similarities in how suppliers price such deals as we see below.
Consumers of both services have been able to shop around at the end of their deal, and it is estimated that
multiple switchers of this consumer type account for over a quarter of the total switching in the market.
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Even here in this relatively healthy segment of the market academic research suggests there are issues that
require regulatory examination. Analysis by Richard Green noted in 2005 that 80% of those who switched
move to a dual fuel deal, which tended to be at a lower price than buying the two fuels separately (as they
should owing to saved account management and billing costs). However Green notes that “Typically a
company will stress the low price it can oVer for its non-traditional fuel, while avoiding the subject of the
high price it is still charging as an incumbent. The low price in the non-traditional market may not leave
much of a proﬁt margin (which is not to say that it is actually predatory), but has the great advantage of
helping to retain consumers in the traditional market, where margins remain much higher”.174
But for others—eVectively the rest but especially the fuel poor, other vulnerable consumers and thosewith
prepayment meters—there is little real competition as emphasised by Ofgem’s call in 2006 for the Big Six
to be lenient on post recalibration price changes. More recently, in late January 2008, the regulator used its
review of debt and disconnection175 to report that RWE Npower was a supplier whose “procedures for
dealing with consumers in debt needed to be improved to bring them into line with best practice”.
5.1.3 Exaggerated switching levels
The health of the market is usually assessed by Ofgem by reference to switching data. Energywatch
believes that disproportionate emphasis is placed on this measure, and the conclusions drawn from it can
be misleading, not least because multiple switchers and mis-selling transfers are routinely included in the
ﬁgures quoted.
In April 2007 when Centrica announced its second price cut Ofgem chief executive said “Consumers are
ﬁrmly in the driving seat and over 600,000 switched in the ﬁrst two months of [2007] alone”. But Ofgem’s
own statistics can be read diVerently, and say:
— 85% of consumers did not use their right to switch energy supplier in 2006, a year during which
the major suppliers levied multiple increases between them;
— switching only increased year-on-year marginally in the ﬁrst seven months of 2007—the latest
period for which ﬁgures are available—to 2.8 million households for electricity (compared with
2.6 million in the same period a year earlier) and 2.3 million for gas (compared with 2.2 million).
This change occurred against a background of the ﬁrst price reductions for many years by
suppliers;
— research commissioned by the National Consumer Council found that 55% of consumers were
unlikely to consider switching or re-switching in both March 2006 and March 2007; and
— nearly half of domestic consumers are still supplied by their incumbent electricity or gas supplier
after over a decade of open markets.
Instead of taking account of this market fundamental and the evolution of an homogenous dual fuel
market, the current regulatory focus centres on the number of switches by fuel (not switchers), despite the
fact that signiﬁcant numbers of consumers have still never changed supplier. Further academic research
suggests that a large number of people who have not switched wrongly believe that the incumbent will
reduce price to match competitive prices, which is erroneous.
And despite much publicity from the regulator, net switching levels have only increased slightly over the
last three years of higher prices. BERR ﬁgures show 36% of direct debit consumers served by British Gas
at September 2007, a reduction of seven percentage points in a year from 43%. Equivalent ﬁgures for
electricity are 39% and 43%, a four percentage point reduction. These ﬁgures show much the rosiest view
of switching as a measure of competition. In contrast six in ten gas consumers on prepayment terms are
served by BritishGas, and for electricity incumbents retain a half of all these users.More than a half of those
on credit terms for gas or electricity remain with their incumbents. We have argued for some time that these
diVerences between types of consumer are signiﬁcant and require much more focus by Ofgem.
5.1.4 Relative pricing
There is also plenty of comment from the City on retail markets and price movements, which tend to
reinforce Energywatch’s interpretation of competitive activity in gas and electricity retail markets. In
general its tone is markedly less bullish than the regulator’s about the vigour of competition. Recent
comment has tended to highlight the limitations of price reductions last year and the controlled nature of
opportunistic price increases this year, as well as the ability the suppliers will have to pass on to their other
consumers the increased contribution to their social tariVs the Chancellor of the Exchequer asked them to
make in the 2008 budget.
174 Duel fuel competition in the British energy retail markets, Richard Green, then of University of Hull Business School, May
2005.
175 Ofgem press release (January 2008).
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Back in February 2007when limited price reductions were leviedMerrill Lynch commented, “In our view,
the recent price cuts do not constitute a price war. The magnitude of competitor reductions across all tariVs
will depend largely upon each company’s forward hedge position in wholesale gas and power, and the
assumed desire to repair retail margins, particularly in gas”.
Citigroup greeted EDF Energy’s cut in gas prices (levied on 15 June but announced six weeks earlier on
30 April) with the comment: “The UK supply companies are acting as we expected, with price reductions
such as EDFEnergy’s merely bringing them in line with the rest of the sector.We argued that the likelihood
of a price war as wholesale energy prices fell was remote. This is because the vertically-integrated generator/
suppliers need to rebalance their proﬁts so that they earn suYcient returns from supply to make up for
sharply falling generation proﬁts this year compared to 2005 and 2006”.
And UBS’s opinion on the last company to reduce prices in 2007 was that “While price cuts will reduce
the proﬁtability of Scottish Power’s supply business, at this point in time, we don’t see evidences of a ‘price
war’ between suppliers, but rather evidence of an ordered and disciplined market”.
More recent pricing developments have also attracted comment that highlights limits on competition in
the market-place:
— “the generator/suppliers such as RWE no longer have the luxury of bumper generation proﬁts to
cushion retail price increases . . . the industry as a whole will be seeking to ensure reasonable levels
of proﬁtability from supply”; Citigroup 4 January 2008;
— moreover, the media attention has for once focused elsewhere “this time round Centrica was
actually the third company to increase prices, and only Scottish and Southern Energy has [to that
point] resisted raising its prices. Therefore there is currently no material price diVerence between
Centrica and four its competitors”; Citigroup 19 February 2008; and
— “the government has asked the companies to work with Ofgem to ensure that prepayment
consumers, who pay higher bills, get a fair deal [in the 2008 budget]. This will inevitably be a
negotiated compromise. But even in the worst case, if the supply industry equalized tariVs, this
cost could be recouped with a 1–3% tariV increase”; Morgan Stanley 12 March 2008.
These observations are from a class of stakeholder that tend to be better informed than most.
They are further backed up by the recent prices set by retailers in their core focus market, dual fuel
consumers on direct debit terms, as shown at Table 5.3. The diVerence between the highest and lowest dual
oVers of the Big Six is just £48 on a typical spend of £1,000 or so, with ﬁve of the Big Six being bunched
within a £13 band.
Table 5.3
COSTS OF DUAL FUEL OFFERS AT 1 APRIL 2008—GB AVERAGE, DIRECT DEBIT TERMS
FOR A MEDIUM USER
Scottish EDF British RWE
Dual Fuel—Medium User Power Energy Gas E.ON UK Npower SSE
Average direct debit £971 £1,010 £982 £999 £1,014 £966
Average standard credit £1,111 £1,035 £1,070 £1,063 £1,056 £1,024
Average PPM £1,062 £1,045 £1,144 £1,097 £1,126 £1,068
Source: Energywatch
It is no surprise then that some stakeholders believe there is a strong case to be answered by the Big Six
with regard to tacit collusion.
5.2 Business consumers
There are similar trends in concentration and discretionary competition in the business sector as in the
domestic sector. Five of the Big Six plus British Energy emerge as the most important suppliers. According
to Elexon data, Gaz de France Energy Supply Services is the only supplier with a non-privatised industry
heritage to hold a volume share of the electricity market in excess of 2%, although there are a few niche
providers with shares below that level. There has been broad stability in shares amongst the major players
in the business sector since the failure and withdrawal from the market by Maverick Energy and Atlantic
Gas and Electricity in 2004.
In fact in the business markets scarcely 2% of power volume is supplied by operators who do not own at
least one major power station. Consumers in the business sector are also suVering because the regional
nature of competitive energy markets often limits their choice of supplier, and it is commonplace for many
smaller business consumers to receive few oVers at renewal. Despite this business users have traditionally
been deemed commercially aware enough not to require the speciﬁc protections in place for household
consumers.
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But many small businesses in particular have a low level of knowledge of the opportunities open to them
from energy supply competition, especially when the use of diVerent brands by some of the major suppliers
can confuse, leaving them with the perception that there is more competition in the market than is actually
the case. They also have diYculties obtaining and evaluating oVers from competing suppliers, given a
perceived non-comparability of terms and a general lack of transparency. Energywatch pushed hard for—
and therefore welcomes—the provision for redress schemes to cover micro-business as well as household
users.
In November 2004, because we were concerned that the state of business markets was being neglected by
the regulator, Energywatch published a major report on business energy supply markets in Britain.176 This
report noted that supplier activity varied by sector and by negotiating round, and there will strong regional
characteristics in these markets. It also highlighted the need for much more structured and routine
information gathering on the health of these markets, which we concluded was worse than regulatory
statements suggested.
Many of the comments we made then still apply today. At various times since some of the major suppliers
have made plain the terms on which they wish to compete, if at all, in competitive business supply markets.
Two examples underline this point. E.ON UK posted a 20% year-on-year reduction in gas sales to industry
to 30 September 2006 reﬂecting “a focus on margin rather than volume”. Separately, Scottish Power’s chief
executive Philip Bowman talked of “deliberately constraining” the growth of his company’s supply business
in December 2006 because of its being “loss-making when measured against current wholesale prices”.
We believe these examples reﬂect the market power held by suppliers in the current trading environment.
They can choose the extent to which they wish to engage with consumers, which cannot be conducive to the
health of the sector.
5.3 Lack of innovation
Despite some signs of development around micro-generation, there is also a lack of innovation from six
large, slow-moving corporations more intent on retaining their powerful regional franchises rather than
seeking to develop new opportunities. Such innovation as there has been to date from the Big Six, like
wholesale price tracker oVerings and online tariVs, is tinkering around the edges and are unexceptional
changes in rapidly changing markets.
Major opportunities to deliver consumer beneﬁts are being over-looked or ignored. Areas where much
greater activity should be expected include:
— energy savings through more eYcient use facilitated by a large-scale roll out of smart metering.
Most consumers will still have to wait several years for real activity even if the regional franchise
proposal sponsored by the Energy Retail Association177 is implemented;
— the oVer of time-of-use tariVs; and
— the development of energy savings services and stimulation ofmicro-generation to improve supply
security and reduce emissions by cutting demand on the public network.
Whilst Energywatch notes with interest the recent launch of British Gas New Energy and other recent
energy service initiatives by some of the Big Six, we remain concerned that these companies see the delivery
of the low carbon agenda in terms of big supply-side projects in which only they can invest proﬁtably. We
think they are neglecting low cost, innovative demand-side measures that can reduce emissions quickly and
without signiﬁcant capital expenditure.
Although some opportunities have been pursued, these are through a facilitated regulatory framework
and not through genuine commercial innovation. The Big Six talk of low carbon being at the heart of their
businesses but only take actions when there are strong ﬁnancial incentives, such as through the Cert and the
RO. The energy services market has also failed to take oV, and progress with smart metering remains ﬁtful,
with the companies looking to government to mandate outcomes so they can in eVect recover their costs
(either developmental or stranded).
At the same time, while individual supplier performance can vary, the energy supply industry as a whole
is not good at billing its consumers and administering contracts. This situation prevails despite the “super-
complaint” made by Energywatch in 2004, and can unfortunately lead to heavy-handed treatment of
consumers who often correctly question erroneous bills. This treatment also acts as a general inhibitor of
consumers exercising their right to access competitivemarkets.Mis-selling has also proved an issue for some
consumers and, once they suVer from it, the experience can deter their participation in the competitive
market-place.
176 Energy business markets report.
177 ERA brieﬁng note.
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5.4 Barriers to entry in retail markets
At the same time the costs of new entry, including accreditation, are signiﬁcant and timescales protracted,
so existing players have limited incentives to change how they approach the market because there is no
credible competition. More importantly their inﬂuence is now such that they can also dictate the terms on
which they will change.
Recent years have a seen a number of new licences come forward in the gas sector, especially in
conjunction with the signiﬁcant development and expansion that has occurred in new gas infrastructure.
Many of these entrants are focussed on wholesale trading or are ﬁnancial traders, and it is noticeable that
there has been virtually no new entry into domestic supply.
The position in the electricity sector is much worse. Apart from some traders few new parties have
engaged in physical supply at wholesale or retail level. As we noted in chapter 3, despite the wholesale price
collapse in from summer 2006, there has been minimal new activity in the electricity supply markets despite
text book, supporting conditions.
There are a number of factors that have contributed to this, including:
— the complexity of the central trading arrangements and the costs of entry. Registration, transfer
and reconciliation processes are all very complex, and dependent on complex systems and
extensive rules;
— the problems we have identiﬁed arising from dysfunctionality in the wholesale markets, especially
electricity and their illiquidity, and the risk of exposure to penal cash-out prices;
— credit is a signiﬁcant problemwith multiple calls across industry codes and trading structures; and
— the economies of scale and the market power of the Big Six, which have become mutually
reinforcing.
There are particular issues that bite in the business markets. The regulator has failed to tackle anti-
competitive behaviour by acting slowly to counter the blocking of a transfer by incumbents reoVering on
notice of a transfer. More importantly the regulator has stood by as the all incumbent suppliers rewritten
their supply terms in ways designed to make customer switching much more diYcult. This combination of
circumstances, combined with the great information advantage the suppliers hold over their small business
customers, cedes signiﬁcant market power to the incumbents who are able to target their activity on
potential switchers at a cost funded by their wider customer base.
6. Failings of Regulatory Oversight
This chapter looks at the evolution of engagement by regulators over the gas and electricity sector,
focussing on responses by Ofgem since the lifting of price controls on the supply markets.
6.1 Consolidation by default
The regionalised nature of household energy supply competition is a direct function of the evolution of
the Big Six through corporate transactions rather than direct competition for consumers. None of the
transactions that created the Big Six has been properly scrutinised by the competition authorities even
though there has been signiﬁcant erosion in competition. For example no objections were raised by Ofgem
as the sectoral regulator when a scale player—TXU—failed in 2002 and its 5.5 million consumers were
acquired by E.ON UK. More recently Scottish Power has been acquired by Iberdrola, and rumours
suggesting that further takeovers or mergers are in the oYng are commonplace within the sector.
The parliamentary Public Accounts Committee warned in 2003 that Ofgem should take seriously the risk
that vertically integrated companies may exploit their position, and Ofgem “should adapt its competition
analysis of the wholesale market and the retail markets to reﬂect the new reality of the market”.178 Despite
this, there have been no studies of the implications of this reintegration, either in terms of the retail market
impacts or the state of wholesale trading (or the interactions between the two). The pervading feeling among
consumer groups is that our regulators have failed to act.
This position has given rise to a situation where large incumbent players enjoy strong market power and
where many consumers choose not to switch possibly because of the time and cost issues. It enables all
suppliers to price tactically often at premium rates in some areas for some domestic consumers in the full
knowledge that they will retain many of them. In business markets, particularly for those consumers with
non-standard load and/or multiple sites, it is frequently diYcult even after complex and costly approaches
to suppliers for consumers to see aggressive oVers. Multi-site consumers with non half hourly meters can
ﬁnd it particularly diYcult. This situation on the ground by no means reﬂects the vigorous or eVective
competition that our policymakers and regulators set out to achieve and whose existence they often invoke.
Against this backdrop levels of transparency and regulatory reporting are minimal and inadequate.
178 The new electricity trading arrangements in England and Wales, Second report of session 2003–04, House of Commons Public
Accounts Committee (1 December 2003).
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6.2 Minimalist oversight of supply
Traditionally, as an important part of the process of setting supply business price controls for each
company, Ofgem exercised a thorough—some would say intrusive—supervisory role over both gas and
electricity supply businesses. It routinely gathered information on costs, performance and returns for a
period of more than three years after the remaining supply franchises were removed and after the sector was
opened to full competition. As part of this oversight process the regulator would routinely check the
allocation of wholesale purchase contracts against diVerent consumer classes to ensure that consumers with
less choice were not treated in a discriminatory manner.
Controversially the remaining price controls were lifted in April 2002, as Ofgem believed—though many
disagreed—that retail markets were suYciently competitive to permit this. But areas identiﬁed as potentially
problematic for consumers at the time the decision to end price control, especially the treatment of
prepayment meters and consumers in Scotland with teleswitching, have not been addressed properly
although six years have since passed.
Since 2002 Ofgem has produced occasional reviews on the state of competition, which have tended to
focus almost exclusively on national switching levels. Its most recent analysis from June 2007 is on the
domestic market and based on data as at end March 2007 and is nearly one year old. It has not issued any
analysis on the business markets since summer 2003.179
6.3 Defending the incumbents
Ofgem has periodically addressed aspects of market operations, especially the wholesale price spikes that
have been a recurring feature of the British markets since October 2004. The main thrust of its analysis
has been:
— to point to supply limitations and competitive bottlenecks on the continent; and
— to attribute price excursions to “market sentiment”.
In response to dissatisfaction among some politicians and stakeholders over suppliers’ resistance to
curbing prices after the collapse in oil prices from mid 2006, Ofgem maintained that it was examining
supplier behaviour but that competition was fundamentally vigorous and eVective. No hard analysis was
presented to substantiate these claims beyond generalised, high-level switching data.
On 8 February 2007 the regulator described British Gas decision to cut prices in March that year as “the
ﬁrst shot in what Ofgem expects will be the start of another battle for consumers” It also went to some
lengths to explain what it described as the lag between wholesale and retail price falls as being helpful to
suppliers in delivering supply security.180 It also introduced the concept of “full cycle” costs, which seemed
to be short-hand term for allowing suppliers to over-recover from consumers at times of lower wholesale
prices.
At the time there was plenty of independent comment that contradicted Ofgem’s view, as the following
examples illustrate:
— “press reports of a price war among UK energy suppliers are, in our view, misleading. While the
industry no doubt welcomes the publicity the price cuts actually announced so far by Powergen
[initial new online oVers] andNpower are the minimal reaction we would expect to see in response
to Centrica’s new tariVs”; Citigroup comment 19 February 2007;
— “in our view, the recent price cuts do not constitute a price war. The magnitude of competitor
reductions across all tariVs will depend largely upon each company’s forward hedge position in
wholesale gas and power, and the assumed desire to repair retail margins, particularly in gas”;
Merrill Lynch comment 19 February 2007; and
— “The reductions result in Npower being marginally cheaper than British Gas (Centrica) on
average, although in their original franchise areas, we believe they will be marginally more
expensive. Although this has been trailed as an intensiﬁcation of a price war, we disagree. We see
it as further evidence of the disciplined nature of the market, given that Npower has moved prices
to almost in line with Centrica. We would expect others to follow suit over the next few weeks”;
UBS comment 19 February 2007.
And with the launch of its latest price probe inquiry on 21 February 2008 Alistair Buchanan, the chief
executive of Ofgem, said “We, of course, keep the market under constant surveillance but to date we have
seen no clear evidence that the market is failing.” Again there was no analysis presented in support of these
statements.
energywatch ﬁnds it extremely disconcerting that the industry regulator—whose primary duty is the
protection of consumer interests—should be making the case for energy suppliers’ price movements. We
also ﬁnd it disingenuous for the regulator, as it often does, to represent prices from the wholesale forward
curves as representative of suppliers costs when the leading players are signiﬁcantly integrated. It has itself
179 It requested views on the market in November 2005, but took no tangible steps as a consequence subsequently. The earlier
review is Review of competition in the non-domestic gas and electricity supply sectors. Initial ﬁndings (July 2003).
180 Ofgem press release (February 2007).
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highlighted the ability of upstream electricity producers to earn windfall gains both in the past and, more
recently, going forward.181 In fact we would say its is mutually inconsistent for the regulator to highlight
this practice and then assert retail markets—which are the means of recovering these arbitrary costs from
consumers—are properly competitive, as it has done consistently over the past three months.
We fear there is a signiﬁcant gap between the reality of the market and the regulator’s rhetoric.
6.4 Dangers of self-regulation
The industry left to its own devices has a verymixed record. The scandal ofmis-selling earlier in the decade
saw many consumers switched fraudulently and without their knowledge. Further many consumers have
found that as reﬂected in continuing high levels of complaints the service they receive has deteriorated
irrespective of whether they have switched.
Regulatory moves to improve the situation for consumers have been dominated by Energywatch, rather
than Ofgem, as the following examples illustrate:
— we launched our “Stop now” campaign in January 2002 to cut out mis-selling. This ultimately led
to an industry code of practice,182 which has substantially reduced the problem;
— in June 2003, we were instrumental in creating the consumer transfer programme, an energy
industry-wide initiative to improve the switching process for consumers;183 and
— in 2003 we launched a “Better billing”184 campaign to highlight our growing exasperation with the
harm such practices were causing consumers, and minimal attempts to address them prompted us
to raise a billing super-complaint,185 which has led to the establishment of a billing ombudsman
by the industry.
Whilst we acknowledge that signiﬁcant eVorts have been undertaken by the industry to address these
issues once they have been escalated, a common theme emerges which causes us great concern. It is other
organisations that have highlighted these consumer issues and prompted the regulator to become involved
in some action. Moreover, and despite it’s recently announced “Consumer ﬁrst” initiative, we detect in its
activities a worrying tendency from Ofgem to keep itself distant from real consumer issues and leave them
to others. There is also a worrying tendency for Ofgem to put the onus on energy suppliers to resolve the
issues once they have become ﬁxed in the media spotlight.
Even though Ofgem may believe it is practising “light touch” regulation, we believe this disengagement
is creating poorer conditions for consumers and will leave signiﬁcant legacy issues once Energywatch is
disbanded.Any arguments that the energy ombudsman scheme is a good example of self-regulation are also,
in our opinion, undermined because it was action by an outside body, in this case Energywatch raising the
super-complaint, which prompted the scheme to be developed.
Recent statements from the regulator have highlighted the merits of increasing self-regulation within the
industry, seemingly as a consequence of managing its own costs following the self-imposition of a RPI-X
control on its costs. energywatch sees this as a worrying tendency given Ofgem track record of reluctant
engagement and its readiness to act as an apologist for the Big Six.
7. Conclusions
There is now a growing body of evidence that shows competition is less robust in Britain than generally
asserted by regulators, and this publication has synthesised some of the arguments and evidence. This
chapter summarises the main reasons why energywatch ﬁrmly believes that energy markets are failing
British consumers, why the sectoral regulator is not responsive to these problems and why there must be a
referral to the Competition Commission. Ultimately the enjoyment of higher gross switching rates means
little when there is no eVective competition for many consumers and where the Big Six can exert signiﬁcant
inﬂuence over the prices they oVer.
In this publication energywatch has identiﬁed a range of signiﬁcant deﬁciencies and questions that require
urgent consideration. We believe the various questions that follow should form the basis of a referral to the
Competition Commission under its Enterprise Act powers.
181 Ofgem press release (February 2008).
182 Energywatch press release (3 June 2003).
183 Energywatch press release (11 June 2003).
184 Energywatch press release (13 May 2003).
185 Energywatch Better billing referral (May 2005).
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7.1 Wholesale market failings
It is clear that the wholesalemarkets in both gas and electricity sharemany of the characteristics identiﬁed
by the European Commission in its recent critique of Europe’s energy markets. The British market has a
much longer record of liberalisation than virtually all of our continental counter-parts, but this should not
obscure a critical appreciation of how our own wholesale markets are working.
Energywatch believes there is suYcient evidence to suggest these markets, especially the wholesale
electricity market, is operating in a way that should deeply concern policy makers and regulators. These
concerns are ampliﬁed given that the Big Six use the forward curve as the basis of pricing through the
supply chain.
We have identiﬁed several questions with regard to the operation of the wholesale market that require
further scrutiny, including:
— have levels of vertical integration gone “too far” and is the resulting industry structure materially
undermining competition in wholesale markets;
— what characteristics deﬁne liquid wholesale markets and what are the impediments to their
realisation in Britain;
— have independent generators and smaller suppliers been forced out of themarket or are they facing
unfair access as a result of the operation of the wholesale markets;
— do suppliers with electricity generation or gas production interests, or with long-term contracts
with independent generators and gas producers, have excessive information and control over the
market; and
— does the operation of cash-outmechanisms in gas and electricity aggravate problems of fair access,
unnecessarily increasing risk and barriers to entry?
7.2 Market linkages
The incumbents’ recent argument that they individually have been exposed to the same increases in costs
derived from market prices is incorrect, and access to in-house production and legacy contracts mean that
they are shielded from signiﬁcant elements of the recent wholesale cost increases. In some cases such as new
environmental costs these costs are being passed through ahead of the point at which these costs fell on
suppliers The practice of basing tariV increases and contracts price oVers on forward prices has greatly
exaggerated consumers’ prices and resulted in windfall proﬁts being earned by upstream activities in both
generation and gas production, in addition to those already acknowledged to arise from carbon trading.
We have identiﬁed several questions with regard to the interaction of wholesale and retail markets that
require further scrutiny, including:
— do the pricing policies of the Big Six enable excessive production and generation proﬁts to be
passed through the supply chain to de facto captive consumers through retail tariVs;
— what transfer prices are used in internal transactions between upstream and downstream
businesses;
— to what extent are the Big Six exposed to market prices;
— to what extent are large suppliers misrepresenting wholesale and environmental costs in their
retail prices;
— do suppliers have the ability to earn exaggerated margins through their supply businesses as a
consequence; and
— what constitutes a reasonable level of margin in retail markets?
7.3 Retail market failings
The retail markets are dominated by a small group of scale utilities sustaining their businesses up the
supply chain through strong revenues from a predominantly regional consumer base that has many de facto
captive consumers. These players pursue essentially similar pricing strategies in the knowledge that there is
little realistic threat of competitive entry. This characteristic is illustrated by the similarity in pricing to key
target consumers despite diVerent costs. It appears that the primary purpose of the supply business of the
Big Six suppliers is to provide a route to market for their in-house generation.
Further competition in regional markets for gas and electricity consumers is not as vigorous as national
measures suggest, with multiple switchers swelling the headline statistics. There is still a lack of real choice
for many consumers outside of dual fuel, direct debit consumer propositions, especially for those who are
vulnerable or are on lower incomes, and they continue to be disadvantaged in relative terms.
Innovation has been constrained and that the development of advanced metering and energy services
remains largely dormant. Service is below standard, with billing proving obdurately inaccurate sustaining
high levels of disputes.
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Barriers to market entry prevent any realistic competitive threat emerging in the retail markets to a
comfortable oligopoly, especially in the domestic markets. Consumers are paying for that lack of diversity
through higher prices than necessary. There is also a noticeable lack of diVerentiation between the large
suppliers. With all of them moving their prices typically within a few weeks of each other and by similar
degrees, the eVect on consumers eventually is very similar—higher bills.
We have identiﬁed several questions relating to the retail markets that require further scrutiny, including:
— how vigorous is competition at the local level and by consumer type;
— is there evidence of tacit collusion in price setting;
— how should eVective retail competition be deﬁned and what criteria should be applied in assessing
competition in these markets;
— why is new entry especially in electricity not occurring on any scale despite volatile commodity
prices;
— do complex licensing, code requirements and centralised trading arrangements eVectively impose
a barrier to entry; and
— if so, how can they be simpliﬁed?
7.3 Failings in regulatory oversight
Throughout the turbulence of the last four years Ofgem has been complacent at best and negligent at
worst. It has consistently refused to consider taking steps to investigate energy utility prices and proﬁts. It
makes too many generalisations about the state of competition based on the market for direct debit dual
fuel consumers and high-level gross switching data. It fails to recognise prices across the board are artiﬁcially
high. It relies on the possibility of new entry to act as a constraint on abusive behaviour by suppliers, but
it oversees industry codes that in energywatch’s view constitute a signiﬁcant barrier to entry in the domestic
markets. It has belatedly and reluctantly agreed to conduct a price probe into supply markets but has done
so grudgingly, and still insists there is no evidence that markets are not working properly.
energywatch welcomes the focus of the Business and Enterprise Committee on the eVectiveness of
regulation of the gas and electricity sector, and we believe in many important respects Ofgem’s exercise of
its brief has been inadequate, aggravating the detriment caused by the high and volatile consumer prices.
We believe Ofgem is failing in its duty to consumers because its views of the markets it regulates are partial,
and it is unwilling to engage in real consumer issues. It’s publication of analysis on the sector is sporadic
and narrowly focussed. Its developing role in Europe is encouraging it in its selective view of the British
market, and its preoccupation with reform on the mainland is also increasing the distraction of resources
it deploys away from its key activity. We would like to see a much more lucid focus by the regulator on the
pattern of competitive activity and its distribution among diVerent types of consumer.
Moreover, the regulator is actively promoting what it believes to be a light touch regime and putting
increasing emphasis on the companies it oversees to regulate important aspects of their own aVairs, which
can only worsen the consumer position as energy suppliers control more and more of their own conduct.
We have identiﬁed several questions relating to the performance of Ofgem with regard to oversight of
electricity and gas markets, including:
— what on-going surveillance of these markets is carried out;
— what is an acceptable standard and how can market reporting and transparency be improved; and
— how can regulatory accountability with regard to market surveillance and reporting be improved.
7.4 Remedies
There are various available policy remedies, all of which we believe have diVering degrees of merit. The
principal ones include:
— disclosure of trading information: companies above a deﬁned size that have both production and
supply interests should be compelled to disclose and publish suYciently disaggregated information
so that stakeholders can see what real trading is occurring and at what prices. All the major
suppliers should report segmented ﬁnancial and operating data about their electricity and gas
production and retailing operations to a robust and explicit standard that Ofgem should develop,
with clear information being recorded on the returns made by individual activities, but especially
gas and electricity supply;
— regulatory reporting requirements: there needs to be greater regulatory scrutiny of purchase costs
to ensure that only costs which companies can demonstrate that they are actually incurring should
be capable of pass-through. This scrutiny has been part of the British regulatory regime previously
and we think it should be reinstated;
— mandatory trading: producers and generators could be required to trade a deﬁned level of out-put
with non-aYliated entities. An alternative mechanism would be to reimpose the self-supply limit
that used to be enforced by the generation licence;
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— simplifying market rules and entry requirements: the current market rules are presently
fragmented but very complex. A fundamental make-over is required if smaller, low carbon
operators are to be able to access markets and consumers fairly;
— supply price control: the reintroduction of direct supply price controls to protect consumer
interests should be seen as a last, though possibly necessary, resort. We think the scale of the
current market failure is such that only a period of direct supply price controls may be necessary
to rebuild consumer conﬁdence in competitive energy markets; and
— ultimately, if other measures are considered insuYcient, divestment of plant or function.
APPENDIX 1
PRICE MOVEMENTS BY THE BIG SIX SINCE 2004
(%) Electricity Gas EVective Date
E.ON UK 0.0 3.1 6 Sep 2004
EDF Energy 3.8 3.5 13 Sep 2004
British Gas 9.4 12.4 20 Sep 2004
RWE Npower 7.6 11.8 1 Oct 2004
Scottish Power 8.0 11.8 4 Oct 2004
E.ON UK 8.9 9.6 29 Nov 2004
EDF Energy 5.4 8.1 17 Jan 2005
Scottish and Southern 6.7 9.1 1 Mar 2005
Scottish Power 0.0 2.6 1 Apr 2005
EDF Energy 12.0 10.7 5 Aug 2005
E.ON UK 11.9 7.2 31 Aug 2005
British Gas 14.2 14.2 19 Sep 2005
Scottish Power 12.0 5.0 17 Oct 2005
Scottish and Southern 8.9 13.6 1 Jan 2006
RWE Npower 12.0 13.7 1 Jan 2006
Scottish Power 8.0 15.0 1 Mar 2006
British Gas 22.0 22.0 1 Mar 2006
E.ON UK 18.4 24.4 10 Mar 2006
EDF Energy 4.7 14.7 13 Mar 2006
RWE Npower 13.4 15.0 31 Mar 2006
Scottish and Southern 9.4 16.5 1 May 2006
Scottish Power 10.0 17.0 1 Jul 2006
EDF Energy 8.0 19.0 31 Jul 2006
E.ON UK 9.7 18.4 21 Aug 2006
British Gas 9.4 12.4 1 Sep 2006
RWE Npower 9.9 17.2 1 Oct 2006
Scottish and Southern 9.4 12.2 1 Jan 2007
Scottish and Southern "5.0 "12.0 1 Mar 2007
British Gas "11.0 "17.0 12 Mar 2007
British Gas "6.0 "3.0 26 Apr 2007
RWE Npower "3.0 "16.0 30 Apr 2007
E.ON UK "5.0 "16.0 30 Apr 2007
EDF Energy 0.0 "10.6 15 Jun 2007
Scottish Power "5.5 "16.5 15 Jun 2007
RWE Npower 12.7 17.2 4 Jan 2008
EDF Energy 7.9 12.9 18 Jan 2008
British Gas 15.0 15.0 18 Jan 2008
Scottish Power 14.0 15.0 2 Feb 2008
E.ON UK 9.7 15.0 8 Feb 2008
Scottish and Southern 14.2 15.8 1 Apr 2008
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APPENDIX 2
EXITS FROM THE LARGE GENERATION MARKET SINCE 2000
Plant type/name MW Tech Seller Purchaser Date
Sutton Bridge 790 gas Enron EDF Energy Mar 2000
Corby 2 350 gas Dominion Powergen Sep 2000
Humber Power 1,260 gas Consortium Centrica, Elf Jun 2001
Peterborough/Kings Lynn 705 gas TXU Centrica Aug 2001
Ferrybridge 2,000 coal Edison Mission AEP Oct 2001
Fiddlers Ferry 2,000 coal Edison Mission AEP Oct 2001
West Burton 2,000 coal TXU EDF Energy Nov 2001
Brigg 240 gas IVO Energy Centrica Jun 2002
Roosecote 229 gas Receivers (formerly Centrica May 2003
owned by Lakeland
Power)
Barry 240 gas AES Centrica Jul 2003
Medway 700 gas AES/EDF Scottish and Southern Oct 2003
Energy
Fife 120 gas El Paso Scottish and Southern Feb 2004
Energy
Damhead Creek 800 gas Banks (formerly Scottish Power Jun 2004
owned by Entergy)
Killingholme 660 gas Banks (formerly Centrica Jun 2004
owned by NRG)
FFF 4,000 coal Banks (formerly Scottish and Southern Jul 2004
owned by AEP) Energy
Shoreham 200 gas AEP Scottish Power Sep 2004
Enﬁeld 392 gas NRG E.ON UK May 2005
Saltend 1,200 gas Calpine International Power Jul 2005
Yarmouth 420 gas BP RWE Npower Oct 2005
Drax 4,000 coal Banks (formerly ﬂotation Dec 2005
owned by AES)
Teesside Power 1,800 gas Teesside Power Ltd Gaz de France/Suez Feb 2008
APPENDIX 3
EXITS FROM THE SUPPLY MARKETS SINCE 2000
Supplier Date Comment
Independent Energy 2000 Company failure with contracts procured from its
administrator by npower.
Enron Direct 2001 Trade sale to Centrica after failure of parent company.
Amerada 2002 Supply operation acquired by TXU Europe.
Electricity Direct 2002 Successful trade sale to Centrica.
TXU Europe 2002 Company placed in administration; contracts acquired by
Powergen.
Exxon Mobil 2002 Company’s gas supply contracts acquired by TotalFinaElf.
Maverick Energy 2003 Company placed in administration; contracts assumed by
Atlantic Electric and Gas.
UK Electric Power 2003 Company withdraws from market by refusing to renew
contracts with customers.
Shell Gas Direct 2003 Exit from the power market on commercial grounds by a
leading supplier of gas to business customers.
Atlantic Electric and Gas 2004 Company placed in to administration ahead of sale of
contracts to Scottish and Southern Energy.
BP Gas Marketing 2004 Reported to be letting gas supply contracts lapse rather than
renew.
Team Group 2005 Administration. Contributed to Utility Link failure.
Customers to EDF Energy.
Egni 2005 Administration. Contributed to Utility Link failure.
Utilita 2005 Managed transfer of customers to EDF Energy.
Eledor 2005 Administration—licence revoked. SOLR invoked with
customers to Npower.
Reepham 2005 Administration—licence revoked. SOLR invoked with
customers to British Gas.
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Supplier Date Comment
Utility Link 2006 Administration—licence revoked. SOLR invoked with
customers to EDF Energy.
Greenwich Energy 2006 Administration. Customers to EDF Energy
Zest 4 2006 Administration—licence revoked. SOLR invoked with
customers to British Gas.
Telecom Plus 2006 RWE takes customers and acquires call option on 29% share
of Telecom Plus.
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Further supplementary evidence by energywatch
COMPETITION REPORT ON THE GB GAS AND POWER MARKETS
AN ENERGYWATCH DISCUSSION PAPER
1. Executive Summary
Research by energywatch has uncovered evidence showing systematic uncompetitive behaviour in the
wholesale gas and electricity markets. The last four years have seen gas producers and power generators
increasingly bypass their open, forward markets in favour of oV-market long-term contracts. The resulting
impact on wholesale market competition was cited as a recurrent problem by a majority of the 45 industry
respondents we spoke to. Electricity buyers had complained of generators spurning the forward power
exchange whilst a recently growing number of gas buyers reported a similar pattern evolving in the
behaviour of gas producers, who have essentially “boycotted” the long-dated wholesale market when it
comes to delivering gas in very large volumes.
The role played by oV-market transactions has signiﬁcantly reduced liquidity in both forward markets.
This has restricted competition in the wholesale gas market and almost cancelled competition completely
in the power market. The suppression of liquidity has induced a vicious circle of deteriorating price
transparency and higher volatility, preventing market-makers from entering the market and thus lower
liquidity still.
Ultimately the wholesale market becomes so susceptible to signiﬁcant long-dated buying activity and
bereft of trustworthy forward prices which buyers can lock into (or hedge against) that they ﬁnd themselves
having to enter into costly “oV-market” deals (such as so-called “ﬂexible contracts”) with the same
producers or generators whose oV-market trading policies caused liquidity to shrink in the ﬁrst place.
Another response has been for buyers to buy a ﬁnancial swap from a merchant bank. However, such price
insurance introduces its own new cost and this rises with increasing volatility in the underlying wholesale
market. Whichever way buyers seek to mitigate the liquidity problem, an additional layer of commission is
involved which is ultimately borne by the end-user.
Mergers and acquisitions among gas producers and vertically-integrated generators, combined with the
exit of US merchants from 2003, had combined to altar the competitive structure of the GB markets. In our
research, we found that today’smarket incumbents have collectively curtailed their over-the-counter trading
activities in their forward markets. Instead of selling volume on a forward basis in the wholesale market,
producers and generators have increasingly made long-dated deliveries only possible on oV-market “long-
term contracts” or via “ﬂexible contracts”. Both these contracts are non-standard and not generally re-
tradable; they also keep all transaction prices and related energy volumes secret from the marketplace. This
practice was widely believed to have signiﬁcantly reduced transparency in the forward market. It has also
caused liquidity levels to fall further still as new entrant traders, merchant generators, independent suppliers
and industry buyers found themselves eVectively “shut out” of the forward market. The “market exit” and
“non-entry” of these players has caused liquidity to decline further and this cycle is essentially self-
reinforcing. This has increased volatility in both prompt prices and especially in long-dated prices posted out
on the forward curve. Consequently, market volatility has reached unprecedented levels and it has risen in
unison with the higher forward prices posted by producers and generators.
Wholesale prices are being driven higher still as the higher volatility is being used to justify higher “risk
premiums” for selling on a long-dated basis, whether the volume is supplied on the wholesale market or,
increasingly, under “long-term contracts” or under “ﬂexible contracts”. Energywatch calculates that the
resulting increase in the risk premium alone has increased long-dated wholesale gas and power prices by
around 15%.
Another competition-distorting impact identiﬁed was the regime of oil-price indexation in long-term gas
contracts. The eVect of ﬁxing gas prices to oil also rolls onto the power market since gas sets the marginal
generating cost in winter. Oil prices, directly or indirectly, were found to dictate ﬁnal long-term gas prices.
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An underlying long-term gas contract now covers almost 90% of all supplies into the GB system.
International oil markets are thus ﬁxing both wholesale gas and power prices. This contractual price
distortion only exists because the gas producers are collectively selling such a high percentage of their long-
dated volumes oV-market, instead of making this supply available on the wholesale market. Energywatch
has learned of gas producers collectively curtailing their forward trading operations. In just one case, a
signiﬁcant North Sea gas producer/UK marketer had its forward gas trading operation closed by the
acquiring gas producer soon after these two US majors had merged.
Oil-indexed long-term contracts exert a coupling-eVect on wholesale markets. They tie up the main gas
volumes on long term contracts ranging from anything between 5 to 25 years and this signiﬁcantly reduces
forward market liquidity. They also undermine gas-versus-gas competition as a long-dated market is made
superﬂuous when the forward price is steered by oil prices.
Consequently, the wholesale gas and power markets are structurally ﬂawed. The chosen trading policies
of producers and generators are responsible. The companies have behaved in a coherent fashion simply
because the current regime gives them all common incentives to restrict supply on forward market in favour
of oV-market deals. This has inevitably led to widespread suspicion of tacit collusion. It is simply policy
ﬁxing, not price ﬁxing as such, although the competition and price impacts will be identical.
The market evidence that illustrates the absence of eVective competition in gas and power is also
emerging. For example, some 15 years after privatisation, the forwardGBpowermarket is practically closed
for business. No meaningful forward trading exists more than two months out on the UK Power Exchange
today. However, electricity trading liquidity inGerman powermarket has already overtaken theGBmarket
whose liquidity has fallen by almost 75% since 2003. Despite a head-start over its EU peers, the GB market
also has one of the lowest churn rates in Europe. Even on the gas side, most of the respondents we discussed
this with expect the Dutch Title Transfer Facility to overtake the National Balancing Point as a principal
liquidity hub very soon. Again, it is not a question of physical gas, pipeline or terminal capacity, which are
plentiful, but the forward trading policies of producers and generators which have led to this new situation.
With the pricing problem entrenched in the forward markets, the suppliers simply pass down the price
increases to their customers. The higher posted prices in the forwardmarket (in the instances where the same
producers and generators supply on a forward basis) are then used to justify these higher prices. Despite an
improving GB supply and demand picture, the “Gas Year 2008–09” contract for gas increased by over 44%
while that for electricity increased by 45% between 1 June and 31 December last year and forward prices
have continued rising since. Contractual gas price indexation to oil prices remains a major distorting factor
that explains this increase. Further, barely one third of this price increase has yet been reﬂected in domestic
energy price increases. A new wave of price rises is thus inevitable unless urgent action is taken to resolve
the liquidity stalemate and also the contract issues which have been driving up wholesale prices in both
markets to artiﬁcially high levels. Above all, the market anomalies which incentivise producers and
generators to boycott their forwardmarkets need to be removed. Obligations on them to trademore volume
openly, on a forward and over-the-counter basis are required now. The market evidence and witness
statements that Energywatch has gathered underline the need for an early referral to the Competition
Commission.
The GB wholesale markets are not working well and a “business as usual” stance is no longer viable. We
also need to refrain from the almost Kafkan logic of asserting that there can be no role for a Competition
Commission inquiry until deﬁnitive evidence of policy collusion or of direct price collusion is produced.
Indeed, the Competition Commission was speciﬁcally set up and given the eVective investigative powers
required so as to ﬁnd this very evidence. No previous inquiry by Ofgem has concluded there is any problem
in wholesale markets that needs to be addressed. So the anti-trust lawyers and international industry
specialists in the Competition Commission, who should recognise any “de facto” cartel behaviour problem,
must be allowed to tackle this matter once and for all.
A referral to the Competition Commission may well impose some compliance costs on the gas producers
and generators involved. But in this equation, we also need to consider the ﬁnancial burden on the consumer.
Regulatory inaction is already weighing heavily on householders, British industry and increasingly on the
stability of the economy.
The market investigation regime contained in the Enterprise Act exists to address the very type of
competition concerns that the majority of our respondents identiﬁed. The market distortions and perverse
incentives that encourage anti-competitive behaviour can however be ameliorated by the Competition
Commission, promptly in our view.
On a ﬁnal and positive note, energywatch believes that intervention options already exist which could
have a positive and early impact on wholesale market competition. These may include tried and tested
measures, as implemented successfully in theUS andUKmarkets during the 1980s. Indeed, the requirement
on producers to foster (rather than boycott) their trading exchanges and to support over-the-counter trading
generally are already working now to various degrees in Continental Europe. Robust liquidity-enhancing
measures are also required for the GB gas and power market to recover and not a moment longer should
be wasted.
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2. Biography
I, DominicWhittome, have worked in the industry for 19 years, having trained as an economist. I started
analysing the energy markets in 1987 when I prepared my postgraduate dissertation into cartel behaviour
and pricing in oil futures markets. I went on to work as commercial analyst, contract negotiator and trader
for Statoil UK, Mobil North Sea and Agip UK. In 1997, I moved to power and worked for EDF Energy
as Head of Gas Trading. Since 2004, I have served as an advisor to commercial and government energy
organisations.
In January this year, Allan Asher asked me to assess the eYciency of the GB gas and electricity markets.
With a background as a buyer and a seller, I hope to provide an impartial and insider’s account on what is
happening in our wholesale and retail markets today.
3. Approach
This report is essentially a qualitative analysis, based on the viewpoints and actual evidence provided by
some forty people working within the industry. They were chosen from a wide cross-section of the gas and
electricity supply chain. Throughout this paper, I also interweave trading experience of my own. The
assertions made will be on the basis of supporting evidence and testimonies provided over the interviews;
forty in total.
The report incorporates contributions made by Allan Asher and his colleagues at energywatch. It also
beneﬁts from additional insights provided by the Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory
Reform, the OYce of Gas and Electricity Markets and DGCOMP and DGTREN of the European
Commission.
The interviews were conducted either over the telephone or in person. The market participants oVered
their own views on the matters aVecting today’s markets. In many cases, the respondents also volunteered
evidence based on their own experiences working within the companies concerned. These comments, as they
relate to evidence of collusion and copycat behaviour, are included in this report. Also included is factual
market and circumstantial evidence which I have assembled.
4. Objective
The main task of this exercise is to establish whether or not GB gas and electricity prices are being
determined eYciently. It will try to identify whether dominant players are acting in active collusion or tacit
collusion, both with the same eVect. This last point is important because a structurally-ﬂawed market will
involve speciﬁc, common commercial drivers that induce players to act in consort and distort end-user prices
as if they were actively colluding.
I will include verbatim quotes from witness statements and discuss supporting evidence186 where this is
relevant. Aswell as themarkets and price changes themselves, I will focus speciﬁcally on the new competitive
situation in both wholesale markets, notably in power which has become more centralised. The main aim
will be to establish whether or not prices have been over-reacting to market fundamentals, which may result
in additional costs that consumers could avoid in an eYciently-operating market. In this regard, I will also
examine the evolving role of the derivatives sector and the role played by ﬁnancial intermediaries. I will
discuss the price-ﬁxing services (ormarket in “swaps”) provided bymerchant banks.While such services can
be very useful, they could be avoided altogether inmarkets that make adequate long-dated forward supplies
available, with robust, undistorted forward price signals so users can hedge directly.
5. Definitions
To ensure everyone is conversant with the terms and jargon that is unavoidable in such a report, a quick
run-through of deﬁnitions should be useful. Some of you may wish to skip to Section 6.
(i)Wholesale Market
The wholesale market; forward187 market (which here refers to “long-dated” delivery, ie over six months
forward or “on the curve”); spot market (short-dated, prompt or balancing) and “over-the-counter market”
(abbreviated to the OTC) are one and the same.
Thewholesalemarket is where gas and electricity volumes are sold openly; traded between counter-parties
under standard and hence tradable contracts. Delivery can be agreed for any supply duration and may
commence at any forward delivery date. OTC trades are usually executed through a broker or exchange,
electronically or over the telephone.
186 On the question of obtaining the “hard evidence”, this is not strictly the role of a watchdog or a regulator but a body such
as the Competition Commission with the proper investigative authority; this report should simply assess whether or not there
are sensible grounds for any referral.
187 As distinct from the futures market, which is operated by ICE (Intercontinental Exchange, formerly the IPE (International
Petroleum Exchange)). This derivative is cleared through the exchange, not between counter-parties; futures contracts are
cash-settled whereas a forward contract may lead to physical delivery.
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The executed OTC trades can be registered with pricing reporters and published in pricing bulletins, such
as Heren and Argus. OTC trades are also posted on the electronic bulletin boards of energy brokers and
power exchanges. OTC transactions therefore play a key role in establishing “headline” wholesale prices for
next-day, next-month, next-year delivery, and so on. It is this open, public display of OTC-traded prices that
enables “price discovery” to develop along the forward curve. Buyer and sellers alike thus have a degree of
certainty and conﬁdence in price transparency of the markets they are trading in and possibly also
investing in.
However, the GB wholesale markets operate in parallel with an “oV-market” trading environment: the
arena of “long-term contracts”. These contracts are secret, bespoke agreements negotiated between large
buyers and large sellers and their price remains conﬁdential throughout the contract term. A long-term
contract can commit a gas supply for anything between ﬁve and 25 years. The contract terms can be longer
still in the case of electricity.
Individual long-term contracts can contain any variety of contract price indexation terms, against which
the base price will escalate over the contract term. In the case of gas, the contract price is generally indexed
to the price of oil and petroleum products.
For example, the escalation formula for a gas contract price P(t) in a long-term contract, where the base
price P(0) is agreed at the outset of the negotiation, might look like—
P(t) % P(0) x (50% Crude Index ! 25% Heating Oil Index ! 25% Producer Price Index
Indexation formulae, oV-take volumes, nominations and delivery terms will vary from contract to
contract. This is in stark contrast to the open OTC market, with only the price, the supply rate (volume)
and contract term (start and end dates) to decide.
There has been a trend in recent years to escalate long-term gas contract prices, especially those of shorter
length, toOTCprices188 as traded for delivery at theNational Balancing Point (NBP).However, a long-term
contract is still an oV-market transaction and the volumes they govern will not be registered on reporters’ or
brokers’ price bulletin boards.
It is worth appreciating that there is nothing to prevent a producer or importer deciding to sell a long-term
gas supply on the OTCmarket. A largish volume of gas could just as easily be sold in blocks on standard and
tradable agreements. In fact, much of the gas volumes are sold on an OTC basis in the States, ever since the
FERC189 liberalised the US market in the mid-1980s. Subject to adequate market liquidity, any forward
volume can be sold and risk-managed using the standard trading contracts used on the OTC market. If
wholesale market liquidity is robust, the necessity for keeping long-term contracts will decline.We will later
explain statements given by respondents who will testify to the sheer dominance of long-term contracts,
which account for over 85% of all sourced gas sold into the GBmarket today. These contracts were asserted
to “crowd out” liquidity in the wholesale market and reduce trading volumes and price transparency levels
that are required for eYcient forward pricing to be possible.
(ii) Reference Prices
As we are interested in trend prices, we will refer to forward Gas Year prices as traded in the wholesale
market. This Gas Year price pertains to both gas and electricity volumes. The price is unaVected by
transitory events, seasonal or short-term factors, which should aVect only the shorter-term prices during the
year. In short, we are looking at the “bell-weather” price, which enables us to compare successive prices
against one another. It will thus give a snapshot of the wholesale market price level at any one time. This
Forward price is also often used as a guide price for establishing P(o) when buyers and sellers sit down to
establish the base price at the start of their long-term contract negotiations.
The electricity prices discussed as shown on graphs will be for base-load power volumes covering the same
periods as gas. So “Gas Year 2008–09” electricity volumes will start from 1 October, 2008 through to 30
September, 2009; Gas Year “2009–10” volumes from 1 October, 2009 to 30 September, 2010, and so on.
6. Background Trends
(i) Overview
The forward curves below show a relatively stable picture in the gas and electricity wholesale markets
between 1997 and 2004. The signiﬁcant price rises that followed were accompanied by stark increases in
market volatility. Prior to this, Gas Year prices proved generally much more resilient to transitory factors
and to changing market perceptions as to future supply and demand. In fact, the forward year price should
only reﬂect changes in long-term supply and demand expectations. They should not, in theory, react to
188 But this raises a second question: if you price against an OTC index anyway then why are parties still keen to trade oV the
OTC and on bi-lateral contracts instead?
189 The Federal Energy Regulation Committee; essentially the US equivalent of Ofgem.
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transitory factors or within-year eVects, unless very signiﬁcant changes have happened which are perceived
permanent, or to last into the next Gas Year, ie up to 12–24 months ahead or 24–36 months in the case of
the following Gas Year.
In the background, it is important to dispel the urban myth about “gas shortages” when in fact there is
no shortage of gas or any perceived shortage. Whether sourced from the UK or Norwegian North Sea,
North Africa, Russia or from other African and Eastern countries, the actual point of production is
irrelevant once prices exceed the long-run marginal cost of delivery.
Indeed, the GB market will enjoy access to a greater diversity of gas supplies than ever before due to
infrastructure improvements. If the wholesale market was eYcient, then one would expect traders’
expectations as to forward supply and demand to be reﬂected into forward Gas Year prices. It would seem
odd therefore to see Gas Year prices gyrating dramatically as we enter an era of improving fundamentals.
Long-term electricity fundamentals are more of a concern perhaps, although the diversity options are
greater still. However, the graph of forward Gas Year prices below shows electricity prices taking their cue
almost directly from gas. Gas prices essentially “set” power prices in winter when gas is the marginal
generation input fuel, being more expensive than imported coal. Because power prices track gas prices, the
impact of any anomaly felt in the gas market will automatically roll onto the power market. Indeed, much
of the forward trading in electricity today is on a spark-spread basis, ie with an equal and opposite trade in
gas executed each time. As we shall discuss later, genuine forward trading in GB electricity has practically
been stopped.
(ii) Prices in Perspective
From the start of 2003, which marked the end of a period of relative stability, to the middle of 2006, gas
and electricity prices soared by over 220% and 195% respectively.Whilemarket expectations as to the future
supply and demand picture had been changing somewhat, the underlying fundaments alone did not come
close to justifying price increases of this magnitude. Global oil prices had played a part and it is important
to assess this impact. The question to ask is whether the jump in wholesale prices has been exaggerated, by
players actively colluding or by amarket that is so deﬁcient that it essentially “rigs itself” and players behave
tacitly: they needn’t bother colluding if their commercial incentives are so obvious and common to them all.
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The price of any commodity that trades above its long-marginal cost will be determined by the structure
of the market into which it is sold. Our discussion will need to look at not just the wholesale market but at
the “parallel world” of long-term contracts, “oV market” agreements that are being ﬁxed to oil prices.
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(iii) Value Chain
The diagrams below illustrate the approximate costs and proﬁt margins secured along the supply chain.
It should be noted that generation margins do vary considerably. These may be obscured by the almost
complete degree of vertical-integration in the electricity sector.
In some interviews, respondents have suggested that power generators have been selling electricity to
“larger, prized customers” and also to their own supply businesses at wholesale prices below those posted
on the forward market in order to thwart competition. This matter was commonly cited as a “barrier to
entry” by new entrant operators, some wishing to build and operate merchant power plants as well as others
simply wanting to trade electricity and become suppliers in the market.
Overall, healthy margins are visible along the supply chain, although the wholesale to retail balance is
probably muZed by vertical-integration.
In the case of gas sold into the wholesale market and via long-term contracts with base prices ﬁxed against
wholesale prices, the margins are simply colossal.
End User
Electricity Supplier
Power Generator 
Generation Margin ~ 1p/kWh (~ 20%)  
Generating Cost*               4 p/kWh
Base-load Power Price      5 p/kWh  
Profiling & Balancing   + 3¾ p/kWh
Transmission & Dist.      + 5  p/kWh  
Metering, Admin., + 2¼ p/kWh 
Billing, Compliance         
Domestic Power Price     19 p/KWh 
Delivery Cost 16 p/kWh 
Retail Margin ~ 6 p/kWh      (~ 15%)
*subject to input fuel 
(iv) Recent Trends
The last in-depth eYciency analysis by aWhitehall department into the wholesale markets was instigated
more than three years ago. It concluded that no evidence could be found of market ineYciency although it
could beneﬁt frommore liquidity. This workwas eclipsed by the subsequent rises in wholesale price increases
which are depicted on the above graph. We shall go on to discuss the body of recent market evidence
gathered and the new facts and marketing situation that has emerged since. The situation has changed
mostly in respect of long-dated trading by the market incumbents.
A cursory look at the last sixmonths of last year, ie from 1 June 2007 to 31December 2007, shows forward
GB gas and electricity prices rising up again by 44% and 45% respectively. Again, it is not easy to explain
increases of this magnitude by long-term supply and demand fundamentals over that period. These had not
altered much and the outlook after 1st October 2008 was and still is improving.
7. The Supply Chain
(i) Flow Chart
The diagrams below depict the supply chains for gas and electricity direct to industrial customers and the
commercial and retail sectors.
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Industry Buyer
Merchant Bank (swap) or
Supplier
Gas Producer /Importer Power Generator
Domestic User
Wholesale Market 
Supplier (flexible contract)
Large industrial users generally buy gas direct from the wholesale market, whereas commercial customers
buy from the suppliers. However, many large gas and especially power users now ﬁnd they have to buy
through a third party intermediary, like a merchant bank who will ﬁx their forward prices for them. In
theory, they should be able to do these themselves by hedging on the wholesale market (ie simply buying
forward), provided there is adequate liquidity along the forward curve. In the electricity sector, most
suppliers are vertically-integrated so the supplier and generator shown in the supply chain are usually one
and the same. In fact, many generators are increasingly oVering to sell forward volumes on so-called
“ﬂexible contracts” that price the energy at par with the forward market although they are essentially oV-
market agreements.
For their part, utilities and generators also rely largely on the wholesale gas market. But they are exposed
to this forward market to varying degrees, depending on the size of their assets and portfolio contract pool
consisting of long-term contracts and forward wholesale contracts that are still running.
These supply-cost estimates provided are purely indicative. But they do serve as a sensible guide and they
also corroborate with ﬁgures discussed during several of the interviews held with some of the actual utilities.
The proﬁt margins highlight clearly where the signiﬁcant proﬁts are being made and it is evidently in the
wholesale market where the big proﬁt is made at the moment.
The retail market is not (in isolation) especially proﬁtable and here are taxes and payments uncertainties
which must also be factored in. This may partly explain the lack of new entry into this sector.
(ii) Forward Prices
Referring back to our deﬁnition of theGas Year 2008–09 contract; disappointing gas ﬂows fromNorway,
delays to LNG terminals and closure of nuclear facilities have certainly aVected the prompt market and the
mid-term part of the forward curve as well. However, transitory events should not be aVecting Gas Year
2008–09 or Gas Year 2009–10 prices in the way seen. Looking again at the second half of last year, between
1 June and 31 December, 2007 there were no signiﬁcant changes in industry perceptions as to UK demand,
gas supply or generation capacity for periods after 1 October 2008. Yet prices jumped by almost half. While
the forward curve is bound to be driven by shorter-term factors on the prompt market, it becomes harder
to explain forward-year price increases of 44% and 45% in this instance, assuming we had a genuinely
competitive market.
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(iii) Oil Market EVects
Oil prices have driven gas and electricity prices through oil contractual indexation eVects in long-term
contracts. With oil prices threatening to pass $100/bl, gas and electricity prices have simply been dragged
up contractually. However, this oil-price distortion should illustrate that GB is suVering a structural market
problem. All too often the matter of oil indexation is used to explain, to justify even increases to GB gas and
GB power prices whenever this question is raised in the context of market eYciency. The high prices that
we see today would not be sustainable if the wholesale markets operated competitively and without this
completely irrational distortion maintained by the policies of oil and gas company executives. From a “sub-
optimal pricing” perspective, the eVect of oil-indexation completely undermines pricing competition in the
forward gas and power markets.
However, oil-indexation is just part of the story. The predominance of the long-term contract themselves
has also had a serious adverse eVect on the forward markets by starving them of liquidity that they need to
work properly. The consequent dearth of forward trading activity has created a self-perpetuating situation
of ever weakening competition and thus artiﬁcially high prices posted in the wholesale market.
(iv) Causes
With the background issues now discussed, we can look to the evidence and statements oVered by the
industry respondents who agreed to be interviewed.
The majority of respondents believe that the forward gas and the electricity markets are intrinsically
ﬂawed. A distinct pattern was observed. Rising gas and electricity prices have coincided with falling
liquidity, which has followed on from the changing company supply policies and the greater market
concentration in the wholesale gas and power markets.
The causes of the liquidity problems in both markets were very similar. We can classify these matters as
“contract foreclosure” caused by long-term contracts for the wholesale gas market and “vertical
foreclosure” caused by consolidation by vertically-integrated generators in the electricity market.
8. Contract Foreclosure in Gas
(i) Forward Market
The majority of our respondents reported a very severe weakening of trading liquidity in the forward gas
market. A graver impact still was reported in the forward electricity market, which we shall cover in
Section 9.
While the prompt market remains liquid and robust, trading in the back end of the curve, most notably
in forward Gas Year contracts, has deteriorated signiﬁcantly over the last four years. It was also reported
that forward volumes that were once beingmade available by producers on theOTCmarket are increasingly
being sold on secret long-term contracts instead. This company policy appears to be a coherent one.
Essentially, producers have been selling more and more of their long-dated supplies away from the market.
This was widely observed to have a “crowding out” eVect on liquidity in the forward gas market.
The decline in liquidity was found to coincide with a rising percentage of physical gas which these long-
term contracts now account for. Consequently, most of the gas that initially enters into the GB system
bypasses the forward market altogether. Furthermore, whereas details of OTC trades are disseminated to
other players in the forward market, long-term contract prices remain hidden throughout the contract’s
duration. Price, volume and all delivery information remain secret: unknown to price reporters, brokers or
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other players in themarket. This privileged information question and the lack ofmarket knowledge of actual
transaction prices, has a negative impact on price transparency. The market simply has fewer “blocks” of
priced gas with which to establish a forward pricing curve. In fact, “weak price discovery” in long-dated
prices was one of themost commonly cited reasons by new entrants andmerchant traders for their decisions
to abstain from the market or to exit the market altogether in some cases.
Some positive reports on forward trading gas liquidity were reported by a small number of merchant
banks and ﬁnancial institutions. However, these entities will have had physical assets to trade against.
Indeed, much of the reported “gas trading” could be accounted for by forward hedging operations, matched
against the crude oil and powermarkets. As for physical players aiming to buy signiﬁcant volumes and hedge
their positions directly, little forward trading seems to be taking place.
In theory, it should be quite possible for long-term contracts and wholesale markets to co-exist, provided
there is a sensible degree of balance between the two. But this is not so today. The vast bulk of long-dated
physical volume is sold on long-term contracts. The actual proportion is, if anything, increasing. This is
partly due to successive mergers and acquisitions in the North Sea and on the Continent as well as more
imports from Europe. However, it is ultimately down to the policies of the producers. These have had the
eVect of limiting the supply of gas that is now traded on the OTC market.
Any eYcient forward market will require a critical mass of liquidity to develop before buyers and sellers
will enter the market. In relation to forward gas, a “contract foreclosure” problem was claimed to exist by
many of the traders and industry buyers we spoke to. The shrinking volume in long-dated transactions was
also evident in the market price reports, such as Heren and Argus. The suggestion is that this deal reporting
problem is also getting worse.
Consequently, industrial buyers and even gas buying utilities fear that the prices they are being charged
for long-dated wholesale gas supplied have been contrived and are even manipulated from time to time.
Meanwhile, the “new entrants” which include traders, suppliers and merchant generators are eVectively
“closed out” of this market as they will not risk trading in a market that they are so deeply suspicious of.
With fewer and fewer supplies made available on an OTC basis, the forward market has become
increasingly illiquid. A shallower trading pool has resulted in opaque, sometimes non-existent forward
prices posted in speciﬁc supply periods out on the forward curve. Price discovery has become “a guessing
game” to quote one respondent and “fair game” for dominant players with large volumes to throw around
if they want to. A shallow market that can be spooked higher just by minimal buying interest represents a
signiﬁcant barrier to entry for UK investors and UK traders wanting to use the forward market to buy and
hedge. Even themarket-makers, merchant banks and hedge funds (who have a valuable liquidity-enhancing
role to play) are wary of entering a market that is overly sensitive to market information shocks and also
prone to manipulation. “We will not be liquidity providers” sums up the overall position. The truth is: only
the physical gas producers can make this initial, meaningful contribution to liquidity that is needed. The
same applies to vertically-integrated generators in the power market, which we will discuss later on in this
report.
A market overly prone to the buying or selling actions of a few traders will become ineYcient over time
and will be likely to remain so. While the producer and supplier numbers might suggest the gas market is
quite competitive, numbers alone can paint an illusory picture. The number of traders in wholesale gas
market may well rank in the twenties or thirties, but if just two or three are active traders on the curve, then
any one morning or afternoon, between them they can “practically invent their own gas price”.
Correspondents have suspected “wash trades” or “phantom deals” from time to time which serve to distort
the forward picture. So, the actual number of players active in the forward market may be tiny compared
to the headline ﬁgures.
Consequently, it is in no individual new player’s interest to inject liquidity and risk the consequences. As
merchants, traders and buyers then start to withdraw, market liquidity falls further. Market risks and price
volatility increase as a result and so a vicious circle is established. This has happened in spite of an improving
gas supply picture and more physical ﬂexibility oVered than ever before. Only one of the respondents that
we interviewed believed that the wholesale gas market will correct itself.
(ii) Cost of Foreclosure
Poor forward liquidity has aVected the wholesale gas market signiﬁcantly and in a variety of ways.
First, low liquidity creates an impression of scarcity of supply along the forward curve which has driven
prices higher. In commodities generally, low liquidity helps to keep prices high and establish what some call
a “buyers’ market”. The very use of this term, however, surely suggests that something is wrong with
competition, especially in market where the commodity is known to be in plentiful supply. Low liquidity
also causes bid/oVer spreads in OTC trading prices to widen. This fact is quite visible on electronic screens
of exchanges and brokers. Forward year gas volumes are currently trading spreads approaching 1°p per
therm, equivalent to almost 3% of the price when they have been less than this in the past.
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Second, low trading volumesmakewholesale prices vulnerable to over-reacting. It was frequently claimed
that wholesale prices have been supported from time to time by players with a commercial interest in
maintaining a high “headline price” on the forward curve in order to secure a higher base price in their long-
term contracts. This question relates to “ﬂexible contracts” in the power market just as much.
The fragile forward curve was also reported to be deterring buyers from using or even entering the
wholesale market lest they drive the price up in the process of purchasing. Consequently, some industry
buyers have claimed that they are avoiding the OTC market and instead are entering into the long-term
agreements which fuel the liquidity-constraining eVects on the rest of the market.
(iii) Market Evidence
We can check this question on liquidity eVects by referring to the Heren Report.190 It shows that, at the
close of trading on 6 February 2008 only 100,000 therms of gas per day were reported traded for delivery
this coming winter.191 This contrasts with a ﬁnal UK winter demand ﬁgure well above 100 million therms
per day. So this reported192 volume, which is used to establish posted forward prices, accounted for less than
0.1% of forward physical demand. Successive low deal volumes like this imply that the lack of physical
forward trading is serious. With regards to trading in Gas Year 2008–09 and Gas Year 2009–10, no deal
was reported as done that day at all.
The impact of weak liquidity is also evident in the posted prices’ section of the Heren Report. Whereas
forward prices were often published on a day-to-day basis in the past, it is increasingly common nowadays
to see an * appear just above the price so as to signify an “indicative price”. Here we see a direct relationship
between weak liquidity and poor price transparency. This corroborates with the claims that were made by
many of the people we have interviewed who still believe that far too little gas is traded today on a forward
season and a forward year basis.
The third and more signiﬁcant price distortion due to low liquidity is the growth of the so-called “risk
premium”: the extra premium which producers and suppliers command for making a long-dated delivery.
This forward premium has increased to a record level. It is calculated to add perhaps another 10 p/therm
(nearly 20%) to the wholesale gas price.
It represents a new cost that eventually passes down to householders and commercial users. In our
example, the Heren Report of 6 February, 2008 quotes a gas price of 62.5*p/th for forward delivery over
the ﬁrst quarter of 2009. This price starkly contrasts with the outturn “day-ahead” price quoted on 6
February, 2008 at 48.5p/th. Assuming that prevailing weather, demand and supply conditions are roughly
similar next year (they are likely to have improved even), the implied risk premium works out at 14 p/th,
which adds roughly one quarter to the wholesale gas price.
The concept of some level of risk premium in forward gas and forward power markets is not new. They
do ﬂuctuate over time and they correlate very closely to forward price volatility. However, an implied risk
premium of around 25% seems very high for a competitive market. It contrasts with the 1990s when UK
gas market exhibited a much lower premium, in the region of 10%. Many commodities, notably crude oil,
exhibit a “backwardated” or downwards-sloping forward curve. Although the level of uncertainty in gas
has increased to a degree, 25% does look excessive.
A risk premium in the 10%–15% range would be more consistent with supply and demand fundamentals,
which should have improved further by next year in which case the premium should have been falling.
One justiﬁcation expressed by some respondents for higher risk premiums today has been the
unprecedented increases in price volatility. This was frequently blamed on poor liquidity levels. With so few
merchants and market-markers trading, the forward market is left much more vulnerable to price spikes;
caused either by players over-reacting to market events or possibly contrived by two or three dominant
players, who see that they have the forward ﬁeld all to themselves.
There is a fourth cost factor to consider, which again concerns power markets as well. It closely resembles
the “risk premium” argument. Large industry buyers need to forward-ﬁx the price of their supply and low
liquidity puts them in a diYcult predicament. They can avoid buying forward, delay purchasing and simply
buy gas on the prompt market where liquidity is still very good. However, this is an exceptionally risky
strategy. The alternative is to approach a third party intermediary, such as a merchant bank, to ﬁx the
forward gas price for them by selling them a swap. This derivative contract will guarantee them a forward
price as if the forward market were liquid. However, swaps are expensive and derivatives’ premiums have
risen sharply due to underlying gas market volatility. However, if the wholesale market were properly liquid
along its forward curve, industry buyers would be not need to approach themerchant banks in the ﬁrst place.
It is another example of market ineYciency introducing a new layer of cost in the supply chain.
190 Daily European Spot Gas Markets price publication of Heren Energy.
191 For period 1 October 2008 through 31 March 2009.
192 Not allOTCdeals are reported to the price publications. Some trades are executed via brokerswho establish their own indices,
eg Spectron’s daily “Spectrometer”. However, they still are reliable indicators as to the true amount of gas being transacted
along the forward curve.
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(iv) Oil Indexation EVects
The ﬁfth factor concerns price distortions caused by oil-indexation in long-term contracts. There is an
automatic impact on gas prices due to indexation to petroleum products in clauses written into many of
these long-term bi-lateral agreements. Consequently, GB gas prices are ﬁxed to international crude prices
and thus forward gas prices fail to respond eVectively to changing supply or demand fundamentals that
should be relevant.
The market impact of oil-indexed long-term contracts resurfaced again at the end of the 1990s. This had
followed a seven year period during which gas prices appeared to have successfully de-coupled from oil
prices. Correspondingly, the forward gas market then saw good liquidity along its forward curve. However,
three industry events played a signiﬁcant part in re-establishing the impact of oil prices on gas and
electricity prices.
(v) Changes in the Market
Firstly, the UK started limited imports from the Continent where prices are linked to oil193 on long-term
contracts. Secondly, the market suVered a signiﬁcant increase in supply concentration following the wave
of “super mergers” involving North Sea producers, UK and European utilities. Thirdly, trading activity
contracted sharply following the collapse of Enron and the subsequent exit of other US merchants194 in
2002–03.
The US merchant traders had played an important liquidity-providing role and this had countered the
impact of oil-indexed contracts that operated in parallel with the evolving forward market. Their departure
saw the mantle of “liquidity provider” pass to newly-merged producers, UK and European utilities. Their
number includedmany of the “Old Guard” energy majors who have been resisting European energy market
liberalisation. They have ﬁercely defended long-term contracts and this regime they perceive will be
threatened by greater liberalisation in the EU energy market.
(vi) Impacts on Competition
It should come as little surprise that the interest of producers in fostering over-the-counter trading has
been limited. However, this cursory investigation has already uncovered some evidence of supply policy
decisions taken by energy majors, aimed at reducing the amount of gas for supply to the forward market.
Two interviewees who had worked for one very large gas producer gave separate and consistent accounts
that forward selling on an over-the-counter basis was halted when their companymerged with another large
gas producer. The incomingmanagement reportedly “killed oV” this formerly signiﬁcantUKgasmarketer’s
forward trading activity. Initially its traders struggled to have their credit lines extended and were said to
be trading “with their hands tied behind their backs”. Ultimately, the trading ﬂoor was reduced to a mere
“balancing function”, simply to support the wider long-term contract activities that were now to take
precedence. This is no isolated example. The trend has been copied by other gas producers, many of which
also merged over the last six years.
The long-term supply policies of producers have converged. Whether this was by design or coincidence,
the detrimental eVect on market competition has been the same. Common incentives have led to common
actions, which have starved forward markets of liquidity, which leads to a greater potential for market
manipulation, less competition, higher market volatility still and higher risk premiums, which all combine
to force prices above levels that an eYcient wholesale market would otherwise dictate.
While the majority of respondents suggested that contract foreclosure was caused by the unwillingness
of producers to trade openly in the forward market, only one of these traders expressed the belief that the
market liquidity problem would remedy itself. A majority of traders believed the liquidity problem is worse
still in the electricity market, which we will now come onto.
A ﬁnal point concerning gas contracts: the policy decisions here that aVect the wholesale market are made
entirely or partly by UK-based organisations. While gas imports from the Continent are a factor and EU
market liberalisation is important, we are here dealing with a UK problem that requires a UK solution. EU
liberalisation is unlikely to resolve this problem. Meaningful European market liberalisation remains some
years away. More to the point, the EU Commission’s “Third Energy Package” does not address the matter
of long-term contracts. Its focus is the unbundling of energy utilities. A “weak” third directive in this respect
will not remedy this UK problem, even when it does arrive. A national initiative is required for our home
wholesale market therefore.
193 The argument that “oil-indexed imports from the Continent mean UK gas prices are linked oil prices” would not strictly be
so if the UK market were competitive. Any spare gas that is available for exporting to the UK has to be sold somewhere if
it is subject to take-or-pay obligations and gas is expensive to store. So the exporter concerned should take whatever the going
price is: he should not be setting the price in the UK.
194 With the departure of Enron and other US merchants who helped provide early liquidity into the forward market including
TXU, Dynergy, Duke Energy, America Electric & Power, Reliant, AES, NRG, Williams.
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9. Vertical Foreclosure in Electricity
(i) Buyers and Merchant Generators closed out of the Forward Market
The issues in the electricity market relating to liquidity constraints and adverse impacts on wholesale
market competition are almost identical to those in gas. So we will not repeat this part of our discussion
here; the pattern of events that leads up to higher prices is much the same. However, we should note the
following diVerences:
Firstly, because gas accounts for a high proportion of the grid’s marginal generation capacity, forward
prices formed in the wholesale gas market set those in the electricity market. So any anomalies present in
the forward gas market automatically rolls onto power.
Secondly, the market has six principal vertically-integrated companies. These are each dependent on the
wholesale gas market and long-term gas contracts (which are often priced against this forward market)
although the extent of gas dependence varies widely between these companies.
Because they are vertically-integrated and churn in the retail market is quite limited, they can eVectively
pass down any price increase in the wholesale markets down to their customers. In short, they lack the
proper commercial incentive to compete in the forward market.
(ii) Perceived Impact on Competition
One observer commented that generators do actually not need to trade in the forward market at all in
order to manage their risk, precisely because of this captive customer base. Respondents repeated there was
no commercial incentive for generators to trade in the forward market while the status quo is so favourable
to them. Weak liquidity is serving to keep power generation prices at high levels.
There seems little prospect ofmarket forces or an internal industry initiative breaking this cycle.Merchant
banks, traders and other new entrants, with no physical generation assets of their own to trade with,
expressed that they were unwilling to enter a market which has virtually no liquidity at beyond one month
forward and is prone to day-to-day manipulation. One respondent asserted that “there are just two
companies who trade two months out and they have learnt how to ﬁx this market as well” (referring to the
former UK Electricity Pool).
Other respondents have asserted that the incumbent generators have systematically spurned the long-
dated forward market. The steady rise in the spark spread195 underlines the increase in the proﬁtability for
gas-ﬁred generators. However, we have witnessed very little entry by new companies into either the power
generation or the power supply markets during the last ﬁve years.
Increasing wholesale power prices have enabled the vertically-integrated generators to beneﬁt both ways:
higher generation margins to industrial customers and higher retail prices to their domestic and commercial
customers. This doubling-up of proﬁt margins is illustrated in the ﬂow diagramme in Section 6 (iii). It
suggests that price rises imposed on household customers are being justiﬁed by the very same price increases
in the wholesale market, which generators may be exacerbating by boycotting their forward market.
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195 Essentially, a proxy for the generation margin power price minus the eYciency-adjusted input gas price.
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(iii) Forward Prices
Rising gas prices, the changing competitive climate in the power generation sector and a severe reduction
in liquidity have been instrumental in base-load electricity prices soaring by over 210%, from barely £16/
MWh just ﬁve years ago to over £50/MWh today.
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The fall in GB power market liquidity has been more recent and even more severe than that witnessed for
natural gas. However, the wholesale power price is inﬂuenced by anomalies in the gas market in addition
to its own.
(iv) Evidence of Market Failure
In fact, the collapse in power market liquidity has been so dramatic that virtually no genuine196 long-dated
trading is believed to be done in the GB market. Even the sporadic few trades that are done on a forward
basis are related to a spark-spread or another hedge by a merchant bank or other ﬁnancial intermediary.
Numerous industry buyers have complained that electricity exhibits the same symptoms of market
distortion that they have witnessed in the wholesale gas market. These include fatter bid/oVer spreads which
tend to widen almost immediately after buying takes place.
To avert exposure to the prompt and forward markets, the electricity buyer again faces the two options.
He can either buy a ﬁnancial swap from a merchant bank, which will ﬁx the forward price for him. Or else
he can approach his own supplier. In this case, he will buy a forward volume of electricity on a so-called
“ﬂexible contract”. However, these contracts generally tie him to the supplier for a longer time period. The
forward price can be ﬁxed at the outset, indexed to the wholesale market (which his supplier may be able to
inﬂuence), or completely ﬂexible so as to allow him to lock or unlock the price from time to time. However,
in all three instances his eVective “base price” is still determined in the wholesale market which is prone to
manipulation. Further, because the supply is now made under a bespoke (oV-market) contract, there is no
price reporting or deal transacted through a power exchange. This serves to reduce market liquidity
further still.
In fact, quite a proﬁtable sideline business has sprouted among the generators who are now marketing
“risk-management services” to industry buyers: “ﬂexible contracts” packaged to protect buyers against
volatile and illiquid forward markets that are arguably of the generators’ own making.
Traders and new entrant merchant plant operators have reported that they have been aVected by the
collapse of forward trading. They have claimed that the extensive liquidity risk that now exists has forced
them to approach the incumbent generators for assistance in order to enter the market, which will
undoubtedly aVect their entry project economics. In other cases, plans to build power stations are
understood to have been thwarted altogether.197
196 For industrial purchasing, ie unconnected with spark spread and/or ﬁnancial hedging by merchant banks.
197 There is a parallel with gas here vis-a`-vis international suppliers of LNG.
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Thepowergenerators themselveshavepartlyblameduncertaintiesover carbonprices fornewrisksand this
is preventing them from selling forward electricity volumes. However, a fairly liquid forward yearmarket for
carbon already exists. With regards to longer term trading, the logic is probably the reverse. Failing GB gas
andpowermarketsmaybe thwarting thedevelopment of a forward carbonprice.Thiswould introduce anew
risk factor in the economics of new-build power stations.
(v) Evidence from the Continent
Liquidity is becoming less of a problem on the Continent compared to the GB market. European power
exchanges beneﬁt from both peer pressure and regulatory pressure on generators to foster their wholesale
markets by trading openly and injecting liquidity. Capacity/release auctions of the type once used in the UK
gas market have contributed to growth in liquidity. For example, the German power exchange traded over
5000 TWhof electricity last year while Nordpool in Scandinavia traded over 2,500 TWh. This contrasts with
the forward tradingbyUKgenerators.Here, openly-traded volumeon theUKPXbarelymanaged 600TWh.
GB liquidity had previously been increasing steadily and it peaked at 2,300 TWh in 2003.
A very signiﬁcant change to competition, company trading policies generally or both factors must have
played a role in this. Fifteen years after privatisation, the GB wholesale market sees a forward curve which
simply no longer operates. The UK Power Exchange has essentially been reduced to a “balancing market”.
Respondents have claimed that it does not allow them to trade eVectively and this is thwarting their long-term
investment plans. The incumbents on the other hand have no obvious commercial incentive to change their
supply strategy, nor to go out and build the new power plants expeditiously.
Two respondents also suggested very similar accounts that suggested some kind of “understanding”
between the generators andUKauthorities not to intervene in themarket. They said this was due to the need
for their wider co-operation in matters ranging from climate change objectives, peak winter cover and the
building of a new ﬂeet of nuclear power stations. It was suggested that any referral to the Competition
Commissionwould introduce“inevitablecostsanduncertainties” thatcouldservetodelaymajorprojects that
only the big companies can build.
10. Conclusion
Whenwetalkabout thesecosts,wedoneedtoweightheseagainstothercostsnowimposedontheconsumer.
The impact onBritish industry andwiderUKeconomy also need to be factored in. The cost of a “business as
usual” approach indealingwith the energy contracts andmarket liquidity problemswill probably prove to be
inﬂationary. In fact, there is also evidence of this already.
Our existing gas and electricity tradingmarkets are bothdefective.They each give commercial incentives to
gas producers and generators to act uniformly in blocking the development of a forward market. They have
lead to signiﬁcant distortions and a self-feeding cycle of ever reducing competition. The market prices, price
premiums, extra layers of price insurance and adverse liquidity impacts have each been identiﬁed.
The overall impact on competition is equally clear from much of the corroborated reports and other
evidence given to us in the course of this research.
The irony is that rising forwardGasYearwholesalepricesare still increasingwhile theunderlyinggas supply
and demand fundamentals are improving into the next two years.
Theprospectofasecondwaveofretailpricerises later thisyear isverypossible,asutilities seek tofullyreﬂect
the impact of the respective 44%and 45%price increases inwholesale gas and electricity in the last sixmonths
of last year.
Thesemarket realities, analysisandsubmittedevidenceunderscore the importanceofan immediate referral
to the CompetitionCommission.
This referral should lead, directly or indirectly, to subsequent market initiatives198 that may succeed in
persuading the companies concerned to foster the forward markets instead of boycotting them. We believe
that this will have a signiﬁcant and early impact on currentGasYear prices.
Only the actual producers and the vertically-integrated generators possess the ﬂexibility to oVer the
liquidity and transparency improvements required. So neither one group should be excluded. Common,
market-distorting incentives need tobe rectiﬁed inboth cases. In eachone,we believe tacit collusion exits on a
verywidescalealthough it is subtle: it relates to“inaction”rather thanactionas such.Theadversecompetition
impact as it plays across these two inter-linkedmarkets is another reasonwhy producers and generators need
to be assessed jointly. We do remain optimistic that a solution does lie close to home. A referral to the
CompetitionCommissionmaywell lead to short-term remedies which haveworked in the past, akin forward
market fostering initiatives that appear to be showing progress in Continental markets now.
April 2008
198 eg liquidity and price transparency initiatives, such as US and UK 1980s-style release programmes; alternatively, mandatory
sponsorship of OTC markets and trading exchanges, as in the improving German and Scandinavian markets.
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Supplementary evidence submitted by energywatch
PAPER FOR ENERGYWATCH BY DR PHILIP MARSDEN,199 BRITISH INSTITUTE OF
INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW
It is Time for an Energy Market Investigation by the Competition Commission
In recent years, governments and the European Commission have become increasingly concerned about
anti-competitive activity in the energy sector. Several inquiries have made clear that it is a “market that is
not working fairly for consumers or many providers. The European Commission’s sector inquiry identiﬁed
ﬁve core problems of market concentration; vertical foreclosure; lack of market integration; lack of
transparency; and price formation.200 To try to address some of these problems, Ofgem and other national
regulators keep the sector subject to regulatory review; while national competition authorities and the
EuropeanCommission’sDG-Competition have increased use of their competition law enforcement powers,
including:
— reviewing mergers more strictly201;
— reviewing state aid and other government support; and
— launching dawn raids that have uncovered further evidence of price-ﬁxing and abusive foreclosure
of competitors.202
These newly discovered anticompetitive practices are particularly troubling, as one would not expect
further anti-competitive arrangements to keep arising in a sector under regulatory scrutiny. This strongly
suggests the need for more work in this sector. It is energywatch’s view that apart from the recently
announced probe into the energy supply markets,203 Ofgem have not held serious investigations into these
markets since 2004 and have made very little intervention at both wholesale and retail levels of the
markets.204 In particular, due to its limited resources and primary focus onmonopoly infrastructure, Ofgem
has paid limited attention to the relation between the retail and wholesale markets. Our current regulatory
and competition law review of the energy sector in theUKneed to be supplemented if they are to be eVective.
Fortunately, help is close at hand. In the UK we are in the unique position of being able to beneﬁt from the
added scrutiny and remedies available through a Competition Commission market investigation.
We will identify the key beneﬁts of such an investigation, and submit that the Secretary of State should
call for such an investigation without delay.
Only a market investigation by the Competition Commission can ensure that OFGEM and the other
authorities are assisted in their crucial role of making this market work fairly for consumers in the UK.
Background to the regime
TheEnterprise Act created theUKmarket investigation reference regime, whereby theOFThas the power
to refer markets to the Competition Commission for further investigation where it has reasonable grounds
for suspecting that any feature, or combination of features, of a market is preventing, restricting, or
distorting competition.205 Under this system the Competition Commission will decide whether competition
is indeed prevented, restricted or distorted, and if so what, if any, action should be taken to remedy the
adverse eVect on competition or any detrimental eVect on customers arising from the adverse eVect.
According to the legislation “detrimental eVect” can take two forms: (a) higher prices, lower quality or less
choice of goods or services in any market in the United Kingdom (whether or not the market to which the
feature or features concerned relate); or (b) less innovation in relation to such goods or services.206
199 Senior Research Fellow and Director, Competition Law Forum—http://www.biicl.org/philipmarsden/
200 European Commission, Energy Sector Inquiry, Final Report, January 2007.
201 R Owen-Howes and C Thomas, “Freeing Energy” ﬁnding that stricter merger control is a major policy tool of the European
Commission, when its usual competition law enforcement powers under Article 81 and 82 are found wanting: reviewing the
E.On/MOL, GDP/EDP/ENI, Endesa/Gas Natural and Endesa/E.On transactions. Competition Law Insight, 6 June 2006.
202 SpiegelOnline reported as late asNovember 2007 that theGermanBundesKartellamt andEuropeanCommission have found
evidence of price-ﬁxing after raids in Germany yielded thousands of documents in dawn raids. “German Energy Giants
Accused of Collusion”, Spiegel Online, 5 November 2007. The European Commission is also investigating Distrigas, the
dominant gas supplier in Belgium—for suspected violations of Article 82 from its long term gas supply contracts with many
of its industrial customers.
203 http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/Media/PressRel/Documents1/ProbeFINAL.pdf
204 Allan Asher, Chief Executive of energywatch, “Consumer welfare—a casualty of ‘light touch’ regulation—The End of
Regulation as we know it? . . . so where next?” SBGI 2008 Seminar London, 6 March 2008,
205 See Part IV of the Enterprise Act 2002.
206 Ibid at Section 134(5). It should be obvious that these two “eVects” are the opposite of those deﬁned as beneﬁts under Section
1(a) of the same act; see supra. Section 134(8) also deﬁnes customer beneﬁt as (i) lower prices, higher quality or greater choice
of goods or services in any market in the United Kingdom; or (ii) greater innovation in relation to such goods or services.
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Examples ofMarket Investigation References: in the energy sector, comprehensive review and remedial powers
In 2002–03, the Competition Commission reviewed the acquisition by Centrica plc from Dynegy Inc of
two companies that owned and operated the Rough gas storage facility.207 Amajor issue for the inquiry was
whether, as a result of the merger, Centrica would be likely to withhold sources of ﬂexible gas in order to
force up wholesale gas prices. The Competition Commission found that Centrica could be expected: (a) to
discriminate between customers in giving access to capacity at Rough; (b) to use to its advantage sensitive
information gained from the operation of Rough; (c) to withhold information about the operation of
Rough; (d) to be less innovative in marketing Rough products than another owner; and (e) to invest less in
expandingRough’s capacity than another owner. As a result, the CompetitionCommission determined that
competition in the markets for ﬂexible gas and domestic gas supply would be weakened, with the likely
consequence of price increases will be higher than in the absence of the merger. To prevent these adverse
eVects, the Competition Commission required that Centrica give statutory undertakings regarding its
behaviour as owner of Rough. The major elements of the undertakings were that Centrica would: sell
Rough’s full capacity on non-discriminatory terms; auction all capacity remaining unsold no less than 30
days before the start of each storage year, with no reserve price; maintain legal, ﬁnancial and physical
separation between its storage business and all other parts of the group; ensure that no commercially
sensitive information arising from the operation of Rough is passed to other parts of Centrica; and make
any disclosure of information relating to the storage operations to all market participants simultaneously;
facilitate the eYcient operation and development of the secondary market in Rough capacity; oVer at least
20%ofRough’s capacity on annual contracts. TheCompetitionCommissionmaintained the power to divest
assets if Centrica did not comply with these commitments.
The CompetitionCommission was theOnlyGovernment Body able toRecommend the Introduction
of Competition into the Energy Sector in the Early 1990’s
In 1992 the then Director General of Gas Supply asked the then Monopolies and Mergers Commission
(MMC) to investigate whether the operation by British Gas plc of its pipeline system and other facilities for
the transportation, and storage of gas, operates against the public interest.208 Related references were sent
to the MMC at the time by the Secretary of State into the supply of gas to tariV customers and to non-tariV
customers, and into the conveyance or storage of gas by public gas suppliers. reports. TheMMC found that
because BG was both a seller of gas, and owner of the transportation system which its competitors have no
alternative but to use, this dual role gave rise to an inherent conﬂict of interest which makes it impossible
to provide the necessary conditions for self-sustaining competition. The MMC recommended modiﬁcation
of BG’s Authorisation so as to establish its businesses as separate units. The Secretary of State (whose ﬁnal
decision it was) chose not to implement the MMC’s recommendation, but British Gas decided to establish
“Transco” as a separate unit in 1994 and the formal demerger that led to the creation of Centrica took place
in February 1997. It was only after this MMC report, that competition actually became possible in the gas
sector in the UK.
Other Market Investigations: No Fear to Act
Excessive prices
In Store Cards the OFT referred the supply of store card services to the Competition Commission
following its conclusion that there are features of the sector, both in the supply of store card credit to
consumers and in the supply of store card services to retailers, that appear to prevent, restrict or distort
competition.209 In paragraph 1.13 of its report the OFT stated that “there is insuYcient competition to
ensure that consumers get good value from store cards and that such lack of competition may lead to
increased proﬁts for retailers and store card providers”.210 For the OFT then, the possible harm to
consumers resulting from the perceived lack of competition in this sector revolved around the concept of
value for money. The idea of “good value” brings to mind the deﬁnition of an “unfair price” in the case
United Brands Co. v Commission; it concerns a price that is “excessive in relation to the economic value of
the product supplied”.211 In other words the OFT is formulating the possible consumer detriment in this
sector in terms of unfair or excessive prices for consumers.212 In its investigation the Competition
207 http://www.competition-commission.org.uk/rep—pub/reports/2003/480centrica.htm<full
208 http://www.competition-commission.org.uk/rep pub/reports/1993/335britishgas.htm<summary
209 Store Cards, OFT Reference to the Competition Commission, 18 March 2004.
210 Emphasis added.
211 United Brands Co. v Commission [1978] 1 CMLR 429, at paragraph 235.
212 At paragraph 6.1 of the reference, the OFT underlined its suspicions that excess prices were being paid by some consumers
for certain store cards: “the provision of store card credit may not be working well for consumers. It is possible . . . that the
diVerence between the interest charged on store cards and other credit cards is not fully explained by the oVsetting beneﬁts
and the diVerences in the cost of providing these services”.
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Commission tried to quantify this consumer detriment by comparing the prices actually paid by cardholders
who pay interest and insurance charges on store cards with the prices they would have paid had these
reﬂected costs, including the cost of capital.213
Subsequent market investigation references submitted to the Competition Commission have also
concerned the impact of (weak) competition on prices paid by consumers; see for example Supply of
Liqueﬁed Petroleum Gas214 or Northern Ireland Banking215 In the former case the OFT suspected that “the
high switching costs [between diVerent gas companies in themarket for the supply of domestic bulk liqueﬁed
petroleum gas] may form a barrier to entry, so that competition is restricted andmany consumers face higher
prices overall than they would in a similar market without switching costs”.216 In the latter case, the OFT
held that the conditions for a referral were met as high levels of concentration, signiﬁcant entry barriers,
price parallelism and consumer inertia appear together to result in limited price competition and weak
switching competition between the big four banks in Northern Ireland.217 Both investigations are ongoing.
In Home Collected Credit218 the Competition Commission actually attempted to quantify the overcharge
suVered by customers in the relevant market; according to the CC customers suVered from “substantial
overcharging”:
[overcharging] may have amounted to as much as £100 million a year over the last ﬁve years across
the whole market, which would imply that a home credit customer pays over £25 too much for an
average loan, or £9 per £100 borrowed, and that home credit lenders have been able to earn more
than £500 million in proﬁts in excess of the cost of capital in the last ﬁve years.219
This case thus highlights that the Competition Commission: (i) considers overcharging as a form of
consumer detriment; and (ii) is willing to quantify the extent of the overcharge when possible. Home
Collected Credit also demonstrates that the CC will consider the eVects of weak competition on particular
categories of consumers as well as consumers in general. Indeed, on the facts before it the Competition
Commission expressed its belief that the overcharge may have more of an eVect on single mothers under 35:
Home credit customers were more likely than the population as a whole to be female, to be under
35, to have young families, to fall into socio-economic groups D and E, to live in a low-income
household and to live in housing rented from a local council or housing association.220
It is not just about price . . .
In Home Collected Credit signalled how the Competition Commission will also consider diVerent forms
of consumer detriment where relevant:
We shall determine whether any eVect on advertisers or users [ie consumers] in the form of higher
prices, lower quality or less choice of goods and services, or less innovation has resulted from, or may
be expected to result from, any adverse eVects on competition in the relevantmarket or markets.221
Indeed, if theCompetitionCommission decides that there is an adverse eVect on competition it must “take
action to ‘remedy, mitigate or prevent’ the adverse eVect on competition and to ‘remedy, mitigate or prevent
any detrimental eVects on customers’ so far as those eVects have resulted from the adverse eVect”.222 By
deﬁnition “any detrimental eVects” must also include those detrimental eVects that cannot be classed solely
as eVects on the prices paid by consumers.
In the ongoing Groceries Market Investigation, the Competition Commission has recently published its
Provisional Remedies notice, which recommends a number of competition policy solutions, including the
introduction of a “competition test” when local planning authorities are assessing planning applications for
new large grocery stores, and A requirement on grocery retailers to lift existing exclusivity arrangements
that have been in place for more than ﬁve years, where these have been identiﬁed as a barrier to entry by a
competing retailer in areas of high concentration. In addition, however, the Competition Commission has
recommended remedies that go beyond what competition law itself could do: namely that the Department
213 See Paragraph 1 of Annex 9.1 of the Competition Commission Report, available at:
http://www.competition-commission.org.uk/rep pub/reports/2006/509storecards.htm.
214 Supply of Liqueﬁed Petroleum Gas, Market Investigation Reference, 5 July 2004.
215 Northern Ireland Banking, Market Investigation Reference, 26 May 2005. See also: Home Collected Credit, Market
Investigation Reference, 20 December 2004.
216 At paragraph 3 of the OFT Reference (emphasis added).
217 See paragraph 75 of the OFT Report.
218 Home Collected Credit, Market Investigation Reference, 20 December 2004.
219 Ibid, Competition Commission News Release, 27 April 2006, available at: http://www.competition-commission.org.uk/
inquiries/current/homecredit/index.htm, at p 1. It should be noted that these ﬁndings are only provisional and that the
Competition Commission intends to discuss them further with home credit companies before making its ﬁnal conclusions on
the matter: ibid.
220 Ibid, at p 2.
221 Classiﬁed Directory Advertising Services, Market Investigation Reference, 5 April 2005, Competition Commission, Issues
Statement, Paragraph 17 (emphasis added).
222 Northern Ireland Banking, Market Investigation Reference, 26 May 2005, at paragraph 83 of the OFT Report (emphasis
added). See also Section 138 of the Enterprise Act 2002.
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for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform amend the Land Agreements Exclusion Order so that
agreements which restrict grocery retailing should no longer beneﬁt from exclusion from the Competition
Act.223
What can the authorities do?
Ofgem
Of course, Ofgem is the port of ﬁrst resort in examining the energy sector. It is energywatch’s view that
apart from the recently announced probe into the energy supply markets, Ofgem has not held serious
investigations into thesemarkets since 2004 and hasmade very little intervention at bothwholesale and retail
levels of the markets. It has also only paid limited attention to the relation between the retail and
wholesale markets.
The Competition Commission
Although all of the UK authorities have considered consumer detriment in its many diVerent forms, it
appears that the OFT, at least, seems to concentrate primarily on price related consumer detriment. The
Competition Commission, by contrast, will consider more readily the other aspects of consumer harm (viz
the negative impact of conduct on innovation, quality and choice for consumers) especially when
considering a particular market in the context of a market investigation reference. The Competition Appeal
Tribunal also takes a more dynamic approach to the market. For the CAT consumers may be harmed
through the higher long-run price levels, reduction in choice and decreases in quality, which, in general,
signiﬁcant distortion of competition brings.
Greater powers than DG-Competition
In contrast, the type of sectoral inquiry employed at EC level can only be used to enforce the competition
law rules enshrined in Articles 81 and 82 EC. In other words the ECCommission is not empowered to adopt
any remedies that would aim to resolve the particular market failure in question; rather, it must bring
competition law based cases against undertakings if it wishes to use its administrative powers to solve the
problem identiﬁed. It is obvious then that the above arguments concerning potential beneﬁts are more
relevant for the UK market investigation regime
The Competition Commission, in contrast to its counterpart in Brussels, has a wide discretion, and the
necessary power to adopt a wide range of measures designed to remedy an identiﬁed defect in the market.
Such remedies available under Competition Commission guidelines can:
— make a signiﬁcant and direct change to the structure of a market (eg, through divestment and
unbundling);
— change the structure of a market less indirectly (eg, by reducing entry barriers or switching costs,
by requiring the licensing of know-how or intellectual property rights, or by extending the
compatibility of products through industry-wide technical standards);
— direct ﬁrms to discontinue certain behaviour (eg, giving advance notice of price changes) or to
adopt certain behaviour (eg, more prominently displaying prices and other terms and conditions
of sale);
— restrain the way in which ﬁrms would otherwise behave (eg, the imposition of a price cap); and
— monitor (eg, a requirement to provide the OFT with information on prices or proﬁts).
This is an impressive array of potential remedies. TheEuropeanCommission, in contrast, can only pursue
formal competition law cases using its powers to enforce Articles 81 and 82.
Competition Commission Plus
In most cases action to impose the remedies can be taken by the Competition Commission. In other cases
(such as changes to industry regulations), the Commission can only recommend such action to government
departments or other bodies. The government has committed that it will respond publicly to any such
recommendation within 90 days of the publication of the Competition Commission’s report.
223 Competition Commission, Provisional Decision on Remedies. http://www.competition-commission.org.uk/inquiries/
ref2006/grocery/provisional decision remedies.htm
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The Competition Commission has an Expert Energy Panel On-hand
The Competition Commission also has a special utilities panel, made up of CC members expert in the
energy and related sectors. Most usually the panel deals with water, electricity, gas and energy code
modiﬁcation appeals but these members would clearly be involved in any market investigation into the
energy sector, thus ensuring an expert and thorough review.
The Competition Commission Exists to Fill the Existing Gap between Regulation (OFGEM) and
Competition Law Enforcement (OFT)
In the words of the Chairman of the Competition Commission, Peter Freeman:
“Not only are market investigations a very useful way of investigating industry-wide issues but, in
terms of fairness of process, thoroughness of investigation and practicality of remedies, they can
have important advantages over the so-called ‘prohibition’ system. And with a maximum of two
years they are comparatively quick for what they can deliver. So, in conclusion, I do not know
what chemical is concocted from mixing regulatory “chalk” with competition “cheese”; but . . .
the distinction between them is not as clear cut as some would argue and that, in particular, market
investigations can act as a bridge over whatever gap divides the two”.224
So what is needed?
Even before amarket investigation is called, it is obvious what is needed to address the problems identiﬁed
by the European Commission alone:
The most obvious candidate is improved transparency. The recent price spikes in the UK gas market and
the diYculties in determining why more gas was not ﬂowing from the Continent to the UK are a clear
indication of this. If the authorities have diYculties getting the information that they need, competitors of
the vertically integrated incumbents must be operating completely in the dark. So regulation here may well
be needed. The Competition Commission is ideally suited to identify further informational remedies to
promote transparency in this sector.
However, transparency alone will not suYce. The greatest problems with the sector stem purely from
oligopoly, and indeed collective dominance. In such cases, as the European Commission has identiﬁed in
this and other sectors,225 the primary problem is one of a forcing out, or keeping out, of rival providers, and
thereby allowing incumbents to charge consumers what they wish. Other problems may arise as well, simply
out of coordinated eVects and tacit collusion that can stem from oligopoly. One of the most common
problems in such a closely held market, however, is the fact that two to three players can eVectively sew
up the market through long-term agreements with downstream distributors. This is precisely the problem
identiﬁed by the European Commission in the energy sector. In its ﬁnal report on its sector inquiry, the EC
reported that “the prevalence of long-term supply contracts between gas producers and incumbent
importersmakes it very diYcult for new entrants to access gas on the upstreammarkets. Similarly, electricity
generation assets are in the hand of a few incumbent suppliers or are indirectly controlled by them on the
basis of long-term power purchase agreements . . . giving the incumbents control over the essential inputs
into the wholesalemarkets”.226 “The Sector Inquiry has also conﬁrmed the vertical tying ofmarkets by long-
term downstream contracts as a priority for review of case situations under competition law and of
providing guidance where required”.227
These problems of vertical foreclosure and long-term contracts, and the linking through de facto
integration between the wholesale and retail levels, is precisely the problem that energywatch has identiﬁed
as prevailing in the UK energy sector.228 It needs to be addressed as a matter of high priority by Her
Majesty’s Government, and it is submitted that the Competition Commission has the analytical tools, the
remedial powers and the expertise to do the job.
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224 P Freeman, “Regulation and Competition—Chalk and Cheese? The Role of the Competition Commission”, CRI Frontiers
of Regulation Conference, Keynote Speech University of Bath 7 September 2006.
225 Case T-342/99 Airtours/First Choice [2002] ECR II-2585; Case T-464/04, IMPALA vs Commission of the European
Communities, 13 July 2006.
226 European Commission, Energy Sector Inquiry, Final Report, January 2007 at 8.
227 European Commission, Energy Sector Inquiry, Final Report, January 2007 at 13.
228 energywatch, EYciency Review of the GB Wholesale Gas and Electricity Markets; Business and Enterprise Committee:
Inquiry into possible anti-competitive behaviour in the energy markets.
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Further supplementary memorandum submitted by energywatch
1. Social Tariffs
Mr Berry questioned what the relationship might be between social tariVs and Warm Front.
It is the view of energywatch that the successful eradication of fuel poverty requires action on all three of
its conspiring causes:
— Low-income.
— Poorly insulated housing with energy ineYcient heating.
— The actual cost of energy paid by this group.
energywatch believes that Warm Front has a vital role to play in the provision of insulation and eYcient
heating to fuel poor households and that this work should be closely integrated with suppliers’ Carbon
Emissions Reduction Target emissions, which also provide energy eYciency measures to low-income
households. We do however share concerns over some recipients being asked to pay top up fees and the
waiting times that they can be subject to. We are also concerned at reductions by government in funding for
Warm Front at a time when fuel poverty is increasing. Various government policies are helping increase
incomes of the poorest in society and a government sponsored beneﬁt entitlement checks service tomaximise
income that suppliers could refer consumers to. Social tariVs would address the actual cost of energy paid
by fuel poor households and minimum standards would ensure these are oVered in a consistent and
eVective manner.
It is on this basis that energywatch advocate that social tariVs should be oVered as an integral part of an
energy assistance package that also comprises energy eYciency and beneﬁt entitlement elements.
2. Green Energy Tariffs
In response to comments from Allan Asher about green energy tariVs, Mr Oaten requested more
information about these tariVs.
With 19 diVerent green tariVs currently on oVer from specialist green suppliers and the big six energy
suppliers, it can be extremely diYcult for consumers to choose a tariV that is right for them. And what do
energy suppliers mean by “green” anyway?
A green tariV can mean one or a combination of three things: a supplier will guarantee to match a
percentage of the electricity used (from 10% to 100%) with a supply of renewable electricity back into the
grid (a green source tariV); a supplier will make a donation to a fund that supports the development of new
renewable generation or environmental causes (a green fund tariV); a supplier will make a donation to a
carbon-reduction project in theUKor abroad in order to help oVset a household’s carbon dioxide emissions
(a carbon oVset tariV).
The information that suppliers provide about the diVerent green tariVs on oVer is not always transparent,
and it can be particularly unclear about the environmental beneﬁts that they deliver. There is currently no
scheme in place to verify the claims that suppliers make about the “greenness” of their tariVs.
Licensed electricity suppliers are already legally obliged to supply a certain percentage of electricity from
renewable sources under the Renewables Obligation. Some of the green tariVs on oVer today are simply a
“repackage” of this legal obligation. Thus, signing up to one of these tariVs may not amount to
environmental beneﬁts (ie carbon dioxide emissions reductions) in addition to those which would already
occur under the law. Energy consumers are also actually contributing towards the Renewables Obligation
and currently pay around £10 per year on their electricity bill, with this amount likely to double by 2015. It
is likely that many consumers are not aware that they are already paying towards renewable energy.
Creating transparency and conﬁdence for consumers
Since last year, Ofgem has been consulting on developing their 2002 guidelines which set out criteria for
the use of environmental or green claims in the description and marketing of electricity by suppliers.
energywatch has been heavily involved in these consultations, and we have set out clearly that there is the
need for the mandatory disclosure of accurate and transparent information that will allow both domestic
and non-domestic consumers to make reliable choices in terms of both carbon emissions reductions and
renewable electricity generation. In our view, the existing Fuel Mix Disclosure requirements (joined owned
by BERR and Ofgem), with some adjustment, together with strict and even-handed enforcement, are
suYcient to deliver the required outcome.
Under the Fuel Mix Disclosure requirements suppliers are obliged to disclose accurate overall
information about the generation fuel mix of the electricity they supplier. Suppliers have the option to
disclose this information for individual tariVs as well. A small change to the fuel mix disclosure regulations
could make it mandatory for suppliers to disclose the fuel mix for every tariV.
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Accurate fuel mix disclosure will allow for the carbon content of the supply to be calculated, and, when
compared to the average, will give a picture of carbon emission reductions. It will also allow for ranking of
suppliers” oVerings in terms of renewable and carbon content. All renewable energy electricity must be
backed by renewable energy guarantees of origin (REGOs) and renewable climate chance levy exemption
certiﬁcates (LECs). This will ensure it is not supplied to more than one customer simultaneously and thus
double-counted.
We recommend that the government appoints an independent certiﬁcation body to monitor and audit
fuel mix disclosure and to ensure that certiﬁed green tariVs deliver additional environmental beneﬁts. The
duty to enforce the rules should remain with Ofgem.
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Letter submitted by E.ON UK plc
Thank you for your letter of 11 January.
You will appreciate that, since E.ON UK operates in a competitive market, and such information may
well be price sensitive, I am not able to provide you with speciﬁc information in relation to any possible
prospective price changes (E.ON has made no public announcement of a change in prices). However, I am
pleased to provide some backgroundwhich I hopewill help with your evidence sessionwithMalcolmWicks.
Retail Pricing
Ofgem has provided some useful independent commentary on the link between wholesale and retail
prices, which I would commend to you. This is provided in depth in their Domestic Market Retail Report
(June 2007) and has been updated in light of further wholesale cost increases, in their short Factsheet on
Household Energy Bills (January 2008).
In summary:
— wholesale costs are volatile, and high by historic standards;
— advance purchase allows for some delay in passing through cost increases, but not indeﬁnitely (and
carries a substantial risk if wholesale costs fall);
— the movement in costs is large (hundreds of millions of pounds) and hedging is not a precise art,
so no two suppliers will have the same cost base. Therefore although all suppliers are under similar
pressures, there are signiﬁcant diVerences in any price change;
— suppliers have to take customers with them, or risk losing market share. The GB electricity and
gas markets are amongst the most competitive in the world, and also as competitive as almost any
other household sector; and
— environmental costs are starting to bematerial (notably the subsidy for energy eYciencymeasures,
which has increased over the last 10 years from the original EESOPs scheme costing £25 million,
to the £² billion cost of CERT, which is due to start this April).
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Vulnerable Groups
In relation to your question about vulnerable groups of customers, for our own part we are very mindful
of the impact of higher costs on vulnerable customers with above average energy needs. The most eVective
mitigation for such customers, both in size of potential saving and in sustainability, is improved energy
eYciency. The larger part of the new CERT scheme will result in free measures for the over 70s and
customers on beneﬁts. Across all suppliers, this will amount to funding of around £500 million each year
for this group of customers.
The next most eVective measure is, through information sharing, to increase customers’ awareness of the
beneﬁts to which they are entitled, so that they claim them. All vulnerable customers are encouraged to call
our “Caring Energy” helpline, which will provide a beneﬁts entitlement check as well as energy eYciency
advice and which also manages referrals to our hardship fund. (Our hardship fund is designed to help
vulnerable customers, particularly those in debt, who cannot aVord new appliances or measures oVered
under CERT or WarmFront, for instance low income customers not on beneﬁts).
TariV based mitigation has a useful role to play but can only have a limited impact on fuel poverty. For
instance we have previously:
— increased the size of the cold weather payment to our Age Concern customers;
— reduced the size of the price increase for prepayment meter customers; and
— deferred increases for some vulnerable customer groups until the spring.
In addition, customers on the social tariV element of our “Staywarm” product have beneﬁted from
continuing to pay average energy bills, although their energy needs are signiﬁcantly above average.
These measures can add up in value to some millions of pounds, and are reasonably well-targeted on the
fuel poor, but cannot compensate all vulnerable customers for the full impact of rising wholesale energy and
environmental costs. In our view, only government can do this, through full indexation of beneﬁts and
winter fuel payments.
The Government’s Decision on Nuclear Power
E.ON UK welcomes the Government’s decision on nuclear power and views this decision as being
complementary to the recent announcements on the UKCCS competition andUK oVshore wind potential,
all with the aim of ensuring the country’s energy supply is secure, low in carbon and aVordable.
Between now and 2020, the UK will close up to 22GW of generation capacity due to the closure of life-
expired nuclear, coal and oil plant. E.ON UK itself will close over 4GW of coal and oil generation capacity
by the end of 2015 and intends to be a major investor in new UK energy supply infrastructure. The closure
of this capacity provides a signiﬁcant opportunity to reduce the carbon emissions from the UK’s power
sector but at the same time it is important to maintain diversity of sources of fuel for power generation, to
help ensure security of supply.
Therefore, new nuclear plant has a role in contributing economically to the UK’s C02 reduction targets
and, in an era of high fossil fuel prices, to a diverse and secure energy supply. Assuming reasonable licensing
and planning processes, we would expect investment in new nuclear plant to be a credible economic option
given current expectations of fossil fuel prices and, at the time a ﬁnal investment decision would be taken
(at least four to ﬁve years hence), conﬁdence in a sustained value for carbon emission abatement.
In the meantime, to 2015 investment in conventional generation technologies will be required to replace
closing coal and oil capacity. The UK market is already responding by building new gas CCGT generation
capacity, but reliance on this technology alone will not deliver energy policy objectives.
Investment in new coal generation capacity using supercritical plant technology enables the UK to
maintain diversity in supply (and has signiﬁcantly lower C02 emissions than existing coal-ﬁred capacity)
whilst carbon capture and storage (CCS) has potentially a key role to play in enabling new coal-ﬁred
generation to reduce its carbon dioxide emissions further by around 90%. New coal investments need to
ensure that CCS can be retroﬁtted to allow reduction in carbon dioxide when the technology becomes
proven. We support the Government’s announcement that it will support demonstration of post-
combustion CCS technology and will be entering a project into the competition.
Stability in the existing Renewables Obligation is essential to maintain investor conﬁdence in the market
for renewable generation, particularly given the diYculties UK developers are facing as a result of high
world demand for turbines, aggressive incentive mechanisms in other countries and limited competition in
the supply of equipment. The legally binding target agreed by the European Council, that by 2020 20% of
total ﬁnal energy consumption should come from renewable sources, will reinforce support for investment
in renewable technologies in the UK.
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Therefore, we do not believe that the Government’s decision on allowing private companies to invest in
new nuclear power capacity will inhibit investment in conventional or renewable generation capacity.
Continued and consistent policymeasures are required across all technologies to enable companies to invest
in a variety of solutions to tackle energy security, climate change and aVordability.
25 January 2008
Memorandum submitted by E.ON UK plc
INQUIRY INTO STRUCTURE OF UK ENERGY MARKET
Summary
— Whether you look at the intense competition on price, the high amount of innovation to win
customers, competition in service, the signiﬁcant changes in market shares or the substantial level
of switching, all indicators point to Great Britain having a highly competitive domestic energy
market. This has been conﬁrmed in independent analysis carried out for BERR and by Ofgem.
— A market of six larger players, with a number of smaller niche competitors, is consistent with a
high level of competition—as is evident from the indicators already discussed.
— Competition beneﬁts all classes of customers, through the close linkage between prices in diVerent
customer groups. It is true that switching levels have been lower for pensioners and, historically,
prepayment meter (PPM) customers, but this is something that the industry is addressing and
where, we believe, improvements are already being seen.
— The wholesale markets for gas and electricity are both competitive, with high levels of liquidity in
gas and increasing levels of liquidity in electricity. Both markets are being aVected by soaring oil
and coal prices, some 83% and 63% higher in March 2008 than a year previously.
— The market for electricity generation is relatively unconcentrated, having seen signiﬁcant entry
since privatisation of the industry some 17 years ago. It faces real challenges going forward, with
a need for substantial investment to replace closing capacity.
— There has been relatively little consolidation in the domestic retail electricity and gasmarkets since
E.ON’s acquisition of TXU in 2002. There has been no signiﬁcant change in the concentration of
the domestic power market over the last three years and it remains relatively disaggregated.
— Suppliers in the domestic energy market manage the risk of wholesale price changes for their
customers—unlike in other volatile markets such as petrol retailing. Changes in input costs can be
signiﬁcant and, whilst a supplier seeks to hedge itself against these changes and shield its
customers, it is impossible to manage them completely or always get it right. This leads both to
price changes for customers and proﬁt variations for suppliers, who are punished by the market
when their competitors manage the risk of hedging better than they do.
— The competitiveness of theGB retail market means that, if suppliers put up their prices in response
to an increase in input costs, they risk losing customers as a result.
— Suppliers in the market tend to be vertically integrated to manage risk. However, they trade
extensively in the market, both reﬂecting their “make/buy” trade-oV decision and to manage
diVerences between their production and demand. Liquidity is increasing.
— The continental gas market (and oil prices) are having an increasing eVect on the UK gas market
(and consequently, the electricity market) as our domestic production reduces, we become more
dependent on imports and more pipeline import capacity is built. The eVect of the continental
European market is likely to increase in both gas and electricity.
— Ofgem has wide-ranging regulatory and competition law powers, which it does not hesitate to use.
We believe that it is right that Ofgem remains independent of Government, with a principal
statutory duty of protecting present and future consumers.
— E.ON, in common with other suppliers in the market, has put in place social tariVs and assistance
programmes to help poor and vulnerable customers, with our ownmeasures being predominantly
focused on the elderly.
— We believe that the most eVective mitigation for poor and vulnerable customers, both in size of
potential saving and in sustainability, is improved energy eYciency.
— Risingwholesale prices, to cover increases in primary fuel costs, environmentalmeasures and large
investment programmes, will inevitably feed into retail prices. It is not practicable for suppliers to
protect fuel poor customers from these rises, except in very speciﬁc circumstances, and then only
temporarily.
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— Given that very substantial funds are already being committed to this area, both by Government
and by suppliers, it is essential that further steps are well-targeted on the most vulnerable
customers, seek to make the most eVective use of resources, and that the Government has clearly
deﬁned the goals it wants to meet.
Introduction
1.1 The UK has the most competitive energy market in the EU and G7 countries. That was the ﬁnding
of research carried out by an independent ﬁrm of economists and presented by the Secretary of State for
Business, John Hutton, at the end of January 2008.229 This also reﬂected the views expressed by Ofgem in
January this year.230 As recently as 15 January 2008, Ofgem looked at household energy prices in Britain and
demonstrated that Britain’s electricity bills were “still competitive” compared with most other European
countries and that its gas bills were “among the cheapest in Europe”.231
1.2 Equally, as we describe below, thewholesalemarkets in theUKare highly competitive, with low levels
of market concentration232 and growing levels of liquidity.
1.3 The Select Committee asked us to respond to seven speciﬁc questions—we deal with these below.
1. Whether the current market structure encourages eVective competition in the retail markets for gas and
electricity
1.4 There are three retail market segments, domestic, small andmedium-sized enterprises and corporates,
each of which is highly competitive. In this submission we have focused on the nature of competition in the
domestic market since we believe that will be of most interest to the Committee, but would be willing also
to discuss competition in the other market segments if that would be helpful.
The nature of the domestic retail market—vigorous competition
1.5 The GB energy market shows all the characteristics that would be expected of a competitive energy
market. Therefore, as considered by Ofgem in its last published review of the GB domestic energy retail
market in July 2007 (the “July 2007 Review”), the market demonstrates competition on price, innovation
to win customers, competition in service, substantial changes in market shares and signiﬁcant levels of
switching.
Competition on price
1.6 The analysis that Ofgem carried out, over four years up to July 2007, showed “vigorous competition”
on price by energy suppliers.233 The scale of price competition can be seen by considering the potential
savings available to customers who switch from one dual fuel supplier to another (larger savings still are
available for the 25%234 of customers who have never switched): see Figure 1 below.
229 Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, Press Release 2008/22, 30 January 2008. Energy market
competition in the EU and G7: Preliminary 2006 rankings: http://www.berr.gov.uk/energy/markets/competitiveness/
page28432.html
230 “Britain’s domestic energy market is highly competitive and remains the most competitive in Europe” Ofgem Corporate
Strategy 2008–2013, published in January 2008 (para 1.6).
231 Ofgem Factsheet 66: Updated Household energy bills explained 15.01.08.
232 A recent in-depth study into the EU electricity wholesale markets using six countries as case studies found Great Britain to
have the lowest levels of concentration (London Economics for EC Commission, 27 February 2007).
233 Ofgem Factsheet 69: Britain’s competitive energy market 04.07.07.
234 Although 50% of customers have not switched in each of the electricity and gas markets, these are not the same 50%—half
have switched the other fuel, typically achieving around half the savings available from switching both fuels.
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Figure 1
PRICE SPREAD ACROSS REGIONS AT 1 APRIL 2008
Price spread (dual-fuel monthly direct debit, highest to lowest price at average 
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Source: E.ON UK
1.7 Ofgem’s own analysis, in the July 2007 Review, showed that all energy customers “regardless of
payment method, have been able to make signiﬁcant savings”.235
Innovation to win customers
1.8 Companies have to be innovative to win customers. This means new products, fresh ideas and novel
propositions. These include online products, ﬁxed tariV products, capped tariV products, green energy and
diVerent types of oVerings for poor and vulnerable customers.
1.9 For example looking at E.ON UK, just since January 2007, we have:
— increased our ﬁeld sales forcemore than four-fold. This increase in ﬁeld sales activity is particularly
important in ensuring that customers have easy access to the competitive market.236 Although 65%
of households now have internet access237 (and 31% of low income households), ﬁeld sales still
account for around 50% of sales. Face to face contact is also increasingly important to securing
customer interest in energy eYciency measures. These can deliver signiﬁcantly larger savings than
just switching supplier;
— made over 1000 price changes (this includes individual adjustments made within two major
changes—a reduction in March 2007 and an increase in February 2008,238 but around 10% are
through the year as we change our competitive position and regularly review products);
— introduced new versions of our Guarantee239 and capped price products, which seek to overcome
customer concerns that price savings will not last;
— continually varied our on-line products, against the background challenge of ﬁerce competition
leading to unsustainable margins and low customer loyalty;
— launched new central heating and green energy products;
— reduced the higher charges to customers on independent gas transporter (IGT) networks and gas
prepayment meters; and
— invested £15 million in improving prepayment meter technology through the ﬁtting of key
meters.240
Competition in service
1.10 We have strived to improve our customer service. Between January 2005 and January 2007, we rose
from number 6 in the energywatch ranking of supplier complaints to number 2. Since then, we have reduced
our complaint levels by a further 25% but slipped to number 3 in the energywatch complaints table241 as our
competitors have improved their customer service—the bar is continually being raised. Over the past four
years, the July 2007 OfgemReview states that the number of complaints for ﬁve out of the six largest energy
suppliers has fallen.
235 Op cit footnote 5, page 1.
236 Developments such as salesmen’s hand-held computers give increased transparency and conﬁdence in price comparisons,
though these are not yet in universal use by suppliers.
237 Ofcom: The Consumer Experience. Research Report 20 November 2007.
238 Delayed to April 2008 for prepayment and Age Concern customers. Separate decisions are made for the 14 regions for 22
products, standard electricity, Economy 7 electricity and gas, plus diVerent payment methods.
239 Our Guarantee product guarantees savings against British Gas, who is the largest competitor. There is also a saving for ﬁrst
time switchers, from the local electricity supplier and British Gas.
240 Total spend on the project, which will not be completed until later in 2008, will amount to over £21 million.
241 EdF is now number 2.
Business and Enterprise Committee: Evidence Ev 363
Substantial changes in market shares
1.11 As Ofgem puts it, “customers have punished ﬁrms oVering high prices and poor service by switching
supplier”:242
— the largest supplier in the market, British Gas, has lost millions of customers through its premium
pricing policy and service problems, and seen its market share in gas fall from 67% to 48% between
2001 and 2008, whilst its electricity share grew from 18 to 23% and then fell back to 22%.243 In 2007
it announced its intention to improve its performance, change its pricing policy and regain market
share,244 evidenced by two price cuts in 2007 and huge investment in IT systems;
— Scottish & Southern has consistently priced and sold aggressively, leading to substantial growth
in customer numbers. In electricity, it has grown from 13% of the market to 18% of the market
over seven years, predominantly through organic growth. In gas, it has grown from 5% to 14% of
the market;245
— both EdF and Scottish Power, with huge resources from European parents and a variety of
strategies including strong doorstep sales activity, high proﬁle sponsorship and partnerships with
leading brands, have grown their market shares over the last seven years;246
— RWE has seen its market share in domestic electricity fall, from 18% to 15%, whilst its gas share
has grown a little, from 9 to 11%247; and
— E.ON itself, whilst growing from 8 to 18% of electricity accounts, and 4 to 12% of gas accounts,
has also seen its market share eroded as a result of ﬁerce competition.248
Switching
1.12 Domestic customer switching levels in the GB domestic energy market have continued to increase:
some 3.4 million electricity customers and 2.6 million gas customers switched supplier in the ﬁrst eight
months of 2007. These ﬁgures showed an increase on the same point in the previous year, despite 2006 being
a year of historically high switching because of the level of prices.249
1.13 Ofgem commented in the July 2007Review that switching does not “reveal the true extent of activity
in the market because it does not include customers who have stayed with their supplier but switched to a
ﬁxed-price or online deal”. Such customers have clearly engaged with the competitive market but would not
appear from the ﬁgures. Switching rates in the GB energy market are higher than in many other markets,
as shown in Figure 2 below.
Figure 2
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Source: Ofcom The Customer Experience: Research Report 16 November 2006
242 Op cit footnote 5, page 3.
243 Source: Datamonitor ﬁgures, from October 2001 to October 2007.
244 See eg The Times interview with Phil Bentley, the Managing Director of British Gas, 7 May 2007.
245 Source: Datamonitor ﬁgures, from October 2001 to October 2007.
246 Ibid.
247 Ibid.
248 Ibid. E.ON acquired TXU Europe in 2002, which more than doubled its then existing market position and catapulted it into
second place behind British Gas, with a 22% market share in electricity.
249 Ofgem Corporate Strategy 2008–2013, paragraph 1.6.
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Market structure and the measurement of competition
1.14 The structure of the retail market is entirely consistent with a competitive market. In the domestic
market there are six larger suppliers and a number of niche suppliers. As discussed, there have been quite
large variations in market shares amongst the bigger players in response to their diVerent market strategies
(data for the smaller players is not available) and high levels of switching. Moreover, the electricity market
is a relatively unconsolidated market by accepted measures of market concentration.250
1.15 Evidence of market entry by smaller players suggests that there are no substantial barriers to entry,
but the lack of long term success bymany smaller suppliers and the preference of well-known brands towork
in partnershipwith existing suppliers (for instance Tescowith E.ON) suggest that proﬁt levels are not viewed
as sustainable at an attractive level. However, some niche players have made a success with particular
products, notably green tariVs.
1.16 Competition beneﬁts all customers, including those who do not want to switch, despite available
savings. Non-switchers are protected by the close linkage between prices in diVerent customer groups. We,
for instance, have ﬁxed diVerentials between quarterly credit and direct debit and single fuel and dual fuel.251
1.17 However, concerns have been expressed over two groups of customers—elderly and prepayment
meter customers—since switching levels have historically been slightly lower. We compare them below.
Table 1
COMPARISON OF PENSIONERS AND PREPAYMENT CUSTOMERS
Pensioners Prepayment
Customers 8.1 million households 3.6 million electricity
2.3 million gas
Switching (to end 2006)252 35% 33% electricity
26% gas
Product choice Staywarm Standard PPM
Age Concern
All other products
Barriers to switching Brand preference for pre 1998 Concerns over change of supplier
suppliers process (eg payment card)
15% repaying debt253 (average
length of restriction 15 months)
Sales channels All. Some restrictions on All, except internet
doorstep (cold calling zones;
supplier self-regulation, for very
elderly)
Partnerships—Age Concern
Source: E.ON UK
1.18 We believe the lower switching rate for elderly customers is a natural consequence of features of the
competitive market which will diminish in signiﬁcance over time. In particular, we expect suppliers to
improve their ability to target customer segments and develop appropriate propositions and partnerships.
1.19 We agree that, although switching is higher than in a number of other non-energymarkets, as shown
in Figure 2 earlier, and the price premium is lower than in many other sectors,254 competition has yet to
be fully eVective for prepayment meter customers. However, this situation is changing rapidly as market
solutions emerge:
— the savings available to prepayment meter customers are larger than in other parts of the
residential market, as shown in Figure 3 below;
250 The gas market measures of concentration are distorted by the continuing large market share of British Gas. Although this
has decreased dramatically over the last ﬁve years, from 67% down to 48%, this will still greatly inﬂuence the results on, for
example an HHI basis.
251 For simplicity these are percentage diVerentials (eg 3% for direct debit compared to quarterly cash/cheque). Percentages result
in a slight widening of the diVerential if there is a price increase—£2.50 at the last price increase on a £400 bill. Switching to
direct debit would save £12.
252 Percentage of customers who have switched once or more, as at December 2006, as reported by customers to Ipsos Mori for
Ofgem. Switching rates for vulnerable customers—Summary Report March 2007.
253 The majority of PPM customers in debt, those with debts under £100, can in fact switch, and assign their debt to the new
supplier, but experience is that few customers use this.
254 FamilyWelfare Association/Save the Children: home contents insurance !33%, mobile phone prepay !25%, car insurance
!20%, energy prepayment !10%—example low-income household costs compared to typical costs for other customer
groups.
Business and Enterprise Committee: Evidence Ev 365
Figure 3
PRICE SPREAD AT 1 APRIL 2008
Price spread (dual-fuel prepayment, highest to lowest price at average consumption) 
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Source: E.ON UK (note that the scale is double that shown in Figure 1 for direct debit customers)
— our experience is that switching rates are higher now for prepayment meter customers than for
other payment types, reﬂecting the changes in sales activity (increased doorstep sales forces and
increased eVectiveness in the use of house moves as a sales opportunity);255
— suppliers are investing in newmetering technology and in payment infrastructure, whichwill allow
a much wider range of prepayment meter propositions; and
— suppliers are seeking to be more innovative in the propositions oVered to PPM customers.We, for
instance, are negotiating with switching sites to allow click-through switching for PPM customers.
1.20 Suppliers’ social programmes are also delivering lower tariVs to some prepayment meter
customers,256 but widespread reductions, based on lower costs, will require implementation of smartmeters.
1.21 We believe that these market developments will remove stakeholder concerns over PPMpricing, but
accept that the challenge is for us and Ofgem to show that these steps will be eVective.
2. Whether there is eVective competition in the wholesale markets for gas and electricity
2.1 The BERR competitiveness report referred to above found that the UK had a highly liquid,
transparent wholesale gas market and a highly competitive increasingly liquid electricity wholesale
market.257
2.2 The gas and electricity markets are linked at the wholesale level, given that gas is used to generate
around 36% of Britain’s electricity. High world oil prices are also reﬂected in gas prices because, outside
Britain, the price of gas tends to be linked to the price of oil and, as Britain is increasingly having to import
gas,258 this feeds through into gas prices in Britain and therefore also into electricity wholesale prices.
Electricity wholesale prices are also aVected by prices for coal, which is used to generate around 37% of
electricity. International coal and oil prices have risen strongly. As at the end of March 2008, international
coal for prompt delivery to mainland Europe stood at 137 $/tonne whilst crude oil stood at 105 $/barrel, an
increase of 83% and 63% respectively over prices a year earlier. Even allowing for the eVect of the
appreciation of sterling against the US dollar, prices were 79% and 59% percent higher than a year earlier.
Competition in the gas wholesale market
2.3 Competition in the wholesale gas market is well developed. We do not have access to precise market
share data but, based on our counterparties, we believe there are around 60 active market participants.259
Liquidity in the wholesale gas market is increasing signiﬁcantly (see Figure 4 below) with traded volumes
accounting for around 10 times physical supply. The UK gas market is becoming increasingly integrated
with the continental gas market, as discussed under question 5 below, and this trend will continue as UK
gas production declines.
255 Three suppliers may be interested—two from the old property, assuming the customer has not previously switched, and
possibly a diVerent supplier at the new property.
256 However, these are typically available to customers on beneﬁts and so can exclude the 40% of fuel poor customers who are
not on beneﬁts, and are thus relatively poorly targeted as a means of supporting fuel poor customers.
257 Op cit footnote 1.
258 According to BERR statistics, the UK has been a net importer of gas since 2004 and the the ﬁgures show that the extent of
this is increasing (BERR Digest of UK Energy Statistics 2007, Table 4.1).
259 There are around 180 gas shippers, according to Ofgem’s list of Gas Shippers but not all are active.
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Figure 4
WHOLESALE GAS MARKET LIQUIDITY
UK NBP Gas Market Liquidity (Broker Screen Trades Only)
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Competition in the electricity wholesale market
2.4 Competition in the wholesale power market is very well developed. In terms of market structure, the
wholesale power market is quite disaggregated, with low levels of concentration.260 Since privatisation in
1991, when there were only three major generating companies in England and Wales,261 there has been a
very high degree of new entry, with twenty generators with capacity above 200MW. The level of
concentration has been broadly unchanged over the last three years.
2.5 Wholesale market liquidity is a key measure of competitiveness. Concerns had been expressed in the
past about whether vertical integration by companies had caused liquidity in the market to fall but, when
the EC Commission looked at this issue as part of its Sector Inquiry into the Energy Industry between 2005
and 2007, it did not ﬁnd vertical integration to be the cause.262
2.6 The Commission recognised in its Report on the Energy Sector Inquiry that, within the electricity
sector, even vertically integrated companies continue to have incentives to trade on the wholesale markets,
in particular to optimise their generation portfolios. The Commission comments that a vertically integrated
company that owns suYcient generation capacity to produce enough electricity to cover all of its customers’
requirements will beneﬁt from buying instead of producing electricity if the wholesale market electricity
price is lower than the short run marginal cost of the last generation unit in the merit order of its own
generation capacity.263 This is commonly known as the “make/buy” decision.
2.7 Liquidity did reduce following the departure of Enron and some other traders from the market in
2002–03, but is now improving quite markedly (see Figure 5 below) and, based on the number of
counterparties we tradewith, we believe there are about 50 active participants. Traded volumes nowaccount
for 3 times physical generation.
260 The HHIs in the generation market in 2007, on both an output and a capacity basis, are below 1000, tending to denote a
competitive market.
261 These were National Power (now RWEnpower and International Power), Powergen (now E.ON UK) and British Energy.
Other generators included imports across the interconnectors, pumped storage and some very small generating stations
owned by supply companies.
262 DG Competition report on Energy Sector Inquiry SEC (2006) 1724 10 January 2007 page 154, paragraph 460.
263 Ibid page 151 footnote 261.
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Figure 5
WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY MARKET LIQUIDITY
UK GTMA Power Market Liquidity (Broker Screen Trades only)
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2.8 Competitive pressures will increase further in future if projected increases in interconnection with the
continental and Irish markets go ahead. A further factor is the emerging requirement for substantial
investment in new generating capacity.
2.9 The UK needs signiﬁcant investment in new energy infrastructure, sustained over the long term.
Between now and 2020, the UK will close up to 22GW of generation capacity due to the closure of life-
expired nuclear, coal and oil plant. Between now and 2030, themajority of today’s coal and nuclear capacity
will be closed and the capacity gap could be up to 48GW, representing up to 60% of current capacity, if
replacements are not made.
2.10 The Government’s recent announcement to target 33GW of oVshore wind capacity by 2020 would
alonemean an investment of around £50 billion.However, given the intermittent nature of wind generation,
only 11GW of this capacity could be deemed eVective. Figure 6 below illustrates that this gives rise to a
further investment requirement of up to 36GW of alternative technologies over the period to 2030, in order
to provide for an adequate generation security margin.
2.11 By way of illustration, the level of investment required in conventional technology to 2020 could be
over £10 billion, assuming replacement of closing nuclear with new nuclear (£3 billion), replacing closing
coal with a mix of new gas and new coal with CCS or carbon capture capability (£8 billion). Continued
investment is required after 2020 to replace further closure of nuclear and coal capacity.
Figure 6
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2.12 The closure of this capacity provides a signiﬁcant opportunity to reduce the carbon emissions from
theUK’s power sector but, at the same time, it is important tomaintain diversity of sources of fuel for power
generation, to help ensure secure and aVordable energy supply. Replacement and additional capacity is
needed in base, ﬂexible mid-merit and peaking roles.
2.13 Given the replacement timescales, the default answer is to build more gas generation but this could
result in a system that is 70% dependent on gas. This would leave UK energy supply even more highly
exposed than it is at present to the price and availability of gas on international markets with unacceptable
consequences, in our view, for security of supply. In terms of carbon reduction, whilst gas is less carbon
intensive than traditional coal, it remains a relatively high carbon fuel. Further reductions would be possible
by retroﬁtting CCS to gas plant but it is much less commercially attractive to ﬁt CCS to such plant, given
the lower carbon content of gas, and a much higher carbon price would be required to render it economic.
2.14 We therefore believe that there is a role for new nuclear, gas, coal (CCS ready) and renewable
technologies to address the supply gap whilst meeting energy policy goals:
— new nuclear plant has a role in contributing economically to the UK’s CO2 reduction targets and,
in an era of high fossil fuel prices, to a diverse and secure energy supply. This should also be
supported by the expected further tightening of the EU ETS in Phase 3 from 2013;
— some new gas CCGT generation capacity will be needed but reliance on gas alone will not deliver
the UK’s energy policy objectives;
— investment in new coal generation capacity using supercritical plant technologywill enable theUK
to maintain diversity in supply (and has signiﬁcantly lower CO2 emissions than existing coal-ﬁred
capacity) whilst carbon capture and storage (CCS) has potentially a key role to play in enabling
new coal-ﬁred generation to reduce its carbon dioxide emissions further by around 90%; and
— the legally binding target that, by 2020, 20% of total ﬁnal energy consumption should come from
renewable sources, will reinforce support for investment in renewables in the UK, as will the
tightening of the EU ETS.
2.15 E.ON UK itself will close over 4GW of coal and oil generation capacity by the end of 2015 and
intends to be a major investor in new UK energy supply infrastructure. E.ON’s investment in new capacity
in the UK over the next three years to 2010 will exceed £4.5 billion, which is equivalent to reinvesting over
100% of our EBIT.
3. The implications of growing consolidation in the energy market
3.1 There has in fact been relatively little consolidation in the domestic retail electricity and gas markets
since E.ON’s acquisition of TXU in 2002. There has been no signiﬁcant change in the concentration of the
domestic power market over the last three years and it remains relatively disaggregated. There has been
some consolidation at the European level but this has not led to any increase in concentration in the UK
on a relevant market basis. In any event, any proposed mergers are subject to the scrutiny of the UK or EU
merger control authorities, as well as to the views of Ofgem.
3.2 To the extent that consolidation has occurred over a longer timeframe we do not see this as having
been detrimental to competition. Indeed consolidation can bring important beneﬁts in terms of eYciency
(with ﬁxed costs spread over a larger customer base) and economies of scale, which include the ability to
fund the very large capital investments which the sector now requires. In any event, as discussed above,
competition in both retail and wholesale markets is well developed.
3.3 In future it is important that themarket structure is not frozen and is able to evolve to reﬂect changing
market conditions and challenges. It would not be conducive to market eYciency if managements felt they
were immune from acquisition.
4. The relationship between the wholesale and retail markets for electricity and gas
4.1 Suppliers in the retail energy market seek to manage billions of pounds worth of highly uncertain
costs, which make up 50–60% of the retail price to domestic customers, on behalf of those customers. There
is therefore a clear relationship between wholesale and retail markets.
4.2 Some othermarkets have a similar scale of cost variability, for example, petrol retailing andmortgage
provision. However, in both of those markets the uncertainty is wholly passed onto customers. In petrol,
pump prices change frequently, whilst in the mortgage market the cost of many products will vary with
changes in the Base Rate and customers have to choose the right product for them, for example, a ﬁxed rate
product, to manage the risk.264
264 Capped or ﬁxed price products are an increasing feature of the energy market but are only 7% of our customer base.
Business and Enterprise Committee: Evidence Ev 369
4.3 One well-respected economic consultancy, Oxera, in a paper issued last year, put it as follows:
“in recent years energy retailers (supply companies) in the UK appear to have been hesitant to
pass through the rapidly increasing wholesale gas and electricity prices to domestic customers. In
contrast, after the reductions seen in wholesale prices over the past six months, energy suppliers
have been quick to announce forthcoming price cuts, but may also hope to see higher margins in
the future”.265
4.4 The hesitancy can be explained by the competitiveness of the UK supply market. Whilst companies
may be suVering as a result of the increased costs, their decision onwhether to increase prices has to be based
on their own reading of the market and of what their competitors might do. As Ofgem puts it, “In Britain’s
competitive market, if they increase bills they have to weigh up how much that increase will lead to a loss
of customers”.266
4.5 It is impossible for energy suppliers to manage this risk completely through hedging, even for the
medium term, or always to get it right. Price changes are therefore inevitable, but suppliers will be punished
whenever they misjudge their positions and their competitors manage the situation better than they do.
4.6 The scale of wholesale cost movements is such that price changes can be substantial and year to year
proﬁt variations larger still. The volatility of energy costs compared to retail prices is shown by Figure 7
below.
Figure 7
DOMESTIC DUAL FUEL—COSTS AND REVENUE
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4.7 In a Press Release of 8 February 2007,267 Ofgem commented on how energy companies manage the
relationship between wholesale and retail markets. It said:
“Energy suppliers buy much of their gas and electricity for domestic customers in advance. This
helps them to deliver security of supply and means that domestic prices do not track movements
in the price of gas from day to day. This allowed suppliers to delay putting up prices when
wholesale gas prices began to increase.
It is a myth that companies were swift to increase prices and slow to cut them in line with wholesale
price changes. Wholesale prices started increasing sharply in June 2003 but it wasn’t until June
2004 that customers saw the eVects. Since then, energy companies have continued to ﬁght to hold
onto or gain customers by absorbing substantial amounts of the wholesale cost increases theywere
incurring. One analyst report—unchallenged—showed that all but one of the companies made a
loss in their retail businesses last year”.
4.8 Ofgem calculated that on average, customers had saved approximately £572 through suppliers’ delay
in passing through wholesale costs.
265 Assessing energy supply proﬁtability: does a margins approach make sense? Oxera Agenda April 2007, page 1.
266 Op cit footnote 3, page 1.
267 Energy Companies have a choice: Cut prices or lose customers, 8 February 2007.
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4.9 A number of market participants are active in both the wholesale and the retail electricity markets.268
This raises the issue of vertical integration in the market and its eVect on competition. Vertical integration
does not, of itself, aVect competition; the only questions are whether competition is eVective at each level
in the supply chain and whether it has led to a lack of liquidity on wholesale markets. We have already
demonstrated above that competition is well developed in both the retail and wholesale markets and that
liquidity in both the gas and electricity markets is increasing.
4.10 Vertical integration arises from the need tomanage risk in thismarket. A player in themarket wishes
to ensure that, commercially, it has a natural hedge between the risks in the wholesale and retail markets.
When wholesale prices collapsed to avoidable cost levels after the introduction of NETA in 2001, those
companies with some degree of vertical integration were able to weather the storm more eVectively than
those such as British Energy who had not.269 NETA, and subsequently BETTA, have made it more diYcult
for standalone suppliers or generators than under the previous Pool structure.
4.11 Aside from the “make/buy” decision, which has already been discussed, vertically integrated
companies in the electricity wholesale market must also trade to manage diVerences between their
production and demand, both in total and arising from the “shape” of a company’s generation relative to
its customers’ load proﬁle. The shape of a domestic customer’s load, for example, is very peaky, with sharp
increases in demand in the morning and after work, compared to a corporate proﬁle, which is likely to be
much ﬂatter over the day.
4.12 There are major diVerences in the positions of the market participants who are traditionally
regarded as vertically integrated (see Figure 8 below). A number of companies generate more than the
volume they supply to customers while others generate signiﬁcantly less.
Figure 8
MARKET POSITIONS OF VERTICALLY INTEGRATED ELECTRICITY MARKET PLAYERS
Relative 2007 UK Generation and Supply Market Shares and Volumes (MWhs)
(Data taken from Central Volume Allocation System (Elexon))
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4.13 All these factors have led to a situation of increasing, rather than decreasing liquidity in the
wholesale markets, as discussed.
5. The interaction between the UK and European energy markets
5.1 In relation to gas, as indicated already,270 the decline of the amount of gas in the UK Continental
Shelf has meant that the UK is increasingly having to import gas. The UK has a more signiﬁcant
interconnection with the continental market in gas than in electricity. There are four import pipelines; three
from gas ﬁelds in the Norwegian Continental Shelf (Langeled, Tampen Link and Vesterled) and one from
the Netherlands, the Bacton Balgzand Line (BBL). In addition, there is one interconnector with Belgium
(Interconnector UK (“IUK”)).
268 This is mostly an electricity question since, in the gas market few of the major UK gas suppliers are vertically integrated with
gas production to any real extent, with the exception of Centrica.
269 Indeed, the Commission’s decision approving the UK Government’s grant of state aid to British Energy to rescue it at that
time noted as a factor in BE’smarked decrease of revenues in 2002 its lack of hedging (see CommissionDecision of 22October
2004 (C (2004) 3474 COR, paragraph 13).
270 Footnote 30, supra.
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5.2 BBL operates on the basis of advance contractual commitments for its capacity and is predominantly
insensitive to price. By contrast, the three Norwegian pipelines are sensitive both to prevailing prices within
Europe and to contractual requirements since they can both import either into the UK or into Continental
Europe. IUK is highly responsive to price changes and can also be used to export gas from the UK to
Europe.
5.3 The other way that gas comes into the UK is through cargoes of LNG. There are two existing
operative LNG terminals, atGrain andTeesside, and ﬁve others are being built or are in the advanced stages
of development. National Grid forecasts that LNG will constitute up to 39% of UK gas supplies by 2017.
However, whether an LNG cargo actually makes it to the UK market will depend on demand for LNG
elsewhere in the world. The Times reported on 9 March 2008271 that, although Grain had been set up to
receive at least a cargo a week, in fact, at that date, the last time a ship had docked had been 29 January
2008, since intervening cargoes had gone to countries prepared to pay more, such as Japan and Korea.
5.4 As the UK has become a signiﬁcant importer of gas, market conditions in the UK have become
increasingly determined by European market conditions. When the UK market requires continental gas
imports to meet marginal UK gas demand, UK gas prices rise to parity with (or slightly above) European
contract price levels. If European demand for gas is itself very high, for example because of unusually cold
weather, prices may rise to very high levels. If UK gas demand is low and/or there is a surplus of gas supplies
fromother sources (UK,Norway andLNG), gas prices will fall below European contract prices and surplus
gas may be exported to the continent. European gas contracts are often indexed to oil products and
European gas prices have therefore shown a close historic relationship with Brent crude prices, with a lag
to allow for the indexation delay.
5.5 Figure 9 below shows the inter-relation between year ahead prices for National Balancing Point
(NBP) gas, and for oil, coal and power. This reveals strong correlation between gas and oil prices, strong
correlation between oil and coal prices from mid 2005 onwards and very strong correlation between coal,
gas, oil and power from January 2007 onwards. Thus, whilst the UK gas and power prices are not directly
linked to oil, there is a strong indirect inﬂuence.
Figure 9
RELATIVE COMMODITY PRICES 2005–07
Relative Commodity Prices (2005 - 2007)
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5.6 Continental gas market conditions are therefore of increasing signiﬁcance for UK gas and power
consumers given that gas prices are a major determinant of power prices as discussed above. Liberalisation
of European gas markets will lead to more liquidity and increasing competition but it seems likely that the
main external gas producers to the EU, who will account for an increasing proportion of EU supply, will
continue to have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on end prices to consumers.
5.7 The right response to this from a UK and continental perspective is to encourage alternative sources
of gas, particularly LNG, to increase investment in gas storage and to diversify away from sole or excessive
reliance on gas in the power market, by investing in alternative generation, including renewables, nuclear
and cleaner coal-ﬁred generation.
5.8 In electricity, themain eVect of interconnection on theUKpowermarket is observed in the short term
markets—this is because the UK does not need to import signiﬁcant volumes of power. This has resulted in
the 2GW interconnector between England and France being a point of price arbitrage between the UK and
271 Price war threat to UK gas supplies, Times Online 9 March 2008.
Ev 372 Business and Enterprise Committee: Evidence
French markets. Historically, ﬂows over the interconnector have been predominantly toward the UK,
reﬂecting the availability in France of a large volume of nuclear generation at low avoidable cost. This has
the eVect of reducing UK power prices. Whether this position persists will depend partly on whether
suYcient investment will be made in continental power markets to meet substantial future capacity
requirements there.
5.9 In future, increasing levels of interconnection with continental Europe and Ireland and the
development of common market rules and more harmonised regulatory structures are likely to mean that
the UK power market is increasingly inﬂuenced by continental market conditions, in eVect becoming part
of a regional European market encompassing North Western Europe, France, the UK and Ireland.
6. The eVectiveness of regulatory oversight of the energy market
6.1 Ofgem has wide-ranging powers under a range of utility and competition legislation, which are
broader than those of most other EU regulators, and is well-resourced. It does not hesitate to make use of
these powers as is evident from its current inquiry into the retail energy market under which it has expressed
its intention to use its powers under the Enterprise Act, and its recent ﬁne of NGC in respect of the gas
metering market. Whilst independent, it is also sensitive to changing political priorities and consumer
perceptions. On balance, we think this is a good thing as consumer perceptions are important. Nevertheless,
we expect it to retain an evidence-based approach to its work in response to pressures to intervene in the
market which are always most apparent when prices are rising rather than falling.
6.2 Ofgem’s principal statutory objective duty is to protect the interests of the consumer, wherever
appropriate by promoting eVective competition. Consumer includes for these purposes both present and
future consumers. It performs that function as an autonomous economic regulator, independent of
Government. We believe that it is right that Ofgem should maintain that independence and its focus on
protecting customers.
7. Progress in reducing fuel poverty and the appropriate policy instruments for doing so
7.1 E.ON, in common with other suppliers in the market, has in place social tariVs and assistance
programmes to help poor and vulnerable customers. Our Staywarm tariV and partnership with Age
Concern are predominantly focused on the elderly, whilst all vulnerable customers are encouraged to call
our “Caring Energy” helpline, which provides a beneﬁts entitlement check as well as energy eYciency advice
and which also manages referrals to our hardship fund.
7.2 We believe that the most eVective mitigation for poor and vulnerable customers, both in size of
potential saving and in sustainability, is improved energy eYciency. The Government’s own strategy has a
strong focus on improving the energy eYciency of property as the means of reducing fuel poverty.
Expenditure on the CERTpriority group,WarmFront and theDecent Homes programmewill total around
£900 million/year, with suppliers through CERT playing the largest part in this programme, around £500
million/year.
7.3 Rising wholesale prices, to cover increases in primary fuel costs, environmental measures and large
investment programmes, will inevitably feed into retail prices. It is not practicable for suppliers to protect
fuel poor customers from these rises, except in very speciﬁc circumstances, and then only temporarily.
Indeed, it is unhelpful to customers to suggest that this can be done. Both CERT and WarmFront
substantially depend on customer pull—ie customers wanting measures to be put in place to reduce their
expenditure.
7.4 Given that very substantial funds are already being committed to this area, both by Government and
by suppliers, it is essential that further steps are well-targeted on the most vulnerable customers and seek
to make the most eVective use of resources. Market intervention, in the form, for example, of a mandatory
social tariV, would impose additional costs on other customers who may be more in need and have side-
eVects which distort the energy market by removing from the competitive market customers who qualify
for the social tariV. Further, it would be likely to be unsustainable and potentially detract from the long
term goal of eradicating fuel poverty.
7.5 We expect to participate fully in any taskforce established to consider these issues. We will also
continue to develop our social programme and seek to target it on customers in greatest need. However, we
do not believe that social programmes can sustainably protect consumers from increases in energy prices,
whether due to rising wholesale or environmental costs. This can only be achieved through improvement
to the quality of housing.
7.6 We believe that the Government needs to reassess how it can more eVectively focus resources and the
eVorts of the many parties involved to deliver lasting solutions for those in real need, avoiding quick ﬁx
market interventions which will in the end do little to address the underlying problem. The Government is
beginning tomake very signiﬁcant progress in improving the energy eYciency of theUK’s housing occupied
by consumers on low incomes through the programmes described above but needs to consider a number of
potential areas for change:
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— targeting policy in a way which recognises the circumstances of diVerent customer groups, for
instance, that elderly owner occupiers are in a quite diVerent situation from tenant families;
— increasing emphasis on higher cost measures needed for “hard to heat” homes (such as homes oV
the gas grid or with solid walls), given that these customers may be in the greatest need (the
ﬂexibility mechanism within the CERT priority group, which gives an incentive to solid wall
insulation and ground source heat pumps, is a useful step);
— exploringmore imaginative approaches to incentivising customers themselves to ﬁnance necessary
investment in their properties. For example, the Government could support schemes enabling
customers to fund energy eYciency improvements by releasing value in their properties, with
additional interest costs funded by lower energy costs; ﬁnancial support could be directed at
households with low value properties while a measure of compulsion might apply for landlords;
— enhancing the beneﬁts system to give more explicit recognition to energy costs which have to be
met by low income consumers, for example, adjusting housing related beneﬁts to recognise that
lower cost poorer quality housing is often oVset by high energy costs; and
— clarifying its view of the ultimate policy objective. TheGovernment has a target of eradicating fuel
poverty, as far as reasonably practicable, for vulnerable households by 2010 and for all households
by 2016. However, while the Government can have a signiﬁcant impact on housing energy
eYciency standards and beneﬁt levels, it has little inﬂuence over energy prices prevailing in
international markets. The Government should deﬁne more speciﬁcally what outcomes it wants
to achieve over the next eight years, to 2016, given the levers that it has and does not have, and
then focus policy on delivering these outcomes.
March 2008
Supplementary evidence submitted by E.ON UK plc
Wholesale Market Liquidity
1. At the Select Committee hearing on 24 June 2008, it was indicated that Ofgem had suggested that the
value of the total Over the Counter (OTC) market in 2007 was £31 million. A question was raised about the
limited size of this market, with the underlying concern being that the companies before the Committee (in
the particular session, E.ON UK, EdF and RWE) were not trading in the market but instead were only
trading internally, hedging between their generation and supply businesses, without this volume ever
reaching the market.
2. Initially, it is worth correcting the picture given above. In fact, the value of the UK wholesale market
that is screen traded through brokers (ie part of the OTC market), was nearly £31 billion in 2006–07 (April
to March) and more than £41 billion in 2007–08. The volume in 2006–07 was 767TWh and in 2007–08 was
928TWh,where physical output volume in each of those yearswas around 332TWh.Trades through brokers
are available to anyone who uses that broker (brokers are, for example, GFI, ICAP, Spectron, Tullett
Prebon), subject to credit risk. In addition to the brokers, a small amount of trades (perhaps 1–2%) go
through exchanges and there are also some bilateral contracts on OTC or bespoke terms.
3. It is certainly not the case that the players in the market who are vertically integrated do not trade in
the market. They all do so, to greater or lesser extents. This may be for a variety of reasons—including
because they run their supply and generation trading businesses entirely independently of each other;
because they need to add “shape” to their trading proﬁle to meet their retail demand which their own
generation portfolio cannot provide; because theymay be “short” or long” in generation and therefore need
either tomake up volume or to sell it on; or because theywish to optimise their trading position—the “make/
buy” decision.
4. For E.ON’s part, it trades more than 100% of its generation volume through the wholesale market.
Indeed, in 2007–08, this was more than 200% of its generation volume, as shown in the table below. All of
this volume was through brokers.272
Generation Volume Wholesale Market Sales as a % of
ESI Year (MWh) Sales Volume (MWh) Generation
April 2006 to March 2007 37,049,369 49,560,875 134%
April 2007 to March 2008 41,480,605 92,239,488 222%
5. In fact, as was set out in our written evidence, liquidity in the electricity wholesale market is not
falling273—it is increasing. We provided graphs in our response that demonstrated that, as do the ﬁgures in
paragraph 2 aboveThis has also been independently conﬁrmed by the Financial ServicesAuthority (FSA)—
272 E.ON also trades a small amount through the APX, a power exchange.
273 It did fall between 2004 and 2006.
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the FSA analysis of activity in energy markets 2007 states that UK traded power volumes increased 52% in
2006–07 over 2005–06.274 The electricity wholesale power market is actually quite disaggregated, with low
levels of concentration. Based on the number of counterparties we trade with, we believe there are about 50
active participants.
6. However, we do believe that the trading market structure can be improved. As the market is currently
set up, liquidity is dispersed across the various diVerent product pools and there is no robust reference price
that can be used as a basis for a simple, cash-settled futures contract. This contrasts with many European
markets that have a centrally organised spotmarket with a single, published, reference price that encourages
the use of ﬁnancial swap and futures contracts, reducing credit risk and the need to take power to
physical delivery.
7. This was recognised by a number of players in the industry and therefore the “Market Design Project”
was initiated by the Power Trading Forum (registered to the Futures and Options Association (FOA)) in
March 2006 to review the current market structure and provide alternatives, with the goal of stimulating
forward power liquidity. AMarket Design Project Steering Group was set up on which E.ON sits, together
with representatives of other major players in the wholesale market, including Drax and International
Power, as well as representatives from the FOA and others.
8. The following rationale was developed for the project:
— In order to attract additional forward liquidity, the correct products, easy access and ﬁnancial and
physical contracts must be developed;
— To trade ﬁnancially settled contracts, robust reference prices are required;
— Reference prices are best established day ahead from the underlying physical market, and it is
proposed to do this through both continuous trading and an auction process—this suggests a
platform which hosts continuous and auction based trading;
— For reference prices to be robust, all (or a signiﬁcant majority) of trades must be captured. A
central clearing platform (energy exchange) is the most eYcient way of achieving this goal (this in
addition provides a revenue stream to the platform provider);
— This platform should then form the starting point for the future development of ﬁnancial trading,
once the reference prices have been accepted.
9. The Market Design Project proposal, therefore, is for a platform which hosts continuous and auction
based trading, capturing all, or a signiﬁcant majority of trades, through a central clearing platform (energy
exchange).
10. A request for proposals frompotential service providers was issued in June 2007 to try to ﬁnd solution
providers who could host the auction and intraday platforms and provide clearing services. The process was
delayed due to the time required for providers to submit detailed responses and for the Market Design
Project to evaluate those proposals thoroughly. Commercial negotiations began with the leading provider
but subsequently broke down due to issues with commercial arrangements between the two parties that had
put forward that solution. TheRFP process has nowbegun again with the short-listed parties and it is hoped
that a recommendation for a way forward will be made in August 2008, with implementation as soon as
possible after that, but realistically likely to be in Quarter 2, 2009.
11. The aim of theMarketDesign Project is to encourage players operating on the fringe of the wholesale
market, or operating indirectly, to participate. Many industrial players and brokers take part in other
European markets such as Nordpool and EEX because of the ease of entry and the fact that credit risk is
reduced via the use of cleared instruments, as described above. So, for example, Bizz Energy and other
independent suppliers will be able to participate more fully and the new arrangements should also attract
new risk capital that will further enhance liquidity. Other large players on the demand side such as Corus,
SCA, Linde Group, and Ineos Chlor are also interested in these developments and E.ON has worked to
keep them informed of development.
12. The Market Design Project is an example of the market seeking its own solutions—the market is not
perfect and is looking to evolve and improve through its own initiatives and actions. The proposed structure
will allow a better range of hedging instruments, thereby encouraging companies without their own
generation assets, or large industrial companies to enter the market and enabling more active hedging and
trading by market participants.
June 2008
274 This gave amarket size of 984.8TWh in the periodAugust 2006 to July 2007, with a value of £31 billion, see: www.fsa.gov.uk/
pubs/others/analysis energy 2007.pdf
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Supplementary evidence from E.ON UK plc
Additional Note on Prepayment Meter (PPM) Charges and Social Tariffs
Prepayment meter charges
1. The question (Q862) asked companies to conﬁrm whether they charged prepaid meter customers
around 17% more than direct debit. There seemed to be some confusion around the answers given, which
it might be helpful to try to clarify.
2. This question was answered for our electricity customers, who make up 63% of our prepayment meter
customers, where it was explained that, whilst the extra costs to serve such customers were around £45, the
additional amount charged was around £35.275
3. The reasons for the apparent diVerence between the question asked and the answers given are, ﬁrst,
that the question looked only at ﬁnal prices to customers, without taking into account the extra costs to
serve, and also whether one looks at dual fuel, gas or electricity. Therefore, whilst it is the case that, for
E.ON’s electricity customers, for example, we are charging them less than the additional cost of that
metering, it is also the case that the total price charged to such customers is 10% of the direct debit price
higher than the amount charged to direct debit customers. Comparable ﬁgures for gas and dual fuel
customers are given below—but again, these are the “bare” ﬁgures, without taking into additional costs to
serve. The size of those costs is being looked at as part of the work with Ofgem on PPM customers.
4. The percentage of our PPM customer base represented by each category is also provided below, to
show the relative size of group covered.
DiVerential (ignoring costs % of PPM customers
diVerences) as % of DD price in category
Electricity 10% 63%
Gas 16% 8%
Dual-fuel 13% 29%
Social TariVs
5. The question (Q889) was around the beneﬁts of clarity and transparency in terms of social tariVs. In
our response we supported that clarity, particularly if it led to fuel poverty being tackled on a long-term
sustainable basis. As is clear from our response to Q888, we subscribe to a view that it is right to stand back
and take a long hard look at how we tackle fuel poverty in this country, which process should be carried
out in an open and honest fashion, with clear direction from Government.
6. That remains our position and, indeed, it is essential if we are really to tackle fuel poverty. However,
we do not support a mandatory social tariV—not least because we do not know what it is that we are being
asked to support. If the Committee were minded to recommend a mandatory social tariV, it would need to
be clear what the proposal was, that it was costed, well-targeted and sustainable and that the cross-subsidy
from other customers was recognised.
7 July 2008
Memorandum submitted by ExxonMobil
Introduction
1. Several subsidiaries of Exxon Mobil Corporation are involved in the parts of the European natural
gas business that involve the UK. For ease of reference, such subsidiaries are referred to both individually
and collectively as ExxonMobil in this submission.
2. ExxonMobil’s participation in the UK natural gas business involves upstream production,
transportation and processing, as well as sales at the wholesale level of the gas supply chain. ExxonMobil
is also a joint venture participant with aminority interest in the SouthHook LNG import terminal currently
under construction near Milford Haven, Pembrokeshire.
3. ExxonMobil is no longer involved in the retail gas market and our focus in making this submission is,
therefore, on the wholesale sector in the UK and factors that are relevant to the functioning of that sector.
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4. Our submission covers observations on the evolution of the gas sector in the UK, competition in the
UK Continental Shelf and wholesale gas markets, the UK’s legislative and regulatory framework and the
evolution of the European gas market.
5. We support the Government’s strategic objective to meet the UK’s need for secure long-term,
competitively priced energy by developing an open, competitivemarket for energy, within a transparent and
stable ﬁscal and regulatory framework. As long as the current market framework remains, we believe the
UK will continue to be successful in attracting the long-term capital investment required to meet its future
energy needs.
UK Gas Sector Development
6. Throughout the 1980’s and 1990’s theUKnatural gas sectorwas not connected toContinental Europe,
and UK demand was met by gas produced from the UK Continental Shelf (UKCS) and Norwegian Frigg
imports to St Fergus. After the Bacton-Zeebrugge Interconnector was completed in 1998 the UK was in a
position to import or export gas from Continental Europe in line with domestic supply and demand.
7. In recent years, additional infrastructure has been put in place to allow further natural gas imports into
the UK. In 2001 the capacity of the Frigg (renamed Vesterled) import line was expanded and additional
Norwegian production sources were connected as Frigg production declined. Norwegian import capacity
was increased further in 2006 when the Langeled pipeline was installed and again in 2007 when the Tampen
Link was completed. In 2005, the Isle of Grain LNG peak shaving facilities were converted to an LNG
import terminal and in 2006 the BBL pipeline was commissioned allowing gas to be imported from the
Netherlands.
8. Natural gas production from the mature UKCS reached its natural plateau between 2001 and 2003
and has been in decline since that time. UK gas demand reached a plateau of around 100 bcm/annum in the
same timeframe having grown at an annual average rate of about 5% during the 1990’s to support new gas-
ﬁred power generation. The decline in UK production during this period when gas demand remained on a
plateau has led to a steady increase in gas imports to meet demand. During the 2007–08 winter period the
UKCS supplied around 75% of total gas delivered to the National Transmission System (NTS) the balance
of supply coming from Norwegian and Netherlands production areas.
9. ExxonMobil believes the UK has eVectively transitioned from gas self suYciency by allowing market
signals to prompt the need for new import capability and by creating the right conditions for new
investment. We see this trend continuing; over the next two years over 25 bcm/annum of additional LNG
import infrastructure is expected to be completed, pipeline interconnection capacity will increase by up to
8 bcm/annum, and new storage deliverability of around 30 mcm/day is projected to be added.
10. The UK operates the most transparent, stable and liquid natural gas market structure of any country
in Europe and this places it in a strong position to compete for its future gas supply. In the future, the UK
can expect gas imports from an increasingly diverse number of sources including Norway, Qatar, Russia,
oVshore West Africa and other gas-producing countries. A global gas market is developing through LNG
interconnection which the UK is part of and well positioned to compete within through new import
capacity. Global gas prices now reﬂect a range of factors including increasing international demand for oil,
gas and coal, the ﬂexibility of these fuels to respond to market conditions, environmental considerations,
declining gas supplies in mature production basins located close to established demand centres and the fact
that replacement gas supply sources are typically further away, more diYcult and therefore more expensive
to access and to extract. Global demand is also growing for all types of fossil fuels and, as a result,
commodity prices for gas, oil, oil products and coal have all increased (although, on a BTU-equivalent basis,
gas remains a very competitive fuel).
Market Conditions: Upstream Natural Gas Production
11. Natural gas production activity in the UKCS has seen a signiﬁcant trend towards diversiﬁcation over
the past eight years. This period has seen asset restructuring as established oil and gas companies have sold
part of their interests in maturing ﬁelds and, in some cases, infrastructure to new entrants to the UKCS.
12. Information produced by Wood Mackenzie shows that in 2000 there were 32 companies producing
gas from the UKCS; this number has increased to 49 in 2007. In 2000, the largest single producing company
accounted for 19% of total UKCS gas production, in 2007 the largest single producing company accounted
for under 12%. Overall, we see no evidence of consolidation among UKCS gas producers; rather the trend
is in the opposite direction with increasing numbers of companies producing gas and decreasing levels of
individual production share.
13. The construction of major new infrastructure (LNG import terminals, storage facilities and
interconnector capacity) is continuing to widen industry participation in various segments of the UK gas
market. LNG import terminals, in particular, enable the UK to access gas from producing countries across
the globe including Qatar, Algeria, Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, Nigeria, Egypt, Trinidad and Tobago,
Oman, Norway and Australia. Overall, this geographical diversity enhances security of supply for the UK.
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Market Conditions: Wholesale Natural Gas
14. The UK’s main natural gas wholesale trading point, the National Balancing Point (NBP), is the most
liquid and transparent gas trading hub in the EU. It has seen continued growth in trading, with the volume
traded reaching a record 3.4 billion cubic metres per day in December 2007. Liquidity is enhanced by the
high level of trading churn, with total volumes traded in 2007 around nine times physical throughput on
average. In 2007, the NBP had around 150 participants registered as shippers and approximately 60,000
trades were carried out. Evidence of the willingness and ability of new participants to continue entering this
market can be seen from the estimated 20 companies that have applied for and been granted a gas shipper
licence by Ofgem over the last 12 months.
15. Signiﬁcant market information is available to participants, providing an eVective level of
transparency that allows clear market signals to develop. National Grid provides real time access to detailed
information on demand and supply ﬂows. In addition, a number of independent industry publications, such
as Heren, Platts and Argus, provide news on developments in the market and publish gas price indices that
enhance participants’ ability to trade. The International Commodity Exchange also provides an accessible
trading platform that facilitates entry by new participants.
16. We believe that the wholesale sector in the UK is increasingly competitive and liquid and we remain
conﬁdent of our ability to place gas and receive a market price. ExxonMobil is not active in the retail gas
sector so we are unable to comment on this area.
Legislative and Regulatory Framework
17. The UK energy sector has steadily evolved since the 1986 Gas Act when the British Gas Corporation
was privatised, the gas and electricity regulators (at that time Ofgas and OVer respectively) were formed,
and markets for industrial consumers ﬁrst opened. There have been numerous milestones in the evolution
of the UK’s regulatory framework including the 1995 Gas Act (which paved the way for the introduction of
competition into domestic gas and electricitymarkets) and the ownership unbundling of BritishGas (leaving
Transco as a separate, regulated-monopoly gas pipeline business). This led to a Network Code in gas being
established and regulators’ powers being enhanced to include aspects of competition. The Utilities Act 2000
went further by creating the Gas and Electricity Markets Authority (GEMA) and contained provisions to
make regulation more transparent and predictable.
18. ExxonMobil believes that strong, independent national energy regulators in Europe exercising well-
deﬁned powers within a clear, legal framework are essential to the correct functioning of energy markets.
ExxonMobil believes Ofgem has progressively earned its reputation as a strong and competent regulator.
Over the years, its activities have helped to create a market with the following characteristics:
Transportation access
— Open access on non-discriminatory terms and at eYcient, regulated transportation prices.
Market transparency
— Amature system for the assessment of long-term energy supply and demand and investment plans
(NGG 10 year statements).
— On-the-day access for all to detailed information on demand and real-time supply ﬂows.
— Storage and LNG import terminal stock information.
Ease of Transaction
— Standard contracts at the National Balancing Point (NBP) which make the selling and buying of
gas more accessible for interested shippers.
— Several sources of independent market pricing and gas supply information.
Investment Environment
— The ability for shippers to stimulate new pipeline investments through participation in well
structured, long-term transmission capacity auctions.
— The opportunity for investors to seek exemption from regulated Third PartyAccess formajor, new
infrastructure under the Gas Act.
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UK and European Energy Markets
Regulatory Development
19. In North West Europe we have seen many signiﬁcant developments that enable us to anticipate
greater integration and increased liquidity in the wholesale gas market, in part led by the First and Second
European Gas Directives. There has been steady regulatory development in the Netherlands over the last
ﬁve years or so and, in Germany, changes over the last couple of years have been considerable including the
establishment of an independent regulator (the Federal Network Agency) in 2006 which has already ruled
on tariV reductions in 2006 and on a new grid access model in 2007.
Hubs and Liquidity
20. There are now a number of trading hubs established across North West Europe including the TTF
(Netherlands), EGT and BEB (Germany), PEG-Nord (France) and the Z-Hub (Belgium). Standard
contracts are available at each, along with independent reporting of trades. Price indices are reported for
both TTF and Z-Hub.
21. At the TTF in the Netherlands there has been rapid growth in liquidity, the Z-hub remains important
and the level of business being conducted at France’s PEG-Nord has exceeded what many might have
expected. Overall we see a growing trend in trading and liquidity across North West Europe.
Investment Access and Competition
22. Transmission System Operators are oVering open seasons to enable network expansion and to
improve access for new entrants, whilst new LNG and storage terminal proposals are being actively
developed across Europe. This demonstrates how hitherto national markets in Europe are beginning to
integrate, that independent regulation is proving eVective and that there are increasing opportunities for
participants to trade.
23. This process is evolutionary, often having to overcome historic network complexity. ExxonMobil
believes there is clear evidence of wholesale market integration and increased competition; it is important
to allow these changes to take hold and that further changes to legislative frameworks are made with care
to avoid unintended consequences or the slowing of progress.
Conclusions
24. Overall, ExxonMobil believes that the UK’s current approach to energy policy will enable it to
continue to attract the future natural gas supplies it will need.
25. The increasing diversiﬁcation of ownership of upstream oil and gas assets in the UKCS and the large
number of companies operating in the wholesale gas sector are, we believe, indicative of healthy market
conditions.
26. We believe Ofgem to be an eVective and well informed regulatory agency for the UK’s energy sector
which has created the right conditions to attract capital investment and ensure market transparency; cross-
border trade in gas will continue to increase as long as investment in new capacity is encouraged.
April 2008
Memorandum submitted by the Fuel Poverty Advisory Group
1. The Fuel Poverty Advisory Group (FPAG) is a group of external members appointed by the
Government (Defra/Berr). Our job is to report on progress on fuel poverty in England and on the additional
policies that are needed to deliver the Government’s fuel poverty targets. The Group’s membership and
terms of reference are attached as Appendix 1.
2. As will be seen the Group consists of a wide range of organisations with diVerent views and this is one
of its strengths. On many of the issues there is a very large measure of agreement, on others—including
energy prices— there are more diVerences and the views in this report do not always therefore reﬂect the
views of all our individual members.
Introduction
3. FPAG takes a pragmatic view of the operation of the market, reaching its judgements on the beneﬁts
or otherwise of the market, on the basis of evidence and of developments rather than on the basis of
prejudged views. Thus we appreciate that for many years energy prices were very low, partly as a result of
the operation of the market. We also believe that the market works well for some customers. We also think
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that there are some serious problems with its operation and we have been more willing than Ofgem or
Government to face up to the diYculties. There are now signs that the Government and Ofgem approaches
may be changing.
4. In this evidence we cover:
— The diVerentials between the prices paid by diVerent customers;
— The overall level of prices;
— Other issues relevant to prices;
— Regulatory oversight; and
— Progress and instruments for fuel poverty.
Price Differentials
5. This section sets out the current situation, and then brieﬂy considers the announcements of the 2008
Budget.
— The position here is extremely troublesome and has been getting worse.
— Customers using prepayment meters for electricity and gas, according to Berr data, are paying on
average £990 pa in 2007 compared with the average for a direct debit customer of £845 pa. This
is a gap of £145, a huge diVerential of 17%.
— In 2004 the gap was £70 per annum and it was similar in previous years, so the gap has increased
a very great deal.
— The average gap between prepayment and online direct debit prices is higher still—as much as
£250.
— Customers on standard credit for electricity and gas (ie those paying by cash or cheque) are paying
£85 more than direct debit customers in 2007 compared with £36 pa in 2004. This is another
huge increase.
— In the very recent increases early in 2008, there was little change in absolute terms on average in
the diVerentials, except that the diVerential between prepayment/standard credit and online tariVs
seem to have increased still further.
— There are very signiﬁcant diVerences between the companies. In some companies prices to
prepayment and standard credit customers and/or the diVerentials are more reasonable than in
others. There are also diVerences in service levels e.g number of payment outlets, availability of
24/7 service.
— Prepayment customers have lower incomes than others; 40% were in the two lowest deciles in
England in 2005–06 compared with 20% of all customers and less than 5% were in the top two
deciles. In 2006 19% of those paying for both fuels by prepayment were fuel poor compared with
6% of direct debit customers—an incidence of fuel poverty more than three times as high amongst
prepayment compared with direct debit. The incidence of fuel poverty amongst standard credit
customers is also fairly high.
— The prepayment /direct debit gap was a big one even before the increases of the last few years, for
instance it was £28 in electricity in GB in 2004 (compared with £6 in Northern Ireland).
— The increase in the gap is diYcult to understand. Margins on prepayment and standard credit
customers appear to have increased signiﬁcantly in relative terms as there is no reason why relative
costs should have gone up.
— About three quarters of gas and electricity costs are wholesale supply and transportation in which
there is little diVerence between prepayment and direct debit costs; the £145 diVerential thus
represents over 60% of the remaining price.
— Ofgem in its Domestic Retail Market Report (June 2007) estimate that costs to companies for
prepayment customers for both fuels are £85 more than the costs for a direct debit customer
(although some of the companies believe that the cost diVerences are greater than this). The costs
for a standard credit customers are £25 greater than for a direct debit customer. Thus the gap in
the prices paid by customers is far greater than the gap in costs. Prepayment and standard credit
customers are therefore signiﬁcantly subsidising direct debit customers.
— There has been good progress on social tariVs and social programmes oVered by the energy
companies and this is important. However—as is now acknowledged—it is in no way adequate to
oVset the sharp deterioration in the relative prices paid by low income customers, because of the
widening price diVerentials described above.
6. The very large divergence between prices and costs suggests that themarket is not working well at least
for prepayment and cash/cheque customers. The prepayment-online price gap is over £250 per annum
compared with Ofgem’s estimate of the cost diVerence of a little over £85 pa. The standard credit-online
price gap is £180 pa compared with the Ofgem estimate of a cost diVerence of £25 pa. Even if the cost
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diVerences are slightly greater than this e.g for online customers, either some companies are making
extremely large margins on their prepayment and cash/cheque customers or they are making losses on their
direct debit/on-line oVers or both.
7. If, as it is likely, there are some high margins, these would be competed away in a well functioning
market—very large numbers of customers would move to companies oVering lower prices and taking lower
margins. Many of those who are paying particularly high prices are likely to be vulnerable and elderly.
8. There is a whole range of actions that could be taken by Ofgem in particular and also by Government.
A menu of possible actions is set out in Appendix 2. These should be driven forward, in the context of
Ofgem’s probe into the energy markets and of the actions following the Budget announcements. It is very
important that the review and the post Budget actions should result in tangible improvements.
Budget 2008
9. Two issues relevant to this enquiry were picked up in the Budget:
— DiVerentials between prepayment and other prices.
— The companies’ social programmes and social tariVs.
10. FPAG is very pleased that the severity of the fuel poverty situation has begun to be recognised. It is
particularly important that the Budget in eVect recognised that the market has not been working
satisfactorily for all customers and that the issue of the price diVerentials is being addressed. Our key points
at this stage are:
— It is important that the intentions should be translated into action.
— We strongly believe, as the Government does, that progress can be made on these issues, but the
impact of any proposals on fuel poverty needs to be carefully assessed so as to secure the most
eVective measures possible.
— In assessing companies’ performance the level of their prices as well as their social programmes is
important.
— The diVerential between the prices for cash/cheque and direct debit/online customers is also
important.
— Independent electricity generators as well as the energy supply companies should contribute to any
fuel poverty fund as their proﬁtability has increased sharply and this will increase the size of the
fund and/or reduce the adverse impact on prices to customers generally.
11. Overall Price Levels:
— World forces have increased energy costs, but the cost increases do not explain all of the price
increases in the UK.
— Speciﬁcally, between 2003 and 2006 expenditure by gas and electricity customers increased by £8.2
billion (or 60%). Higher fuel costs only accounted for a little over half of this—£4.5 billion—in
spite of claims that the price increases are attributable to rising world energy prices. Other cost
increases explain £1/1.5 billion of the increase. It seems that there has been a signiﬁcant increase
in margins along the supply chain, especially in electricity, of over £2.5 billion, accounting for as
much as 30% of the price increases.
— Some increase in margins, especially in power generation, is reasonable given the low prices in
2003, but it seems most unlikely that this could explain and justify such a big increase in margins.
— We do not know exactly where the extra customer payments have gone and where the extra
margins have been taken. The bulk of the extra payments have probably gone to generators—both
independent generators and to some (although not necessarily all) of the big six integrated
suppliers. Traders and also owners of storage and distribution networks will also have gained.
— There will be signiﬁcant diVerences between companies in the extra margins made.
— These data on prices, costs andmargins come essentially fromadetailed report on this byCornwall
Energy, commissioned by the National Right to Fuel Campaign and UNISON. Further data
based on this report are in Appendix 3.
— Ofgem also believe that electricity generators are making some windfall proﬁts—as a result of the
free allocation of permits under the EU Emissions Trading Scheme. They and FPAG share the
view that current and future proﬁts from this source should be removed over time by the
auctioning of the EU ETS permits, and in the interim by other means, and the proceeds should be
recycled into fuel poverty programmes.
— However, FPAG’s view based in part on the Cornwall analysis is that the issue is wider than just
that of the EUETS. In 2006 the EU ETS accounted for £0.4bn extra margins out of a total of £2.5
bn, ie 15%.
— FPAG has, over a number of years, asked Ofgem to carry out a proper analysis of prices, costs
and margins along the whole energy supply chain. They have not been willing to do this. They
should now carry out a full enquiry into where the extra expenditure by consumers has gone. It is
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hoped that this will now be done in the context of Ofgem’s recently announced probe into the
energy market. In doing this they should give their views in detail on the National Right to Fuel
Campaign/Unison analysis—do they agree with the basic quantitative conclusions and if so what
in their view are the implications?
— Now it has been demonstrated that this work can readily be done, Ofgem should carry out such
analyses at regular intervals in an objective way when they review the operation of the market.
— The Government has also been surprisingly passive on the price increases. given that there are
macroeconomic as well as fuel poverty implications.
12. It is acknowledged that there are diYcult issues here—volatility of proﬁtability, low levels of
proﬁtability in the early 2000s and the need for incentives for new investment. We also appreciate that there
are signiﬁcant variations in the position of the diVerent companies. Nevertheless the companies have not
only been able to pass on substantial additional costs in full, but they have also signiﬁcantly increased their
margins as well. This would not happen in a properly functioning strongly competitive market.
Other Issues on Prices and Competition
13. FPAG are clearly not experts on competition issues, but we would just make a few brief comments.
— The six major suppliers of electricity and gas to households are all vertically integrated, especially
in electricity. It is therefore necessary to look at the whole energy supply chain and not just at the
supply companies. It is also necessary to look beyond the relationship between retail andwholesale
prices, as wholesale prices are often prices paid by one part of a company to another part of the
same company. It is sometimes claimed by Ofgem that wholesale price increases are not fully
reﬂected in retail prices and that this shows that the market is working well. This argument seems
false to us—as the losses or low proﬁtability in the supply company aYliates of the energy
company are often oVset by higher proﬁtability in the electricity generating part of the company—
so it is necessary to consider the whole chain.
— Ofgem often argues that there is no evidence of anti-competitive behaviour. FPAG is not
suggesting that the companies are operating in an overtly anti-competitive way. It is, however, our
view that the outcomes are not satisfactory, prices are too high certainly for some customers and
the market is not working well.
— Ofgem and the Government suggest that the level of UK prices compared with those on the
Continent is evidence of the satisfactory operation of the competitive market. We agree that such
price comparisons are relevant. But in making any comparisons for current purposes, prices
excluding taxes should be quoted, as low prices stemming from low UK taxes do not provide any
evidence of a better functioning market. In July 2007 UK domestic electricity prices excluding
taxes were the same as the average for the EU 15 and gas prices were 15% lower. This is relevant,
but UK gas prices should be lower—irrespective of the competitive situation— as the UK still gets
the bulk of its gas from the UK Continental Shelf rather than from much more distant sources,
and the UK is densely populated with a high penetration of gas and hence lower gas transmission
and distribution costs. When these factors are stripped out the diVerences between the UK and the
Continent appear to be small. These comparisons are also very much aVected by exchange rates
and as result of the fall in the pound against the Euro in recent months it is possible that the gap
between the UK and Continental European gas prices will now be signiﬁcantly eroded.
Effectiveness of Regulatory Oversight
14. Ofgem does some good work on social issues, but regulatory oversight of the working of the market
especially, but not only, for vulnerable customers has been poor. It is possible that this will now change.
— Ofgem was very slow to recognise the sharp widening in the diVerentials between those paying by
diVerent methods.
— They have done little so far about these really troublesome diVerentials although there are signs
that this may now be changing.
— Ofgem has plenty of potential tools to help to deal with the situation of the diVerential prices and
these are included in the list of possible measures in Appendix 2.
— Ofgem has been complacent about the level of margins and has been unwilling over the past few
years to assess where the extra expenditure by consumers of gas and electricity has gone.
— The Government has also given the impression that they have been satisﬁed with the working of
the market and have not, until recently, given any indication of disquiet.
15. It is a complex task to assess the functioning of the market, but Ofgem (and Government) have, in
our view, been too eager to believe that the market is working well and have not been willing to face up to
the diYculties and to take an objective view. This may be changing now, although this is not yet certain. We
hope very much that there will be tangible outcomes from the Budget announcements, Ofgem’s probe of
the energy markets and the Ofgem summit.
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Progress on Fuel Poverty and Fuel Poverty Policy Instruments
16. FPAG has just published its 2007 Annual Report and these points are covered in detail in the Report.
The Report is attached.
Progress on Fuel Poverty
Table 1 sets out the position on fuel poverty in England.
Table 1
Number of households (m)
Table 2: Fuel Poverty in England Projected
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Households in fuel poverty 1.2 1.2 1.5 2.5 2.9
Vulnerable households in fuel poverty 1.0 1.0 1.2 2.0 2.3
Households in fuel poverty (broader deﬁnition) 1.5 1.4 1.8 — —
Vulnerable households in fuel poverty (broader deﬁnition) 1.2 1.1 1.4 — —
17. It will be seen that 1.2m people were in fuel poverty in England in 2003, the lowest number reached.
In 2006 this had doubled to 2.4 million households (according to the Government’s Annual Fuel Poverty
Progress Report) and in 2007 this will rise to about 2.9 million. The 2008 price increases will take the total
to over 3 million. This is close to the 1998 position when 3.4m households were in fuel poverty, although
still well below the 1996 level of 5.1 million. (These estimates take no account of improvements since 2005
in energy eYciency from the fuel poverty programmes and they are in general “broad brush” although it is
likely that they will be in the right order of magnitude).
18. FPAG only covers England, but we understand that the numbers in fuel poverty in 2006 were about
4 million in the UK (compared with 2.5 million in England).
Policy Instruments
19. Fuel poverty results from a combination of the energy eYciency of homes and equipment, incomes
and energy prices. Fuel poverty policy instruments need, therefore, to take account of all of these.
— The fuel poverty programmes need to be maintained at reasonable levels. In particular it was
decided in the Comprehensive Spending Review that annual expenditure on Warm Front (the
Government’s main fuel poverty programme) will be nearly 25% lower in 2008 to 2011 than it was
in 2007–08. At the very least Warm Front annual expenditure should be restored to its 2007–08
level of £350 million. This can easily be done if Government expenditure is better targeted, eg by
discontinuing Winter Fuel Payments for higher rate tax payers, which would free up £200 million
into Warm Front and which would make possible increases in Warm Front over the three year
period. Alternatively the programme could easily be funded if, as Ofgem has proposed, the
windfall gains being made by some electricity generators as a result of the EU emissions trading
scheme were recovered. Finally the Treasury has received an additional £400 million pa of VAT
payments from energy customers as a result of the price rises and this is another source of funding.
— More generally, the balance between capital and revenue measures should be reconsidered. It will
be essential, in a world of high energy prices, to secure the highest possible energy eYciency in the
dwellings, heating and equipment of low income households. Although the recent increases in
Winter Fuel Payments will clearly be welcomed by pensioners, it would be better to spend some
of the money on energy eYciencymeasures, which could also be better targeted—in order tomake
progress towards the fuel poverty targets.
— The Government is considering the energy supply companies’ carbon reduction obligations after
2011, and a sizable social obligation will continue to be required along with the carbon reduction
programme.
— TariV diVerentials should be reduced as discussed in Section 2 above and in Appendix 2.
— Ofgem and the Government should do everything possible to keep energy prices as low as
practicable, again as discussed above.
— Energy companies’ social programmes should be expanded, following the Budget announcement.
— There should be more drive by Government to ensure that Beneﬁt take-up is increased. In
particular there are opportunities for automating the take-up of Council Tax Beneﬁts for those in
receipt of other beneﬁts or tax credits.
— The Government should, with the necessary safeguards, make available data on customers on
beneﬁt toLocalAuthorities and toEnergy andEnergyEYciency companies so that they can target
their social tariVs and energy eYciency programmes to vulnerable customers more eYciently.
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— Smart meters are potentially good news for customers generally and low income customers in
particular. The provision of low cost “pay as you go” meters will be a major breakthrough and
accurate bills with no estimates will provide signiﬁcant beneﬁts. The decision should therefore be
made to introduce smart meters for all customers over a speciﬁed period and this should be
mandated by Government to avoid long delays in resolving some of the issues.
— Other shorter run lower cost payment methods should also be pursued eg fuel direct should be
expanded.
— The Public Service Agreement and Government Target Framework and that for Local
Government must provide adequate priority to fuel poverty, given that the eradication of fuel
poverty is a statutory requirement. It does not currently do so.
20. A series of detailed recommendations is set out in section 13 of the FPAG Annual Report.
Conclusions
21. The fuel poverty situation is now very serious. Action in a range of areas is needed in order to meet
the Government’s fuel poverty targets in England. A key area is energy prices. It will be important to ensure
that prices are no higher than necessary—for all customers and for vulnerable and low income customers
in particular. This is now beginning to be recognised by Government and Ofgem. This will not, on its own,
resolve the fuel poverty problem as other measures are needed, but it is a necessary step and it would make
a noticeable diVerence.
APPENDIX 1
Membership of the Fuel Poverty Advisory Group
Peter Lehmann, Chair.
John Chesshire, Vice Chair Chair—Energy EYciency Partnership for Homes.
George Mayhew, Director of Corporate AVairs, National Grid.
Ian Peters, Chief Operating OYcer, British Gas Centrica Plc.
Graham Kirby, Retail Regulation & Energy Policy Manager, E.ON.
Jenny Saunders, Acting Chief Executive OYcer, National Energy Action.
Kevin Miles, Chief Executive OYcer CEO, Npower Retail.
Gill Owen, Chair, Public Utilities Access Forum.
Sarah Webb, Director of Policy and Practice, Chartered Institute of Housing.
Dr Noel Olsen Public Health Physician, Trustee, National Heart Forum.
Jerry Robson, Chairman, Association for the Conservation of Energy.
Mervyn Kohler, Special Adviser, Help the Aged.
Jonathan Stearn, Head of Campaigns, energywatch.
David Pickles, Energy Agency Manager, Local Government Association.
John Clough, Chief Executive, Eaga plc.
Teresa Perchard, Director of Policy, Citizens Advice,
Eva Eisenschimmel, Chief Operating OYcer, EDF Energy.
Terms of Reference
The Fuel Poverty Advisory Group is an Advisory Non-Departmental Public Body sponsored by Defra/
DI. Its primary task is to report on the progress of delivery of the Government’s Fuel Poverty Strategy and
to propose and implement improvements to regional or local mechanisms for its delivery.
The role of the Group us:
— To consider and report on the eVectiveness of the current policies in delivering reductions in fuel
poverty and the case for greater co-ordination.
— To identify barriers to the delivery of reductions in fuel poverty and to the development of eVective
partnerships, and propose solutions.
— To consider and report on any additional policies needed to deliver the Government’s targets.
— To enthuse, and encourage, key players to tackle fuel poverty.
— To consider and report on the results of the work to monitor fuel poverty.
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APPENDIX 2
Recommendations on Relative Prices
There is a menu of possible actions on relative prices. Some of these are alternatives. We set out below
the range of possible activity. In order to drive all this forward there should be the following actions by
Ofgem and Government. Ofgem’s probe into the energy markets is a welcome ﬁrst step, but it is very
important that the review should result in tangible improvements. The list below includes many of the issues
and outcomes which should be considered by the review.
— Ofgem should make the issue of price diVerentials a Special Project with adequate resources.
— The Government should provide further resources (from the abolition of Winter Fuel Payments
for higher rate tax payers or the auctioning of EU ETS Permits) to enable extensive local advice
to be given to low income households on switching and on the best tariV available, linked to other
advice on energy eYciency, in order to cut fuel bills.
— As proposed last year the Treasury should, withinGovernment, take the leadwith a determination
to ﬁnd a solution on low cost payment methods.
The menu of speciﬁc actions is:
— Ofgem should assess the relationship between relative prices and relative costs and, for companies
where prices and costs are far out of line, should consider whether further action—legal,
regulatory, guidance, persuasion—should be taken. It may well be possible to use existing Licence
conditions and sales codes and/or it may be necessary to introduce changes. Ofcom is taking action
on similar issues and it may be possible to learn from this.
— There should be reserve powers in the Energy Bill to prevent companies with exceptionally high
prepayment prices from taking on new prepayment customers. This is important as there is
evidence that a very large number of prepayment customers, who switch, are switching to worse
deals.
— As an alternative where prepayment customers are applying to switch to a worse deal, companies
about to receive such customers should by self-regulation or by Energy Bill provisions, be obliged
to explain the position to such customers in a clear way. It is appreciated that this will be aVected
by diVerences in service levels.
— The Government should strengthen its Environmental and Social Guidance to Ofgem.
— TheGovernment should, as it is doing, consider the use of its existing powers on prepayment prices
under the Utilities Act.
— Those companies with wide diVerentials should radically re-examine their policies.
— The market is clearly not working for many low income customers. Much more advice and
guidance should be provided by voluntary and local organisations for low income customers on
the beneﬁts of switching suppliers, the advantages and disadvantages of diVerent payment
methods and on the best prices available. Many very elderly people for instance will need careful
guidance. Local organisations will need to be resourced for this. This guidance should be linked
to energy eYciency and money advice services.
— Eaga, with its very good contacts with, and channels to, low income customers could play a useful
role here, but an important proviso is that additional funds would be needed—this should not be
at the expense of the already inadequate fuel poverty programmes for energy eYciency and
central heating.
— It will be important to ensure that nomore prepayment meters are installed than necessary in debt
situations eg where payment by instalments or fuel direct would be feasible.
— The price comparison and switching sites should provide the same facilities for prepayment as for
other customers.
— The debt blocking situation should be reconsidered especially but not only where the receiving
company is willing to take on the debt.
— Smart pay as you go meters are now available which would signiﬁcantly reduce the cost to serve
of prepayment customers. There should be a determined drive by Government and Ofgem to
secure the installation of such meters at the earliest possible opportunity.
— Banking arrangements can make a contribution by encouraging more customers to pay by direct
debit and the Treasury should play a signiﬁcant role here.
— Post OYce budgeting arrangements are well worth pursuing and the Government should be
encouraging such arrangements for the successor to the Post OYce Card Account.
— Energywatch has provided tireless support and advice for customers, especially low income
customers, on prices and other issues, and it will be important for the successor to the National
Consumer Council to take on this role as far as is feasible.
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— There should be strong minimum standards on social tariVs and the Government should take
reserve powers in the Energy Bill on Social TariVs and Programmes.
— If progress is not made by other means, the size of the diVerentials between diVerent payment
methods should be re-regulated. The Government should take powers in the Energy Bill to direct
Ofgem to do this.
APPENDIX 3
Gas and Electricity Prices
In total expenditure by consumers on gas and electricity increased by £8.2 billion between 2003 and 2006.
Fuel cost increases only accounted for a little over half of this—about £4.5 billion.
The changes for gas and electricity are set out in tables 1 and 2 below.
Table 1
INCREASES IN PRICES AND PAYMENTS 2003–06—GAS
P per kwh P per kwh £Bn £Bn
Increase in Price of Gas Increase in Price of Increase in Payments of Increase in Payments for
to Domestic Customers Purchased Gas Gas by Domestic Gas to UKCS Producers
Customers and for Imports and
Storage
1.12 0.92 3.95 3.34
Table2
INCREASES IN PRICES AND PAYMENTS 2003–06—ELECTRICITY
P per kwh P per kwh £Bn £Bn
Increase in Price of Increase in Price of Fuel Increase in Payments of Increase in Payments to
Electricity to Domestic Purchased for Power Electricity by Domestic Fuel Suppliers
Customers Generation Customers
3.49 0.99 4.27 1.20
The numbers are all from published Berr data.
— It can be seen that in electricity there is a marked gap between price and fuel cost increases. The
price of electricity to domestic customers increased by nearly 3.5p per kwh between 2003 and 2006,
far more than the increase of 1p per kwh in the price paid for fuel used in power generation.
— Expenditure on electricity by domestic customers increased by over £4.3bn, far more than the £1.2
billion increase in payments for fuel use in power generation.
— The price of gas to domestic customers increased by 1.12 p per kwh between 2003 and 2006,
compared with the increase in the price of 0.96p per kwh paid for purchases of gas from the UK
Continental Shelf and from imports and for storage.
— Expenditure on gas by domestic customers increased by nearly £4bn—with an increase of a £3.3
billion in payments to UKCS producers and for imports and storage.
— Other costs have increased by £1.4 million—£370 million for gas and just over £1 billion for
electricity. Tables 3 and 4 give a breakdown of these cost increases.
Table 3
INCREASES IN NON-FUEL COSTS 2003–06—GAS
£m
Transportation 43
Metering 37
Suppliers cost to serve 31
Energy EYciency Commitment 73
VAT 188
Total non fuel costs 372
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Table 4
INCREASES IN NON-FUEL COSTS 2003–06—ELECTRICITY
£m
Transmission network use of system 108
Distribution network use of system 124
Metering 16
System losses 379
Suppliers’ cost to serve 4
Renewables Obligation 108
Energy EYciency Commitment 84
VAT 204
Total non fuel costs 1,028
— It will be seen that the main increases for the two fuels taken together are VAT [nearly £400
million], transportation/network charges [£275 million], system losses [nearly £400 million] and
EEC/Renewables Obligation [£260 million].
— two points from this are worth noting—additional VAT payments account for £0.4 billion of the
extra £8 billion paid by customers. Environmental policies, taken together [the whole impact of
EUETS, EEC and the Renewables Obligation] account for £800 million of the extra £8 billion,
with EU ETS accounting for by far the largest part of this. While the additional costs of the
environmental policies are clearly material, they only account for a relatively small proportion
(nearly 10%) of the large increase in payments by customers.
— The cost increases are overstated here and margin increases are understated as substantial
increased proﬁts in gas storage and in distribution are not reﬂected in the above ﬁgures.
— Thus prices paid by customers have increased by nearly £4bn more than the costs of fuel, and
between £1 billion and £1.5 billon of this can be explained by other cost increases. It seems that
there has been a signiﬁcant increase in margins along the supply chain of over £2.5 billion,
accounting for as much as 30% of the price increases.
— Some increase in margins, especially on power generation, is reasonable given the low prices in
2003, but it seems most unlikely that this could explain and justify such a big increase in margins.
— The estimates of the extra margins exclude additional margins made by gas and oil producers on
the UK Continental Shelf.
— The overall position in 2007 will not be very much diVerent.
— We do not know exactly where the extra customer payments have gone and where the extra
margins have been taken, The bulk of the extra payments have probably gone to generators—both
independent generators like Drax and International Power and to some (although not necessarily
all) of the big six integrated suppliers such as Scottish Power and Powergen. Generators with a
great deal of coal ﬁred plant will have been the biggest gainers. Traders, and also owners of storage
and of distribution networks, will also have gained.
— There will be signiﬁcant diVerences between companies in the margins made.
— In any case customers are paying more than they should be.
April 2008
Memorandum submitted by GMB
THE STRUCTURE OF THE UK ENERGY MARKET
Executive Summary
1. GMB is the United Kingdom’s third largest trade union with 600,000 members employed in virtually
every sector of the economy, and is the largest and most inﬂuential trade union in the energy sector.
Regardless of who they are employed by, ourmembers are also all energy consumers.ManyGMBmembers
are low-paid workers, and have been amongst those who have suVered ﬁnancially as a result of the failure
of the liberalised UK energy market to supply gas and electricity at aVordable prices.
2. GMB believes that there is a wealth of evidence to sustain our view that the energy market is failing,
and we are conﬁdent that the ﬁgures on gas and electricity costs and the rise in fuel poverty, which we
anticipate will be submitted by others to the Committee, will speak for themselves. Our submission therefore
predominantly focuses on a single one of the seven aspects of the energy market that the Committee
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announced as the focus of its review, namely the eVectiveness of regulatory oversight of the energy market.
Central to our argument about how and why the energy market is failing consumers is that the regulatory
mechanism for protecting their interests by keeping the energy market under close and eVective scrutiny
is failing.
3. GMB therefore urges the Committee to take a detailed and critical look at the performance of the
energy regulator, Ofgem. It is our belief that this body has comprehensively failed to regulate the energy
market eVectively, and has, by its failings, been a major contributor towards the uncompetitive and
dysfunctional market for energy that now prevails. The behaviour of the major energy companies that
operate within this oligoply is a reﬂection of the regulator’s complacency. Ofgem’s inability or unwillingness
to consistently safeguard the interests of consumers stems from its slavish adherence to a set of dogmatic
economic “principles” that have little to do with the real world in which the energy market operates.
Inevitably, this seriously impacts upon consumers, who suVer the consequences of Ofgem’s inadequacy in
the form of rising prices for gas and electricity.
Introduction
4. GMB is the largest and most inﬂuential trade union in the energy sector with over thirty thousand
members employed throughout the UK in the Electricity, Gas, Nuclear, Coal, Oil and Renewables
industries, undertaking activities ranging from production and distribution to retail and service. GMB’s
long history of representing members employed in the energy sector, which has been on-going since the
Union began as the Gas Workers and General Union in March 1889, has given us vast experience and a
clear insight into the workings of the energy sector. This has helped GMB to develop a comprehensive
understanding of the importance of the energy market and its inﬂuence over the economic well-being and
daily lives of the UK’s citizens.
5. GMB warmly welcomes the investigation by the Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform
Committee into the structure of theUK energymarket.We believe that this decision to put themarket under
such an independent scrutiny by conducting a full scale inquiry into the structure of the energy market is a
very important one which is long overdue.
6. In considering whether the current market structure encourages eVective competition in the retail
markets for gas and electricity, the Committee will undoubtedly need to carefully consider a wide range of
factors in order to form a view. GMB fully recognises the need for the Committee to examine the wholesale
markets for gas and electricity, growing consolidation in the energy market, the relationship between the
wholesale and retail markets for electricity and gas, the interaction between the UK and European energy
markets and progress in reducing fuel poverty.
7. All of these are undoubtedly crucial to the eVectiveness of the current market, and, if called to give oral
evidence to the Committee, GMB would be pleased to elaborate our views about how these factors impact
upon the energy market. However, GMB is focusing our written submission upon the lack of any eVective
regulatory oversight of the market. We believe that the poor performance and inertia of the regulator
directly contributes towards the market failing consumers, and that the lack of progress in reducing fuel
poverty and the shortcomings of the regulator are inextricably linked.
The Effectiveness of Regulatory Oversight of the Energy Market
8. GMB is aware that the regulator for the gas and electricity industries in Great Britain is the Gas and
Electricity Markets Authority and that Ofgem’s role is to support the Authority. However, for reasons of
simplicity, this memorandum refers to Ofgem as “the regulator” and/or “the energy regulator”.
9. Central to the whole of the Government’s energy policy approach is the promotion of competitive
energy markets. The underlying assumption is that the market provides the most eVective and eYcient
mechanism for ensuring the supply of energy and protecting the interests of energy consumers. The extent
to which the “competitive energy market” (which is in reality not a free and fair market, but an oligopoly,
dominated by a few sellers who can greatly inﬂuence price and other market factors) operates fairly is
determined by the strength and eVectiveness of the regulatory regime. A robust regulator is absolutely
essential to prevent a small number of powerful energy providers acting against the interests of consumers
by exploiting their position in order to maximise proﬁts.
10. Given the crucially important role of the regulator in the UK’s energy market, it is impossible for
GMB to comment upon the eYcacy of the market without reference to the shortcomings of the regulator.
In our view, Ofgem, the regulator for the gas and electricity markets, has been an abject failure. GMBﬁrmly
believes that the lack of robust and eVective regulation of the market for gas and electricity is of crucial
importance to this investigation. Although our view is that the private market is not the most eVective
mechanism for ensuring that gas and electricity is available at aVordable prices to all, if such a market is to
prevail, then it simply cannot do so without the regulator doing its job properly.
11. In short, left to its own devices, the UK energy market will not operate fairly because the barriers to
entry are such that only a few suppliers actually operate within the market. However, the only price control
mechanism that Ofgem appears to recognise, advocate and rely upon—the notion that within such a limited
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market consumers will keep prices down by switching suppliers—does not work in practice. Nevertheless,
Ofgem adheres rigidly to this doctrine, despite the evidence to the contrary, and its inertia in the face of rising
prices and a real increase in the number of UK citizens in fuel poverty is staggering.
12. In our view, Ofgem is arrogant and out of touch with the industries that it regulates, and repeatedly
fails to understand and take account of the concerns expressed by stakeholders (consumer groups, and the
unions representing employees working in the gas and electricity industries, for example) about issues of
major concern to the companies, workers and consumers who are aVected by its decisions. Ofgem’s failings
have an impact that reaches far beyond theGMBmembers whowork in the energy sector—all ourmembers
are energy consumers, and all of our members are aVected in some way by Ofgem’s inability to see beyond
its narrow economic dogma and provide eVective regulation.
13. Our contention that the regulator is complacent, arrogant and out-of-touch is strongly re-inforced
by reference to a number of Ofgem’s most recent actions and announcements. What is distinctive about the
three examples that follow is the way that this recent ﬂurry of activity by Ofgem contrasts so sharply with
its previous inactivity. This provides a powerful illustration of how the regulator operates, in eVect doing
little or nothing to protect the consumer with any consistency, then rushing to react once the price hikes are
announced and the storm breaks as a result.
14. A prime example of the energy regulators’ weak, inconsistent and unconvincing performance was
Ofgem’s surprise announcement, made on 21 February 2008, that it was launching a probe into the energy
supply market.
15. To announce this probe, which was in eVect a complete u-turn by the regulator, smacks of
opportunism and desperation. Less than ﬁve weeks beforehand, Ofgem had insisted the market was sound.
In a press release dated 16th January 2008, following a meeting between the Chancellor and Ofgem’s most
senior executives (Chairman Sir John Mogg and Chief Executive Alistair Buchanan), Ofgem “conﬁrmed
that Britain’s competitive market in energy is working”. To make such an unequivocal statement, when the
real-world experience of consumers was that the market was clearly not working—huge prices rises had just
been announced almost across the board—beggars belief. The announcement of an investigation a few
weeks later begs the question: why make such a bold and conﬁdent assertion and then shortly afterwards
announce that Ofgem will take “a more detailed look at the retail market”?
16. The tone of the announcement of the enquiry was also somewhat grudging, whilst also hinting that
its outcome was already foreseen and its intention was to reassure the public that competition was working.
Ofgem thus appeared to be “going through the motions”—either reacting to events, or responding to some
“behind the scenes” arm-twisting byMinisters. In belatedly making this announcement, and thereby “being
seen to be doing something”, did Ofgem jump or was it pushed? Whichever of these it was, and it could
conceivably have been a combination of both, Ofgem demonstrated its inability to act independently and
reliably. It does not inspire any conﬁdence, and provides no lead whatsoever in scrutinising and monitoring
the companies operating in the market.
17. This came as no surprise to GMB, which for several years has been urging Ofgem, without success,
to launch just such an investigation. Yet Ofgem only stirred from its slumber once the Business, Enterprise
and Regulatory Reform Committee had announced its investigation, thus putting a political and public
focus on the energy market and Ofgem’s failure to regulate it eVectively. We see the Ofgem investigation
less as evidence of its concern about the behaviour of the energy companies, and more about its concern
over Ofgem being open to criticism if it doesn’t appear to be putting the market under the microscope. We
urge the Committee to examine why Ofgem announced its own investigation so quickly after declaring the
market to be sound.
18. A second example of Ofgem’s inconsistency was its decision, announced on 25th February 2008, to
ﬁne National Grid £41.6 million, for a breach of competition law that it claims restricted the development
of competition in the domestic gas meter market. After an investigation lasting almost three years, what
motivated Ofgem to act in the manner that it did, when it did? The scale of this ﬁne was totally
disproportionate to the oVence that National Grid allegedly committed, as the cost of any such anti-
competitive behaviour related to gas metering is paltry. Even if the company’s actions did cause a 40%
increase in the costs of gas meters to domestic gas consumers, (which amount to £12 per year per customer)
that represents less than £5 per year per customer.
19. In our view, what this ﬁne represented was Ofgem once again behaving in an opportunistic and
ineVectual manner. Ofgem baring its teeth and taking inappropriate action over this issue is simply no
substitute for consistent andmeaningful regulation of the type of company behaviour that imposes the really
painful costs upon gas and electricity customers. Consumers need a regulator that has real teeth and takes
action on their behalf over issues of mainstream importance—ie the cost of gas and electricity, not on
matters that have only a peripheral eVect on prices. It is diYcult to escape the conclusion that the timing
and nature of Ofgem’s sanctions reﬂected its desire to appear tough, because of the energy market being in
the political and media spotlight.
20. The third example of a recent announcement by Ofgemwas that of 6March 2008, when the regulator
announced a review of the regulatory regime for energy networks. This two-year internal review of a regime
that has been in place for 20 years, and which Ofgem described in its press release announcing the review
as a success, is also consistent with the “ﬂavour of the month” approach that Ofgem now seems to favour,
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following the recent increase in public and political interest in the energy market. Is this review prompted
merely by the possibility that the regulator is aware that it is not perceived as being consumer-friendly
enough? At a length of two years, this appears to be a major and very comprehensive investigation into a
regulatory regime which until now has enjoyedOfgem’s unshaken faith. On the other hand, two years is also
more than suYcient to allow the grass to grow and for this review to disappear from view. GMB is
unconvinced, especially in view of the comments in the Ofgem press release celebrating the achievements of
the regime, that Ofgem is doing anything more than posturing.
21. We oVer the examples in paragraphs 14–20 above to illustrate the manner in which the regulator fails
to address the real issues aVecting consumers. Contrast the action taken against National Grid over gas
meters with the total lack of action against those companies that exacerbate the problem of fuel poverty by
charging prepayment meter users—often poorer households—an average of £255 a year more than online
customers. This is a very real problem with serious eVects upon low-income households, and the £5 per year
that National Grid’s actions apparently cost is chickenfeed by comparison. We would urge the Committte
to questionOfgem about its lack of action in support of those households “trapped” into paying higher bills.
22. Ofgem complacently responds to claims of unfairness about the prices charged by the “big six”
suppliers by saying that consumers should switch. Of course, many consumers do—in 2007 four million out
of 36 million energy account holders did so. However, just under half of consumers have never switched
supplier and market research suggests they are unlikely to. Amongst pensioners, only around a third have
ever switched, while the sixmillion consumerswith prepaymentmeters are unlikely to be able to switch using
the convenient online switching services. The two million consumers in debt are prohibited from switching
by the suppliers, and hundreds of thousands more in Scotland are prevented from switching through
technical restrictions on their accounts. The reality is that switching is just not working for the most
vulnerable.
23. Ofgem’s job is, apparently, to make sure it sets the framework for healthy and fair competition. If the
ability of consumers to switch is central to its strategy, and this clearly isn’t working, shouldn’t Ofgem have
a plan B? The public perception is that the existing big six suppliers are making excessive proﬁts. People
should not be expected to accept big price rises, by every supplier in the market, on products and services
that they have no option but to buy. Whatever the regulator says about its role and how it isn’t Ofgem’s
responsibility to interfere with the market, some four million households (and growing) meet the
Government’s oYcial deﬁnition of “energy poverty”, in that 10%ormore of their disposable income is spent
on energy bills. In our view, this is clearly an issue for the regulator, which isn’t doing it’s job properly if it
persistently ignores the reality of the situation that exists, in favour of its belief in the purity of some
theoretical construct known as “the market”.
24. The real-world eVect upon lower-income households of excessively high prices for gas and electricity
should not be under-estimated. Fuel is a basic human need, and one of the ﬁrst duties of any Government
is to ensure the provision of a safe and secure supply of aVordable energy to its citizens. For these reasons,
the failure of the regulator to exercise any form of consistent oversight of the energy market, and put
consumers at the heart of what it does, represents a very serious failing that directly contributes towards
the rising levels of fuel poverty that now prevail. GMB urges the Committee to put the lack of any eVective
regulatory oversight of the market at the heart of its investigation, and take these failings up with Ofgem.
March 2008
Memorandum submitted by Good Energy
COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE POSSIBLE ANTI-COMPETITIVE BEHAVIOUR IN THE UK’S
ENERGY MARKET
Executive Summary
1. Good Energy believes that the current market is not fully competitive, and this is principally down to
the operation of the wholesale market which favours large vertically integrated participants. This is of
particular concern as we believe that this is stiﬂing innovation in the market as it responds to the pressures
to combat climate change.
About Good Energy
2. Good Energy is a small energy supplier, active in the electricity market since 1999. We supply 100%
renewable electricity to approximately 25,000 customers in the UK, most of whom are domestic customers.
We have recently received our gas supply licence and hope to oVer a carbon accountable dual fuel product
in the near future. The Good Energy group also owns a wind farm in Cornwall, but buys most of its energy
for small size renewable generators.
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3. We have restricted our comments to the electricity market as we do not feel suYciently experienced
to comment on the gas market, and have structured our response to match the questions posed in the call
for evidence
Does the current market structure encourage eVective competition in retail markets for gas and electricity?
4. The current retail market is dominated by the big six oligopoly, all of whom have an inert customer
base inherited from their previous existence as monopoly providers of electricity or gas. There are a handful
of independents and entry into the retail market is not diYcult per se, although expensive as the ﬁxed costs
are high due to the requirements that need to be in place before a supplier can acquire its ﬁrst customer.
Good Energy estimate the breakeven point is 20,000 domestic customers or the equivalent.
5. There are also regulatory hurdles as smaller suppliers are required, except in a few cases, such as CERT
to meet the same regulatory requirements as the big six. These however are not insurmountable provided
the smaller participant is not attempting to compete with the big six on price.
6. The diYculty of market entry lay in entering the wholesale market, and the unpredictability of prices
and lack of liquidity and transparency in that market. The number of independent generators has
diminished considerably since the introduction of NETA (New Electricity Trading Arrangements), which
in turn reduces the sources of generation for any new electricity suppliers entering the market. Conversely,
the lack of independent suppliers is also a barrier to entry to small generators.
Is there eVective competition in the wholesale markets for gas and electricity?
7. The current trading arrangements were designed by the regulator on the basis of ensuring that energy
trading was cost eVective, as opposed the previous “pool” arrangements which set a market price for energy
in each half hour, which was received and paid by all participants. The result of this arrangement was
twofold, consolidation by market players, and vertical integration. The reasons for this are complex, but
the principle is the mitigation of risk.
8. Suppliers oVer prices to customers which change periodically maybe two or three times a year max.
However, at a wholesale level they have an exposure to the market where prices on the edges of their
portfolio are unpredictable by each half hour. To mitigate this risk, then the ownership of a generation
portfolio seems a logical business step. As the market was designed around large generation units, then to
ensure a suYciently sized portfolio of generation required a large customer base.
9. As a result this limits competition to large integrated players.New entrants on either side of themarket,
generation or supply ﬁnd that the market is illiquid and not transparent which poses a business risk.
Suppliers below a certain size are unable to buy in the small quantities required and thus are exposed to the
unpredictability of the cash out market. Something that removed several players in the winter of 2005–06.
10. If a liquid market existed, then independent suppliers and generators could see market prices and be
sure of buying or selling to hedge their position. Equally, a level of predictability of the cash out prices would
remove some of the ﬁnancial risk of exposure. Which can be very real.
11. Independent players due to the market risks are also required to provide credit to counter-parties
either as cash or letters of credit. This in itself is a cash drain on players which restricts growth of new
entrants.
What are the implications of growing consolidation in the energy market?
12. The implications of consolidation in the market are a lack of consumer choice, and a stiﬂing of
innovation. It also impacts Government ability to manage the energy aspect of the economy because it has
to go “cap in hand” to the big 6 to deal with important issues such as climate change and fuel poverty. If there
was eVective competition in the market then specialist companies would be developing innovative tariVs for
diVerent market sectors. For example, specialists in Pre-payment metering using new technology to bring
down the cost to serve or premium lifestyle tariVs linked to other product oVerings.
13. Competition would not necessarily reduce energy prices, as the two predominant costs, fuel for
generation and transportation are limited in the diVerential that can be applied. Although improvements in
thewholesalemarket and reduction of risk could bring lower pricing. It could however lead to awider spread
as specialist in certain sectors focus on their oVering rather than trying to be everything for everybody.
14. As new entrants are deterred from entering the retail market because of the wholesale market risks,
then the need for innovation decreases and the expectation of customers become lower.
15. Good Energy’s concern is that this lack of competition is impeding the delivery of the UK’s 2020
target by market means and requires the government to “horse trade” deals with the oligopoly to deliver.
Something which only increases their hold on the market and increases the risk of non-delivery on these
targets.
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What is the relationship between the wholesale and retail markets for electricity and gas?
16. The two markets are closely interlinked and it is the problems with the wholesale market structure
that are restricting competition in the retail market. The wholesale market is structured around cost
reﬂectivity, ie That generators and suppliers buy and sell on the open market. In reality, the risk this has
created has lead to vertical integration by the largest players, and as such the market has become illiquid as
most energy is self-supplied and thus a market price is based on a small number of hedging trades.
17. It is not possible to be in the retail market without being a player in the wholesale market, and thus,
the structure of the wholesale market dictates the structure of the retail market. ie The need for a balanced
portfolio of generation dictates the need to have a large retail base to use that portfolio of generation.
18. Good Energy also believes that NETA was conceived at a time when economic priorities were the
predominant driver, and sustainability and carbonmarkets were not high on the agenda. If theUK is tomeet
its 2020 and 2050 commitments, thenNETA is a hindrance rather than beneﬁt as it favours large, predictable
generation at the expense of smaller, less predictable generation. To deliver a low carbon economy, NETA
is not ﬁt for purpose. It also puts NGC in a powerful position on this debate.
What is the interaction between the UK and European energy markets?
19. In electricity there is little interaction between the UK and European market, as the interaction is
limited to capacity of the interconnectors. It is noted however, that diVerent wholesale market structures in
the EU are helping some countries to increase the levels of renewable or low carbon generation to compete
better with fossil fuel based generation.
What is the eVectiveness of regulatory oversight of the energy market?
20. In essence the market regulator, Ofgem is a ﬁnancial regulator. Its role is either to regulate prices,
where there is a monopoly service, or ensure that competition means that energy prices are cost reﬂective.
Bolted on to this primary objective are social objectives surrounding fuel poverty and sustainability.
21. In managing its primary role, the regulatory oversight depends on the deﬁnition of competition. If
competition means that customers can move from one supplier to another with ease, then the jobs is well
done. If however, you deﬁne competition as being that the market is open to new entrants to oVer new and
innovative products to customers, then the regulatory oversight has failed.
22. The perception of most domestic customers is that there are six “Dinosaurs” suppliers oVering very
much the same deal. Parts of Ofgem itself appears to have this view as small suppliers such as Good Energy
often have to gate crashmeeting whereOfgemhas only invited the big six suppliers to consult “the industry”.
23. On the two secondary roles, the regulation is failing because Ofgem, as an economic regulator, and
staVed by amultitude of economists, has diYculty running these objectives which are often against the grain
of its primary objective.GoodEnergy has consistently argued thatOfgem remit should be changed to deliver
a low carbon energy market as cost eVectively as possible. Rather than a cost eVective energy market as
sustainably as possible. This would require Ofgem to provide leadership to the market, rather than act as a
policing body.
What progress has been made in reducing fuel poverty and the appropriate policy instruments for doing so?
24. Fuel Poverty (as deﬁned) is increasing as raw energy prices increase. This is outside the control of the
market players, and competition, whilst oVering a better choice, will not deal with the fundamental issue of
rising energy prices. The solution to fuel poverty lies in reducing the energy demands of those in poverty.
The correlation between fuel poverty and poorly insulated housing stock is high and thus improving housing
must be a priority. This would also assist in reducing carbon emissions. We believe there are more eYcient
ways of implementing this than obligating electricity suppliers.
What is currently missing within the UK energy market is any form of heat market?
25. Heat is outside the remit of Ofgem, except where it coincides with the provision of power, and thus
has nomarket driver. If, as mentioned above an energy regulator was set up to drive theUK to a low carbon
energy market, then heat would be within its remit. The provision of locally distributed heat, if aimed at
social housing could go a long way to drive down fuel poverty. However, the current vacuum of regulation
makes investors nervous of what may be regulated. (eg Competition access etc)
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Recommendations
26. Good Energy’s recommendations are:
— Set-up an energy regulator in place of Ofgem with the remit to lead the UK to an eYcient, market
based, low carbon energy market.
— Restructure thewholesale electricitymarket tomake it suitable for new entrants on both the supply
and generation side by establishing stable pricing and market liquidity and transparency.
April 2008
Memorandum submitted by Green Energy UK Plc
GreenEnergy (UK) plc is a small independent “white label” supplier, supplying electricity from renewable
and chp generation to domestic and small business customers.
Green Energy UK started trading in 2001 and hence has ﬁrst hand experience is the barriers to entry and
growth displayed by the electricity markets.
Summary
There are three main points I wish to make:
(1) The lack of liquidity in the wholesale electricity markets.
(2) The use of credit and security cover.
(3) The inherent bias within the consultation process in regulatory reform.
Lack of Liquidity in the Wholesale Markets
The markets have consolidated, with few new entrants in recent years and the “big 6” becoming
increasingly vertically integrated. With a smaller and smaller open market, there are fewer “risk”
management options or products available to small and new entrants creating both a barrier to entry and
a barrier to growth.
There is a separate submission from a group of smaller suppliers, Bizz energy and others, which covers
these points inmore detail, and whose recommendations on opening up themarket we endorse and support.
Use of Credit and Security Cover
A form of credit cover or security cover is required at many points in the market, from the forward
purchase of electricity, the use of the distribution or transmission networks or the use of the balancing
system.
The reasons for these arrangements are to protect the industry from any “domino” eVect resulting from
a company failure. However for the large and established players these are of little cost, as they are providing
credit to one another but for a new entrant these are considerable ﬁnancial obstacles to overcome. If a new
entrant or small supplier was to fail, the cost to the industry is minor, when put against this the cost to the
consumer of deterring competition which is probably greater. In protecting the industry from failures, the
industry has created a barrier to innovation and entrepreneurialism.
Regulatory Reform
To change any part of the regulation within the industry, a change is proposed, and then goes out to
consultation for views from both within and without the industry.
In reality, the large organisations (which means the big six) have the resources to put into a carefully
crafted response, whereas the smaller organisations, and those from without the industry, but with a valid
concern, rarely have the resources to respond to the consultations in detail if at all. The result is an inbuilt
bias in favour of the larger players, who in turn will naturally be responding with their own companies’ best
interests inmind. As any new entrants can only grow by taking customers away from the established players,
the incumbants will naturally favour measures which will maintain or build barriers to entry or growth.
March 2008
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Memorandum submitted by Growhow UK Ltd
Growhow UK Limited is the largest industrial consumer of gas in the UK (used as feedstock for
manufacture of ammonia and fertilisers) and a major consumer of electricity. We have followed closely the
evidence that has given to the Committee. There are a small number of key inaccuracies in the information
has been given to the Committee that we feel strongly need to be addressed. In the light of this, we have
elected to submit the following brief note.
1. LNG Deliveries to both UK and US
Deliveries to the Isle of Grain (IoG) in Winter 2007–08 have been well below capacity. In Q4 2007 seven
cargoes were delivered and in Q1 2008 three cargoes. So out of a total of “26 slots” only 10 were used this
winter. It was suggested that LNG was not readily available and that the high price of LNG was a cause of
high gas prices in the UK.
It was further suggested that no LNG deliveries are being made to the US. The table below shows that
theUS has slightlymore dependence than theUKonLNG imports. LNG imports to theUS have continued
through winter 2007–08 and into summer 2008. US market prices for gas remain well below UK prices as
shown in the data later. In our view the TPA access arrangements at Isle of Grain are inadequate to ensure
an optimum ﬂow of LNG into the UK market.
2. Forward Pricing and the Competitive Disadvantage Faced by Large Consumers
We wish to be clear that as a large consumer of gas we wish to be able to lock in forward prices for our
business. However we are almost always faced with the problem that UK forward prices are grossly
uncompetitive compared to the US and mainland Europe and this forces us to rely on short term pricing.
Essentially we are forced to buy short term in order to have some chance of buying gas at competitive prices.
This is not a position with which we are comfortable.
The competitive disadvantage we face is illustrated below.
Forward price (p/therm) Winter 2008–09 summer 2009
UK 104 95
USA 61 72
Europe 83 88
3. Measures to Address Inequalities
It is important to emphasise that the UK has suYcient capacity for the supply of gas to the market
(pipelines andLNG) but the capacity is not being utilised. The problem is lack of physical gas being delivered
to the UK.
There are a number of measures we believe government could take to improve the position of UK
industrial gas consumers. These include:
(a) Suppliers who trade gas and electricity in several European countries as well as UK should be
forced to oVer UK consumers the same terms and conditions and pricing arrangements that they
oVer in other European countries. (This may include gas prices linked to oil though we are not
arguing for a major move to oil indexation. In the long term we wish to see gas to gas competition
in a fully functioning UK market).
(b) The UK requires much more storage capacity. The market is failing to deliver this and diYculties
obtaining planning permissions are not the only reason. The government needs to take action to
encourage development of new storage. Ideas include an obligation on gas suppliers to the
domestic sector to hold stored gas for winter, and a small tax on gas to raise funds to ‘seed’
investment. (0.1p/therm per annum would raise £35 million per annum).
(c) There need to be major changes to allow proper Third Party Access to LNG facilities at IoG and
Milford Haven to ensure capacity is utilised. At present, LNG supply to IoG is severely hampered
by a combination of:
(i) the existence of a preferred supplier agreement with only three companies; and
(ii) insuYcient notice provision for available slots (7–10 days). Cargoes would need at least 30
days notice of a slot to make IoG a viable destination for LNG.
Deborah Pritchard Jones
7 July 2008
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Memorandum submitted by Professor Dieter Helm, Professor of Energy Policy, University of Oxford
1. This memorandum addresses possible anti-competitive behaviour in the UK electricity and gas
markets, the relevant evidence, and the extent to which the structure of the market distorts competition.
The Various Claims made by the Treasury, Ofgem and Others
2. Recent large increases in retail electricity and gas prices have given rise to claims that the energy
markets are not suYciently competitive. It has further been claimed by Ofgem that the electricity companies
have beneﬁted from a windfall of some £9 billion as a result of the grandfathering of the EU Emissions
Trading Scheme (EUETS) permits for the second phase, 2008–12. Ofgem has recommended that a windfall
tax for this amount be levied on the electricity companies and that the revenues be used to cross-subsidise
the fuel poor. The Treasury, through a series of “star chamber” meetings with the industry, has conﬂated
these issues further, by arguing that, because of the alleged excess proﬁts (whether from the permit
grandfathering or otherwise), the main suppliers should cross-subsidise the fuel poor “voluntarily” against
the threat of a windfall tax.
3. These claims confuse three separate questions:
(i) whether there is anti-competitive behaviour?
(ii) whether there is a windfall, and whether this amounts to £9 billion?
(iii) whether in a competitive market, cross-subsidies are appropriate from one group of customers
to another?
Evidence on Anti-competitive Behaviour
4. The main claims that have been made about anti-competitive behaviour have not been substantiated
by empirical evidence. Ofgem claims that this is because there is no evidence. The industry claims that retail
prices have increased because wholesale prices have risen (and by more than retail prices), and that there is
customer switching between suppliers.
5. In the NETA market structures, which went live from 2000, the evidence is extremely hard to assess
from the outside. Unlike the Pool, which NETA replaced, generators and suppliers are free to contract as
they choose, whereas the Pool required all signiﬁcant electricity to be sold into the Pool and anyone could
purchase supplies at the Pool price. The Pool was compulsory, transparent and (very) liquid. The
introduction of NETA encouraged vertical integration, and pluralised the contracting strategies of the
participants. As a result, vertical integration became highly desirable, creating physical hedges for the
integrated companies, and leaving generation-only and supplier-only companies at a competitive
disadvantage. NETA has proved a major barrier to entry by both merchant generators and supply-only
businesses. It is therefore not surprising that there is no signiﬁcant entry up or downstream since its
introduction.
6. NETAalsomade consolidationwithin the vertically integrated players attractive, and indeed the result
has been that a small number of companies now dominate the market.
7. It is impossible from the outside to establish whether the result has been consistent with the behaviour
of a competitive market. In the absence of entry, the incumbents could be engaged in an intensely
competitive battle for market share—and, in the key test for a competitive market, prices could be related
to costs.
8. The problem for external observers is that the costs upon which prices are based vary, and in a non-
transparent way. In particular, it is not suYcient to claim that prices in the wholesale market are tracked by
retail prices. The reasons include: the determination of wholesale prices and the inﬂuence on those prices of
the vertically integrated players; the impact of diVerent fuel mixes on the costs of particular players; and the
extent of physical hedges.
9. It is therefore not possible for Ofgem to claim that themarket is competitive (or not)—as, for example,
in response to theChancellor of the Exchequer’s questioning in January 2008 (and it is surprising thatOfgem
then announced that, although it believed themarket was competitive, nevertheless due to “public pressure”
it would conduct its own wide-ranging inquiry). In order to make an informed judgement, there will need
to be close scrutiny of the contracts, costs and their relation to prices.
The Windfall Claim and the EU ETS
10. Ofgem claims that the generators have made a windfall proﬁt of some £9 billion from the
grandfathering of permits for the EU ETS phase two, and that these ought to be taxed, with the proceeds
given to the fuel poor. This is extremely simplistic. Whilst there was a case for an ex ante auction, the
arguments for an ex post windfall tax are very diVerent. There are very considerable implications for the
market. It is very surprising that Ofgem claims that it knows what the generators would have paid had there
been an auction (and the example of the 3G licences for telecoms indicates the possible scale of error in such
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predictions). It is also very important to bear in mind the impact on balance sheets of such a tax and the
particular implications for the smaller generation-only players, whose competitive role would probably be
signiﬁcantly diminished by an ex post windfall tax.
11. It is also extremely surprising that Ofgem and the Treasury chose to conﬂate the windfall tax with the
fuel poor, given that there are generators without retail customers, and the climate change problem is
distinct from the fuel poverty concerns.
Cross-subsidies and Competitive Markets
12. The Treasury’s intervention has gone further in its conﬂation of diVerent issues. The Chancellor’s
initial concern was with the degree of competition, but then the Treasury used “star chamber” meetings to
try to get the main vertically integrated players to cross-subsidise from the bulk of their customers to the
fuel poor. Such cross-subsidies are patently inconsistent with competition, so either the Treasury wanted to
exploit the claimed (excess) revenues from the claimed anti-competitive behaviour for the beneﬁt of
achieving a separate policy goal, or it wanted to handicap the incumbents against entrants.
13. Fuel poverty remains a serious issue—whichmight get worse if incomes fall and/or prices rise further.
There are at least three possible permanent solutions: a levy on all suppliers, a levy on distribution, or social
security spending. The latter is the least distorting (and the most appropriate). Distribution is a monopoly,
and hence distribution customers can be in eVect be taxed for this purpose. Supply is supposed to be
competitive, and therefore only if a levy is applied across all suppliers on an equal weighting can it be
consistent (roughly) with maintaining competition. The (political) trouble with the explicit supply or
distribution levy is that they both make transparent that some customers are subsidising others—a
redistribution policy that is normally regarded as a function of the tax and social security systems.
Towards a More Competitive Market
14. The current market design—NETA—lies at the heart of competition problems in the UK energy
markets. In the NETA market, the combination of a lack of transparency and the competitive advantages
under this market form for vertically integrated large companies tend to limit competition in eVect to the
main players. This was predicted at the time, and it was not surprising that these large players were
enthusiastic advocates of the replacement of the Pool by NETA. Given the close involvement and advocacy
of NETA by Ofgem, it is unlikely that it will be willing to take a close enough look at this market design.
15. Serious considerationmay need to be given as to how to place supplier-only businesses on a level ﬁeld
with vertically integrated players, and NETA needs appropriate reform in this regard.
16. NETA also replaced the capacity market. Whilst the Pool-based capacity market was seriously
ﬂawed, the elimination of this market has further reduced the scope for merchant entry into generation. A
capacity market, with auctioned slots, would provide a more even ﬁeld for entrants.
Conclusions
17. The main conclusions are:
(i) the voluntary nature of the NETA market makes it impossible to externally establish whether
there is evidence of anti-competitive behaviour. This requires detailed scrutiny of the costs of
generators, to see whether these are closely related to prices. It is not apparent that Ofgem is in
a position to know the answer at this stage;
(ii) the relationship between wholesale and retail prices is not a suYcient test of competition;
(iii) the case for an ex post windfall tax is very weak;
(iv) Ofgem is not in a position to knowwhat generators would have paid ex ante in a permits auction
for phase two of the EU ETS;
(v) the relationship between the grandfathering of permits and fuel poverty is at best tenuous—
especially given that not all generators are vertically integrated;
(vi) the Treasury’s attempt to “persuade” vertically integrated companies to “voluntarily” cross-
subsidise the fuel poor has been very unfortunate;
(vii) fuel poverty requires a permanent solution which does not distort competition—cross-subsidies
are not consistent with a competitive market;
(viii) NETA is amajor cause of market distortions and it acts as a signiﬁcant barrier to non-vertically
integrated entrants; in this regard it is anti-competitive;
(ix) the absence of a capacity market under NETA further reduces the scope for new entry.
31 March 2008
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Memorandum submitted by John Huggins
UK NATURAL GAS COMPETITION
1. Executive Summary
1.1 There is strong evidence to suggest that competition is working for large industrial gas consumers but
is no longer working for small consumers.
1.2 this evidence is based on BERR’s own ﬁgues and shows that the price diVerential between the largest
and the smallest consumers has more than doubled since the third quarter of 2005 and in the third quarter
of 2007 was around 40p/therm.
1.3 The diVerential between large and small consumers is justiﬁed by the higher transmission, distribution
and administration costs associated with small consumers and there is no evidence that these costs have
more than doubled over the two year period.
2. Personal Introduction
2.1 I have 40 years’ experience in the energy industry, most of it in senior commercial positions buying
or transporting gas.
2.2 My last employed position was a Director of Gas Transportation at British Gas.
2.3 I now work as an independent commercial gas advisor and have worked in several countries.
3. Gas Prices 2004–07
3.1 Chart 1 shows how gas prices to non-domestic consumers276 has varied, depending on size, between
the ﬁrst quarter 2004 and the third quarter 2007.
3.2 Until the third quarter of 2005 the prices moved more or less in line.
3.3 In the fourth quarter of 2005 there was a substantial increase in all prices and thereafter prices no
longermoved in line, as the prices to the largest consumers dropped back to around their original level, while
prices to the smallest consumers remained high.
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4. Gas Price Differentials
4.1 Chart 2 shows the diVerentials between prices to the largest consumers and others.
4.2 The historic diVerential between the largest and the smallest consumers averaged between 9 and 18p/
therm until the third quarter of 2005. A signiﬁcant diVerential is to be expected because of the higher
transmission and distribution costs associated with the smaller consumers.
4.3 By the third quarter of 2007 this diVerential had widened to over 40p/therm. This would appear to
indicate an increase in the proﬁtability of the smallest consumers of over 20p/therm unless, of course, sellers
were making a loss on sales to the largest consumers in the third quarter of 2007.
276 Quarterly Energy Prices: Table 3.4.1 Prices of fuels purchased by non-domestic consumers in theUnitedKingdom (excluding
the Climate Change Levy).
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4.4 There is here evidence that competition is working well for large consumers, but progressively, less
well for smaller consumers.
4.5 Directly comparable ﬁgures are not available for domestic consumers but the category of very small
non-domestic consumers can be considered a good prosy for domestic consumers.
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Memorandum submitted by INEOS ChlorVinyls
1. Executive Summary
1.1 INEOS ChlorVinyls is a major chemical company operating throughout Europe. We are able to
provide evidence based on extensive and comprehensive knowledge of the gas and electricity markets in
which the Company operates.
1.2 Our evidence is based on ﬁrst hand experience of the operation of UK and Continental European
markets.
1.3 The UK and industrial consumers in particular need secure supplies of competitively priced energy—
absolute price level is less of a concern if all consumers are similarly aVected. Since theDepartment of Trade
and Industry Committee’s “Security of the Gas Supply” Report (Report HC 632), UK market prices have
gone through a period of very high price volatility. For a brief period the UK did enjoy comparatively low
and therefore competitive prices. However, this was short-lived and once again both UK gas and electricity
prices are signiﬁcantly higher than other major European markets. (See Addendum 1).
1.4 For example, we can broadly assessUKgasmarket forward prices as being at close toEuropean levels
in summer but having a signiﬁcant premium above this in the winter. As a result UK annual prices are
uncompetitive. This situation is apparently driven by the price required to attract LNG supplies to the UK
in winter. With the expected need for growing LNG imports in future years this situation seems set to
deteriorate further.
1.5 Such uncompetitive price levels are a huge concern to us and other industrial consumers. The need
for increasing imports could lead to further severe price distortions as witnessed in Winter 2005–06. During
this period we had to severely curtail production with signiﬁcant ﬁnancial impact on our business.
Meanwhile a number of manufacturing sectors, including paper and glass reported site closures as a result
of high energy prices.
1.6 The electricity market is a cause for further concern. The anticipated short-fall in generation capacity
in themedium term creates further uncertainty.While there is now clear intent to allow new nuclear capacity
to be built we consider ideally this needed to be clariﬁed a number of years earlier.
1.7 It is rather surprising that this situation has arisen again when the UK has apparently the most
competitive gas market in Europe and remains a major producer of natural gas.
1.8 In this evidence we have made various comments in response to the speciﬁc questions asked in the
original call for evidence.
1.9 We have covered a range of themes, some of which we have highlighted in previous submissions to
Select Committee Inquiries. These themes include:
— Barriers to entry to energy markets.
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— Market complexity.
— Market transparency.
— Issues with LNG.
— Interaction of UK and Continental European markets.
1.10 Previous Committees have acknowledged the price distortions created by the interaction of the UK
market with the less liberalised Europeanmarkets.We recognise the support theUKGovernment has given
to the liberalisation agenda.However, we remain extremely concerned at the rate of progress due to the clear
resistance that remains in some of the major European energy markets.
2. Effective Competition in the Retail Markets
2.1 We consider that for there to be eVective competition in the retail markets we would expect to see a
diverse mix of market players.
2.2 The UK Government and Regulator (OFGEM) frequently herald the UK as the most liberal and
competitive energy market in Europe. However, we believe that such statements do not properly recognise
a number of structural faults within the operation of the gas and electricity markets in the UK.
2.3 In the case of electricity, the UK market is now characterised by large vertically integrated players
with broadly identical product oVerings. The early days of market liberalisation in the UK found many
small independents oVering diVerentiated products, independent generators operating single (or a small
number of) power stations and competing successfully with the incumbents. This is no longer the case.
2.4 INEOS has extensive experience of electricity markets throughout Europe. In our opinion the UK
oVers a signiﬁcantly poorer market structure for small and independent players than, for example, Germany
and the Nordic countries. This is borne out by the number of industrial consumers accessing wholesale
markets directly in these countries providing a strong base for increasing liquidity, in stark contrast to the
UK position.
2.5 It is not only our view that the UK market is failing to provide the desired liquidity. We note that
there has also been very signiﬁcant concern highlighted by a number of themajor market players. As a result
of this the Power Trading Forum of the Futures and Options Association is leading a “Market Design
Project” to “encourage a more liquid traded market” (see http://www.foa.co.uk/forums/power.jsp).
2.6 We would suggest that the problem is largely a result of the increasing consolidation and vertical
integration found within the UK electricity industry. This is compounded by the increasing diYculty for
independents and small companies to operate alongside the major vertically integrated companies.
Increasingly modiﬁcations to the major UK Codes strive to deliver better economic models with increasing
complexity and risk without regard to the impact upon the UK market in the broadest context. As a result
we are delivering an electricity market where small independents have disappeared and new entrants are
wholly absent.
2.7 As an independent operator in the power market (and to our knowledge the only UK industrial
operating in this way) we suggest that the above situation is driven to a large extent by market rules that are
signiﬁcantly over complicated and appear to us to go well beyond what is required for eVective and eYcient
market operation. These rules create a major hurdle for small players and new entrants to overcome and
create signiﬁcant risk and hence competitive disadvantage for such small operators.
2.8 As an absolute minimum a test for all modiﬁcations to the governing Code Structures should be an
over-arching objective that they make the market simpler and more accessible thus increasing participation
and liquididity.
3. Effective Competition in Wholesale Markets
3.1 In this section we have highlighted our particular views on the operation of the wholesale UK gas
market—an area we have made much comment on in the past few years including written submissions to
inquiries undertaken by the Trade and Industry Select Committee.
3.2 Those inquiries were triggered by rising UK wholesale gas prices that reached record levels during
the winter of 2005–06. In early 2007 UK wholesale prices fell to comparatively low and competitive levels
as the gas supply and demand balance in the UK and across Europe improved—albeit this was signiﬁcantly
inﬂuenced by an extremely mild winter across Europe.
3.3 Later in 2007 prices again started to rise. Signiﬁcantly these rises have been much greater than
comparative price rises in other markets. The result of these increases is that UK wholesale prices in both
gas and electricity (which is largely driven by gas price) are once again uncompetitive (Addendum 1). As an
industrial consumer wewould stress that our concern ismuch less about absolute price level than the absence
of a level playing ﬁeld (Addendum 2).
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3.4 Forward summer prices now trade at levels which are broadly around European price levels (for
either gas or coal277). In winter, UK prices have a premium of at least 20% to wholesale markets around the
Atlantic Basin.
3.5 Over recent months through discussions in various market forums (individually or through industry
associations including the Energy Intensive Users Group and Chemical Industries Association) we have
highlighted our view of key issues in the UK gas market:
3.5.1 Liquiﬁed Natural Gas (LNG)
— Deliveries of LNG so far this winter, through the only operating terminal at Isle of Grain, have
been very signiﬁcantly below the maximum available capacity. We note OFGEM have asked for
information from parties with regard to use of spare capacity at this facility and we have yet to see
the outcome of this review. However, it is does appear that there is signiﬁcant concern regarding
the eVectiveness of the Use It Or Lose It (UIOLI) regime in place as to our knowledge, released
capacity has never been used by another party.
— It is apparent that LNG prices can now determine UK gas prices at least in winter as UK prices
have to rise to the highest in the world to attract any cargoes. In the winter of 2005/2006 it was
suggested that the price levels at the time were a short-term issue as new infrastructure had arrived
too late to match UK Continental Shelf production decline. However, with the need for LNG
imports expected to increase dramatically in coming years (source National Grid), then we are
hugely concerned that uncompetitive prices are set to become an enduring issue in the most (or
only) liberalised market in Europe.
3.5.2 Norwegian Flow Information
— Norway has become a crucial supplier of gas to the UK market—and this is set to grow
signiﬁcantly over the coming years.
— We note the contrast in the amount of information now available to the UK Gas Market (largely
through the eVorts of consumers) compared with the information from oVshore and in particular
Norwegian imports to both theUK and other European gas terminals.Most disturbingly this lack
of information is in sharp contrast to the situation deemed suitable by the Norwegians for trading
in the Norwegian electricity market (Nordpool).
— We believe that UK Govermnent must push at EU level for much greater transparency of
information on Norwegian (and other importing countries) ﬂows into European gas terminals.
3.5.3 Impact of the Large Combustion Plant Directive
— It is becoming apparent that the Large Combustion Plant Directive is having a more signiﬁcant
impact on the gas and power markets than perhaps even some of the more pessimistic forecasts.
— It is very noticeable that gas demand for power generation has increased above that which would
have been expected from market prices. Most particularly, from the introduction of the LCPD,
we have seen a requirement for gas ﬁred generation to replace coal generation as baseload supply.
— Of most concern is that a signiﬁcant amount of “opted-in” coal plant is oV-line for extended
periods whilst they await completion of Flue Gas Desulpherisation (FGD) projects. These
facilities appear to have been given far more stringent constraints than the “opted-out” plant and
have been largely removed from the generation mix.
— This situation appears perverse, particularly while we have a period where nuclear generation
capacity and gas availability are both low. Our greatest concern is the apparent failure of
government to properly consider the impact of policy (be it European or UK) on the market. The
introduction of this policy in January, the period of maximum demand in the UK energy market
suggests, at the very least, a failure of adequate impact assessment.
4. Growing Consolidation in the Energy Markets
4.1 As we noted in section 2, we do now see greater consolidation in the UK energy markets. In the
previous “dash for gas” during the nineties, there were a number of new entrants who entered the market.
4.2 Many of these new players have since withdrawn from the market for a number of reasons. These
issues largely prevail and include:
— Credit issues;
— Risk; and
— Market complexity.
277 In this context the coal price referenced is the equivalent price of coal and gas when converted to electricity in a power station.
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There are now a very small number of new/small entrants (in the UK) and we believe that we are also
seeing a move towards increasing market concentration throughout Europe by large and vertically
integrated companies.
4.3 Our view is that these current market developments rather suggest that the balance of risks within
the market is wrong such that new entrants are eVectively excluded and size and vertical integration overly
rewarded. This cannot be conducive to the development of a healthy and competitive market.
5. Relationship between Wholesale and Retail Markets
5.1 We consider the situation in the gas and electricity markets is rather diVerent so we have considered
these separately.
5.2 Gas
5.2.1 In the UKmarket end user prices are determined based on theWholesale (NBP) market prices plus
“add-on” costs.
5.2.2 We consider that the cost of the add-ons is quite transparent and in particular the “retail margin”
is relatively low compared with the total cost of the bill.
5.2.3 However, we do ﬁnd that the UKmarket, in our experience, oVers no alternative to this “NBP plus
delivery” model. We have explored diVerent approaches at great length but have been unable to achieve any
alternative. The UK is “NBP—take it or leave it”. This approach prevents UK consumers procuring gas at
competitive prices ormanaging competitive risk. Further, theNBPmarket essentially only oVers a relatively
short-term market—two to three years—as there is limited market trading beyond this period.
5.2.4 Large European utilities refuse to oVer contracts in the UK that are freely oVered to INEOS sites
and other consumers throughout NorthWest Europe. The inability of consumers to procure natural gas on
“common contractual terms”—that is on the terms that retailers operating in the UK market oVer in other
European markets—represents a signiﬁcant failure of European Market regulation.
5.2.5 We have already commented on the signiﬁcant price diVerentials between UK and other markets,
particularly in winter. This situation is considered in part to be due to the lack of storage in the UK—a
situation arising from the UK having had highly ﬂexible production for a number of years. It is apparent
that the need for storage will increase as import dependency increases. This situation is being recognised
throughout the rest of Europe as gas demand is expected to grow.
5.2.6 We understand that Planning Reforms seek to enable nationally important infrastructure projects
to be developed more quickly. We believe the need for this to be implemented and to deliver the intended
beneﬁts will be crucial in the very near future.
5.3 Electricity
5.3.1 In the UK market prices are related to the wholesale market with pass-through costs. These costs
are less transparent and represent a signiﬁcantly greater add-on to the wholesale price than is the case with
gas. Nonetheless our experience is that retail margins are low.
5.3.2 Our greatest concern lies with the “other” costs that are passed to consumers. The cost of imbalance
through BalancingMechanism costs (Energy Imbalance) or Balancing Services costs (BSUoS) is signiﬁcant
and adds hugely to the retail price. Our experience in Germany and NordPool is that large industrial
consumers pay signiﬁcantly less on top of the wholesale price than in the UK.
6. The Interaction between UK and European Markets
6.1 The impact of the interaction between the UK and European markets was highlighted and accepted
as a signiﬁcant issue in previous Select Committee Inquiries.
6.2 We recognise that there has been a major political drive through the various European bodies and
particularly DGCompetition. The so called “3rd Package” was a major statement of intent andmakes clear
the desire to progress the liberalisation agenda across Europe.
6.3 However, we note that very strong resistance remains to some of the key elements of this package and
in our view it will still be a number of years before we see the markets functioning eVectively. The view of
a previous Select Committee (HC 279-1) that market liberalisation would not happen before the end of this
decade appears to have been correct.
6.4 During the interim period, the UKwill continue to be exposed to the market distortions that we have
seen in recent years.
6.5 It is essential thatUKgovernmentmaintains its resolve and exerts its inﬂuence to ensure that properly
functioning markets are developed across Europe.
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6.6 We would also stress that it is no longer simply Europe that results in the UK “importing
uncompetitive prices”. LNG is a rapidly increasing part of our primary energy supply mix. Despite the
expectation of secure supply arrangements from countries such as Qatar, there is concern that such supplies
will only arrive if the UK can “out-bid” other markets and so driving UK prices to un-competitive levels.
ADDENDUM 1
WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY PRICE COMPARISON
Source: Energyquote)
ADDENDUM 2
BACKGROUND TO INEOS
INEOS Chlor is based in Runcorn, Cheshire where we produce 80% of the UK’s chlorine and caustic
soda. These products are vital building blocks in the production ofmost chemicalsmade in theUK.Chlorine
is used to purify 98% of our national water consumption, to produce 96% of crop protection products and
85% of pharmaceuticals. It is also a major raw material for the manufacture of plastics. Caustic is used in
every major chemical production process and is essential to a wide range of everyday products including
soap, cosmetics, clothes, antiseptics and cleaning products. INEOSChlor has around 1,400 direct employees
based in Cheshire.
The manufacture of chlorine is energy intensive. INEOS Chlor purchases energy in the form of natural
gas, which is used to produce electricity for use in the chlorine production process (electrolysis of brine).
INEOS Chlor purchases around 250 million therms per year of natural gas for use in the Runcorn
manufacturing activities. As such we understand we are probably in the top three of industrial consumers
(by volume) in the UK, outside the power generation sector. Natural gas represents some 60% of the total
business variable production costs. Every penny added to the wholesale cost of gas increases our production
costs by some £2.5 million.
INEOS Fluor, INEOS Vinyls and INEOS Enterprises also have operations within the same site at
Runcorn. While these businesses are not as energy intensive as INEOS Chlor, energy is a signiﬁcant cost.
More importantly, these businesses are extremely dependent on the chemicals produced by INEOS Chlor.
Runcorn site is the home of a number of other companies including APL and BOC that again are dependent
on the chemicals produced by INEOS Chlor.
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INEOS Chlor and INEOS Vinyls also have manufacturing assets located in Germany and Italy as well
as several smaller UK sites. The various sites consume signiﬁcant amounts of energy in the form of both
natural gas and electricity.
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Supplementary evidence from INEOS ChlorVinyls
Introduction
Further to the oral evidence session on Tuesday 17 June 2008 (Mr Alistair Buchanan and Mr Andrew
Wright of OFGEM) there are a number of points of clariﬁcation and factual corrections that we would like
the Committee to be aware of.
We have structured these into sections that do not follow the same order as the actual evidence session.
Where appropriate we have provided supporting data and/or links to sources of public information.
We will, separately, provide comments directly to OFGEM.
Short Term Versus Long Term Trading (Q560)
We are surprised at the remark that industrial users “seek to trade short term”.
We (and we are aware that this is the case for other industrial consumers) have consistently argued that
we need to have the ability to contract for our energy supplies on a forward basis at competitive prices. We
have made this point clearly, we believe, to previous Select Committee Inquiries as well as more generally.
The very harsh reality is that we are (again) forced to a position where we no longer have a choice.
Purchasing forward contracts is simply not an option as prices are unaVordable.
For the avoidance of doubt, we have presented again in Appendix 1, wholesale price comparisons for key
energy markets.
Moving Production and UK/Germany Price Comparisons (Q564)
The answer to this question included a comment that there was the “the inference [INEOS Chlor] could
pack up Runcorn”.
We refer back to our own oral evidence. We actually highlighted that the longer the current situation of
high energy prices persists, the more we will be driven to put our investments into Continental plants. Our
business does need to continually re-invest to maintain our assets and we always have to consider where is
the best place to do this.
Ofgem also suggested that once other factors (such as the cost of carbon and transportation) are taken
into account, the UK actually is no more expensive than for example Germany.
We can only comment speciﬁcally on the situation facing Energy Intensive Users such as ourselves. For
these end users, “other factors” are actually lower in Germany than they would be for comparable plants
in the UK. Taking the points raised by Ofgem in turn:
— It is beyond doubt that the cost of carbon is being passed across all European Power markets
largely irrespective of the actual carbon intensity of generation in the market. For example the
Norwegian power market—which is almost entirely hydro and nuclear (carbon free)—still has an-
uplift because of the price of carbon as the markets are physically connected to others in Europe.
We believe that the uplift from inclusion of CO2 costs between theUKandGerman powermarkets
is actually very similar.
— For “other factors” we share with the Committee publicly available information on the cost of
Extra High Voltage (grid) electricity connections in Germany and the UK, and the add-ons faced
by Energy Intensive Industry in both countries for renewable generation. These conﬁrm that in
Germany for very large users such as ourselves “other factors” are SIGNIFICANTLY LOWER
than corresponding charges in theUK.Wehave shown amore detailed comparison inAppendix 2.
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LNG
There are two key points that we would like to clarify.
Q543. It was stated that 63 out of 64 delivery slots were used. This was quite clearly not the case, with
Isle of Grain being idle for much of the this year and importantly last winter. We understand there were
three cargoes delivered through the Isle of Grain terminal in Quarter 1 2008. The terminal has delivery slots
scheduled approximately every seven days, indicating a utililisation of less than 25% of capacity.
Q546. With reference to imports of LNG to the United States, it was stated that they “are taking none”.
We have made further enquiries and would like to stress that cargoes have continued to arrive in the US
through the winter despite price levels being much lower than in the European or Asian markets.
The latest oYcial data can be found in the link below (Energy Information Administration). It shows
steady volumes arriving from Trinidad.
http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/ng/ng move impc s1 m.htm
Gas Import Capacity (Q541)
Reference was made to new pipelines and LNG import capacity—around 100 to 120 MCM/day.
We would like to stress, again, that new capacity does not (and demonstrably has not) guaranteed new
supply. Unless this new capacity actually has ﬁrm supply agreements behind it (as appears to be the case in
many other markets) then the UK will remain exposed to high and volatile prices.
Information Transparency (Q578)
It was stated that storage information is not available in Germany.
While information provision is not as good inGermany as it is in theUK,German stock data is published
weekly and can be found at:
http://transparency.gie.eu.com/
Although we believe better information is a positive step, it is clear that on its own it will not change the
situation we face in the UK.
APPENDIX 1
WHOLESALE GAS AND ELECTRICITY PRICES
Wholesale Forward Gas Prices
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APPENDIX 2
COMPARISON OF “OTHER FACTORS” ADDING TO THE COSTS OF WHOLESALE
ELECTRICITY TO ENERGY INTENSIVE USERS IN GERMANY AND THE UK
Our comparison is (by nature of common experience) between large directly connected sites (that means
connected to the National Grid directly at very high voltage and not through a local distribution company)
in the UK and Germany. In both cases the sites are purchasing wholesale power through a supplier, and
delivering it to the site. The site is a high load factor industrial user with a normal demand of 50MW
consuming 400 GWh per year. Treatment of losses has been ignored for simplicity.
Charges in Germany
Grid and connection charges
We assume the user is connected to EonNET (as is our sister site in Germany). The published connection
tariVs for the site are:
— a unit charge of 0.06c/kWh; and
— a capacity charge of ƒ27.39/kWa;
for the example above this gives rise to an annual unit charge of ƒ240,000 and an annual capacity
charge of ƒ1,369,500—a total annual connection charge of ƒ1,609,500—equivalent to ƒ4/MWh.
Other charges
Supplier charges in addition to the wholesale price are very low. Our experience suggests these are in the
range ƒ0.05–ƒ0.15/MWh. The most signiﬁcant other charge in Germany is the Renewables charge.
Businesses in Germany are obliged to buy a proportion of their energy as Renewable Energy at a higher
price than the normal rate. For a non Energy Intensive business, the obligation would be to purchase an
average of 18.34% of electricity consumption at an average price of ƒ118.8/MWh. For Energy Intensive
users, German law caps the amount at a value of ƒ0.5 million per year. The actual additional cost of this
is estimated to be ƒ0.25 million per year,278 or ƒ0.63/MWh for our 50MW site.
278 The ƒ0.5 million payment delivers approximately ƒ0.25 million of electricity—hence the true cost is actually half of the
obligation.
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Charges in UK
Grid and connection charges
The charging regime is slightly diVerent in the UK. The “capacity” charge is paid for in a fee commonly
known as “Triad” charges. Unit charges would be more commonly recognised as “BSUoS” charges, which
vary by half hour.
— In theNorthWales andMersey region of England connection charges are £15.46/kW for 2008–09.
— The forecast rate for 2008–09 for BSUoS is £1.24/MWh (see
http://www.nationalgrid.com/NR/rdonlyres/11BE6CED-FD6B-49FF-BF90-F1FB69C14F1B/
26463/01 Op Perf OpsForumJun08.pdf)
Therefore for our 50MW site, the annual unit charge (BSUoS) charge is £496,000 and the annual (triad)
charge is £773,000—a total annual connection charge of £1,269,000—equivalent to £3.17/MWh.
Other charges
As inGermany, the largest “other” single element is payment for renewables. For 2008–09, UK electricity
suppliers are obliged to buy Renewables Obligation Certiﬁcates for 9.1% of their supplies, or alternatively
pay the buy-out price of £35.76/MWh (recently published by OFGEM). Irrespective of the way suppliers
meet this obligation, our experience is that they charge the impact of the buy-out obligation, averaged over
the whole supply. This means that £35.76 on 9.1% of the supply is equivalent to £3.25/MWh charged on
100%.
Summary of “Other Factors”
In Germany, an Energy Intensive User connected directly to the grid would face costs of less than ƒ5/
MWh for delivered electricity in addition to the wholesale price.
In the UK a similar site would face costs of over £6/MWh for the same elements.
11 July 2008
Memorandum submitted by International Power plc
Summary
1. International Power plc (IPR) is a UK-based FTSE-100 company with experience of operating and
trading generation assets in a range ofmarkets across theworld—in theUK it controls a diverse independent
portfolio of assets amounting to 7% of GB installed capacity.
2. IPRbelieves that that theGBwholesale energymarkets are viable, competitive and relatively attractive
to investors. The company has demonstrated its long term commitment to the market, and is an active
trading participant.
3. It is concerned however with the potential increase in regulatory risk to its investments, as a result of
the plethora of market reviews, investigations, and impact of EU proposals. We anticipate some change,
evolution and ongoing scrutiny ofmarkets, however, ongoing uncertainty overmarket design is unwelcome.
4. Although the market is in good health, we do believe that any additional consolidation amongst the
six major vertically-integrated companies could be detrimental to competition and threaten liquidity.
Capability Statement and Perspective
5. IPR is a fast-growing FTSE 100 company based in London, with interests in 40 power stations in 20
countries amounting to a net ownership of 18,824 MW of generating capacity worldwide.
6. In conjunction with its partner, Mitsui & Co. Ltd., it owns and operates a diverse generation portfolio
in Great Britain, representing 7% of installed capacity.279
7. IPR’s growth strategy targets key regions around the world (Europe, Australia, Middle East, South-
east Asia, and the USA).
8. It has built up extensive knowledge and experience in a range of market environments, typically as an
independent market participant, competing with utility incumbents.
279 The portfolio includes the 1,000 MW coal-ﬁred station in Rugeley, StaVordshire, a 500 MW gas-ﬁred CCGT station in
Deeside,NorthWales, a 1,200MWcogeneration plant at Saltend,Hull, a 140MWoil-ﬁred plant at IndianQueens, Cornwall,
and 2,088 MW of hydro-electric pumped storage capacity at the Dinorwig and Ffestiniog power stations in Snowdonia.
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In the GB market:
9. The company sells its output through the wholesale power market, and manages its fuel and carbon
requirements through trading in the gas, coal, oil and emissions markets. It relies on sound liquidity, and
transparency to support its business model and its remit is straightforward: it seeks to optimise its proﬁts
from these generation assets through active participation in the wholesale energy markets.
10. It has a substantial presence in the generationmarket, but its UKbusiness remainsmuch smaller than
the main six vertically-integrated players. Without the diversity that having a signiﬁcant supply business
would bring, IPR is sensitive to the potential for large vertically-integrated players to inﬂuence wholesale
prices such that they could undervalue generation costs, thereby cross-subsidising retail businesses.
11. Given that our experience and expertise in the UK is limited to the wholesale markets, this is where
we focus our comments.
Investment Criteria
12. IPR’s global portfolio is geographically diverse, and spread between merchant style markets, and
those that oVer long term power purchase agreements. The company’s strategy is to seek proﬁtable, and
sustainable growth in power generation and associatedmarkets. Thismeans that its investments inmerchant
environments are considered very carefully against the company’s rigorous investment criteria, and political
and regulatory risks clearly form part of that assessment.
13. These investments are made for the long term, and IPR therefore seeks stability, predictability and
transparency in market arrangements. It recognises that market design will evolve, and also that energy
policy and security of supply remain highly political issues, but bases its investment on the assumption that
this will not materially alter the fundamental economics of the opportunity.
Observations on the GB Markets
General
14. TheGB energymarkets have developed rapidly over the past 20 years, both in structure and inmarket
design. The nature of electricity in particular (eg that it cannot be stored in large quantities) means that
whilst commodity style markets can and have been allowed to form, some central controls are required to
enable the market to balance and supplies to be delivered to the customer instantaneously. This is the basis
of the NETA/BETTA market.
15. In general, there is much to be positive about with respect to theUK’s energymarkets. In comparison
with other national energymarkets, in the EU, retail competition is well advanced andmarket concentration
is low. In the generation market levels of market concentration are even lower. Many of the continental
markets are typiﬁed by one or two dominant ﬁrms, with few independents (in either retail or generation.)
Market shares in the GB market are reasonably well spread between at least six players.
16. These views are supported by the government’s own analysis, which concludes that the UK energy
markets are the most competitive in the EU.280
17. However, as with all markets, there are imperfections and potential problems (eg inconsistent
liquidity, volatility.) We are not convinced that these are material, and in any case, do not justify major
market investigation and overhaul. This leads onto the next point:
Regulatory Risk
18. As a UK-based independent player with a diverse portfolio of global investments, we are increasingly
concerned about the sheer volume of market change proposals, policy announcements, and major industry
reviews (eg Transmission Access Review, Cashout Pricing Review, Industry Governance Review etc) that
appear to be running in parallel in the UK.
19. Furthermore, the lack of uncertainty regarding the future shape of the EUEmissions Trading Scheme
and the adoption of the EU Renewables Targets creates longer term price uncertainty in the power and
carbon markets and threatens timely and eYcient new investment in the industry.
20. These factors necessarily aVect our willingness to invest, pushing up risk premia, and serving to deter
potential new entrants that could deliver valuable competition to the incumbent players.
21. Therefore from our perspective, we perceive the issue of regulatory risk to be a much more serious
issue for competition, and ultimately consumers, than any market imperfections.
22. We very much hope that this inquiry, and the separate inquiry into retail markets being undertaken
by Ofgem, do not lead to signiﬁcant market reforms. This would damage investor conﬁdence.
280 Energy Market Competition in the EU and G7: Preliminary 2006 Rankings, by Oxera for BERR.
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Price levels
23. It is important to note that increases inwholesale prices seen in recent years do not necessarily indicate
a more attractive market to independent generators such as IPR. Market value to generators is actually
driven by the available spreads between price and fuel costs. Since the introduction of the New Electricity
Trading Arrangements in 2001, IPM has not seen spreads sustained at levels where it would be prepared to
invest in new build projects—high fuel costs have reduced margins available to wholesale generators.
However, the company has pursued such projects in a range of other markets across the world where
margins have been more attractive.
24. We therefore do not believe that any analysis of the wholesale market undertaken by the BERR
committee could conclude that prices are “too high”.
25. In any case, if higher prices were coupled with higher generator margins, this should, from time to
time, be a natural feature of the market cycle, encouraging new investment when it is needed, and allowing
operators to recover (material) capital costs. Any regulatory actions designed to suppress prices at these
critical times are likely to be detrimental to customers in the longer term.
Liquidity
26. Liquidity in gas and carbon emissions is strong and does not warrant examination. However liquidity
in the power market is less consistent. Under the NETA market when it was launched in 2001, traded
volumeswere slow to build, largely due the impact of the collapse of Enron (and subsequently British Energy
amongst others) and the associated credit concerns.
27. In our view, despite improved conﬁdence in trading since then, power market liquidity has not
recovered to the levels that it would be expected to reach. This is in no small part due to the increased levels
of vertical integration in the market—meaning that many trading opportunities are now internalised within
vertically-integrated organisations. The design of the market is based on the external trading of a net
position, quickly incentivising consolidation in order to reduce risk.
28. This does tend to limit strategic bilateral trading opportunities for standalone generators such as
ourselves—increasing reliance on liquidity in uncertain, short term markets.
29. However, we do have conﬁdence in the power market as it stands to deliver suYcient liquidity for our
portfolio. We would become more concerned if market concentration was allowed to increase further,
through potential M&A activity (eg EdF and Iberdrola.) between the large vertically-integrated players.
This could start to seriously marginalise independents to the point where new entry would not occur.
Conclusions
30. IPR believes the GB wholesale energy markets are fundamentally sound, and the sector is one of the
most competitive and liberalised in the world.
31. Regulators need to be wary of the threat of any increased consolidation amongst the main vertically-
integrated players, to this position.
32. Regulatory risk is a growing concern in the UK to potential investors such as International Power.
Regulators and politicians should be aware of the impact of unnecessary market upheaval on competition
and ultimately consumers
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Memorandum submitted by the LGA
TheLGA is proposing a council-led programme to ensure every home in the country is insulated, reducing
energy bills in 10 million homes by on average £200 a year, lifting 500,000 out of fuel poverty and cutting
household carbon emissions by 20%.
The programme would be paid for by energy suppliers paying an annual charge of £500 million a year to
match pound for pound the existing contributions made by householders through the Carbon Emissions
Reduction Target (CERT) scheme. Ofgem would ensure that these extra costs would not be passed on to
consumers.
Problems with the Way Energy Suppliers are Regulated
Our new report “Switch oV, switched on” has identiﬁed three main faults with the current way that energy
suppliers are regulated to cut carbon emissions and tackle fuel poverty through the CERT scheme:
— Energy suppliers spend huge amounts of money trying to market and advertise a scheme nobody
has heard of often failing to reach the householders who need it most.
Ev 408 Business and Enterprise Committee: Evidence
— Companies often abruptly end programmes as soon as targets have been met—regardless of
local need.
— There is little public understanding or scrutiny of the scheme—even though it is householders’
money being spent.
Regulations are trying to force energy suppliers to do something that goes against their core business of
selling energy. Instead we propose that a duty should be placed on them to work with councils who would
be able to lead on oVering households free insulation and are used to dealing with social and environmental
objectives.
How Councils can Help Households Reduce Energy Consumption and Tackle Fuel Poverty
— Councils know their own area and know which households are most likely to suVer from fuel
poverty and would be trusted to help the elderly empty their lofts to be insulated.
— A one oV payment to properly insulate a home is a much more eYcient way to cut fuel poverty
than giving money each year to help pay for extra fuel use.
— Councils can operate on a larger scale oVering free insulation to every household in a
neighbourhood.
— Councils are democratically elected and can be held accountable for promoting energy eYciency
and tackling fuel poverty.
— We estimate that if councils were able to insulate every household they could take half a million
people out of fuel poverty.
How Insulating Every Home and Tackling Fuel Poverty Could be Paid For
Weare calling for energy companies tomatch the average £35 per household, contribution that customers
already pay towards the CERT scheme. This could raise an extra £500 million a year and if they worked
with councils to achieve economies of scale they would be able to ensure every household in the country is
properly insulated over a three year period.
It would have to be Ofgem’s role to ensure that these costs are not just passed on to the consumers. The
CERT scheme will be reformed for another three year period in 2011, but regulations can be put in place
straight away to ensure energy suppliers work with councils to promote carbon reduction and tackle fuel
poverty more eVectively.
I have included with this submission our report “Switch oV, switched on” which sets out in detail our
proposals for how energy bills could be reduced by reforming the CERTs scheme.
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Memorandum submitted by Major Energy Users’ Council (MEUC)
I am writing on behalf of the Major Energy Users’ Council (MEUC), which is an independent body
representing the interests of a large number of industrial, commercial, retail and public sector organisations
for which the use of electricity and gas is a signiﬁcant factor in their operations.
TheMEUCwas formed 20 years ago, shortly after the England andWales gas market was privatised and
opened up to competition, as there was no other body in being at that time to represent industrial
consumers’ interests.
Its principal objectives are to keep members informed of developments, to advise them on energy matters
(purchasing and energy eYciency) and where appropriate oVer a consumer’s view to government and
regulatory bodies.
Before answering the questions you have put directly we should stress that we quite understand that the
rise in prices is a world wide phenomenon and that they are likely to remain high. Our concern is for the
competitiveness of British industry.
We would add that the eVect on industry’s costs became apparent about two years ago with the ﬁrst steep
rises in wholesale prices. There is always a delay before the increases are reﬂected in domestic prices. It is
worth noting that it is quite likely that if wholesale market prices remain at this level for any length of time
domestic consumers may well ﬁnd themselves subjected to further price increases later in the year.
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1. Whether the current market structure encourages eVective competition in the retail markets for gas and
electricity
The current market structure does not encourage price competition in the retail gas and power markets
as energy prices are in the main derived from the traded screens which are common to all suppliers. There
are however a choice of contract structures which can be used to diVerentiate between one supplier and
another. Some of the more ﬂexible and innovative products are only available to very large users. By way
of example risky “day ahead” prices may be an option for certain energy intensive users to consider.
2. Whether there is eVective competition in the wholesale markets for gas and electricity
There are a suYcient number of generating companies in themarket place to provide eVective competition
if they so choose to do so. However, many of them also have downstream operations in the supply of
electricity to customers, ie are vertically integrated. This provides a supply demand balance position which
reduces their risk as the amount traded is limited to imbalances only. The screen based tradedmarket prices
therefore become the mechanism for pricing contracts and not the operational costs of generation.
While there is no shortage of physical gas itself, gas market liquidity is adversely aVected by producers
who are adopting a virtually identical supplymodel that involves selling less and less gas on the open forward
market in favour of long-term contracts, which are not traded in this open market. Consequently, only
short-dated and residual contract gas supplies are available for sale in the wholesale market and this
exacerbates price transparency and volatility problems.. Despite having access to a variety of gas sources,
long term contracts, stored gas and the open forward market, suppliers’ oVers are linked solely to the last
source, which of course is the smallest traded volume and highest price. For annual or longer gas contracts
all suppliers use an identical pricing model, the average forward price plus transportation plus the supplier’s
admin margin. Therefore the buyer ﬁnds that there is very little diVerence in the oVers they receive and is
leading them to question the value of changing supplier and hence competition. The alternative available
to the buyer is to increase the risk and buy on index-linked contracts, linked to the month or day-ahead
prices on the forward market.
Constrained liquidity in the long-dated market also serves as a barrier to entry for new entrants, energy
merchants and independent suppliers.
3. The implications of growing consolidation in the energy market
The consolidation of the energy sector both through mergers, acquisitions and vertical and horizontal
integration limits choice to the customers. For industrial and commercial customers that choice now is
limited to six for electricity and a few more for gas. Even then some suppliers refuse to tender on the basis
of credit risk, unattractive load shape or don’t like the unpredictable nature of industrial loads, etc. There
appears to be an inherent reluctance from some supplies that have upstream and downstream in balance to
take on additional risk. In these cases a quotation, even if one is submitted, can be very unattractive.
You will be aware that EDF Energy has recently indicated that it would like to purchase Iberdrola, the
Spanish owner of Scottish Power. Should this takeover be conﬁrmed the six would become ﬁve.
Small suppliers have almost disappeared from the market. The complex supply and distribution code
structures are clearly a barrier to new entrants, who are disadvantaged anyway by the wholesale price
structure and the power of the vertically integrated six.
4. The relationship between the wholesale and retail markets for electricity and gas
There is a very close relationship between the wholesale and retail markets in both gas and power
especially for Industrial and Commercial customers. As already mentioned above customer contract prices
are based on the traded market screens even though only a small amount of volume is actively traded there.
The thin liquidity of the traded markets can be an encouragement for the activity of ﬁnancial institutions
(banks and traded funds) and produce increased volatility but they have no direct role in the supply of gas
or electricity. The forward price of power and gas can be driven upwards by high volume purchases by these
organisations. Everyone seems to be aware that it goes on but there are no market rules which prevent or
limit this speculative activity. This is particularly diYcult for the smaller manufacturing companies to
manage and undoubtedly adds to their vulnerability.
5. The Interaction between the UK and European Energy Markets
With an interconnected European energy network one would have expected price convergence between
member states. A comparison between gas and electricity prices across Europe would seem to demonstrate
the opposite. One may question why the Interconnector to Zeebrugge, which has a capacity of 76 mcm/day,
the average daily ﬂow for the last three months has been 9mcm, ie 1/8th of the capacity. The attached graphs
show UK forward 2008 and 2009 electricity prices in comparison to those on the continent.
Ev 410 Business and Enterprise Committee: Evidence
For several years the UK Government has been striving for a liberalised market throughout Europe. As
is well known France, Germany and other countries have remained implacably opposed to any moves to
open their markets to real competition. The eVectiveness of several countries Regulators’ is questionable.
The Government of France, indeed, has gone in the opposite direction by encouraging the merger of Suez
and Gaz de France and by doing so has made it clear that its policy is to protect what it describes as its
strategic assets.
The British Government’s desire for competitive markets throughout Europe is laudable but the lack of
progress should be acknowledged and it should take a more pragmatic approach to protect its own citizens.
6. The eVectiveness of regulatory oversight of the energy market
We acknowledge the eVectiveness of Ofgem in taking a proactive overseeing role in many instances and
its work in drivingmatters forward in Europe. However we believe that there are systematic weaknesses that
become apparent during periods of high prices which it is failing to acknowledge or address. We note that
immediately following a meeting with the Chancellor of the Exchequer on 16 January, Ofgem issued a press
release stating that the “Market is Sound”. However Ofgem announced on 21 February that there would
be an Energy Supply Markets Probe. Its call for evidence was announced on 27 March. Our concern is that
Ofgem’s view of a competitive market fails to take account of consumers’ perception of fundamental ﬂaws
and seems limited to the calculation of the number of domestic customers that switch supplier in any one
year.
In conclusion our major concern with the current UK energy supply is the lack of liquidity in what is
supposed to be a competitive market and the dominance by a small number of vertically integrated
generation and gas supply companies. It is not helped by restricted access to supplies from Europe. To a
certain extent the European companies are the same ones that dominate in the UK.
We cannot see an easy solution to resolving the issues detailed above other than by a fundamental review.
The last review on power was held in 1999 and resulted in the New Electricity Trading Arrangements
(NETA). At least in the old days of the electricity pool, the operational costs of generation played a more
important role in marginal pricing than it does today and now that so much electricity generation is
dependent upon gas supplies and an increasing reliance upon imported gas a fundamental review of both
gas and electricity markets would be a necessary conclusion to draw.
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Memorandum submitted by Morgan Stanley & Co.
Morgan Stanley & Co. International plc welcomes the opportunity to comment on behalf of itself and its
aYliateMorgan Stanley Capital Group Inc., with regard to the Business Enterprise andRegulatory Reform
(BERR) Investigation into Energy Prices, Fuel Poverty and the Structure of the Market, as well as Security
of Supply. Morgan Stanley’s commodity business is an active participant in the UK’s electricity market and
in other commodity markets worldwide. As a ﬁnancial intermediator we facilitate access to the market for
new entrants as well as providing risk management services to more established participants. This response
reﬂects our activity in this capacity and the knowledge of the market gained. The focus of our comments
relates to Energy Prices and the Structure of the Market. We should be grateful if you would treat this as a
non-public, conﬁdential response.
The best protection against excessive costs to consumers is well-designed, transparent, liquid markets at
both a wholesale and retail level. Markets allow entities with a competitive advantage to enter and compete
in speciﬁc market segments without needing to be vertically integrated. Other specialist entities
competitively provide other components or attributes that form the ﬁnal bundled product to consumers.
Thus consumers get a wide range of choice in both price and service. Reducing barriers to entry should thus
be a core objective for regulators. Low barriers to entry are key attributes of an eYcient market. An eYcient
market should have a diversity of participants and should not result in vertical integration.
The most signiﬁcant barrier to entry for new participants in the retail market is the cash-out mechanism,
which is currently being reviewed by Ofgem. Retail power suppliers and generators will always have some
level of imbalance which they cannot avoid because load cannot be predicted with complete certainty.
Imbalance volumes will be a smaller percentage of the total power supplied for a larger portfolio, due its
greater forecastability. Thus smaller players are disadvantaged by the current arrangements.
There are two important issues in the cash-out mechanism. Firstly, the assignment of costs to participants
does not follow the principle of cost assignment to cost causation. Cash-out charges should relate to the cost
of energy imbalance, but they currently also include a large proportion of system balancing costs that should
fall under BSUoS.
The second, more signiﬁcant issue is the highly punitive dual pricing structure. This strongly beneﬁts
larger, vertically integrated participants who have at least some ability to reduce imbalance charges for their
combined portfolio via adjustments to the output from their generation assets. A single cash-out price, or
a signiﬁcantly less punitive spread between SBP and SSP for the ﬁrst X MW of imbalance would reduce the
imbalance cost burden on small suppliers and generators, thereby removing this barrier for new entrants.
The overview above captures Morgan Stanley’s views on the competitiveness of the retail and wholesale
markets at this time. Listed below are answers to selected speciﬁc questions asked by BERR:
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1. Whether the current market structure encourages eVective competition in the retail markets for gas and
electricity.
The core of the market structure is sound. However, early competitive pressures have naturally driven the
market towards consolidation. After achieving this type of equilibrium state, it is not unnatural for
companies to migrate towards more defensive positions whereby defending existing market share of supply
points is more important than vigorous additional competition. The best market design to protect against
such a state is to ensure that there are no institutionally supported barriers to entry or assessments of costs
that are not related to cause. This maximizes opportunities for innovative, specialised market entrants to
compete for any proﬁt making opportunities that may exist. Morgan Stanley have outlined one barrier to
entry that we believe needs addressing. There may be others.
2. Whether there is eVective competition in the wholesale markets for gas and electricity.
There are a number of wholesale competitors. Some however are vertically integrated which harms
wholesale competition. The harm comes primarily from the reality or perception of unfair advantage. We
note that regulators in some jurisdictions forced divestiture and vertical disaggregation. Morgan Stanley
does not believe this is necessary. A market design with low barriers to entry and a level playing ﬁeld tends
to drive vertical disaggregation. A primary barrier to wholesale market eYciency is the balancing market.
3. The implications of growing consolidation in the energy market.
Morgan Stanley observes that highly eYcient and competitive markets can be dominated by a few large
participants. Horizontal consolidation would be an expected outcome in such a market. However,
signiﬁcant vertical integration would not be an expected outcome. It would instead be a consequence of a
market that is not fully competitive. Thus barriers to entry must be kept low so that small innovators can
continue to bring improvements.
4. The relationship between the wholesale and retail markets for electricity and gas.
Awholesale market should service the interests of retailers. This is occurring and exemplary evidence can
be seen. An example is Morgan Stanley’s product oVerings to small retailers. However as already noted, we
and our clients are disadvantaged by the wholesale balancing market.
5. The interaction between the UK and European energy markets.
Webelieve there should be tight coupling betweenmarkets. If cross border capacity is explicitly auctioned,
holders of capacity whether long term or short term, should be able to rely on the transmission system
operator (TSO) to optimize ﬂows on their capacity on their behalf, with capacity holders keeping the
resulting congestion revenues. Only the TSO has the real-time information to ensure that all ﬂows are easing
and not increasing congestion.
6. The eVectiveness of regulatory oversight of the energy market.
7. Progress in reducing fuel poverty and the appropriate policy instruments for doing so.
Morgan Stanley views reduction of fuel poverty as a societal goal, not directly related to energy markets.
As such, remedies should be provided and funded by society generally, not via mandates or restrictions on
energy markets. However, if energy markets are vigorously competitive, prices will be fully cost-reﬂective.
The resulting level of fuel poverty will be minimised relative to levels that may otherwise be experienced if
the market is not fully competitive. Therefore, actions taken to ensure vigorously competitive energy
markets have the additional beneﬁt of reducing fuel poverty.
1 April 2008
Memorandum submitted by National Energy Action (NEA)
1. Introduction
1.1 NEA is a national charity working to eliminate fuel poverty through a combination of policy
development and practical programmes. NEA’s primary objective is to address fuel poverty through
measures to improve heating and insulation standards in dwellings occupied by vulnerable households.
Energy eYciency is the most rational and sustainable approach to delivering long-term aVordable warmth
solutions to disadvantaged households.
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1.2 However poor energy eYciency is only one of three components that predispose to fuel poverty, the
others being:
— low household income; and
— unaVordably high domestic energy prices.
1.3 Consequently, NEA welcomes the BERR Select Committee Inquiry into the working of the energy
market and the opportunity to submit evidence and comment on how the market is failing vulnerable
consumers. Since theCommittee’s remit clearly does not extend to income-relatedmattersNEA’s comments
will centre on energy prices within the competitive market.
1.4 Given NEA’s key areas of concern, comment will be limited to those aspects of the Committee’s
inquiry related to market structures and fuel poverty.
2. Whether the Current Market Structure Encourages Effective Competition in the Retail
Markets for Gas and Electricity
2.1 There is one clear ﬂaw in the operation of domestic gas and electricity markets and this relates to the
anomalous relationship between the incumbent281 supplier and in-area customers. Despite the fact that
competition within the domestic sector has existed since the late 1990s, almost half of all customers have
never switched supplier. This, in itself, would not pose a problem were it not for the tariV structures devised
by energy suppliers which exploit the failure to switch from the incumbent.282 In eVect the incumbent
supplier treats “legacy” customers as a cash cow. These customers are charged signiﬁcantlymore thanwould
be the case in a properly functioning market. Whilst these diVerential charges may have galvanised and to
some extent still sustain the competitive market it is clearly at the expense of almost half of all consumers
many of whom are vulnerable and disadvantaged. The perverse eVect of this arrangement is that a perfect
manifestation of market forces would require all customers to have switched away from their original
supplier.
2.2 However the perfect market has refused to develop. Almost 50% of domestic energy consumers
remain with their original supplier despite clear economic disadvantage—a circumstance which incumbent
suppliers are happy to exploit. Instead of their oVering competitive terms to their in-area customers in order
to retain their business they have relied on a combination of lack of knowledge, anxiety about the process
and inertia to continue a form of exploitation. In other cases, suppliers have been able to prevent indebted
customers from switching supplier thereby locking in to a high cost arrangement those who clearly cannot
aVord existing charges. Paradoxically, whereas most commercial arrangements provide a positive return for
loyalty the energy industry imposes a ﬁnancial disadvantage on those who do not switch. Ofgem is
unacceptably sanguine at this clear distortion of the market.
3. Switching and Market Failure
3.1 Ofgem maintains that supplier switching continues to develop but there are signs that we are
approaching a point where the potential for switching may have reached saturation point, at which time it
seems likely that a permanent minority of non-switchers will remain and that these will predominantly
comprise households who are not conﬁdent consumers andwho face other economic or social disadvantage.
4. Characteristics of Non-Switchers
4.1 The table below illustrates the disparity in switching rates by socio-economic characteristics. It is clear
that certain categories of disadvantaged consumers are more likely to compound this disadvantage by
remaining with their original supplier.
CUSTOMER SWITCHING RATES TO DECEMBER 2005
Low State
Average Over 65 Prepayment income Rural Disabled pension
Gas 47% 37% 37% 39% 46% 50% 37%
Electricity 48% 44% 43% 43% 46% 54% 41%
Source: Social Action Plan, Ofgem, 2006
4.2 More recent data conﬁrm the reluctance or inability of certain customers to switch. Whilst use of
prepayment meters is not a precise proxy for disadvantage it is associated with diYculty in managing energy
costs.283 It should be noted that the Government has now undertaken to address the existing ﬁscal
disadvantage faced by prepayment meter users284 but has done little to remedy their disporportionate
exclusion from the market.
281 The incumbent supplier is BritishGas or the original regional Public Electricity Suppliers which have now reduced in number
from fourteen companies to ﬁve companies.
282 See for instance: Consumer Choice and Industrial Policy: A Study of UK Energy Markets, Centre for the Study of Energy
Markets, Working Paper 112, 2003.
283 Ofgem reports that in 2006, 66% of prepayment meters were installed in cases of debt.
284 Budget Statement 2008.
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INCUMBENT MARKET SHARE BY PAYMENT METHOD 2006
Gas Electricity
Direct debit 41% 42%
Standard credit 56% 55%
Prepayment 63% 53%
Source: Domestic Retail Market Report, Ofgem, 2007
5. Progress in Reducing Fuel Poverty and the Appropriate Policy Instruments for Doing So
5.1 As discussed earlier, NEA views heating and insulation improvements as the only permanent and
sustainable approach to fuel poverty whilst recognising the role of income maximisation and action to
control energy prices as other key elements. Defra has primary responsibility for energy eYciency, and
income support policy clearly rests with the Department for Work and Pensions but there are a number of
areas where the Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform has both the powers and
responsibility to intervene.
5.2 The 2003 Energy White Paper285 published by BERR’s predecessor, the Department for Trade and
Industry, positioned the need to: “ensure that every home is adequately and aVordably heated” as one of
the four key goals of energy policy.
5.3 The subsequent 2007 White Paper286 revealed just how far the Government was from achieving this
objective. The graph also illustrates the gulf between the Government’s commitments to eradicate fuel
poverty for vulnerable households by 2010 and for all households by 2016 and the likelihood of these
objectives being realised.
Figure 2.1.1
HISTORIC AND PROJECTED NUMBERS OF HOUSEHOLDS IN FUEL POVERTY IN
ENGLAND, 1996–2016
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•    Positions in 2005 and 2006 are based on the modelling of the impact of income, energy prices movements
     and energy efficiency measures on the number of vulnerable households in fuel poverty.
•    Positions from 2007 to 2016 are based on modelling and show central, low and high price scenarios.
    These are based on the fossil-fuel price assumptions published at the same time as the White Paper.
285 Our energy future—creating a low carbon economy, DTI, 2003.
286 Meeting the Energy Challenge, DTI, 2007.
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6. The Current Incidence of Fuel Poverty
6.1 NEA has calculated the actual eVect of energy price movements since 2004 to spring 2008. ByMarch
2008 all six major energy suppliers had announced signiﬁcant increases in both gas and electricity prices.
The impact is illustrated in the graph below and indicates that the prevailing situation is worse than in even
the high price scenario posited in the Energy White Paper.
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7. Action on Energy Prices
7.1 The 2008 Budget Statement promised somemeasures to mitigate the impact of unmanageable energy
prices on disadvantaged households and this is welcome. The Chancellor’s key proposals centred on the
need to address the existing pricing diVerentials associated with prepayment meters and the need for energy
suppliers to provide additional assistance to certain categories of consumer through more eVective and
better resourced social tariVs.
7.2 This in itself raises some issues around the extent to which Government social policy objectives can
be devolved to commercial organisations. The Government simultaneously celebrates market solutions to
a range of social problems whilst recognising that social welfare considerations are not uppermost in the
priorities of companies whose primary loyalty is to their shareholders.
7.3 NEA concludes that Government cannot delegate responsibility for delivering fuel poverty solutions
to any other agency least of all energy suppliers. Nor can it rely completely on Ofgem, a regulatory body
which sees its main role as the promotion of competitive markets, even where these markets have self-
evidently failed a considerable number of vulnerable and marginalised customers.
7.4 The Government does have powers to act on other areas of fuel poverty policy but demonstrates a
reluctance to support households in, for example, extension of Winter Fuel Payments to those non-
pensioner households in the greatest need. It should also be noted that the Government has cut funding for
its main fuel poverty programme,Warm Front, leading inevitably to tens of thousands of households being
denied heating and insulation improvements.
8. Prepayment Meters
8.1 After many years of ignoring the strong case for intervention to address the growing disparity
between chargesmade tomore aZuent direct debit customers and thosemade to disadvantaged prepayment
meter users, theGovernment has resolved to act. The case for action is compelling. The diVerentials between
prepayment and other payment methods have increased to an unacceptable level. Whereas suppliers, with
the endorsement of Ofgem, have cited cost-reﬂective pricing as the justiﬁcation for any diVerential it is clear
that additional costs associated with maintaining the prepayment infrastructure are not responsible for
growing disparities in charging practice.
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ADDITIONAL CHARGES TO PREPAYMENT USERS COMPARED TO
ONLINE DIRECT DEBIT
Total
Total additional
Additional additional cost to service Excess
cost to service Number of cost incurred prepayment charges levied
individual prepayment by prepayment customer by energy
Average prepayment customers customers base suppliers
diVerential customer (millions) (£ millions) (£ millions) (£ millions)
Gas £146 £52 2.3 million £340 £120 £220
Electricity £85 £35 3.6 million £304 £123 £181
Total £644 £243 £401
Source: energywatch, March 2008
8.2 The diVerential between online direct debit and prepayment may to some extent reﬂect the beneﬁts
to the supplier of an administratively eYcient system but the rationale for the gulf between prepayment and
other payment methods is also signiﬁcant with prepayment customers paying on average 13%more than for
conventional direct debit arrangements and as much as £270 more than the lowest standard credit charges.
9. Addressing the Prepayment Surcharge
9.1 NEA’s main concern relating to prepayment meter surcharges reﬂects the view that many
disadvantaged households are compelled to use this payment method. However it is also recognised that the
majority of fuel-poor households do not pay by thismethod and that these householdswould face additional
costs were charges to be equalised. Ofgem calculates that equalisation of prepayment tariVs with direct debit
or standard credit would cost the average household £14 or £6 per year respectively.
9.2 Clearly, NEA does not wish to see any fuel-poor household further disadvantaged; nor does the
charity wish to see perpetuation of unjust and inequitable charges to any prepayment customers.
Consequently, NEA proposes that prepayment charges be capped at the level charged to standard credit
customers; this degree of cross-subsidy would constitute a reasonable compromise. NEA further proposes
that Ofgem carries out research to verify not only the additional cost of supply but also the beneﬁts accruing
to suppliers as a result of prepayment:
— Receipt of payment in advance for energy costs rather than in arrears.
— Minimal meter reading and billing procedures.
— No expensive debt recovery procedures associated with this payment method.
10. Social Tariffs
10.1 In fact, NEA sees social tariVs as making a much greater contribution to fuel poverty alleviation
than any reduction in the prepayment surcharge. Awell targeted social tariV can ensure that those in genuine
need are the beneﬁciaries. The key issue is the degree of discretion allowed to suppliers in designing such a
tariV against a strongly prescriptive mandate fromGovernment setting out eligibility criteria and the overall
and individual beneﬁt that must result from such a tariV. NEA has set out its view of the essential criteria
for a social tariV (See Appendix).
10.2 The Gas Act 1986 and the Electricity Act 1999 provide the Secretary of State with powers to
intervene in the market where—[he] considers that members of any group (a “disadvantaged group”) of
customers of authorised suppliers are treated less favourably than other customers of theirs as respects
charges for electricity [or gas], he may make an order containing a scheme for the adjustment of charges for
electricity [or gas] with a view to eliminating or reducing the less favourable treatment.
10.3 NEA understands that these provisions could be used to minimise cases of disadvantage such as the
prepayment surcharge. However it is further understood that the legislation cannot be used to require
preferential treatment of certain categories of consumer ie whilst the legislation can be used to reduce or
eliminate disadvantage it does not authorise the Secretary of State to require action to provide preferential
treatment. Consequently, an alternative method is required to devise a system of discounted or subsidised
charges that can be made available to the most disadvantaged energy consumers.
10.4 TheChancellor alluded to this issue in his Budget Statement: “TheGovernment believes further action
is now needed to help vulnerable groups deal with rising energy prices. The Government welcomes the steps the
energy companies have already taken to help vulnerable households cope with higher prices. There is common
agreement on the need to do more. Energy companies currently spendaround £50million a year on social tariVs;
the Government would like to see that ﬁgure rising over the period ahead to at least £150 million a year. Acting
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with the companies andOfgem, theGovernment will draw up a plan for voluntary and statutory action to achieve
that. To underpin this as necessary, the Government will legislate to require companies to make a fair
contribution”.
10.5 The Government’s intimation of willingness to legislate makes it all the more strange that the
opportunity to do this in the current Energy Bill was rejected. However the Government is presumably
conﬁdent that an equivalent legislative mechanism exists and is prepared to use it. NEA believes that an
eVective social tariV is essential to protect the well-being of millions of vulnerable households and welcomes
the Government’s endorsement of this view provided that the end result is signiﬁcant, consistent and
eVective.
APPENDIX
SOCIAL TARIFFS
A1. Introduction
A1.1 There is no consensus as to what constitutes a social tariV, but for the purposes of this paper it is
taken to mean any special payment arrangement, over and above those speciﬁed by suppliers’ Licence
Conditions, devised with a view to beneﬁting disadvantaged energy consumers. The Government’s
commitment to eradicate fuel poverty by 2016 has focused the minds of suppliers, and the energy regulator
Ofgem, on how innovative tariVs can contribute to this wider policy objective. Consequently there have been
a number of tariV initiatives developed by companies to address speciﬁc elements of fuel poverty. Further
information on company initiatives can be found on the Social Action Plan section of the Ofgem website.
A1.2 This paper sets out NEA’s view of the essential elements of a social tariV for domestic energy
consumers.
A2. Eligibility Criteria
A2.1 As indicated above, beneﬁciaries of a social tariV should be those most disadvantaged ﬁnancially
and who can also be categorised as vulnerable. Whilst individual energy suppliers are free to develop their
own criteria, and already do so in some of their Corporate Social Responsibility oVerings, NEA oVers as a
potential example those households who qualify for the Department forWork and Pensions’ ColdWeather
Payment scheme.287 Eligible households comprise:
— A household in receipt of Pension Credit.
— A household in receipt of Income Support or Income-based Jobseeker’s Allowance and where the
beneﬁt includes one of the following:
— Disability Premium;
— Severe Disability Premium;
— Disabled Child Premium; or
— Higher Pensioner Premium.
— A household in receipt of Income Support or Income-based Jobseeker’s Allowance and with
responsibility for a child under ﬁve years old.
— A household in receipt of Child Tax Credit which includes a disability or severe disability element.
A2.2 All of these households are on aminimal income and share a further degree of vulnerability through
age (elderly or very young) or disability.
A3. The Potential Customer Base
A3.1 Some 2.8 million households are currently in receipt of some form of Pension Credit and a further
1.5 million non-pensioner households qualify for the Cold Weather Payment. Consequently, around 18%
of all households in Great Britain would be eligible for a specially developed social tariV. It should be noted
that the Department for Work and Pensions can readily identify all of the households who would qualify
for this form of social tariV.
287 ColdWeather Payments are made automatically to eligible households where a period of exceptionally low temperatures has
occurred or been forecast to occur, households in receipt of Pension Credit and to households in receipt of Income Support
or Income-based Jobseeker’s Allowance provided the beneﬁt includes a premium related to disability or the family includes
a child aged under ﬁve. Payment is triggered by a 7-day period of exceptionally low temperatures.
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A4. The Structure of the Tariff
A4.1 Since the purpose of the tariVwould be to protect low-income households and to provide themwith
aVordable warmth, one option would be to adopt the fuel poverty formula (a maximum spend of 10% of
household income on fuel costs) in determining how much in cash terms a household could aVord to spend
in meeting energy bills. The theoretical household income would be assumed to be the lowest amount that
that household type could receive in Pension Credit, Income Support or Income-based Jobseeker’s
Allowance and cap energy costs at 10% of this ﬁgure. The virtue of this approach is that, by deﬁnition, it
removes a household from fuel poverty; the negative aspect is that it completely separates energy
consumption from cost and would be extremely unlikely to be well received by energy suppliers. For this
reason it is not proposed that a ﬁxed charge scheme of this type be adopted.
A5. Essential Criteria for a Social Tariff
A5.1 The fundamental principle of a social tariV is that it should oVer terms and conditions equivalent
to, or better than, the best existing oVer available from an energy supplier in terms of total charges for the
number of units of energy consumed. It is also essential that there be consistent charging by suppliers
regardless of the payment method used or the geographical location of the customer.
A6. Energy Efficiency
A6.1 All households qualifying for the social tariV should be oVered a comprehensive energy audit, a full
package of energy eYciency measures and energy advice. Practical measures would be funded through a
combination of Warm Front and Carbon Emissions Reduction Target Priority Group budgets288 and
should seek to improve the energy eYciency standard of the property to a minimum of SAP 65.Eligible
households should also be oVered advice on beneﬁt entitlement and support and guidance in making any
subsequent claim.
A6.2 SinceWarm Front is speciﬁc to private sector housing and the Carbon Emissions Reduction Target
Commitment has no formal fuel poverty objective there is a strong case for an improved hybrid programme
that merges the aVordable warmth objectives of Warm Front and the considerable funding resources
available to the Carbon Emissions Reduction Target in a single, national programme to deliver optimal
beneﬁts to the maximum number of households.
A7. Markets and Social Tariffs
A7.1 Whilst NEA has reservations about the role of commercial organisations in delivering social
objectives that are properly the responsibility of Government, it seems inevitable that the market will be
asked to deliver a solution in respect of social tariVs. NEA considers this to be somewhat dogmatic and
confusing since the market is clearly subject to a degree of external control through direct regulatory
intervention and rather less direct involvement through Government. Vulnerable low-income households
are least likely to participate in the competitive market and NEA would see considerable merit, at least at
the present time, in eVectively removing certain categories of household from the vagaries of competitive
markets. However the degree of prescription required for a universal social tariV is not an option at this time
and, in this instance, a modiﬁed market is certainly preferable to a free market.
A8. The Government Role
A8.1 Seemingly the Government sees a comparatively biddable market (a clear oxymoron) as a means
to promote its own fuel poverty objectives whilst stopping short of formal intervention throughmechanisms
such as the beneﬁts system. It is instructive to note the example of the Republic of Ireland and that country’s
operation of a Household Beneﬁts Package which last year increased the number of free gas and electricity
units provided to low-income elderly households, all persons aged over 70, carers and peoplewith disabilities
to 2,400 kWh and 2,226 kWh respectively.
A8.2 NEA’s argument that fuel poverty is too important to be left to commercial enterprises received
some support with publication of The Stern Review: The Economics of Climate Change. The Stern Review
considers brieﬂy the implications of domestic energy costs in the context of carbon abatement and appears
to conclude that subsidies are not the way forward: “But it is inappropriate to deal with poverty by distorting
the price of energy. Addressing income distribution issues directly is more eVective. There are a number of
ways to achieve this. One is by indexing social transfers to a price index, taking account of diVerent
consumption patterns of poorer groups in the relevant price index for those groups.Othermore directmeans
includemaking special transfers to those with special energy needs such as the elderly, and the use of ‘lifeline’
288 The Warm Front budget for 2008–11 is £800 million whilst funding for the CERT Priority Group in this period is some
£1.5 billion.
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tariVs, whereby people using a minimal amount of power pay a sharply reduced rate for a ﬁxed number of
units”. NEA would understand this as an endorsement of our view that whether social or environmental
objectives are the issue Government should develop and implement the policy.
A9. Other Issues
A9.1 A number of additional issues will have to be addressed including how continued eligibility for a
social tariVwill be monitored and the role of theDepartment forWork and Pensions in promoting the tariV.
However these and other practical details will have to be resolved in discussions involving the Government,
the energy supply companies, Ofgem and energywatch and relevant voluntary sector organisations. Ofgem
should urgently convene a meeting of high level representatives from these agencies to reﬁne and develop
the concept of a universal social tariV.
NEA Recommendations
The Committee should consider the extent to which the competitive market has failed to engage with a
signiﬁcant percentage of disadvantaged energy consumers and the reasons for this lack of engagement.
The Committee should investigate the continuing disadvantage faced by consumers who, for whatever
reason, have not switched from the incumbent supplier and Ofgem’s passive response to this demonstration
of market failure.
The Government is minded to act to reduce diVerentials between prepayment and other payment
methods; the Committee should form an opinion on the appropriate level of intervention needed to
eliminate or minimise disadvantage.
Most suppliers provide a “social tariV” of some kind to a predetermined segment of their customer base;
the Committee should provide some degree of guidance to Government, Ofgem and suppliers on what form
and level of support could be considered proportional.
The Committee should take a view on whether a social tariV should be highly prescriptive, standardised
and mandatory on all suppliers or whether decisions on this issue can be left to the discretion of energy
suppliers.
The Committee may wish to consider the principle of Government delegation of responsibility for social
policy objectives to commercial entities. The Government aVects not to understand that the primary,
possibly exclusive, purpose of private enterprise is to generate proﬁt and not to act as a philanthropic agency.
The Committee may wish to question BERR ministers and oYcials on the drastic reversal of progress
towards 2010 and 2016 fuel poverty targets and the inadequate and unconvincing response of Government
to date.
The Committee should consider whetherUadditional guidance should be given to Ofgem by
GovernmentUor new duties should be placed on the regulator to protect vulnerable consumers.
28 March 2008
Memorandum submitted by National Grid
Introduction
1. National Grid plc owns and operates the high voltage electricity transmission system in England and
Wales, and as Great Britain System Operator (GBSO), we operate the Scottish high voltage transmission
system. National Grid also owns and operates the gas transmission system throughout Great Britain and
through our low pressure gas distribution business; we distribute gas in the heart of England, to
approximately 11 million oYces, schools and homes. In addition National Grid owns and operates
signiﬁcant electricity and gas assets in the US, operating in the states of New England and the state of
New York.
2. In the UK, our primary duties under the Electricity andGas Acts are to develop andmaintain eYcient
networks and also facilitate competition in the generation and supply of electricity and the supply of gas.
Our activities include the residual balancing in close to real time of the electricity and gas markets.
3. Through our subsidiaries, National Grid also owns and maintains around 20 million domestic and
commercial meters, the electricity Interconnector between England and France, and a Liquid Natural Gas
importation terminal at the Isle of Grain.
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4. National Grid is pleased to have the opportunity to contribute to this inquiry. Our submission will
focus on:
— the regulatory checks and balances in place around the scale of transportation charges;
— how National Grid transportation charges feed through into end users energy bills;
— demonstrating the eYciency savings achieved through the cost saving measures;
— our role in promoting a competitive market environment through eVective and timely provision
of information; and
— the role of National Grid’s AVordable Warmth Programme in tackling fuel poverty.
How National Grid Determines its Charges
5. National Grid’s charges that feed through to end users’ bills are designed to be non-discriminatory and
cost reﬂective, and are set by applying methodologies regulated by Ofgem. The total revenue National Grid
collects through its charges is restricted by the allowed revenue and tariV caps set by Ofgem as part of ﬁve-
year price controls. The transmission businesses in gas and electricity along with gas distribution and
regulated metering business are all subject to separate price control reviews. The consultation period for
changing the price control typically lasts for two years. The process involves not only just licence holders,
but also consumer interest groups, market participants, major energy consumers and any other interested
parties.
6. In electricity transmission, the high level regulatory framework is set out in our transmission licence.
This includes prices controls and incentives schemes for our Transmission Owner and Systems Operator
functions. Revenues remunerating transmission assets are regulated through a price control running until
31March 2012. The transmission licence also details National Grid’s annual system operation incentives to
eYciently balance the system in real time. Annual charges for market participants are determined by
applying a Charging Methodology.289 This is published, together with the resulting charges, in a number of
Charging Statements. Changes to the Charging Methodology can be made following consultation with
market participants and must improve cost reﬂectivity and promote competition. Any changes are subject
to an Ofgem veto, and Ofgem can conduct a Regulatory Impact Assessment, if necessary, before making
any decision.
7. In gas transmission, National Grid’s regulatory framework is set out in our gas transporter licence.
National Grid is subject to a ﬁve year Transmission Owner (TO) price control for gas transmission activities
that currently runs to 31 March 2012. The TO price control sets a maximum allowed revenue which covers
assets and related expenditure. We are also subject to a System Operator (SO) price control which covers
operating costs and mechanisms to fund the additional provision of transportation capacity for new
connections to the system. In addition the SO activity is subject to a number of ﬁnancial incentive schemes of
varying durations aimed at driving eYciencies in the overall costs of systemoperation andmarket operation.
8. Similar price controls exist for the four gas distribution networks that National Grid owns. The level
of distribution charges is regulated by Ofgem in respect of each network. The current price control for the
distribution activities run to 31March 2013.Alongwith the other gas distribution network owners,National
Grid establishes the charging methodology that determines the structure of the distribution charges.
9. Any potential change to the gas transmission and distribution charging methodology has to be
consulted on with the gas shippers through the Joint OYce of Gas Transporters.290 All the staV for this oYce
are seconded from the diVerent gas transporters involved. The role of this oYce is to provide an even handed
service to all parties to the Network Code and the wider gas industry by publicly providing information and
acting as a forum for discussing modiﬁcations of the commercial regimes. A report on the consultation
highlighting representations made and any consequential change proposals has to be provided to Ofgem
which has the power to veto any proposed change.
National Grid Charges as Proportion of Consumers’ End Bills
10. National Grid’s transmission and distribution charges are a small component of the end users bills
and we have made considerable steps in reducing the costs these charges seek to recover.
11. The contribution of gas distribution charges fromNational Grid and the four distribution companies
to an average consumer gas bill of approximately £549 pa make up around £104 (19%). Gas transmission
charges levied by National Grid account for £11 (2%) of that bill. The electricity transmission charges which
recover the costs of the Scottish transmission companies as well as National Grid Electricity Transmission
account for about £20 (5%) of an average electricity bill costing approximately £393 pa. The charts below
illustrate these charges as an approximate proportion of current end users gas and electricity bills.291
289 National Grid, Electricity Charging. http://www.nationalgrid.com/uk/Electricity/Charges/
290 Joint OYce of Gas Transporters Home Page. http://www.gasgovernance.com
291 The analysis of the charges making the consumer bills is based on information from a number of sources: Energy Watch,
Ofgem, BERR and other gas and electricity companies.
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Effective Operation of Our Businesses
12. National Grid is dedicated to delivering the highest level of safety, reliability and eYciency while
controlling the cost of our operations borne by the customers.
13. National Grid has been subject to the RPI-X regulation for around 20 years. TheOfgem price control
reviews use this method to incentivise National Grid to achieve eYciency savings that are in turn passed on
to end users through lower bills. National Grid has also undertaken a programme of cost reduction
measures to deliver best value to gas and electricity consumers, as well as to shareholders. The chart below
gives an example of how we have performed in this area. In electricity transmission, National Grid has
delivered estimated cost reductions of around £350 million in the period between 1991 and 2006.
COST REDUCTIONS IN ELECTRICITY TRANSMISSION
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14. Between 1996 and 2006, the contribution of National Grid’s gas distribution charges on an average
consumer gas bill fell by approximately 23% in real terms. There was an increase between October 2006 and
2007 which can be attributed to the outcome of the one year distribution price control review for 2007/8.
The review gave an 11% increase in allowed revenue and partly reﬂected the company’s existing and planned
investment in replacing iron mains pipes. The replacement projects aim to minimise leakage and to allow
the company to maintain our excellent safety record and ensure security of supply over the long term.
Average Gas Distribution Transportation Charges
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Fostering a Competitive Market Environment through Information Provision
15. National Grid endeavours to promote a competitive market environment by providing useful,
relevant and timely information to themarket in order to assist operational and commercial decisionmaking
by participants such as generators, suppliers and energy traders.
16. Under our licences, National Grid is obliged to provide long term outlook of seven and 10 years for
electricity and gas respectively.292, 293 The statements outline the company’s latest capacity forecasts, system
reinforcement projects and investment plans. This information assists existing and prospective new users of
the GB transmission system in assessing opportunities available to them for making new or additional use
of the GB transmission system in the competitive market. In conjunction with the industry, we compile
summer and winter consultation reports to provide the market with analysis of the supply and demand
backgrounds in the gas and electricity markets under a range of weather conditions.
17. Other market information is available closer to real-time such as normalised demand data, latest
weather forecast, indicated generation and system reserves information. The majority of information from
National Grid related to the electricity transmission system is published on a website operated by a third
party.294 Information related to gas transmission is published on National Grid’s own websites.
National Grid’s Affordable Warmth Programme (AWP)
18. In 2000 National Grid launched the AVordable Warmth Programme which is designed to generate
consumer beneﬁts, with an emphasis on deprived consumers by increasing household energy eYciency.
19. This programme systematically targeted households at estate, community, local area and most
recently at regional level.
20. The principal outcomes of the programmes under AWP have assisted almost 600,000 households,
with over 130,000 homes receiving a central heating system. Over thirty communities have been connected
to the gas network where otherwise under usual regulatory mechanisms it would be uneconomic to do so.
A further twenty ﬁve network extension projects are under construction or subject to detailed contractual
negotiations.
21. In addition, a further 5700 people have received training in schemes ranging from domestic gas
appliance installers, energy eYciency advisors to cavity wall insulators.
292 National Grid, Seven Year Statement. http://www.nationalgrid.com/uk/Electricity/sys
293 National Grid, 10 Year Statement & Long Term Investment Plan. http://www.nationalgrid.com/uk/Gas/TYS/
294 Elexon Ltd, The New Electricity Trading Arrangement Home Page. http://www.bmreports.com
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Metering
22. National Grid Metering is a subsidiary of National Grid and is responsible for National Grid’s
regulated metering service to around 18 million domestic, industrial and commercial customers in Great
Britain. The costs of providing a meter contribute on average about 2% to domestic gas bills. The charges
made by National Grid Gas to energy suppliers for domestic meter services are subject to a price control
set by Ofgem. OnStream is another subsidiary of National Grid oVering competitive metering services thus
aVording choice to suppliers in gas and electricity. OnStream currently own 1.7 million meters in gas and
0.7 million meters in electricity.
23. On 25 February Ofgem announced that they foundNational Grid to be in breach of the Competition
Act and imposed a ﬁne of £41.6 million in respect of a number of metering contracts entered into with gas
suppliers in 2004.
24. In 2004 National Grid signedMetering contracts with most of the major gas suppliers. The contracts
oVered suppliers the option of continuingwith their existing arrangements or receiving lowermetering prices
in return for a commitment to leave National Grid’s meters in place for a speciﬁed period (or completing
payment on them if they removed them before the end of the contracted period).
25. On 24 June 2005, Ofgem announced that it was undertaking an investigation into the new contractual
arrangements between National Grid and the gas suppliers concerning the provision of gas metering
services.
26. Ofgem’s original allegation was that the contracts locked suppliers in for a signiﬁcant share of their
gas meter requirements and thereby restricted the development of competition in metering. Ofgem alleged
that this conduct amounted to an abuse of dominance, which would infringe competition law. Throughout
the course of the investigation, this allegation narrowed and focused more on the technical aspects of the
contracts rather than the contracts themselves.
27. We support competition in metering and strongly believe we have never acted anti-competitively in
the development of our contracts. We believe the contracts, which were developed over a two year period
with gas suppliers and in consultation with Ofgem, have:
— Delivered immediate and substantial ﬁnancial beneﬁts to customers in the form of lower metering
prices, saving customers around £120 million over the four years of operation.
— Not inhibited the development of competition, such that the market share of National Grid’s
metering business is now around 40% of the new and replacement meter market, from a starting
point of over 90% in 2002.
— Provided scope for large numbers (about 1.2 million per annum) of existing meters to be replaced
annually in an orderly and sustainable way, whilst limiting consumer disruption, and wasteful
replacement of good working meters.
28. Ofgem was consulted throughout this process of contract development and negotiation and has
acknowledged that National Grid had no intention to breach the Competition Act. National Grid has
consistently demonstrated its support for competition in metering.
29. We remain convinced that the contracts do not infringe competition law, and we are taking steps to
lodge an appeal with the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT). This appeal will deal with both the decision
and the size of the ﬁne (£41.6million).It will be a diversion fromour primary focus on improving the services
for our customers and will also distract the industry from the important development of Smart Metering
solutions for the UK—which we strongly support.
Conclusions
30. Our written evidence to this inquiry has demonstrated the transparency and regulated nature of the
process through which our transportation charges are derived.
31. We believe we have a role to play and duly discharge our duties in fostering competition in themarket
by providing an array of information about our assets and operations.
32. Support for and involvement in the drive to tackle fuel poverty continues to be important to us as
demonstrated by our investment over the last eight years in the AVordable Warmth Programme.
33. We hope that this submission is helpful to the Business, Enterprise, Regulatory Reform Select
Committee investigation into possible anti-competitive behaviour in the UK’s energy market.
April 2008
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Memorandum submitted by National Housing Federation
Summary of Evidence
1. The Federation believes that Ofgem is failing in its duty to help low income customers because it allows
energy suppliers to charge their poorest customers (pre-payment meter customers) a premium for their
energy.
The Government recently acknowledged that pre-payment meter customers get an unfair deal and has
threatened energy suppliers with the introduction new legislation if they don’t improve the situation by
winter 2008. The Government should not have had to make this threat if Ofgem was fulﬁlling its duty to
low income customers.
2. We believe that Ofgem’s current position that switching is the solution to helping over a million fuel
poor pre-payment meter customers is ﬂawed, as many customers cannot switch suppliers for various
reasons.
Ofgem should advocate the equalisation of pre-payment meters tariVs to standard credit tariVs as the
instrument to help over one million customers in fuel poverty.
About the Federation
The National Housing Federation represents 1300 independent, not-for-proﬁt housing associations in
England and is the voice of aVordable housing. Our members provide two million aVordable homes for ﬁve
million people.
The mission of the National Housing Federation is to support and promote the work that housing
associations do and campaign for better housing and neighbourhoods.
Our pre-payment meter campaign
Over the last year the Federation and housing associations have been campaigning for energy suppliers
to give pre-payment meter customers a better deal for their gas and electricity.
On average pre-payment meter customers pay a premium for their energy compared to other customers
who pay for their gas and electricity by standard credit and direct debit. Some suppliers have equalised their
gas or electricity pre-payment meter tariVs to standard credit but we want all energy suppliers to equalise
their tariVs.
Our Evidence
Our evidence to the committee comes under the following issue headings:
1. The eVectiveness of regulatory oversight of the energy market
2. Progress in reducing fuel poverty and the appropriate policy instruments for doing so
The eVectiveness of regulatory oversight of the energy market
The Federation believes that Ofgem is failing in its duty to help low income customers because it allows
energy suppliers to charge their poorest customers a premium for their energy.
The Utilities Act 2000 gives Ofgem the principal objective of protecting the interests of consumers and it
places duties on it in respect of a number of groups within society, namely the disabled or chronically sick,
pensioners, those on low incomes and those living in rural areas.
Ofgem acknowledges that pre-payment meter customers on average have lower incomes compared to
customers who pay for their energy by standard credit (customers who pay on receipt of a quarterly bill)
and direct debit.295 [NHF1]Yet it continues to allow the market to charge these low income customers the
most for their energy.
Everyday 1,000 new pre-payment meters are installed and these meters come with a premium of up to
£162 more per year compared to standard credit. The diVerential between pre-payment meters and direct
debits can be as much as £200 and this continues to grow.
295 Ofgem, Domestic Retail Market Report—June 2007..
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CURRENT ENERGY PRICES296
TariV Type - Gas - Medium User
Standard
TariV
Current Current Current Current Current 1 April Max Min Average
SPower EDF BGas E.ON Npower SSE Bill Bill Bill
Average direct debit £604 £633 £588 £603 £610 £584 £633 £584 £604
Average standard
credit £679 £650 £656 £642 £631 £618 £679 £618 £646
Average PPM £643 £660 £712 £676 £673 £662 £712 £643 £671
NOTE: Source: energywatch price comparison factsheets
Based on an average Gas consumption of 20,500kWh per annum.
Prices include VAT.
TariV Type - Electricity - Medium User
Standard
TariV
Current Current Current Current Current 1 April Max Min Average
SPower EDF BGas E.ON Npower SSE Bill Bill Bill
Average direct debit £367 £377 £394 £396 £404 £382 £404 £367 £387
Average standard £432 £385 £414 £421 £425 £406 £432 £385 £414
credit
Average PPM £419 £385 £432 £421 £453 £406 £453 £385 £419
NOTE: Source: energywatch price comparison factsheets
Based on an average Electricity consumption of 3,300kWh per annum.
Prices inclusive of VAT.
Over the last few years Ofgem has consistently fought against equalisation of pre-payment meter tariVs
to standard credit tariVs. They have continually produced brieﬁngs and reports which have made the case
against this reduction in pre-payment meter tariVs.
Ofgem has argued that “if pre-payment were aligned to standard credit tariVs a typical customer would
pay an extra £6 per year. Equalisation would therefore make the 3 million DD [direct debit] and SC
[standard credit] customers who are fuel poor worse oV”.297
Ofgem is adamant that this £6 a year increase would be catastrophic to those in fuel poverty and yet it
allowed some suppliers to make price increases of up 17% gas and 15% electricity in early 2008. These
increases have brought the average yearly energy bill over £1,000.
Ofgem also declined to comment on theGovernment’s decision to introduce policies which add £80 yearly
on to bills. This increase will go toward environmental schemes such as Renewable Obligation Certiﬁcates
(ROC) and the European Union Greenhouse Gas Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS).
Energy suppliers recently received a £9 billion windfall when they were given free allocations of EU ETS
allowance. It would cost energy suppliers less than 1% of the £9 billion to equalise pre-payment meter tariVs
to standard credit tariVs this winter.
There has been some hope recently for pre-paymentmeter customers. In his budget speech theChancellor,
Alistair Darling, acknowledged the plight of pre-payment meter customers. He nowwants a ‘fairer deal’ for
these customers and has threatened energy suppliers that it will introduce new legislation if they don’t
improve the situation by winter.
The Government should not have had to make this threat to energy suppliers for action if Ofgem was
fulﬁlling its duty to low income customers.
There is no pre-payment premium in Northern Ireland. The market has shifted to beneﬁt pre-payment
customers. Their pre-payment meter customers get 2.5% discount oV the standard rate and can buy top-ups
over the telephone 24 hours a day.
Recommendations
We recommend the Committee:
— seeks clarity from the Government on what it would count as a successful outcome to its
discussions with energy suppliers on reducing the price diVerential between pre-payment and
standard credit tariVs
— asks Ofgemwhy the Government has had to intervene to get a “fairer deal” for pre-paymentmeter
customers.
296 Based on ﬁgures from Energywatch on 20 March 2008
297 Ofgem, Domestic Retail Market Report—June 2007.
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Progress in Reducing Fuel Poverty and the Appropriate Policy Instruments for Doing So
There are one million pre-payment meters customers in fuel poverty. Ofgem’s advice to those customers
who pay the highest prices for their energy has simply been to switch to a cheaper energy supplier.
This advice is not helpful for some pre-payment meter customers who cannot switch supplier or payment
method for various reasons. On top of this the National Audit OYce has said that “problems such as
complex tariVs and a lack of information mean that some consumers, particularly those classiﬁed as
vulnerable, are still unable to take full advantage of the competitive market.”
The Federation believes that switching is part of the solution but should not be seen as a panacea. We
ﬁrmly believe that many low income customers do not have the ability to switch.
Energywatch recently said that “The sad truth is that millions of consumers are switching but their bills
still rise. For millions more consumers switching to a cheaper tariV is either fraught with diYculty or just
plain impossible. No-one can seriously think that switching, by itself, provides the answer for Britain’s
besieged energy consumers.”
Currently the best deals for gas and electricity are online and are not readily accessible to millions of low
income consumers who are in energy debt, without bank accounts or access to home internet.
Ofgem has just announced that switching is at its highest rate for the past ﬁve years but Energywatch
believes that ﬁgures may not be truly positive “[we] don’t know what proportion of those reported to have
switched are multiple switchers or what proportion have actually saved money”. We question how many
are from low income back grounds.
Recommendation
Ofgem should advocate the equalisation of pre-payment meters tariVs to standard credit tariVs as
instrument to help one million customers in fuel poverty.
April 2008
Memorandum by the National Right to Fuel Campaign
Introduction
NRFC was established in 1975 with a key objective to end fuel poverty by securing a warm, dry, well-lit
home for all, regardless of income and location, and has taken a leading role in putting fuel poverty high
on the political agenda. The Campaign has a membership comprising voluntary organisations, local
authorities, trade unions, individuals, academics and professionals in housing, social welfare and
environmental health.
Currently, it focuses on campaigns to ensure that there is continuing commitment by Government,
Industry and the regulator to end fuel poverty for all households by 2016. We also believe that there should
be no unfair taxes or fuel price increases which adversely aVect low-income consumers. This includes all
aspects of energy supply from unfair tariV diVerentials to prices which are a proper reﬂection of industry
costs.
Our response to the questions posed by the BERR select committee as part of its full scale inquiry into
energy prices have focused on those which are directly relevant to fuel poor consumers and which fall into
the areas of expertise of Campaign members.
Our overall impression is that markets do not work for the fuel poor who are at the bottom of the heap
for government, industry and the regulator in that they neither get the beneﬁt from a functioning market
or adequate protection by regulation or suYcient income.
Inquiry Questions
— Whether the current market structure encourages eVective competition in the retail markets for
gas and electricity;
— Whether there is eVective competition in the wholesale markets for gas and electricity; and
— The relationship between the wholesale and retail markets for electricity and gas.
Business and Enterprise Committee: Evidence Ev 427
Pricing
NRFC wanted to understand whether or not the price increases over the past several years could be
legitimately explained—could they be accounted for by signiﬁcant increases in proﬁt or dividends to
shareholders? Or was there some other, less transparent explanation for the increases which have caused an
increase in the numbers in fuel poverty. This information was not readily available in the public domain,
using publicly available data. One might expect that this information would be publicly available from the
industry regulator, Ofgem, but this was not the case so NRFC commissioned its delivery (attached at
appendix 1)
The ﬁndings from our research, Gas and Electricity Costs to Householders, demonstrate that domestic
consumer expenditure on gas and electricity increased by considerablymore than costs in the period 2003–06
(the most recent period for which all relevant data is available). Expenditure rose by around £8 billion over
the period to £22.5 billion. However, and despite comments by energy companies, fuel costs rose only by
£4.5 billion at most. Other costs such as gas storage, electricity system losses, VAT, support for renewable
energy and energy eYciency and network costs account for a further 15% of the increases.
Asmuch as £2.5 billion of the extramonies paid by consumers for the energy therefore seems to have gone
into increased margins. Most of these higher margins have been in electricity generation, with some also in
gas storage and gas and electricity distribution (the latter two being regulated by price control by Ofgem)
£mn 2003 2006 Change % change
Reported expenditure 14,264 22,491 8,227 58%
Estimated fuel costs 4,391 8,936 4,545 104%
Estimated other costs (inc some proﬁts) 7,849 9,249 1,400 18%
Increase in margins 2,025 4,305 2,280 213%
Consumers have paid more than £2.3 billion more for their energy than they ought to have done over
2003–06 and are continuing to pay over the odds as they deal with price increases in 2007 and 2008. Ofgem’s
failure has allowed over half a million low-income consumers to be pushed into fuel poverty. There are 2.5
million households in theUKwhose lives are blighted by cold homes who because the British energymarket
is not working eVectively.
As we come out of another winter, it is the case that all suppliers have raised their prices again, even before
some consumers could gain the beneﬁts of the tardy price reductions over 2007. This is despite the lack of
evidence of shortage or constraints on security of supply.
Government andOfgemmust take action now to prevent further hardship or face the consequence
of more fuel poverty and excess winter deaths. Further fuel price increases should not take place
until a full investigation has taken place. Government should take steps to recover excess proﬁt
through a windfall tax to be used to fund fuel poverty programmes.
TheGovernment’s energy strategy relies upon independently regulated competitive energymarkets as the
most cost eVective way of delivering its objectives.
The evidence here is clear that government should have no such conﬁdence in a market that allows
companies raise prices with impunity earn huge margins at the expense of vulnerable low income
consumers.
Many energy companies pleaded for sympathy when wholesale gas prices were increasing and as has been
described by one author “lamented that they are just as much victims as consumers and that it has been
painful indeed for them to have to inﬂict inevitable price rises on consumers.”298
A market where suppliers can require consumers to bear disproportionate risk is not healthy and
action now is needed to address this problem.
Government has suggested that price increases are in part the “recovery of wholesale electricity prices
from unsustainably low levels.”299 However the evidence here suggests companies have been able to regain
proﬁt levels that more than compensate for these low prices.
NRFC is shocked that it may be the case that companies have used the high wholesale gas prices
as a means of gaining proﬁt levels that would not be sustainable in markets that worked well.
298 Wright, P (2007) Competition in gas and electricity; companies proﬁt, consumers pay Consumer Policy Review vol. 17 no.
1 pg 3
299 BERR (2007) The UK Fuel Poverty Strategy: 5th Annual Report pg 37
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The Effectiveness of Regulatory Oversight of the Energy Market
Suppliers have been able to raise prices and earn excessive proﬁts because of poor regulatory oversight
in the energy market. Ofgem’s recent decision to investigate the energy market can be described as grudging
at best and we have little positive expectation of the outcome. Ofgem have also failed to provide analysis
about the way in which the energy market has worked over the period of price increases. We believe that it
is now appropriate for regulatory responsibility for the competitive elements of the energy market be
transferred to the OYce of Fair Trading.
It should not be the responsibility of a campaigning body to produce market analysis when there
is a publicly-funded regulatory body with a speciﬁc remit to address the issues raised here.
Progress in Reducing Fuel Poverty and the Appropriate Policy Instruments for doing so
The government has statutory targets to remove all vulnerable consumers from fuel poverty by 2010 and
all other consumers by 2016. The targets are set down in legislation by the Warm Homes and Energy
Conservation Act 2000. The increases in energy prices have had a profound impact on those who live in fuel
poverty who spend more than 10% of their income on gas and electricity.
While energy price increases have been diYcult for all consumers, they have been especially challenging
for consumers who live with fuel poverty. The energy price increases have had a signiﬁcant impact on the
numbers in fuel poverty. Work by NRFC suggests that every 10% increase in energy prices in England puts
another 50,000 people into fuel poverty.300 This means that they face stark choices between paying for fuel
and eating. OYcial fuel poverty ﬁgures, recently published in the 5th Annual Fuel Poverty Strategy Annual
Report301 by Government conﬁrm the impact that energy prices have had on their progress to achieving fuel
poverty targets.
For England, Scotland and Wales fuel poverty numbers have risen from 1.75 million in 2004 to 3.39
million in 2006—this represents an increase of just under 95%. This is likely only to get worse with further
price increases already happening.
England Scotland Wales
In 2004 there were 1.2 million In 2002 there were just under In 2004 130,000 households were
households in fuel poverty which 300,000 households in fuel poverty in fuel poverty which had
had increased to 2.6 million by (13.4% of all households)This had increased to 243,000 by 2006. This
2006. increased to nearly 420,000 is an 87% increase.
households in 2004–05 and
543,000 in 2005–06 (23.5% of all
households)
Government continually protests that they are committed to ending fuel poverty by 2016 but its actions
belie these intentions. It has cut the budget for Warm Front this year which will mean that fewer fuel poor
households will be helped as their numbers are increasing dramatically. It has also reduced the proportion
of the energy eYciency commitment (now renamed as the CERT) that will be dedicated to vulnerable
consumers. It increased the Winter Fuel Payment to all pensioner households but only for one year. There
was no additional ﬁnancial help for other fuel poor households announced in the budget.
They are relying on the voluntary action of industry to solve the problem suggesting that industry increase
its expenditure on social programmes from £56 million per annum to £150 million per annum. On the face
of it, this may seem signiﬁcant but amounts to £44 for every fuel poor household which is the equivalent of
around two weeks gas and electricity (based on the notion of the £1,000 annual bill).
Government has failed to use the opportunity of the Energy Bill to provide itself with suYcient powers
to make companies deliver services to fuel poor households (for example social tariVs) and is not using the
powers that it currently has under the Utilities Act 2000. This legislation would allow Government to set
up a scheme requiring companies to remove the diVerential in tariVs between groups that are treated less
favourably than others. The suggestion is that prepayment tariVs should be equalised to those of standard
credit, however the legislation would also them to be equalised to direct debit tariVs.
March 2008
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Memorandum submitted by NHS Purchasing and Supply Agency
Please ﬁnd attached written evidence to the Select Committee from the NHS Purchasing and Supply
Agency regarding the new inquiry investigating possible anti-competitive behaviours in the UK’s energy
market.
While we assume sole responsibility for its content, we would like you to note that this evidence has been
produced in consultation with HM Treasury’s OYce of Government Commerce and the Ministry of
Defence, the programme lead and sponsoring department respectively for the cross-government
collaborative procurement project for energy currently being delivered as part of the HM Treasury policy
Transforming Government Procurement, published January 2007.
I would like to take this opportunity to conﬁrm that the NHS Purchasing and Supply Agency, together
with representatives from the collaborative programme, would welcome the opportunity to present oral
evidence should the Committee require it.
Summary of Main Points
— Retail markets for gas and electricity are dominated by a small number of suppliers.
— There is a diVerence between companies registered to supply and those actually active within the
market so the number of registered companies is not an accurate measure of customer choice or
competition.
— All major electricity suppliers and all but onemajor gas supplier is vertically integrated.Given that
there have been no new market entrants for large, multi-site portfolios, vertical integration is a
signiﬁcant barrier to entry.
— Liquidity within the gas market has improved but there is no eVective long term market; the lack
of liquidity in the electricity market is still more pronounced.
— The speed of liberalisation and continued lack of visibility and transparency between diVerent
markets causes uncertainty and may be detrimental to customer interests.
— We are not convinced that the regulator is eVective in delivering value for the customer in terms
of delivered cost of the commodity.
— The regulator is focused on the domestic market, but the ﬁnal delivered price for all customers is
produced as a result of basic structural factors (in the market and in the supply chain) which even
large Industrial and Commercial (I&C) customers are not in a position to inﬂuence signiﬁcantly.
Who we are
The NHS Purchasing and Supply Agency (NHS PASA), established in April 2000, is an executive agency
of the Department of Health. We work to ensure that the NHS in England makes the most eVective use of
its resources by getting the best possible value for money when purchasing goods and services.
TheNHSPASAEnergy team provides theNHSwith a strategic service for the procurement of electricity,
gas, oil and coal. Buying energy is a highly complex and specialised area and our strategy involves
inﬂuencing thisUarea of signiﬁcant spendUthrough a variety of ﬂexible procurement options (including
trading on the wholesale market) to improveUservice delivery and reduce costs in the NHS.
NHS PASA is a strong and experienced advocate of collaborative procurement across government
departments and is actively supportingHMTreasury’s TransformingGovernment Procurement policy, this
includes developing a price risk management model for the UK public sector.
Recommendations
— The UK moves to a central cleared exchange based market to increase liquidity and access to
wholesale markets for new market entrants and customers.
— The regulator aligns its measures for assessing the competitiveness of the market to the real
underlying factors driving delivered prices so that all consumers can be assured that the market is
operating eVectively.
Written Evidence
Each topic on which the Select Committee request our view is reproduced in bold italic below. Each is
followed by our brief written evidence, produced by NHS PASA in consultation with the OYce of
Government Commerce and the Ministry of Defence.
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Whether the current market structure encourages eVective competition in the retail markets for gas and
electricity
Response
We recognise that the current markets for gas and electricity diVer. Within electricity there are concerns
about the extent of vertical integration which exists between generators and suppliers. Although there is no
direct evidence that this in itself has an eVect upon the competitive nature of themarket, the general purpose
of backward vertical integration is to increase company proﬁtability and its presence raises questions over
visibility and accountability (especially regarding input costs).
The retail markets for both gas and electricity are dominated by a small number of suppliers. In a truly
competitive market, suppliers should be seen to drive innovation in an attempt to diVerentiate themselves,
gain competitive advantage and win market share. Again, while a small number of suppliers by itself does
not stiﬂe competition, there is little evidence of suppliers within the UK market rushing to introduce new
and innovative product oVerings. Such market oVerings as have been made available have tended to come
as a result of persistent customer demand.
Within the Industrial and Commercial (I&C) arena, there is a further limitation to competitiveness—
namely, the tendency for the already small number of suppliers to segment the market. This leads to an
element of specialisation and reduces the numbers of suppliers actively competing for some customer
segments. A recent national NHS procurement exercise for electricity attracted only a small number of
compliant bids, which—while disappointing—is in conformity with the bidding pattern across the UK
public sector as a whole. Such apparent segmentation is consistent with established analysis of how
companies seek to maximise proﬁts in an oligopolistic market (c.f. Porter, Competitive Strategy, 1980). At
the very least, customer choice is constrained (by the self de-selection of suppliers). Recent supplier meetings
conducted as part of Treasury collaborative procurement programme indicate that suppliers are more
concerned with retaining existing customers than actively competing for new business.
There is a diVerence between companies registered to supply and those active within themarket, so amere
register of suppliers with licences within the UK does not accurately reﬂect customer choice or competition.
Likewise, using switch rates as a measure of competition will not show the true extent of competition if the
customer is given little or limited choice at the time of renewal.
We also note that all major electricity suppliers are vertically integrated, and all but one of the gas
suppliers is as well. Backward vertical integration is a trend that has expanded signiﬁcantly over the last ﬁve
years. At the same time, we note increasing supply market concentration. There have been no new market
entrants for large multi site portfolios such as the public sector, which raises the questions about barriers to
entry—one of which is precisely the need to be vertically integrated!
Whether there is eVective competition in the wholesale markets for gas and electricity
Response
Customers within the I&C market have pushed for contracts which allow them access to the wholesale
market. This option is now available to a large majority of customers and has enabled some beneﬁts,
especially around risk management. For a customer purchasing gas in the wholesale market competition
can be seen to be represented by choice. This choice can be measured in terms of visibility, availability and
number of trades. Within the gas market, we make the following observations:
— the day ahead and prompt market are working eVectively, at least in relative terms; and
— it is possible to obtain pricing for periods further out in the curve, but liquidity is very thin.
It is our view, therefore, that while liquidity has improved within the gas market over the last couple of
years, there is no eVective longer-termmarket. Consequently, the ability to optimise themanagement of risk
is constrained even for large users, potentially increasing ﬁnal out-turn costs.
In the electricity market, we have yet to see even these minor improvements in liquidity. We acknowledge
that the electricity market is less mature than that for gas, but this cannot be accepted indeﬁnitely as an
excuse for limited visibility and availability of oVers.
The lack of liquidity is perhaps more eVectively explained by the vertically integrated structure of the
electricity market. This reduces the need to trade volumes in the open market and results in a lack of
visibility. The consequent market ineYciency can be viewed as a goal of vertical integration as it tends to
deliver more control over price and output to suppliers. Liquidity in electricity is limited even for the ﬁrst
12 months forward, and it is almost impossible to purchase peak load beyond the next 12 months making
it impossible for large customers to manage their longer-term cost exposure risk eVectively.
As more customers move towards contracts which include a wholesale market approach to the purchase
of the commodity element, and develop a longer term approach to spreading risk by purchasing further out
in the market, the limitations within both the gas and electricity markets will become a still more signiﬁcant
problem in securing value from the wholesale markets.
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We also think that moving to a central cleared exchange based market would signiﬁcantly increase
liquidity and access to the wholesale markets for new market entrants and customers. Nord pool serves as
a good example of this—and liquidity is signiﬁcantly higher compared to the UK.
The implications of growing consolidation in the energy market
Response
Consolidation of suppliers within both the gas and electricity markets has been a concern for a number
of years. It can be argued that an element of the supplier consolidation within both gas and electricity
markets has been oVset by new entrants, especially those from Europe. However, in reality the out-turn
position has been left very much unchanged and if anything the general decline in suppliers within the
market since liberalisation is evident. Combined with our observations on customer segmentation—or
“cherry-picking”, as it is sometimes known in the market—we are of the view that consolidation is more
likely to diminish choice and increase costs for customers than it is to deliver eYciency beneﬁts.
It should be noted that there have been no major new entrants to the market in the last ﬁve years. Some
niche players (such as GazProm or Wingas) have entered the gas market, but only where they have access
to production and are thus vertically integrated. There have been no new entrants to the electricity market
of suYcient size to meet large scale customer volumes.
The relationship between the wholesale and retail markets for electricity and gas
PASA Response
Our contracts facilitate interaction at wholesale market level and as such we cannot make further
comment on this issue.
The interaction between the UK and European energy markets
PASA Response
The liberalisation of the European energy market has been slow. As the UK has become more reliant on
gas ﬂows from Europe the speed of liberalisation and the continued lack of visibility and transparency
between the diVerent markets creates uncertainties. Market regulation within the various member states
appears to diVer. These diVerences, coupledwith the apparent lack of visibility (of, for example, information
on real gas ﬂows within Europe), do raise questions as to whether the UK market is operating on a level
playing ﬁeld with its European counterparts. A typical frustration arises when the UK and continental
market prices diverge (eg UK prices are higher) but the expectation of gas ﬂowing to the higher priced
market does not materialise and is not adequately explained (gas is not delivered to the UK). We are
concerned that supplier control of much of the infrastructure may be detrimental to customer interests.
The eVectiveness of regulatory oversight of the energy market
Response
We have insuYcient evidence on which to make a judgement of the eVectiveness of current regulatory
oversight. We oVer the following observations:
1. The UK regulator appears however to be hampered by the complexities and slow pace at which
other nations states are approaching liberalisation.
2. We have no evidence that the regulator has any control over the upward pressures on energy
prices—at least one of which is the market structure (vertical integration, supplier concentration,
high barriers to entry, limited competition).
3. Wewelcome the recent action aimed at driving competitive behaviour associated withMeter Asset
Management.
4. We observe that one of the drivers of price is speculative trading which impacts on consumer value
and yet it is an area outside of regulatory control.
5. The focus of the UK regulator seems to be on the domestic rather than the I&C market.
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Progress in reducing fuel poverty and the appropriate policy instruments for doing so
Response
We have neither expertise nor responsibility in this ﬁeld and as such we can oVer no further comment.
28 March 2008
Letter by Ofgem
Energy Prices
1. The Chairman of the Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Select Committee, Peter LuV MP,
has asked the independent energy regulator, Ofgem, to submit an information note on certain recent
developments in the energy markets. This note addresses ﬁve particular questions:
— Why are energy prices rising?
— Is the energy market uncompetitive?
— Are suppliers quicker to pass on wholesale price rises than wholesale price cuts?
— What can be done to help vulnerable customers aVected by higher energy prices?
— How does Britain’s energy market compare with that on the continent?
Why are energy prices rising?
2. Energy prices have risen since 2003 due to a range of factors. Rising global demand for energy has led
to higher oil and coal prices, which in turn have put upward pressure on gas and electricity prices.
3. High world oil prices (close to $100 a barrel) are reﬂected in gas prices because, outside Britain, the
price of gas is linked to the price of oil. This aVects Britain because ourNorth Sea reserves are declining sowe
now have to import a growing amount of gas from the rest of Europe via pipeline links and from elsewhere as
liqueﬁed natural gas (LNG). Liquefying gas, shipping it to Britain and converting it back into gas is more
expensive than transporting it by pipeline. LNG prices have risen substantially, with pressure from Asian
markets (notably Japan) paying high prices to secure LNG imports. There have been delays in completing
the construction of two major LNG terminals at Milford Haven in South Wales. The ﬁrst phase of these
two facilities, which have a combined capacity totalling around 16.5 billion cubic meters, was scheduled to
be ready for the start of this winter (2007–08). Gas imports from the NorwegianOrmen Lange gas ﬁeld have
been less than expected due to production problems.
4. Currently gas is used to generate around 36% of Britain’s electricity. Increases in wholesale gas costs
will therefore have a knock-on eVect on electricity generation costs. Prices for coal, which is used to generate
around 37% of our electricity, have also increased to record levels. In addition the second phase of the
European Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), which began in January 2008, has increased the price of
carbon which in turn increases electricity prices.
5. Whether suppliers need to put up prices as a result of higher wholesale costs will depend on howmuch
gas and electricity they bought on the wholesale markets when prices were lower earlier in 2007, and how
much they have boughtmore recently at higher prices. In Britain’s competitivemarket, if a supplier increases
bills they have to weigh up how much that increase will lead to a loss of customers. If a supplier can keep
prices lower, they will retain existing customers and attract new ones.
6. In addition, prices have also risen as a result of programmes introduced by the government to help
tackle climate change. For example, the Carbon Emissions Reduction Target—which replaces the Energy
EYciency Commitment on suppliers in April 2008—doubles the cost of the scheme to customers. Defra
estimate that this will add another £20 to customers’ bills in addition to the £18 customers are already paying
for EEC, giving a total of £38. Furthermore, network charges—which pay for the transportation of gas and
electricity through the pipes andwires—rose by an average of £22 for gas and £2.96 for electricity in 2007–08.
Increases over this period have varied considerably between regions: in London the increase was around £52
compared to £2 in the East Midlands. In 2008–09 they will rise by £1 in electricity and £2 to £6 in gas,
depending on the region. Taken together, all of these wider factors mean that energy prices are unlikely to
fall back to the levels of a decade ago.
Is the energy market uncompetitive?
7. Ofgem constantly keeps themarket under surveillance, and we look at it evenmore closely when prices
are rising, but our monitoring has not revealed any evidence of anti-competitive behaviour. All suppliers
are facing similar cost pressures, driven by rising wholesale gas and electricity prices, environmental costs
and energy network costs. The extent to which they need to pass on rising wholesale prices will depend on
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how smart they have been at buying their energy. So far this year, three of the major suppliers have
announced price increases; two suppliers have made no announcement; one supplier has promised to hold
its prices at least until the end of March, when most customers’ energy consumption begins to fall.
8. Another sign of healthy competition is that we see companies gaining and losing signiﬁcant market
share, plus record switching levels and innovative deals. The supplier which has consistently oVered the
lowest prices and best service has doubled its number of customers to eight million over the past three years.
At the same time, others have been punished severely by customers switching away to suppliers oVering
better deals. What is more, this level of customer switching is on an increasing trend. 4 million customers
switched their supplier in 2006 and 4 million customers are now on ﬁxed price or other innovative deals.
There are now diVerences of around £100 per household between suppliers’ prices—so customers could still
make big savings.
9. Although this evidence suggests a strongly competitive market, Ofgem continues to monitor it
constantly and regularly publish our analysis. If anybody has evidence of anti-competitive behaviour, we
urge them to send it to us. We have a tough set of penalties at our disposal, including our formal statutory
powers as well as the informal pressure we can exercise as a regulator. For example, last year we “named
and shamed” two suppliers—EDF Energy and Scottish Power—who had not passed through falling
wholesale prices to their customers. Within days they had announced retail price cuts for their customers.
More formally, the Competition Act gives Ofgem the power to impose ﬁnes of up to 10% of a company’s
turnover if they break the law by abusing their dominance or engaging in agreements which distort
competition. We will not hesitate to use our powers to investigate and, if necessary, impose penalties on any
supplier that has been found to have broken competition law.
Are suppliers quicker to pass on wholesale price rises than wholesale price cuts?
10. Not necessarily. If a supplier buys badly and has to keep its prices up, it risks losing customers and
their cash.
11. Wholesale energy prices began to rise in 2003, due mainly to a decline in Britain’s gas reserves at a
time of rising global demand. From 2004, retail prices began to increase signiﬁcantly for customers. In 2006,
wholesale gas prices began to fall and in 2007 all suppliers reduced bills at least once. However, in 2007
wholesale prices rose again. Comparing average day-ahead prices over in January 2008 with the same period
in 2007 shows thatwholesale gas prices have increased by 66%andwholesale electricity prices have increased
by 64%.
12. Suppliers will be aVected by these price changes diVerently because they have diVerent buying
strategies. Some buymost of their energy in advance and others aremore exposed to day-to-day ﬂuctuations
in wholesale prices. Those who have been smarter at buying their energy have been able to oVer lower prices
and gain market share. Contrariwise, more expensive suppliers have been punished severely by customers
switching away to cheaper deals. For example, in 7 of the 14 British regions, the old incumbent suppliers
have lost more than half their market share. The cheapest major supplier, on the other hand, has gained four
million extra customers in Britain in the last three years.
13. Ofgem believes these challenging conditions will clearly show which companies have been the most
successful in buying their energy ahead at keen prices, as they will be able to keep prices low. Much of the
increase in wholesale prices is due to high global commodity prices particularly for both coal and gas.
Pressure on prices could ease if global prices for these commodities fall.
What can be done to help vulnerable customers aVected by higher energy prices?
14. Fuel poverty has three main causes: high energy prices, low incomes and poor housing. Prices are
unlikely to return to the lower levels of the 1990s because of rising global energy demand and higher
commodity prices (see above). An enduring and sustainable solution to fuel poverty will, therefore, need to
focus on the issues of housing and incomes.
15. Signiﬁcant strides have been made to improve the energy eYciency of housing and to install cost
eVective heating systems through the Decent Homes standard, theWarm Front programme and the Energy
EYciency Commitment. However, Warm Front is focussed on private sector housing. Social housing, on
the other hand, is covered by the Decent Homes Standard and this provides for lower standards of thermal
comfort.Wewould therefore encourageGovernment to take a “ﬁnd and ﬁx” approach, ensuring that where
work is being done on a property under the Decent Homes Standard, a comprehensive solution is provided.
We would also encourage government to ensure eVective inter-working between the various schemes.
16. In addition,Government should keep focussed on the vital role of the tax and beneﬁt system in raising
incomes. Beneﬁt entitlement checks can help ensure vulnerable customers are getting their fair share of the
millions of pounds of unclaimed beneﬁts. Government could also review the Winter Fuel Payment and
refocus the payments on those who need them the most. Furthermore, additional funding for fuel poverty
programmes could be made available by recycling revenues from environmental schemes. For example,
Ofgem identiﬁed a windfall to electricity generators of up to £9 billion of permits which are allocated for
free under Phase II of the European Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) which runs from 2008 to 2012.
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This windfall could be used to help customers in fuel poverty. If Government were to auction allowances
for the following phase of EU ETS, some of the revenue generated from this could also be used to fund
further measures to help tackle fuel poverty and environmental improvements—as recommended by Ofgem
in our submission to the Government’s 2006 Energy Review.
17. On prices, vulnerable customers can make big savings if they are in a position to switch supplier or
payment method and if the support available from Government and suppliers is better targeted. There are
now diVerences of around £100 per household between suppliers’ prices, and the biggest savings available
are to prepayment meter (PPM) customers.
18. Ofgem, along with other agencies, works to help improve consumer awareness of these choices and
to help vulnerable customers access the beneﬁts of the competitive energy market. For example, we are
calling an energy summit this Spring to look at the speciﬁc issue of how to improve switching levels among
vulnerable customers, including lower income customers, the frail, the elderly and those with low literacy
and numeracy skills. We are also working with Citizens Advice Bureaux to develop a pilot programme to
help educate low income and hard to reach customers in how to make better choices in the energy market.
We also work to tackle any barriers that unreasonably prevent customers switching supplier. For example,
this year we will be reviewing suppliers’ policies on blocking customers who are in debt from switching.
19. Government can keep up the “Winter Initiative”: a practical way to improve targeting, using
Department of Work and Pensions data, of suppliers’ social measures as well as the energy eYciency help
available from Government under the Warm Front scheme and the Carbon Emissions Reduction Target.
Ofgem led the ﬁrst such initiative in winter 2006–07, and BERR are repeating this in January with the active
involvement of energy suppliers and Ofgem. Consideration could also be given to extending the remit of the
Warm Front scheme. For example, customers could be referred to their supplier for tariV advice or to go
onto their social tariV, where applicable.
How does Britain’s energy market compare with that on the continent?
20. Competition in the supply market, eVective regulation by Ofgem of the energy networks, and lower
taxes mean Britain’s electricity bills are still competitive compared with most other European countries.
Britain’s gas bills are also still among the cheapest in Europe. For example, the German media have been
reporting likely price increases in their retail market of 25% in electricity and 15% in gas.
21. Britain’s wholesale gas markets are closely linked to European prices, due to the interconnector
pipelines connecting us with the continent and declining supplies from the North Sea. Thanks in large part
to Ofgem’s eVorts through the European regulators’ groups CEER (Council of European Energy
Regulators) and ERGEG (European Regulators’ Group for Electricity and Gas), currently chaired by Sir
John Mogg, we have made signiﬁcant strides in improving transparency in European power and gas
markets.We nowhave access to important information on the levels of gas in store in all themajor European
markets and can see how much gas is taken out of store each week. Through the ERGEG “Regional
Initiative”, which seeks to make practical progress at the regional level so as to facilitate cross-border trade,
we can now see daily gas ﬂows on major pipelines in France, Belgium and the Netherlands and we will have
an even wider range of information available to us by the end of the year. Germany remains a problem and
less progress has been made there. There is also limited transparency on production from the Norwegian
gas ﬁelds. It remains impossible to understand total Norwegian gas supply and this adds uncertainty and
volatility in the GB and north-west European regional market. The picture is much better in the power
market with most countries, including Germany, now publishing regular and detailed information on the
availability of their generating stations, maintenance plans etc.
22. However, a longer term solution to the structural problems in the European market will require
changes to the legal and regulatory framework in the EU. The European Commission (EC) adopted
legislative proposals in September 2007 with a view to establishing such a legal and regulatory framework at
national and EU level—the “third package”. The proposals aim to complete integrated EU energy markets,
achieve security of supply and allow the markets to deliver on sustainability (when combined with the EU
Emissions Trading Scheme). The proposals have now been passed to the European Parliament andMember
States for full legislative scrutiny. This co-decision process usually lasts two to three years, although the EC
have set a target of reaching agreement by the next European Parliament elections in June 2009. Ofgem is
providing advice to the Government on the proposals and continues to play a lead role within ERGEG. In
particular, we strongly support the work of the EC to end the large multinational companies’ domination
of the European energy market, as fair access to EU gas supplies would bring signiﬁcant beneﬁts to UK
consumers. Ofgem has been instrumental in assisting in that work, including during the 2006 Sector Inquiry.
23. Ofgem would be happy to provide any further information to the Committee on any of these issues.
January 2008
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Memorandum by the OYce of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem)
Introduction
1. Ofgem is the regulator of the gas and electricity industries in Britain. We welcome the announcement
of the Committee’s inquiry. Like the Committee, we have noted the increasing public concern at recent
events in the energy supply markets. Although we have not seen conclusive evidence that the market is
failing, we know that customer conﬁdence is vital in order for a market to function well—and it is clear in
this case that customer conﬁdence has been damaged. On 21 February, therefore, we launched an
investigation which will look at whether the energy supply markets are working well for all consumers—
and not just particular groups such as those who are on the cheapest online deals. The probe will be carried
out under Ofgem’s Enterprise Act powers which will give us access to detailed company information that
is not routinely made available. We expect to report on our initial ﬁndings from the investigation in
September.
The Energy Market in Britain
2. It is useful to consider the energy market as comprising two elements. In the wholesale markets,
electricity generators and gas shippers sell their energy onto suppliers. In the retail markets, suppliers then
sell this energy onto business and domestic customers.302 At the time of privatisation all customers received
their gas from British Gas and their electricity from the Public Electricity Supplier for their region. Since
the gradual rollout of competition in the late 1990s, customers have been free to switch to diVerent suppliers.
3. There are parts of the supply chain in which competition is very limited. This is true for the energy
networks—the pipes and wires that carry the gas and electricity. It would be too expensive for every energy
supplier to build its own pipes and wires, so there are monopoly companies which transport gas and
electricity from shippers and generators to customers.303 In order to protect consumers, the revenues that
the networkmonopolies can earn and the structure of their charges (ie the proportion of these revenues they
can collect from business and domestic customers) are regulated by Ofgem in ﬁve-yearly price controls.
4. This combination of liberalised markets and independent regulation has brought signiﬁcant beneﬁts
to British consumers. Britain’s energy market was recently assessed to be the most competitive in Europe.304
The stable regulatory framework has proved attractive to investors, with £30 billion being invested in the
networks since privatisation. Consumers, in turn, have beneﬁted as costs have been driven down by
companies, a greater range of tariV oVerings has been made available, and service levels and quality of
supply have improved.
5. However, there are times when companies do not play by the rules or customers’ conﬁdence in the
market is damaged. In these cases, the regulator must be prepared to investigate and act where necessary.
As recently as February 2008, we imposed a ﬁne of £41.6million onNationalGrid for abusing its dominance
in the gas metering market—the biggest ﬁne ever imposed for this kind of competition law breach. Now, in
response to customer concern at recent events in the energy supply markets, we are conducting a probe to
ensure the market is working well for all customers—including the vulnerable. We welcome the insight that
the Committee’s work will bring.
6. In this memorandum we have addressed all seven of the questions posed by the Committee and we
have provided background analysis wherever possible. Since our investigation is at an early stage, there are
inevitably some points on which we are not yet able to oVer deﬁnitive conclusions. Where this is the case we
have sought to provide advice to the Committee on the issues it may wish to consider and the information
on which it could draw in reaching its own view. In addition, ifMembers or StaV have any further questions,
we would be happy to explore these issues in more detail, either in oral evidence or in a supplementary
memorandum.
Q1. Whether the current market structure encourages eVective competition in the retail markets for gas and
electricity
7. We think a range of indicators should be used to assess the eVectiveness of competition in a market.
These include changes in prices relative to costs (and hence margins) over time; product innovation and
improvements in customer service; customers’ responsiveness to suppliers’ oVerings (measured by switching
rates); the resulting changes in suppliers’ market shares; and the concentration of the market amongst
suppliers. The retail market is increasingly complex with a range of diVerent types of energy contract oVered
(ﬁxed and capped rate deals, market trackers, standard variable price contracts, green tariVs) and payment
methods (direct debit, standard credit and prepayment). In looking at these indicators it is important to look
at them in each of the various segments of the retail energy market to assess their competitiveness and also
to look at trends in movements of customers between market segments over time.
302 The retail markets are often also referred to as the supply markets.
303 Independent Gas Transporters and Independent Distribution Network Operators represent a very small exception to this.
These operators sometimes install systems on new housing developments.
304 “Energy market competition in the EU and G7: preliminary 2006 rankings”, prepared by Oxera for BERR, October 2007.
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Pricing and costs
8. There are six big players active in the energy retail market in Britain: BritishGas Trading (BGT); E.ON
(which until recently traded under the name Powergen); EDFEnergy;Npower; Scottish Power; and Scottish
and Southern Energy (SSE). Together, these six suppliers account for over 99% of the domestic retail
market.
9. Since the beginning of this year all six major suppliers have increased their gas and electricity prices.
SSE was the last to increase prices, waiting until the end of March by which time most customers’ energy
consumption has begun to fall. Customers can still make savings by switching supplier, particularly if they
are still with the incumbent gas and electricity suppliers in their region and if they pay on receipt of their bill
(ie standard credit) or through a prepayment meter (PPM). Customers who have never switched supplier
can make considerable savings on their annual gas and electricity bills. These combined savings are, on
average across regions, £125 for a PPM customer, £93 for a standard credit customer and £56 for a direct
debit customer. The following graph shows the best savings available in each region by payment method,
at the time of writing.305
Figure 1
POTENTIAL SAVINGS FOR ENERGY CUSTOMERS WHO HAVE
NEVER SWITCHED SUPPLIER—APRIL 2008
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305 The savings shown in these tables do not include additional savings available through online deals or switching to dual fuel.
They sum the savings from moving from the incumbent gas supplier to the best gas oVer, and moving away from the
incumbent electricity supplier to the best electricity oVer.
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10. Further savings are available to customers who switch their payment method or who move to dual
fuel (DF) ie taking both gas and electricity from the same supplier. In particular, online tariVs are growing
in popularity and are often the cheapest tariV. The chart below shows, region by region, the cheapest deal
by payment type for an average dual fuel customer.
Figure 2
LOWEST DUAL FUEL (DF) PRICE PER PAYMENT TYPE BY REGION—APRIL 2008
600
700
800
900
1000
1100
1200
East 
Midlands
Eastern London Merseyside 
and North 
Wales
Midlands North East North West North 
Scotland
South 
Scotland
South East Southern South 
Wales
South West Yorkshire
DF Direct Debit DF PPM DF Standard Credit DF Online DD
 
C
he
ap
es
t p
er
 re
gi
on
 b
y 
pa
ym
en
t (
£)
Source: TheEnergyShop.com and Ofgem
11. Despite the regional savings for customers who have never switched, we have noted that the recent
price changes have resulted in the six major suppliers setting their average national dual fuel direct debit
prices towithin £19 of each other. The following table sets out the range in dual fuel prices (based on national
average annual bills) between suppliers and shows how this has changed over the last year. While this level
of price convergence could indicate eVective competition, we will consider whether there are other reasons
for this as part of our probe.
Table 1
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE CHEAPEST AND MOST EXPENSIVE SUPPLIERS OVER THE
LAST YEAR BY PAYMENT METHOD
Price range based on each
Payment method supplier’s average annual dual
and year fuel bill
Direct Debit
2007 (Feb) £118
2007 (July) £72
2008 (April) £19
Standard Credit
2007 (Feb) £158
2007 (July) £85
2008 (April) £93
Prepayment
2007 (Feb) £159
2007 (July) £92
2008 (April) £108
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Product innovation
12. As well as price competition, suppliers are also innovating to retain and win customers. Innovative
products oVer more choice to customers and have proved to be very popular. Last year we estimated there
were some 9 million gas and electricity accounts on green, ﬁxed price and online deals, accounting for
roughly 20% of all energy accounts.
13. When retail prices were rising, suppliers responded by introducing price guarantee deals such as ﬁxed
price, capped price and tracker deals. The ﬁrst price guarantee tariV was introduced in 2003 and by March
2007 all suppliers not only oVered the products, but the tariVs had evolved as competition increased. An
example of this evolution was the removal of termination charges to allow customers to switch without
penalty. Figure 3 shows the increasing popularity of price guarantee tariVs over time. As at March this year
around 6 million product accounts (gas and electricity)—or around 13% of the market—were on price
guarantee tariVs.
14. Online tariVs are another growing product area, often oVering additional cost savings to customers.
These oVer customers savings for managing their accounts online. We estimate there are about 2.5 million
online accounts with the biggest six suppliers.
15. Green tariVs have grown in popularity as customer concern for the environment has risen. This
interest has allowed small suppliers specialising in green energy to enter the market, and large suppliers have
introduced more green products to their tariV oVerings to attract climate conscious customers.
16. More recent developments in the market have shown signs that suppliers are beginning to compete
in the provision of services aimed at reducing energy consumption. For example, one supplier oVers cash
credits to match the reduction in energy use.
Figure 3
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Changes in suppliers’ costs
17.Table 2 below provides an illustrative estimate of the increase in costs that suppliers face in 2008.
Various costs that suppliers need to recover from domestic customers are increasing, including network
charges and measures to tackle climate change.306 However, such has been the increase in wholesale costs,
we think this is the dominant area of higher cost for a number of suppliers, particularly for gas. In the table,
the “energy, supply costs and margin” is a residual ﬁgure, based on an annual bill minus the known costs
to suppliers.
306 The Renewable Obligation increases from 7.9% to 9.1% on 1 April 2008. The RO currently adds around £10 to an electricity
bill per year and is set to rise to around £20 a year by 2015. The Carbon Emission Reduction Target (CERT) replaces the
Energy EYciency Commitment in April 2008 and it is estimated that the cost will increase from £18 to £38 for the average
customer bill in 2008. The cost of the European Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is estimated at £31 per customer for
2008 and this is already reﬂected in the wholesale electricity cost. Network charges to pay for upgrades to invest in Britain’s
pipes and wires increased on average by around £11.37 for gas and £1.37 for electricity in 2007–08; and in 2008–09 they will
rise on average by around £2 in gas and £1 for electricity for a typical domestic customer.
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Table 2
ESTIMATED AVERAGE DOMESTIC ENERGY BILL COMPOSITION
2007–08 to 2008–09 YoY % Share of total
2007–08 2008–09 Change bill 2008–09
Bill Composition Gas Elec Gas Elec Gas Elec Gas Elec
Energy, supply costs
and margin £404 £254 £454 £283 12% 11% 71% 69%
Distribution 92 62 115 62 25% 0% 18% 15%
Transmission 12 13 10 13 "17% 0% 2% 3%
VAT 28 18 31 20 11% 11% 5% 5%
Environmental 9 16 19 30 111% 88% 3% 7%
Meter provision 12 4 14 4.5 17% 13% 2% 1%
Average current bill £557 £367 £643 £412 15% 12% 100% 100%
Source: Ofgem
18. The Renewables Obligation (included above in environmental costs) obliges electricity suppliers to
source an increasing share of their power generation from renewable sources. Where a power supplier is
unable to meet their obligation from their own generation they must buy renewable energy from accredited
suppliers or pay a buyout price to meet the obligation. The share of energy that suppliers are obliged to
source from renewable increases on 1 April 2008 from 7.9% to 9.1%.
Switching
19. In response to competition on price and the introduction of new products, there has been a steady
increase in the level of switching between gas and electricity suppliers, with the level in 2007 exceeding that
seen in 2006. Figure 4 and Table 3 below show the number of monthly and annual transfers of domestic gas
and electricity customers.307
Figure 4
MONTHLY CUSTOMER TRANSFERS IN GAS AND ELECTRICITY
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307 The ﬁgures show the number of meter points that are transferred from one supplier to another. Therefore, customers who
switch more than once will be counted more than once in the annual switching ﬁgures.
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Table 3
TOTAL ANNUAL TRANSFERS IN GAS AND ELECTRICITY
Total transfers Jan to Dec 2004 Jan to Dec 2005 Jan to Dec 2006 Jan to Dec 2007
Electricity 4,229,023 4,316,401 4,820,756 5,157,028
Gas 3,588,634 3,510,976 3,915,480 3,982,207
Source: Ofgem
20. There are approximately 26 million domestic electricity and 21 million domestic gas customers in
Great Britain. Based on a consumer survey undertaken by Ipsos Mori in early 2007, around 22% and 19%
of these electricity and gas customers respectively switched their supplier in 2006.308
21. Datamonitor has estimated that of the 21.5 million customers taking both gas and electricity, 80%
have switched either their gas or electricity since the market opened to competition. Taking the market as
a whole, and including electricity only customers, Datamonitor estimates that 70% of households have
engaged in the energy market by switching either their gas or electricity supplier.309
22. However, there is evidence that within some groups of customers, the percentage who have never
switched supplier is higher eg amongst those who pay by standard credit. We will be doing more work to
understand the reasons for this and what action can be taken as part of the probe.
Cross-sector switching comparison
23. Evidence fromOfcom research in 2006 provides a benchmark with which to compare switching rates
and the ease of switching in the gas and electricity markets. The ﬁrst chart in Figure 5 indicates that relative
to sectors with similar characteristics (eg network characteristics and the presence of an incumbent in the
case of telecoms) the number of customers who have switched is broadly similar. The second chart in Figure
5 indicates that when compared to the telecoms industry the relative ease of switching is deemed to be
similar.
Figure 5
COMPARISON BETWEEN SECTORS OF THE PERCENTAGE OF SWITCHERS
AND EASE OF SWITCHING
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Sources: Accent 2005 for gas and electricity (commissioned by Ofgem) and Ofcom’s Consumer Experience
Report 2006 for telecoms and car insurance. *Datamonitor Report “The true state of the market—an
analysis of dual fuel switching in the UK energy market” January 2008.
308 The Ipsos Mori consumer omnibus survey is available from our website at
http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/Sustainability/SocAction/Publications/Documents1/Switching%20Rates%20for%20Vulnerable
%20Customers%20Report.pdf
309 Datamonitor’s report is available from www.datamonitor.com.
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Market shares
24. Customers are still leaving their incumbent suppliers and the market shares of the incumbents
continue to fall. British Gas’ market share for gas has continued to decline (in December 2007 it was 46%),
while the electricity market incumbents have less than half the customers in 8 of the 14 regions.
25. Nationally, in electricity and gas, SSE has seen the biggest increase in its share of customers. It has
gained four million extra customers in Britain in the last three years and has moved to the second biggest
supplier behind British Gas. During this period SSE has consistently been one of the most competitive
suppliers on price and has been rated the highest supplier for customer service. British Gas has seen the
biggest fall in market share in gas, while E.On has seen the biggest fall in electricity.
Table 4
NATIONAL MARKET SHARES IN GAS
Change in
market
share
Group Dec 2002 Dec 2003 Dec 2004 Dec 2005 Dec 2006 Dec 2007 2002–07
British Gas 63 61 57 52 48 46 "17
E.On 12 12 13 13 13 13 1
EDF Energy 5 5 5 5 7 7 2
npower 9 9 9 10 11 12 3
Scottish Power 5 6 8 9 9 9 4
SSE 6 7 8 10 12 14 8
Others 0.2 0.6 0.3 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.2
Source: Ofgem analysis
Table 5
NATIONAL MARKET SHARES IN ELECTRICITY
Change in
market
share
Group Dec 2002 Dec 2003 Dec 2004 Dec 2005 Dec 2006 Dec 2007 2002–07
British Gas 22 24 23 22 22 22 0
E.On 22 22 21 20 19 18 "4
EDF Energy 15 14 13 13 14 13 "2
npower 17 15 15 15 16 15 "2
Scottish Power 10 11 12 13 12 12 2
SSE 13 14 15 16 17 18 5
Others 0.3 0.7 0.4 0.6 0.2 0.3 0
Source: Ofgem analysis
26. To understand in more detail the change in electricity market share it is necessary to consider the
market shares of the incumbent electricity suppliers in each of the old Public Electricity Supply regions. This
is because there was originally a monopoly electricity supplier in each of these 14 regions.
27. In December 2007 the market shares of the electricity incumbents was below 50% in 8 out of the 14
regions. Figure 6 shows the regional market share of the incumbent electricity supplier in each region. The
incumbent supply group is identiﬁed in brackets alongside the name of the region.
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Figure 6
ELECTRICITY REGIONAL MARKET SHARES (DECEMBER 2007)
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Retail market concentration
28. In some markets there may be many buyers and sellers. In others, the market may be concentrated
in the hands of a very small number of participants. In extreme cases there may be only one seller (a
monopolist) or one buyer (amonopsonist). The level ofmarket concentration can, therefore, provide further
clues as to the nature of competition. Very generally, the more concentrated the market, the weaker the
competitive inﬂuence ﬁrms are likely to have.
29. The Herﬁndahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is one method of measuring the level of concentration and
is part of the conventional toolkit used by competition authorities as part merger assessments. The HHI
takes account of the diVerences in market participants’ size and it is calculated by summing the squares of
the market shares of all the ﬁrms engaged in the market. The maximum that an HHI can be is 10,000. The
OFT consider that amarket with aHHI score of above 1,000 would be regarded as concentrated and a score
above 1,800 would be regarded as highly concentrated. That said, care should be taken in interpreting HHI
scores. For instance, in comparing HHIs in diVerent markets, account should be taken of the diVerent cost
structures in operation.
30. Tables 6 and 7 show the HHI in the national gas market and the average HHI across the 14 regions
in electricity respectively. These tables illustrate that both sets of HHIs have been declining steadily over the
past ﬁve years.
Table 6
MEASURE OF CONCENTRATION (HHI) IN THE GAS MARKETS
Dec 2002 Dec 2003 Dec 2004 Dec 2005 Dec 2006 Dec 2007
National 4,301 4,049 3,610 3,206 2,841 2,722
Table 7
MEASURE OF CONCENTRATION (HHI) IN THE ELECTRICITY REGIONAL MARKETS
Dec 2002 Dec 2003 Dec 2004 Dec 2005 Dec 2006 Dec 2007
Average across Regions 4,892 4,557 4,236 4,002 3,724 3,461
Source: Ofgem analysis
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Small new entrants
31. As well as the “big six” domestic suppliers, there are six active small suppliers licensed in the energy
market. In a number of cases, these suppliers oVer products in niche markets. For example, Ecotricity and
Good Energy oVer “green” products or tariVs. One newer supplier, First Utility, is oVering a smart meter
to its customers, complete with a home display unit, and Utilita is oVering competitive pricing focused at
PPM customers. In the small and medium enterprise (SME) market three new entrants are Opus, Corona
and Bizz Energy.
32. There are also other active small suppliers who are not licensed but have ongoing arrangements with
more established suppliers. These companiesmay provide specialised social oVerings such as EBICo. EBICo
is a not-for-proﬁt energy company that oVers PPM customers the same unit price as customers paying by
other payment methods. This company obtains energy from one of the larger suppliers, but has separate
pricing arrangements.
33. While these suppliers have been gaining customers, they have less than 0.5% of the market. As part
of the probe wewill be looking to understand the reasons why small new entrants have not been able to enter
the market more eVectively.
Q2. Whether there is eVective competition in the wholesale markets for gas and electricity
34. In wholesale markets, as in retail markets, a range of information is used in assessing the nature of
competition. Below we consider evidence on price movements, market shares, liquidity in the market and
also the interaction between the UK and continental markets.
Price movements
35. Understanding price developments is key to understanding whether competition is operating
eVectively. In particular, we need to understand whether price levels and changes in prices are driven by
changes in demand or supply (ie cost) conditions or whether ﬁrms are exploiting market power and raising
prices above competitive levels. Below we present evidence on the factors we view as having contributed to
recent increases in wholesale price levels. The evidence suggests that recentwholesale gas and electricity price
increases appear to be largely driven by the main cost drivers.
Wholesale energy price increases
36. To understand the determinants of electricity prices, it is helpful to note that a signiﬁcant share of
GB electricity generation is gas and coal ﬁred (around 75%) as shown in Figure 7 below, this is important
since these sources of generation are usually the ones called on when an extra unit of electricity is needed—
ie they are themarginal source of supply. Both these energy sources are exposed to the international markets
and can consequently be aVected by price movements in these markets.
Figure 7
GB ELECTRICITY GENERATION CAPACITY (2007)
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Source: National Grid
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37. High world oil prices are reﬂected in gas prices, particularly since the GB market is now increasingly
exposed to the European markets where oil and gas prices are closely linked as a result of the market’s
structure.310 The price of all four main energy sources (coal, oil, gas and electricity) have increased
signiﬁcantly between August 2007 and now. Global Liqueﬁed Natural Gas (LNG) markets were also much
tighter thanwinter 2006–07 due to unexpected higher global LNGdemand, particularly fromAsianmarkets
such as Japan. Charts 8b and 8c show that prices are expected to remain high for next winter and
summer 2009.
Figure 8a
UK ENERGY PRICES MAY 2005—MARCH 2008 (30 DAY MOVING AVERAGE)
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Figure 8b
FORWARD CONTRACT PRICE WINTER 2008–09 FOR ELECTRICITY, COAL, OIL (BRENT
CRUDE) AND GAS
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310 Speciﬁcally, it is because gas prices are linked to oil prices through formulae in long term contracts.
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Figure 8c
FORWARD CONTRACT PRICE Summer 2009 FOR ELECTRICITY, COAL, OIL (BRENT
CRUDE) AND GAS
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Environmental costs
38. In addition to upward pressure from global oil, coal and gas prices, GB prices have also risen as a
result of programmes introduced by the government to tackle climate change ie Phase II of the EU
Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) and the renewable obligation for GB power generation.
39. Phase II of the ETS started in January 2008. As a result, the price of carbon has increased from
virtually zero before the turn of the year to around ƒ23/t (euros per tonne) today. Generators will seek to
recover the costs of these permits through the price at which they sell their generation, either in the wholesale
market or to their own supply business. Even though they receive some of the permits for free they will still
seek to recover the value of the permit, since otherwise it would be more proﬁtable not to generate and to
sell the permit in the EU ETS market. The impact of this increase in the carbon price accounts for about
an extra £9/MWh (pounds per Megawatt hour) in wholesale electricity prices. Under the UK’s National
Allocation Plan, large electricity generators receive slightly less than half of their emission allowances free
of charge, so the resulting increase in the price of power represents awindfall gain for these generators. Based
on today’s carbon prices, these free emission allowances represent a windfall of emission allowances of
around £9 billion pre-tax over the ﬁve year compliance period.
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Figure 9
ETS CARBON PRICE
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Possible infrastructure constraints
40. Constraints on gas supply infrastructure can cause peaks in prices, choking oV consumer demand
when the market believes supply capacity constraints are signiﬁcant. While the UK gas infrastructure
position is signiﬁcantly better in 2007–08 with more import and storage capability than in winter 2005–06,
some of the expected capacity is now coming on later than planned. However, compared to winter 2006/07,
last winter was very mild both here and on the continent which helped to keep GB gas prices lower than this
winter to date.
41. Overall, evidence points to a combination of energy price increases driven by price increases in global
energy markets, as well as, environmental policy levies. However, it is useful to consider other indicators
commonly used to assess the potential eVectiveness of competition in a market. The next section considers
evidence on market shares in the wholesale gas and electricity markets.
Wholesale gas market shares
42. For market deﬁnition purposes here we consider the relevant gas market to encompass those
companies involved in supplying gas on to the GBNational Transmission System (NTS). There are around
120 companies that were active in supplying gas onto the NTS in 2007. Due to the large number of
companies active in the gas market we provide an overview of gas supply by broad supply source, below.
43. The gas supply shares for the four main gas delivery sources in calendar year 2007 were: 70% from
Beach (a combination of more mature UK continental shelf (UKCS) and Norwegian ﬁelds); 12% Langeled
(a pipeline carrying gas fromNorwegian ﬁelds); 7%Bacton BalgzandLine (the new gas import pipeline from
the Netherlands, known as BBL); and the remainder from LNG, storage and the gas interconnector (a two
way gas pipeline, known as IUK, connecting the UK with Belgium). Within each of these key sources of
supply a varying number of companies operate.
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Figure 10
WHOLESALE GAS MARKET SUPPLY SHARES, BY SUPPLY SOURCE 2007
Bacton-BBL
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Source: National Grid
Gas market concentration
44. The level of market concentration can provide clues as to the nature of competition. Generally, the
more concentrated the market, the weaker the competitive inﬂuences are likely to be. As in the retail
markets, the concentration of the gas and electricity wholesale markets can be considered using estimates
of Herﬁndahl-Hirschman Indices (HHI).311
45. One way of deﬁning the market share for calculating concentration ratios in the gas supply market
would be the share of gas deliverability in gigawatt hours per day312 (GWh/day). On this basis, the overall
gas wholesale supply market’s HHI is estimated to be 430, indicating a relatively low concentration.
46. As well as looking at the overall market it is also useful to look at market concentration with respect
to the source of gas delivery. This is because diVerent gas sources will be marginal at diVerent times,
depending on the level of demand, as illustrated in Figure 10. When a gas source is marginal it is possible
that operators have relatively more market power—enabling them to inﬂuence prices to a greater extent.
While the overall HHI score indicates that there are a relatively diverse number of players, some of theUK’s
individual gas supply sources are relatively more concentrated.
Table 8
ESTIMATED MARKET CONCENTRATION BY SUPPLY SOURCE
Estimated HHI
UKCS 704
Norway 2023
Storage313 708
IUK 1,164
BBL 4,400
LNG 3,342
Overall wholesale gas market 430
311 For more information on HHIs see paragraph 28.
312 This analysis combines a number of data sources, reﬂecting Ofgem’s best HHI estimate at the time of writing. Examining
each source of gas delivery on an individual basis can provide a more rounded picture.
313 Excludes Short Range Storage (SRS) controlled by National Grid.
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Source: Ofgem analysis
47. UKCS and storage are the sources with the lowest market concentration, while BBL, LNG and
Norway have relatively higher concentrations.
48. Figure 11 shows daily gas supply for each supply source. Gas supply has been ranked by gas demand,
so day 1 on the chart represents the highest gas demand during the period, and shows the sources used to
meet demand.314 As demand increases more expensive sources of gas bid into the market. While we do not
know exactly what the costs of each supply source are, the chart makes conventional assumptions about the
merit order of each source.
Figure 11
ESTIMATED GAS SUPPLY BY DEMAND ORDER, OCTOBER 2007 TO MARCH 2008
Source: Ofgem analysis, National Grid data. (SRS is mostly controlled by National Grid for balancing,
although some capacity is auctioned)
49. Overall, Figure 11 gives an indication of the number of days each supply source is at the margin. A
concentrated marginal source may have the ability to inﬂuence prices temporarily, bidding them above a
competitive level. Combining the gas load stack with its components concentration ratios enables us to see
which source is at the margin and the sources concentration.
50. Table 9 below, shows the volume of gas delivered per day during Winter 2007–08, as a share of the
estimated total volume each gas source can deliver per day (one way of measuring capacity). The data
showing the maximum volume of gas delivered over theWinter 2007–08 period indicates that, even on these
maximum delivery days, each source is still likely to be capable of delivering more gas. This provides
evidence that it is unlikely that more concentrated supply sources are able to inﬂuence the price of gas at
the margin, since other supply sources still have remaining supply capacity to compete.
Table 9
WINTER 2007–08 GAS DELIVERED AS SHARE OF ESTIMATED TOTAL DELIVERABILITY
(A MEASURE OF CAPACITY)
Ave delivered gas Max delivered gas Min delivered gas
UKCS 73% 84% 54%
Norway 62% 95% 22%
BBL 70% 88% 17%
IUK 22% 58% 0%
Storage 23% 72% 0%
LNG 16% 74% 0%
SRS 1% 28% 0%
Total 53% 68% 38%
314 For example, since gas from UKCS is likely to be the cheapest to supply, this is the ﬁrst source to satisfy demand.
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Sources: Ofgem analysis
51. While some of the more concentrated gas sources are at the margin during periods of peak demand,
the following should be noted: (i) there are very few days during which these sources are themarginal source
supplying peak demand, (ii) the supply market overall has a relatively low concentration, (iii) total supply
capacity is in excess of peak demand, (iv) the total deliverability of each source is in excess of maximum gas
delivered (each source has some additional margin which they can supply to the market), and (v) wholesale
energy buyers have the ability to hedge in advance of the gas delivery day. Hence, on the basis of this
evidence, there are limited signs of one source being able to inﬂuence market price to a signiﬁcant extent.
52. In addition to examining the competitiveness of the gas supply market it is also noteworthy that at
certain price levels a demand side response occurs. This can act as an additional break on potential market
power. The demand side response seen in winter 2005–06 when gas supply capacity was tighter than normal
saw examples of this response.
Wholesale electricity market shares and concentration
53. Similar to the market deﬁnition for gas, we deﬁne the wholesale electricity market as those players
who supply electricity to the National Grid. This deﬁnition hence overstates the case for some electricity
users since 12.7 gigawatts of generation is embedded and not supplied to National Grid. This volume of
generating capacity is four times the output of the very large Drax power station. Figure 12 below shows
the market shares of generators in Great Britain.
Figure 12
GENERATION OUTPUT SHARES, 2007
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54. As for the gas market, we present HHI measures for the electricity market. The HHI of the wholesale
electricity market (based on output) is estimated to be around 986, indicating a relatively low concentration.
55. Looking ahead to the ownership of the generation capacity anticipated to be entering commission,
the concentration outlook continues to be one of a relatively low HHI. Proposed new generating capacity
is being commissioned by the “big six” as well as smaller independents. Figure 13 below shows the forecast
HHI and new generation capacity coming on stream between 2008–09 and 2013–14.315
315 Based on a scenario where all generation which has a connection agreement with NG gets built.
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Figure 13
CAPACITY IN MWh (LHS) AND CONCENTRATION OUTLOOK (RHS) IN HHI
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Vertical integration
56. Evidence suggests the six majors are becoming increasingly vertically integrated. Vertical integration
is often an eYcient response by ﬁrms aiming to minimise their transaction costs and optimise their risk
management strategies. For instance, since the depth316 of the day ahead electricity market is limited (due
in part to the innate inﬂexibility of certain types of generation plant), suppliers can gain greater control of
their potential supply liabilities by owning generation capacity. In particular where they own ﬂexible plants,
enabling a quick response to prices and demand.
57. However, vertical integration, can, in some instances raise competitive concerns. In the energy
market, a high concentration of generation capacity in the hands of a small number of electricity suppliers
could preclude other players from gaining competitive access electricity supply. Figure 14 below shows the
estimated supply—generation balance across the power market, and we can see that the main six retail
suppliers are able to cover their own domestic and SME supply liabilities with their own generation.
58. Around 55% of generation capacity is owned by the six main domestic suppliers (see Figure 12), and
the remaining share would seem suYciently large and ﬂexible enough for potential new entrant to contract
to supply energy for their customers.317
316 Depth is deﬁned here as the volume of day ahead power can be bought in the short term markets.
317 For example, Drax is a large ﬂexible coal plant of between 3 and 4 Gigawatts. Furthermore, much of the new renewable, as
well as new conventional, build is not owned by the main six suppliers. See Figure 11.
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Figure 14
ESTIMATED SUPPLY—GENERATION BALANCE BY SUPPLIER 2006
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Liquidity
59. Liquidity refers to the ability to quickly buy or sell a particular item without causing a signiﬁcant
movement in the price. A liquid market will feature a large number of buyers and sellers ready and willing
to participate in the market at all times. Liquid markets are important in ensuring that price signals to
participants are accurate and to allow participants to adjust contractual positions without materially
altering the prevailing price. Short term exchange liquidity might also lower barriers to entry for new
suppliers.318 It is important to note that a high level of liquidity is not an end in itself, and is merely one
indicator of a healthy market as it makes new entry relatively easy.
60. It is worth noting that theremay be a number of benign explanations for falls in liquidity, for example
improvements in initial contracting, supply-demand balancing and forecasting may cause liquidity to fall.
In addition,more sophisticated products (eg options) are a substitute for direct trading in physical products.
However, at very low levels of liquidity, conﬁdence in traded prices can be undermined.
61. There are a wide range of measures of liquidity, including number of market participants, number of
trades, volumes traded and churn (the number of times a single unit is traded).
Gas
62. The majority of total volume traded in the UK is traded over-the-counter (OTC), with most activity
observed close to real time and close to the delivery of the product, ie volumes are highest for near term
products (day-ahead, week-ahead, month-ahead).
63. The Financial Services Authority (FSA) conducts an annual survey of energy brokers in the UK to
determine total OTC traded volumes, these are reported below.
318 Since the ﬁnancial risk of not being able to buy generation to meeting their supplier obligations could be reduced.
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Table 10
ESTIMATED VALUE OF UK GAS MARKET
Volume traded Est value of market
(billion therms) (£billion)
2006–07 437 134
2005–06 209 108
Increase on 2005–06 226 (109%) 26 (24%)
Source: Financial Services Authority
64. According to the FSA, the total volume of forward traded gas through electronic or voice brokered
services year from 1 August 2006 to 31 July 2007 was 437 billion therms, an increase of 109% on the
previous year.319
Electricity
65. As with gas, the majority of trades in electricity take place OTC, so that the share of trades over
exchanges (usually the APX or ICE) is very small as a share of total trades.
66. As in the gas market, parties trading gas in the UK can utilise a wide range of trading platforms. The
FSA annual survey is reported in the table below.
Table 11
UK ELECTRICITY OTC TRADING VOLUMES
Vol traded Est value of the
(TWh) YoY growth market (£m) YoY growth
2006–07 985 337 (52%) 31 1 (3%)
2005–06 648 30
Source: FSA
67. The relative lack of depth to the exchange traded power market relative to the gas market in the UK
is likely, in part, to be a function vertical integration. That is, power suppliers own a sizable portion of their
own generation capacity, when compared to the UK gas market. In addition, the UK power market is less
well connected in infrastructure terms than some European power markets. For instance, Germany and
France are well connected, allowing greater scope for trading power across borders.
Investment
Gas
68. The increased diversity of gas supply sources goes towards strengthening competition in thewholesale
market as well as ensuring security of supply. Over the last few years the market has delivered several new
import infrastructure projects, including the Langeled pipeline, the BBL interconnector, expanded capacity
of the IUK interconnector and LNG import facilities at Teeside, Isle of Grain and Milford Haven. In
addition to this a number of new storage facilities have also been constructed by market participants and
others are in various stages of the planning process. These have the potential to double the GB storage
capacity; if these projects gain planning permission the extra storage capacity will assist the market in
managing peak winter demand as North Sea production continues to decline. Figure 15 shows the outlook
for LNG infrastructure capacity between 2007–08 and 2012–13.
319 As some voice and electronic brokered services are cleared through exchanges, energy traded on exchanges are excluded from
this analysis to avoid double counting.
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Figure 15
NEW LNG INFRASTRUCTURE
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Electricity
69. We would expect a properly functioning market to send price signals to investors encouraging them
to build the generation capacity to meet required future demand. Below we assess some of the evidence on
market signals for investment.
70. A standard industry measure of proﬁtability in electricity generation is to consider the “spark and
dark” spreads.320 These provide an indication of the expected return from investment in new generating
capacity over the short term. There is much debate about the levels required to encourage new investment
in generation capacity, particularly in the context of current pressure on new plant capital costs. Some of
these capital costs may be attributed to current high commodity prices. Forward spreads for winter 2008–09
can be found below in Table 12. DiVerent eYciency factors can be used to calculate spreads, and it is
noteworthy that new gas plants are able to achieve eYciency rates of around 58%, where 49% to 54% might
be more normal for existing plants.
Table 12
WINTER 2008–09 FORWARD SPREADS (13/3/2008)
Winter 2008–09 (£/MWh)
Spark 17.56
Dark 34.60
Clean Spark 12.11
Clean Dark 22.10
Clean Spark (!O&M !Transportation321) 11.71
Clean Dark (!O&M !Transportation) 16.21
Source: Ofgem analysis, Bloomberg data. EYciency factors (heat rate) taken to be:
Spark 54% and Dark 37%.
71. Long lead times for building plant, combined with large ﬁxed costs and long payback periods mean
that market uncertainty can lead to higher discount factors and risk coeYcients being used in making
investment decisions. A variety of factors can aVect these investment payback calculations, not least of
which is conﬁdence in the market.
72. Rates of proposed investment in new generation capacity provide some evidence that the wholesale
market is encouraging the private investment needed to meet future UK energy demand. For each of the
years in Figure 16 below, the ﬁrst bar shows the amount of generation capacity which is already in existence
320 The spark spread is the diVerence between the electricity price and the price of gas used to generate it. The dark spread is the
diVerence between the electricity price and the price of coal used to generate it. Clean spreads also take into account the cost
of buying allowances to emit CO2 under the European Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS).
321 O&M stands for Operation and Maintenance. Many GB coal plants are built near disused GB coal ﬁelds and not near to
coal sources, such as ports. These adjustment factors can, therefore, play a signiﬁcant role on indicating eYciency.
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or under construction; the second bar adds to this the generation capacity not yet built butwhich has consent
under section 32 or section 36 of the Electricity Act 1989; and the third bar adds in all possible capacity from
generation that has a connection agreement with National Grid.
Figure 16
NEW GENERATION CAPACITY OUTLOOK
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73. The extent of investment in new generation capacity we have seen over the last 10 years, as well as
planned capacity, suggest the market is functioning well and encouraging investment.
European interaction
74. GB—European energy market interaction has increased signiﬁcantly over the last few years, and
short term prices on the GB, Zeebrugge (Belgium), and TTF (the Netherlands) markets are becoming
increasingly correlated. That said European market liberalisation is crucial to increase price transparency
and increase European and GB market eYciency. We cover the GB markets interaction with European
markets in response to question 5, below.
Q3. The implications of growing consolidation in the energy market
75. A discussion of the impact that consolidation may have had on energymarket competition is covered
in response to questions 1 (on the retail market) and 2 (on the wholesale market). Ofgem’s market probe
will examine the nature of competition in the gas and electricity retail markets.
Q4. The relationship between the wholesale and retail markets for electricity and gas
76. The volatility in energy prices means that the cost of the gas and electricity is the largest and most
diYcult component of energy supply cost to estimate.While network and environmental cost will be subject
to the same inﬂuences for all suppliers, a supplier’s actual energy costs depend on its own forward
purchasing strategy—howmuch gas and electricity it has bought to cover customer requirements at diVerent
times. In the more volatile gas market we have witnessed, with wholesale gas prices rising by around 40%
to 60% over the last year (depending on the time period measured), forward purchasing strategies are likely
to be an important determinant of cost.
77. A key decision a supplier makes in energy procurement is what proportion of the energy should be
bought ahead (hedged) on the forwardmarkets. If they don’t buy all of their customer’s energy requirements
in advance they must buy them at day ahead or spot prices. Hedging reduces suppliers’ exposure to the
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volatility of day ahead and spot prices. But it also leaves suppliers in a less ﬂexible position, andmore reliant
on their forecasts for their customer numbers and their customer demand being accurate. The balance
between hedging and buying at spot can impact heavily on the wholesale costs faced by a supplier.
78. Britain has faced increased exposure to global markets (from increased supplies being sourced
through new infrastructure connections withNorway and theNetherlands) at a time when wholesale energy
prices have increased signiﬁcantly. The rise in energy prices means that the spread of diVerent wholesale
energy prices faced by a supplier also increases. Some suppliers are, therefore likely to be more eVective at
buying low cost than others.
79. Figure 17 shows the correlation between the average annual dual fuel standard credit tariV (the red
line) and the wholesale day-ahead energy price for an average domestic consumer’s annual consumption322
(the green line). Wholesale energy costs are only one part of the costs faced by suppliers, but do represent
around 70% of the total cost in the average 2007 domestic customer bill.
Figure 17
WHOLESALE AND RETAIL ENERGY PRICES, CONSTANT Q1 2008 PRICES
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80. Wholesale prices rose between q2 2005 and q1 2006 and subsequently fell between q1 2006 and q2
2006. However, retail prices did not fall to the same extent as wholesale prices between q1 2006 and q2 2007.
It is possible that this relationship results from a combination of factors aVecting suppliers. These factors
might include: (i) increases in environmental costs, (ii) increases in charges tomaintain the network, and (iii)
heightened price uncertainty in the European and global energy markets going forward—such uncertainty
could be manifesting itself in an aversion, on the part of retail suppliers, to pass through price falls in the
short term, because the risk of short term prices increasing again might be deemed to be high.323
Q5. The interaction between the GB and European energy markets
81. The interaction betweenGB andEuropeanmarkets has increased signiﬁcantly in the last few of years.
The declining production of the UK continental shelf, the advent of new supply infrastructure from
Norwegian ﬁelds, and a new import pipeline from the Netherlands324 mean that the UK is becoming
increasingly exposed to European energy markets.
82. In this section, we examine the behaviour of GB gas and electricity prices and infrastructure
connections with Europe, as well as providing an overview of the European energy market.
322 The weighted average of day ahead gas and power prices.
323 The increased volatility of global commodity prices (not least of which is crude oil rising to $100 barrel) is likely to be a good
indicator of increased uncertainty.
324 The BBL pipeline entered commission in late 2006 and provided around 7% of UK gas supply in the calendar year 2007. See
chart in Q2—BBL pipeline.
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Gas: price diVerentials and infrastructure ﬂows
83. GB gas supply infrastructure with the continent consists of two major interconnectors, BBL325
(ﬂowing from the Netherlands to GB) and IUK326 (ﬂowing in both directions, to and from Belgium to GB).
In addition to this there are a number of pipelines supplying gas from UK and Norwegian gas ﬁelds.
84. Figure 18 shows the correlation between day ahead gas prices in Britain, Zeebrugge in Belgium and
the Title Transfer Facility (TTF), a gas trading hub based in the Netherlands. It is clear that apart from a
relatively short period around January 2006, there is a strong price correlation. This is likely to be due in
part to the commissioning of the BBL pipeline in late 2006.
Figure 18
GB, ZEE AND TTF DAY AHEAD PRICES
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85. On examination of Figure 19 (showing IUK exports from GB to Belgium and BBL ﬂows from the
Netherlands to GB) there is some evidence that IUK ﬂows respond to price diVerentials between GB and
Belgium. Broadly, where the Belgian price is higher, ﬂows to Belgium increase, and where the GB price is
higher, ﬂows switch to GB. This is consistent with the reasonable price correlation observed (particularly
from January 2007 onwards) between GB, Belgium and the Netherlands in Figure 18.
86. BBL is a one way pipeline between the Netherlands and GB, and is generally used by UK suppliers
for sourcing gas under longer term contract. Since, ﬂows are only one way it is not possible for the BBL
pipeline to respond in the same way as the IUK interconnector, although some price driven behaviour may
be observed—for instance a drop oV of ﬂows between September and October 2007.
325 Bacton Balgzand Line (BBL) entered commission in Q3 2006.
326 Interconnector UK (IUK).
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Figure 19
IUK AND BBL FLOWS AND PRICES
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87. It is noteworthy, however, that the depth of the short term markets in the Netherlands and Belgium
is very limited in comparison with the GBmarket. The vast majority of European gas is traded on long term
(oil indexed) contracts. Consequently, only a small share of European supply is sourced from the Belgian
and Dutch markets, meaning the large GB wholesale market heavily inﬂuences day-ahead Belgian and
Dutch prices. The prices European energy suppliers actually face are relatively opaque.
88. In relation to ﬂows from Norwegian gas ﬁelds, we initially observe a reduction in ﬂows to the UK in
winter 2007 compared to the previous winter, while at the same time ﬂows to the continent increased.
Although GB gas supplies have been adequate this winter, this fall may initially seem of concern.
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89. One possible explanation for this drop in early winter is that the GB market is receiving this gas via
BBL instead. It is clear from Figure 20 below that GB received around 10–15 million cubic metres (mcm)
per day more through BBL this winter (November and December 2007) than last winter. It is also clear that
the signiﬁcant fall oV in Norwegian ﬂows to GB in the last week of October 2007 coincides closely with the
ramp up of BBL (approx 25mcm/day). In addition toNorwegian gas the BBL pipeline can be used to source
ﬂows from and through Germany and Belgium.
90. Another explanation for the drop oV in ﬂow to GB in October/November could be a combination
of production outages at Norwegian ﬁelds, (eg Njord, Kviteebjorn, Ormen Lange) and continental buyers
exercising ﬂexible terms in their contracts to increase their supplies. For instance, ﬁgure 20 shows a year on
year fall in ﬂows to GB and an increase in ﬂows to Germany, France and Belgium fromOctober/November
onwards.
Figure 20
NORWEGIAN, IUK AND BBL IMPORTS
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Figure 21
AVERAGE MONTHLY PIPELINE UTILISATION
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UK-European gas liquidity
91. Trading in the UK gas market is signiﬁcantly higher when compared to European markets in recent
years, the open market for wholesale gas in GB is the most mature energy market in Europe, both in terms
of traded volume and value. Greater market liquidity is generally thought to increase market eYciency, and
as such is generally accepted as a feature of a well functioning market. As shown in Table 10, the volume
trade on the GB gas market has increased rapidly, year-on-year (YoY) between 2005/06 and 2006–07 the
volume of trade rose 109%, and the value of trade on market increased by 24%.
92. Figure 22 showing GB and European gas trading statistics from the FSA illustrate that the volume of
gas traded on the openmarket in GB is signiﬁcantly greater than that traded on the European openmarket.
Figure 22
GB-EUROPEAN ANNUAL GAS TRADING VOLUMES (OVER-THE-COUNTER)
500
400
300
200
100
0
bi
lli
on
 th
er
m
s
2003/4             2004/5             2005/6            2006/7
UK Gas                Euro Gas
UK and European Annual OTC gas volumes
Source: FSA
Lack of liberalisation and transparency in euro market
93. The lack of eVective gas market liberalisation on the continent means that the GB market is unlikely
to get the full beneﬁts of gas producers and suppliers seeking out the most attractive destination for their
gas and supplying gas to GB at times when our market has relatively high prices. Related to this point is the
fact that European gas markets are far less transparent than the GB market. This can make it diYcult for
market participants to assess whereNorwegian ﬂows are going and to trackmovements in customer demand
on a daily basis. This uncertainty is likely to add to the daily and within day volatility of GB spot prices,
increasing prices and the risk premium that customers need to pay to ﬁx prices.
Euro gas contracts oil indexed
94. A feature of the less liberalised continental gas market is that contract gas prices are generally linked
to oil prices through pricing formulas meaning that contract gas prices adjust to oil prices with a lag. Oil
prices have increased over the last year to over $100/barrel. This means that European buyers can take the
opportunity to arbitrage their long term contract gas price against the spot gas price using the ﬂexibility they
have to vary the volumes they take under contract. It also means that European gas prices rise to higher
levels than gas supply and demand fundamentals might suggest they should, which in turn means that GB
prices have to be higher to attract marginal gas supplies for domestic consumption.
95. European long term contract prices move with changes in the oil prices with a lag of around six to
nine months. Therefore, we expect the high sustained oil price to continue to be a factor behind high UK
and European gas prices looking forward.
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Electricity
96. The GB electricity market is heavily inﬂuenced by international coal and gas prices, as shown in
Figure 6, 38% and 37% respectively, of GB power generation is fuelled from these fuel sources. In addition
to a 2 gigawatt interconnector with France,327 the remainder of GB generation is from nuclear, oil, and
renewable sources.
GB-France power price correlation
97. Figure 23 below shows the correlation betweenGB and French electricity prices. Detailed Ofgem and
National Grid analysis suggest there is strong evidence that the interconnector is functioning well, and
responding as expected to price diVerentials.
98. Taking into account the limited 2GW capacity, the GB and French power prices show a strong
correlation. More recently the spike in prices in December 2007 saw French power reach above £200328 and
GB prices peak at around £93.
Figure 23
GB AND FRENCH ELECTRICITY PRICES
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99. Overall, GB and French prices show a correlation, which has increased more recently as gas
infrastructure and supply sources have become more interlinked.
Q6. The eVectiveness of regulatory oversight of the energy market
100. Strong independent regulation has a key part to play in maintaining a well-functioning market.
Companies want to know that the investment climate will remain stable and that they will not face
unacceptable burdens—otherwise they may invest their money elsewhere. Customers want to know that if
their supplier does not play by the rules, ﬁrm action will be taken and consumers will be protected. It is
important to consider whether these challenges are being met.
101. Let us consider the customer perspective ﬁrst. Markets are never perfect. Sometimes customers are
treated unfairly and sometimes companies behave in an anti-competitive way. We have a range of powers
at our disposal to deal with this activity and these can be considered across four main areas: our ongoing
monitoring of the markets; the informal inﬂuence we can exercise through encouraging best practice and
“naming and shaming” companies; the rules we place on suppliers in their licences; and the formal powers
we can exercise under the Gas and Electricity Acts and competition law.
102. Monitoring the market: We conduct surveillance into the retail and the wholesale energy markets,
analysing prices, supply, demand and market activity, plus more specialised analysis of individual areas eg
quantitative analysis of the relationship between wholesale and retail prices. This constant market
monitoring can bring problems to light and lead to action under our powers below.
327 UK peak demand recorded in 2002 was 61.7 GW—source: DTI.
328 French peak thought to be driven by French power station outages due to strikes.
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103. Naming and shaming: In 2007 we “named and shamed” two suppliers—EDF Energy and Scottish
Power—who had not passed through falling wholesale prices to their customers. Within days they had
announced retail price cuts for their customers. In June 2007, we singled out Npower and British Gas for
their prepaymentmeter (PPM) tariVs relative to other suppliers urging customers on these tariVs to consider
switching away. In February 2008, we named and shamed Npower for not doing as much as other suppliers
to help customers in debt.
104. Placing obligations in suppliers’ licences: In our 2007 supply licence review we lifted certain
conditions which were either redundant or no longer required given other protections, to help promote new
entry and the development of new tariVs and services. For vulnerable customers however we strengthened
the range of protections. For example, we have extended a ban on gas suppliers from disconnecting older
customers over the winter to electricity suppliers. New obligations now require the timely recalibration of
prepayment meters after a price change, following earlier intervention by Ofgem and guidelines to bring
three suppliers into line.We have maintained requirements in the licence on suppliers to provide a full range
of payment options to suit customers’ needs. We have broadened the requirements on suppliers to provide
information to customers on the dangers of carbon monoxide poisoning and the beneﬁts of ﬁtting carbon
monoxide alarms. This is in addition to the existing requirement to provide free gas safety checks for
pensioners in receipt of certain beneﬁts.
105. Using powers under energy and competition legislation: Ofgem has a range of powers under theGas
and Electricity Acts and under the Competition and Enterprise Acts. We have used these to good eVect to
help make the market work better for customers. We have in the past taken action against suppliers for mis-
selling and for blocking customer transfers, including the imposition of a £2 million ﬁne. More recently we
have used the Competition Act to tackle anti-competitive behaviour by National Grid in the gas metering
market which has harmed competition and consumers. Our investigation resulted, in February 2008, in the
imposition of a £41.6 million ﬁne—the biggest ever ﬁne for this type of competition law breach. The
Enterprise Act gives us powers to refer the market to the Competition Commission, and to gather detailed
ﬁnancial information from the companies we regulate. It also gives the OYce of Fair Trading (OFT) the
power to prosecute individuals who engage in cartels. We have drawn on some of these powers in the past,
during the wide-ranging wholesale market probe in 2004–05, and we are currently making use of them again
as part of our investigation into the energy supply markets.
106. Although we have not seen conclusive evidence that the market is failing, we know that customer
conﬁdence is vital in order for amarket to function well—and it is clear in this case that customer conﬁdence
has been damaged. Our investigation into the energy supply markets, announced on 21 February, will look
at whether the market is working well for all consumers—and not just particular groups such as those who
are on the cheapest online deals.
107. We expect to publish our initial ﬁndings before the end of September. If we conclude that further
action is required, this could take several forms. For example, we could refer the market to the Competition
Commission for another investigation or we could take more immediate action under our existing powers
eg investigating and imposing penalties on companies that have broken competition law; changing the
licences under which all companies in the energy market have to operate; recommending legislative changes
to the government; or campaigning to promote customer awareness and participation in the market.
108. If anyone has any evidence of anti-competitive behaviour, we urge them to bring it to us. We will
not hesitate to use our powers to investigate and, if necessary, impose penalties on any energy company that
has been found to have broken competition law.
109. From the companies’ perspective, Britain’s stable regulatory regime has proved attractive to
investors. Between privatisation and 2006 over £80 billion has been invested in new oil and gas production
from the North Sea; over £30 billion in the gas and electricity networks; and £14 billion in new electricity
generation stations and in refurbishing coal ﬁred stations to create a more diverse generating mix. This is
clearly good for energy companies—and it is good for consumers too. Britain’s domestic gas supplies are
declining faster than expected and we have ambitious targets for renewable energy. In order to secure our
energy supplies and protect the environment, therefore, unprecedented levels of investment are required. In
addition, where new players enter the market, competition increases and customers beneﬁt from greater
choice.
110. We must therefore maintain a stable regulatory regime which gives investors conﬁdence and
removes unnecessary administrative burdens, whilst being prepared to boost consumer protection where it
is necessary and proportionate. In the energy supply markets, Ofgem is working to tackle barriers to entry
and give more choice to customers. In 2007 we cut the energy supply licence from 160 pages to 60 pages,
removing barriers to entry like the “28 day rule” which many saw as preventing suppliers from oVering long
term energy services such as the installation of household electricity generation or measures to improve
energy eYciency. We also amended the rules to make it easier for suppliers to install smart meters which
have the potential to help cut emissions and improve the accuracy of customer bills. All these steps help to
encourage investment in the market.
111. Overall we believe that our work is helping to support the operation of the market whilst providing
customer protection where necessary.
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Q7. Progress in reducing fuel poverty and the appropriate policy instruments for doing so
112. A household is considered to be in fuel poverty when it spends more than 10% of its income on gas
and electricity. Three main factors are responsible: high energy prices, low incomes and poor housing.
113. The number of customers living in fuel poverty declined steadily between 1996 and 2003, with little
movement in overall ﬁgures in 2004. These reductions resulted from a combination of improvements to
income (such as the new pension credit arrangements), improved energy eYciency (primarily through the
Energy EYciency Commitment andGovernment funded fuel poverty schemes such as theWarm Front and
its counterparts in Scotland and Wales) and reductions in energy prices. The Government estimates that
nearly three quarters of the reduction in fuel poverty numbers in England between 1996 and 2005 was as a
result of improvements to incomes, 20% was due to improving energy eYciency and only 5% was due to
falling fuel prices.329 In Scotland, half of the reduction in fuel poverty between 1996 and 2002 was attributed
to rising incomes, 35% to falling fuel prices and 15% to improvements in energy eYciency.330
114. However, the number of households in fuel poverty has risen in the last three years as a result of
electricity and gas price increases. Current estimates suggest that there were over 4 million households in
fuel poverty in the UK in 2006.331 Ofgem is committed to doing all it can to ensure prices are no higher than
they need to be.However, prices are unlikely to return to the lower levels of the 1990s because of rising global
energy demand and higher commodity prices. An enduring and sustainable solution to fuel poverty will,
therefore, need to focus on the issues of housing and incomes which are principally for Government to
address.
Housing
115. Signiﬁcant strides have been made to improve the energy eYciency of housing and to install cost
eVective heating systems through the Decent Homes standard, theWarm Front programme and the Energy
EYciency Commitment. However, Warm Front is focussed on private sector housing. Social housing, on
the other hand, is covered by the Decent Homes Standard and this provides for lower standards of thermal
comfort.332
116. We encourage Government to take a “ﬁnd and ﬁx” approach, to ensure that when someone is
identiﬁed as being in fuel poverty a comprehensive solution is provided to help lift them out. Joined-up
action across Government is therefore essential. For example, we would encourage data sharing between
the Department for Work and Pensions, the EAGA Partnership and energy suppliers to improve the
targeting of the help available. In addition, consideration could be given to extending Warm Front so that
customers are also referred to their supplier for tariV advice or to go onto their social tariV, where applicable.
Incomes
117. In addition, Government should stay focussed on the vital role of the tax and beneﬁt system in
raising incomes. Beneﬁt entitlement checks can help ensure vulnerable customers are getting their fair share
of the millions of pounds of unclaimed beneﬁts. Government could also review the Winter Fuel Payment
and refocus the payments on those who need them the most. Furthermore, additional funding for fuel
poverty programmes could be made available by recycling revenues from environmental schemes. For
example, Ofgem identiﬁed a windfall to electricity generators of up to £9 billion of permits which are
allocated for free under Phase II of the European Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) from 2008 to 2012.
This windfall could be used to help customers in fuel poverty. If Government were to auction allowances
for the following phase of EU ETS, some of the revenue generated from this could also be used to fund
further measures to help tackle fuel poverty and environmental improvements—as recommended by Ofgem
in our submission to the Government’s 2006 Energy Review.
Prices
118. On prices, vulnerable customers can make big savings if they are in a position to switch supplier or
payment method and if the support available fromGovernment and suppliers is better targeted. Customers
who have never switched supplier can make big savings by switching. On average, across all regions,
switching savings amount to £125 for a PPM customer, £93 for a standard credit customer and £56 for a
direct debit customer.
329 The UK Fuel Poverty Strategy, 5th Annual Progress Report (2007).
330 Scottish Household Condition Survey (2002).
331 Ofgem estimates based on Government’s Energy Review Report—July 2006 (projected ﬁgures for 2005 and 2006).
332 The Warm Front scheme sets a target SAP rating of 65 for properties beneﬁting from remedial works. The Decent Homes
Standard requires a SAP rating of greater than 35.
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119. As well as savings available from switching payment method and supplier, a number of suppliers
oVer special discounted tariVs and packages to vulnerable customers that meet certain criteria (such as those
in receipt of government beneﬁts). Ofgem published two reports in 2007 in order to “shine a light” on
suppliers’ social measures, encourage best practice and inform consumer agencies of the range of assistance
available.
120. Ofgem, along with other agencies, works to help improve consumer awareness of these choices and
to help vulnerable customers access the beneﬁts of the competitive energy market. For example, Sir John
Mogg chairs Ofgem’s Social Action Strategy Review Group and will host an Ofgem Fuel Poverty summit
in April. This Summit will focus on identifying ways to ensure that vulnerable customers are able to take
full advantage of the savings available by switching supplier. Where switching is diYcult or not possible, we
will look at what other help may be available to reduce the amount customers have to pay for their fuel.
121. We are also working with Citizens Advice to develop and launch a pilot programme to help educate
low income and hard to reach customers on how to make better choices in the energy market. If the
evaluation of this pilot proves successful, we are hoping that the Government will consider funding a
national rollout of this programme.
122. As part of Ofgem’s energy supply markets probe, referred to above, we are focussing in particular
on whether competition is beneﬁting all customers. This includes those who pay by PPM and Standard
Credit, given the concern about the diVerentials between these tariVs and Direct Debit. In addition, we will
look at whether there are any immediate actions we can take in this area to improve consumer awareness
of the options available. Furthermore, we are looking to tackle any barriers that unreasonably prevent
customers switching supplier. This work includes a review of suppliers’ policies on blocking customers who
are in debt from switching.
123. Given the challenge of targeting help, we would recommend that the Government keeps up the
“Winter Initiative”: a practical way to improve targeting, using Department of Work and Pensions (DWP)
data, of suppliers’ social measures as well as the energy eYciency help available from theGovernment under
the Warm Front scheme and the suppliers through the Carbon Emissions Reduction Target. Ofgem led the
ﬁrst such initiative in winter 2006–07. The Government should also consider how it could facilitate data
sharing between theDWP,HMRevenue andCustoms and energy suppliers to improve the targeting of their
social programmes to assist those who need them most.
124. I hope that this information and analysis is useful to the Committee. If Members have any further
questions, my colleagues and I would be happy to explore these issues in more detail, either in oral evidence
or in a supplementary memorandum.
1 April 2008
Further supplementary memorandum submitted by the OYce of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem)
1. On 17 June 2008 Ofgem’s Chief Executive, Alistair Buchanan, and Managing Director of Markets,
Andrew Wright, gave oral evidence to the Business and Enterprise Select Committee. There are several
issues on which we thought it would be helpful to provide the Committee with further information.
Investigating the Wholesale Energy Markets
2. We can assure the Committee that our decision to launch a probe into the energy supply markets
neither precludes us from investigating the wholesale markets nor stops our ongoing monitoring.
3. The background to our announcement of February 2008, which focused principally on the
downstream supply market, was of rising customer concern about bills. When we met the Chancellor in the
previous month, only one major supplier had raised its prices. A month later ﬁve of the six had done so, and
the spread between the oVers available to customers had narrowed signiﬁcantly. In addition, the diVerentials
between the tariVs for diVerent payment methods had been rising. Our view was that the level of customer
concern about this behaviour in the retail market justiﬁed investigation.
4. At the same time, our eye remains very ﬁrmly on the position in the wholesale markets. Current work
in that area includes:
— an investigation into Scottish Power and Scottish and Southern Energy, focusing speciﬁcally on
allegations of uncompetitive behaviour in the upstream generation market;
— examining the relationship between wholesale and retail energy prices as part of our current supply
markets probe;
— the impact of vertical integration on energy supply markets is also being covered in the probe; and
— we have also recently published National Grid’s latest winter outlook report, analysing the
outlook for security of supply in gas and electricity this winter.
5. This work will continue and, should we receive any evidence of anti-competitive behaviour in the
wholesale markets, we will not hesitate to investigate that information very thoroughly.
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Liquidity in the Wholesale Gas Market
6. The Committee requested our views on the ﬁgure cited by energywatch in their evidence that “80% or
so of all of the gas coming in is covered by these mysterious [oV-market] contracts and we do not know
whether there are restrictive clauses.”333 Energywatch have now advised us that this ﬁgure is not correct.
Furthermore, their revised assessment of 70% is based on a report byGlobal Insight from 2005 which is now
out of date.
GB Wholesale Gas Market Liquidity
7. As we explained in our oral submission, liquidity in theGB gas wholesale market is signiﬁcantly higher
than in other European markets. This makes the GB market the most liquid in Europe by some distance.
(See Chart 1 for more information.) Information from a range of sources suggests that the level of gas made
available to the market is signiﬁcantly higher than the 20% suggested by energywatch in their oral evidence,
since revised by them to 30%.
— Gas market liquidity has increased steadily since 1996, with 11,000TWh of gas traded in 2007–08
up from 7,329TWh in 2006–07. (The volume in April 2008 alone was 1,253TWh). The current gas
churn ratio (the total level of gas trading divided by actual throughput) is almost 11, meaning that
on average each unit of gas is traded 11 times before delivery. This ﬁgure includes all reported
trades to National Grid and includes products for delivery in under a few months (known as the
prompt) and those for delivery further in advance (the forward market).334 In comparison, the
Nordic power market has a churn of 10 whilst oil churn is around 18.
— Figures fromNationalGrid indicate that 60 to 70%of total gas physically delivered is in fact visible
to the market, ie it is traded via the National Balancing Point (NBP). This is up from just 20% in
2000. National Grid’s ﬁgures are based on all trades registered on NG’s systems for daily
balancing, BP, Shell and ExxonMobil have conﬁrmed (as part of their evidence to the Committee)
that around 60% of their gas is not tied up under long term contracts but is sold into the market.
8. Ofgem investigated the wholesale gas market in 2004. As part of that probe we examined whether any
of the long term contractual arrangements for the supply of gas from the North Sea were restrictive or
capable of withholding gas from themarket.We only found concerns that justiﬁed further investigationwith
one set of contracts relating to the Sean ﬁeld. We concluded, after a thorough investigation that these
contracts were not problematic. All of our analysis and the reasons for our conclusions were published in
a series of detailed reports. Given the decline in North Sea production and the size of new ﬁelds that have
been commissioned since that report we doubt if any new contracts signed since 2004 would be likely to have
restrictive features or be capable of having a signiﬁcant impact on the GB gas market. The most signiﬁcant
long term contracts signed since then have been related to imported gas through the major new import
infrastructure, such as the Langeled pipeline from Norway and the Bacton-Balgzand (BBL) pipeline from
the Netherlands. The existence of these long term contracts relating to Norwegian supplies and supplies
through BBL are in the public domain and were announced by the relevant companies as part of their
ﬁnancial reporting when signed.
9. Themajority of these new infrastructure projects have applied for and been granted an exemption from
the requirements to oVer third party access. As part of the process for determining whether an exemption
should be granted, Ofgem takes into consideration the allocation of capacity, including where this is done
on a long term basis, to determine whether it will have a detrimental impact on competition. In addition,
the exemption application and all supporting analysis is provided to the European Commission which is
able to review and has ﬁnal sign-oV on many exemption applications.
10. The European Commission also carried out its own detailed sector inquiry into both the gas and
electricity markets across Europe and requested detailed information on all of the long term contracts in
place. The Commission’s report highlighted a number of concerns with the eVects of these contracts in a
number of continental European gas markets but did not directly raise any speciﬁc concerns about their
eVects in the GB market.
11. As a result, we have no evidence or grounds to be concerned about the eVects of existing restrictive
long term contracts to the GB market.
12. In addition, long term contracts can and do have an important role to play in helping to maintain
security of supply. Long term contracts may be necessary to support substantial investment in new
infrastructure necessary to bring imported gas to the GB market and to promote security of supply. In
assessing the impact of long term contracts, it is important to assess the terms of the contracts and to
determine whether downstream companies are able to compete eVectively to sign them. If the contracts do
not prevent re-sale of the gas to other suppliers and are not indexed to commodities such as oil, then there
is no reason to assume that they will have any detrimental eVects on the market. In fact, they are likely to
333 Response to Q 277.
334 The trades included in the churn ﬁgure are all trades for the month of gas ﬂow and not the month of the trade.
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have a positive impact on both competition and security of supply.Most of the existingNorth Sea long term
contracts, and the new import contracts, index the delivered price of gas to the spot price of gas. This helps
make sure that the price under the contract rises and falls in line with changes in demand and supply.
13. For these reasons, we have focused on whether spot gas markets are competitive and liquid. We also
undertake routine market surveillance to make sure that any change in price in the spot market can be
explained by changes in demand and supply. We see this as a more useful measure of whether the market
is competitive than the share of long term contracts. However, we would have concerns if long term
arrangements had an impact on liquidity in wholesale markets and we will not hesitate to investigate any
evidence of anti-competitive behaviour.
14. Trading in gas is focused on the prompt, rather than the forward market. A similar issue is found in
the forward market for oil, a commodity for which the market is commonly thought of as liquid. Bank of
England research suggests that liquidity in oil further out on the forward curve is very low compared with
the prompt.335 We have seen some increase in forward trading in gas. This increase in trading has occurred
on exchanges as well as over the counter (OTC)336 as can be seen in Charts 3 and 4.
15. Contracts need two parties and since our appearance before the Committee bothMajor EnergyUsers
Council (MEUC) and Ineos Chlor have conﬁrmed to us that they will be submitting additional information
to you. This broadly conﬁrms our oral submission on the spot/short term purchasing habits of the large
users. They will outline their reasons for this strategy, but it has been conﬁrmed to us by a number of larger
purchasers that Stock Market considerations are a key factor behind this.
Chart 1: GB and European gas traded volumes
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335 http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/quarterlybulletin/qb060105.pdf
336 OTC trading describes trading of ﬁnancial instruments such as commodities directly between two parties and can be
conducted via a number of routes including over the phone and via net. In contrast exchange based trading takes place at
one physical location. Exchanges are organised to provide “trading” facilities for brokers and traders for example clearing
services.
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Chart 2: Total monthly traded volume as a percentage of gas throughput (churn)
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Chart 3: Exchange based trading by product
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Chart 4: OTC trading on Spectron (smoothed to eliminate seasonality)
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GB Wholesale Electricity Market Liquidity
16. The wholesale market for electricity is considerably less liquid than that for gas. The estimated value
of electricity traded over the counter in 2006–07 was £31 billion.337 This represents an increase of £1billion,
roughly 3%, on the previous year. Total traded electricity—including both OTC and exchange—is around
two to three times the total physical delivery. This is low compared with other commodity markets such as
gas, where total traded volume is roughly 11 times the total physically delivery. In addition, trading in
electricity is very heavily weighted towards products on the prompt rather than the forward market.
17. In the oral evidence session on 24 June, Members expressed interest in comments by some witnesses
who said they still trade heavily in the market despite being vertically integrated. It is worth noting that a
vertically integrated company may still trade extensively on the open market, partly to hedge its position
but also to speculate on the price of power, and so its total volume traded may be close to its total physical
generation.
18. One factor that may inhibit liquidity in the wholesale electricity market is the current operation of
the “cash out” arrangements. These denote the commercial incentive on generators and suppliers to balance
their contractual and physical positions at any given time, thus helpingNational Grid to balance supply and
demand and maintain security of supply. Parties who are not in balance incur charges that are designed to
reﬂect the costs incurred by National Grid in dealing with any imbalance. The charges are known as cash
out prices. We have conducted a review of the cash out arrangements and our impact assessment suggested
that the current cash out prices often do not reﬂect supply and demand conditions and prices can be too
high when the system is not under stress. This creates additional risk for the parties involved andmay reduce
the role that ﬁnancial institutions such as banks and companies without generation or supply businesses
could play in trading electricity and improving liquidity. There are currently two proposed changes to the
rules that are being developed through the industry’s governance process. These proposals will shortly come
to Ofgem for a decision.
337 Not £31 million as stated in Table 11 of our written submission.
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Gas Storage Capacity
19. As we outlined in our oral submission most European countries have signiﬁcantly more storage than
the UK and this needs to be seen in the context of their indigenous production. The British market is in a
period of transition as, until recently, we were self-suYcient in gas. Large swing ﬁelds in the North Sea were
capable of signiﬁcantly ramping up production either between seasons or—in the case of ﬁelds such as
Morecambe and Sean—within day.338 This meant there was less need for storage to cope with supply shocks
and the seasonal pattern of demand. Britain also had a large ﬂeet of gas ﬁred power stations that were
capable of running on back up fuel and the ability to switch between gas and coal generation. This provides
a signiﬁcant source of “virtual” storage as was seen in the winter of 2004–05.Gas production from theNorth
Sea has been declining in recent years and therefore the commercial rationale for storage has become much
stronger. This has been reﬂected in the signiﬁcant increase in the price of capacity at existing storage
facilities.
20. Current investment in storage—which is not limited to the existing main energy suppliers—suggests
that the incentives to invest in storage are strong. Customers want a reliable and continuous supply, and
suppliers have strong market incentives to meet their contractual supply obligations. Therefore, they are
willing to pay for storage to meet the uncertainty of very high demand periods. In addition, the fact that
there is demand for storage means that companies can make suYcient returns to justify investing in new
facilities. We can see this happening in practice. Major investments in new storage facilities are planned by
energy companies, including Scottish and Southern Energy and E.ON, and by companies who are not
existing energy suppliers. For example, Statoil and Ineos Chlor are both investing in storage. A list of
proposed and under construction gas storage facilities can be found in Annex 1, Table 1. If all the above
projects are completed, our gas storage capacity will double by 2010.
21. However, the planning regime remains a major barrier. For example, Canatxx want to build a large
facility in Fleetwood, Lancashire, that would store 1,660 million cubic meters (mcm) of gas—but it has been
blocked by the local planning authority. At aminimum this will delay the commissioning of a signiﬁcant new
storage facility by at least two years from 2010–12. Furthermore, it sends a damaging signal to all companies
wanting to invest in storage in the UK. Developers have to incur substantial costs in getting to the stage of
making an application; the length of time it can then take to get a ﬁnal decisionmakes the case for investment
in storage much less compelling.
22. One witness has suggested that an additional blockage could be the regime for gaining access to the
gas transmission system. This is not the case. The arrangements for access to the gas system are relatively
simple and any new user, including storage sites, can secure access to the system by using the annual long
term or shorter term capacity auctions. Once they have agreed contracts to secure capacity rights, they are
entitled to compensation if National Grid does not deliver the capacity. A number of storage sites, including
Aldbrough, have used this mechanism, secured rights and connected to the system. Canatxx also used this
mechanism to secure access to the system for their planned facility from 2010 and secured long term rights
for the next 20 years.
23. An additional facility at Hornsea bought capacity in the September 2006 auctions that commence in
January 2010 when it will be ready to enter commercial operation.
24. It is important to emphasise that there are strong commercial incentives to invest in storage and
companies are ready and willing to invest. The major barrier remains the planning regime.
Isle of Grain LNG Import Terminal
25. National Grid opened a Liqueﬁed Natural Gas (LNG) import terminal at the Isle of Grain in July
2005. BP entered into a contract to secure half of the slots and Sonatrach the other half. In addition, the
terminal has “use it or lose it” arrangements. These arrangements were part of a package of demands by
Ofgem in return for the facility being exempted from directly regulated third party access. The “use it or lose
it” arrangements allow other companies to gain access to the facility if it is not being used by the primary
capacity holder (BP/Sonatrach). The current arrangements for the Isle of Grain facility are that if a slot is
not going to be used it must be oVered to the secondary market 10 days in advance, with an auction held
seven days in advance.
26. Since February 2006, there have been 127 slots available for the importation of LNG. BP/Sonatrach
have used 63 of those slots themselves. In accordance with the rules they have oVered 64 for sale on the open
market. None of the slots that have been oVered to the secondary market has ever been bought. This
assessment is consistent withNationalGrid’s ﬁgureswhich cover the period since the opening of the terminal
in July 2005. NG state that, since July 2005, there have been 158 possible slots for cargoes to import LNG.
Of those 158 slots, 74 have been used. In our oral submission we caused some confusion by only focusing
on the 63, rather than the 64. We wish to clarify this and refer to the caveat we provided the committee in
answer to question 545 in the Hansard transcript.
27. The above ﬁgures raise two obvious questions. Are the current arrangements for third-party access
appropriate? Are there other reasons why more LNG is not being delivered?
338 This is likely to become more limited in the future.
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28. In November 2007, Ofgem published an open letter requesting comments on the way that the “use it
or lose it” arrangements at the Isle of Grain work. Of the responses received, none suggested that the current
arrangements had ever prevented a cargo being brought into the terminal. Many of the respondents were
companies who have purchased capacity at one of the future LNG terminals.
29. Concern has been expressed about the lack of LNG arriving at Grain during winter 2007–08, despite
high spot gas prices, with only 11 of 32 slots being used. There are two important points to make. The ﬁrst
relates to the LNGmarket. The fact that more LNG did not come to Britain in that period can be explained
by the higher prices on oVer in other LNG importing countries. For example, demand and prices in Asia
were much higher than spot prices in Britain at the NBP, reﬂecting nuclear outages in Japan and high
demand from China and India. Most Asian countries have no alternative source of natural gas and will
therefore pay whatever is needed to secure it. Closer to home, shortages in Spain and Turkey meant that
any available cargoes in the Atlantic Basin went to these markets in preference to the UK.
30. Second, there was an alternative to the Isle of Grain if suppliers wanted to import LNG to the UK.
Excelerate now have a facility to import LNG through the Teesside terminal using special ships that can re-
gasify LNGwithout the need for an onshore terminal. They are also able to transfer LNG from conventional
tankers to their ships. No deliveries were made through this facility either, thus suggesting that it was not
the lack of eVective “use it or lose it” arrangements at the Isle of Grain that prevented more LNG arriving.
31. A large increase in UK LNG importation capacity is due for winter 2008–09. The Dragon and South
Hook terminals at Milford Haven are expected to have a base-load delivery of 16mcm/day and 29 mcm/day
respectively. In addition, the facility at the Isle of Grain is due to expand by 25mcm/day (phase two). The
new capacity at the Isle of Grain will see a number of new capacity holders339 with primary rights to use the
terminal. All these facilities are due to be in operation by Q4 2008. This will see much greater competition
and availability of LNG import capacity in GB. As with last winter, however, there are uncertainties over
the amount of LNG that will be attracted to the UK market if demand in Asia remains strong and prices
in other markets remain above UK prices.
32. Wewould be pleased to answer any further questions, and to provide any additional information that
the Committee may require.
June 2008
Annex 1
Table 1
OPERATIONAL STORAGE FACILITIES
Facility Space (GWh) Deliv. (GWh) Start date Capacity Holder
Rough 36,800 (max) 455 1985 Centrica (subject to Third Party
Access)
Hornsea 3,496 195 1979 SSE (subject to Third Party Access)
Avonmouth 877 156 1978 NG
Dynevor Arms 303 49 1983 NG
Glenmavis 509 101 1975 NG
Partington 1,126 219 1972 NG
Hole House Phase 1 325 58 2007 EDF
Hatﬁeld Moor 1,260 22 2002 Scottish Power
Humbly Grove 3,100 82 2005 Petronas
Table 2
POSSIBLE, PROPOSED AND UNDER CONSTRUCTION STORAGE FACILITIES
Facility Space (GWh) Deliv (GWh) Proposed Applicant
start date
Aldbrough (completed) 4,550 421 2008 SSE/StatoilHydro
Hole House Phase 2 (under 325 58 2009 EDF
construction)
Humbly Grove Expansion (under 630 — 2008 Petronas
construction)
Holford (under construction) 1,758 175 2009–10 EON
Holford H165 50 75 ? EON
Aldbrough phase II 4,550 0–210 2013 SSE/StatoilHydro
Whitehill Farm 4,548 433 2012 EON
339 Centrica (3.4 billion cubic meters (bcm)), Gaz de France (3.3 bcm) and Sonatrach (1.9 bcm).
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Facility Space (GWh) Deliv (GWh) Proposed Applicant
start date
Stublach (under construction) 5,800 525 2013 GDF/Ineos
Caythorpe 3,000 120 Planning Warwick Energy
inquiry
Portland 10,830 216 2011–12 Portland Gas
Saltﬂeetby 7,650 85 Planning Wingas/Gazprom
stage
Gateway 12,775 305 Planning Stag Energy
stage
Esmond/Gordon 44,403 567 Planning Petronas
stage
Albury I 1,850 46 2011 Petronas
Welton I 2,520 63 2011 Petronas
Welton II 1,258 32 Planning Petronas
stage
Gainsborough 1,730 63 2011 Petronas
Bains 6,000 Unknown 2011–12 Centrica
Bletchingley 9,450 126 2012? Petronas
Albury II 7,553 945 2012? Petronas
British Salt 10,800 Unknown After British Salt
2010
Larne Lough Unknown Unknown Planning Portland Gas
stage
Fleetwood18,400 650 2010–delayed, Canatxx
planning
refused
Source: Ofgem.
25 June 2008
Further supplementary evidence submitted by Ofgem
I enclose our supplementary memorandum to the inquiry into energy prices.
As I mentioned last week to you I apologise once again for the inaccurate ﬁgure cited in our oral evidence
and I won’t hide behind the caveat I gave the Committee (in reply to Q 545 of the transcript). The accurate
ﬁgures are shown in our follow-up memorandum to BEC.
There are two key points in our supplementary memorandum which I think it is particularly important
to reinforce. The ﬁrst is in regard to long-term contracts.
Energywatch claimed that 80% of gas entering Britain comes from oV-market long-term contracts.
Energywatch have now advised us that this ﬁgure is not correct. They have revised that ﬁgure to 70%. Even
this ﬁgure is, in our view, inaccurate in that it is based on a report by Global Insight, which dates from 2005
and is itself now out of date. Indeed I believe that this admission from energywatch relating to the dubious
quality of their evidence will upset many observers.
Secondly as we observed in our oral submission our assessment is that the GB wholesale gas market is
the most liquid in Europe by some distance. This is supported by information from a range of sources,
including the following:
— The current gas churn ratio (the total level of gas trading divided by actual throughput) is almost
11, meaning that, on average, each unit of gas is traded 11 times before delivery. This ﬁgure
includes all reported trades to National Grid and includes products for delivery within a few
months (known as the prompt) and those for delivery further in advance (the forward market). By
way of comparison, the Nordic power market has a churn of 10.
— Figures fromNationalGrid indicate that 60 to 70%of total gas physically delivered is in fact visible
to the market, ie it is traded via the National Balancing Point (NBP). This is up from just 20%
in 2000.
— BP, Shell and ExxonMobil each conﬁrmed (as part of their evidence to the Committee) that
around 60% of their gas is not reserved under long-term contracts but is sold into the market.
Indeed at Ofgem’s Annual Open Meeting (our AGM) last week Richard Guerrant conﬁrmed that
this ﬁgure for ExxonMobil is nearer 70%.
Contracts are not one-sided and in my evidence I spoke about the information provided to us with regard
to the Industrial and Commercial Purchasing Customers. The Major Energy Users Council (MEUC) and
Ineos Chlor have since conﬁrmed to us that many of the larger users do trade spot/short–term. At the time
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of the last severe price increase I received a delegation of large consumers, led by John Hall Associates, and
they were very clear that stock market considerations were key factors in buying spot/short, as well as a
perceived lack of contract choice.
The wholesale market for electricity is considerably less liquid than that for gas. I will not repeat the
comments from our previous discussions but that I did acknowledge the “profound illiquidity” in my oral
submission. I would urge that the historical context of this market be considered carefully in your analysis.
This is available in our written and oral submission.
26 June 2008
Further supplementary memorandum from the OYce of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem)
1. The Committee asked Ofgem, following our oral evidence on 17 June, to submit a supplementary
memorandum containing our reﬂections on the regulation of domestic heating oil. Members also raised the
issue of how customers can have greater conﬁdence in green energy tariVs.
Domestic Heating Oil
2. Approximately 5 million households in Great Britain are not currently connected to the gas network.
The best starting point may be to step back and ask how these customers heat their homes. At present, many
rely on domestic heating oil and so it is important to be sure that there are no barriers to thatmarket working
as eVectively as it could. Secondly, rising prices are pushing more users of domestic heating oil into fuel
poverty and so concerted action is required to alleviate the diYculties they are facing. Thirdly, it is important
to look at longer term options too. For example, in some cases, extension of the gas network or district
heating may be a long term solution and customers’ electricity could come from the public network or from
microgeneration.
3. If the concern is that there is a problem with the market for domestic heating oil, the OYce of Fair
Trading (OFT) has the remit to look at the market and if necessary refer the matter to the Competition
Commission (CC) for them to undertake a full market investigation. The CC has the power to put in place
whatever regulatory remedies it considers appropriate. Indeed, as you may be aware, this is the approach
that has already been taken with the market for bulk liqueﬁed petroleum gas (LPG or propane). In 2004 the
OFT conducted a study of that market and referred it to the CC in July of that year. The CC published its
ﬁnal report in June 2006 and is now in the implementation phase, putting in place a number of remedies to
help overcome barriers to the eVective working of the market.
4. I understand that the Committee has raised with the OFT the issue of the domestic heating oil market.
This matter can be pursued as a supercomplaint by a designated consumer body, such as the National
Consumer Council, and in those circumstances the OFT is required under the terms of the Enterprise Act
to carry out an investigation and report within 90 days.
5. Our work onOfgem’s energy supplymarkets probe will look, among other things, at howwell markets
are serving the needs of diVerent groups of customers, including those who are customers of electricity only.
In addition, our broader work on fuel poverty—such as helping to improve the targeting of existing
measures—should play a part here.
6. Even if there are no structural failings in the market for domestic heating oil, it is still clear that prices
have increased signiﬁcantly and that many customers are at risk of fuel poverty as a result. In this case, there
are several appropriate routes for action:
— The Government’s Fuel Poverty strategy covers this group of customers who, as National Energy
Action indicated in their evidence, account for a disproportionately high number of the fuel poor.
For example, in considering the new arrangements for the Carbon Emissions Reduction Target
(CERT) Defra introduced a ﬂexibility mechanism to allow more expensive measures to be
provided to groups most at risk of fuel poverty. This includes the provision of ground source heat
pumps for those not on the gas grid. This is addition to anyWarmFront grants or CERTmeasures
that the suppliers provide to these households as electricity customers.
— Defra are considering the needs of this group in the context of the Energy Services Directive which
covers these other fuel types as well as gas and electricity and where they are looking to secure
voluntary commitments from the providers involved. There is thus already a clear remit for Defra
to consider the needs of this group of customers from a fuel poverty perspective.
7. We believe it is important to seek longer term solutions wherever possible, facilitating the use of
electricity and gas where appropriate, including as an alternative to heating oil:
— Approximately half the communities which are oV the gas network in Britain are only 2 km from
a gas main, meaning it would be relatively easy to connect them. Within that half, there are some
220,000 fuel poor households. Providing new gas connections to these communities could reach a
lot of fuel poor households and possibly cut their fuel bills in half, if they were previously using
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LPGand switched to gas. Ofgemhas put in place incentives in our gas distribution price control for
2008 to 2013 that encourage the gas distribution networks to extend the gas networks to deprived
communities.
— TheDepartment for Business has announced funding of £3million as part of a pilot project within
the low carbon buildings programme (LCBP) to introduce fuel saving microgeneration to fuel
poor communities oV the gas grid.
— We also recognise that customers oV the gas grid may be well placed to beneﬁt from support to use
renewable heat, or district heat, and this may be a relatively cost eVective contribution to meeting
renewable targets. The Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR) has
lead responsibility for heat, and we understand they plan to publish a heat strategy later this year,
we are providing input to them on these issues.
Green Energy Tariffs
8. Many consumers want to play their part in the ﬁght against climate change through buying green
energy deals. However, when they look at the range of tariVs available, they can ﬁnd it hard to tell howmuch
of an environmental beneﬁt each one actually oVers. Ofgem therefore launched a project last year to produce
new guidelines for suppliers and an independent accreditation scheme that will give customers conﬁdence.
We have engaged extensively with consumer bodies, environmental groups and energy suppliers and expect
to publish our proposals next week.
9. Our proposals will focus on two main principles:
— Transparency: to ensure clarity on supplier claims.
— Additionality: requiring that green tariVs provide some beneﬁt to the environment, as customer
research shows this is the core requirement.
10. We will be happy to provide the Committee with full details of the proposals as soon as they are
published and we expect to ﬁnalise the guidelines in September.
4 July 2008
Memorandum submitted by Opus Energy
Background
Opus Energy is an independent supplier of electricity to business customers. Formed in April 2002 Opus
Energy now supplies electricity to in excess of 40,000 customer sites in the UK. By any normal ﬁnancial
analysis, such as proﬁtability or return on invested capital, Opus Energy is the most successful small
supplier. We believe this gives us a unique insight into overcoming the barriers to entry and understanding
the problems facing a small supplier.
Reducing Access to Power Generation
Opus Energy believes that new entrants and small suppliers are a necessary and important element to a
competitive supply market. Whilst in practice their market share remains small they increase competition
and provide innovation. A simple example of this is Opus being the ﬁrst company to provide free smart
meters to all of its business customers. Furthermore, new entrants seek to drive a regulatory agenda that
promotes competition rather than favouring incumbents. An example of this has been the eVorts of
Bizzenergy in changing the regulatory structure regarding objections in the business supply market.
Current market conditions do allow for properly funded, well managed, innovative new entrants, such
as Opus Energy, to thrive. However, we believe that the conditions which have allowed new entrants to
prosper have, and continue to be, eroded. The key market condition required is to be able to purchase
electricity on a long term market related basis. If a supplier cannot access market related power then it is
impossible to operate. In order for there to be competitive access to power there needs to be competition in
the generation market.
When Opus Energy entered the market in 2002 we reviewed possible providers of electricity. This list
included generators and intermediaries, such as energy trading desks at larger international energy
companies. At that stage none of the investment banks had trading desks suYciently developed to deal with
our requirements. Eight companies were willing or able to provide Opus with competitive access to the
energy products to meet our customers’ needs. We signed a long term arrangement with Magnox Electric
Plc (now part of the NDA). That arrangement concluded in late 2005, due to the decommissioning of the
Magnox nuclear plants.We then conducted a further review of themarket place and the number of potential
counterparties reduced from eight to ﬁve (including two investment banks). A number of generators had
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exited, in the main through acquisition by the Big six. InMay 2006 Opus signed a long term power purchase
agreement with International Power Plc. Since 2006, with the imminent exit of British Energy, the number
of possible counterparties has decreased even further.
This reduction in the number of counterparties will have a massive impact on the number of new entrants
entering the market. We have also seen independent generators entering the supply market. Haven Power
Limited, Smartest Energy and International Power Retail Limited have all either recently entered the
market or have applied for supply licences. The trend has seen the Big six suppliers buying generators and
now generators entering supply. The ultimate conclusion of this is that it will only be realistically possible
to compete as a vertically integrated electricity company. This would produce an enormous barrier to entry.
New entrants would need to own generation assets prior to entering the market. This would severely reduce
the number of new entrants and signiﬁcantly reduce competition.
Possible Solutions
Opus Energy believes that competition in generation is key to a competitive electricity supply market. We
believe there are two possible solutions:
Firstly, The Government or Regulator could restrict the further sale of generation or even force
divestment from the Big six suppliers. This would encourage a broader ownership of these assets and would
bring beneﬁts of competition with it. However, we do not think this is a realistic option, due to the ﬁnancial
impact and distortion of asset values it would produce.
Secondly, and more realistically, legislation could be introduced that would require, on a regular, long
term basis, for all generators to publicly auction a certain percentage of their output, say 5–10%. These
auctions would need to be carried out on deﬁned industry terms. This would provide a liquid market with
pricing transparency. Whilst small and large suppliers would be able to participate in the auctions, it would
also encourage intermediaries such as investment banks. They would then be encouraged to provide the
products and services that the suppliers and new entrants require.
This would provide price transparency, liquidity and long term access to power generation. These are the
conditions required to allow good suppliers to thrive and encourage new entrants into the market.
In Conclusion
— New entrants are necessary for a competitive supply market.
— Innovative suppliers can thrive in the current market.
— Those conditions are signiﬁcantly worsening due to increased vertical integration.
— Competition in generation and access to electricity is vital for competition in supply.
— Requiring generators to auction part of their output would provide a liquid, transparent and
accessible wholesale market to new entrants, current suppliers and intermediaries alike.
If you require any further information please feel free to contact me.
19 May 2008
Letter by RWE npower
Thank you for your letter of 11 January. In response to the two questions that you raise:
1. npower increased its prices on 5 January 2008. The steps that we have taken to mitigate the impact on
vulnerable customers are:
(a) We have not increased our prices for those on our First Step tariV. First Step is our cheapest tariV;
it is 22.5% cheaper (based on estimated consumption) than our average price, across all payment methods,
for an annual dual fuel bill. The tariV forms part of our First Step programme, under which advisers provide
one-to-one account management for customers who are struggling to pay for their energy usage. In addition
First Step advisers will assist with energy eYciency. Under the programme certain customers who follow a
payment plan will become eligible to have any outstanding debt cleared through the resources of the First
Step Fund established by npower.
(b) In addition to the First Step programme, a further 50,000 vulnerable customers will receive rebates
this winter totalling £80. These customers are also oVered free energy eYciency measures and, if taken up,
will receive an extra £20 in rebates. We direct the rebate towards customers who are vulnerable and fuel
poor, identifying recipients through our vulnerable customer programme and through fuel poverty
modelling based on internal customer information.
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(c) In 2000 npower established its Health Through Warmth Scheme (HTW). The scheme beneﬁts the
vulnerable; people living in cold or damp homes whose health is adversely aVected. These people are often
hard to reach and HTWworks with key community workers who, when visiting people in their own homes,
can identify those who are most vulnerable and refer them to the HTW team. HTW is not tenure speciﬁc,
in other words clients do not need to be or become an npower customer.
Once a referral is made to the HTW team, its home advisers facilitate access to statutory national grant
schemes and other locally available funds. If clients are not eligible funding is sought from charitable
organisations on their behalf. Financial support may also be oVered from the npower HTW crisis fund.
HTW also facilitates the installation of energy eYciency and heating measures such as insulation, energy
eYcient boilers etc.
There have been some 36,000 referrals to the HTW scheme, and practical help to the value of £30m has
been delivered to vulnerable households. The npower HTW crisis fund has itself contributed £3m in
circumstances where households would otherwise have received no assistance.
HTW is completely independent of any statutory obligations under the Government’s EEC/CERT
scheme, npower recently agreed a further commitment of £4.5m for the continued operation of HTW.
(d) Although I would stress that pre-payment is not necessarily a proxy for vulnerability or fuel poverty,
we have also put the following measures in place:
(i) The impact of the increase will be reduced, for customers with and electricity prepayment meter,
by an average of £10 per customer per annum (there are more than 475,000 electricity pre-payment
meter customers) and an average of £4 per customer per annum for gas pre-payment customers
(there are 280,000 gas pre-payment meter customers);
(ii) There will be no increase in prices for some of our token meter customers (in total 135,000
customers) until April 2008. In addition we are currently carrying out a programme of debt write-
oV and accelerated replacement of token meters. npower has to date replaced 67,000 token meters
and existing debt of more than £70 from price increases has been written oV.
(e) Macmillan Cancer Support has been our chosen corporate charity since 2004; the company gives £
for £ matching for all fundraising, as well as supporting a number of commercial initiatives (eg TV
advertisements for the World’s Biggest CoVee Morning in support of Macmillan). The npower First Steps
Team is currently piloting a fuel management programmewithMacmillanCancer Support aimed at helping
people living with cancer manage their energy bills.
(f) The npower Spreading Warmth Programme is designed to speciﬁcally assist vulnerable customers
(those in receipt of means tested beneﬁts) and brings together a number of initiatives and products and
services such as large print bills, free gas safety checks, energy measurement devices and energy eYciency
advice. This programme forms part of our regulatory obligations and speciﬁc elements include:
(i) The Warm Response Helpline, a free-phone service with trained advisers who assist the customer
in the light of his/her situation. This line also takes calls from the Home Heat Helpline.
(ii) An energy eYciency advice telephone service based on close examination of the customer’s energy
bill and consumption history to provide personalised and relevant advice.
(iii) A network of in-home advisers who specialise in providing face-to-face advice in how a customer
can heat their home aVordably. Integrated within this service is the provision of real-time display
devices to the customer so they can understand their household’s electricity consumption.
(g) npower operates a detailed 14 point programme to seek to ensure that we would never knowingly
disconnect the electricity or gas supply of a vulnerable customer who was unable to pay his or her bill.
(h) This winter we are working with all of the major energy suppliers, EAGA (the UK’s leading provider
of residential energy eYciency solutions) and BERR in mailing 250,000 members of the public who are in
receipt of, or are eligible for but are not claiming pension credit. In the letter to them we are oVering free
insulation and central heating grants as well as other services such as beneﬁt entitlement checks, energy
eYciency advice and registration on our Warm Response Service.
(i) In 2007 under our Energy EYciency Commitment npower spent over £50 million helping
consumers improve the energy eYciency of their homes, over half (£25.5) of which was spent
helping a priority group of customers. FromApril wewill double our programme under the CERT
scheme, the programme being introduced to replace the Energy EYcient Commitment.
We provide the opportunity for all of our employees to volunteer to help in the delivery of many of these
programmes. At present more than 10% of our employees are actively engaged in our volunteering
programme.
In summary therefore, npower has a wide number of measures to protect vulnerable customers from price
increases and generally assist those most in need with energy costs. These include: no increases for our First
Step customers, debt write-oVs for such customers, the provision of rebates of up to £100 for 50,000
customers, the provision of home advisers and payments through the crisis fund as part of the Health
Through Warmth Programme, mitigating the cost increase for pre-payment meter customers, delaying the
increase for many token pre-payment customers until 1st April and not recovering outstanding debt for
some such customers, the products and services of the Spreading Warmth Programme, our 14 point
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programme relating to disconnections and the oVers for those in receipt of, or eligible for pension credit. In
addition more than half of our 2007 expenditure under the Energy EYciency Commitment related to
priority group customers.
2. Your second question asked about our increase in prices and the underlying reasons. We increased our
residential prices by on average 12.7% for electricity and 17.2% for gas from 5th January 2008. Our
preceding change in prices, and a price reduction came into eVect in April 2007 based on our expectation
at that time of forward costs. Almost immediately wholesale costs rebounded and forward wholesale
commodity costs for 2008 have increased by 66% for electricity and 60% for gas.
Our retail business buys electricity and gas on thewholesalemarket.Whilst this increase in wholesale costs
is the major reason for the price increase, there have also been substantial cost increases in two other areas:
(i) The costs of the CERT scheme are double those under the EEC scheme.
(ii) There have been substantial increases in distribution costs, most particularly in gas where there
has been a major increase in transport costs. In electricity, although not of the same order of
magnitude, distribution and transmission costs are increasing.
npower’s retail proﬁts in 2007 will be substantially below those in 2006. The position was not sustainable
into 2008 with the further level of cost increases in that year.
I hope that I have adequately responded to the two questions that you raise in your letter. In conclusion
the huge level of commodity cost increases, the substantial increases in non-commodity costs for energy
transportation and distribution costs and the doubling of the costs to meet CERT have resulted in our price
increase, but we have implemented the change in conjunction with a wide programme ofmeasures to protect
vulnerable customers from energy costs.
25 January 2008
Memorandum submitted by RWE npower
Background
1. RWE npower, part of the RWE Group, is one of the UK’s largest energy suppliers, with some seven
million electricity and gas customers and a diverse portfolio of some 10 GW of generation capacity in the
UK. We also sell our expertise in power generation in key markets.
2. We welcome the opportunity to contribute to the BERR Select Committee’s inquiry into the UK’s
energy market. In our evidence below we concentrate on those areas raised by the Committee where we feel
our comments will be most useful.
Whether theCurrentMarket StructureEncouragesEffectiveCompetition in theRetailMarkets
for Gas and Electricity
3. Ofgem stated in January1 that: “Britain’s domestic energy market is highly competitive and remains
themost competitive in Europe. Energy companies continue to compete vigorously on price, service and the
range of products they oVer their customers.” We agree with this assessment. The six major companies in
the domestic energy supply market are competing aggressively as reﬂected in the changing market shares,
the number of customers who choose to switch supplier, the degree of product innovation, the improvement
in customer service, brand positioning and low margins earned by retailers. These aspects are discussed
further below.
4. In 1996, British Gas had a 100% market share of residential gas customers as a consequence of its
statutory monopoly in the supply of gas to those customers. That legacy position has been aggressively
unwound through competition from other suppliers so that in March 2007 it stood at 47%2. Similarly, the
market shares of the 14 regional Public Electricity Suppliers (PESs), which in 1998 had a 100%market share
in the supply of electricity to residential customers in their regions, have been aggressively competed away.
This signiﬁcant collapse in the market shares of the former statutory monopolists is indicative of a dynamic
national market for the retailing of electricity and gas, and has been deﬁned as such by the OYce of Fair
Trading3, with customers free to choose from a number of competing suppliers.
5. The major shifts in market shares we have observed over the past ten years have been due to the high
level of customer switching that has occurred, and which remains a feature of the market. As Ofgem has
stated4 the level of switching has increased over time and in October 2007 over 2.8 million households
switched supplier in the ﬁrst seven months of the year. The European Commission noted in January 20075
that the UK rates for switching are among the highest for electricity and exceed all otherMember States for
gas. This is facilitated by the range of ways customers can access products and services, namely: web
comparison sites, company websites, telesales, direct mail and face to face sales and marketing. A National
Consumer Council study6 shows that electricity and gas have higher switching rates than home insurance,
mortgages, ﬁxed and mobile telephony and current and savings bank accounts. npower’s own aggregate
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residential customer gains and losses together over the last three years, ie gross transfers, have amounted to
38%, 44% and 48% of the year-end total number of customers respectively for 2005–07. In 2007, on the same
basis, our customer switching rates by product type were: PrepaymentMeter 81%, StandardCash&Cheque
42% and Direct Debit 39%.
6. Product innovation shows a dynamic market developing to meet customers’ needs. As Ofgem
commented last July, there has been an increased take up of dual fuel contracts which it expects to continue
to rise7; around 4.2 million households are choosing new ways to buy energy ranging from on-line (1.2
million households), ﬁxed and capped rates, green products (nearly 350,000) to low-priced deals for fuel
poor customers8. In addition to providing a range of such innovative products, npower also has a product
which tracks wholesale energy prices and provides low carbon/energy eYciency products such as
microgeneration along with export tariVs, solar thermal and PV systems and ground source heat pumps. It
also provides associated services of gas boiler and central heating installation, servicing, repair and other
cover products as well as electrical installation.
7. In this ﬁercely competitive market, consumers’ expectations of service levels continue to increase and
the industry is having to adapt and evolve to keep ahead of these expectations. Consumers expect to be able
to make contact outside normal business hours, to be able to handle their accounts on line and to receive
innovation in service (eg graphs on bills and SMS text for meter reading). The competitive market is further
reﬂected in the decline of complaints over the last four years for ﬁve of the six largest energy suppliers as
Ofgem commented last year9. Over the period 2004 to 2007 complaints against npower reported to
energywatch have fallen by 9,144 to 3,709.
8. The market participants have taken slightly diVerent positions on branding and marketing, as would
be expected in a competitive market, with some building more of a national focus, some more local, some
channel speciﬁc sub-branding (eg Atlantic) and some positioning themselves based on, for example, product
innovation and the carbon agenda.
9. Competitive pressures have recently reduced domestic energy retail margins as E.ON UK10 and
Centrica11 have commented. Since 2002 npower’s domestic energy retail margins have been in single ﬁgures
and at times negative.
10. In summary, these characteristics conﬁrm a thriving, dynamic market, with customers free to choose
amongst several retailers all competing aggressively for their business.
Whether There is Effective Competition in the Wholesale Markets for Gas and Electricity
11. The GB wholesale electricity market is widely regarded as being highly competitive. In addition to
BERR12 andOfgem13, a range of other bodies from theEuropeanCommission14, theOYce of Fair Trading15
and the International Energy Agency16 to Oxera17 have all described the UKwholesale electricity market as
competitive. The DTI’s UK Energy Sector Indicators 200718 illustrates the decline in the HHI for electricity
generation from above 2,000 (which is normally regarded as highly concentrated) in 1991 to around 1000
(the level below which the market is conventionally regarded as unconcentrated) in 2006. We calculate that
the HHI for electricity generation in 2007 was below 1000. This collapse in the level of concentration was
due to new entry in power generation as well as plant divestments in the late 1990s, both of which have
signiﬁcantly increased the competitiveness of the sector.
12. Financial performance of generation plant needs to be assessed over its lifespan of 20 years or more.
The returns need to be such as to provide a basis for future investment. In fact the returns in the generation
market are volatile and this places a premium on risk management skills. Its diYculties are highlighted by
the ﬁnancial problems experienced by some major operators; at the end of 2002 British Energy required
support from the Government and TXU Europe withdrew from the market leading n 2003 to AES giving
Drax up to its creditors—a clear demonstration of the intensity of competition in the generation market.
Proﬁtability assessment therefore needs to take account of ﬁnancial performance over a long period of time.
13. What is important is that the market provides clear signals for new investment and entry in order to
promote the right level and mix of generation plant to meet the demands of customers. Hitherto, that has
been the case—the market has delivered the right level of capacity, and delivered it eYciently.
14. Over the next ten years from 2008 RWE plans to incur considerable capital expenditure on low-
carbon generation plant in the UK to replace its existing plant. The generation programme will reduce the
amount of CO2 npower emits (per unit of power generated), compared to 2000 levels, by around 33% by
2015.
15. As a consequence, the npower generation business is forecast to be substantially cash negative over
the next ten years. RWE’s CEO has recently outlined RWE’s intent to invest widely in generation across
Europe. As a result our UK business is eVectively in competition for those funds. For example, the RWE
Group has announced its intention to spend ƒ1bn a year from 2008 on renewable generation and much of
this investment is expected to bemade in theUK. It is therefore vital that theUKgenerationmarket remains
a stable and credible environment in which to invest.
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The Implications of Growing Consolidation in the Energy Market
16. We do not consider that there are signiﬁcant barriers to entry to the energy markets. We would
suggest that if there were proﬁtable opportunities, there are a number of companies that would have the
resources to enter the energy retail supply market such as retailers from other sectors, European energy
companies and energy retailers to non-domestic customers. We note that there currently are a number of
smaller players in the energy supply markets oVering specialised and speciﬁc niche products.
17. Ofgem has and is continuing to address some of the complexities of the energymarket such as through
its Review of Energy Supply Licences19 and on the generation side is undertaking aReview of Industry Code
Governance20 to assist distributed energy providers and micro-generation interests.
The Relationship Between the Wholesale and Retail Markets for Electricity and Gas
18. The link between the wholesale and retail markets is provided by the trading activity that enables
generators to sell power, and retailers to buy power. This trading creates contracts between parties that
enables them to balance their physical position in advance of “gate closure”, and also enables them to
manage price risk. Whilst most retailers also own generating plant, the retailers still need to trade, not only
with their own generation business, but also with other generators and traders. There are a number of
reasons for this.
19. First, the wholesale market arrangements (NETA/BETTA) set up by DTI and Ofgem prohibits the
netting oV of generation and retail imbalances forcing both the retail and generation arms of the same
business to trade in the market. Second, no producer/retailer is in perfect balance either in terms of the total
amount of electricity produced and demanded, or the time proﬁle of that production and demand over the
course of the day, and therefore needs to buy from the market when it is short and to sell when it is long.
20. npower operates its generation and supply businesses independently, each transacting all its volumes
through RWE Supply & Trading (RWEST). Generation volumes are sold in a manner determined by the
RWE Group’s hedge policy. This hedge policy is subject to liquidity available in the wholesale power, fuel
and carbon markets. Encouragement of liquidity is therefore a key focus of the RWE Group, and much of
the RWEST business is focussed at encouraging liquidity in the markets in which we operate (as reﬂected
by the Market Design Project sponsored by the Futures and Options Association).
21. npower’s retail business has a separate hedge policy determined by its management team. npower
retail’s hedgingmodel applies its hedging policy and npower retail operates within strict position limits. This
ensures that npower retail has little room to speculate on commodity prices, but is incentivised to
concentrate on cost, service, pricing and brand as its value drivers.
22. RWEST is a separate company from RWE npower and operates in the energy wholesale markets as
the RWE Group’s sole face to the wholesale markets. All transactions with both the generation and retail
business units of npower are made at arms length and are subject to stringent and routine “fair value” testing
by an independent team within the RWE Group. During 2006 and 2007 of about 140 TWh transacted by
RWE npower through RWEST only around 11%were netted trades. Netted trades occur when one npower
business unit eVects trades “simultaneously” with another, where “simultaneously” roughly approximates
to the same day.
23. It is clear from the discussion above that retail prices are fundamentally driven by wholesale prices,
which for electricity are in turn fundamentally driven by the prices of gas and other fuels. npower’s domestic
electricity and gas price increases in early 2008 were necessitated by the rising forward electricity and gas
wholesale commodity costs for 2008 which increased by 66% and 60% respectively since mid-February 2007
as well as increases in network charges, social obligations and environmental costs, the last of which will
inevitably continue to rise.
24. Our customers, however, have been protected from the full impact of wholesale prices increases over
recent years as a result of our eVective hedging policy. A view of themovement in costs (on a rolling forward
12 month wholesale commodity costs basis for electricity and gas, plus transport, EEC and metering costs)
and of npower’s Dual Fuel Quarterly Cash and Cheque annual bill size from 2004 to 2008 shows that the
diVerence in prices and costs is now less than in 2004 and that the retail price changes signiﬁcantly lag
changes in costs (mainly increases) (see Appendix A).
25. Whilst all companies are subject to similar increases in energy commodity costs as well as network
charges and the Energy EYciency Commitment/Carbon Emissions Reduction Target (EEC/CERT) at the
same time, there is in fact a signiﬁcant variation in the timing of price movements for domestic customers.
This variation in the timing and scale of price changesmay be due to diVerences between suppliers in hedging
or business strategies.
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The Interaction Between the UK and European Energy Markets
26. The UK has moved from being an exporter to an importer of gas. Consequently, and as a result of
improved infrastructure links to European and world markets, it has becomemore exposed to international
prices. Continental gas prices have been pushed up by the rise in oil prices as most are indexed to oil and
LNG prices have increased as a result of demand from Asia notably Japan. With regard to Europe, RWE
supports measures that strengthen competition in the EU (and contribute to an economically and
ecologically sensible climate protection strategy).
27. We note that, as Ofgem showed in January21, Britain’s domestic electricity bills are competitive with
most other EU countries being on a par with the EU average and that its domestic gas bills are amongst the
cheapest in Europe being considerably below the EU average.
The Effectiveness of Regulatory Oversight of the Energy Market
28. Ofgem has clearly successfully created competitive generation and retail energy supply markets.
Ofgem has continually monitored the development of the wholesale and retail energy supply markets to
make sure that competition remains eVective and periodically publishes information, for example through
at least annual Domestic Retail Market Reports. In addition, Ofgem has successfully embarked on
delivering on its “better regulation” duty as illustrated by the recent Supply Licence Review, where it sought
to protect the interests of consumers with an appropriate balance of sectoral regulation and a blend of self-
governance, competition and consumer law.
29. Historically, Ofgem has focussed on promoting eVective markets and cost reﬂectivity in charges.
However, this approach is coming under increasing pressure as Ofgem appears to become a vehicle for the
pursuit of social and environmental goals rather than as a pure economic regulator. Experience shows that
there are increasing tensions between the objectives set for Ofgem as illustrated by the following example.
30. Ofgem’s Proposed Corporate Strategy and Plan for 2008–1322 suggests that the retail energy market
may become increasingly like a normal service industry market. In practice, recent developments show the
reverse is the case. These include:
— Ofgem’s two CSR reports in 2007.23
— Ofgem’s debt and disconnection “best practice” report in January 2008.24
— The 2008 Budget.25
— The doubling of CERT from April 2008 compared to EEC2.26
31. All the evidence that has been adduced by a large number of studies indicates that the market does
workwell. If there are policy objectiveswhichwill not naturally be delivered by themarket, it would be better
to be clear about what those are and to seek to identify appropriate interventions which introduce the least
distortions. This would improve regulatory certainty, both for Ofgem as to its role, and for market
participants.
32. Ofgem has also explained in its Proposed Corporate Strategy and Plan 2008–1327 that: “investors will
require a stable political and regulatory environment before making investment in new generation
capacity”. However, it is diYcult to see how this reconciles with its recent proposals for a windfall tax on
energy companies28, particularly at a time when additional generation investment of some 20—25GW is
required by 2020, in order to replace capacity that will have to be taken out of service.
Progress in Reducing Fuel Poverty and the Appropriate Policy Instruments for Doing So
33. npower’s mandatory expenditure on fuel poverty through energy eYciency programmes is increasing
markedly. The Government recognises the beneﬁt of the Energy EYciency Commitment/Carbon Emission
Reduction Target (EEC/CERT) for priority group customers (those in receipt of income/disability based
beneﬁts, tax/pension credit or those aged 70 or over), announcing the combination of its expenditure on
Warm Front and increasing expenditure on CERT as together increasing the spending on fuel poverty, but
energy suppliers receive little credit. Of its expenditure on energy eYciency under EEC1 (April 2002-March
2005) £48m andEEC2 (April 2005-March 2008) £147.7m, 50% of the savings were targeted at priority group
customers. Expenditure under CERT (April 2008-March 2011) group customers is estimated at around
£400m of which 40% of the energy savings will be targeted at the priority group. In all cases, the proportion
of expenditure on the priority group exceeds 50% of the total because of the increasing diYculty of
identifying and implementing measures for this group of customers.
34. In addition, npower already has an extensive range of measures available to support vulnerable
customers which include:
(a) npower’s Health Through Warmth Scheme (HTW) which beneﬁts the vulnerable (not necessarily
npower customers) by using its working in partnership with local authorities and the health sector
to identify people living in cold or damp conditions whose health is adversely aVected by these
conditions and facilitating access to statutory national grant schemes and local funds. If clients are
not eligible for statutory or charitable funding,HTWoVers a crisis fund and facilitates installation
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of energy eYciency measures. It has had 36,000 referrals that delivered practical help to the value
of £30m and the HTW crisis fund has contributed £3m. npower has agreed a further commitment
of £4.5m to HTW.
(b) The First Steps Programme targeted at those most in need. This includes social tariVs, debt relief,
one to one account management, energy advice & measures and beneﬁt entitlement checks
(c) First Steps is just part of our Spreading Warmth Programme which oVers assistance to a wider
group of vulnerable npower customers through products and services such as large print bills, free
gas safety checks, energy measurement devices and energy eYciency advice. Speciﬁc elements
include: the Warm Response Helpline, an energy eYciency helpline and a network of in-home
advisors.
(d) A detailed 14 point programme to ensure that we would never knowingly disconnect the electricity
or gas supply of a vulnerable customer.
(e) Working with other major energy suppliers, EAGA and BERR to inform 250,000 people in GB
who are eligible for pension credit by letter of free insulation, central heating grants and other
services.
(f) A commitment to fund theHomeHeatHelpline: an impartial, single-point of advice for vulnerable
customers set up by the ERA in conjunction with energy suppliers.
(g) In relation to npower’s January price increase we provided additional protection for the
vulnerable by:
(i) Not increasing prices for thousands of customers on our ﬁrst step tariV
(ii) Committing to rebates of up to £100 for 50,000 of npower’s most vulnerable customers
(iii) Mitigation of the cost increase for pre-payment customers by halving the average electricity
diVerential and reducing the diVerential for gas
(iv) A delayed price increase for many token pre-payment customers.
35. As a result of the announcement in the Budget, we are presently in discussions with government on
a possible way forward. We hope that this might lead to a long-term sustainable approach to tackling
poverty.Wewould like to see all parts of government aswell as other relevant industries working collectively
on this important issue.
36. Other measures that could alleviate fuel poverty include:
— More help through data sharing with suppliers required to enable them to identify and so more
eVectively target vulnerable customers.
— Increased use of Fuel Direct by extending its availability to those on beneﬁts and not just those in
debt. This would help us oVer more attractive tariVs.
— A universal roll-out of Smart Metering.
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Supplementary memorandum from RWE npower
At the Select Committee hearing on 24 June 2008 Mr Oaten asked for information on the percentage
increase in the last year for customers who are defaulting on their bills. I would therefore be grateful if you
could place this response before the Select Committee.
The total number of debtors in June 2008, compared to June 2007, has increased by 3.8%.
We have improved our practices in the way in which we help customers to manage debt. In particular the
number of customers disconnected in the ﬁrst half of 2008 was less than half those of the corresponding
period in 2007. various schemes and payment methods are in place to help manage debt levels and £3.5
million of debt of vulnerable customers has either been written-oV or put on hold over the last two years
under our “First Steps” social programme.
10 July 2008
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Letter by Scottish and Southern Energy
In response to the Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Committee’s request for energy
companies to submit in writing details of any price increases they plan to implement in the near future, ahead
of the oral hearingwith theMinister of State for Energy on 31 January, below is a contribution fromScottish
and Southern Energy (SSE).
In our contributionwe outline our recent price commitment, how it ﬁts in with the competitive UK energy
market, explain how in the current climate of energy price increases we support our most vulnerable
customers, and highlight how we feel the fuel poor are best supported longer term.
Summary
— SSE, already the cheapest of the major suppliers, has committed to keep our electricity and gas
prices for domestic customers at their current levels for the rest of this winter, when people are
having to use most energy, and until at least the start of British Summer Time.
— In the highly competitive GBmarket the ultimate safeguard for customers is their ability to switch
supplier if they are dissatisﬁed with the service they receive.
— Our track record in customer service and in regard to responsible pricing proves this as we had a
net gain of over one million customers between December 2006 and December 2007.
— SSE’s fair pricing policy is that it seeks to be the last, or one of the last, of the energy suppliers to
increase prices if it has to and the ﬁrst, or one of the ﬁrst, to lower prices if it can. As a result,
following the recent British Gas price rise, a typical SSE customer pays around £175 a year less
for their electricity and gas than an equivalent British Gas customer.
— This, backed up with our voluntary social tariV and tailor-made approach to payment
arrangements for vulnerable customers, means that SSE is making a meaningful contribution
towards assisting the fuel poor.
— The case for a mandatory social tariV is not supported by SSE as it would be a very blunt and
inﬂexible way of targeting support to fuel poor households.
Our Energy Prices
SSE adopts a “fair pricing” policy and we seek to be the last, or one of the last, of the energy suppliers to
increase prices if we have to, and the ﬁrst, or one of the ﬁrst, to lower prices if we can. At a time of sustained
rises in wholesale energy prices and other upward pressures on domestic prices, SSE is aiming to protect its
customers from the worst eVects.
Household energy consumption is at its highest in the ﬁrst quarter of the year, with the average household
in Great Britain using around 40% of its annual gas consumption and around 30% of its annual electricity
consumption in January, February and March. That is why SSE has committed not to increase prices this
winter. The company is keeping its electricity and gas prices for domestic customers at their current levels
for the rest of this winter, when they are having to use most energy, and until at least the start of British
Summer Time.
The UK Energy Market
SSE believes that our ability to keep our prices down and the fact that we have almost doubled our
customer base to over eight million in the past ﬁve years shows that the UK has a vibrant and highly
competitive energy market. SSE is the second largest energy supplier, having been ﬁfth six years ago.
Our achievements in recent years demonstrate the highly competitive nature of the market: by oVering
lower prices and achieving the best performance ratings for customer service we have outperformed our
competitors in this market, and customers have voted with their feet.
SSE last changed prices in early 2007. On 1 March 2007, SSE started implementing a cut of 12% in its
average gas bill and on 1 April 2007 it started implementing a cut of 5% in its average electricity bill.
However, this is not the only evidence of the energy market being highly competitive. Consumers have a
wide choice of energy suppliers and they are exercising that choice. According to Ofgem’s Domestic Retail
Market Report June 2007 annual rates of switching were at the highest levels in four years. On average
30,000 more switches took place per month than in the previous year. This is an 11% increase in monthly
switching rates over the year.
This trend is set to continue. The most recent statistics published by Ofgem show that more than 2.8
million customers switched supplier in the ﬁrst seven months of 2007. Energy suppliers will continue to
compete heavily on price and service, strive for innovation and customers will continue to beneﬁt from
switching supplier.
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Britain’s energy supply market also stimulates new product development. Towards the end of last year,
SSE launched the “better plan”, a unique and innovative package which oVers customers ﬁnancial rewards
for reducing their energy consumption.
Contributory Factors to Price Rises
Whenever price rises are examined, it is very important that people understand the reasons behind
price rises.
One of the key drivers is the recent rises in the wholesale gas price across the world. This is not the fault
of suppliers and the eVect of this on gas prices within a country importing signiﬁcant quantities of its gas is
obvious. However, it must also be understood that withmuch of theUK’s electricity coming from gas power
stations, it will clearly aVect electricity prices also.
In addition,Government policies to tackle climate change and improve energy eYciency, which command
broad support, put an upward pressure on energy prices for all customers. TheCarbonEmissionsReduction
Commitment (CERT) for example, will add around £38 to the average Energy Bill for 2008. Network
infrastructure costs have also increased to support the delivery of new renewable energy and the upgrading
of energy networks to ensure they are safe and secure for another generation. The total costs to customers
in delivering network infrastructure and environmental policies have risen by almost 50% in the last four
years, from almost £170 on electricity and gas bills in 2004 to almost £250 in 2008.
It is also important to understand that for entirely responsible reasons suppliers “hedge” their
requirements by buying a signiﬁcant proportion of their customers’ energy needs in advance. When
wholesale prices are going up, customers beneﬁt as there is a lag before suppliers raise retail prices; similarly,
when wholesale prices fall, it takes time for suppliers to see reduced purchasing costs and pass these through
to customers. Our ability to work eVectively and eYciently in this area has helped us to succeed in this
competitive market, and not pass on the full extent of wholesale price increases to customers. As a result,
our customers have paid an average of around £400 less for their gas and electricity between 2004 and 2007
than have customers of British Gas—a gap which will grow over the rest of this winter.
These are not all the contributory factors. Issues as diverse as Japanese nuclear plant problems, LNG
supplies, Chinese coal demand, logistical and freight transport issues, Russian and Norwegian gas, and the
Oil price and its eVect on the global economy, all play their part in inﬂuencing wholesale energy prices. It
is against these contributory factors that a supplier must make its price choice and suppliers, of course, have
their own internal company structure and cost variations.
Helping Vulnerable Customers
SSE takes fuel poverty very seriously and our strategic approach is to ensure prices are as low as possible
for as long as possible. At the same time, we target deeper help to the households who need it the most. The
“fair pricing” policy ensures that SSE’s customers consistently enjoy the lowest prices for gas and electricity
in the UK, ensuring that many of our customers are prevented from being fuel poor by virtue of cheaper
supply deals.
In recent months, the energy regulator Ofgem has conducted two reviews of suppliers’ voluntary
initiatives to help the fuel poor. This review shone a light on the way in which SSE conducts its business
through responsible pricing strategies and a focus on high quality customer service: “SSE has adopted a
strategy around competitively priced energy and excellent customer service, which beneﬁts all of its
customers, including those who are fuel poor and vulnerable and hard to reach . . . SSE’s fuel poor
customers will be around £40 per annum better oV than the average as a result of SSE’s competitive pricing
strategy”. (Update: Ofgem’s review of Suppliers’ voluntary initiatives to help vulnerable customers,
October 2007.)
SSE was one of the ﬁrst suppliers to introduce a social tariV to help its most vulnerable customers. Those
qualifying for Energyplus Care (people spending 10% or more of their income on energy) are oVered: a
discount of at least 20% oV their current tariV; a beneﬁts health check, where appropriate; free energy
eYciency measures such as loft and cavity wall insulation; and the loan of an A-rated fridge or fridge freezer
if the existing one is ineYcient. We believe this tariV makes a signiﬁcant diVerence to families living in fuel
poverty as it addresses energy eYciency aswell as price reductions, while some of our competitors’ purported
social tariVs have, on occasions, been more expensive than our standard tariVs. We are working now to
double the number of customers on Energyplus Care by March 2008.
However, the case for a mandatory social tariV is not supported by SSE as it would be a very blunt and
inﬂexible way of targeting support to fuel poor households. A ﬁxed tariV would also be insensitive to the
market and presents potentially perverse consequences which could result in higher prices than the market
price to such who are highly price-sensitive.
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To complement our general strategy of low prices, over 140,000 customers beneﬁt from our policy to
equalise electricity Pre-Payment Meter tariVs with standard credit tariVs. As a result SSE has the lowest
electricity Pre-Payment tariV on the market. We also have the second lowest gas pre-payment meter tariV.
SSE also oVers tailor-made payment measures, used on a daily basis by hundreds of thousands of people,
in order to help them to pay their bills in a manner which suits their ﬁnancial situation.
Finally, SSE’s product portfolio includes the “better plan”, a unique package that provides ﬁnancial
rewards to customers for using less energy. This product is designed to encourage households to become
more energy eYcient but can also make a contribution to reducing the energy bills of some fuel poor
households.
A Longer Term Solution to Fuel Poverty
Investing in energy eYciency measures and the energy systems of poorer households is critical in bringing
down overall energy costs and while much progress has been made through the Energy EYciency
Commitment, there is a long way to go before many buildings are as eYcient as they could be.
In time, part of the solution may lie in the opportunities aVorded by smart metering to allow more
communication between energy suppliers and their customers. In tracking energy usage, smart meters
enable householders to use energy optimally. Beyond this, intelligent heating controls could allow people
to manage their energy use so that they are able to heat their homes in the most eYcient way possible. To
help identify the potential for smartmeters, SSE is sponsoring EnergyDemandReduction Trial in a number
of locations throughout the UK.
Company Information
Scottish and Southern Energy is one of the largest energy companies in theUK, employing around 15,000
people. We are involved in the generation, transmission, distribution and supply of electricity; energy
trading; the storage, distribution and supply of gas; electrical and utility contracting; and telecoms.We have
over eight million energy customers operating through the brands of Southern Electric, Scottish Hydro
Electric, Atlantic and Swalec. For further information on the company, please visit our website
(www.scottish-southern.co.uk).
January 2008
Memorandum submitted by Scottish and Southern Energy plc
INQUIRY INTO THE ENERGY PRICES AND STRUCTURE OF THE ENERGY MARKET
Scottish and Southern Energy (SSE) is grateful to have this opportunity to submit evidence to the
Committee’s inquiry into the structure of the energy market in the UK. SSE is the UK’s second largest
supplier of electricity and gas, with around 8.5 million customers, having been the ﬁfth largest six years ago.
It supplies energy as Southern Electric, SWALEC, Scottish Hydro-Electric and Atlantic Electric and Gas.
It is also involved in the generation, transmission and distribution of electricity and in the storage and
distribution of gas. SSE is listed on the London Stock Exchange and employs over 14,000 people in the UK.
Key Points
This submission makes the following key points about the UK’s energy market:
1. the market is competitive;
2. there are no signiﬁcant barriers to entry;
3. price decisions are the result of many issues; and
4. there should be meaningful support for the fuel poor.
In the light of this, SSE believes the Committee should encourage progress to be made in the following
key areas:
— securing additional transparency to increase market conﬁdence in the European wholesale gas
market and, indeed, the UK’s oVshore gas market;
— adopting the right principles to ensure there is meaningful support for the fuel poor;
— reinstating metering as a regulated product of the distribution business; and
— simplifying the industry arrangements, to the beneﬁt of potential new entrants and existingmarket
participants and customers.
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1. The Market is Competitive
— The UK’s energy market is the most competitive in the EU and G7—Oxera.
— All segments of the market remain highly competitive—Ofgem.
— Successful suppliers increase customer numbers.
— Responsible and fair pricing.
— EVective customer service.
— The UK’s competitive market encourages innovation.
The UK’s energy market is the most competitive in the EU and G7—Oxera
Multiple studies have been undertaken into the competitiveness of the UK Energy Market. In October
2007, Oxera, the independent economic consultancy, undertook an independent study examining energy
market competition in the EU andG7. Its key conclusion was as follows: “On aggregating the electricity and
gas markets, the UK is found to have the most competitive energy market in the EU and G7 in 2005—a position
it has held since Oxera ﬁrst analysed competitiveness of energy markets in 2001”.340 On a scale of 1 to 10,
the UK’s competitiveness score was 9.1, compared with 7.8 in second-placed Sweden and 6.3 in ﬁfth-placed
Germany.
As the Secretary of State for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform put it: “Creating an open and
competitive energy market has meant that UK consumers have consistently beneﬁted from amongst the lowest
energy prices in Europe.While it is true that wholesale energy prices are rising, greater choice and transparency
are clearly the best protection against these costs being disproportionably passed onto consumers”.341
All segments of the market remain highly competitive—Ofgem
In addition, Ofgem’s Domestic Retail Market Report of June 2007 found that: “Our analysis shows that
all segments of the market remain highly competitive and not just for customers who pay by direct debit or
online”.342
Ofgem’s analysis hinged upon a number of ﬁndings, including that: price competition has led to the spread
between prices shrinking and the most expensive suppliers being forced to become more competitive; how
innovative products are emerging as suppliers seek to win and retain customers; how customer service is
improving; and how switching rates are increasing.
Consumers have a wide choice of energy suppliers and they are exercising that choice. According to
Ofgem’s June 2007 Report, annual rates of switching were at the highest levels in four years. On average
30,000 more switches took place per month than in the previous year. This was an 11% increase in monthly
switching rates over the year.
This trend is set to continue. Statistics published by Ofgem show that, between January 2007 and July
2007, 2.8 million customers switched their electricity supplier and 2.3 million switched their gas supplier.343
This compares favourably to the ﬁgures for 2006 between January and July, when 2.6 million electricity
customers and 2.2 million gas customers switched supplier. Energy suppliers will continue to compete
heavily on price and service, strive for innovation and customers will continue to beneﬁt from switching
supplier.
In addition, Ofgem have found that of those customers who have not switched, the majority (more than
70%) say they are happy with the price and service they get from their supplier. Around 15% have not
switched as they “do not see the point”, while under 3% have not switched as they see it as too diYcult, or
were unaware of switching as an option.344
Successful suppliers increase customer numbers
SSE,which supplies energy as SouthernElectric, SWALEC, ScottishHydro-Electric andAtlantic Electric
and Gas, gained one million customers during 2007 and now has well over eight million electricity and gas
customers. This enabled it to overtake EONUK to become the UK’s second largest energy supplier, having
been ﬁfth six years ago.
This achievement in recent years demonstrates the highly competitive nature of the market: by oVering
lower prices and achieving the best performance ratings for customer service SSE has outperformed its
competitors in this market, and customers have voted with their feet.
340 Oxera Report: Energy Market Competition in the EU and G7: October 2007.
341 GNN ref 156920P.
342 Ofgem Domestic Retail Market Report June 2007.
343 Ofgem Press Release R/45.
344 Ofgem Domestic Retail Market Report June 2007.
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Responsible and fair pricing
SSE adopts a “fair pricing” policy: it seeks to be the last (or one of the last) of the major energy suppliers
to increase prices if it has to, and the ﬁrst (or one of the ﬁrst) to lower prices if it can. At a time of sustained
rises in wholesale energy prices and other upward pressures on domestic prices, SSE aims to protect its
customers from the worst eVects.
Household energy consumption is at its highest in the ﬁrst quarter of the year, with the average household
in Great Britain using around 40% of its annual gas consumption and around 30% of its annual electricity
consumption in January, February and March. That is why SSE committed not to increase prices during
this winter period. The company kept its electricity and gas prices for domestic customers at their pre-
existing levels for the whole of the winter, when they are having to use most energy, and will not implement
a price increase until after the start of British Summer Time, on 1 April.
In addition, SSE believes that the following displays further evidence of its fair pricing policy:
— During the period of rising wholesale energy prices, SSE passed on to its customers much less than
the full extent of the increases in wholesale prices and environmental costs experienced in that
period and it delayed any price rises for as long as possible.
— As a result, its customers have paid an average of a total of £433345 less for their gas and electricity
between April 2004 and March 2008 than have customers of British Gas.
— SSE was one of the ﬁrst suppliers to introduce a social tariV to help its most vulnerable customers.
Those qualifying for Energyplus Care are oVered: a discount of at least 20% oV their current tariV;
a beneﬁts health check, where appropriate; free energy eYciency measures such as loft and cavity
wall insulation; and the loan of an A-rated fridge or fridge freezer if the existing one is ineYcient.
— SSE has aligned its electricity prepayment prices with standard credit prices. However, given that
only around 25% of customers on PPMs are classiﬁed as fuel poor, we are not certain that this
decision was an optimal solution for helping our most vulnerable customers.
— SSE has tailor-made payment measures, used on a daily basis by thousands of people, in order to
help them to pay their bills in a manner which suits their ﬁnancial situation.
— As a result of its fair pricing policy, SSE’s standard direct debit tariV is actually cheaper than the
tariV British Gas claims to be their social tariV—“essentials”. Essentials is a tariV designed to help
fuel poor customers pay for their energy bills.
EVective customer service
While SSE attributes a signiﬁcant amount of the credit for its customer growth in terms of attracting new
customers upon its pricing strategy, it also retains customers by leading its sector in customer service and
complaint handling. Suppliers are competing on complaints and customer service performance as well as
price, so SSE considers service to be a primary part of its oVering to customers.
SSE has consistently been the best performer in the energy sector because of its high standards in
complaint handling and it continues to make signiﬁcant improvements in its complaints handling
procedures.
In the year to March 2007, SSE signiﬁcantly reduced the total number of complaints referred to
energywatch for resolution by 47%, to an average of 70 per month. This has been further reduced during
2007–08, with the number of complaints so far averaging just over 50 per month.
According to energywatch investigated complaints cases, SSE is consistently the best performer. See
graph below taken from energywatch website which shows performance across the industry for November
07—January 08.346 In contrast British Gas’s complaints doubled.
345 Based on an average over the 14 supply areas for a dual fuel customer consuming 20,500kWh of gas per annum, and
3,300kWh of electricity per annum and paying quarterly. Prices include VAT.
346 http://www.energywatch.org.uk/help and advice/supplier performance/index.asp
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In addition to the ﬁgures above, SSE had its reputation for providing the best customer service in the
energy supply industry conﬁrmed, by topping three independent surveys—J.D. Power and Associates 2007
UK Electricity and Gas Supplier Customer Satisfaction Study, uSwitch.com’s Customer Satisfaction
Report, and the quarterly supplier performance report by energywatch. This was the fourth consecutive year
SSE had topped JD Power Customer Satisfaction awards.347
Furthermore, in the highly competitive GB market the ultimate safeguard for customers is their ability
to switch supplier if they are dissatisﬁed with the service they receive. SSE’s track record in customer service
proves this, with its net gain of one million customers in the year to December 2007.
SSE will continue to work to ensure that the quality of service it provides to its customers is sector leading
and that it responds eVectively to its customers’ concerns about products and services. In 2006, it
implemented a new Domestic Energy Customer Charter, the ﬁrst of its kind in the UK. It made a series of
speciﬁc commitments in respect of customer service, such as a pledge to respond to letters from customers
within ﬁve days of receipt. SSE intends to publish a revised and enhanced Charter later this year.
The UK’s competitive market encourages innovation
In addition to stimulating competition in service levels, evidence also suggests that Britain’s energy supply
market drives new product development: 20% of the market is now served by new products such as ﬁxed or
capped rate products, online deals or green supply products.348
As a supplier SSE has responded to competition by launching a number of competitive innovative tariVs,
catering for diVerent customers’ needs. Towards the end of last year, SSE launched the “better plan”, a
unique package which oVers customers ﬁnancial rewards for reducing their energy consumption. Customers
receive 100% hydro-electricity at no extra cost and can earn cash credits by being helped to take a few steps
to being more energy eYcient. New joiners also receive a monitor displaying their energy usage.
SSE also oVers a feed-in tariV called Solar Energyplus. It oVers grid-tied photovoltaic solar system owners
a market leading 18 pence/kWh export tariV. It is aimed at small businesses and households and SSE pays
to install export meters, obtain Renewable Obligation Certiﬁcate (ROC) accreditation, and act as ROC
agent for owners of solar energy systems. At 18 pence per kWh exported, a system generating 1500kWh per
347 J.D Power and Associates 2007 United Kingdom Electricity Supplier Domestic Customer Satisfaction StudySM. SSE came
ﬁrst place in both the electricity and gas JD Power Customer Satisfaction Survey, the ﬁrst time one company has won both
since the studies’ inception. SSE was signiﬁcantly above industry average for all categories except metering in both studies.
348 Ofgem Domestic Retail Market Report June 2007.
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year (equivalent to half the UK average for household energy consumption) will earn £135 per year if it
exports 50% of power generated. It is also important to note that tariVs such as Solar Energyplus and other
ﬂexible innovative tariVs would be aided substantially by the introduction of smart meters.
2. There are no Significant Barriers to Entry
— 150 licensed suppliers.
— Market entry by high proﬁle names.
— Simplifying industry arrangements.
— Metering needs to be reinstated as a regulated product of distribution businesses.
As explained above, the energy supplymarket is vigorously competitive, with strong evidence of customer
awareness of the competitivemarket, a switching process that is straightforward for customers, a wide range
of oVers from suppliers and large numbers of customers exercising choice to switch to alternative suppliers.
SSE believes that on each of these counts the competitive energy supply market would compare favourably
with other similar competitive markets.
150 licensed suppliers
Nevertheless, one criticism that has been levelled at energy supply is that it is “too diYcult” for new
entrants to break into themarket. Again, SSE does not believe that the evidence supports this. It is relatively
easy for any party to obtain a supply licence and sign up to the relevant industry agreements. There are,
for example, currently 150 licensed suppliers and in the last 12 months alone there have been a total of 13
applications for supply licences (six applications for gas supply licences and seven applications for electricity
supply licences).
It is true that, since competition began, a number of smaller players have exited the market, notably the
insolvency of Independent Energy in September 2000 and the exit of a number of electricity and gas suppliers
between December 2005 and February 2006 (Zest4, Utility Link, Reepham Limited, Elador and Team
Group UK Limited). There has, however, also been exit and failure by “incumbent” generators and
suppliers, including the Government intervention to prevent British Energy going under and the failure of
the former Eastern supply business under TXU.
Market entry by high proﬁle names
It is also important to note that there has been market entry by a number of high proﬁle names, such as
aYnity deals with Nectar, Tesco Clubcard, Argos, British Heart Foundation, BA Airmiles and RSPB. In
addition, a number of niche players have emerged in the electricity market such as Ecotricity and Good
Energy, who specialise in green energy products. Good Energy has also recently been granted a gas
supply licence.
Simplifying industry arrangements
SSE is, however, sympathetic to the view put forward by some that the industry trading arrangements at
both wholesale and retail level are complex and are becoming increasingly so. It would not agree that at
present those arrangements are an insurmountable barrier and the fact that there has been some entry into
the market is evidence of that. Nevertheless, SSE does believe that more could be done to simplify the
industry arrangements, to the beneﬁt of potential new entrants and indeed existing market participants and
customers.
There have been some signiﬁcant steps taken in this regard, such as the recent supply licence review which
halved the bureaucracy of the supply licence, for which Ofgem deserves praise. The remaining obligations
were deemed necessary either to facilitate the smooth operation of the competitive market or to aVord the
most vulnerable domestic customers with additional—but necessary—protection and support.
There is, however, more that can be done. For example, SSE supports Ofgem’s review of the industry
governance arrangements and would hope that it would lead to a much reduced regulatory burden on the
industry, as well as a more streamlined modiﬁcation process. It also believes that Ofgem could do more to
reduce the complexity of some of its reforms, for example in relation to the mind-bogglingly complex
auctions for gas entry capacity which have, in SSE’s view, reduced competition oVshore. Similarly complex
arrangements are now being introduced for gas exit capacity and, if Ofgem has its way, would be introduced
in electricity. SSE understands the public policy reasons behind the introduction of these arrangements but
would urge Ofgem to take wider account of the eVect of its complex reforms on the market.
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Metering needs to be reinstated as a regulated product of distribution businesses
Another example at a retail level is metering, where the introduction of metering competition has not
produced the anticipated beneﬁts, but has led to a ﬁvefold increase in the amount of data that must be
processed on change of supplier. Backing out metering competition and reinstating metering as a regulated
product of the distribution business would not only simplify the industry change of supplier process
signiﬁcantly, it would also better facilitate the roll-out of new smart metering technologies (which would in
turn bring competitive beneﬁts).
3. Price Decisions are the Result of Many Issues
— Wholesale markets.
— Delivering climate change initiatives.
— Network infrastructure costs.
— Bill breakdown.
— Other contributory factors.
— Wholesale gas market in Europe.
— UK wholesale markets are liquid.
— EU ETS was not a “windfall”.
The Committee is concerned about what it termed “the continuing controversy over energy prices”.349
Whenever price rises (and falls) are examined, it is very important that people understand the reasons behind
the decisions. In the sections below, SSE outlines some of the contributory factors to price rises (and falls)
covering wholesale gas prices, network costs, and the costs associated with tackling climate change.
Wholesale markets
One of the key drivers to recent supplier announcements to raise prices is the recent rise in the wholesale
gas price across theworld. This is not the fault of suppliers and the eVect of this on gas prices within a country
importing signiﬁcant quantities of its gas is obvious. However, it must also be understood that with much
of the UK’s electricity coming from gas power stations, it will clearly aVect electricity prices also. Between
2003 and 2008 wholesale energy prices have increased by a factor of 2.5.
It is also important to understand that for entirely responsible reasons suppliers “hedge” their
requirements by buying a signiﬁcant proportion of their customers’ energy needs in advance. When
wholesale prices are going up, customers beneﬁt as there is a lag before suppliers raise retail prices; similarly,
when wholesale prices fall, it takes time for suppliers to see reduced purchasing costs and pass these through
to customers.
SSE’s ability to work eVectively and eYciently in this area has helped it to succeed in this competitive
market, and not pass on the full extent of wholesale price increases to its customers. As a result, its customers
have paid an average of around £433 less for their gas and electricity between April 2004 and March 2008
than have customers of British Gas.350
The graphs below illustrate the relative change in wholesale prices and SSE’s domestic prices351 for
electricity and gas since January 2004, clearly showing how SSE has prevented its customers from facing the
full extent of wholesale price increases.
349 BERR Committee PN 19.
350 Based on an average over the 14 supply areas for a dual fuel customer consuming 20,500kWh of gas per annum, and
3,300kWh of electricity per annum and paying quarterly. Prices include VAT.
351 Domestic prices are based on the expected annual bill using typical annual consumption of 3,300 kWh for electricity and
20,500kWh for gas. Prices include VAT and are based on a national average of prevailing tariV rates for customers who pay
their bills quarterly. Energy prices are based on the forward view of annual prices within the prevailing wholesale market.
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In addition to the above, there is often a misconception that suppliers treat businesses preferentially to
domestic customers in terms of passing rising costs on to them. However, the following graphs352 showing
retail price trends for domestic and manufacturing customers tell a diVerent story.
Taken in conjunction with wholesale price trends outlined above, they show that the upsurge in costs in
recent years was passed through much faster to business customers than to domestic customers. This might
be expected since business customers regularly contract for ﬁxed prices on an annual basis and suppliers
arrange short periods of backing accordingly.
Government data is not particularly timely so we can only get as far as Q3 2007 in our modelling, where
we see the impact of falling wholesale prices bringing a rapid fall in business prices so that the gap with the
domestic trend closes. Since that time however, wholesale prices have started to rise again and we can expect
the next data set to show a gap opening up again.
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352 Source: BERR Quarterly Energy Prices (December 2007).
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Delivering climate change initiatives
In addition,Government policies to tackle climate change and improve energy eYciency, which command
broad support, put an upward pressure on energy prices for all customers. TheCarbonEmissionsReduction
Commitment (CERT) for example, will add around £38 to the average energy bill for 2008.
Network infrastructure costs
Network infrastructure costs have also increased to support the delivery of new renewable energy and the
upgrading of energy networks to ensure they are safe and secure for another generation.
The total costs to customers in delivering network infrastructure and environmental policies have risen
by almost 50% in the last four years, from almost £170 on electricity and gas bills in 2004 to almost £250
in 2008.
In total, this additional investment in networks and environmental improvements has added at least £80
per annum to the typical household’s353 energy bills.
Bill breakdown
The below table indicates how all of the above aVects the breakdown of a typical bill, showing the price
of SSE’s tariVs, the use of distribution and transmission costs (UoS); the costs of ROCs; the cost of EEC,
now CERT; and metering and billing costs. These ﬁgures are then added up to make a “Non Energy Cost”.
In addition, the “Energy” costs are included, which include the cost of buying the energy (therefore
wholesale costs) and include our proﬁt margins.
It is useful to note the following:
— The portion of the electricity bill allocated to “Energy” has increased by a factor of x1.9.Wholesale
energy prices have increased x 2.5 in this period.
— In addition, the portion of the gas bill allocated to “Energy” has increased by a factor of x1.7.
Wholesale energy prices have increased x 2.4 in this period.
Breakdown for typical bill
£pa 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2008 v 2004
£pa Change
Electricity
TariV 238 251 267 298 382 436 185 x 1.7
UoS* 64 64 70 72 75 76 12 x 1.2
ROC 4 5 6 7 9 11 6 x 2.1
EEC 4 4 9 9 9 19 15 x 5.3
Metering&Billing 18 18 22 25 27 28 10 x 1.5
Non Energy Costs 90 91 107 113 120 134 43 x 1.5
Energy* 148 160 160 185 262 302 142 x 1.0
Gas
TariV 319 348 380 500 495 584 236 x 1.7
UoS* 94 91 94 101 124 124 33 x 1.4
EEC 4 4 9 9 9 19 15 x 5.3
Metering&Billing 33 33 33 34 35 36 3 x 1.1
Non Energy Costs 97 94 103 110 133 143 49 x 1.5
Energy* 222 254 277 390 362 441 187 x 1.7
* UoS refers to distribution and transmission costs. Prices generally refer to levels at April for
electricity and October for gas. Gas in 2008 has been kept at 2007 level.
* Energy includes supply proﬁt/loss
353 Based on a standard general domestic customer with typical annual consumption of 3,300 kWh for electricity and 20,500
kWh for gas.
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To make this information easier to digest, the information is also translated into graphs below.
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Other contributory factors
The above are not all the contributory factors to price rises and falls. Issues as diverse as Japanese nuclear
plant problems, LNG supplies, Chinese coal demand, logistical and freight transport issues, Russian and
Norwegian gas, and the oil price and its eVect on the global economy, all play their part in inﬂuencing
wholesale energy prices. Outside Britain, for example, the price of gas is linked to the price of oil.
It is against these contributory factors that a supplier must make its price choice and suppliers, of course,
have their own internal company structure and cost variations. At the same time, however, the issue of the
wholesale gas market in Europe looms very large.
Wholesale gas market in Europe
In recent years there have been a number of investigations into the wholesale gas market which have
examined whether high gas prices were attributable to supply and demand fundamentals, or manipulation
by producers or European interconnector eVects. There has been no ﬁrm conclusion regarding the real cause
of the problem, however the opacity of upstream information has been identiﬁed as a common concern with
the market. In the downstream gas market there has been some improvement in the resolution of
information available to market participants which has been beneﬁcial, but it is not on a par with that
available to participants in the electricity market.
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For example, the transparency of a change in ﬂow at an entry sub-terminal informs market participants
in that it updates the overall supply position and allows an assessment to be made of short-term prices. On
its own though, because the ﬂows are aggregated, this does not provide suYcient information to allow the
market to understand which party has suVered a loss and who is likely to come to the market to balance a
position. There is no ﬁeld-speciﬁc ﬂow information which would be equivalent to the instantaneous
individual power station data that is available in the electricity market.
In SSE’s experience it is diYcult to contract for long-term gas on ﬁxed price contracts as the majority of
contracts are sold on the basis of a ﬂoating prompt month index price, leaving only a small volume of gas
to be sold prompt. This creates a market where a small volume of gas is being chased by a large number of
buyers. Parties like SSE do not therefore have access to information relating to the entire gas supply chain,
unlike in electricity. The lack of transparency in the activities of upstream players makes it diYcult to
understand the true picture in terms of the dynamics on prices.
In Europe, SSE ﬁrmly believes that additional transparency is a pre requisite to increasing market
conﬁdence which will lead to further trading activity and hence greater liquidity at the gas hubs.
A series of gas pipelines connects the UK with the continent, with the result that this country’s wholesale
gas market is inevitably aVected by prices for gas in Europe. It is likely that dealing eVectively with the
wholesale gas market in Europe would make the cost of gas imported into the UK less than it otherwise
would be.
This illustrates that what goes on in Europe is having a growing and major eVect on energy in the UK.
It has rightly been observed that Britain can no longer be regarded as an isolated and self-suYcient market
for electricity and gas. As a result, the relative lack of competition which the Oxera report (above) identiﬁed
in Europe is a source of signiﬁcant concern, and needs to be addressed as a priority.
UK wholesale markets are liquid
Despite the well-documented issues with the wholesale gas market in Europe, it is generally recognised
that the UK’s wholesale energy markets are the most liberalised and competitive in the EU.
The UK’s six leading energy suppliers all own and operate electricity generation capacity, but the
wholesale electricity market is muchmore complex than that.With gas being used to generate over one third
of the UK’s power needs, rising wholesale gas prices have a follow-on impact on electricity prices. In
addition, prices for coal, which is used to generate another one third of the country’s power needs, have
recently risen to record levels.
Over 50 parties participate in theUKpower and gasmarkets: themajor energy suppliers; other generators
(such as Drax, British Energy and International Power) ﬁnancial traders; foreign utilities (mainly European
gas and power incumbents); other utilities; and gas producers (such as Shell, Conoco, Gazprom and BP).
This means that the virtual trading location for the sale and purchase of UK natural gas (the National
Balancing Point or NBP) is a fully liquid and competitive market, in which active trading provides liquidity,
risk capital and market direction. Traded volumes in the UK power market are good, although the lower
level of ﬁnancial interest in thismarket means companies like SSEmake a greater contribution to the overall
liquidity of the market.
EU ETS was not a “windfall”
In recent weeks, it has been suggested that the energy industry has received a windfall through the award
of carbon emissions permits under the EU ETS. This is completely wrong. The fundamental point is that
the permits did not represent a “windfall”, but were carefully conceived and designed to ensure the smooth
introduction of EU ETS. Moreover, uniquely, the UK electricity generation sector had to operate within
tighter emissions limits. Where those limits have had to be breached—often to ensure the overall stability
of the country’s electricity system—generators have had to purchase permits. SSE, for example, has incurred
signiﬁcant costs in securing permits tomake up for the shortfall in our allocation. This is in marked contrast
to the position before the EU ETS was introduced, when power stations could emit carbon dioxide free of
charge. All of this means that the UK has been a net buyer of permits to emit carbon dioxide.
The approach adopted by the UK government when EUETS was introduced has ensured stable supplies
of power while conﬁrming that carbon dioxide should have a market price. It has, therefore, been very
successful and a similar, measured approach to future phases of EU ETS should ensure a progressive move
towards lower carbon power generation while maintaining secure supplies of energy.
4. Meaningful Long Term Support for the Fuel Poor
In Budget 2008, the UK government said that it wanted to see energy companies spend a total of £150
million a year to help tackle fuel poverty. SSE has published a draft Code of Practice for helping vulnerable
customers that it believes should be adopted across the energy supply industry. This draft Code is founded
on two key points:
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— the single biggest contribution which suppliers can make to preventing fuel poverty is to keep
prices as low as possible for as long as possible. On this basis, those suppliers who charge most
for electricity and gas should contribute most to helping vulnerable customers. At the same time,
account does need to be taken of the number of customers which each supplier has. The way to
combine these principles is to base suppliers’ contribution on the annual turnover of their domestic
energy supply businesses—a simple and fair formula which reﬂects suppliers’ total customer
numbers and the prices they charge for electricity and gas; and
— suppliers should ensure that any “social” tariV which they oVer to vulnerable customers is the
lowest cost tariV that is made available by them to any type of customer, or any type of payment
plan or sign-upmethod. This will ensure that the lowest-cost tariVs are available for the customers
who have most diYculty in paying their bills. As an additional safeguard, SSE believes that
suppliers should be required to ensure that their “social” tariV for “dual fuel” is lower than the
average UK direct debit tariV.
SSE’s voluntary eVorts to assist our fuel poor customers have been founded on these two principles.Given
the notorious diYculty there is in identifying and targeting fuel poor households, we ﬁrmly believe that our
twin track strategy makes the greatest contribution in alleviate fuel poverty in Britain. Our determination
to keep prices as low as possible for all our customers has prevented many thousands of families falling into
the formal deﬁnition of fuel poverty.
This approach to general pricing is complemented by a deep andmeaningful package of supportmeasures
through our social tariV “energyplus care”. Eligible households receive at least a 20% discount from their
energy tariV in addition to other help including beneﬁt entitlement checks, free energy eYcient appliances
and homes insulation, where appropriate.
At the time of writingwe are engaged in detailed discussions with theDepartment for Business, Enterprise
and Regulatory Reform is devising a voluntary agreement where we will radically increase our voluntary
contribution to target even more support to our fuel poor customers.
We will welcome however greater support from government in the future to help us identify the right
customers with our programmes to assist the fuel poor. Without that help, we cannot be sure that our
voluntary programmes are reaching the right customers.
Summary
SSE understands why there has been so much attention focused on energy supply in the UK in recent
months. There are clearly areas which would beneﬁt from progress being made, and SSE has highlighted
some which would deliver signiﬁcant beneﬁts going forward.
Nevertheless, the market is fundamentally sound, delivers for customers and represents the best prospect
for the delivery of sustainable, reliable and aVordable electricity and gas in the years to come.
SSE would be happy to supplement this written evidence with oral evidence to the Committee if that
would be helpful and could be arranged.
1 April 2008
Supplementary evidence submitted by Scottish and Southern Energy
ENERGY MARKET INQUIRY: FOLLOW UP TO ORAL EVIDENCE ON 24 JUNE 2008
I am grateful to the Committee for giving me the opportunity to set out views on the issues being
considered in its inquiry into the UK energy market, and I would like to take up your invitation to follow
up the evidence given on 24 June by addressing brieﬂy three speciﬁc points: the EU Emissions Trading
Scheme (EU ETS); so-called “social tariVs”; and vertical integration.
EU ETS
It is absolutely vital that theCommittee does not fall into the trap of concluding that allocations of permits
to emit carbon dioxide, under the EU ETS, represent any kind of “windfall”. They have been carefully
conceived and designed to ensure the smooth introduction of EU ETS. Moreover, uniquely, the UK
electricity generation sector had to operate within tighter emissions limits. Where those limits have had to
be breached—often to ensure the overall stability of the country’s electricity system—generators have had
to purchase permits. SSE has incurred signiﬁcant costs in securing permits to make up for the shortfall in
our allocation. This is in marked contrast to the position before the EU ETS was introduced, when power
stations could emit carbon dioxide free of charge. All of this means that the UK has been a net buyer of
permits to emit carbon dioxide.
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The approach adopted by the UK government when EU ETS was introduced has ensured stable supplies
of power while conﬁrming that carbon dioxide should have a market price. It has, therefore, been a positive
ﬁrst step and a similar, measured approach to future phases of EU ETS should ensure a progressive move
towards lower carbon power generation while maintaining secure supplies of energy.
A retrospective tax on previously-allocated permits would severely undermine the EU ETS going
forward. The impact of such a move would also resonate well beyond the EU ETS. Investors in the UK
electricity sector would undoubtedly see such a proposal as a short-term populist gesture—but one which
would have profound long-term consequences. It would reverberate across the sector, leading to a step-
change increase in investors’ perceptions of regulatory and political risk in the UK—at a time when the
country is looking for massive levels of investment in power generation and distribution and gas storage. It
is likely to discourage existing—or new—investors from putting their money into energy in the UK.
“Social” Tariffs
I hope I was able to impress upon the Committee the strength of SSE’s feeling about so-called “social
tariVs”. In April 2008, we published a Code of Practice for Fuel Poor Customers which contains two key
principles:
— Energy suppliers should ensure that any “social” tariV which they oVer to fuel poor customers is
the lowest-cost tariV made available by them to any type of customer, via any type of payment
plan or sign-up method; and, as an additional safeguard,
— Energy suppliers should ensure that their “social” tariV for customers is lower than average direct
debit tariVs in the UK.
Vulnerable customers need the lowest prices available, not simply a tariV labelled “social”, and that
principle is at the heart of our Code of Practice. Most claims about “social” tariVs do not conform to this
principle, but SSE believes they should. In that way, Britain’s poorest customers should be able to access
Britain’s cheapest energy prices.
That said, SSE is of the ﬁrm belief that whatever superﬁcial attractions it may appear to have, a
mandatory social tariV would be a retrograde step. Firstly, it would be yet another contentious piecemeal
intervention in the country’s already complex beneﬁts system. Secondly, it would distort competition by
eVectively encouraging suppliers to avoid (loss making) customers who could qualify for the social tariVs
whereas, in fact, the industry should be working on innovative schemes to help them. Thirdly, it does not
tackle energy eYciency, so is further subsidising people to heat inadequately insulated homes. Fourthly, it
creates additional issues in terms of establishing and then identifying eligibility.
All these issues have to be addressed along with that of what standards would this mandated tariV consist
of? This is the fundamental aspect of social tariVs, mandated or otherwise. If a mandate was given that
allowed British Gas’s Essentials tariV to count as a social tariV, then none of SSE’s customers (fuel poor or
otherwise) would be on a deal that beneﬁtted them signiﬁcantly. Likewise, if the entire “fuel poor
population” (by the Government’s deﬁnition) were mandated to be put on a tariV as deep as SSE’s social
tariV—all suppliers would have to raise their standard prices extremely, and unsustainably, high (potentially
putting yet more people into fuel poverty).
In addition, such an imposition does not cater for the eventuality of wholesale prices falling, making an
imposed “one size ﬁts all” social tariV more costly than the market price, nor does it cater for the fact that
some people are in deeper poverty than others, and therefore need more support.
Against this background, the Committee certainly should consider recommending mandatory principles
for a social tariV, thus ensuring that suppliers do not get away with inﬂated claims about their contribution
in this area, but should think very seriously about the implications of a “one size ﬁts all” tariV, which, on
reﬂection is inﬂexible, unworkable and inadequate.
Vertical Integration
There is a real inconsistency in some of the arguments that have beenmade relating to vertical integration,
and I hope this section clariﬁes this for the Committee. Of particular concern to me are the suggestions that
being vertically integrated is a bad thing, leading to an unfair deal for consumers. In fact, the reverse is
the case.
In almost every market in the world, major energy companies are vertically integrated. The reason they
are is so that in periods where supply businesses are making a loss (which occurs very often, including at
present) the supply business can survive because another part of the wider company is covering the loss, thus
protecting customers. If SSE did not have any generation business at present, it could not have kept its prices
as low as they have been, and they would have been raised far more frequently, and to even higher levels,
over the last year.
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However, just because SSE has both a supply and generation business, it does not allow it to actually
speciﬁcally sell units of energy from its generation business to its supply business in some form of underhand
advantageous way, outside of the boundaries of the market and out of sight of Ofgem. This type of practice
is not allowed within the BETTA arrangements and any evidence that you have been given that suggests
this is true, indicates a fundamental lack of understanding in how energy is traded in the UK.
In summary, we believe the wholesale electricity market is liquid and transparent and allows indvididual
generators and suppliers to trade as equals.
Summary
I would like to repeat my thanks to the Committee for its time on 24 June and I would be happy to provide
any further information that might be helpful in advance of the publication of its Report.
25 June 2008
Letter by ScottishPower
Thank you for your letter to Jose´ Luis del Valle of 11 January 2008, asking for us to provide written
evidence on energy prices and the Government’s recent decision on nuclear power. I am replying as Mr del
Valle is out of the country on business.
Retail Pricing
At the time of writing, ScottishPower has not increased its prices this year. However, we are actively
reviewing the position; in the light of sharply higher input prices aVecting our business, it seems inevitable
that an upward movement will need to occur in the early part of 2008.
We already have a programme of assistance for vulnerable customers, involving the ScottishPower
Energy People Trust and our new social tariV which will come into operation shortly.
The tariVs charged to prepayment meter customers have received particular attention in recent weeks.
ScottishPower is, we believe, the ﬁrst and only large supplier to provide prepayment electricity and gas at
prices lower than standard quarterly credit.
We are giving careful consideration to the position of our most vulnerable customers and considering if
there are any further steps we can take tomitigate the impact on them of any price increase we have tomake.
As we approach ﬁnalising our pricing review, we will be looking at the following factors:
— the “end to end” income from the business. It is important that income from customers covers the
input costs needed to serve them (coal, gas, ETS permits; energy eYciency and renewables
programmes; operational costs etc) plus a return on the substantial capital invested.Many of these
factors have gone up sharply since February 2007, especially:
— coal and gas (market prices for both are up approximately 80%);
— energy eYciency programmes (estimated by DEFRA to rise from April 2008 by about £10 a
year for a single fuel customer and £20 for dual fuel); and
— ETS costs (where allocations are lower and permit costs have gone from nearly zero to about
ƒ20 per tonne);
— the prices in the wholesale market. In the long term, net income from retail sales needs at least to
match what we could achieve in the wholesale market, taking account of the capital deployed in
retail; and
— the competitive landscape. We monitor our customer numbers daily and we need to take account
of the likely impact on our customer numbers of any pricing change we make.
It is important to emphasise that the retail business does not track the wholesale market precisely in the
short term. Retail margins tend to grow when wholesale prices are low and shrink when they are higher.
When wholesale power prices fell below cost in 2001–02, a signiﬁcant number of generators without
suYcient retail customers became insolvent; conversely, in winter 2005–06 the retail market was not fully
covering its costs against wholesale prices and several small retailers could not survive. However, end to end
margins were broadly sustainable throughout that period, enabling integrated suppliers to maintain reliable
supplies to consumers and to continue investing.
The free ETS allowances for phase II have acted as an incentive to investment in generation (both gas
ﬁred power stations and FGD plants) and a number of signiﬁcant investments would not in our judgement
have gone ahead without them. It is important, to maintain a stable framework for investment, that this
position is not changed retrospectively. The free allowances will have contributed to the adequacy of
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generation margins in the next few years, reducing the likely level of price spikes in the wholesale market,
as well as directly reducing the upward pressure on end to endmargins. A signiﬁcant proportion of the value
of these allowances is therefore likely to accrue to customers.
Nuclear
Our parent company Iberdrola is a signiﬁcant nuclear operator in Spain. The Group is closely examining
the prospects for investment in new nuclear power in the UK, focusing on opportunities in England and
Wales.
We believe that the facilitative actions theGovernment has announced are broadly the right ones to secure
the policy objective of allowing new nuclear to proceed without subsidy. It is a signiﬁcant programme of
work that will need to be driven forward with determination; wewill play our part in helping this. Inevitably,
there will bemany details that will need to be resolved as the workmoves to the next level andwe as potential
investors will participate in this.
ScottishPower Renewable Energy Limited is the UK’s largest wind generator. We think that the
proposals on nuclear will make no discernible diVerence to deployment of renewables which will be
determined in the short termby the amount of progressmade on planning and grid issues, and in themedium
term by the Government’s decisions on extending the duration and level of the renewables obligation.
We are satisﬁed that the wider electricity wholesale market in Great Britain has suYcient capacity, depth
and ﬂexibility to accommodate nuclear plant at the likely rate of construction without an adverse eVect on
the construction of suYcient other plant to maintain security of supply.
Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) is also a technology which can play an important role in minimising
the emissions of CO2 from power generation. While there is a great deal of work still to do on both the
economic and the regulatory frameworks for CCS to succeed, the Government’s approach of seeking a post
combustion demonstration starting by 2014 and thenmoving on to a wider deployment seems right and best
calculated to secure a positive result.
25 January 2008
Memorandum by ScottishPower
Summary
1. ScottishPower is a major participant in the energy market at a retail, networks, wholesale and
generation level. We believe that there is strong competition—almost certainly the best in Europe—in both
the retail and wholesale markets and that the quality of this competition has been conﬁrmed by studies
undertaken at a national and EU level.
2. As a supplier, we have been aVected by very large increases in our input costs arising from conditions
in the international markets in gas and coal (by 83% and 97% respectively in the year from February 2007
to February 2008), together with increased costs for energy eYciency and renewables programmes.
Inevitably, these increases have impacted the amount we need to charge our customers; measured against
current wholesale and retail prices, we judge that domestic supply remains a loss-making activity.
3. We believe that similar factors will also have aVected our competitors in retail markets and this may
explain why they have made similar adjustments to their pricing. Switching remains intense, with some
400,000 electricity and 330,000 gas accounts changing hands every month. The very strength of competition
tends to bring prices closer together as any supplier charging signiﬁcantly more than its competitors is likely
to lose a large number of customers to others. Based on the usual indices, the domestic retail market does
not give grounds for concern, though this could change adversely in the event of further mergers. The
wholesale market is less concentrated and this would remain the case with further consolidation.
4. We remain concerned that European markets, especially in gas, are not as open as they should be and
that the market is not clearing eYciently between the UK and the continent. This may be contributing to
additional volatility of gas prices in theUKand possible excess proﬁts for upstreamhydrocarbon producers.
For these reasons, we support the progress being made on liberalisation of EU markets.
5. A huge investment programme is needed over the next decade to ensure security of supply as a number
of older fossil fuelled and nuclear generation plants are retired. It will be essential, in bringing forward that
investment, that there is conﬁdence in the operation of the market and in the ability of participants to earn
a return suYcient to remunerate their capital. At present, wholesale market prices and spreads are not
suYcient to support the investments that are needed. We do not consider that suggestions of a windfall to
generators from the free ETS allowances are correct; a signiﬁcant part of the beneﬁt from the allowances—
perhaps all of it—will accrue to customers. In these circumstances, a windfall tax would be neither fair nor
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likely to facilitate the necessary power sector investment. Indeed, serious consideration needs to be given to
some form of capacity payments, or free ETS allowances for phase III, in order to ensure that adequate
investment is made.
6. Like many market participants, we agree with Ofgem’s judgements in some speciﬁc areas and are
seeking opportunities to persuade them to re-assess their policies in others. For example, we have serious
reservations about their approach to the allocation of transmission charges to generators. However, we have
a high degree of conﬁdence in the ability of Ofgem to provide the necessary regulatory oversight of
competition in the retail market. Competition is clearly the best way to protect consumer interests because
it drives the industry to innovate to raise standards and improve eYciency. Accordingly, we are supportive
of Ofgem’s policy of avoiding detailed intervention in competitive areas where possible, and of promoting
self-regulatory solutions where appropriate. Ofgem also acts as a competition regulator and has shown a
willingness to be very tough in this sphere, as evidenced by the recent £41.6 million ﬁne imposed on
National Grid.
7. ScottishPower is supportive of eVorts to address questions of fuel poverty. We support a large and
eVective trust fund, the ScottishPower Energy People Trust, and have recently introduced a social tariV,
Carefree Plus, for our most vulnerable customers. We are holding discussions with the Government with a
view to establishing how their aspiration of almost trebling the industry’s social programmes to £150million
a year can be made an eVective reality. We look forward to participating constructively in Ofgem’s Fuel
Poverty Summit on 23 April.
Introduction
8. In April 2007, ScottishPower was acquired by Iberdrola SA, the leading Spanish energy utility. The
combined group is one of the top ﬁve utilities globally and its renewables business is the clear world leader
in the ﬁeld.
9. ScottishPower is a major participant in the UK energy market. Its activities include generation, where
we own 3,456 MW of coal ﬁred plant, 1,915 MW of gas ﬁred stations and various hydro and other plant;
networks, where we own the transmission system in South and Central Scotland, as well as the distribution
system in that region and the former Manweb area; renewables, where our sister company ScottishPower
Renewable Energy Limited is the UK’s largest wind power generator; and retail, where we have some 5.25
million customer accounts.
10. We believe that the Committee’s Inquiry will provide useful independent investigation of the gas and
electricity markets. Since the privatisation of the electricity industry in the early 1990s we have played a full
and active role in the promotion of competition in Great Britain’s electricity and gas markets, growing our
customer base from around 3 million customer accounts in 1998 to its current level today, witnessing ﬁrst
hand the competitive nature of these markets.
Competition in Retail Markets for Gas and Electricity
Current Market Structure
11. It is widely recognised that Great Britain has amongst the most competitive retail energy markets in
Europe and indeed globally. Much of the evidence for this is set out in Ofgem’s June 2007 Domestic Retail
Market Report354 which provides a wealth of information and analysis. That report indicates that switching
is taking place at a rate of about 400,000 electricity and 330,000 gas accounts per month, a much higher
rate than for many other products including telephony, broadband, banking and mortgages. This level of
competition is emphasised by the changes in market shares as a result of customer switching that have been
witnessed in recent years, with at least one supplier signiﬁcantly increasing its market share over the period
from 2002 when the last major structural change through acquisition occurred (this was the purchase of
TXU’s UK assets by Powergen).
12. The opening of the separate gas and electricity markets to competition has meant that incumbent
suppliers in one fuel can now also compete for customers in the other fuel. The market is rapidly evolving
from separate electricity and gasmarkets into a national market in dual fuel supply, though some customers
are likely to continue to buy their gas and electricity separately and 20% or so use only electricity. Figures
published by Ofgem in April 2007 indicate that almost 80% of customers who switch choose a dual fuel
deal,355 and our own internal research indicates that 99% of all dual fuel customers who switch supplier will
switch both fuels.356
354 Domestic Retail Market Report—June 2007 (Ref No 169/07)
http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/Markets/RetMkts/Compet/Documents1/DRMR%20March%202007doc%20v9%20-
%20FINAL.pdf
355 Press Release: Big Gap Opens Up in the Energy Market As Switching Rates Rocket—April 2007 (R/17)
http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/Media/PressRel/Documents1/Ofgem17.pdf
356 Based on a sample of 3,209 ScottishPower dual fuel customers who deregistered between July 2006 and March 2007.
Interviews conducted by Progressive between October 2006 and May 2007. The deﬁnition of dual fuel customers in this case
is those who take both fuels from ScottishPower.
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13. A simpleway to assessmarket shares and the competitive position is to use theHerﬁndahl-Hirschman
Index (HHI). In assessing whether or not a merger should be referred to the Competition Commission the
OYce of Fair Trading (OFT) uses this index to assess the level of competition in a market. The HHI is
deﬁned as the sum of the squares of the market shares of all participants and ranges from around 100 for
an almost perfect market (100 participants each with 1%) to 10,000 for a pure monopoly (1 participant
with 100%).
14. In previous cases theOFThas referred to guidelines issued by theUS competition authorities deﬁning
a market with an HHI less than 1,000 as “unconcentrated”, between 1,000 and 1,800 as “moderately
concentrated”, and over 1,800 as “highly concentrated”. Any merger resulting in an HHI over 1,800 or
producing an increase of over 100 and resulting in an HHI between 1,000 and 1,800 “potentially raises
signiﬁcant competitive concerns”.
15. We estimate that the HHI for the domestic retail electricity market is around 1700 (ignoring dual fuel
for this purpose), and that it would increase by at least 300 if there was a merger of any of the six major
players. Accordingly, the electricity market is presently moderately concentrated, but would become highly
concentrated if there was a merger. The retail gas market, again ignoring dual fuel, rates at around 2650,
which is considered to be “highly concentrated”. This reﬂects the historic dominance of British Gas, though
concentration levels in this market have reduced progressively since the introduction of competition and
British Gas’s share is now around 45%, meaning that more than half gas customers have switched at least
once. Consolidation would however increase the HHI in gas by 130 or more from a high base. Precise data
on the dual fuel market is less readily available at present. Indicatively, we consider that the HHI for dual
fuel would resemble the position in the retail electricity market.
Competition and switching
16.The best means of protecting customers in terms of price and service quality is by ensuring that the
energy markets remain fully competitive. Since the market was opened to full competition, 52% of UK
customers have switched their energy supplier. In contrast, in Germany that ﬁgure has been about 4.5%.
The best country to compare GB with is Spain, which has reached levels of around 20%, well short of the
GB level.
17. Ofgem regularly monitor and report publicly on retail market developments to ensure that energy
consumers can beneﬁt from competition and to check that the market is operating as eVectively as possible.
Their most recent review357 conﬁrms that all customer groups are beneﬁting from the competitive market
and showed:
— vigorous price competition between the big six suppliers for all customers—the spread between
prices has shrunk and the most expensive suppliers have been forced to become more competitive
to stem customers losses;
— suppliers are innovating to retain and win customers—there has been rapid growth in: ﬁxed and
capped price deals that shield customers from rising wholesale prices; cheaper online deals; and
green tariVs. They now account for roughly 20% of the market with one in ﬁve households signed
up to a ﬁxed price deal or other innovative oVer;
— customer service is improving: suppliers are investing huge sums to improve their systems and ﬁve
suppliers have cut the number of unresolved complaints;
— annual customer switching rates are at a very high level of around 400,000 electricity and 330,000
gas each month. Over four million switches took place in 2006, a ﬁgure which Ofgem has stated
to be the highest in four years.
18. Ofgem has also speciﬁcally commissionedMori to review switching rates for vulnerable customers.358
The resultant report clearly showed that the key motivation for switching supplier is price, with 76% of gas
switchers and 71% of electricity switchers doing so with the aim of saving money. The research highlights
that as well as price, service quality is an important consideration for many customers with one in ten
customers citing this as the main reason they had switched energy supplier. It also demonstrated that there
were very few (2%) customers who thought that the switching process would be too complex, or that they
were prevented from switching by an existing debt. Ofgem’s study showed that of those customers who had
never switched supplier, over 80% said that this was because they were happy with their current suppliers
or that they simply “couldn’t be bothered”.
357 Domestic Retail Market Report—June 2007 (Ref No 169/07)
http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/Markets/RetMkts/Compet/Documents1/DRMR%20March%202007doc%20v9%20-
%20FINAL.pdf
358 Switching Rates for Vulnerable Customers—March 2007
http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/Sustainability/SocAction/Publications/Documents1/
Switching%20Rates%20for%20Vulnerable%20Customers%20Report.pdf
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19. While the competitive market oVers all customers the opportunity to switch supplier, the Ofgem
report did recognise that switching rates among lower income groups and older people are slightly lower
than for the population as a whole. However, it should be noted that (at 24% for electricity and 23% for gas)
switching levels in the lowest switching group (customers in Social Group E) are still higher than switching
rates across all other major European markets.
20. At ScottishPower, we are anxious to encourage switching to us across all customer groups including
those traditionally perceived as vulnerable, such as low-income groups and older customers, and we
welcome initiatives to help customers overcome their caution to switch. We believe that Ofgem have sought
to do this and have struck an appropriate balance in the work that they propose in this area. In particular,
they have committed to a number of initiatives including building their understanding of the diVerent facets
of vulnerability and the issues facing vulnerable customers; looking at more direct ways of encouraging
customers, that are vulnerable to switch to cheaper deals and continue to publish annual reviews of
suppliers’ initiatives in this area to help inform debate, promote best practice and aid consumer advisers in
helping consumers understand the oVers that exist. We support this work and believe that placing greater
focus on this customer group will encourage even more customers to engage actively with the competitive
supply market.
21. Although price comparison websites have a high proﬁle, many other routes to market continue to be
used. Face to facemarketing remains an important source of switching that does not depend on the internet.
Currently, over 2 million switches take place every year as a result of visits by Energysure Accredited
Agents.359
Pricing in retail markets
22. Our retail pricing decisions have been made independently at all times. As many parties, including
Ofgem, have recognised, energy prices will ﬂuctuate for a number of reasons, particularly in relation to the
input costs faced by energy suppliers. All market participants are subject to broadly similar cost structures
and common input cost pressures and this can be expected to result in comparable price increases and
decreases.
23. Customer behaviour in relation to switching shows that pressure from customers who wish to switch
will encourage suppliers to keep prices competitive. Over the last few years, suppliers have had to reposition
their prices in order to remain competitive, particularly in their incumbent areas. This has resulted in a
narrowing price spread across the suppliers and has meant that those suppliers who are the most expensive
have had to re-think their prices in order to compete and retain customers. For example, British Gas was
the most expensive dual fuel supplier until falling customer numbers in 2007 forced it to cut prices.
24. Pricing decisions in fully competitive markets reﬂect a variety of factors, including:
— “end to end” company speciﬁc cost structures. It is important that income from customers covers
the input costs needed to serve them (for example, coal, gas, ETS permits; energy eYciency and
renewables programmes; operational costs etc), plus a return on the substantial capital involved;
— prices in thewholesalemarket. In the long term, net income from retail sales needs at least tomatch
what we could achieve by selling the energy in the wholesale market, taking account of the capital
deployed in retail; and
— our position in relation to competitors, as discussed above.
25. Energy companies tend to buy most of their requirements, whether generation fuels (coal and gas) or
wholesale energy, some time in advance. This is because spot markets are highly volatile and because there
may be delivery timescales on some items such as coal and LNG. Accordingly, it may be several months
between a change in the headline wholesale price of energy and it ﬁltering into suppliers’ cost bases. This
explains why retail price movements (in either direction) tend to lag movements in the wholesale market.
26. When considering prices, it is important to recognise that these must reﬂect the costs incurred by
suppliers in supplying the customer, and that this will vary across products, regions and payment methods.
A ﬂat pricing structure, without variation, would fail to signal the beneﬁts of low cost behaviours to
consumers, resulting in higher costs in the industry and eventually raised prices to all customers.
Competition in Wholesale Markets for Gas and Electricity
27. The GBwholesale electricity market is recognised as being the most competitive energy market in the
EU and G7 with over 30 major generators competing in a single GB market and the largest individual
market share being around 15%. The wholesale market has changed fundamentally since privatisation in
the early 1990s from a highly concentrated market with ﬁve main generating companies to an
unconcentratedmarketwithmany diverse generating companies. The change has largely been driven by new
gas-ﬁred capacity built by new entrants and plant divestment by incumbent generators. Signiﬁcant changes
to trading arrangements have also increased competition with new bi-lateral trading arrangements
359 See EnergySure leaﬂet http://www.energy-retail.org.uk/documents/EnergySureFINAL.pdf
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introduced in 2001 in England & Wales to replace the Electricity Pool, implemented at privatisation, and
the extension of these new arrangements to Scotland in 2005. These arrangements allow all generators to be
price setters through forward and futures markets, short term power exchanges and a balancingmechanism.
28. When assessed under the Herﬁndahl-Hirschman Index, the GB wholesale electricity market scores in
the range 840–910. This is categorised as un-concentrated and mergers could still take place in this market
between major players without the market being rated as highly concentrated under the index.
29. We do not consider that suggestions of a windfall to generators from the free ETS allowances are
correct. The free allowances for phase II have acted as an incentive to investment in generation (both gas
ﬁred stations and FGD plants) and a number of signiﬁcant investments would not in our judgement have
gone ahead without them. These investments will ensure that there is more generation plant available in the
years to come—a factor which will both increase security of supply and reduce wholesale prices.
Additionally, the free ETS allocations have had the eVect of causing the postponement of plant closures,
with similar positive impacts on security of supply.
30. This issue was studied in a Consultants’ report published by BERR alongside the Government’s 2007
Energy White Paper.360 This concluded that, as a result of more investment and fewer closures, some 90%
of the beneﬁts of free allocations in phase III would accrue to consumers (through reduced scarcity in the
power market) and not to generators. It also concluded that free allowances would eliminate the substantial
dip in capacity margins projected for around 2017 and the corresponding peak in unserved energy.
31. In addition to the impact on the wholesale market described above, free allowances granted to
integrated companies are likely to reduce the pressure for retail price increases because they contribute
toward ensuring that end to end returns on capital are being met. Taking account of both these factors, we
believe that it is clear that a signiﬁcant part of the beneﬁt of the phase II allowances—perhaps all of it—will
accrue to customers. In these circumstances, a windfall tax would be neither fair nor likely to facilitate the
necessary power sector investment. Indeed, consideration could usefully be given to capacity payments or
free ETS allowances for phase III in order to ensure that adequate investment is made.
32. The GB wholesale gas market is also highly competitive with over 20 active shippers with the largest
individual market share around 20%. Price information is publicly available for the complete market and
standardised contracts are available to all participants. This results in a highly competitive market on
whatever basis is used to assess the level of competition. Since international long term gas contracts are
indexed to the price of oil, high oil prices—frequently over $100 a barrel—are impacting gas prices. Thus
underlyingmarket fundamentals are resulting in high prices at the current time but the market has remained
highly competitive throughout this volatile period and without this level of competition, we believe prices
would have been even higher.
33. The GB gas storage market is also competitive with six current storage operators and a further seven
operators for storage projects under construction or seeking planning approval. Although a single operator
is responsible for over 75% of the current storage capacity, this capacity is required to be oVered to other
market participants to ensure all participants in the gas market have access to storage.
The Implications of Growing Consolidation in the Energy Market
34. There has been no major consolidation in either the electricity or the gas retail markets since 2002
when E.ON and EdF signiﬁcantly increased their market shares through acquisition. Since 2002 there have
been signiﬁcant changes in the market shares of some participants achieved through organic customer
acquisition. Over the recent diYcult period of fuel and wholesale price volatility, the retail market structure
of six major vertically integrated competing suppliers has demonstrated its ability to continue to deliver
competitive pricing without the failure of any of the major market participants as happened in 2002 and
previously.
35. In our view, the market consolidation that has occurred since 1995 has beneﬁted ﬁnal customers in
that it has resulted in a number of strong players competing in the market, who are able to withstand
volatility in fuel and wholesale prices. They have been able to shield customers from much of the short and
medium term market volatility by using the natural hedge for much of their customers’ demand through
owning upstream power generation assets. The market is also used by the major suppliers to hedge their
positions and thus the volume traded on the market can be many times the volume ﬁnally delivered to
customers. This volume of trading ensures suYcient market liquidity for the long term and the short term
market. In the long term, however, ﬁnal customersmust pay prices reﬂectingmarket fundamentals. Analysis
of the HHI ﬁgures suggests that further horizontal consolidation at the retail level would be undesirable.
36. To date, over 6 million customers have beneﬁted from a smooth transition between suppliers in cases
of supplier failure.Without such transfers, the impact on customers could be considerable, leaving a number
of customers without a secure supply of energy and many vulnerable customers particularly at risk. The
great majority of these transfers took place without invoking the formal Supplier of Last Resort (SoLR)
procedures. However, these procedures are necessary when a trade sale is not possible, to ensure continuity
360 Dynamics of GB Electricity Generation Investment: Prices, Security of Supply, CO2 Emissions and Policy Options.
http://www.berr.gov.uk/ﬁles/ﬁle38972.pdf See pages 55–58.
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and security of supply for consumers and help to prevent increased costs across the market. Appointing a
SoLR only for domestic customers would leave other customers without a supplier and at risk of possible
disconnection. It could also expose other industry parties to bad debt as customers continued to use
electricity or gas for which the failed supplier was not paying.
37. The retail gasmarket beneﬁts to a lesser extent fromvertical integrationwith themajority of themajor
competing suppliers having limited ownership of upstream assets. There is beneﬁt, however, in the major
suppliers owning gas-fuelled generating plant allowing them to spread gas purchases across both the retail
market and the electricity generation market and thus enabling them to reduce the volatility in their gas
prices to ﬁnal customers.
The Relationship between the Wholesale and Retail Markets for Electricity and Gas
38. The structure of our energy market has evolved over time, with the business models of the six main
energy suppliers reﬂecting a natural level of vertical integration in the power market (from generation and
trading through to electricity supply) and a desire to achieve an increasing level of integration in the gas
market. This positioning is understandable and reﬂects a desire to mitigate commodity sourcing, trading
andmarket price risk in a period of unprecedented volatility in global ﬁnancial and commoditymarkets and
the need to secure input fuels from new sources around the world. It is our strong belief that this structure
provides beneﬁts to retail customers by ensuring security of energy supply, mitigating commodity risk and
protecting customers from the extremes of wholesale price movements.
39. We believe that the returns earned in theGB integrated energymarket can not be considered excessive
and in fact have not been suYcient on a sustained basis considering the inherent level of risk faced in our
competitive markets. Since the introduction of competition proﬁtability levels along the various parts of the
energy value chain have been highly cyclical, with independent retailers such as Independent Energy facing
ﬁnancial distress and at other times generators such as British Energy experiencing a similar fate.
40. During 2005 and early 2006, retail margins were highly negative at prevailing market prices and these
losses were oVset by improved industry returns in power generation. The subsequent fall in wholesale prices
in late 2006 and early 2007 improved retail economics and coincided with a signiﬁcant fall in returns
available to coal generators. Recent industry wide tariV increases reﬂect the very strong rebound in global
commodity prices (gas increase 83% and coal increase 97% from February 2007 to February 2008) and
industry wide costs such as the CERT programme and the Renewables Obligation. We believe that retail
energy prices do not currently show a sustainable margin over wholesale prices and we are continuing to
monitor the position.
The Interaction between the UK and European Energy Markets
41. A fully competitive energy market in Europe is very important for the long term future of the UK
energy market. While this is important in electricity it is essential in gas, where a signiﬁcant part of UK
requirements are imported. We remain concerned that European markets, especially in gas, are not as open
as they should be and that the market is not clearing eYciently between the UK and the continent. This
may be contributing to additional volatility of gas prices in the UK and possible excess proﬁts for upstream
hydrocarbon producers. For these reasons, we support the progress being made on liberalisation of EU
markets.
42. The domestic retail gas market is signiﬁcantly larger inGB than in themajority of EUMember States
and thus gas price volatility has a more detrimental impact on GB domestic customers. The GB wholesale
gas market is closely linked to European prices due to the interconnector pipelines connecting with the
continent and the increased volume being sourced through these interconnectors. It is essential that a true
European gas market is developed to ensure that GB suppliers have access to gas in Europe on the same
terms as other European energy companies and are able to make full use of gas storage.
43. Ofgem continues to play a key role in working with the European Commission and other European
regulators with the aim of ensuring that a genuine and open market is developed. Such a market would
beneﬁt energy consumers both in Britain and elsewhere in the EU. Signiﬁcant progress has recently been
made in improving transparency in European power and gas markets with key information now available
on daily gas ﬂows onmajor pipelines and on gas storage in all themajor Europeanmarkets. Regional energy
markets are being developed towards the eventual goal of a competitive single European energy market.
The Effectiveness of Regulatory Oversight of the Energy Market
44. Like many market participants, we agree with Ofgem’s judgements in some speciﬁc areas and are
seeking opportunities to persuade them to re-assess their policies in others. For example, we have serious
reservations about their approach to the allocation of transmission charges to generators. However, we have
a high degree of conﬁdence in the ability of Ofgem to provide the necessary regulatory oversight of
competition in the retail market. Competition is clearly the best way to protect consumer interests because
it drives the industry to innovate to raise standards and improve eYciency. Accordingly, we are supportive
of Ofgem’s policy of avoiding detailed intervention in competitive areas where possible, and of promoting
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self-regulatory solutions where appropriate. Ofgem also acts as a competition regulator and has shown a
willingness to be very tough in this sphere, as evidenced by the recent £41.6 million ﬁne imposed on
National Grid.
45. The Government’s response to the House of Lords Select Committee Inquiry on Economic
Regulators361 points out that Ofgem’s regulation of energy markets is widely regarded as successful and the
Government would not want to change its objectives in a way that hampered its ability to continue to
regulate eVectively. We support the Government’s position in this area and believe that Ofgem provides
eVective and adaptive regulatory oversight within the current market.
46. The highly competitive GB wholesale and retail energy markets were achieved through strong
national regulatory oversight. In particular the establishment of a market structure separating monopoly
activities from competitive activities has been key to ensuring that owners of monopoly assets do not gain
a competitive advantage over other market participants. These markets have, however, been highly
competitive for some time and are now able to be governed increasingly by general competition law. Over-
regulation can stiﬂe competitive innovation, which in the long term will be detrimental to customers.
47. Overall Ofgem’s ability to oversee the GB market relies upon a variety of tools to cater for diVering
circumstances as a market with both monopoly regulation and robust competition demands ﬂexible,
targeted and often innovative approaches to regulation. It is also important to note that Regulators have a
duty to take account of the costs that they impose on industry and hence consumers, and to ﬁnd new and
cost eVective ways to achieve their objectives. Examples of eVective regulatory oversight can be seen in a
variety of cases including:
— The sustained success of self-regulatory initiatives in the retail market such as the Association of
Energy Suppliers (AES) Selling Code of Practice, recognised by the OFT’s Market Study on
Doorstep Selling as a signiﬁcant eVort made by the energy suppliers, which has resulted in the
number of selling complaints falling by around 90% since 2002.
— Ofgem’s review of the gas and electricity supply licences which was aimed at opening the market
to new entrants, improving protection for vulnerable customers and creating a path for the
development of more innovative products and technologies, including micro-generation.
— The change in the GB market to increase the amount of information available to industrial
customers on supplies of gas from oVshore sources thus removing unnecessary problems for
customers, traders and suppliers and demonstrating Ofgem’s desire to see greater transparency in
energy markets across Europe.
Progress in Reducing Fuel Poverty and the Appropriate Policy Instruments for Doing So
48. In the current climate of increasingly higher energy prices, some customers, including some of the
most vulnerable, ﬁnd it diYcult to achieve aVordable warmth. ScottishPower is committed to playing its
part, with Government, in helping to combat fuel poverty. We have undertaken a number of initiatives in
this area, which involve improving the housing stock, implementing social tariVs, providing winter rebates
to vulnerable customers and establishing the ScottishPower Energy People Trust (an independent charity
established to help combat fuel poverty in the UK).
49. We are holding discussions with the Government with a view to establishing how their aspiration of
almost trebling the industry’s social programmes to £150 million a year can be made an eVective reality. We
believe that a voluntary approach on the basis the Government has outlined is achievable and would deliver
the best results by allowing suppliers to innovate to ﬁnd the best solutions. A mandatory social tariV could
stiﬂe innovation and prevent the best solutions being found.
Prepayment meters
50. Concern has been raised over the diVerence in some suppliers’ retail prices for prepayment meters
compared to other payment methods, particularly direct debit. Nearly 11% of gas customers and 14% of
electricity customers pay by prepayment meter (PPM). All PPM systems require customers to pre-purchase
electricity or gas at a vendor outlet (eg post oYce, shop, petrol station etc). The customer needs to bring a
card or key to the vendor outlet for the card or key to be “charged”, or for a token to be sold so that when
the customer inserts the card, key or token into the meter they obtain credit on their meter. The
establishment and maintenance of a network of vending outlets, along with the additional costs associated
with payment devices such as cards and keys makes PPMs a more expensive payment method when
compared to standard credit meters. In addition, some PPMs are more susceptible to fraud, theft and other
forms of misuse. They can often require more frequent visits by ﬁeld staV than traditional credit meters.
51. Ofgem’s breakdown of the estimated cost diVerence between supplying a PPM and a direct debit
customer for both gas and electricity shows an additional cost of £85 per annum. ScottishPower currently
views the cost diVerential as being slightly higher—a little above £100 per annum, and prices accordingly.
However, this is an area we keep under review, and if we are satisﬁed that the cost diVerential is less than
361 http://www.parliament.uk/documents/upload/GovRespRegulators.pdf
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the ﬁgures in our current tariVs, we would take account of this in future price adjustments. We believe that
our cost reﬂective approach to pricing provides the best deal for customers who pay by PPM, and the
minority of PPM customers who are fuel poor362 are best served by a programme of social assistance directly
targeted at reducing fuel poverty.
52. ScottishPower remains the only GB energy company to set standard pre-payment prices for both gas
and electricity lower than standard quarterly credit prices. This ensures a good deal for all PPMcustomers—
with an estimated beneﬁt to them of nearly £8.4 million per annum.
53. We welcome Ofgem’s announcement of a Fuel Poverty Summit which will be held later this month
as this form of co-ordinated action between Government and industry often results in new and innovative
solutions being developed to address the many dynamic and complex factors that contribute to the problem
of fuel poverty in the UK.
ScottishPower activity
54. ScottishPower has always been committed to providing assistance for vulnerable customers and our
current eVorts in this area include:
Housing Stock
ScottishPower was the ﬁrst company to achieve the Government’s challenging Energy EYciency
Commitment (EEC) target, which was set in 2005. To deliver the required reduction in energy demand, an
extensive programme was implemented to improve the energy eYciency of homes across Great Britain.
Over the three year period, half of the energy savings were targeted at people in receipt of state beneﬁts
ensuring that those most in need could also beneﬁt. To achieve their target ScottishPower insulated over
150,000 lofts and 270,000 cavity walls and distributed over 5 million energy eYcient light bulbs.
Social TariVs
Our Carefree Plus TariV, which was launched on the 1st February 2008, is designed to help our most
vulnerable customers save money. The tariV means that eligible customers will save up to £112 (including
VAT) on their energy bills each year.
All Carefree Plus customers will also be oVered a free Energy EYciency Survey to help them save on their
energy bills and identify whether they qualify for insulation or other energy eYciency measures, and a
Beneﬁts Health Check. Our experience of carrying out Beneﬁts Health Checks through the ScottishPower
Energy People Trust suggests that for every £1 spent on this work, £20 of unclaimed beneﬁt is recovered for
customers. As such we have developed this as a key component of our Social TariV oVering.
Winter Rebates
This Winter, we tookmitigating action against the impact of retail price increases on our most vulnerable
customers. For customers who were on our Carefree Priority Services Register, ScottishPower provided a
rebate of up to £31 to oVset the eVect of the recent price increase until 31 March 2008.
Trust Fund
The ScottishPower Energy People Trust was established in November 2005 to fund not-for-proﬁt
organisations that help vulnerable people including families, young people, the disabled and the elderly who
need to spend more than 10% of their income on energy bills. So far, the Trust has awarded £3.6 million to
87 projects across Great Britain, assisting over 215,000 individuals in over 88,000 households.
Proactive Approach to Debt Prevention
Ofgem’s 2005 review of energy suppliers’ debt and disconnection procedures identiﬁed ScottishPower as
a market leader in terms of ﬁnding innovative ways of helping consumers avoid debt and disconnection. A
more recent review part of which was done in collaboration with energywatch, concluded that since Ofgem’s
last review in 2005 there has been an increased focus by all suppliers on debt and disconnection issues.
362 Of all customers who pay by PPM, less than 20% are fuel poor. See Accent survey results, published as an Appendix to the
June 2005 Domestic Retail Market Report, Ref 24b/06
http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/Markets/RetMkts/Compet/Documents1/12882-2406b.pdf
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Community Liaison OYcers (CLOs)
We oVer targeted and detailed face-to-face advice to customers through our unique network of CLOs.
Thirteen dedicated staV represent ScottishPower within the community, assisting customers and providing
training across the business, including on how to identify and deal with vulnerable customers. Last year
ScottishPower’s CLOs undertook around 7,200 customer visits, the majority of which will have included
providing energy eYciency advice.
Clear Information on Savings
ScottishPower has launched a “Savings Challenge” to encourage existing customers to ensure that they
are on the company’s best deal. Over 80% of ScottishPower customers could pay less by making simple
changes to their energy account such as changing payment method.
Home Heat Helpline
ScottishPower currently supports the national Home Heat Helpline, an independent free telephone
service that oVers help and advice to people struggling to pay their energy bills. We are in discussion with
Government about the best method for its continued funding. The helpline can assist vulnerable people in
a number of ways, including providing advice on:
— Identifying grants that are available to make homes more energy eYcient.
— Alternative payment methods.
— Accessing a priority service team in each supplier to provide specialist advice.
— Linking with other support agencies.
Government activity
55. Given the wider causes of fuel poverty there will inevitably be a limit to the role that the industry and
indeed the regulator can play in tackling it.While wewill play our part, the primary focus has to be on raising
incomes and improving housing, both of which are more the responsibility of Government. We believe that
there are a number of helpful tools available to Government that would reinvigorate the focus on fuel
poverty at this time. These include:
Winter Fuel Payment
We welcome the Chancellor’s recent announcement of a one-oV additional Winter Fuel Payment for
2008–09.We would suggest that consideration is given to discontinuing theWinter Fuel Payment for higher
rate taxpayers and using the money saved to fund other schemes which would more directly help with fuel
poverty, including Warm Front.
Warm Front
Funding should be increased for Warm Front, the Government’s main grant funded programme for
tackling fuel poverty. The budget forWarmFront was cut before Christmas from £350million in the current
year to around £270million in each of the next three years. This move was contrary to the recommendations
of the Fuel Poverty Advisory Group which stressed it “is essential that Warm Front funding be maintained
in 2008 to 2011 at the 2007–08 level of around £350 million”.
Beneﬁt take-up
Consumer income should also be maximised through an increased drive from Government to encourage
beneﬁt take-up, including automating the take-up of Council Tax beneﬁts and other tax credit. The
Government estimates that up to £9.3 billion of beneﬁts went unclaimed in 2005-06.363
ScottishPower
1 April 2008
363 The OYce for National Statistics, “Income Related Beneﬁts Estimates of Take-Up in 2005–06”, 13 September 2007; issued on
behalf of the Department for Work and Pensions.
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Memorandum submitted by Shell
Introduction
In the UK, Shell is engaged in exploration and production, oil reﬁning and marketing, gas and power,
chemicals, renewables and research and development.
As regards gas:
— Shell does not sell gas toUKhouseholds. Indeed Shell does not have a domestic gas supply licence.
— Shell sells gas to ca 6500 Industrial and Commercial (I&C) customers in the UK. The volumes
represent about 2.5% of the total UK gas market.
— We believe Shell is one of approximately 60 companies involved in UKCS gas production. Our
share of UK gas production is approximately 8%.364 This gas is sold to a range of UK energy
companies.
— Shell also brings in its own gas from abroad, mainly Norway. In 2007, these volumes amounted
to less than 1% of UK annual demand.
— Shell trades gas at the National Balancing Point (NBP), partly for supply/demand balancing
purposes to support the above activities.
Our comments below concentrate on the wholesale and I&C market.
Structure and Competitiveness of the UK Gas Market
The UK gas market was the ﬁrst to liberalise in Europe and provides in our view a good framework for
a competitivemarket. An unbundled, price-regulated grid operator that is prohibited from engaging in other
commercial activities provides for the correct environment in which competition in non-monopoly
activities, eg shipping and supply can develop. Shell believes that this market structure has also been
conducive to the development of a liquid tradedmarket at theNational Balancing Point (NBP), thus helping
to facilitate gas-to-gas competition.
The traded market for instance has witnessed growth both in terms of traded volumes and the number of
parties involved. The growth in recent years of the APX Exchange illustrates this point. Traded volumes,
for example, have grown from 106 TWh in 2004 to 131 TWh in 2007. During the same period, the number
of members has grown from 55 to 74.365
In the I&C sector we now experience a market where not only are margins low but customers readily able
and willing to switch, and also where intermediaries invite several potential suppliers to compete for
business.
Shell sells gas from own production and third party gas in the UK market partly under medium- or long-
term contracts with other merchants and partly by selling directly to I&C customers under short-term
contracts. The conclusion we draw from Shell’s involvement in the gas market is that we see competition,
with the company both losing and gaining business.
In amature and liberalisedmarket, one would expect not only newmarket entrants but also consolidation
to take place in parallel. The UK gas market has seen both and this is likely to continue in the coming years.
So far as we can see, any consolidation so far has not diminished competition in the market. This is our
practical experience. In that context, we note that BERR’s own calculation of indices such as theHerﬁndahl-
Hirschman Index that assess market concentration, appears to indicate a satisfactory position.366 Should
there be any tendency in future for consolidation to diminish levels of competition, we believe national and
EU competition authorities have the necessary information and powers to intervene eVectively.
Interaction between the UK and European Gas Markets
It should be noted that the gas market is developing towards a global market with global eVects on
availability and prices. With ever more physical interconnections and LNG regas terminals (Interconnector
upgrade, BBL pipeline, Langeled pipeline and LNG regas terminals on the Isle of Grain and in Milford
Haven), the UK has an increasing number of gas supply options and is increasingly part of the European
and even global gas market.
In saying this, however, it is important to note that additional capacity does not directly translate to
equivalent gas ﬂows. Rather, gas ﬂows to the UK will be determined by market attractiveness and price.
This is supported by our own experience. Shell has in late 2007 and early 2008 redirected gas volumes to
the UK that were originally destined for the European continent (in the same way, LNG cargoes initially
earmarked for Spain have been diverted to North America). With the integration of the UK into European
and global markets, the number of such transactions is set to increase.
364 https://www.og.berr.gov.uk/pprs/pprsindex.htm
365 Source: http://www.apxgroup.com/index.php?id%106
366 http://www.berr.gov.uk/energy/statistics/publications/indicators/page39558.html
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Given that gas prices are a response to the demand and supply balance, the impact of the globalisation
of the gas market as described above must be considered when assessing market eVects in the UK. Energy
prices in general must be taken into account, as primary energies are in principle interchangeable.
In the UK, natural gas is mainly used for power generation and space and water heating. In power
generation gas is competing against coal and nuclear energy and against oil and electricity for space and
water heating. In addition there is gas-to-gas competition between diVerent gas installations. Policy
decisions on the energy mix and climate protection will also have an impact on overall energy price levels.
In line with the above, the changes we have seen in wholesale prices appear broadly consistent with supply
and demand fundamentals, inter- and intra-fuel competition and an increasing reliance on imported gas.
Regulation of the Gas Market
Aclear distinction should be drawnbetween the role of a regulator and the role of competition authorities.
These bodies should, of course, have adequate powers to carry out their respective functions but the two
roles are not the same as each other.
Competitive market activities such as shipping and supply should not be subject to economic regulation
of the type that logically applies with respect to monopoly grid operators. Rather, such activities should be
subject to regulatory oversight and, where necessary, applicable competition rules.
Additionally, we would question the extent to which regulatory policy has concentrated on the core
activity of the economic regulation of grid networks. Increasing emphasis appears to have been placed on
subjecting competitive market activities to increasingly complex market rules and arrangements. The result
is that the complexity of market rules and arrangements that are also subject to constant change—see for
example the development and growth of the Uniform Network Code over the past 10 years—create
diYculties not only for only market participants but also for regulatory authorities in understanding the
market. As such, there may be some merit in the regulatory authorities waiting for new rules and
arrangements to bed-in and take eVect before trying to demonstrate the need or otherwise for further
change.
Summary
In our view, the UK gas market is characterized by:
— Competition in the sectors in which we are involved.367
— More and more integration—physical and ﬁnancial—into European and global markets.
— Increasing diversity in terms of players and sources.
— A market framework, as described earlier in this response, that does not appear to have any
obvious deﬁciencies and, notwithstanding the comments above, to a large degree this comment
also applies to the regulatory framework.
11 April 2008
Memorandum submitted by the Sussex Energy Group368
About the Sussex Energy Group
There is growing awareness that a transition to a sustainable energy economy is one of themain challenges
facing us in the 21st Century. Although climate change is a signiﬁcant factor, there are many other reasons
why we need to address the energy transition, including security of supply, fuel poverty and the attractions
of innovations such as renewable energy resources, distributed generation and combined heat and power.
Critically, the energy transition needs to be designed in such a way that maximises economic eYciency. An
eVective response requires technical ingenuity, behavioural change and virtually unprecedented political
commitment. These are the challenges that the Sussex Energy Group is addressing. We undertake
academically excellent and inter-disciplinary research that is also centrally relevant to the needs of policy-
makers and practitioners. We are supported through a ﬁve-year award from the Economic and Social
Research Council from April 2005, but also have funding from a diverse array of other sources.
367 As mentioned, Shell does not sell gas to the UK’s residential market.
368 This response was written by Professor Gordon MacKerron, Director, Sussex Energy Group, SPRU, Freeman Centre,
University of Sussex, BN1 9QE; Tel 01273 873539; Email g.s.mackerronsussex.ac.uk, with inputs from Dr Jim Watson,
Deputy Director of the Greoup (w.j.weatson sussex.ac.uk)
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Introduction
The committee has requested evidence on seven inter-related questions. In line with our competences, we
have chosen to respond in two areas: competition and market structure (eVectively spanning the ﬁrst three
of the Committee’s issues); and the ﬁnal issue, fuel poverty. The main theme of our evidence is the
implication of market structures, regulation and fuel poverty policy for the vital long-term objective of
reducing carbon emissions
Competition, Market Structure and Low Carbon Objectives
Energy policy in theUKwants: competition (low costs and potentially low prices); radically lower carbon
outcomes; energy security; and abolition of fuel poverty. These are very diYcult to pursue simultaneously
and various trade-oVs will usually exist. Competition may impede low carbon objectives (for instance if coal
prices are low); and energy security may exacerbate fuel poverty if we pay an “insurance premium” to get
more secure supplies or more rapid reductions in demand.
The main focus for this inquiry is competition. This can come in several diVerent forms: in the UK
liberalised market-place it has usually taken the form of short-term price competition, rather than
competition—for instance—in oVering diVerent quality/type of service (eg green tariVs or energy services
rather than selling a simple energy commodity). This kind of short-term price competition in the retail sector
puts a premium on reaping economies of scale and this has meant a minimum ﬁnancially viable size for
energy suppliers of several million customers. Given, too, that economic regulation is vigilant against
market domination by too few companies this has led to an apparently quite stable oligopolistic market
structure consisting of six main suppliers who hold some 98% of the market: companies can be neither too
small nor too large.
A given market structure (in this case oligopoly with substantial vertical integration of retail and
generation businesses) cannot in itself tell you if behaviour is competitive. Where there are as many as six
ﬁrms in oligopoly, a high degree of competition is at least possible. It is impossible to judge whether or not
behaviour is anti- or pro-competitive without detailed and diYcult analysis. If diVerent companies’ prices
move together and tend to converge, they may do so either because the market is competitive or because it
is implictly or explicitly collusive. Price convergence in competition is a result of the need on one hand for
ﬁrms to avoid charging too high a price (or theywill losemarket share) and on the other, to avoid engaging in
price-cutting to gainmarket share (because the regulator will not allowmuch furthermarket concentration).
Equally prices may converge in the opposite situation of implicit or explicit collusion.
It is sometimes argued that high levels of consumer switching between suppliers is evidence high levels of
competition. However, a very high proportion of vulnerable and elderly consumers have never switched,369
and while consumers can make small short-term gains from switching, the high levels of switching seem
evidencemore of theway inwhich regulation and advertising have facilitated switching in the British system,
rather than that there have been signiﬁcant long-term consumer beneﬁts. It is certainly the case that there
have been no major changes in long-term market share among the six suppliers as a result of switching
activity.
The two critical questions then become:
— are these more or less common price levels allowing high proﬁt margins relative to activities of the
same risk (indicating little or no competition) or low margins (indicating high levels of
competition)? We have no conducted no recent work in this area and have no comment to make.
— are there major barriers to entry? If so, there are concerns that while there may still be a degree of
competition, incumbent ﬁrms may collectively (for example) be slow to pass on input price falls
to their customers, but much quicker to pass on input price rises.
The fact that the six retailers have 98%of themarket and that a signiﬁcant number of smaller new entrants
have failed to establish themselves suggests that barriers to sustainable entry (mainly due to economies scale
represented by large customer numbers) are high. Whatever the results of these barriers may be for short
term proﬁtability, this is a serious issue in relation to the longer term objective of low carbon.
New niche players have tried to establish themselves on the basis of radically greener tariVs and oVering
energy services rather than energy commodities. Some, such as Good Energy, have been successful in
oVering green tariVs but still have a very small market share. The regulatory system—dominated by the need
to show that prices to consumers are minimised in the short term—has also taken a rather individualistic
view of competition and consumer choice. An example is that Ofgemhas seen smartermetering (which could
open up avenues for lower carbon futures) as a matter of individual consumer choice and preference, rather
than as an infrastructure issue facilitating wide-ranging, national-level learning and innovation in providing
new ways to deliver energy (especially less energy) in eYcient and eVective ways.
Another example of the limited approach to competition within the UK is the lack of an energy service
market for households.370 Although this has long been talked about (BERR has been working in this area
since 2000),371 it has not yet happened. The current market structure makes it very diYcult for new entrants
369 energywatch energywatch welcomes MPs’ inquiry into energy market Press release 5 February 2008.
370 For more, see J Watson (2006) Domestic Energy Services: What Will it Take? Power UK No 154, December.
371 See the ﬁnal report of the government’s Energy Services Working Group from 2003: http://www.berr.gov.uk/ﬁles/
ﬁle20139.pdf
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to establish themselves with such a diVerent business model. Reforms are now planned for a new “supplier
obligation” to replace the Carbon Emissions Reduction Target which mandates energy eYciency action by
suppliers in 2011. This is expected by many to shift suppliers towards a more service-oriented approach to
minimise emissions from the energy they supply. But it will be important to design the new obligation so that
it allows diversity of approaches (including new entry)—and therefore helps to encourage more meaningful
competition between suppliers.
Overall the rather static supplier market structure, reﬂecting the particular UK liberalisation context and
regulatory structure, has both channelled competition into a narrow focus on short-term price movements
in energy prices, and acted as an impediment to longer term objectives of a lower carbon system.
Fuel Poverty
Fuel poverty is real: it is not just a simple sub-set of poverty in general. It is true that most people in fuel
poverty have quite low incomes but the match is not anything like exact. The reason is that those on
relatively low incomes experience great variety in the level of energy eYciency of both their housing fabric
and their space heating system. A poorly insulated house with a highly ineYcient heating system may need
to consume up to four times as many units of delivered energy (in kWh) to achieve the same comfort level
as a well-insulated house with an eYcient heating system.
Fuel poverty cannot be eradicated just by raising incomes (though that helps a little) and the Government
can do little to aVect energy prices in a liberalised market. This means that the principal policy approach to
fuel poverty needs to be via improved eYciency of both the building fabric and/or the heating system. There
has been recent advocacy of lower “social” tariVs for those in fuel poverty. While such a measure could
substantially improve the fuel poverty status of many families:
— it is a short to medium term measure at best and should not be used as a substitute for improving
energy eYciency, which is a necessary component of a long-term low carbon and sustainability
objective. If energy prices remain high, the cost of social tariVs to Government will be
correspondingly high; and
— it is unlikely to work unless made mandatory, and this raises the problems of identifying all those
who are eligible for such tariVs and overcoming probable resistance from the supply companies.
This resistance may have two origins: a general resistance to the idea that their total company
revenues will initially suVer (and a possible response, in compensation, to raise tariVs for other
customers); and more speciﬁc company resistance that may come from those suppliers who have
a disproportionately high proportion of customers in fuel poverty.
This suggests a need to persist with, and intensify, existing Government programmes which do recognise
the importance of improved energy eYciency to overcome fuel poverty—for example the Warm Front
scheme and the Energy EYciency Commitment (now the Carbon Emission Reduction Target) which has
historically required companies to concentrate much of their eVort on the fuel poor. There is some way to
go before fuel poverty can be eradicated but concentrating on intensiﬁed energy eYciency measures is both
the most reliable policy approach and the one most consistent with long term lower carbon goals.
However, recent decisions by theGovernment have gone in the wrong direction. Before the recent Budget,
annual (revenue) expenditure on Winter Fuel Payments (WFP) was around £2,200 million per year.
Following the WFP increases announced in the Budget—of roughly £550 million—this WFP expenditure
in 2008–09 will now rise to something close to £2,750 million By contrast, and against the strong advice of
the Fuel Poverty AdvisoryGroup, the pre-Budget report cut (capital) spending onWarmFront for 2008–11
by 25%, from roughly £350 m pa, to about £270 m pa. Thus, revenue spend on WFP in 2008–09 is now
roughly 10 times annual capital spend on Warm Front.
This growing, order ofmagnitude diVerence between capital and revenue spend is a poor way to tackle the
fuel poverty question. This not least because househoods treat their WFPs as just another source of income
(consumers are just as reluctant as Government to hypothecate revenues) and can be expected to spend
relatively little of it on fuel. This is especially so if they experience low energy eYciency, as a given ﬁnancial
outlay will have a limited outcome in terms of greater warmth. A continuation of growing WFPs with
diminishing capital spend on better household energy eYciency will be both expensive in absolute terms and
do little to tackle the experience of fuel poverty. For both low carbon and fuel poverty alleviation reasons,
it is urgent that Government reverse this recent trend.
April 2008
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Memorandum submitted by Trading Standards Institute
The Trading Standards Institute is the professional body for Trading Standards professionals working in
the private and public sectors.
It is the national body responsible for representing, supporting, lobbying, and championing Trading
Standards to a range of stakeholders including government, business, consumers, and the media.
We look to provide innovative solutions across the regulatory arena; to administer and award
professional qualiﬁcations; to accredit and certify training and ensure the ongoing competence of members;
and to inﬂuence and lobby on behalf of the profession as a whole.
We aim, through our actions and our members’ actions, to empower consumers and reputable business
to contribute to a vibrant economy.
We strive to eliminate rogue traders and unfair trading practices from the marketplace; to promote
environmental sustainability; and to make an eVective contribution to the health and social wellbeing of
citizens and communities.
Whether the current market structure encourages eVective competition in the retail markets for gas and
electricity
1. Regarding the eVectiveness of competition, TSI believes that more onus should be put upon the energy
companies to ensure that the information they give consumers is as clear as possible in terms of their pricing
policies—it is currently extremely diYcult for the average consumer to compare ‘like for like’ price plans
and make informed choices.
This is also very important for helping consumers to manage their energy consumption: at present energy
information makes it diYcult for customers to do this. TSI would like to see smart meters so that consumers
can easily see their energy consumption costs as it happens.
2. Price comparison websites are complicated and this is compounded by the fact that the price plans
change so frequently that a company which may be the cheapest one month is unlikely to be the cheapest
the following month. Trading Standards Services have dealt with a number of consumer complaints where
this has been the key issue. It is a cause of great frustration amongst the individuals with whom TSI Lead
OYcer Richard Matthews has dealt with as a local authority Trading Standards OYcer.
3. A further factor that aVects competition is the apparent diYculties which can arise when a consumer
makes the decision to move from one energy supplier to another. Trading Standards Services across the
country deal with complaints owing to administrativemistakes which occur during the transfer of customers
between companies. It could be said that if the internal procedures of these companies were to be tightened
up then customer conﬁdence would be increased and customers would feel more conﬁdent in their ability
to change energy supplier more easily. At present TSI feels that that this puts customers oV switching energy
suppliers and is a barrier to customers being able to obtain the best possible energy deal.
The eVectiveness of regulatory oversight of the energy market
4. Whilst Energywatch, the independent gas and electricity watchdog, has responsibility for policing this
sector, it is often felt by Trading Standards professionals and consumers alike that its powers do not go far
enough.Whilst Energywatch is able to advise consumers, if the complaint results in deadlock, the consumer
must then refer their complaint to the Energy Ombudsman.
TSI would like to see a more streamlined system which makes it easier for consumers to complain and
also get a faster response from the energy companies, particularly where the complainant has problems
paying his or her bill.
TSI is also concerned that later on this year when Energywatch is disbanded the regulatory regime could
be weakened and not strengthened.
Progress in reducing fuel poverty and the appropriate policy instruments for doing so
5. In the main the policy of the energy companies surrounding fuel poverty appears to be concerned with
energy saving techniques, such as additional insulation. Whilst from an environmental perspective this is a
commendable step, those on the lowest incomes may struggle to implement thosemeasures where there may
be a one-oV cost involved if the grants that are currently available stop in the future.
6. Supporting consumers in making energy eYciency improvements is essential. Currently, subsidies and
discounts can even, in some cases, make insulation measures, for example, free—but it should be noted that
such help is variable by area and/or supply company. However, even if there is a one-oV payment required,
better-insulated buildings mean lower long-term costs, which is even more important as energy prices rise.
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It is true that problems may occur because of lack of awareness of the eYciency savings possible from
insulation measures and subsidies and discounts available, and the perception of high capital costs. An
additional problemmay be the lack of consistency in grants and subsidies available. Energy companies need
to provide clarity in supporting their customers to ﬁnd out what is available.
7. Advice on energy eYciency measures is essential, but should sit alongside advice to reduce actual
energy cost. eg by changing the way that bills are paid.
8. Pre-paid energy contracts are increasing in popularity and TSI believes that it would be of value to
consumers if the energy companies gave them adequate information on the volatility of wholesale energy
prices, thus enabling them to make informed consumer choices.
For example, energy providers may wish to use the following wording: “the cost of energy ﬂuctuates and
at some periods you may pay more for the energy you use”.
9. Information about energy consumption of diVerent appliances and simple energy savings tips may be
more helpful than general statements, helping consumers to save money and reduce emissions.
10. It tends to be the case that those customers living on lower incomes ﬁnd themselves using pre-paid
energy as the only option available to them. However, these customers may ﬁnd themselves paying up to
50% more for the energy they use, which puts them at the greatest disadvantage.
TSI appreciates that there are circumstances where these customers have issues obtaining credit and may
not even hold a bank account. However, we feel that something should be done to address this issue so that
the poorest members of our communities have the ability to heat their homes suYciently. One action, for
example, could be the more consistent use of social tariVs by energy companies.
All suppliers should be obliged to oVer energy assistance packages to the most vulnerable groups based
on minimum standards set nationally. The tariV should be set at the lowest rate oVered by that supplier,
regardless of payment method.
11. It could be said that in order to eVectively tackle fuel poverty and ease the ﬁnancial burden on those
in society who are least well oV, it is essential that those in the energy sector make links with organisations
tackling other areas of poverty so that tangible beneﬁts are delivered to the poorest communities.
12. TSI remains concerned over the controls on sales on the doorstep and the complaints that are still
received. This is particularly important for the more vulnerable in society.
Our research has determined that over 90% of consumers surveyed do not wish to buy on the doorstep.
TSI feels that more could be done by the energy retailers to expose opportunities for switching to better
deals without the pressure of purchasing such a complicated product on the doorstep.
They could, for example, engage further with community groups to market their services in a more
comfortable environment for the community.
28 March 2008
Memorandum submitted by the University of East Anglia
1. Summary of Main Points
We believe that there are important doubts about the intensity of competition in the retail market. On
structural grounds, there are concerns about high concentration (fewness of eVective competitors), and
barriers to the entry of potential new competitors. There is at least a case to be answered that the vertical
integration of the six remaining ﬁrms provides them with the ability to foreclose any future entrants.
Following liberalisation in the late 1990s, it was hoped that cross-region and cross-fuel entry by the
traditional electricity incumbents and British Gas would replace monopoly with competition amongst a
large number of sizeable ﬁrms. In the event, however, cross-entry by electricity incumbents has been
relatively insigniﬁcant, and all regional markets remain eVectively duopolies—British Gas and the previous
electricity incumbent. For this and other reasons, the characteristics of the market are such that “tacit
collusion” is a possible outcome. It is important to stress that this term does NOT imply a cartel, but rather
a “soft” form of competition—loosely speaking, a mutual recognition that it is in no-one’s interest to
compete very aggressively. Tacit collusion, so deﬁned, may not be illegal in competition law, but it is most
certainly not in consumers’ interests. The evidence on various features of “performance” also merits deeper
scrutiny. In particular, the extent of switching by consumers is controversial. There are those, including
OFGEM, who argue that eVective switching has been substantial, and that this is direct evidence of healthy
competition. However, this is unconvincing for three reasons: (i) much of the switching that has occurred
reﬂects the introduction of dual-fuel bundles, which would be cheaper than single-fuel supply even in the
absence of competition; (ii) survey evidence suggests that much switching by consumers has been ill-advised
and ill-informed, (iii) with the exit of so many ﬁrms since 1999, it is increasingly doubtful that consumers
have any genuinely low price suppliers to whom they can switch. A second topic on which sound evidence
would be invaluable is retail price cost margins and proﬁtability, but here the data are diYcult to unravel—
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not least because of the integrated structure of all the majors, raising uncertainty about what is the
appropriate transfer price from wholesale to retail. However, we do know—and this seems to be
uncontested—that the traditional incumbents are not only still dominant in their traditional markets of
incumbency (in terms ofmarket share), but, even to this day, they continue to oVer the consumer price tariVs
which are more expensive than those oVered by non-incumbents. Other things equal, high market shares
coupled with high price are inconsistent with vibrant competition—especially when, as here, all ﬁrms sell
essentially an identical product (what economists call an “homogenous” good).
2. Brief Introduction of Authors
Stephen Davies is Professor of Economics in the School of Economics at UEA and a Principal
Investigator of the ESRC Centre for Competition Policy. His research interests include: the economics of
competition policy; European industrial structure; mergers andmerger simulation; andmultinational ﬁrms.
He is amember of theAcademic Panel which advises theOYce of Fair Trading.Hewas formerly theGeneral
Editor of The Journal of Industrial Economics. He is currently working on: mergers, competition with non-
linear pricing in the electricity market; and the resale price maintenance.
Catherine Waddams (formerly Price) is founding Director of the ESRC Centre for Competition Policy
at theUniversity of East Anglia and Professor of Regulation in the School ofManagement. She joinedUEA
from the University of Warwick in 2000. She has studied the development of utility privatisation and
regulation, and is particularly interested in the eVect on diVerent income groups of introducing competition
to such industries, both in developed and developing economies; and in the role of consumers in competition
policy.Much of Catherine’s research centres on the energy sector. She is a part timemember of the reporting
panel of the UK Competition Commission.
The ESRC Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) at the University of East Anglia (UEA) undertakes
interdisciplinary research into competition policy that has real-world policy relevance without
compromising academic rigour. Our members are drawn from a range of disciplines, including economics,
law, business and political science.
The Centre was established in September 2004, building on the pre-existing Centre for Competition and
Regulation (CCR), with a grant from the ESRC (Economic and Social Research Council). It currently
includes a total of 17 faculty members (including the Director and a Political Science Mentor), seven full-
and part-time researchers and 14 PhD students.
The Centre produces a working paper series, runs weekly seminars, holds a number of events throughout
the year (including a yearly conference), and publishes a regular newsletter and e-bulletin. Its members
welcome links with academics, practitioners, policy makers and the voluntary sector.
3. Factual Information for the Committee
The committee asks:
— Whether the current market structure encourages eVective competition in the retail markets for
gas and electricity;
1. How vigorous is competition?
3.1 There is concern that the retail energy suppliers may be competing less aggressively than they might.
In general, the ability of consumers to choose a better (usually cheaper) supplier is an important curb on
any unilateral market power which incumbents of previously monopolised markets might otherwise wield.
However such choice provides no countervailing power if suppliers co-ordinate their prices. There is little
evidence of any explicit collusion, which is illegal, but there is a suggestion of tacit co-ordination: this is
sometimes referred to as “tacit collusion”, in which ﬁrms do not compete vigorously with each other,
resulting in “co-ordinated eVects”. The UK Competition Commission (following the decision of the
EuropeanCourt of First Instance judgement in theAir tours case, 2002) describes three necessary conditions
for co-ordinated eVects. First, ﬁrms must be aware of the behaviour of others. In energy markets the prices
are highly transparent: publicly available information on oVerings clearly provides ﬁrms with information
about each other’s actions. Secondly it must be costly for ﬁrms to deviate from the prevailing (non
competitive) behaviour. Since six large ﬁrms interact repeatedly in 15 markets (14 regional electricity
markets and a national gas market), there is plenty of opportunity for any deviation from the “non
competitive” position to be detected, so that themarket will revert to the less proﬁtable butmore competitive
situation as ﬁrms note any individual departure from the “collusive” situation. And, thirdly, competitive
constraints are weak. Small independent companies have struggled to enter and survive in the household
energy market; if they do manage to enter they generally exit (through failure or takeover) within a couple
of years. The national recognition of the brand names of the main leaders can act as a signiﬁcant barrier for
new entrants.
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3.2 Add to these market characteristics, the homogeneity of energy, and the conditions certainly seem
ripe for co-ordinated eVects. The energy regulator noted such concerns in a 2004 review (Ofgem, 2004) but
has not publicly revisited this issue in detail since then. Companies interact regularly to discuss “best
practice” in areas such as social concerns. There is little evidence to support allegations (as reported in the
Sunday Times in January 2008) that suchmeetings are used to ﬁx prices, but they do provide an opportunity
for the industry to share common approaches. Such legitimate interaction is likely to increase as the
environmental and fuel poverty agendas become more pressing, raising such concerns further. Moreover,
the problem is not just in the UK. Four of the six large energy companies are major European players (EdF,
EOn, RWE and Iberdrola each own incumbent suppliers in three of the electricity regions) and interaction
is at international as well as UK level. This is likely to be a continuing issue for the European Commission
as well as the UK authorities.
3.3 The analysis of such problems depends partly onwhether the energymarkets are regional or national.
The evidence points strongly in the direction of markets being regional. We estimate that, in the typical
electricity region, 10 times more consumers buy from the original electricity incumbent than from other,
entrant, suppliers who were previously incumbents outside that region. This means that, within each region,
market structure still amounts to little more than a duopoly involving British Gas and the local regional
electricity incumbent.
2. Consumer switching
3.4 Householders continued to change energy supplier after the removal of price caps in 2002,
unsurprisingly at a slower rate than when the market was initially opened, and not always away from the
incumbent. Interestingly, there has been only a slight increase in switching rates in the last two years. Given
the rapid recent acceleration in retail electricity prices, one might have expected a sharp upturn in switching
as more and more consumers were galvanised into actively searching for cheaper suppliers. While the ﬁgure
does suggest an upturn, it is only very moderate.
Figure 1: number of switchers (000)
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3.5 By September 2007 the market share of the incumbent gas supplier remained as high as 47% on a
national level; and at the same date the average market share of the incumbent electricity suppliers in their
“home” area ranged from 39% for direct debit to 53% for standard credit customers. Across the markets,
incumbents retained exactly half the prepayment customers.
3.6 The role of switching in a newly opened market is clearly crucial. If consumers are loyal to their
incumbent suppliers, then no amount of entry by those oVering alternatives can exert competitive pressure
on the ﬁrm. In energy, the ﬁrst decade of consumer choice has shown a little less than half of consumers
remain loyal to the incumbent at the kind of savings which entrants are able to oVer.
3.7 The energy regulator has encouraged consumers to switch supplier and at various times has hailed
high switching rates as a sign that competition is working well in the household energy market. However,
if consumer errors are large, high rates of switching are not necessarily a sign of a well functioning market—
nor are they necessary for the market to function eVectively. The threat of switching could act as a powerful
discipline on the incumbent’s behaviour, and if it responded by lowering its price to a competitive level to
retain consumers, then the market might indeed be functioning well. In that case there would be little mark-
up by incumbents. However, as noted below, consumers often appear to make erroneous switches,
incumbent markups remain, and it is therefore improbable that the threat of switching is in fact disciplining
the market.
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3. Relation of prices to costs
3.8 One indication of the competitiveness of the retail market is provided by analysing how closely the
charges to consumers reﬂect the costs of the suppliers. The closer prices are to costs, the more competitive
the markets are. Such analysis also provides an indication of whether (and howmuch) the incumbent is able
to charge more than other suppliers, once other factors are taken into account.
3.9 Such an analysis was undertaken for three consumption levels and three payment methods (ie nine
times in all) in the electricity market, seeing how the charges for high/medium/low consumption level
consumers, and for diVerent payment methods, depended on the charges paid by retailers for use of the
distribution system in December 2006 (results tables shown in Annex 1).
3.10 Results across the markets are very similar, with distribution costs, the main cost category that we
can identify, being reﬂected almost one to one in retail charges, except formedium consumption prepayment
consumers. Other costs are transmission, which accounts for only 3% of retail tariVs, and generation and
supply costs, which we cannot observe. Generation costs at least are likely to be similar for each company
in each region, so if they are just reﬂecting costs in their prices we would expect the “company eVect” to be
similar across consumption levels and price methods.
3.11 All credit customers pay more if they are supplied by the incumbent. The diVerential, compared to
British Gas, is between £9 and £33 per year, and, in turn, British Gas prices are higher than those of (non
incumbent) electricity competitors by an average of around £63 a year. This reveals a fair degree of
incumbency power. The only place where there was no incumbent electricity mark-up was for low
consumption prepayment consumers, suggesting that entrants are not targeting consumers in this group.
This was also the only market in which British Gas’s price was not higher than all other non incumbent
suppliers. This analysis applies to charges for electricity only and not to dual fuel deals, to which many
consumers switch.
4. Consumer errors
3.12 Switching (or its threat) disciplines the market because consumers choose suppliers who meet their
needs better, usually by being cheaper for a homogenous product like electricity. However evidence from
CCP questions the assumption that consumers necessarily make good choices for themselves. Even amongst
those who switched electricity supplier purely to save money, consumers made surprisingly poor decisions:
atmost half selected the tariV that was best for them; thosewho switched captured less than half the available
beneﬁts; and more than a ﬁfth switched to a more expensive supplier. This raises concerns not only for the
consumers themselves, and for potential overestimates of the direct beneﬁts from switching (if it is calculated
by multiplying the number of switchers by potential beneﬁts). But also because the discipline of switching
on suppliers is likely to be less beneﬁcial if switching is not based on the maximum beneﬁt available to the
consumer. The assessment of the beneﬁts and the eVects of competition depend partly on the nature and
extent of consumer response to the incentives in themarket, and in this market we can see that such response
is often faulty, and the consequent discipline correspondingly lax.
5. Does ownership of the electricity network by the incumbent hamper competition?
3.13 Accounting unbundling and separate licensing of the incumbent and the distribution network in
each electricity region has been enforced since 2000, and since then there has been separation of ownership
in half of the regions (seven of the 12 regions in England andWales). In the other ﬁve in England andWales
the incumbent supplier and the distribution wires are owned by the same company, while full vertical
integration remains in the two Scottish regions. This provides a natural experiment to identify whether such
co-ownership hampers the development of competition. In any one year since entry was permitted, the
amount of market which entrants had managed to capture was 4% less where the incumbent was co-owned
with the distribution company than where ownership was separate. Similar eVects are found if Scotland
(where vertical integration is more extensive) is excluded. These simple statistics suggest that co-ownership
of the distribution system, evenwith the rigorous license and accounting separation now required in theUK,
may still endow some (albeit relatively small) advantages on the incumbent in repelling entrants to its home
territory. If further exploration conﬁrms these ﬁndings, it might be appropriate to explore consider whether
ownership separation should be imposed. However in this case (as compared with voluntary separation)
some of the costs of separating ownershipmight have to be borne by the consumer, rather than shareholders,
which would aVect the valuation of its beneﬁts.
— The implications of growing consolidation in the energy market;
3.14 Since the market was opened in 1999, the number of distinct retail suppliers to households has fallen
dramatically, so that there are now ﬁve consolidated survivors of the previous electricity incumbents (which
may reduce further, depending on the outcome of discussions about the future of Iberdrola), and one gas
incumbent. Our discussion above shows that this has created conditions where tacit collusion is likely to
ﬂourish, and that other indications on prices and market share conﬁrm this possibility.
— The interaction between the UK and European energy markets;
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3.15 As a general principle, any move to a genuinely integrated single European energy market would be
competition enhancing, ceteris paribus. However, we noted above the trend towards consolidation in
ownership of the leading ﬁrms across member states. Clearly, if this trend were to continue unabated, the
end result may be that the bigger integrated market is dominated by just a few large multinational suppliers.
The potential problem of tacit collusion may then resurface at a supranational level.
— The eVectiveness of regulatory oversight of the energy market;
3.16 Many questions were raised about the beneﬁts of opening household retail energy markets to
competition at the time, and more recently David Newbery has noted that “retail margins have widened
considerably since the domestic franchise ended in 1999” (2005), indicating that the consolidated energy
market is exerting less competitive pressure on the liberalised market than did the previous regulatory
regime. The dilemma for the regulator is that entrants will only be attracted by high margins, and so some
increase may be necessary to “kick start” a change from regulated monopoly to competition. Consumers
have certainly been oVered a much wider choice of tariVs since 1999. But if the market is functioning well,
margins should in turn be reduced through competition. Since the regulator has itself become a champion
of competition (its duties include the protection of consumers by promoting competition wherever
appropriate), there is a danger that it has an incentive to defend the success of competition as ameasure of its
own eVectiveness.We therefore welcome the announcement of OFGEM’s own probe into the energy supply
markets, and the microscope which they promise to bring to the exercise.
— Progress in reducing fuel poverty and the appropriate policy instruments for doing so.
3.17 Fuel poverty depends, both in a statistical and a practical sense, on income and on energy prices. In
the early years of the century, while prices fell and incomes rose, fuel poverty also fell. Since energy prices
have been rising from 2004, fuel poverty has correspondingly risen. As the rise in incomes slows, as seems
likely, in 2008, this counterbalance to rising energy poverty will be less eVective than in the recent past.
3.18 It is very diYcult to see how the government can meet its target to eliminate fuel poverty amongst
vulnerable households by 2010 with the present and likely future changes in energy prices. The underlying
world price of oil and the increasing importance of the environmental agenda are both relentlessly increasing
the upstream cost of energy. The signals from such prices will help to curb demand and further green house
gas emissions; but for the fuel poor they may depress demand below a level which is desirable from a social
perspective and/or cause real hardship for households with low levels of disposable income.
3.19 The most eVective way to help the fuel poor is to raise their income. Compared with oVering them
lower prices (for the same eVect), this also has the advantage of not distorting their demand, so that they
purchase “too much” energy relative to its real cost to society. Since lower income households are more
responsive than average to changes in price, subsidising their prices has a larger than average eVect in
raising demand.
3.20 However if fuel poverty is to be addressed through lower prices, voluntary schemes are unlikely to
be eVective. The recent move to encourage companies to oVer social tariVs to low income consumers has
had little eVect, and it seems unlikely that the Chancellor’s exhortations for them to increase their provision
will do so. Any company whichmakes a signiﬁcant commitment to supply one group at lower proﬁtmargins
than others, puts itself at a competitive disadvantage for other parts of the market, where prices would have
to be higher than otherwise in order to subsidise such oVers. It is interesting that the only company which
does oVer signiﬁcant cross-subsidies (Ebico) is a not for proﬁt subsidiary of one of the major players, and
does not pay to be included as a full participant in the “search and switching engines” which are approved
by energywatch. If the government believes that low income energy consumers should be subsidised by other
energy consumers, then it should mandate such schemes, so that the impact on the market (eVectively a tax
on other energy users) is equal across players, and does not cause further distortions. One immediate result
of such a policy will be to make the subsidised consumers less attractive for companies, who, as we have
seen from the history of the prepayment market, can take a number of steps to try to avoid recruiting such
consumers.
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APPENDICES
A: RESULTS TABLES FOR THE ESTIMATED RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RETAIL
CHARGES AND DISTRIBUTION CHARGES
(i) Determinants of Annual Bill for Standard Credit, December 2006
Annual Consumption 1650kWh 3300kWh 4950kWh
Constant 23194.31*** 35778.68*** 54088.27***
(1182.11) (1817.53) (2520.73)
Distribution charge 1.098*** 1.436*** 1.042***
(0.253) (0.222) (0.207)
Distribution area (km2) "0.036** "0.069*** "0.074***
(0.014) (0.017) (0.204)
Distribution customers "0.927*** "0.339 "0.612
(000) (0.229) (0.356) (0.549)
Incumbent 948.71** 2121.79*** 3266.66***
(378.45) (463.04) (681.92)
Suppliers
London "4631.86*** "7847.52*** "11085.71***
(484.33) (592.57) (872.69)
Npower "2731.86*** "3811.81*** "4914.28***
(484.33) (592.57) (872.69)
Powergen "2453.29*** "3947.52*** "5421.42***
(484.33) (592.57) (872.69)
Scottish Power "2964.10*** "4353.11*** "5816.66***
(480.54) (587.94) (865.87)
SSE "5967.58*** "8826.09*** "11778.57***
(484.33) (592.57) (872.69)
Adjusted R2 0.7271 0.8188 0.7918
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
* Signiﬁcant at 10%; ** Signiﬁcant at 5%; *** Signiﬁcant at 1%
(ii) Determinants of Annual Bill for Direct Debit, December 2006
Annual Consumption 1650kWh 3300kWh 4950kWh
Constant 22939.57*** 34333.56*** 52540.69***
(1182.07) (3914.55) (2970.20)
Distribution charge 0.878*** 1.707*** 1.062***
(0.253) (0.479) (0.244)
Distribution area (km2) "0.029** "0.108*** "0.744**
(0.014) (0.038) (0.029)
Distribution customers "1.038*** "1.072 "0.878
(.000) (0.229) (0.768) (0.647)
Incumbent 900** 4001.92*** 3215.38***
(378.44) (997.28) (803.51)
Suppliers
London "4228.57*** "7264.69*** "10181.87***
(484.31) (1276.27) (1028.30)
Npower "3278.57*** "3978.98*** "4574.72***
(484.31) (1276.27) (1028.30)
Powergen "1950*** "3564.69*** "5081.86***
(484.31) (1276.27) (1028.30)
Scottish Power "4592.85*** "7178.84*** "9973.62***
(480.52) (1266.29) (1020.26)
SSE "5614.28*** "7144.69*** "12517.58***
(484.31) (1276.27) (1028.30)
Adjusted R2 0.7236 0.5212 0.7581
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
* Signiﬁcant at 10%; ** Signiﬁcant at 5%; *** Signiﬁcant at 1%
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(iii) Determinants of Annual Bill for Prepayment, December 2006
Annual Consumption 1650kWh 3300kWh 4950kWh
Constant 21357.97*** 36822.46*** 57343.09***
(1398.01) (1988.79) (2647.43)
Distribution charge 1.451*** 1.669*** 1.279***
(0.301) (0.243) (0.217)
Distribution area (km2) "0.055*** "0.080*** "0.079***
(0.018) (0.020) (0.027)
Distribution customers "1.033*** "0.351 "0.411
(.000) (0.284) (0.395) (0.580)
Incumbent 715.38 1910.89*** 3112.17***
(481.00) (546.24) (750.78)
Suppliers
London "3453.29*** "9988.04*** "16552.61***
(615.56) (699.06) (960.81)
Npower 1360.98** "2388.04*** "6181.18***
(615.56) (699.06) (960.81)
Powergen "1460.44** "6195.19*** "10931.18***
(615.56) (699.06) (960.81)
Scottish Power "1987.91*** "6601.55*** "11280.31***
(610.75) (693.59) (953.30)
SSE "2760.44*** "9645.19*** "16538.32***
(615.56) (699.06) (960.81)
Adjusted R2 0.5994 0.8295 0.8592
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
* Signiﬁcant at 10%; ** Signiﬁcant at 5%; *** Signiﬁcant at 1%
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Ownership unbundling of vertical stages in the energy sector has become a contentious topic of debate
at the end of 2007. To illustrate the issues, this paper focuses on ownership separation between the
distribution and retail parts of the energy supply chain, where a mixed experience has emerged in the UK.
Ten years ago both the national gas incumbent and all the electricity incumbents (monopoly suppliers before
themarkets were opened to competition) in each region shared ownership with the local pipes/wires (though
accounting separation had been imposed some time earlier). In 1997 the incumbent gas supplier voluntarily
disinvested the pipeline business, and seven of the fourteen regional electricity companies have followed suit
since then, once separate licenses for the distribution and retail functions were introduced. If co-ownership
confers advantages on the incumbent, higher incumbent market shares would be expected in regions where
there had been no separation. This paper explores the evidence for such exploitation of integration, but ﬁrst
considers the general issues involved and the structure of the UK energy industry.
Arguments for and against Integration
The debate around unbundling in energy concerns the separation between parts of the industry which
have an element of natural monopoly (national transmission and regional distribution) and those where
there are no obvious economic reasons why the market should not be competitive (generation and retail).
There are four vertical stages to the energy industry: generating the fuel (from exploiting gas deposits or
imports for gas, from a variety of sources for electricity); transmission (generally at high pressure or voltage
over fairly long distances); distribution (more local transportation of energy at lower pressure/voltage,
generally to customers’ houses or premises); and the retail function of selling and billing to the ﬁnal
customer, which generally includes obtaining the fuel and necessary transportation en route. Most energy
industries have a history of vertical integration over at least some of these functions, and of established
monopolies, so introducing eVective competition may involve some separation of diVerent vertical (and
perhaps horizontal) elements. The essential arguments in principle can be identiﬁed by focusing on this
boundary between distribution and retail, but they should be broadly applicable to other parts of the
supply chain.
372 Published in December 2007 edition of Intereconomics.
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In a general model of an upstream natural monopoly and a potentially competitive downstream market,
there are three possible patterns, each of which has diVerent implications for integration. If the upstream
monopoly is not regulated and the downstream market is competitive, the upstream distribution company
will extract all the monopoly rent, the downstream retailer is constrained by competitive pressures, and the
outcome will be the same whether or not the company is integrated. However if the downstream retailer has
some monopoly power (for example from incumbency advantages) there is a danger that if they are
separated both the unregulated distribution company and the retailer will try to raise price, resulting in so
called “double marginalisation”, and a higher price for the end consumer than if the company were
integrated. In this case of market power in both parts of the supply chain, the perhaps counterintuitive
conclusion is that it would be better both for consumers and for overall economic welfare to integrate the
two parts of the chain. The third situation is the most common in practice and relevant to the current
discussion. This involves a regulated monopoly distribution company, and an incumbent who retains some
market power in the retail market. In this case there is concern about whether a vertically integrated
company can inﬂuence the eVectiveness of the regulation and so “lever” its monopoly advantage to deliver
(or protect) market power in the downstream market.
Whereas regulation can in principle ensure that the regulated distributor does not confer any advantage
on a co-owned retailer, the integrated company has an incentive to increase the price of the monopoly
product and lower the downstreamprice, thus raising its rivals’ costs in the downstreammarket, andmaking
its own retailer more relatively attractive (Bradley and Price, 1991, Noll and Owen, 1994). Much regulatory
theory and practice has been concerned with addressing such issues. The eYcient component pricing rule
(originally developed for the telecoms market, Baumol and Sidak, 1994) identiﬁes ways of ensuring that an
upstream distributor withmonopoly power levies a price which allows eYcient downstream entry but deters
ineYcient entry. In general, regulators responsible for such integrated entities require accounting separation
between the two functions, to minimise the chances of exploitation by reducing the inherent information
asymmetry in such situations. Nevertheless while common ownership persists, so does both the incentive
and the ability to distort prices. The latter can be achieved by the allocation of costs disproportionately to
the regulated function to raise the charges in that sector. If such costs are in some sense “common”, it is
diYcult for the regulator to detect or correct such “biases”. The main concern about allowing common
ownership in such cases is thus that the ﬁrm has both the incentive and ability to distort emerging
competition in the downstream market.
However there are counterarguments which may indicate that integration is better. The natural
monopoly of the distribution pipes means that the eYcient price to charge for this element is below the
average cost, and some cases of vertical integration might enable this. Such pricing would be the reverse of
the incentives to raise the distribution costs discussed above. Nevertheless there are cases where it would be
more eYcient to keep the ﬁrm integrated, if the access charge for using the network is (positively) related
to the degree of entry downstream (de Fraja and Waddams Price, 1999). Proponents of integration also
often argue that common ownership can deliver important sources of eYciency gain. One example is the
transactions costs which arise in cases where it is very diYcult to specify complete contracts between the
diVerent parts of the industry, and so it makes sense to bring these “in house”. Some commentators (BBC,
2006) suggest that such diYculties account for some of the problems experienced by the segregated
privatised British rail system, where responsibility has sometimes been diYcult to attribute. There may also
be information eYciencies from integration; here the general rule is that decisions should be made where
the information lies. If information is needed about retail customers, for example for safety purposes, by
gas and electricity distributors, can such information really be eVectively hidden from the retail activities of
the same company? “Chinese walls”, designed to separate such activities, are notoriously diYcult to seal in
practice, particularly when the employees on each side of the wall are former colleagues.
Policy makers also need to take into account any “one oV” costs of changing from the current situation.
If these are imposed on unwilling ﬁrms, who will bear the costs? Here the experience of the UK is of some
interest. Since divestiture between the distribution and retail function has been voluntary, the costs have
been borne by the shareholders. However if separation is imposed by regulators or governments,
shareholders might argue that they should not bear the costs, but that these should be passed on to
consumers.
In the UK, the story of separation is associated with that of privatisation, but not in a clearly
deterministic sense.
The UK Energy Sector and Integration
One of the major criticisms of the 1986 privatisation of the UK gas industry, which had been nationalised
since 1949 and a national monopoly since 1972, was that the opportunity for both horizontal and vertical
separation was missed: the privatised incumbent proudly announced that it was responsible for gas and its
delivery “frombeach head tometer”, ie for the last three stages in the supply chain. By the time the electricity
industry was privatised four years later some vertical separation was imposed in England and Wales
(between generation and transmission) but the distribution and retail function remained integrated under
a single license for another 10 years. In Scotland two fully vertically integrated companies (one serving the
north and one the south of the country) were created, each providing generation, transmission, distribution
and the retail function. Throughout Great Britain (ie excluding Northern Ireland), the electricity industry
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retained its nationalised structure as fourteen separate companies (distributors and incumbent retailers) in
distinct regionally deﬁned markets. Despite these initial integrated positions, over the last 10 years the gas
incumbent and seven of the fourteen regional electricity incumbents (table 1) have voluntarily separated
themselves from the associated distribution function. In the case of the gas incumbent this was under some
regulatory pressure, but the mixed result in the electricity case shows that both common and separated
ownership are chosen outcomes. It is this range of ownership patterns than enables a test of whether
integration adversely aVects the development of downstream competition.
Government ministers had rejected a recommendation by the Monopolies Commission in 1993 that the
gas industry should be vertically separated before retail competition was introduced, and instead enacted
primary legislation to introduce competition from 1996 while the incumbent supplier was still vertically
integrated with the transmission and distribution provider. The regulator sent clear messages that the retail
function of the company would fare better if it was separately owned, and in 1997, in the midst of market
opening, the company itself divested the distribution and retail functions. Commentators at the time
believed that the retail arm would not prosper, and that the separation was partly to protect the assets
invested in distribution and transmission from the much riskier retail function. In practice the retail arm
has retained almost half the gas market, and is now the largest single electricity retailer, supplying about a
quarter of the market (Ofgem, 2007).
Table 1
THE UK ELECTRICITY SUPPLY REGIONS AND OWNERSHIP OF INCUMBENT AND
DISTRIBUTION WIRES IN 2007
Area Distribution Wires Owners Incumbent Supply Owners Same
Ownership?
East Midlands Central Networks of E.ON PowerGen of E.ON Y
East England EDF Energy PowerGen of E.ON N
London EDF Energy EDF Energy Y
Merseyside, Cheshire & North Wales Scottish Power Scottish Power Y
Midlands (west) Central Networks of E.ON Npower of RWE N
North East England CE Electric Npower of RWE N
North West United Utilities PowerGen of E.ON N
North Scotland Scottish and Southern Energy Scottish and Southern Energy Y
South Scotland Scottish Power Scottish Power Y
South East England EDF Energy EDF Energy Y
Southern England Scottish and Southern Energy Scottish and Southern Energy Y
South Wales Western Power Distribution (WPD) Scottish and Southern Energy N
South West England WPD EDF Energy N
Yorkshire CE Electric Npower N
The retailmarket in gas was opened on a regional basis between 1996 and 1998, and in electricity across all
regions in 1998 to 1999. FromMay 1999, therefore, all energy consumers have been able to choose between a
range of suppliers. All the incumbents entered each others’ (gas and regional electricity) markets, and since
then there has been considerable consolidation in both retail and distribution, so that there are now sixmain
retailers (ﬁve consolidated regional electricity incumbents and the national gas incumbent) and seven
distribution company owners. Of these, four are alsomajor retailers. All companies were required to impose
accounting separation between their distribution and retail functions. In its review of electricity distribution
companies in 1999, just as competition was starting in the retail market, the regulator, Ofgem, intervened
in the company attributions, and reallocated over a ﬁfth of companies’ costs from the distribution to the
retail function. One company was told to transfer over one third of its costs. This action by the regulator
suggests that the companies both had incentives to load costs more heavily onto the distribution function
in anticipation of competition, and that they acted on these incentives.
During themany post-privatisation transactions in which electricity companies changed hands, amixture
of ownership patterns for the incumbent suppliers and distribution companies emerged. The original 14
regional incumbents had reduced to ﬁve through takeover by 2003, and the main suppliers, as they stand
in mid 2007, in addition to British Gas, are shown in table 1, along with their ownership. One main retailer
owns no distribution assets; one owns distribution assets only in (both) the areas where it is incumbent; one
owns them for two of its three incumbency regions, but not elsewhere; and the remaining two own
distribution assets in some areas where they are incumbent and some where they are not. In this paper the
main focus is in the seven areas where there is common ownership between the incumbent and the
distributor. In particular, is there any evidence that the incumbent retains higher market share in those
regions where it shares ownership with the distributor?
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Does integration protect incumbent market share?
Figure 1 shows the evolution of incumbent market share in the 14 regions, labelled according to the status
of their joint ownership (solid lines) or not (dotted lines) in 2007. This graph provides a useful preliminary
overall picture, but it is simpliﬁed because, where ownership did become separated, it happened at diVerent
times since market opening commenced in 1998. Nevertheless, it does reveal that the region in which the
incumbent has retained the largest market share in 2007 (North of Scotland) is integrated, while as the
regions with the four lowest incumbent market shares (Midlands, theNorthWest, Northern andYorkshire)
are not; however, the evidence between these two extremes is mixed.
Figure 1
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*Solid lines indicate regions where the incumbent and the local distributor are owned by the same company
in 2007; dotted lines indicate regions where the incumbent is not owned by the same company as the local
distributor.
Source: Ofgem, 2007 and predecessor Ofgem reports
Therefore, to examine this further, a least squares panel regression has been used to explore whether the
market share retained by the incumbent in each year was related to whether or not it was integrated with the
distributor up to and including that year. The results are shown in Table 2, inwhich the dependent variable is
the incumbent’s market share, in a given region at a given point in time, integrated is a binary dummy
variable, indicating whether or not the retailer was integrated with the distributor in that year. The equation
also includes a time trend, to allow for the natural erosion of market share over time, which will typically
occur in any, previouslymonopolised,market into which new entry is introduced.However, this is modelled
using a quadratic time trend (including time squared), to allow for the possibility that, as consumers become
increasingly familiar with themarket, the rate of switching will perhaps slow down after the initial few years.
Since this is a panel model, the equation also controls for any other diVerences between the regions, which
may remain even after taking account of integration and the time trend (for instance, consumers in certain
regions of the country may exhibit more or less loyalty to the incumbent, perhaps because it has a strong
regional identity.
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Table 2
MARKET SHARE, TIME TREND AND VERTICAL INTEGRATION 1999–2007
Market share Coef. Std. Err. t P(t
Time "9.125303 0.6835588 "13.35 0.000
Time squared 0.5128004 0.0644144 7.96 0.000
integrated 4.104698 1.664571 2.47 0.015
constant 93.93349 2.178107 43.13 0.000
sigma u 6.1550725
sigma e 4.0301183
Rho 0.69992939
The estimated equation includes very striking, and statistically signiﬁcant, results on both the time trend
and the role of incumbency.
First, as expected, the incumbent’s market share does indeed tend to decline over time: typically, then,
incumbents lost market share year-on-year in all regions. However, the particular values and signs of the
coeYcients on time and time squared reveal that the rate of decline gradually slowed down over the period,
so that, in the last year (2007, year 9), the annual rate of loss had almost levelled out. On average over the
whole time since market opening, the annual loss of market share by the incumbent was around 4%, but at
much higher rates in the opening years, and much lower rates in the later years.
Second, and most important for the current discussion this general reduction in market share, though
experienced in all regions, is found to be signiﬁcantly slower for companies which are integrated (as
indicated by the positive coeYcient on the “integration” variable.) Thus, on average, in any one year, the
market share of an integrated ﬁrm has beenmore than 4 percentage points higher than that of a counterpart
where diVerent companies own the incumbent retailer and the associated regional distribution company.
These are the “headline” results, but the estimated equation also reveals considerable background
variation between regions (not shown in the table). Five regions show similar patterns of market share
reduction: Manweb, Northern, NorthWestern, South Eastern and East Midlands. Incumbents in the other
nine regions retain signiﬁcantly higher market shares, even after accounting for whether or not the
incumbent is integrated. In particular, the north of Scotland, whose incumbent is Scottish Hydro, shows
particularly high incumbent market share, over 20% above that of the comparator regions, in addition to
the higher market share attributable to its integrated status. Scottish Power, the incumbent in the southern
part of Scotland, also retains a higher market share than the comparator regions. Both these companies are
vertically integrated not only with distribution, but also with transmission, which is not allowed in England
and Wales.
Conclusion
The analysis above appears to provide clear evidence that those UK incumbent electricity suppliers who
remained vertically integrated with their local distributor have retained a higher market share than those
where these functions have been undertaken by separately owned companies. This result is evident even after
region speciﬁc characteristics, such as diVerent levels of consumer loyalty, have been included. Competitors
have been slower to gain market share where there is common ownership despite considerable intervention
by the regulator. Its actions have included reallocating costs (originally attributed to the distribution
function by companies) to the potentially competitive retail function, a regulatory regime for distribution
which is generally regarded as robust, and constant vigilance by the regulator in the retail market.
We should stress that the above statistical model is relatively simplistic, and it should be viewed as a piece
of documentary evidence—to be put alongside any other information which becomes available results. It
certainly does not prove that the companies concerned have been indulging in illegal or improper behaviour.
Nevertheless, the results do suggest that, even with vigilant regulation and clear accounting separation,
incumbents who are vertically integrated appear to exhibit an advantage in retaining their market share
against the inroads of entrant ﬁrms. As the debate about ownership separation continues in Europe, this
summary of UK experience provides one piece of evidence which suggests that joint ownership of the
distribution function may indeed confer competitive advantage on the incumbent.
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APPENDIX C
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Abstract: This paper suggests that the ability of consumers to choose accurately between alternative
suppliers is substantially limited even in a relatively simple and transparent market. Across two independent
datasets from the UK electricity market we ﬁnd, on aggregate, that those consumers switching exclusively
for price reasons appropriated between a quarter and a half of the maximum gains available. While such
outcomes can be explained by high search costs, the observation that at least a ﬁfth of the consumers actually
reduced their surplus as a result of switching cannot.We consider and reject several alternative explanations
to pure decision error.
1. Introduction
Competition policy and other policy initiatives in markets as diverse as health and education are
increasingly based on the presumption that consumers can play a positive role in generating market
competition by choosing to trade with the supplier that best suits their needs. However, consumers may be
unable to perform this role and competitive forces may be consequently weakened for several reasons.
Consumers may be unwilling to change suppliers because of switching costs, unaware of alternative
suppliers because of search costs or may face diYculties in evaluating and comparing diVerent suppliers’
oVers because of cognitive decision-making costs374. While previous empirical research has largely focussed
on identifying the eVects of switching costs, this paper investigates the importance of the last two
possibilities by analysing empirically the accuracy with which switching consumers choose their best
available alternative supplier.
We exploit two independent datasets from the UK electricity market where consumers have been free to
switch away from their regional incumbent to one of several entrants since the market’s liberalisation in
1999. In such a market, we would expect consumers’ switching decisions to be relatively accurate for several
reasons. First, almost all households consume electricity and for many, it forms a signiﬁcant part of their
household budget. Second, the market is relatively simple as ﬁrms supply a near-homogenous good and at
the time of our surveys each supplier eVectively oVered only a single tariV option. Third, the market is
transparent with the industry regulator and several online price comparison services providing many forms
of advice and tariV information.Yet, despite suchmarket conditions, this paper suggests that the inaccuracy
of consumers’ switching decisions remains substantial. Even when focussing only on the consumers who,
when asked, indicated that they had switched suppliers exclusively for price reasons, we ﬁnd that across the
two datasets and under a range of assumptions, only 8–19% of consumers switched to the ﬁrm oVering the
highest surplus and, in aggregate, switching consumers appropriated only between 28% and 51% of the
maximum gains available to them.While such behaviour is wholly consistent with the behaviour of rational
consumers facing high search costs, the additional ﬁnding that 20–32% of switching consumers appear to
have lost surplus through their choice of supplier is not. These consumers lost an average £14–35 per year
in increased bills, apart from any other switching costs they may have incurred.
373 Published as CCP working paper 07-6
374 See Farrell and Klemperer (2006) for a review of the market power eVects of switching costs, Baye et al (forthcoming) for
search costs, and Gabaix et al (2005) for cognitive costs.
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Very little previous research has examined empirically the switching accuracy of consumers. As part of
a much wider investigation into the eVects of entry in the New York State telephone market, Economides
et al (2005) suggest that 42%of consumers switched to amore expensive supplier, resulting in an average loss
of $4.32 per month.Giulietti et al (2005) suggest theremay be consumer inaccuracy in theUK gasmarket by
showing that consumers’ (binary) switching decisions appear unrelated to themonetary gains available from
doing so, especially for consumers who expect price diVerences to be transitory. A larger literature however,
has analysed the widespread potential for consumers to select a non-cost minimising option from a menu
of tariVs oVered by the same ﬁrm. Agarwal et al (2006), for example, suggest that over 40% of consumers
selected the more expensive tariV when oVered the option of two credit card contracts in a market
experiment by a US bank, while Lambrecht and Skiera (2006) use data from a German internet provider
to estimate that around a third of consumers chose a more expensive ﬁxed rate tariV, and over half of these
paid more than double the cheapest alternative tariV. The proposed explanations for such choices fall into
three broad categories. First, consumers may show a preference for certain tariV structures, such as ﬂat-rate
fees (Lambrecht and Skiera 2006). We ﬁnd no support for such an explanation as the gains from switching
are largely unrelated to any associated change in tariV structure. Second, in comparing tariVs, consumers
may weight inappropriately the various components of a tariV or price, such as the introductory rate,
shipping charge or state-tax rate (eg Ausubel 1999, Hossain and Morgan 2006, Ellison and Ellison 2006,
respectively). This explanation is not supported by our data which show that the gains made by consumers
who switched to suppliers oVering a potentially focal “dual-supply” discount are not signiﬁcantly diVerent
from the gains made by other consumers. Third, consumers may evaluate alternative suppliers’ tariVs using
an incorrect prediction of their own future consumption (Miravete 2003,Della Vigna andMalmendier 2004,
2006). This explanation also appears unconvincing as all results are derived from consumers’ own
(expenditure) beliefs and remain robust across consumption variations of plus and minus 10 percent.
Highlighted by the recent widespread allegations about such practices within the industry, one plausible
explanation of the results concerns the pressurising or misleading inﬂuence of suppliers’ sales activities.
However we ﬁnd that the accuracy of consumers’ choices are not signiﬁcantly related to the self-reported
inﬂuence of a sales agent; nor does an increased number of regional competitors, which might result in
increased sales activity, consistently reduce the accuracy of decisions. Instead, the paper concludes that
consumers’ switching inaccuracy is consistent with pure decision error. This ﬁnding underlines the
importance of the growing research into the incentives ﬁrms may face to exploit or induce consumer
confusion—see Ellison and Ellison (2004) or Armstrong and Spiegler (2007) for a further discussion.
Section 2 provides a brief theoretical foundation for the measures of the gains from switching that are
later calculated. Section 3 introduces the market, the data and the calculation procedures. The descriptive
results are presented in section 4. Section 5 proposes some potential explanations for the results and presents
some further analysis to test them; section 6 concludes.
2. Theory
To analyse the accuracy of consumers’ switching decisions it is necessary to calculate both the actual gains
in surplus that each consumer made through their choice of new supplier and the maximum possible gains
that each consumer could have achieved by switching to their best supplier (given their demand
characteristics). We now present some simple measures to form the basis of such calculations.
Consider consumer i’s decision to switch away from his old supplier, o, to a new supplier, n, chosen from
his set of alternative suppliers, Si. Assuming that consumer i cares only about the tariV oVered by each
supplier, equation (1) describes the approximate annual gain in consumer surplus (excluding switching
costs) from deciding to switch from supplier o to supplier, n n,
ΔCSi%CSni"CSoi ∼− [ui(Cni)"E(Cni;Tn)]"[ui(Coi)"E(Coi)"E(Coi;To)] (1)
where the consumer surplus received at any ﬁrm j consists of the utility from consuming Cji homogenous
units of electricity annually, ui(Cji), minus the associated bill expenditure, E(C
j
i;T
j), which depends on ﬁrm
j’s tariV, Tj. With the use of a revealed preference argument to ensure that ui(C
o
i)—E(C
o
i ; T
o) ≥ ui(C
n
i) —
E(Cni;T
o) an upper bound for the actual gains made from such a switching decision, xi
sw, is constructed by
comparing the expenditures that would result from consuming the level of post-switching consumption,Cni,
at each supplier, (2). Such an upper bound is very close to the approximate change in surplus described by
(1) when demand is highly price inelastic, as in the electricity market (Baker et al 1989).
Δ ≤ ≡ −CS x E C T E C Ti i
sw
i
n o
i
n n( ; ) ( ; ) (2)
Similarly an upper bound for the maximum possible gains that consumer could have made by switching
away from supplier, o, xmaxi,o , can be constructed by comparing the expenditure at i’s old supplier with the
lowest possible expenditure available from the set of alternative suppliers, Si , (3). One ﬁnal upper bound
measures the gains consumer iwould have expected tomake by randomly selecting an alternatively supplier,
xmeani,o . (4) compares the expenditure at i’s old supplier with the average expenditure across supplier i’s set
of alternative suppliers.
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x E C T E C Ti o i
n o
k S i
n k
i
,
max ( ; ) min ( ; )= −
∈
≥ 0 (3)
x E C T mean E C Ti o
mean
i
n o
k S i
n k
i
, ( ; ) ( ; )= −
∈
(4)
Fully rational and informed consumers who care only about the tariVs oVered by each ﬁrm would select
the alternative supplier that oVers the maximum reduction in expenditure, xi
sw % xmaxi,o . However if they are
rational but not fully informed, perhaps due to the existence of search costs, switching consumers may be
willing to select a supplier that does not oVer the maximum reduction in tariV expenditure, xi
sw
∈ [0,xmaxi,o ] .
As consumers always retain the option of not switching, one should never observe switching consumers
making negative gains, xi
sw ' 0.
3. Calculations
This section uses the measures constructed in section 2 to analyse the switching accuracy of two sets of
consumers in the UK electricity market. After an introduction to the market in section 3.1, section 3.2
presents the data and illustrates how the UK electricity market is particularly well suited for such an
analysis. Section 3.3 explains how the ﬁnal calculations are made.
3.1 The Market
Since liberalisation of the UK residential electricity market was completed in mid 1999, electricity
suppliers have been permitted to enter each of the fourteen regional markets to compete with the original
regional incumbent. While few new suppliers chose to enter the industry, many regional incumbents took
the opportunity to enter most, if not all, of the regions in which they had not previously been incumbent,
as did the national gas supplier, British Gas. Consumers were free to switch away from their regional
incumbent (or any subsequent supplier) with 28 days notice and no ﬁnancial penalty. In the subsequent eight
years about half of all energy consumers moved away from their regional incumbent.
An example of the range of tariVs on oVer to consumers is displayed in Table 1. As tariVs vary by region
and by time, Table 1 presents a typical snapshot of the tariVs oVered within an example region, the
Midlands, in June 2000. Suppliers are obliged to oVer tariVs for three possible consumer payment
methods—standard credit, direct debit and prepayment, but in practice, only oVered a single tariV per
payment method375.
Suppliers typically oVer two-part tariVs, with some oVering three-part tariVs that contain an additional
marginal rate for higher levels of consumption beyond some threshold. The majority of electricity suppliers
who are also active in the gas market increasingly participate in mixed bundling by oVering a dual-supply
discount to those consumers who choose to buy both forms of energy. While it is common for suppliers to
approach consumers directly in the hope of persuading them to switch, it is rare for suppliers to use upfront
discounts or incentives.
Since liberalisation, many internet-based price comparison sites have oVered consumers advice in
choosing between suppliers. Despite the industry regulator and consumer body endorsing the use of several
comparison sites, their popularity remained limited in the period of our studies, with only 10% of surveyed
consumers having used them in 2003 (OFGEM 2004).
375 More recently suppliers have oVered a wider choice of tariVs, including “capped” tariVs, but these were not available at the
time of the consumer decisions analysed here.
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3.2 Data
Two datasets were constructed from two independent, cross-sectional, face-to-face surveys of consumers
in England, Scotland and Wales. The EA survey (Cooke et al 2001) was conducted between March and
August 2000 and was intentionally biased towards low-income consumers376. Of the 3417 consumers
surveyed, 523 had switched electricity suppliers and, of these, 373 had a full set of responses to questions
relevant for the analysis. In contrast, the CCP survey, was designed to be representative of the general
population and was conducted for the ESRC Centre for Competition Policy in June 2005377. Of the 2027
consumers surveyed, 370 had switched suppliers in the previous three years, and 245 furnished useable
responses.While the presence of a low-income bias andmissing information limit our ability to draw general
inferences about how switching behaviour varies with consumer characteristics, we view the measurement
of switching accuracy within each of these samples as informative.
A major constraint on the ability to measure consumers’ switching accuracy arises from the possibility
that consumers switched for reasons other than price.Whilst non-price gains are likely to be small in a near-
homogeneous market like electricity, they may arise from two sources. First, although the reliability of
supply is independent of the supplier (since it depends upon the vertically separated distribution function),
consumers may perceive that ﬁrms vary in attributes such as customer service or environmental awareness.
Second, in addition to the possible monetary beneﬁts of being supplied electricity and gas by the same
supplier, for which we account for, consumers may perceive some non-price, practical beneﬁts from having
to deal with only one supplier. To eliminate these possibilities, we restrict our analysis to a subset of
consumers who stated that their switching decision was motivated purely by price. Speciﬁcally, two sub
samples are created that contain 318 and 154 consumers respectively who, when asked, cited only diVerences
in price as a reason for switching and did not mention factors such as the quality of service, the provision
of “environmental” tariVs or the practical beneﬁts of being dual-supplied. A full summary of the consumers’
(multiple) reasons for switching suppliers is presented in Tables 2a and 2b.378
Tables 2a and 2b
REASONS FOR SWITCHING SUPPLIERS ACROSS THE TWO DATASETS
Reason for Switching (EA) Mean Reason for Switching (CCP) Mean
Cheaper 0.77 Better Prices/Rates 0.86
Dual Supply Discounts 0.10 Better Service/Quality 0.19
Inﬂuence of Sales Agent 0.10 Not Satisﬁed with Old Supplier 0.11
“Conned”/Unaware of switching 0.03 Dual Supply 0.06
Poor Service from Old Supplier 0.03 Environmental TariVs 0.03
Better Service 0.02 Other 0.10
No Standing Charge 0.01 n 245
Other 0.05
n 373
3.3 Calculating the Gains from Switching
This section provides further details of how the bound measures constructed in section 2 are used with
the selected data samples to calculate consumers’ switching accuracy.
376 The EA survey and its initial analysis were funded by the Electricity Association—an early description of consumers’ choices
and errors is contained in Waddams Price (2003).
377 The CCP survey was designed to analyse search and switching behaviour across eight diVerent product markets as analysed
by Chang and Waddams Price (forthcoming). Here, only the data from the electricity market is used.
378 The EA respondents were asked to provide an unstructured explanation for why they had switched, which was later coded
into an exclusive list of reasons, whereas theCCP respondents were asked to indicate up to three reasons from a list of possible
options. No distinction was made between price and non-price beneﬁts of dual-supply and so all consumers who cited dual-
supply as a reason for changing suppliers are eliminated from the sample.
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To focus only on the accuracy of consumers’ choice of supplier and not on the choice of payment method
or gas supplier, all calculations are made by comparing suppliers’ relevant tariVs whilst treating each
consumer’s known choice of payment method(s) and gas supplier as given. Speciﬁcally, the calculations are
made using equations (5)–(7), where the tariV of each supplier, Ttr (m,g), varies according to the consumer’s
date of switching, t, electricity supply region, r, choice of gas supplier, g, and choice of payment method,
m, (both before and after switching).
x E C T m g E C T m gi
sw
i
n
tr
o o
i
n
tr
n n
= −[ ˘ ; ( , )] [ ˘ ; ( , )] (5)
y agent conned D x stablei
swg
i i i i i i* ’
max
= + + + + + +β β β β β β ε1 2 2 3 4 5 (6)
x E C T m g mean E C T m gi s
mean
i
n
tr
o o
k S i
n
tr
k n
r
, [ ˘ ; ( , )] [ ˘ ; ( , )]= −
∈
(7)
Using a time series of the unique tariV oVered by each supplier per payment method379, an estimate of
consumption, Cˆni, was calculated from each consumer’s own estimate of their average electricity
expenditure380. Such an approach oVers two advantages. First, it is probably more accurate as consumers
are more likely to recall their expenditure than their consumption. Second, and more importantly, all gains
are calculated in a way that is consistent with consumers’ own consumption beliefs, so that any inaccurate
consumer choices cannot be attributed to consumers’ incorrect consumption estimates. A potential
drawback, however, comes from the possibility that each consumer’s expenditure beliefs may have changed
in the intervening period between the time of the switching decision and the time of the survey. We take two
approaches to allow for this possibility and to add further robustness to the ﬁndings. First, we identify a
subgroup of the EA consumers whose survey responses indicated that their consumption was highly price
inelastic, and stable over time, and demonstrate that these do not diVer signiﬁcantly from the rest of the
sample381. The insigniﬁcant diVerence supports the claims that i) the constructed upper bounds form close
approximations to the true gains from switching and ii) consumption is likely to be stable between the time
of switching and the time of the survey. Second, we repeat the three measurements for all consumers using
consumption levels which are plus and minus ten percent of our original estimate.
Whilst the CCP dataset is suYciently rich to provide all the required information, the EA dataset does
not provide all the necessary variables directly from the survey because of uncertainty about the exact date
of switching and of any change in payment method. To proceed we derive the EA calculations under the
four most likely scenarios and compare the results for robustness. This leads to the speciﬁcations,
Oct99nochange, Oct99change, Jun00nochange and Jun00change, which are detailed fully in the appendix.
4. Descriptive Results
Figure 1 plots the estimated actual gains from switching against the maximum gains available for all
consumers (averaging across the EA speciﬁcations outlined above). Two immediate observations can be
made. First, many of the consumers have not appropriated the maximum gains available, as indicated by
the points located below the 45) line. This is consistent with the behaviour of rational consumers facing
search costs and with experimental evidence that suggests consumers often search too little (Sonnemans
1998 and Tenorio and Cason 2002). Second, however, a signiﬁcant fraction of switchers appear to have
actually lost surplus by switching to a more expensive supplier, as indicated by the points below the x-axis,
a ﬁnding which is inconsistent with the behaviour of rational consumers motivated to switch only by price.
To explore the ﬁndings in more detail, Table 3 displays the main results derived from the original estimates
of consumption and Table 4 includes the results with the alternative consumption levels.
379 The tariV dataset builds on that used by Giulietti et al (2005) and was obtained by either contacting suppliers directly or
downloading bimonthly tariVs from a consumer advice website, www.which.co.uk or the energy consumer body,
www.energywatch.org.uk.
380 Consumers were asked to provide an estimate of their expenditure on a weekly, fortnightly, monthly or quarterly basis as
they preferred.
381 The subgroup of consumers indicated high price inelasticity by replying “the same” to the following questions: Q. If the cost
of electricity went down would you use more electricity or use the same electricity and use the savings for something else?,
and Q. If the cost of electricity went up would you use less electricity or use the same electricity?, and further indicated a
stable consumption pattern by replying “No” to the following questions, Q. Has there been any change in your household’s
circumstance in the last two to three years that aVected your fuel consumption?, and Q. Has your household’s electricity ever
been disconnected because of unpaid electricity bills?
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Figure 1
THE ACTUAL GAINS MADE FROM SWITCHING RELATIVE TO THE MAXIMUM GAINS
AVAILABLE, CCP AND EA (POOLED SPECIFICATION) DATASETS
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The results shown in tables 3 and 4 are remarkably robust across datasets, across speciﬁcations and across
consumption levels, providing support for the chosen measurement methodology. Despite including only
decisions based exclusively on price, many consumers failed to switch to the cheapest supplier. Across
datasets, speciﬁcations and consumption levels, the reported percentage of consumers selecting their
cheapest supplier ranges between only 8 and 19%. Although consumers as a whole made positive average
gains of between £16 and £22 per annum, in aggregate, consumers appropriated only between 28 and 51%
of the maximum beneﬁts available to them.
They have only achieved a little more than would have been expected by switching to a randomly selected
supplier; this would have oVered consumers a 7–14% chance of picking the cheapest supplier382 and
appropriated 17–23% of the maximum gains available.
More startlingly, even without taking into account the (ﬁnancial or non ﬁnancial) costs of making the
switch, between 20 and 32% of consumers switched to a more expensive supplier, losing, on average,
approximately £14–35 per year. Further, between 3 and 31% of these loss-making consumers actually
switched to a “dominated” tariV that could not have oVered them a reduction in expenditure at any level
of consumption. Finally, although it is diYcult to make robust comparisons given the biases within each of
the samples, our data provide no evidence that switching accuracy improved over the ﬁve years which
elapsed between the two surveys.
5. Potential Explanations
The existence of search costs can explain why consumers did not select the best possible supplier, but the
choice of a more expensive supplier remains puzzling. In this section we explore the validity of four possible
explanations:
i) consumers exhibited some bias or preference for particular tariV structures;
ii) consumers were overly-attracted to suppliers oVering dual-supply discounts;
iii) consumers were inﬂuenced by misleading sales activity; and
iv) consumers made genuine decision errors.
First, we consider the possibility that consumers’ choices could be explained by a bias or preference for
diVerent tariV structures, as proposed in the literature documenting consumers’ inaccurate tariV choices (eg
Lambrecht and Skiera 2006). While the potential for such biases is limited in our market due to the narrow
range of available tariV structures, we investigate the potential for consumers to have displayed a preference
for tariV structures in two respects—the number of parts in the tariV (two or three) and whether or not there
is a positive ﬁxed fee. The evidence for such biases seems limited. Table A1 in the appendix indicates that
the estimated switching gains are largely unrelated to the choice of a two- or three-part tariV; the only weak
evidence of such a bias occurs in the EA June speciﬁcation where the 40 consumers who switched from a
three- to a two-part tariV made signiﬁcantly less accurate decisions than other switchers. Table 2a shows
that only 1% of consumers cited the existence of a zero ﬁxed fee as a reason for switching and Table A2 in
the Appendix shows that the estimated switching gains are, for the most part, unrelated to the magnitude
of the chosen ﬁxed fee. The only possibility of a bias occurs within the EA dataset where the 18 consumers
who switched to a positive ﬁxed fee made signiﬁcantly worse decisions.
Second, we examine the possibility that consumers could have overestimated or have been overly sensitive
to the dual-supply discount, as emphasised as an explanation in other contexts by Ausubel (1999) and
Hossain and Morgan (2006). Despite excluding any consumer who cited the existence of a dual-supply
discount as a reason for switching, this explanation may seem persuasive since 74% of the consumers in the
sample who changed supplier switched to their gas provider. However, Table A2 in the appendix indicates
that the dual-supplied switchers made, if anything, higher gains than the non-dual supplied consumers,
contradicting such an explanation. This evidence also eliminates the potential explanation that consumers
may have switched to their gas supplier to receive some unmeasured non-price beneﬁt.
Third, could consumers have been inﬂuenced by suppliers’ mis-selling activity? Such an explanation is
particularly plausible in the UK electricity market where there have been many allegations of mis-selling.
While some complaints have been targeted at internet price comparison sites for misleading consumers by
favouring certain suppliers383, most allegations have been aimed directly at the use of more direct mis-selling
tactics by suppliers themselves. Indeed, the problem of aggressive or misleading “cold-calling” or doorstep
selling was considered so serious that several bodies conducted investigations (energywatch 2002, OFGEM
2002 and OFT 2004) and OFGEM subsequently ﬁned London Electricity two million pounds384,385
382 This ﬁgure was calculated by ﬁnding the reciprocal of the number of alternative suppliers, averaged across consumers, given
their respective regions. The probability doubles to 0.14 for the later CCP dataset due to the heavy market consolidation in
recent years.
383 See http://business.guardian.co.uk/story/0,,1975484,00.html. 19 December 2006.
384 See http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/2315115.stm. 10 October 2002.
385 We ﬁnd no evidence that those consumers who switched to London Electricity made signiﬁcantly diVerent gains to those who
switched to other suppliers.
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5.1 Potential Mis-selling
In this section we estimate whether the consumers’ switching accuracy is related to two sets of test
variables associated with potential mis-selling. We analyse each in turn. First, we explore whether the
accuracy of consumers’ switching decisions is adversely aVected by the self-reported inﬂuence of suppliers’
sales activity, as captured by two dummy variables from the EA survey. These correspond to consumers
either reporting that they had been “conned” into switching without their consent, connedi, or that a sales
agent had been active in their switching decision,386. Consumers could cite both inﬂuences. To analyse how
these variable relate to switching accuracy, two procedures are used to estimate variations of equation (6),
where the gains from switching, yi
swg *, are modelled as a function of the two test variables agenti and connedi
while controlling for a vector of consumer demographics, Di, and each consumer’s maximum available
gains, xi
max.
Table 5
SUMMARY STATISTICS OF THE DEMOGRAPHIC AND TEST VARIABLES
Varianle Variable Deﬁnition Mean (StDev)
Name
highsoc Household social grade: A, B or C1 0.28 (0.45)
midsoc Household social grade: C2 or D 0.49 (0.50)
lowsoc Household social grade: E 0.22 (0.42)
highinc Household income: £25,000! 0.13 (0.33)
midinc Household income: £12,500–£25,000 0.25 (0.43)
lowinc Household income: Less than £12,500 0.43 (0.50)
incref Income status refused 0.20 (0.40)
age Age of respondent 44.86 (15.96)
single The household respondent is single 0.15 (0.36)
married The household respondent is married 0.62 (0.49)
exmar The household respondent is widowed or divorced 0.23 (0.42)
arrears The household has electricity arrears 0.04 (0.21)
gassw The household has previously switched gas supplier 0.51 (0.50)
rent The household lives in rented accommodation 0.43 (0.50)
disable The household has some form of disability beneﬁt 0.19 (0.47)
agent The household cited the inﬂuence of a sales agent 0.11 (0.31)
conned The household switched without consent 0.03 (0.18)
n The number of regional competitors 14.75 (0.85)
Number of Obersevations 318
A further variable, stablei, is included to investigate whether the measured switching accuracy of the sub
group of consumers who reported highly price inelastic and stable consumption diVers from the rest of the
sample. This variable is later reported to be insigniﬁcantly diVerent from zero, as discussed previously in
Section 3.3. All relevant variables are described and summarised in Table 5.
yi
swg * % ß1 ! agenti ß2 ! connedi ß2 ! Di ’ ß3 ! xi
max ß4 ! stablei ß5 ! εi (6)
We use equation (6) to explore how consumers’ switching gains depend on a set of independent variables
in two ways. In the ﬁrst case, yi
swg * is treated as a latent variable and we estimate the probability of a
consumer making a positive gains using a probit model, and in the second case, we model the gains from
switching as a continuous variable using OLS with heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. For
robustness, the two estimations are conducted across each of the four EA data speciﬁcations and the results
are reported in Tables 6 and 7.
The self-reported incidences of sales and “conning activity” have no signiﬁcant eVect on switching
accuracy across all speciﬁcations. The estimations also indicate, in line with the ﬁndings of Economides et
al (2005) and Miravete (2003), that very few demographic variables are useful predictors of the ability of
consumers to make accurate decisions. Consumers living in rented property make less accurate decisions,
probably because they expect to enjoy any beneﬁts for a shorter time. Some of the speciﬁcations suggest
that consumers with higher incomes (and those who declined to reveal their incomes) appropriate less of
the available gains. Consumers are less likely to make a loss from switching suppliers if the maximum gains
available are higher, a ﬁnding consistent with consumers having a higher incentive to make an accurate
decision when the rewards from doing so are greater.
386 The CCP data do not include these variables
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Table 6
ESTIMATIONS OF THE PROBABILITY OF MAKING A POSITIVE GAIN387
June June October October
No Method Change Method Change No Method Change Method Change
M.EVct z M.EVect z M.EVect z M.EVect z
agent 0.03 0.53 "0.16 "1.62 0.08 1.39 0.04 0.61
conned "0.18 "1.16 "0.23 "1.24 0.07 0.79 "0.07 "0.45
gainmax 0.00 4.23** 0.01 7.16** 0.01 5.52** 0.01 7.18**
stable "0.03 "0.55 "0.02 "0.46 "0.05 "1.04 "0.06 "1.31
highsoc "0.01 "0.11 "0.07 "0.74 0.02 0.21 "0.08 "0.89
midsoc "0.02 "0.39 "0.07 "1.00 "0.05 "0.79 "0.14 "2.12*
highinc "0.24 "2.03* "0.22 "1.78 "0.13 "1.21 "0.16 "1.37
lowinc "0.05 "0.69 "0.04 "0.55 "0.03 "0.43 "0.09 "1.40
incref "0.09 "1.13 "0.11 "1.21 "0.08 "1.05 "0.10 "1.17
age 0.00 0.63 "0.01 "0.83 0.00 0.30 0.00 0.21
age2 0.00 "0.71 0.00 0.78 0.00 "0.01 0.00 0.12
disable "0.05 "0.96 "0.07 "1.25 0.00 "0.01 "0.04 "0.70
single "0.10 "1.17 "0.08 "0.86 "0.12 "1.33 "0.21 "2.07
exmar 0.01 0.09 0.03 0.50 0.02 0.29 0.02 0.29
rent "0.15 "2.87** "0.16 "2.58** "0.10 "1.93 "0.14 "2.55**
arrears 0.03 0.27 "0.01 "0.05 0.09 1.29 0.08 1.02
gassw "0.12 "2.77** "0.12 "2.44* "0.05 "1.20 "0.04 "0.84
n 318 318 318 318
Log-Lik "141.7 "145.6 "144.3 "137.0
LR(17) 51.90** 89.65** 58.78** 91.07**
McF R2 0.15 0.24 0.17 0.25
There is no evidence that previous experience improves decision accuracy. While Giulietti et al (2005)
suggest that consumers are more likely to switch in a givenmarket if they have previously switched in others,
we ﬁnd that a past experience of switching gas suppliers does nothing to improve (and sometimes reduces)
switching accuracy.
Table 7
ESTIMATIONS OF THE GAINS MADE FROM SWITCHING388
June June October October
No Method Change Method Change No Method Change Method Change
CoeV t CoeV t CoeV t CoeV t
agent 0.70 0.14 "2.57 "0.49 "2.10 "0.41 "3.34 "0.58
conned 0.22 0.05 "0.03 "0.01 "3.64 "0.45 "3.75 "0.49
gainmax 0.01 9.43** 0.01 11.05** 0.01 14.24** 0.01 10.55**
stable 0.93 0.31 0.79 0.27 "1.22 "0.42 "1.54 "0.54
highsoc "4.21 "0.90 "2.98 "0.61 "2.26 "0.56 "2.28 "0.54
midsoc "3.88 "1.00 "3.91 "0.95 "3.08 "0.85 "4.45 "1.16
highinc "13.90 "2.21* "13.23 "2.08* "1.08 "0.19 "0.36 "0.06
lowinc "5.12 "1.39 "5.80 "1.50 1.89 0.52 1.55 0.41
incref "13.57 "3.22** "13.73 "3.22** "6.87 "1.57 "5.63 "1.41
age "0.02 "0.04 "0.27 "0.51 0.39 0.81 0.27 0.55
age2 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.66 0.00 "0.25 0.00 0.04
disable "4.87 "1.30 "4.52 "1.16 "6.53 "1.77 "6.30 "1.71
single "5.66 "1.25 "4.94 "1.06 "0.33 "0.08 "3.25 "0.75
exmar "0.49 "0.16 "0.33 "0.10 0.16 0.05 "0.44 "0.13
rent "6.08 "2.17* "4.54 "1.58 "8.40 "2.77** "7.71 "2.46*
arrears "8.98 "1.21 "8.22 "1.08 "4.17 "0.66 "4.48 "0.72
gassw "3.92 "1.33 "3.44 "1.15 "4.27 "1.53 "3.32 "1.20
constant 5.28 0.38 7.29 0.52 "15.52 "1.23 "12.03 "0.92
387 All signiﬁcant tests are indicated by * for the 5% level and by ** for the 1% level. Where applicable, all marginal eVects are
calculated for the average switcher relative to the base case of a consumer who is married, of low social class and with
middle income.
388 All signiﬁcant tests are indicated by * for the 5% level and by ** for the 1% level. Where applicable, all coeYcients are
estimated relative to the base case of a consumer who is married, of low social class and with middle income.
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June June October October
No Method Method Change No Method Method Change
Change Change
CoeV t CoeV t CoeV t CoeV t
n 318 318 318 318
F(17,300) 10.34** 14.06** 18.37** 14.06**
R2 0.58 0.61 0.68 0.64
To provide a further (less direct) test of the eVects of mis-selling, the estimations are repeated with the
inclusion of a diVerent test variable—the number of competitors in each consumer’s regional market.
While conventional theories of consumer search do not predict any negative relationship between
consumers’ ability to appropriate the gains available and the number of competitors389, it is reasonable to
conjecture that mis-selling strategies may be more attractive to ﬁrms as the proﬁts from more standard
forms of competition are reduced from increases in the number of suppliers. In a related sense, recent work
by Spiegler (2005) illustrates how ﬁrms face an increased incentive to obfuscate by increasing the variance
of their utility oVers when faced with more competitors, while Miravete (2007) oVers evidence to suggest
that ﬁrms are more likely to employ dominated tariV options when competition increases. To test for such
an eVect, we exploit the fact that the number of regional competitors varied between twelve and sixteen
at the time of the EA survey390. If mis-selling were an explanation, consumers would make less accurate
decisions in regional markets with a higher number of competing suppliers391.
Formally, the two estimation procedures are repeated with the replacement of the previous test
variables, agenti and connedi, with the new test variable, ni, measuring the number of regional suppliers
faced by each consumer392. As the estimated coeYcients diVer very little from those previously reported,
only the eVects of the test variable are displayed in Tables 8 and 9.
Table 8
ESTIMATED MARGINAL EFFECTS OF THE NUMBER OF REGIONAL COMPETITORS ON
THE PROBABILITY OF SWITCHING TO MAKE A POSITIVE GAIN393
June June October October
No Method Change Method Change No Method Change Method Change
M.EVct z M.EVect z M.EVect z M.EVect z
n "0.01 "0.54 0.03 "0.96 "0.04 "1.43 "0.05 "1.77
Table 9
ESTIMATED MARGINAL EFFECTS OF THE NUMBER OF REGIONAL COMPETITORS ON
THE ACTUAL GAINS MADE FROM SWITCHING
June June October October
No Method Change Method Change No Method Change Method Change
CoeV t CoeV t CoeV t CoeV t
n "3.76 "2.47* "3.84 "2.47* "1.87 "0.99 "2.66 "1.36
While there is no evident relationship between the number of regional competitors and the probability
of making a positive gain by switching, Table 9 suggests that in two out of four speciﬁcations, consumers
appropriated relatively less of the maximum available gains in regions with a higher number of suppliers.
However as much of the variation in the number of regional competitors arises, however, from the relative
lack of market entry in the two Scottish electricity regions, such a ﬁnding is also consistent with the
presence of some unobserved characteristic of ﬁrms or consumers within the Scottish markets. The results
are therefore unclear and do not provide direct evidence that mis-selling explains the inaccuracy of
consumers’ switching decisions.
389 Indeed, for any given price distribution and cost of search, a consumer should accept any discovered price below the optimal
reservation price which is deﬁned independently from the number of ﬁrms (Kohn and Shavell 1974).
390 These numbers refer to the number of large ﬁrms that were patronised by consumers in the EA sample and do not include
some smaller ﬁrms that also operated across all regions. Including such ﬁrms in the estimations increases the number by a
constant and does not aVect our qualitative results. No such variation in ﬁrm numbers existed at the time of the CCP survey
due to later market consolidation.
391 It is feasible, but unlikely given the limited variation in the number of ﬁrms, that consumer inaccuracy may also be prompted
by a ‘choice overload’ eVect from the increased complexity of the decision (eg Iyengar and Lepper 2000 and Iyengar and
Kamenica 2006).
392 Both the number of competitors and themaximumgains can be included as explanatory variables, since they have a negligible
correlation of approximately 0.02 across speciﬁcations.
393 Signiﬁcance is denoted at 5% by * and at 1% by **.
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The evidence presented in this section does not indicate that consumers’ poor switching choices are
explained by tariV biases or suppliers’ mis-selling activity. We deduce that much of the switching
inaccuracy results from genuine consumer confusion and decision error.
6. Conclusion
Using two independent datasets from the UK electricity market our results show that the capacity of
consumers, to choose eYciently between suppliers may be limited, even when switching purely for price
reasons. While the results are not necessarily representative of the general population, our estimations
show that, at best, a ﬁfth of the consumers in our samples actually lost surplus as a result of switching;
and that, in aggregate, switching consumers appropriated only half of the maximum gains available to
them. Such a failure of consumers to compare accurately between alternative suppliers can damage their
welfare, both directly in lost savings, and indirectly by delivering ﬁrms with a source of market power.
Indeed, together with the well established eVects of switching costs in reducing the willingness of
consumers to switch suppliers, such behaviour may seriously impede the competitive process, even after
a market has been liberalised or made subject to standard competition policy (as recently argued by
Waterson 2003).
We have examined and rejected several explanations of consumer errors, including preferences for
particular tariV structures or dual fuel supply, and misleading sales activities by ﬁrms. Instead, despite the
apparent simplicity and transparency of the market, consumers’ poor choices seem more consistent with
an explanation of pure decision error. This ﬁnding casts doubt on the ability of consumers to generate
competitive forces through accurate switching decisions and raises many important policy concerns.
Future research would be valuable in understanding how competition and consumer authorities should
respond to consumer errors, if at all, and in investigating the implications for current policies aiming to
increase competition in less familiar markets, such as health and education.
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APPENDIX C1
IDENTIFYING TARIFFS FOR THE EA DATASET
Two aspects of the EA dataset make it diYcult to identify directly the exact set of tariVs relevant for
each consumer’s switching decision. The ﬁrst is the exact date of the switching decision. (Economides et
al (2005) faced the same problem and were forced to assume that consumers had switched at the date of
information collection.) The second problem arises from the timing of the change in payment method for
the 32% of consumers who reported such a change. To calculate the gains on switching we need to know
whether they, changed their payment method before, after, or at the same time as they switched suppliers.
To resolve these uncertainties and to enhance the robustness of our ﬁndings we report the results over four
diVerent speciﬁcations. As the EA survey was conducted in March–August 2000, very soon after
liberalisation, consumers could have switched using one of only four possible tariV sets, namely those
commencing in June 1999, October 1999, April 2000 and June 2000. Consumers are most likely to have
switched under either the October 1999 tariVs, as these were stable for the longest period (October
1999–April 2000), or the June 2000 tariVs, as the proportion of consumers switching suppliers was rising
over the period. Using both of these time periods, the calculations are then made under two further
assumptions to provide a total of four speciﬁcations. These two assumptions concern whether the 32% of
consumers who had changed their payment method, changed either before they switched suppliers (the
consumers traded with both their original and current supplier under their current payment method) or,
perhapsmore realistically, at the time of switching (the consumers traded with their original supplier using
their previous payment method but traded with their current supplier under their current payment
method)394. The four speciﬁcations are respectively labelled as Oct99nochange, Oct99change,
Jun00nochange and Jun00change (see appendix for further details).
394 The most commonly reported method changes are moving from credit to direct debit (41%) and credit to prepayment (38%).
We do not allow for the unlikely possibility that the change was made after the process of changing suppliers.
395 Notes for Tables A1-A3. ** and * are used to indicate a signiﬁcant diVerence in means under both a standard t-test and a
non-parametric Mann-Whitney U test at the 5% and 1% respectively.
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Table A1
SWITCHING ACCURACY BY CHANGES IN CHOSEN TARIFF STRUCTURE
No Change in Three-part to Two-part to
TariV Structure Two-part Three-part
CCP Data Average (StDev) Average (StDev) Average (StDev)
Number of Switchers 74 50 30
Proportion of Switchers 0.48 0.32 0.19
Average Maximum Gains Available (annual, £) 44.25 (32.46) 53.16 (44.10) 53.99 (45.35)
Average Actual Gains Made (annual, £) 14.82 (41.96) 23.18 (50.25) 16.80 (32.63)
Average Actual Gains/Average Maximum Gains 0.33 0.44 0.31
Proportion of Switchers with Negative Gain 0.30 (0.46) 0.28 (0.45) 0.37 (0.49)
EA Data (Pooled June Speciﬁcation) Average (StDev) Average (StDev) Average (StDev)
Number of Switchers 169 40 109
Proportion of Switchers 0.53 0.13 0.34
Average Actual Gains Made (annual, £) 12.50 (29.24) "3.38** (27.69) 35.14** (41.33)
Average Maximum Gains Available (annual, £) 42.17 (36.40) 34.69 (29.29) 56.72* (54.29)
Average Actual Gains/Average Maximum Gains 0.30 "0.10 0.62
Proportion of Switchers with Negative Gain 0.31 (0.45) 0.55** (0.46) 0.06** (0.20)
EA Data (Pooled October Speciﬁcation) Average (StDev) Average (StDev) Average (StDev)
Number of Switchers 226 78 14
Proportion of Switchers 0.71 0.25 0.04
Average Actual Gains Made (annual, £) 19.85 (43.01) 23.28 (24.11) 16.84 (32.72)
Average Maximum Gains Available (annual, £) 41.42 (42.66) 41.85 (28.43) 57.19 (47.58)
Average Actual Gains/Average Maximum Gains 0.48 0.56 0.29
Proportion of Switchers with Negative Gain 0.27 (0.43) 0.18 (0.37) 0.21 (0.43)
Table A2
SWITCHING ACCURACY BY CHANGES IN CHOSEN FIXED FEE TARIFF STRUCTURE397
No Change in Pos. Fixed Fee to Zero Fixed Fee
TariV Structure Zero Fixed Fee to Pos. Fixed Fee
CCP Data Average (StDev) Average (StDev) Average (StDev)
Number of Switchers 69 29 56
Proportion of Switchers 0.45 0.19 0.36
Average Actual Gains Made (annual, £) 19.46 (43.29) 19.43 (32.43) 15.25 (48.19)
Average Maximum Gains Available (annual, £) 46.97 (33.38) 55.08 (45.67) 48.46 (42.55)
Average Actual Gains/Average Maximum Gains 0.41 0.35 0.31
Proportion of Switchers with Negative Gain 0.28 (0.45) 0.28 (0.45) 0.36 (0.48)
EA Data (Pooled June Speciﬁcation) Average (StDev) Average (StDev) Average (StDev)
Number of Switchers 156 144 18
Proportion of Switchers 0.49 0.45 0.06
Average Actual Gains Made (annual, £) 8.79 (29.44) 32.78** (37.93) "15.72** (22.08)
Average Maximum Gains Available (annual, £) 39.93 (35.04) 53.73** (50.27) 40.64 (40.53)
Average Actual Gains/Average Maximum Gains 0.22 0.61 "0.39
Proportion of Switchers with Negative Gain 0.36 (0.46) 0.08** (0.23) 0.78** (0.39)
Table A3
SWITCHING ACCURACY OF DUAL AND NON-DUAL SUPPLIED CONSUMERS
Not Dual Supplied Dual Supplied
CCP Data Average (StDev) Average (StDev)
Number of Switchers 29 125
Proportion of Switchers 0.19 0.81
Average Actual Gains Made (annual, £) 15.36 (62.37) 18.52 (37.68)
Average Maximum Gains Available (annual, £) 48.07 (49.43) 49.27 (36.66)
Average Actual Gains/Average Maximum Gains 0.32 0.38
Proportion of Switchers with Negative Gain 0.45 (0.51) 0.27 (0.45)
396 Notes for Tables A1-A3. ** and * are used to indicate a signiﬁcant diVerence in means under both a standard t-test and a
non-parametric Mann-Whitney U test at the 5% and 1% respectively.
397 TariVs with positive ﬁxed fees were so common within the EA Pooled October Speciﬁcation that all consumers switched to
such tariVs, preventing us from testing such a hypothesis.
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Not Dual Supplied Dual Supplied
CCP Data Average (StDev) Average (StDev)
EA Data (Pooled Speciﬁcations) Average (StDev) Average (StDev)
Number of Switchers 96 222
Proportion of Switchers 0.30 0.70
Average Actual Gains Made (annual, £) 10.45** (43.17) 23.29 (30.95)
Average Maximum Gains Available (annual, £) 46.87 (50.42) 43.07 (34.82)
Average Actual Gains/Average Maximum Gains 0.22 0.54
Proportion of Switchers with Negative Gain 0.39** (0.40) 0.19 (0.34)
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ARE THE CONSUMER PRICE INCREASES FOR ELECTRICITY IMPOSED
IN JANUARY 2008 JUSTIFIED?
Summary
This paper examines whether increases to published wholesale prices justify the retail electricity price
increases imposed on residential consumers in January 2008. The study is based on analysis of two questions:
Is the reported wholesale price a reliable indicator of the cost electricity retailers are paying to buy power;
and is the corporate structure of the British electricity sector competitive?
Detailed analysis of prices shows that even in the period 1990–2002, when prices for electricity were falling
in real terms, the wholesale electricity market was not working well. Large cost reductions experienced by
the generating companies were not passed on to consumers as would have been expected to occur if the
wholesale electricitymarket had been an eYcient one. Experience since 2002 has demonstrated that the retail
electricity market is also not eYcient and has allowed the electricity companies to increase prices to
residential consumers without convincing justiﬁcation and not pass on cost reductions. So the current
problem is not an isolated one in an otherwise successful system.
The assertion by the six electricity retail companies that the large price rises for electricity imposed in the
ﬁrst quarter of 2008 are justiﬁed by movements to the wholesale market price for electricity is not supported
by the evidence they have given. The liquidity of the visible wholesale market is negligible and the six
companies buy nearly all their own power from their own power stations or from independent power
producers under long-term contracts. The connection between the cost of these purchases from their own
sources and under long-term contracts, and the published price in the spot market is weak. There are strong
suspicions that this is not the ﬁrst time the companies have manipulated prices to their advantage. In 2002,
the wholesale electricity price fell by 40% but none of this was passed on to residential consumers. In
2005–06, the companies increased their prices by 50% or more citing high wholesale prices, but when
wholesale prices fell in 2006, the price reductions were minimal.
Residential consumers already face a near impossible task in trying to get the best deal for their power
purchases. They have to choose a supplier knowing only the current relative prices, which in a volatile
market could easily have changed even before the switch to a new supplier has been completed. They have
to compete with large users to buy power and the retailers have a history of systematically allocating their
cheapest power purchases to large users, presumably because of their stronger negotiating power. The
companies also discriminate against poorer consumers, oVering much lower prices to those that can aVord
to pay by direct debit and who have access to, and are conﬁdent with the internet. Pre-payment meter and
standard credit (quarterly variable bills) consumersmight pay a thirdmore than direct debit consumers. The
companies have provided no convincing evidence that this price diVerential is justiﬁed by real cost
diVerences.
The structure of the electricity industry has become signiﬁcantly less competitive and more concentrated
in the past decade, with the implicit approval and sometimes at the instigation of both the government and
the regulatory authority, Ofgem. Further changes are likely that will make the situation worse. In the case
of the likely takeover of British Energy, which will remove the main independent power producer, the
change was at least in part prompted by the government itself. This reduction in competition will give
consumers even less conﬁdence that prices are being set competitively by the market. It will leave residential
consumers even more vulnerable to the market power of the oligopoly of a handful of European companies
that increasingly dominate UK as well as European energy markets.
Solutions to these problems are not easy. When confronted with such serious market failures, it is
tempting to recommend pro-competition measures, such as breaking up the companies, forcing greater use
of visible spot markets and reducing the extent of integration of generation and supply. However, the result
of such measures could be to jeopardise security of supply if, as seems likely, independent generation
companies would proﬁt more from power shortages than from investing in new capacity.
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The regulator, Ofgem, has a poor record. Dubious price movements in 2002, 2004–05, 2006 passed with
no serious investigation by them and their response to the latest price rises was belated. There must be
suspicions that it was only prompted by public outrage and the announcement of the BERR Select
Committee investigation. Ofgem’s announcement of its inquiry gives concern that Ofgem will be looking to
shift blame elsewhere. It states: “We are concerned about the increased volatility of wholesale prices and we
want to investigate how European and other global energy market developments are aVecting energy bills
in Britain”. Fundamental issues such as the eYciency of the British wholesale market and the corporate
structure in Britain are nowhere mentioned. Ofgem has also consistently failed to tackle the issue, long
recognised, of price discrimination amongst residential consumers which results in pre-payment and
standard credit consumers paying far more than direct debit consumers.
A more impartial investigation than can be carried out by Ofgem is needed and the Competition
Commission seems the most appropriate body to carry out such an investigation. The issues it would need
to examine are:
— Do movements in the price actually paid for power by retailers justify the January 2008 price
increases?
— What if any is the relationship between the published spot price for electricity and the price paid
by retailers for power?
— Do cost diVerences justify the price diVerences between the tariVs oVered to pre-payment meter
and standard credit consumers, and to consumers paying by direct debit?
— Are residential consumers paying disproportionately more for their power than large industrial
consumers?
— What are the costs of switching by residential consumers and, if as seems likely they are high, can
these costs be reduced to more aVordable levels?
— Is the structure of the electricity market competitive and, in particular, would the takeover of
British Energy by one of the existing retailers lead to serious competition issues?
If the problems identiﬁed cannot be remedied by changes to the market, a return to a more strictly
regulated system of tariVs may be necessary.
The problem of the ineVectiveness of Ofgem is a serious one and needs to be addressed separately. There
must be doubts, given its role in designing the wholesale market and presiding over the corporate changes
in the industry, whether it is now too compromised to carry out its primary duty of protecting the interests
of consumers. A more comprehensive reform of regulation may be required.
1. Introduction
In January 2008, ﬁve of the six electricity retail companies supplying residential consumers in Great
Britain increased their electricity prices by up to 15% (see Table 1). The sixth supplier, Scottish & Southern
Energy pledged not to increase its prices before the end on March 2008 but on 20 March, it announced its
prices would rise by about 14.2% from 1 April 2008.
It is estimated that these price rises will mean that 4.5 million households in Britain, about 20% of the
population, now suVer from “fuel poverty”, they pay more than 10% of their household income on energy
purchases, compared to about 2.5 million three years ago.
The companies try to justify the price increases by claiming that the wholesale prices of electricity and gas,
which accounts for about a third of electricity generation and therefore has an impact on electricity prices,
had risen sharply. This paper examines whether increases to published wholesale prices do justify these retail
price increases. The study is based on analysis of two questions: Is the reported wholesale price a reliable
indicator of the cost electricity retailers are paying to buy power; and is the corporate structure of the British
electricity sector competitive?
Table 1
ENERGY RETAIL PRICE INCREASES FOR RESIDENTIAL CONSUMERS
Company Date Electricity (%) Gas (%)
RWE (Npower) 04.01.08 12.7 17.2
EDF 15.01.08 7.9 12.9
British Gas 18.01.08 15.0 15.0
Iberdrola (Scottish Power) 01.02.08 14.0 15.0
E.ON (Powergen) 07.02.08 9.7 15.0
Scottish & Southern Energy 20.03.08 14.2 15.8
Average 12.3 15.1
Source: Press reports
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2. How Electricity Prices are Set
In order to understand movements in electricity prices, it is necessary to examine the four main elements
thatmake up an electricity bill. For price comparisons, taxes should be excluded. This is especially important
for international comparisons because the tax rate varies from country to country and comparing prices
including taxes would give a distorted picture of the relative costs from country to country.
2.1 Components of an electricity bill
Since the privatisation of electricity in Britain in 1990, the four main components of electricity bills have
been calculated by diVerent methods (see Table 2). These four components are: wholesale electricity
purchase price, supply cost (meter reading and billing etc), transmission (use of the high voltage transmission
network) and distribution (use of the low voltage distribution network and purchase and maintenance of
the meter). The wholesale price should be set by the market. From 1998, when residential consumers were
allowed to choose their retail supplier, the supply price, which had previously been set by the regulator,
should also be set by the market. Transmission and distribution are monopolies and the price for these
elements is set by the regulator and, for the same service, will be the same for all generators and retailers.
Table 2
ELEMENTS OF A RESIDENTIAL CONSUMER’S ELECTRICITY
BILL—% (EXCLUDING SUBSIDIES)
Price setting 1991 2008
Generation (wholesale price) Market 54 (60) 69 (75)
Supply cost 1991, Regulated monopoly. 2008, market 6 (7)
Distribution (inc meter) Regulated monopoly 25 (28) 18 (20)
Transmission Regulated monopoly 5 (6) 4 (4)
Nuclear subsidy/Environment Subsidy/levy 10 8
Total 100 (100) 100 (100)
Source: OVer and Ofgem
There have been a number of generally smaller elements. From 1990–96, 10% of every electricity bill was
paid essentially as a subsidy (the Fossil Fuel Levy, FFL) to the nuclear industry.398 Now, about 8% of the
average bill is used to pay for energy eYciency measures including the Carbon Emissions Reduction
Target (CERT).
For residential consumers, if we strip away these additional costs leaving just wholesale, supply,
distribution and transmission, we can see that the monopoly elements (transmission and distribution) have
fallen as a percentage of the bill from 34% in 1991, to 24% in 2008. Generation and retail combined have
increased from 67% to 75%. Ofgem no longer estimates separately generation and supply costs. It provides
a ﬁgure of 66% (75% if we exclude VAT and environment subsidies) that covers “energy, supply costs and
margin”. When Ofgem last estimated separately the supply cost in 2005, the ﬁgure it gave was 35% of the
total bill. If the price retailers pay for electricity (the wholesale price) has increased signiﬁcantly and the
supply cost has not changed, the supply cost, as a percentage of the overall bill would have fallen somewhat
since 2005.
In practice, it is diYcult to know howOfgem can estimate the supply cost as Ofgem, as we will argue later,
has no knowledge of the price retail companies pay for their wholesale supplies, so it would seem diYcult
for Ofgem to split up wholesale and supply. In addition, Ofgem has moved a small number of costs that
were allocated to distribution in 1991 to supply so the 1991 ﬁgures are not strictly comparable with current
prices. Nevertheless, it is clear that the supply cost has increased substantially since 1991. Various authors
have tried to breakdown the elements of the bill more precisely, especially the supply element (see Annex 1).
2.2 Price movements up to 2002
The rapidmovements in prices from 2004 onwards came on top of a period following privatisation in 1990
up to 2002 when prices were relatively stable falling slowly in real terms. Household electricity prices fell in
real terms by about 25%. It is widely assumed that these price reductions resulted from the impact of
competition in the wholesale and retail markets and from the improved eYciency of private companies
compared to nationalised companies. In fact, these factors had little or nothing to do with the price
reductions. It can be shown that there were two main components to the price reductions (Thomas, 2006):
the removal of the FFL in 1996 (which raised about £1 billion per year), which reduced prices immediately
by 10%; and reductions in the cost of the monopoly elements, which halved in that period.
398 A very small proportion of this subsidy was paid to renewables.
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Given the collapse of British Energy in 2002 and the government’s rescue package which will cost tax-
payers in the order of £12 billion,399 it is far from clear that the removal of the nuclear subsidy was ultimately
anything more than a shift of costs from electricity consumers to taxpayers.
The dramatic reductions in the cost of transmission and distribution came not from improvements in
eYciency, but essentially because the electricity assets were privatised for about a third of their asset value
(Thomas, 2004). The prices for these services are set by allowing the companies a given rate of return on the
value of the assets they own. By selling the companies for only a small fraction of their asset value, much
of the value of pre-privatisation assets was essentially written oV and as a result, prices fell sharply. The
reductions will be temporary and prices will tend to rise again as the written-down pre-privatisation
equipment is replaced at full market cost. The price reductions were eVectively paid for by taxpayers because
assets they owned were sold for below their value.
The price of generation was largely unchanged in the period 1990–99. This is hard to justify given that,
like the transmission and distribution assets, the power stations were sold for about a third of their asset
value and the real price generators paid for coal and gas fell by 40%ormore. These cost reductions appear to
have been retained partly as extra proﬁts for the privatised companies and partly passed on only to industrial
consumers.
So even in the period 1990–2002, when the public, understandably, believed that privatisation was
working through the impact of competitive markets and the superior eYciency of privately owned
companies, the reality was diVerent. Markets were not working well and there was no strong evidence that
the privately owned companies were more eYcient than the nationalised companies.
2.3 Price movements from 2004–07
The price increases in the ﬁrst quarter of 2008 come on top of very steep price increases imposed by
electricity retailers from 2004–06 (see Table 3).400 Like the 2008 price increases, the companies tried to justify
them by claiming large increases in wholesale prices. From mid-2006, wholesale prices fell but price
reductions followed only slowly (see Table 4) and, except for British Gas, these reductions were more than
wiped out by the price increases of 2008. On average, electricity prices have increased by over 60% since the
beginning of 2004.
Table 3
PRICE RISES (%) IMPOSED BY UK ENERGY SUPPLIERS FROM JANUARY 2004
TO DECEMBER 2006 (mm/yy)
Company 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total
B Gas 9.4 (08/04) 14.2 (09/05) 22 (02/06) 9.4 (07/06) 66.7
EDF 6.7 (02/04) 3.8 (08/04) 5.4 (01/05) 10.7 (07/05) 4.7 (02/06) 8.0 (07/06) 46.0
RWE (NPower) 5.8 (01/04) 7.6 (09/04) 13.6 (11/05) 13.4 (03/06) 9.9 (09/06) 61.2
E.ON (Powergen) 6.9 (01/04) 8.9 (11/04) 7.2 (07/05) 18.4 (02/06) 9.7 (08/06) 62.1
Scottish Power
(Iberdrola) 9.0 (09/04) 5.0–8.0 (10/05) 8.0 (02/06) 10.0 (06/06) 36.0–39.9
Scottish & Southern
Energy 4.0 (06/04) 6.7 (02/05) 8.9–12.0 (11/05) 9.4 (03/06) 32.2–36.0
Source: Author’s research
Notes
1. Dates shown are when the price rise was announced.
2. Scottish Power’s and Scottish & Southern Energy’s gas and electricity price increases have varied according to the region (whether
it was their former home region) and method of payment.
Table 4
PRICE REDUCTIONS (%) IMPOSED BY UK ENERGY SUPPLIERS FROM JANUARY
TO DECEMBER 2007 (m/y)
Total price change Total price change
1/04"12/07 1/04"2/08
B Gas 11.0 (2/7) 6.0 (4/7) 39.5 60.4
EDF 46.0 57.5
RWE (NPower) 3.0 (2/7) 56.3 76.2
E.ON (Powergen) 5.0 (2/7) 54.0 68.9
399 Commission decision of 22 September 2004 on the State aid which the United Kingdom is planning to implement for British
Energy plc. OYcial Journal of the European Union. L/142 26-80.
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri%OJ:L:2005:142:0026:0080:EN:PDF
400 It should be noted that these ﬁgures should not be taken as an indication of which is the cheapest supplier. The companies
that show relatively small increases might have been expensive suppliers at the start of 2004.
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Total price change Total price change
1/04"12/07 1/04"2/08
Scottish Power (Iberdrola) 5.5 (5/7) 28.5–32.2 46.5–50.7
Scottish & Southern Energy 5.0 (4/7) 30.6–34.2 49.1–53.3
Source: Author’s research
3. Choice of Electricity Supplier for Residential Consumers
3.1 Special features of electricity
Intuitively, most people would assume that being supplied by a competitive market will inevitably be
preferable to being supplied by a monopoly supplier. However, a number of factors in combination mean
that choosing an electricity supplier is a very diVerent and far more diYcult choice than most other
consumer decisions they have to take. This may mean that consumers would be better oV being supplied by
a well-regulated monopoly. These factors include:
— Electricity is a standard product.
— Consumers must commit to buy a product without knowing the price they will pay.
— Residential consumers are in competition with large consumers to get the best deal from the
retailers.
— In a competitive market, retailers will target the most proﬁtable customers; they cannot be given
social obligations without compromising the eYciency of the market.
3.1.1 Electricity is a standard product
Electricity is an entirely standard product. Changing supplier cannot give the consumer “better” or more
reliable electricity. Billing should be an entirely routine business (unfortunately, it appears not to be given
the large number of complaints) so service quality should not be a factor and consumers should only have
price by which to judge the diVerent oVers.
3.1.2 Consumers must commit to buy a product without knowing the price
When consumers are investigating the prices oVered, all they have to go on is the current price (assuming
the price comparison sites are up-to-date). Given that most consumers are unlikely to want to go through
the process of establishing which company is the cheapest and then switching supplier (a process that can
be very time-consuming and frustrating if things go wrong) more than, say, once every two to three years,
the chances that relative prices will remain the same over that period are negligible. In today’s volatile price
climate, it is not unlikely that relative prices will have changed before the switch is completed and the
consumer will not even start with the cheapest deal. Anyone who ﬁnds that large savings are to be made
simply by switching supplier (not changing payment method) is likely to be with a company that has just
raised its prices and the cheap company will be one just about to increase its prices. There is also evidence
that while consumers that switch are generally attempting to move to the cheapest company, they are often
not successful. In a detailed behavioural study, Waddams-Price (2004) found that, amongst a sample of
about 400 consumers who switched supplier, 42% of those switching ended up paying more, 14% were
paying the same, while only 44% actually made savings. These percentages were calculated based on the
time the choice was made, not when the switch was completed.
3.1.3 Residential consumers are in competition with large consumers
In a market, the best prices go to buyers with the most buying power. Unlike most products, residential
consumers will have to compete with very large users, eg, aluminium smelters and chemical works with
annual bills of millions of pounds, to buy power. Residential consumers do not have anything like the
buying power or expertise of such companies, which can employ specialists to negotiate the price they pay.
Now that electricity retail is a free market for all consumers, the regulator has no knowledge of the
wholesale price retailers buy their power at. Large consumers buy their power on conﬁdential contracts, the
details of which are only known to the two parties, so it is diYcult to provide current evidence for the
existence of the likely distortions noted above arising from the buying power of large companies.
However, in 1997, the regulator, then OVer, published evidence that the retailers had systematically
allocated all their cheapest power to large consumers. The large consumers were then able to choose their
electricity supplier, while residential consumers still remained captive to their local retailer. This meant that
the generation element of a residential consumer’s bill was about 30% higher than that of a large consumer
(Thomas, 2006). While the retail, distribution and transmission elements of the bill for a large consumer are
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legitimately lower for a large consumer than for a residential consumer, it costs no more to generate a kWh
for a residential consumer than for an aluminium smelter. The electricity retail companies were simply
taking advantage of the inability of residential consumers to switch.
OVer did nothing about this abuse, assuming, naively, that the introduction of retail competition would
mean that retail companies would not be able sustain this unfair allocation of costs. In fact, the evidence is
that introducing retail competition allowed retail companies to increase the diVerential between the
generation price they charged large consumers and the price they charged residential consumers. From
1999–2002, the price large consumers paid for generation fell by 22% while the price paid by residential
consumers actually increased by 5% (Power UK 2002), so opening up the market to competition actually
exposed residential consumers to greater exploitation. In this period, as in 2007, large price reductions in
the wholesale market were not passed on to residential consumers.
The National Audit OYce (NAO, 2003) in an investigation into NETA [New Electricity Trading
Arrangements, the then name for the wholesale market] found:401
“Prices paid by industrial and commercial customers have fallen sharply since NETA was
implemented. Consumerswho switch supplier can see substantial reductions. However, prices that
domestic consumers pay for electricity have not fallen much since NETA was implemented,
although they have fallen broadly in line with the trend in suppliers’ overall costs since 1998. The
prices that industrial and commercial consumers pay for electricity have fallen by 18% since the
start of NETA, and by 30% since April 1998. Prices for domestic consumers have fallen little since
the start of NETA but by 8–17% since April 1998, reﬂecting the much higher costs of supplying
domestic consumers which have been rising due to new environmental costs and the substantial
costs of processing changes of supplier”.
3.1.4 In a market, companies will target the most proﬁtable customers
There is much clearer evidence of discrimination between diVerent classes of consumer within the
residential sector. Speciﬁcally, there is a large and consistent diVerence between the prices charged to
consumers on pre-payment meters and standard credit terms (quarterly bills that are settled when they are
issued) compared to the prices charged to those paying by monthly direct debit. There is no evidence that
these price diVerentials reﬂect diVerences in costs and there must be strong suspicions that companies are
simply targeting the more proﬁtable consumers.
Pre-payment meters (PPMs) have played a key role in dealing with low-income consumers since
privatisation of the electricity industry in 1990. In no other developed country are pre-payment meters used
by a signiﬁcant proportion of consumers. After its privatisation, BritishGas adopted amuch tougher stance
towards consumers that could not pay their bills, and the number of consumers cut oV increased markedly,
bringing the process of privatisation into disrepute. To avoid this recurring with the electricity industry, pre-
payment meters operated with “smart cards” individual to each consumer were introduced. Consumers
facing diYculty paying their bills had little choice but to move to a PPM and the number of consumers
paying by such meters increased from about 1 million to more than 3.5 million by 1995 (about 15% of
consumers). The number of consumers using PPMs fell slowly to about 3 million by 2003, but the increase
in electricity prices since then has led to a substantial increase so that by 2006, the number was 3.8 million
and has continued to rise since then.
In 1992, the Regulator capped the extra cost that could be passed on to PPM consumers requiring that
they pay no more than 5% more than standard rate consumers. This cost cap did not concern the retail
supply companies because any costs not recovered from PPM consumers could be passed on to other
franchise consumers. For the pre-payment meter consumer, there were signiﬁcant advantages with this
system. It allowed them to continue to receive a supply of electricity even before they had paid oV their debts.
They also did not need to fear receiving a bill of unpredictable size once a quarter. So PPMs helped with
low-income consumers with budgeting but it imposed extra costs on them and if they really could not aVord
their bills, a PPM was no help to them.
PPMs also had an important advantage for retail electricity supply companies. The meters were set up to
use a proportion of any payments to buy more electricity to pay oV existing debts. The retail companies did
not incur the expensive and politically damaging cost of cutting oV consumers that could not pay their bills.
Consumers that could not pay their bill disconnected themselves. They also meant that debts to them were
paid. The extent of the fuel poverty problem was masked. There is no ready way to accurately determine
the extent of self-disconnection. A survey by the Electricity Association found that about 24% of PPM
consumers self-disconnect and about 1% (about 36,000 consumers) chronically disconnect (more than 20
times per year) (Electricity Association 2001, pp 22–23).
Nevertheless, PPMs have proved popular with consumers. They are generally aware that they are paying
a higher price for their power, but, in the same way as pre-payment mobile phones are popular despite high
call charges, consumers value the extra control over tight household budgets that the PPM gives them.
401 National Audit OYce (2003) “TheNewElectricity TradingArrangements in England andWales”Report by the Comptroller
and Auditor General HC 624 Session 2002–03: 9 May 2003.
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Once retail competition had been introduced in 1998, prices were set by the freemarket and the companies
were no longer required to maintain the 5% diVerential and the gap between PPM prices and those of other
payment plans, especially direct debit plans, has widened. This issue has been continually been highlighted
by consumer groups such as Energywatch and the National Right to Fuel Campaign, but Ofgem has taken
no eVective action. However, in its 2008 Budget, the government announced that it was going to work with
the companies to ﬁnd new ways to help the poorest consumers, with the threat that legislation would be
introduced if a satisfactory agreement could not be reached. It remains to be seen how eVective this new
initiative will be.
Table 5
PRICES OF ELECTRICITY BY PAYMENT METHOD AND ACCOUNT TYPE (£/YEAR)
On-line direct debit Direct debit Standard credit Pre-payment
SEEBOARD 306 359 387 390
London 312 372 400 402
Southern 327 372 401 405
South West 336 394 420 422
North West 321 385 396 404
South Wales 356 409 441 448
Eastern 316 362 387 389
Midlands 338 375 400 406
East Midlands 322 368 392 398
Manchester/N Wales 321 369 396 404
Northern 332 382 411 420
Yorkshire 326 370 397 408
South Scotland 336 390 417 426
North Scotland 342 386 409 418
Average 328 378 404 410
Source: http://www.energywatch.org.uk/help and advice/saving money/index.asp
Notes:
1. Rates were calculated for 21 February 2008 and represent the average for the six suppliers for a
“medium” consumer, ie, 3300kWh/year.
2. Note, EDF does not oVer on-line direct debit terms.
Table 5 shows that, on average a pre-paymentmeter consumer nowonly pays a littlemore than a standard
credit consumer, but 11% more than a direct debit consumer and 25% more than an on-line direct debit
consumer. This seems to represent a worsening from the position ﬁve years ago, before on-line tariVs were
widely oVered. Then, Thomas (2004) found that for the London region, the price for those with pre-payment
meters was about 3% more than standard credit and about 8% more than direct debit. A detailed analysis
of prices on oVer in the London region (see Box) shows that PPM consumers that have not moved from the
original monopoly supplier are now paying 27% more than the cheapest oVer, an on-line direct debit dual-
fuel account.
The picture has changed in the past ﬁve years. Then, the most expensive suppliers were almost invariably
the incumbents, presumably because the companies could assume a high proportion of their existing
consumers would never switch and the companies could exploit this inertia. Now, there appears to be no
such relationship because the proportion of consumers willing to switch might be high enough to ensure
that companies cannot rely on this inertia. There was also then a signiﬁcant diVerential between PPM and
standard credit consumers. This diVerential no longer exists. How far this is due to a change in the expected
costs of supply and how far it is down to other factors is impossible to know. However, ﬁve years ago, there
was signiﬁcant criticism of companies for the high cost of PPMs. Companies can now legitimately, but
disingenuously, claim that their prices for PPM consumers are now in-line with their standard credit
consumers.
The companies claim there are additional costs for supplying pre-payment meter consumers. While it is
plausible that the system of topping up is more expensive than sending out bills, there are oV-setting cost
savings. No meter-reading and billing is required, payment is in advance, and there is no possibility of the
consumer not paying their bill.
Unless convincing and independently authenticated evidence is provided to show that these high prices
reﬂect real additional costs, the companies must be seen as guilty of exploiting the classes of consumers,
pre-payment and standard credit, that contain the most vulnerable and disadvantaged consumers. If the
diVerential does reﬂect real cost diVerences, there is a need for government or regulatory action to ensure
that vulnerable and disadvantaged consumers are not in such a poor position for the purchase of an essential
public service.
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Ms A’s Energy Purchases
Ms A is a single, working mother known to me. She has had problems with previous debt to energy
suppliers, not incurred by her. Her limited budget and this bad experience mean she values very highly the
assurance pre-payment meters (PPMs) gives that unaVordable bills will not be incurred even though she is
aware that PPMs are not the cheapest method of paying. She is also reluctant to experiment with untried
energy providers. She lives within London Electricity’s catchment area and buys her electricity from the
previous monopoly supplier, London Electricity (EDF) and her gas from British Gas (Centrica) using pre-
payment meters (PPM). If we assume she is a “medium user” (3,300kWh/year of electricity and 20,500kWh
of gas per year), the price she currently pays and her options are shown in the Table. She has ﬁve basic
payment options: pre-payment meters; standard credit (SC) terms (a variable quarterly bill); direct debit
(DD) under which a ﬁxed sum is taken monthly from her bank account; and on-line DD under which her
account is a paperless one operated via the internet. For all options except PPM, a dual fuel oVer is available
oVering a small discount over buying the energy under separate accounts. For clarity, dual-fuel prices are
only shown for the cheapest way of paying, on-line DD.
Care needs to be taken interpreting the Table as Scottish & Southern Energy (S&SE) is almost invariably
the cheapest supplier for any given class of payment, but the prices shown here were calculated before it
announced a price rise of 14.2% eVective from April 2008. This means that in most cases it is not now the
cheapest supplier.
Table
COST OF PURCHASING ENERGY IN THE LONDON REGION
PPM Standard credit Direct debit On-line DD On-line DD dual-fuel
EDF/B Gas
Electricity 401 401 393 393* n/a
Gas 617 656 588 565 n/a
Total 1,018 1.057 981 968 n/a
Dearest
Electricity 440 (NPower) 429 (S Power) 402 (Npower) 320 (NPower)
Gas 676 (E.ON) 656 (B Gas) 633 (NPower) 595 (NPower)
Total 1,116 1,085 1,035 (NPower) 915 (NPower) 876 (S Power)
Cheapest
Electricity 353 (S&SE) 350 (S&SE) 329(SS&E) 285 (NPower)
Gas 579 (S&SE) 535 (S&SE) 503 (SS&E) 462 (S&SE)
Total 932 885 832 747 744 (E.ON)
Cheapest (ex SSE)
Electricity 393 (E.ON) 393 (E.ON) 357 (S Power) 285 (NPower)
Gas 617 (B Gas) 642 (E.ON) 580 (S Power) 565 (B Gas)
Total 1,010 1,035 937 850 744 (E.ON)
Source: http://www.energywatch.org.uk/uploads/PriceComparison london 21February2008.pdf
The Table shows a number of important features:
— On-line Direct Debit dual-fuel, is 27% cheaper than paying by PPM with the incumbent utilities.
— There is little to be saved within PPM suppliers. Now that S&SE has increased its prices, the
available savings are negligible.
— Standard Credit terms are now generally little if any cheaper than PPMs and ifMs A remains with
the same supplier and switches to SC, her bills would actually increase.
— Signiﬁcant savings are available if Ms A switched to paying by Direct Debit. The savings would
be only about 4% if she remained with her existing suppliers, but if she switched to the cheapest,
excluding S&SE, she would save 8%.
— However, the big pay-oVs arise when on-line DD are considered. Switching to the cheapest
supplier (excluding S&SE) would save 17%.
— Switching to the cheapest supplier with on-line DD and a dual fuel oVer would increase savings
to 27%.
— Now that S&SE has increased its prices from April, anyone following Ofgem’s advice in January
and February to switch is likely to have found that by the time the switch was complete, S&SE
was no longer the cheapest supplier and their eVort was wasted.
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3.2 Switching rates and price diVerentials
Switching rates, that is, the proportion of consumers that change supplier each year, are frequently used
as an indicator of the health of the retail electricity market, while a clustering of prices is claimed to be an
indicator that markets are not operating competitively. In both cases, these assertions are misleading.
Amarket that has little switching because the process is so onerous or because companies are not actively
competing is clearly not healthy. Equally, if the market is operating eYciently, competing companies would
know they would quickly lose market share if their prices were signiﬁcantly higher than their competitors.
In such a market, there would be no need to switch because consumers would be assured that their supplier
would follow closely the price movements of the market. So a market with a low switching rate and closely
clustered prices could be operating eYciently.
From another perspective, if the market is working well, prices should cluster. If we look at the
components of an electricity bill, including tax and environmental costs, 35% is accounted for by elements
that are standard for all suppliers, for example, the transmission charge. Of the rest, about two thirds is the
generation cost. If the wholesale market is working eYciently, it should be very diYcult for one retailer to
buy power more cheaply than another. If we look at most commodity markets, all buyers pay essentially
the same cost for the commodity. This leaves the supply cost. If one retailer was, say, 20% more eYcient
than its competitors, this would allow them to oVer power about 6% cheaper than their competitors, hardly
a major incentive to switch for residential consumers. So the existence of major price diVerentials is more
likely to be an indication of a malfunctioning wholesale market than an indicator of a healthy retail market.
3.3 Retail costs in a competitive market
It is generally assumed for most products that competition is a “free good” (or negligible costs) with only
beneﬁts from competition. It is diYcult to know what the retailers’ costs are but it is clear they are up to
four times as high as when retail was a monopoly. Some of the additional costs include:
— Marketing.
— Switching costs.
— Higher proﬁts.
3.3.1 Marketing
Marketing costs range from product advertising in mass media and sponsorship of sports, to door-to-
door and telephone marketing. These costs are likely to be substantial will inevitably be passed on to
consumers.
3.3.2 Switching costs
The systems to allow retail switching were hugely expensive to build and are expensive to operate. OVer
estimated allowed the companies to recover £850 million from consumers to pay for the building of the
systems and operation over seven years from 1998 (Thomas, 2006). The NAO (2003) wrote of “the
substantial costs of processing changes of supplier”. InMay 2005, the British energyminister, BrianWilson,
said: “The beneﬁts of price falls must not be restricted to those who switch, not least because if everyone
starts to switch, the costs of administering this will outstrip the savings”. No reliable estimate of the average
switching cost per consumer exists, but it is unlikely to be less than about £40. This cost legally cannot be
charged to the switching consumer so is borne by consumers in general. While not charging consumers to
switch will result in higher switching rates than if they were charged the real cost they were incurring, it does
mean that consumers that do not switch are not only not receiving the potential beneﬁts of switching, they
are having to pay for the beneﬁts switching consumers receive.
If all consumers switched as regularly as Ofgem advocates and suYciently to ensure they were generally
on the lowest tariV, this is likely to require them to switch up to twice a year. Even if the switching systems
were able to cope with this, which seems unlikely, the annual costs would be in the order £2 billion. Ofgem’s
standard response when complaints are made about prices, that consumers should switch to cheaper
suppliers is therefore ill-thought out and likely to result in extra costs far above any potential savings from
greater competition.
Ofgem should be required to re-estimate the annual cost of switching so that sensible advice can be given
to consumers on switching.
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3.3.3 Higher proﬁts
It is now diYcult to see whether energy retailers are making excessive proﬁts. Four out of six of the energy
companies are subsidiaries of foreign companies and do not publish audited accounts of their UK
businesses. The other two companies, Centrica (which trades as British Gas in the UK) and Scottish &
Southern Energy oVer both gas and electricity, and are also integrated into electricity generation and, in the
case of Centrica, gas production. So it is diYcult to know where their proﬁts come from. In February 2008,
Centric reported proﬁts for 2007 of £571 million compared to £95 million in 2006.
4. Is the Corporate Structure Competitive?
The corporate structure for the electricity industry, with six major companies is much more competitive
than most countries in Europe. Nevertheless, using the standard measure of market concentration (the
Hirschmann-Herﬁndahl Index, HHI), the market would still be categorised as moderately concentrated (an
index of 1,500). However, the market is still highly regionalised with the former monopoly supplier for each
region still holding perhaps 50% of the residential market, with British Gas holding about 30% of the
residential market. This would give an HHI of about 3500, well above the level (1800) that is the threshold
for a highly concentrated market. However, while the fact that, a decade after the introduction of retail
competition, these measures are still so disturbing does provide ample grounds by itself for the need for a
Competition Commission Inquiry, the issues are more complex than is suggested by these simple statistics.
4.1 Vertical integration of generation and retail
When the electricity industry was privatised in 1990, there seemed a clear desire by the government to
maintain a corporate separation between generation and retail. The reason for this was clear. The rationale
for the new structure was to force generating companies to compete with each other “every half-hour of
every day”. At that time, generation accounted for over half the cost of electricity. Most of the rest of the
cost was made up by activities that would remain monopolies, so it did not seem likely the new structure
would lead to major cost reductions in these activities. The beneﬁt to consumers would come from the
operation of an eYcient electricity wholesale market, which would force generators to continuously force
their costs down to the minimum they could achieve. The prices in this market would also act as investment
signals, stimulating new investment when the price was high and ensuring that investment in new capacity
kept pace with demand.
If generation and retail had been allowed to integrate, the majority of power would have been produced
by generators and sold directly to their retail customers, bypassing the wholesalemarket.With low liquidity,
the wholesale market would not have been an arena where independent generators and retailers could risk
trading a signiﬁcant proportion of their power and would not provide reliable investment signals.402
The logic of the need to separate generation and retail was so compelling that in many countries that
copied the British structure, it was illegal for the same company to generate power and sell to ﬁnal
consumers. However, while the British government did try to maintain a separation between the generators
and the 14 privatised retail companies, it caved in to pressure from the generators in 1998 and very quickly,
the 14 separate and competing retail companies were taken over by ﬁve large generation companies. Annex
2 gives greater details on the history of this change.
The most recent development concerns the one remaining major independent generator that does not
have a retail business, British Energy, the privatised nuclear company. British Energy did buy a retail
company (SWALEC) in 1999, but sold it a year later. This may have contributed to its collapse in 2002.
Eventually it was rescued by government at huge cost to taxpayers in a deal that eVectively gave the
government 65% of the shares. In June 2007, the government sold 30% of the shares and in March 2008, it
announced it was looking to sell the remaining 35% of the shares and would not exercise its Golden Share
which allowed it to veto any company owning more than 15% of the shares. Separately British Energy
announced that it was in talks with a number of companies about a full takeover. The likelihood seems to
be that British Energy will be partly or fully taken over by one of the six integrated generator retailers.
Investment in new generation in Great Britain continued after privatisation because of the failure of the
wholesale market to bring down prices (the so-called “Dash for Gas” in 1991–92 and a second “Dash for
Gas” in 1997–98. New generators could produce power at well below the market price and it seemed that
investing in new plant represented a low risk.After the wholesale price fell in Britain in 2002, new investment
would have become much riskier if the generation and retail had been separate because there would have
been little assurance that a new entrant could produce at lower than the market price. However, the market
is now dominated by a handful of integrated companies so investment risk is low because the companies
are selling direct to consumers that cannot easily switch rather than into a half-hourly market. The risk that
402 The ﬁrst design of wholesale market, the Power Pool required generators to bid all the plant they wanted to operate into the
Pool with only successful bidders allowed to generate. However, hedging contracts were allowed that meant that the price
generators bid into the Pool bore no resemblance to the price they were actually paid and bids were little more than a charade.
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there will be insuYcient generating capacity may also be lower. Integrated companies will tend to ensure
they have enough capacity to supply their own consumers reliably. So supply security may be improved by
integration, but the price will be much reduced competition.
However, the intuitive conclusion that if integration of generation and retail is destroying competition,
this form of integration should be prevented is dangerous. As stand-alone businesses, both generation and
retail supply are highly risky businesses. Investment in new power plant will be seen as highly risky if the
plant owner has to sell the output into a competitive market in which the prices and volumes sold will not
be predictable from one hour to the next. For a standard product like electricity, retail suppliers will quickly
lose their market share if they cannot match the cheapest prices on oVer. The evidence from California and
Brazil, where integration was not allowed and investment in new generation collapsed after liberalization,
is not encouraging.
4.2 Emergence of ﬁve dominant European players
These changes in theUKmust be seen in the context of changes in the corporate structure of the electricity
industry in Europe. Like the UK, the European Union has been pursuing a policy of liberalisation of
electricity markets but, ironically, the result of the attempt to introduce competition has been a massive
process of corporate concentration and the emergence of an oligopoly of about ﬁve major players present
in several countries. Thomas (2003) wrote about the Seven Brothers in 2003, examining the proposition that
seven or eight companies would dominate European electricity markets.
Of the eight companies considered by Thomas as candidates, three were then already signiﬁcantly larger
than the other companies. These three companies, EDF, E.ON and RWE, were the ﬁrst European
companies to enter the UK and remain very powerful throughout the rest of Europe as well as in their home
markets and the UK. Of the other ﬁve possible companies identiﬁed by Thomas: ENEL (Italy) is in the
process of taking over another of the companies, Endesa (Spain); and Electrabel (Belgium/France) is in the
process of merging with the gas equivalent of EDF, GDF. However, Vattenfall (Sweden) appears not to
have the scope for further expansion and Iberdrola (Spain) has taken over Scottish Power, but is now under
threat of takeover by EDF. The ﬁve dominant companies likely to emerge from this process, EDF, E.ON,
RWE, ENEL and Electrabel/GDF are comparable in size and would have the resources to take over either
of the two remaining British integrated companies, Centrica and Scottish & Southern Energy as well as the
nuclear generator, British Energy.
4.3 Prospects for new entry
The Energy Minister, Malcolm Wicks expressed concern in February 2008 about the lack of new entry
to the retail market since 2003 saying he wanted to raise the issue with Ofgem.403 However, the prospects
for potential new entrants are now very poor and the reason for this is the actions of Ofgem and the
government itself in allowing integration of generation and retail. New generators will only be able to enter
the market if they can obtain a long-term contract to sell their power to one of the integrated companies.
Such deals will contribute little to competition in generation. A new retailer will ﬁnd it diYcult to obtain
wholesale supplies because generation is dominated by integrated companies. If, as now seems likely, British
Energy, the only large independent generator left, is taken over by one of the six integrated companies, the
proportion of capacity not owned by these six companies will be even smaller.
US companies moved rapidly into the UKmarket as soon as the “Golden Share” provisions that allowed
government to veto takeovers of the privatised companies expired in 1995. However, many exited within a
year or two, while the UK subsidiaries of those that remained after 2000, almost all went bankrupt.
Experience by these US companies in other markets was generally little if any better, and virtually all the
US companies have now withdrawn from all non-US markets after suVering heavy losses. The prospects
that any US utilities will try to enter the UK market again in the next decade or so seem slim. Investment
organisations, such asMacquarie Bank andOntario Teachers’ Pension Fund and SEAsian companies have
invested in UK utilities, but they seem only interested in regulated network activities, where the commercial
risk is much lower than for electricity generation and retail.
A particular issue for prospective small new entrants is the so-called balancing market for power. This is
a complex mechanism. Essentially retail companies have to forecast the demands of their consumers a day
ahead and generators have to declare which power stations will be used so that the system operator
(National Grid Transco) can check the compatibility of these plans with the transmission network and with
their own (more accurate) forecast of demand. Inevitably, the retailers’ forecasts will not be precisely
accurate and the system operator will, an hour ahead, have to buy additional generation or pay for a
generator not to generate so that supply and demand do balance precisely. The price in the balancingmarket
to generate extra power at short notice has proved to be highly variable and is often very high. For a large
integrated company, this risk is manageable. For a small new entrant retailer, if their forecast is, say, 10%
too low at a time when the balancing price to buy extra power is, say 10–50 times the normal market price,
the company could easily be bankrupted.
403 Power UK, “Wicks to raise entry issues with Ofgem” Issue 167, January 2008, pp 57–58.
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So new entry to the UK only seems likely from European companies with only the ﬁve emerging,
dominant players having the size to move into the UK market or expand their existing position here. EDF,
RWE and E.ON will probably remain strong forces in the UK market. The other three UK integrated
companies (Centrica, S&SE and Scottish Power) and British Energy must be seen as takeover targets for
these three companies or the other two major European companies, ENEL and Electrabel/GDF that have
yet to establish a position in the UK. The latter company has already bought a major UK power station in
2008 signalling its intention to move into the UK market.
5. Is the Reported Wholesale Price a Reliable Price Indicator?
5.1 The Pool and NETA/BETTA
As discussed earlier, from 1990–2002, the wholesale market for England and Wales was the Power Pool,
which was a market all generators and retailers had nominally to operate through. In practice, the allowing
of hedging contracts meant that the prices bid into the Pool had little or no impact on price-setting in the
wholesale market. However, the terms and prices of the contracts were mostly known to the regulator at
least up to 1998 because residential consumers were still captive to their regional company and the regulator
had to be assured that the companies were only passing on to their captive consumers the costs they were
actually incurring.
The Pool was replaced by a new spot market, the New Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA), which
in 2005 became the British Electricity Trading and Transmission Arrangements (BETTA), when Scotland
was integrated into the England &Wales market. NETA/BETTA is a voluntary market and generators and
retailers are free to sign conﬁdential contracts outside the visible spot market. Whilst NETA/BETTA is
immensely complex in detail, for these purposes, as we will argue, the fact that power can be bought and
sold on conﬁdential contracts outside NETA/BETTA is the key point.
The justiﬁcation provided by energy retailers for the price increases of 2004–06 and for 2008 was that they
were forced to pass on wholesale price increases to consumers. This begs the question: is the published
wholesale price from BETTA a reliable indicator of the price retail companies pay for their power?
Statistical analysis of day-ahead wholesale prices and retail prices found no correlation between these
suggesting that there is no statistical basis for this claim (Waterson et al, 2008). But on a number of practical
grounds, it is clear that the wholesale price is not a reliable indicator.
5.2 The day ahead market is not liquid
The only market for which prices are published is the “day-ahead” market for each 30-minute period.
This is essentially a market used by the companies for ﬁne-tuning their purchases, buying additional or
selling surplus power. The volumes traded areminimal and the prices ﬂuctuate dramatically fromone period
to the next. For example, inDecember 2007, the highest half-hour price on this spotmarket was £400/MWh,
while the lowest was £15/MWh. The total turnover for the month was 857GWh. Total demand for the
month was of the order 40,000GWh. So it can be seen that only a very small proportion of wholesale sales
pass through the day-ahead market.
5.3 All retailers can cover a large proportion of their sales from own capacity
All six major companies are able to cover 50% or more of their power needs from their own coal- and
gas-ﬁred plant. The transfer price from the generation to the retail division of this power is not known and,
if the fuel used to generate this power is bought on long-term contracts, the price of this fuel may not be
strongly related to spot market gas and coal prices.
5.4 The rest of the purchases are on medium- or long-term contracts
There remain three signiﬁcant independent power producers that do not have retail businesses,
International Power (2.8GW), Drax Power (4GW) and British Energy (10.8GW). These companies own
about a quarter of British generating capacity and supply a somewhat higher proportion of British power
needs (their plants are used more intensively than average). All three companies are potential takeover
targets for the six integrated companies. These independent generators were selling their power through
short-term and spot sales in 2002 and British Energy andDrax Power (then owned by aUS company, AES)
both collapsed ﬁnancially when the short-term price fell sharply. They now sell their power primarily via
medium- and long-term contracts to the six major retail companies. The terms of these contracts are known
only to the two parties involved and are highly unlikely to have a systematic relationship to electricity spot
market prices.
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6. Conclusions
Detailed analysis of prices shows that even in the period 1990-2002, when prices for electricity were falling
in real terms, the wholesale electricity market was not working well. Large cost reductions experienced by
the generating companies were not passed on to consumers as would have been expected to occur if the
wholesale electricitymarket had been an eYcient one. Experience since 2002 has demonstrated that the retail
electricity market is also not eYcient and has allowed the electricity companies to increase prices to
residential consumers without convincing justiﬁcation and not pass on cost reductions. So the current
problem is not an isolated one in an otherwise successful system.
The assertion by the six electricity retail companies that large price rises for electricity imposed in the ﬁrst
quarter of 2008 are justiﬁed by movements to the wholesale market price for electricity is not supported by
the evidence they have given. The liquidity of the visible wholesalemarket is negligible and the six companies
buy nearly all their own power from their own power stations or from independent power producers under
long-term contracts. The connection between the cost of these purchases from their own sources and under
long-term contracts, and the published price in the spot market is weak. There are strong suspicions that
this is not the ﬁrst time the companies have manipulated prices to their advantage. In 2002, the wholesale
electricity price fell by 40% but none of this was passed on to residential consumers. In 2005–06, the
companies increased their prices by 50% or more citing high wholesale prices, but when wholesale prices fell
in 2006, the price reductions were minimal.
Residential consumers already face a near impossible task in trying to get the best deal for their power
purchases. They have to choose a supplier knowing only the current relative prices, which in a volatile
market could easily have changed even before the switch to a new supplier has been completed. They have
to compete with large users to buy power and the retailers have a history of systematically allocating their
cheapest power purchases to large users, presumably because of their stronger negotiating power. The
companies also discriminate against poorer consumers, oVering much lower prices to those that can aVord
to pay by direct debit and who have access to, and are conﬁdent with the internet. Pre-payment meter and
standard credit (quarterly variable bills) consumers might pay a third more than direct debit consumers.
The companies have provided no convincing evidence that this price diVerential is justiﬁed by real cost
diVerences.
The structure of the electricity industry has become signiﬁcantly less competitive and more concentrated
in the past decade, with the implicit approval and sometimes at the instigation of both the government and
the regulatory authority, Ofgem. Further changes are likely that will make the situation worse. In the case
of the likely takeover of British Energy, which will remove the main independent power producer, the
change was at least in part prompted by the government itself. This reduction in competition will give
consumers even less conﬁdence that prices are being set competitively by the market. It will leave residential
consumers even more vulnerable to the market power of the oligopoly of a handful of European companies
that increasingly dominate UK as well as European energy markets.
Solutions to these problems are not easy. When confronted with such serious market failures, it is
tempting to recommend pro-competition measures, such as breaking up the companies, forcing greater use
of visible spot markets and reducing the extent of integration of generation and supply. However, the result
of such measures could be to jeopardise security of supply if, as seems likely, independent generation
companies would proﬁt more from power shortages than from investing in new capacity.
The regulator, Ofgem, has a poor record. Dubious price movements in 2002, 2004–05, 2006 passed with
no serious investigation by them and their response to the latest price rises was belated. There must be
suspicions that it was only prompted by public outrage and the announcement of the BERR Select
Committee investigation. Ofgem’s announcement of its inquiry gives concern that Ofgem will be looking to
shift blame elsewhere. It states: “We are concerned about the increased volatility of wholesale prices and
we want to investigate how European and other global energy market developments are aVecting energy
bills in Britain”. Fundamental issues such as the eYciency of the British wholesale market and the corporate
structure in Britain are nowhere mentioned. Ofgem has also consistently failed to tackle the issue, long
recognised, of price discrimination amongst residential consumers which results in pre-payment and
standard credit consumers paying far more than direct debit consumers.
A more impartial investigation than can be carried out by Ofgem is needed and the Competition
Commission seems the most appropriate body to carry out such an investigation. The issues it would need
to examine are:
— Do movements in the price actually paid for power by retailers justify the January 2008 price
increases?
— What if any is the relationship between the published spot price for electricity and the price paid
by retailers for power?
— Do cost diVerences justify the price diVerences between the tariVs oVered to pre-payment meter
and standard credit consumers, and to consumers paying by direct debit?
— Are residential consumers paying disproportionately more for their power than large industrial
consumers?
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— What are the costs of switching by residential consumers and, if as seems likely they are high, can
these costs be reduced to more aVordable levels?
— Is the structure of the electricity market competitive and, in particular, would the takeover of
British Energy by one of the existing retailers lead to serious competition issues?
If the problems identiﬁed cannot be remedied by changes to the market, a return to a more strictly
regulated system of tariVs may be necessary.
The problem of the ineVectiveness of Ofgem is a serious one and needs to be addressed separately. There
must be doubts, given its role in designing the wholesale market and presiding over the corporate changes
in the industry, whether it is now too compromised to carry out its primary duty of protecting the interests
of consumers. A more comprehensive reform of regulation may be required.
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Annex 1
A DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF SUPPLY COSTS
Cornwall Energy (2008), in a paper commissioned by UNISON and the National Right to Fuel
Campaign has tried to establish a more detailed breakdown of the current cost of power for residential
electricity consumers (Table 7). If we include system losses with generation, the generation element makes
up 35% of the total cost (excluding taxes and subsidies); distribution (including metering) comprises 21%;
transmission 3%; leaving 41% to cover the supply cost and proﬁts.
There appears to have been a four-fold increase in proﬁts from 2003–06 and, if Centrica’s proﬁts for 2007
are a guide, the percentage of the price made up by proﬁts will have increased again sharply in 2007.
Marketing costs are likely to have fallen given that most of the companies are no longer employing major
door-to-door and telephone marketing eVorts.
While distribution and transmission have fallen as a percentage of the bill, they are increasing, reﬂecting
extra costs associated with integrating renewables, but also, as argued in section 2.4, the fact that the
industry was sold at a small fraction of the asset value and the pre-privatisation assets are now having to
be replaced.
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Table 6
COSTS OF SERVING RESIDENTIAL CONSUMERS—£m (%)
2003 2006 % change 2003–06
Fuel costs 1,815 (25) 3,020 (27) 66
System losses 499 (7) 878 (8) 75
Distribution charge 1,610 (23) 1,734 (16) 8
Metering 526 (7) 543 (5) 3
Transmission charge 190 (3) 298 (3) 57
Suppliers’ cost to serve 903 (13) 908 (8) 1
Proﬁts 557 (8) 2,635 (24) 373
Residual 1,020 (14) 983 (9) –4
Total (exc tax and environmental) 7,120 (100) 10,999 (100) 54
Energy eYciency commitment 97 182
Renewables obligation 148 256
Total 7,365
Source: Cornwall Energy Associates
Annex 2
INTEGRATION OF GENERATION AND RETAIL
The British government has been inconsistent about integration of generation and retailing electricity.
Because of strong opposition in Scotland, from across the political spectrum (Lang 2002), to the break-up of
the two nationally-owned Scottish electricity companies, these were privatised intact as two fully vertically
integrated companies. However, the Scottish electricity industry has now being absorbed into that of
England and Wales.
In England and Wales, the 12 regional retail supply companies were allowed to build their own power
plants and the generators were allowed to supply directly the large consumers who were able to choose their
electricity supplier. The situation became more confused in 1995 when Scottish Power was allowed to take
over a regional company in England and Wales (Manchester and North Wales Electricity Board). At that
time, Scotland was commercially separate from England and Wales but physically interconnected.
Improvements to the interconnections were underway and it was clear that Scottish Power would be able
to operate as an integrated company in England and Wales. A regional company, Eastern, had bought the
plant the Regulator had forced the two large privatised generators, National Power and Powergen, to sell
in 1995, also creating a large integrated company. However, the proposed take-over in 1996 of regional
companies by both National Power and Powergen caused government to think again.
These two companies still had immense power in the generation market and allowing them to take over
regional companies would have been a risk to competition and the take-overs were prevented. Only two
years later, renewed take-over bids by the duopoly were allowed. It is not clear why the government changed
its position on vertical integration. What had changed was that the market share of National Power and
Powergen in generation had fallen and the government required, as a condition, that the duopoly sell more
of its plant to new entrants. National Power and Powergen were also experiencing ﬁnancial diYculties
because long-term gas contracts they had signed had proved to be over-priced. Between them, the two
companies had to write oV about £1.5 billion in 1998–99 on these contracts. The government may have been
concerned that these problems had so weakened the companies they would have been vulnerable to foreign
take-over. Allowing them to integrate appeared likely to give them more strength. In fact, this protection
was ineVective. In 1999, National Power had to split itself into aUK business and an international business.
The UK business of National Power was taken over by RWE in 2002 while Powergen succumbed to E.ON
in 2001.
The decision on vertical integration of National Power and Powergen opened the ﬂoodgates to
integration and by 2002, the 14 retail businesses of Great Britain (12 in England and Wales and two in
Scotland) had all been taken over by generators. Now ﬁve integrated companies dominate generation and
retail supply. RWE, E.ON, EDF and Scottish & Southern Energy each own three regional companies, and
Scottish Power owns two. A sixth company, Centrica (trading as British Gas), has made signiﬁcant inroads
into the retail market for residential consumers and owns a signiﬁcant amount of plant. There is every
prospect that, in the next year or two, further mergers and take-overs will leave just three or four dominant
companies.
The risks of this form of vertical integration to consumers were soon apparent. 40% of Britain’s
generating capacity was in serious ﬁnancial diYculties at the start of 2004. Some was for sale at distress
prices, some had been repossessed by the banks that lent money to the owners and the nuclear plants were
owned by companies that were only able to continue to trade because of government support. This 40% of
capacity was owned by non-integrated generators. The integrated companies get most of their power from
their own plant or under long-term ﬁxed price contracts and are little exposed to the markets. When the
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wholesale electricity price as measured by the wholesale market price fell, the integrated companies did not
pass on the reduction to consumers (National Audit OYce 2003). The non-integrated companies, most of
whom had only bought their plants in 2000–01, were much more seriously exposed to the price reduction
and began to lose money heavily.
While this form of integration signiﬁcantly reduces the risks to electricity generators and retailers, it is
not a guarantee against failure. In Great Britain, by about 2000, TXU, a Texas-based electric utility held
about 4000MW of generation and supplied to two regions and was widely seen as having a very strong
position in the British market. However, it contracted too much power at a high price from an independent
power producer, sustained heavy losses and was bought out by E.ON in 2002.
March 2008
Memorandum submitted by Utilita
My company, Utilita (www.utilita.co.uk) is a relatively new entrant in the energy supply market. Unlike
most new entrants we have targeted the residential sector for both gas and electricity, and do NOT
speciﬁcally sell a renewable or “Green” product. We are the 7th largest dual fuel supplier in Great Britain,
basically because there is no one else after the Big 6 (BritishGas, RWE,Eon, Iberdrola, Scottish&Southern,
and EdF). As a small company we seek to exploit our advantages in technology vis-a`-vis the Big 6, and are
currently launching a new pre-payment product based on smart metering which we believe is the biggest
smart metering project in the residential sector and the only smart meter project focused on pre-payment.
This product is priced to be competitive with incumbent supplier direct debit prices, rather than at a
signiﬁcant premium.
We have not been invited to give evidence to the select committee, and are not particularly looking to give
oral evidence, however, we would like to ensure that the committee is aware of the evidence that we have
submitted to Ofgem as part of their review of the retail market. In particular the points we have focused
on are:
1. Predatory pricing—whilst pushing through big increases to their incumbent customer base several
of the Big 6 suppliers have continued to cut the prices they oVer to new customers. Obviously as
a new entrant we have to compete with their discounted prices and believe that these are therefore
preventing competition. Furthermore it should be noted that much of the cost to serve for utility
customers is in winning and losing customers, both in terms of internal costs of setting up and
closing accounts and external costs of commission payments. These same companies often apply
even higher prices to pre-payment customers. On the surface it certainly seems that they are cross-
subsidizing their new customers from their inert and/or pre-payment customers. This is a barrier
to entry.
2. Credit cover—Sometime ago, Ofgem reviewed the credit cover arrangements that were being
imposed by the monopoly electricity distribution businesses and came to the conclusion that these
were a barrier and that there were more eYcient ways to manage bad debt. They subsequently
introduced changes to the standard terms of business that removed the credit cover requirements,
however, they failed to translate the same principles onto the gas distribution companies, and as
a consequence there are still onerous and unnecessary credit cover arrangements being imposed
by the gas distribution companies. The same applies to NGC Meters, a company that essentially
operates a near monopoly in the provision of gas meters and that was ﬁned by Ofgem earlier this
year, but there has not changed the onerous credit cover arrangements that they impose. This is a
barrier to entry.
3. Balancing prices—because a supplier cannot predict exactly how much gas or electricity its
customers will use on a day, but at the same time there is a physical need to ensure the systems
remain in balance, bothmarkets have a “balancingmechanism”. These are markets that come into
play after the event to balance out the diVerences between what a supplier bought in advance
(based on what he thought his customers would use) and what his customers actually used whether
more or less. Obviously for these to work there needs to be a mechanism for determining the price
at which these balancing trades are performed, in fact there are two prices, one that applies if you
are short, and a lower price that applies if you are long and need to sell back the excess. The
diVerentials in these prices between the two markets is enormous, in the gas industry typical
spreads are around !/" 2%, but in the electricity industry they can be !100% (or more when we
need to buy) and –50% (when we are selling). This leads to diVerential wholesale costs between big
and small suppliers because we both trade in the same markets ahead of time where there is a
minimum granularity in the products we can trade and smaller suppliers therefore cannot hedge
as accurately in percentage terms as bigger suppliers. This is a barrier to entry.
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We did have concerns about smart metering.We are currently rolling out a fully commercial product that
both delivers smartmeters and addresses the fuel poverty issue by reducing prices to pre-payment customers.
We would not wish to see any measures being imposed on the industry (primarily on the Big 6) that had the
eVect of removing a critical element of one of the few competitive advantages we have over our much larger
competitors.
4 June 2008
Memorandum submitted by Welsh Power
INQUIRY INTO UK ENERGY MARKET
Introduction
Welsh PowerGroupLimited is a dynamic independent power company, which aims to build an integrated
multi-asset European energy business using a buy and build strategy.
Welsh Power Group is the owner and operator of Uskmouth Power, a 363MW coal ﬁred power plant in
South Wales. Uskmouth is one of the most eYcient and ﬂexible coal plants operating in the UK and being
ﬁtted with FGD is also one of the cleanest plants. Welsh Power has a subsidiary Severn Power Limited who
is developing an 850MW gas-ﬁred power station on the brown-ﬁeld site next to Uskmouth Power.
In January 2007 Welsh Power launched Haven Power, an electricity supply company providing
predictable electricity prices and straightforward contracts tailored to the individual needs of business
customers. In June 2007 the Company commenced the development of a 49.9MWbiomass plant atNewport
Docks through its wholly owned subsidiary Nevis Power Limited. This development is being managed by
Carron Engineering & Construction our specialist power engineering business. Carron Energy Limited is
the commercial and trading arm of theGroupmanaging its trading and energymanagement functions, coal,
CO2 and gas trading.
As one of the few new market entrants in the last few years, Welsh Power Group has experienced ﬁrst
hand the barriers to entry to theGB powermarket. We believe that themarket is fundamentally broken and
in need of amore radical solution than recent Ofgem initiatives, such as the cash-out review, have examined.
Outlined below are our key concerns and some proposed solutions.
Market Design Confers a Significant Advantage on Integrated Players
The integrated players, owning both generation and supply businesses, do not have to eVectively
participate in the wholesale market. Their position allows them to pass generation costs straight to their
supply arms, via internal power sales, and on to customers. This has three impacts:
The European Commission’s 2006 report into the EU electricity sector pointed out that the UK
was the only power market with falling liquidity (see graph 1 below). Since their report in 2006,
data from the power exchanges show that liquidity in the wholesale market has continued to fall
withmonthly volumes almost halving in the past two years.Graph 2, illustrates the falling liquidity
for the year 2007 based on data from the London Electricity Broker’s Association (LEBA). This
lack of trading means that the market is not working eYciently with the less economic plant, in
terms of cost and environmental performance, being dispatched as the market does not trade into
an eYcient outcome.A very large proportion of all the electricity sold is not traded in the wholesale
market. This thinness of the market, making prices increasingly volatile, makes it very diYcult for
suppliers (other than the large integrated suppliers) to oVer competitive prices to their customers.
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Customers switching between integrated players face increased costs as their suppliers are not
adopting an economic purchasing strategy. Incumbent suppliers face very limited competitive
pressure from the threat of new entrants as the lack of a liquid wholesalemarketmeans newmarket
entrants cannot purchase necessary power at economic rates.
The integrated players see their supply portfolios alter, but their general supply levels remain large
enough to support their own generation portfolios. Switching numbers for customers are coloured
by some customers being regular switchers, but the general level of change in the smaller end of
the market is, we believe, overstated. These “sticky” customers pick-up the cost of expensive
generation through inﬂated tariVs.
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Solution
There are several ways to mitigate the market power that the integrated players have:
The generation licences could be altered to require generators to sell all of their output via the wholesale
market, rather than to their supply arms. This could be monitored by Ofgem. The new EU electricity
Directive proposes reporting on power trades, and the UK could develop reporting requirements to allow
Ofgem to monitor the position of the integrated players. For example all OTC trades and exchange trades
would have to be notiﬁed to Ofgem and amarket reporting service to stop generators from concealing trades
and this may lead to a requirement to licence all BSC signatories.
Alternatively, if this was felt to be diYcult to police, a divestment of generation, or full ﬁnancial separation
of generators from all other larger energy businesses (along the lines applied to monopoly networks) could
be used. Under this scenario back to back trades between related companies should be banned and ﬁnancial
penalties, under competition law, should be applied to any parties found to be in breach of the law.
Barriers to Entry
As well as the lack of liquidity, there are a number of other barriers to entry to both the electricity retail
and wholesale markets:
The market itself is very complex, with physical players having to sign a number of multi-party contracts,
with a variety of diVerent governance regimes. The market rules are subject to regulatory risk with Ofgem
signing oV all changes to the market rules and also able to raise its own policy initiative driven changes that
can lead to fundamental changes to the market structure.
The balancing mechanism at the heart of the market arrangements imposes further uncontrollable costs
on smaller players. The larger a portfolio the lower the demand forecasting risk and the more likely you are
to have embedded generation, all of which reduces your exposure to imbalance prices and this lowers your
costs. A number of modiﬁcations to the BSC404 have been raised that aim to reduce the level of imbalance
cash-out prices. However, changes to cash-out in themselves will not resolve the structural issues.
Since the advent of NETA/BETTA the credit and ﬁnancial requirements for market participation have
grown enormously. Whilst some of this can be traced to supplier failures the level of credit and security
required to buy and sell electricity is now so great that it represents the most diYcult (and potentially
expensive) step for any new entrant. In addition the larger integrate players tend to have investment grade
credit ratings which means that they are not subject to the same credit constraints and their overall purchase
costs are signiﬁcantly lower as a result.
For generators, there is currently a signiﬁcant queue to get transmission capacity to connect new plant.
Welsh Power has recently requested a connection in the South West only to be told that the earliest
connection data would be 2020. We are extremely concerned that the Transmission Access Review (TAR)
is looking at ways to allocate scarce capacity, including the removal of the ﬁrm access rights on which
generators made investment decisions. The Government and the regulator need to focus on ways to get
National Grid as the transmission owner to build the capacity that generators are willing to pay for. We are
in danger of missing out on the beneﬁts of a competitive wholesale market as new generators will not be able
to come to themarket and existing generators will have their transmission rights removed and given tomore
expensive, intermittent renewable generation.
Solutions
Ofgem is currently carrying out a review of the industry Codes. We are hoping that this may streamline
the number of codes and the way that they are governed. The gas market arrangements would create a good
template for improving the power market, with only one key code and a more ﬂexible and streamlined
governance process. The regulatory risks would also be reduced if Ofgem withheld from undertaking
fundamental reviews of market structure unless prompted to do so by change proposals raised by market
participants. Such reviews take up resource and only the largest players are resourced to participate.
A levy on larger suppliers could be used to meet the credit requirements of those new entrants that had
demonstrated some competency in their operation. This could work in a similar way to the current High
Distribution Cost Area levy which is used to subsidize distribution costs in the North of Scotland.
On transmission access, National Gridmust be allowed to progress signiﬁcant investment in new capacity
under its price control. Ofgem’s concern over costs to customers must be weighed against the costs that the
customers will face if eVective competition in generation is eroded still further. New entrants should expect
to be oVered ﬁrm connection rights within a reasonable (say 4 years) timeframe if the generator is willing
to underwrite the costs. To encourage new entrants the calculation of the amount to be underwritten
(shallow verses deep connection costs) could reduce the costs to generators. However, delivery of ﬁrm
physical rights is vital. A copy of a conﬁdential letter sent to Ofgem, in Annex 1 (not printed here), explains
404 Balancing & Settlement Code.
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how transmission access is impacting investments today. Alternatively some mechanism could be found to
introduce more competition into the provision of transmission services; this could involve a break up of
National Grid.
Why Prices Will Continue to Rise
Welsh Power believes that the Government, and the country as a whole, needs to face up to the fact that
energy prices are likely to go on rising. A more competitive energy market would be better able to absorb
some of these costs, but generally costs faced by generators are increasing:
Renewable energy targets (under the EU Renewables Directive and the Government’s own targets) are
expected to add in the region of £200 to each household bill. We expect that it will be higher than this as the
technologies are expensive, and thus subsidized, but also the amount of wind results in intermittent
generation that requires additional reserve generation is held by the system operator.
Global fuel prices are rising sharply. Gas and oil have risen 135% and 90% respectively in the past year.
Biomass fuels are also going up in price. For those needing landﬁll to dispose of waste those costs are also
increasing, along with freight and shipping charges. For those looking to undertake new build generation,
equipment prices are increasing signiﬁcantly with global demand and availability is very limited. All of these
factors combine to increase the price of delivered power.
EU ETS is a real cost for generators, all of whom are theoretically short under phase II, and under phase
III of the scheme the Government has said that is will auction all permits for the generation sector. The cost
of buying carbon contributes to generators costs and ultimately prices.
Environmental policy, such as LCPD and NECD,405 are pushing up costs to generators. They either
require installation of new equipment, further monitoring and reporting, more expensive (lower emissions)
fuel, reduced running hours or closure. The Commission is already moving forward on environmental
legislation that will continue to add costs to the generation sector. It is also easy to aim policy at generation,
so where policy aims to reduce one type of pollution and the government is missing its targets, it is easy to
require generators to act rather than other sectors, such as transport. The use of the generation sector as the
main tool for all clean air policies, despite the most economic improvements already being made, simply
adds to the costs of generation.
Solution
While the Government controls some of these policies, if its policy framework is ﬁxed it must ﬁnd an
economically eYcient way to help the fuel poor and educate the rest of the population so that the price rises
that are coming are not a surprise and all customers can prepare and/or budget for them. Attempts to use
the energy suppliers as a vehicle to implement social policy have not been ineYcient as suppliers cannot
identify target groups easily. For example customers on pre-payment meters are often students and not
pensioners.
This Committee can kick start this process by reporting that the price rises currently look inevitable and
that the promotion of energy eYciency, along with tackling vertical integration, will help all customers to
adapt to the change as well as reducing emissions.
1 April 2008
Supplementary evidence from Welsh Power
I hope you and the BERR Select Committee found our evidence interesting and relevant.
I was interested to hear the views of SSE, RWE and E.ON about the volumes that they trade through the
market; I can’t reconcile this with our experience perhaps we also need to deﬁne the “wholesale market”
better. Ready access to power and reporting of traded volumes and prices is critical and the wholesale
market reporting should cover trades of all descriptions. Given the “Big 6”s apparent enthusiasm for
wholesale trading, the proposals that we made should be quite acceptable to them.
I was also interested to note that a number of the “Big 6” (SSE and E.ON) were against further
consolidation. If things have got this far it strongly reinforces the need for action!
I thought it would be helpful to set out our views of the sensible remedies for the liquidity and new
generation entry issues as we got through a lot of material in quite a short time.
405 Large Combustion Plan Directive, National Emissions Ceiling Directive.
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Liquidity
— 100% of generation to be sold on the wholesale market.
— Ban on self supply.
— Requirement to sell on a “no worse” basis across the market and not just to a “closed shop” subset
of the market. Care would have to be taken to ensure that credit terms were reasonable.
— Given that the “Big 6” all told the Committee that they do trade their power via the wholesale
market we would not expect any of them to have any problems with our proposals. This means
that a change to the generation licences could be secured quickly as it requires only a majority to
agree to the change. Once the largest agree, the change can come into force in a matter of months.
This makes it a timely solution, but it does rely onOfgem to take a proactive stance onmonitoring.
— An alternative would be for Parliament to use their legislative powers to require plant divestment.
We would propose that no supplier can be related to a generation company that could generate,
and thus supply,more than 50%of their supply requirement. In order to help themarket in a timely
manner, the legislation would have to require divestment in a relatively short timeframe, say one
year. While this is tight, it is an achievable timeframe and could have a backstop that plants not
sold through a bi-lateral process would be auctioned.
Generation Entry
— WPG has only succeeded with Severn Power its new generation plant because it absolutely meant
to build it.
— WPG does not have an investment grade credit rating and has to lodge collateral with eg National
Grid so there is real money at stake. Other players are able to use their credit ratings to book
transmission capacity which keeps it away from the rest of the market, but they may choose not
to build while they assess and rank alternative projects in a number of markets (eg Germany,
Spain, France etc). This creates a low cost option to build andmakes it more diYcult and expensive
for competitors to build new generation. A good example is Pembroke which is on the National
Grid list for connection in April 2009—we understand that construction has not yet started and
this is making the construction of new plant in the same grid area correspondingly more expensive.
— WPG wants to build a further two plants but needs more certainty over the process. The consents
take too long to get (it took two years and we still don’t have the pipeline consent).
— Planning processes need to oVer certainty on timetable at present they are open ended.
— The current work on transmission access may well backﬁre and make new entry much more
diYcult, especially if Ofgem approves the auctioning of entry rights and the removal of existing
rights the generators have built business on. It is very unlikely that banks will fund new plant under
this sort of regime.
Prices to End Users
We mentioned to the Committee that the Big Six claimed to be losing money on supply while still
appearing rather proﬁtable. It may be useful to understand that their current wholesale supply portfolio
gives them a cost of supply that is not directly connected to the current high prices. All players will try to
lock-in power for the customers that they have committed to supply. The “shape” of the contracts will
depend on the type of portfolio supplied, but the supplier will try to match their longer term contracts to
their forecast yearly, monthly and then daily requirements.
For the integrated players they can internally “contract”, allocating their generation output to their own
supply. These internal contracts would have a price of generation associated with them, without one they
could not then price their retail supply. These generation prices may relate to longer term fuel contracts, the
price of carbon, etc. . . The deals done, either internally or externally, are unlikely to give you the “right”
output for each given day, so as demand forecasts are known each company must ﬁne tune their generation
requirements by trading either day ahead and on the day. We believe that it is the trading to ﬁne tune
positions that forms the bulk of the trading in the current wholesale market. This is truly amarginal activity.
The fact that the market is simply ﬁne tuning means that “Big 6” are not currently saving their customers
a huge amount of money. The cost of actually supplying their customers is made up of the price of contracts
they signed in the past, plus the costs of the ﬁne tuning. However, they should be oVering terms today that
will have an element of locking in current supplies and thus current wholesale prices.
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Wewould be happy to provide any further information that you require.Wewould also be able to provide
information on competitor oVers that are below wholesale cost but before doing so I would like to
understand how public this would be as it will contain individual customer information and we may need
to obtain customer consent.
27 June 2008
Memorandum submitted by Professor Michael Waterson, Professor of Economics, University of Warwick
INVESTIGATION INTO POSSIBLE ANTI-COMPETITIVE BEHAVIOUR
IN THE UK’s ENERGY MARKET
1. Executive Summary
Together with other academics, I have investigated the linkages between domestic electricity retail prices,
wholesale prices and prices of the underlying fuels over the period since 2001, following reforms both in the
retail supply market and in wholesale market trading arrangements. We ﬁnd that despite these reforms,
there is signiﬁcant price dispersion between suppliers in their oVers to domestic consumers. Surprisingly, we
also ﬁnd rather little observed linkage between retail andwholesale prices for electrical power. To this extent,
the operation of what is intended to be a competitive market is somewhat opaque.
2. Brief Introduction
I am Professor of Economics at the University of Warwick, a post I have held since 1991. My specialist
research area is Industrial Economics and I have recently been working on topics in the area of domestic
energy supply, in partnership with various other scholars. This area interests me academically because the
UK is in the vanguard of moves towards competition in generation and in supply. I have a paper in the
Economic Journal (2005) with two other scholars on consumer switching in the gas industry (funded by the
Leverhulme Trust) and am currently working on pricing behaviour in domestic electricity supply, focusing
on ﬁrms’ strategies. This latter work is funded by the ESRC and is joint withMonica Giulietti, an academic
at Aston Business School (and has been assisted by a visiting statistician, Luigi Grossi). The conclusions I
summarise above, and themore detailed comments below, relate in large part to our current (and somewhat
preliminary) work on investigating trends in domestic supply prices and on linking domestic electricity
supply prices and wholesale energy prices. We have not been working on retail gas prices at this particular
stage. I should also make clear that we are interested in the topic as independent academics engaged in a
study of markets and, in particular, we are not engaged byOFGEM, or any of the energy supply companies,
nor any similar parties.
3. Points on Which I Feel I can Comment
Below I make comments in several areas relating to the bullet points in the announcement of inquiry,
where these link with our investigation. I do this in the order of the points that youmake, but I can comment
more fully on some than others. Where I write retail below, I refer only to domestic retail.
4. You ask whether the current market structure encourages eVective competition in the retail markets
for gas and electricity. Certainly it has been designed to do that. In my opinion, it does so imperfectly.
However, whether an alternative system would do better is I think a moot point. To elaborate somewhat,
the current structure certainly leads to a very large amount of switching between suppliers; approximately
20% of consumers switch supplier in any year. A good deal of this switching appears to be what might be
described as “churn” and a substantial minority of consumers appears uninterested in switching supplier.
Our analysis of pricing trends in the market has suggested that substantial percentage price diVerences
between suppliers can coexist in the market, despite the seeming homogeneity of the product. In particular,
an incumbent supplier (the ﬁrm that would be your supplier had you never switched) has historically been
able to command around a 10% price premium over the average of other suppliers. However, there is some
evidence that this premium is declining.Within the set of other suppliers, signiﬁcant price diVerences appear,
up to 30% at times, although these commonly do not persist for long periods (that is, there are commonly
these diVerences, but any one company is not consistently a “best buy” for long). Why do I say that it is a
moot point whether an alternative system would be better? Other academic studies on pricing dispersion
more generally (with diVerent products) show that pricing diVerences across suppliers are very common,
and that the percentage magnitude of these diVerences is not out of line with the results above. Nevertheless,
it is perhaps unusual considering the importance of electricity in many peoples’ budgets.
5. I would say that the workings of the wholesale market are somewhat opaque. I have obtained from
Platts, one of the three main data supply companies in this area, price data for wholesale electricity and gas.
However, these data refer only to rather short-dated supply, up to one month out. Platts tell me data for
less prompt contracts are not readily available. However, I have also been told by an industry representative
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that the majority of contracts they engage in are for much longer dates than those for which I have price
data. Since these are bilateral contracts, whose terms are only known by the two parties themselves, it is
diYcult to get a view of how the market as a whole is operating. As with any commodity, it is normal in
order to reduce the risk inherent in an energy portfolio for the energy company to hold a set of contracts
diversiﬁed as to maturity. What is somewhat surprising is that the short term signals do not necessarily
reﬂect what the supply companies tell us are underlying movements in the longer term market. In addition,
so far as I am aware, there are no third parties providing liquidity.
6. One intriguing aspect of the current market is the consolidation amongst suppliers. So far as domestic
electricity supply is concerned, independent operators seem to have been squeezed out of the market. Since
these operators tended to have the most ﬁnancially attractive tariVs, price pressure on the bigger companies
may have been lessened. As to why the independents have been squeezed out, I conjecture that one
consequence of the replacement of the Pool system by NETA was that it became more diYcult for
independents to obtain adequate cover against market price risk. In contrast to independents, the major
suppliers are all signiﬁcantly vertically integrated and therefore have signiﬁcant cover against price risk on
the supply side. Having said this, I do not feel there is any intrinsic reason why a market with six suppliers
and active consumers should be markedly uncompetitive.
7. My remarks on the relationship betweenwholesale and retail markets for electricity should be prefaced
by a point made above. We have price series for wholesale electricity, but only on a day-ahead and month-
ahead basis. We also have price series for retail prices (over a standard set of contracts), collected from the
energywatch website. We have examined the relationship between these series of wholesale and retail prices
for the time period 2001- February 2007. Expressed in terms of returns (as one would in comparing say the
movements of one particular share against a market portfolio), there is essentially no statistically signiﬁcant
relationship between the two series. “In sum, these simple cross-correlation experiments suggest no strong
link between the relatively shortdatedwholesale prices for whichmarket data are available, and retail prices.
This is not because retail prices are simply a smoothed version of wholesale prices. Rather, the series show
quite diVerent characteristics”. (a quote from the article in Power UK I wrote, attached to this
memorandum). I ﬁnd this a most surprising result. In my opinion, it does put the onus on the supply
companies to explain where they view the underlying cost pressures as arising. We may also note here that
the other elements of cost are unlikely to be of the magnitude, nor the variability, to provide the missing
explanation.
8. I am not able to comment in any detail on the interaction between UK and European energy markets.
9. The main regulator, OFGEM, has in my opinion focused on developing the prerequisites for
competitive operation of the generation and supply markets, rather than on micromanagement of these
markets. It therefore focuses onmarket-driven solutions to perceived problems in supply. It has also eagerly
embraced the NETA and BETTA arrangements it devised for trading electricity. In part because other
European nations havemore of a “command and control” approach to energy supply, the UKmay bemore
exposed to price movements in the market.
10. I am not able to comment on the issue of fuel poverty, save to note that the proportion of consumers
of electricity who are on Prepayment terms is quite high.
March 2008
Memorandum submitted by Dominic Whittome
Contract Price Fixing
Since August last year, forward gas prices in the wholesale market have risen by over 70%. This is in spite
of an abundance of gas in Northern Europe. The increase has had little to do with “security of supply”
because forward North Sea gas reserves estimates have not altered in this short period. Yet wholesale prices
of long-dated gas deliveries are continuing to rise as major gas producers continue to ﬁx their long-term
contract prices to oil. This contractual ﬁx has driven forward prices to levels much higher than would
otherwise have been the case. Consequently, North Sea gas and UK electricity prices have being driven
higher by the price of OPEC crude.
In recent years, gas producers and importers appear to have aligned their wholesale supply policies.
Forward price rises in the wholesale market have been exaggerated as a result. A full examination of
company trading policies will reveal signs of co-ordinated behaviour in the wholesale market. Gas producers
have acted collectively in gradually curtailing their forward trading activities. Instead, producers have
marketed an increasing and disproportionate percentage of their principal gas volumes on secret, oV-
market, long-term contracts.
Many, though not necessarily all, of these long-term contracts involve contractual indexation to crude oil
and petroleum products. But, whether the gas price in these long-term contracts is indexed to oil or not, the
dominance of oV-market trading undermines the inﬂuence of open trading in wholesale market.
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This adverse eVect on forward pricing competition transgresses into power generation, where output
electricity prices are driven by input gas prices. The eVect then feeds down to the commercial and retail
markets for both gas and electricity.
Secret Contracts
The long-term contracts in question are negotiated bi-laterally between large users, utilities and
international producers. They eVectively seal the gas out of the forward market for contract terms ranging
generally from 10 to 20 years.
Today over 80% of the gas initially sold into the UK and 90% on the Continent is contracted under long-
term, oV-market contracts. Not only does this action withhold forward price and volume information from
market participants but the predominance of long-term contracts also “crowds out” forward gas trading
that would otherwise take place; where the “trading multiplier” make the market impact considerable.
A proper investigation should expose the fact that, over the past seven or eight years, gas majors and
importers have been selling an ever reducing fraction of their long-dated gas volumes, ie dated one year
forward or longer, on the forward market and selling a correspondingly higher fraction on long-term
contracts.
The disproportionately high volume sold oV-market is a major problem from the point of view of
eYciency. Consistently higher-than-optimal prices may not be the result of decisions made by individual
traders but by the gas producing companies who—wittingly or unwittingly—having synchronising their
policy decisions.
Copycat Strategy
The convergence of wholesaling policies has had the eVect of greatly constraining liquidity in the long-
dated wholesale market. The dearth of forward trading in large volumes has reduced wholesale price
transparency (where posted long-dated prices are indicative, estimated or non-existent). It has also increased
market volatility, which in turn has signiﬁcantly increased the price premium, ie on top of the already
exaggerated forward prices, which the producing supplier can levy on gas consumers who need to ﬁx their
price one year forward ormore. Consequently, some gas buyers will purchase a swap from amerchant bank,
although that is a further unnecessary cost they then incur.
The inquiry must identify what the individual wholesaling policies of major gas producers are; assess the
extent to which these company polices coincide; and ascertain whether these policies have been converging.
In short, are we witnessing copycat behaviour in the supply policies of the producers. In the background,
we have seen in a 180% increase in forward-year power prices (from £21/MWh to £59/MWh) and a 400%
increase in wholesale gas prices (from 13 p/th to 65 p/th) since the start of 2000.
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Corporate Motives
Duplicative gas supply policies, which promote oV-market contracts as the principal (or only) platform
for selling forward have the eVect of supporting long-dated prices posted in the wholesale market. Higher
wholesale gas prices not only boost the immediate proﬁts of producers, they also serve to safeguard the
contractual integrity of their long-term contracts. Restricting the liquidity in forward trading reduces the
danger of any wide price discrepancy evolving between long-dated wholesale prices and long-term contract
prices. Allowing these prices to get out-of-kilter would trigger calls from consumers and possibly regulators
for some contracts to be re-negotiated, which producers should want to avoid at all costs.
Tacit Collusion
If we not concern ourselves—at least for now—about “price ﬁxing” between individual gas traders, we
should be concerned about any alignment of producer policies. Above all, the inquiry should explore the
unwillingness of producers to sell a signiﬁcant proportion of their gas openly, on the long-dated, forward
market. In most cases, this proportion could be below a third and in some cases below 5%, quite possibly
zero in one or two cases.
In the ﬁnal analysis we may see a textbook example of tacit collusion whereby producers are not ﬁxing
prices directly but simply acting rationally; recognising in common the commercial interest in copying the
other’s behaviour, which replicates the eVect of a price-ﬁxing cartel.
This de facto producer boycott of the forward market when it comes to selling gas on a long-dated basis
will partially explain why wholesale gas prices have soared to the unprecedented levels that we see today,
far above the levels that would otherwise be achieved in an eYciently-operating market, where actual gas
supply and demand fundamentals will determine the forward price.
Electricity Market Impacts
A proper inquiry should ﬁnd evidence of producers reverting to long-term contracts for practically all
their forward selling, trading only residual gas volumes on the wholesale market to support these long-term
contracts’ ﬂexibility commitments to the buyer. The consequential constraint on liquidity in the forward gas
market has also aVected electricity trading, where liquidity collapsed over the past two years. Only a
miniscule percentage of power volumes are now traded more than six months forward on the UK Power
Exchange as a result.
Despite Britain’s head start over its EU peers in terms of energy market liberalisation, forward liquidity
in the Nordic and German power markets has already overtaken the UK’s and other European countries
are closing in. Even in gas, industry insiders see theDutch Title Transfer Facility replacing our ownNational
Balancing Point (NBP) as the principal trading hub in North West Europe.
This meltdown in liquidity in our gas and especially power markets has coincided with weaker price
transparency, soaring volatility and record “risk premiums” (ie over short-term delivery prices) in the
forward market.
Vicious Circle in the Wholesale Market
Constraints in forward trading have hadmultiple impacts on traded prices. First, reducing the availability
of long-dated gas supplies posted for sale on the forwardmarket puts buyers into a position where they have
to compete (what appear to be) “scarce supplies”. This tightens the market generally and leads to higher
prices than would otherwise be the case. Second, higher volatility and weak price signals make new entrants
(eg large consumers, independent generators and energymerchants) wary of posted prices which deters them
from entering the market. This reduces forward trading further and the liquidity problem becomes self-
reinforcing. (Mergers between producers and exit of US merchants added to the problem of market
concentration). Third, with the market is more volatile and allegedly “riskier” to trade in, the incumbent
producers are then able to charge a higher “risk premium” to buyers, although producer policies contributed
to this situation. A similar pattern may be prevalent in the power market, but as gas prices aVect electricity
and not vice-versa, the root problem with producers of gas needs tackling ﬁrst.
Profits in Perspective
Today we see a widening gap between the pre-taxes supply cost of gas delivered into the UK (at 15 p/th
&30%) and the wholesale price (at 65 p/th), which suggests a nominal and pre-tax proﬁt margin of around
50 pence per therm.
To put the producers’ proﬁts into perspective, we can make a back-of-an-envelope calculation by simply
estimating the total proﬁts of producers who just supply gas as far as the wholesale market viz. the beach
terminal and no further. We can exclude the cost of ﬂexible volume or “swing gas” for which producers will
charge a premium. Assuming the UK consumes on average 130 million th per day in a year, the nominal
proﬁt shared by the handful of producers % 130, 000,000 th/d x 365 days x 50 p/th % £ 24 billion gross.
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This rough estimate shows just how high the stakes are and the sensitivity of producers to any change in
the status quo. This same is probably true of any Exchequer in light of the high tax take involved. At the
moment however, supra-normal proﬁts for the club of producers who export gas to theUK is assured; nearly
all the equipment is in place and is operating, as are the long-term contractual arrangements which provide
the income stream outlined above. Producers have no commercial incentive to advocate changes or foster
the development of a wholesale market that may facilitate price discovery and expose any discrepancy with
long-term contract prices. So this market is unlikely to correct itself without a proper investigation that
would show that a problem exists.
Conclusion
The most recent charge in the wholesale market has seen gas and power prices rise by 300% and 200%
respectively versus ﬁve years ago. Long-term supply & demand fundamentals alone should not explain
increases of this magnitude. Twomain factors are responsible for this anomaly. First, the ﬁxing of gas prices
to oil in most long-term gas contracts agreements and second the adverse eVect on liquidity in the forward
market caused by long-term contracts generally, by they oil-indexed or not.
These two anti-competitive practices might be resolved jointly, by obliging producers to release pre-
contracted gas into the open market, albeit at the expense of gas tied up under legacy long-term contracts.
In addition, wider measures to promote free-market trading of gas on an over-the-counter basis could be
introduced, so more gas is sold on standard, re-tradable contracts. Such remedies, which a Competition
Commission investigation should be equipped to identify, will be key to resolving the problems which still
exist in the wholesale gas and power markets, some 15 years after privatisation.
It is odd perhaps to see so much attention placed on the retail gas market, where proﬁt margins per therm
are comparatively small (possibly negative in the case of some utilities) and where prices are ultimately
dictated by the wholesale market. Further, the question of competition within the wholesale market itself is
not included in the terms of reference of theOfgem inquiry although it is to be covered by the BERR inquiry.
Whatever motive, design or co-incidence explains the policies of gas producers towards the wholesale
market, seemingly synchronised behaviour is having the eVect of a price support operation. Because of the
complexity of the long-term contracts in question and the cartel-type impact on competition, the multi-
national producers concerned should be referred to the Competition Commission. A start can then be made
to identify why we are seeing exaggerated gas and electricity prices posted in the wholesale market.
The Competition Commission is the appropriate body to act, having been set up speciﬁcally to deal with
such cartel questions under the Enterprise Act. Due to numerous energy mergers and acquisitions in recent
years, the ﬁnal number of gas producers in question may be comparatively small. However, all the
companies concerned will have UK gas shipper licences and many will also be UK domiciled. In either case,
English law applies to them just like any other entities selling goods and services within the UK.
Whatever producer practices are distorting market competition, householders and industry are in urgent
need of answers. A fully independent investigation by the Competition Commission will deliver this and it
may well throw light on some early market remedies as well.
April 2008
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WHY THE RE-INTRODUCTION OF PRICE CONTROL REGULATION IS THE ONLY
REMEDY WHICH WILL WORK FOR DOMESTIC ENERGY CONSUMERS
Summary Points from Evidence
Our ﬁrst conclusion responds to the Committee’s questions about the competitiveness of the UK’s retail
energy markets. We believe that our evidence demonstrates two main points: (a) that the market structure
which has evolved is anti-competitive and (b) that any amount of switching by retail consumers has and will
fail to change this. In particular, litmus tests for the anti-competitiveness of themarket structure are not only
concerned with market concentration. As we demonstrate in considerable detail, the companies involved in
the market have arranged their aVairs so that they can sustain high and rising proﬁts whatever the level of
their ﬁnal prices to households and small businesses. Corroboration of this and of the ineVectiveness of
switching is that companies can be observed to make more money with lesser number of customers—hardly
a punishment for causing their customers to switch.
A second conclusion addresses the Committee’s concerns about wholesale markets. Our evidence
demonstrates how UK households are paying higher gas and electricity prices as a result of the increased
uncertainty which liberalised wholesale gas markets entail and reﬂect, imposing an insurance premium on
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consumers which is highly sensitive to the actual and perceived risks of shortfalls in supply over winter
months. Moreover, policy has contributed to this problem by failing to ensure that suYcient gas storage be
built in a timely fashion.
Our third conclusion identiﬁes areas of regulatory oversight. Apart from the anti-competitive structure
of the UK’s domestic gas and electricity markets, there is also evidence of actual anti-competitive behaviour.
There is evidence of both gas prices to households being raised bymore thanmight be justiﬁed by increasing
wholesale prices and of electricity consumers being discriminated against. While this evidence is from one
company, this is only because there is only one company which discloses suYcient information to consider
these issues. All companies have the ability to vary the mark-up on wholesale, transportation and supply
costs, according to market conditions and speciﬁcally, to discriminate between gas and electricity customers
in order to protect the overall margin; only lack of company-sourced data prevents us from ascertaining
how frequently other supply companies exercise this option.
Our ﬁnal conclusion is that it is the domestic consumer who is most vulnerable to the deployments of
companies’ market power which we have identiﬁed—the domestic consumer is at the end of the chain and
thereby the ultimate recipient of price risk as it is passed down the chain. However, this does not also mean
that we see a remedy in the break up of the portfolios which companies have built up in order to manage
their risks. Indeed such a break-up could have serious consequences for prices if it increased uncertainty and
undermined the capacity of supply companies to contract for eg the large volumes of imported gas which
the country will increasingly require. Instead we would propose the re-introduction of price control
regulation as the only way of ensuring that households and small businesses are not exploited. Moreover,
it may well be, bearing in mind the large investments in electricity generation capacity which companies are
being supplicated to undertake, that rate of return regulation would be a better option than the previously
favoured price-cap form of price control regulation.
WHY THE RE-INTRODUCTION OF PRICE CONTROL REGULATION IS THE ONLY
REMEDY WHICH WILL WORK FOR DOMESTIC ENERGY CONSUMERS406
This evidence directly addresses the ﬁrst 6 out of the 7 questions posed by the committee. It only addresses
fuel poverty policy by way of the remedy suggested for addressing market structure and market power.
1. The Symptoms of Problems in the UK’s Energy Markets
Rising Consumer Expenditure on Gas and Electricity
Between January 2003 and December 2006, the expenditure by UK households on electricity and gas
increased by 71.7%whereas over the same period the consumption of these domestic fuels fell by 4.2% (Table
1). Since then, price reductions during 2007 have been followed by further increases in early 2008 and it
therefore seems likely that total expenditure will have increased further since the publication of the data in
Table 1.
Table 1
EXPENDITURE ON AND CONSUMPTION OF ELECTRICITY AND GAS BY UK
HOUSEHOLDS
Expenditure £m Consumption GWh
Electricity Gas Total Electricity Gas Total
2003 7,660 6,260 13,920 115,761 386,486 502,247
2004 9,120 8,285 17,405 115,526 396,411 511,937
2005 10,205 9,195 19,400 116,811 384,009 500,820
2006 12,375 11,520 23,895 116,449 364,555 481,004
% Change 2003–06 61.6 84.0 71.7 0.6 "5.7 "4.2
Source: Digest of UK Energy Statistics, Tables 1.1.6, 4.2 and 5.2
The onset of this rapid increase in the burden of household expenditure on fuel which has pushed an
additional 2.5 million households into “fuel poverty” (Financial Times 2008a) has broadly coincided with
the ﬁnal removal of all domestic price regulation (April 2002). In short, full “competition” has been
accompanied by rapidly rising fuel prices. Moreover, there are strong indications that household
expenditure on electricity and gas is likely to increase further as we move into the next decade, with even
more serious implications for household fuel poverty—an issue we shall return to brieﬂy in the concluding
section of this evidence.
406 The domestic market for energy supply is variously described as “retail” (of which it is a part), “household” or “residential”.
In our evidence we use “domestic” to refer to the residential or household sector of the retail market (the other part of the
retail market consists of small businesses and other organisations paying posted retail tariVs)—except when quoting company
documents where we retain their original vocabulary.
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Gas and Electricity Prices Rise Faster than Inﬂation
Figures 1 and 2 subtract the annual rate of inﬂation from the annual increase in gas and electricity prices
and the black-shaded columns therefore show the extent to which gas and electricity prices have been rising
faster than inﬂation. Since the complete deregulation of all domestic gas and electricity prices the story has
mainly been of these prices rising faster than inﬂation (rising in “real terms”): whereas the previous
regulatory regime generally resulted in consistently falling real prices. Let it also be said at this stage that any
solace which OFGEMand BERRmay take from any one of the possible country rankings (permutations in
euros, purchasing power parity, with or without various taxes, for particular groups of consumers) of UK
domestic gas and electricity prices in EU league tables is misplaced: in particular, unlike most other EU
states our gas has mainly been supplied from our own oVshore resources not imported by pipeline from
Siberia and by ship from other places more distant than the UKCS. We should therefore expect to have gas
among the cheapest in Europe. As far as domestic electricity prices (excluding taxes) are concerned the UK
is consistently more expensive than the “unliberalised” markets of France and Greece, and the latest
Eurostat data place the UK above the EU average.
Figure 1
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FIGURE 1: GAS PRICES TO DOMESTIC CONSUMERS 1986 - 2007
Business and Enterprise Committee: Evidence Ev 565
Figure 2
UK DOMESTIC ELECTRICITY PRICES AND INFLATION
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FIGURE 2: ELECTRICITY PRICES TO DOMESTIC CONSUMERS 1986-2007
Source for Figures 1 and 2: BERR Quarterly Energy Prices, Table 2.1.1
Note: the gas and electricity prices used in constructing these Figures are the RPI fuel components exclusive
of VAT
Company Proﬁts Increase Despite Flat Demand
While consumers have been experiencing the pain of these price increases, energy company proﬁts have
been growing strongly (Table 2). Moreover, while some companies possess regulated gas and electricity
transmission and distribution businesses, it is proﬁts from their non-regulated businesses in the
“competitive” part of the market which have been growing most rapidly (Tables 3 and 4).
Table 2
TOTAL OPERATING PROFITS OF THE DOMESTIC ENERGY SUPPLY
COMPANIES FROM ALL THEIR UK ENERGY BUSINESSES, 2003–2006/07
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Centrica plc 872 989 1,335 1,198 1,745
EDF Energy plc 517 521 587 647 n/a
E.ON UK plc 583 642 741 710 778
RWE npower 496 411 299 348 496
Iberdrola (Scottish Power) 495 597 739 955 n/a
SSE plc 680 790 887 1,081 n/a
Total 3,643 3,950 4,589 4,939 n/a
Sources for Tables 2, 3, and 4: see Appendix for sources and methodology
Notes: As with all the succeeding tables containing company-sourced information, the
data have been aligned so that there is maximum overlap between the diVerent ﬁnancial
years used by the companies: data from those companies with ﬁnancial years ending in
March have been aligned with data from those whose ﬁnancial year ended the preceding
December, eg the year endingMarch 2007 is aligned with the year endingDecember 2006.
Table 3
OPERATING PROFITS OF THE DOMESTIC ENERGY SUPPLY
COMPANIES FROM THEIR REGULATED BUSINESSES, 2003–2006/07
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
EDF Energy plc 394 392 415 484 n/a
E.ON UK plc 155 323 350 334 349
Iberdrola (Scottish Power) 394 416 525 524 n/a
SSE plc 318 325 373 349 n/a
Total 1,260 1,456 1,662 1,691 n/a
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Table 4
OPERATING PROFITS OF THE DOMESTIC ENERGY SUPPLY
COMPANIES FROM THEIR NON-REGULATED BUSINESSES, 2003–2006/07
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Centrica plc 872 989 1,335 1,198 1,745
EDF Energy plc 126 164 151 117 n/a
E.ON UK plc 402 499 539 586 522
RWE npower 496 411 299 348 496
Iberdrola (Scottish Power) 101 181 214 431 n/a
SSE plc 363 466 523 740 n/a
Total 2,360 2,709 3,061 3,420 n/a
Between 2003 and 2006, the total operating proﬁts from UK energy operations of the 6 domestic energy
suppliers increased by 35.6%. For the three companies for which 2007 data is available the increase between
2003 and 2007 was 54.7%. Operating proﬁts from regulated operations (electricity and gas distribution)
increased by 34.2% between 2003 and 2006 while operating proﬁts from non-regulated operations (gas
production, electricity generation, gas storage, energy trading, energy supply to all customers, energy-
related services), increased by 44.9%.
Relating these substantial increases in operating proﬁt to the post-tax, post-net interest earnings
attributable to the companies’ shareholders is more diYcult. Only three of the above companies provide
suYciently comparable data on this subject. Moreover data for the year 2007 is currently only available for
one company (Centrica). Since such data relates to all the companies’ operations including foreign and non-
energy operations we can only interpret the ﬁgures with considerable caution. With these caveats in mind,
Table 5 displays post-tax “adjusted” earnings per share (“adjusted”—as with the operating proﬁt data
shown above—meaning before exceptional items and re-measurements of certain derivatives) and the
proportion of their total operating proﬁts contributed by UK energy operations.
Table 5
ADJUSTED EARNINGS PER SHARE (PENCE) AND PROPORTION OF TOTAL
OPERATING PROFIT ATTRIBUTABLE TO UK ENERGY OPERATIONS, 2003–07
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Centrica 16.80p (80.4) 20.00p (80.6) 18.20p (88.2) 19.40p (83.1) 30.60p (89.5)
Scottish Power 36.40p (43.0) 36.20p (89.9) 44.10p (88.7) 47.17p (85.7) n/a
SSE 55.30p (88.2 62.80p (88.5) 72.90p (89.8) 92.50p (89.5) n/a
Source: Annual Reports and Accounts of Centrica plc, Scottish Power Ltd, Scottish Power plc and SSE plc
Note: The data in parentheses are the proportions of total operating proﬁts contributed by UK operations.
From this data we can conclude that aggregate earnings per share for the three companies in question
increased by 46.6% between 2003 and 2006, while Centrica’s EPS increased by 82.1% between 2003 and
2007.
2. Explanations from OFGEM and BERR
In response to the substantial real price increases experienced by UK domestic consumers and in
particular the evidence that “Britain’s vaunted competitive energymarket—often held up to other EU states
as a model—is not serving all parts of society”. (Financial Times, 2008b) OFGEM and the Department for
BERR have, in a variety of diVerent documents over the past few years, advanced the following
propositions:
(1) The UK’s domestic energy market remains highly competitive as evidenced by customers
switching suppliers (OFGEM, 2006a; 2006b) and the fact that, measured by a range of additional
structural indicators (regulated third party access to transportation infrastructure, transparent
wholesale markets etc) the UK has the “most competitive” energy market among the EU and G7
countries (BERR/OXERA, 2007a; 2007b). By implication therefore, the steep rise in domestic
energy prices cannot be attributed to any particular structural features of that market or the exercise
of market power on the part of the supply companies.
(2) While certain environmental charges have necessarily been added to the retail price of gas and
electricity, the primary cause of fuel price inﬂation has been the substantial increase in wholesale
electricity and gas prices with the rising gas price feeding through to electricity prices via gas-ﬁred
electricity generation (OFGEM, 2006a).We are therefore invited to infer that the companieswhich
supply gas and electricity to domestic customers are themselves the “victims” of these wholesale
price increases, a proportion of which they reluctantly pass-on.
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(3) UK wholesale gas prices only increased because they became linked to “unliberalised” oil-price
indexed prices in mainland Europe as a result of the physical linkage of markets via new pipelines
and the fact that the UK has recently become a net gas importer (OFGEM, 2006a).
Bearing inmind these explanationswe shall now investigate the issues of concern to theBERRCommittee
enquiry, starting with the fundamental question of the nature of competition in the UK’s energy markets.
To what extent has the structure of the UK domestic energy supply industry become intrinsically
uncompetitive and is there evidence that this structure has resulted in actual uncompetitive behaviour?407
3. Market Structure and Competition in the Domestic Markets for Gas and Electricity
Initial Expectations
At the time when the UK domestic energy supply industry was moving from regulation to competition
(1996–2002) it was generally envisaged that the market would become dominated by a large number of
independent “pure” supply companies,408 and that prices would continue to fall and generally, remain low
in historical terms. The business would be intrinsically a risky one for the competing companies, but they
would be able to hedge their purchases and sales in what was expected to be a deep and liquid futures and
forwards (OTC) market. In the event this “deep and liquid” secondary market failed to materialise, partly
because of the disappearance of the “mega-BTU marketers” like Enron and TXU who would have
constituted the substantial counter-parties required, had they survived. Nevertheless, competition in the
UK’s domestic energy supply business did appear to deliver decreasing real gas and electricity prices during
the years 1997–2002. However, the extent to which competition per se, was responsible for these
exceptionally low prices has been greatly exaggerated; these were also years of excess energy supplies
worldwide and the speciﬁc characteristics of energy privatisation and liberalisation in the UK led to a
massive over-production of gas during the earlier part of this period (IEA, 1998) and amassive over-capacity
in electricity generation in the latter part (Rutledge, 2007). The “asset-sweating” regulation of transmission
and distribution was also responsible for delivering a large part of the reductions in prices which domestic
consumers experienced at this time.
However, this transient success from a consumer perspective also drove a company response concerned to
create an industry structurewhichwouldmitigate the risks associatedwith the combination of over capacity,
extreme exposure to price risk and very low (and volatile) wholesalemarket prices. This new structure “could
not be described as anything other than a vertically-integrated oligopoly” (Helm 2003, p 311).409 As we shall
see, this characterisation by Helm has become even more appropriate since 2003. More important though
is how it has functioned to the detriment of domestic consumers.
The Development of Oligopoly since 2000
Oligopoly—the domination of a market by a small group of companies—developed in the UK energy
supply industry over a relatively short period of time (2001–04). In 2000 there were 28 gas suppliers licensed
to operate in the domestic market of Great Britain, 16 of which were said to be “active”. Similarly there were
20 licensed electricity supply companies of which 13 were “active”. (OFGEM, 2001a).
Commenting on this relatively happy state of aVairs and having observed that, “the number of competing
suppliers and changes in the number can be a useful indicator of the degree of competition”, OFGEM
noted that:
“Since October 2000, the number of licences granted to . . . suppliers has increased signiﬁcantly.
This can be mainly attributed to the entrance of new companies into the market, which will
eVectively serve to aid the development of competition”. (OFGEM, 2001a, p 61)
However within a mere three years, a dramatic industry concentration had taken place. According to one
industry source, by 2004, just six supply companies served 95% of the domestic and small business electricity
sector, while the same six companies served 99% of the domestic (only) gas and electricity sectors. The same
source described the market as “highly concentrated” (EDF, 2004). Today those same six companies
dominate the totality of the domestic gas and electricity markets.
407 In this respect we adopt the traditional “structure-conduct-performance” paradigm of industrial economics, see Sawyer
(1985).
408 A “supply” company is one that simply buys energy wholesale and sells retail without having any other midstream or
upstream energy operations. Sometimes the term “marketing company” is used as an alternative.
409 Although, the originally state-controlled energy monopolies were broken up (or encouraged to break-up) in the years after
privatisation it was highly predictable, according to “transaction cost” theory, that such an industry would soon seek new
modalities of concentration and re-integration; see Rutledge (2007).
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Table 6
NUMBER OF ACTIVE DOMESTIC ENERGY SUPPLIERS
IN GREAT BRITAIN 2000–06
2000 2006
Active Gas Supply Companies 16 6
Active Electricity Supply Companies 13 6
Source: OFGEM (2001a), OFGEM (2006b)
Since, as we have noted, OFGEM regards “the number . . . and changes in the number” (our emphasis)
of supply companies as “a useful indicator of the degree of competition”, it is diYcult to see how OFGEM
or anyone else can avoid the logical conclusion that the UK domestic energy supply business has become
much less “competitive” than it was in eight years ago.
From this we cannot conclude a priori that the six UK domestic energy supply companies are able to use
market power to raise retail prices above levels which are putatively competitive. There are four potential
constraints on oligopolies exercising such market power. Firstly, if the market for the particular commodity
being supplied is price-elastic (a percentage increase in price results in a larger percentage fall in demand) the
incumbent companies would be constrained from raising prices by the expectation of lower total revenues.
Secondly if there are few barriers to entry, even a small dominant group of companiesmight fear that raising
prices—and proﬁts—will attract new entrants who would drive prices back to lower levels. Thirdly, if each
company in the oligopoly has reason to believe that if it unilaterally increases prices the other companies
will refrain from following and it will consequently be “left out on a limb” losing signiﬁcant market share
(and proﬁt), this individual company fear will inhibit the oligopoly collectively from exercising its potential
market power. Finally, a fourth potential constraint on the exercise of market power by an oligopoly is the
government and its agencies: if the companies have reason to believe they will be punished—whether by
some kind of “windfall tax” or price control—if they increase prices above levels which are generally
considered by society to be “reasonable”, they will obviously refrain from doing so.
Unfortunately, in the case of the UK domestic energy supply industry none of these four constraints
apply. Firstly, domestic consumer demand for gas and electricity is highly inelastic—we all require a certain
minimum level of heating, warmth and light whatever their prices: there are no substitutes for these
“commodities”. Neither can we hedge by switching between the diVerent fuels: if electricity were to suddenly
be oVered to us at a much lower price we cannot switch our gas central heating systems or gas ovens to
electricity except in the very long-term.410
Secondly, in today’s highly concentrated domestic supply industry there are formidable barriers to entry:
the six incumbent companies have spent considerable sums investing in the latest technology to handle
millions of customers (Centrica’s bill for this was around £200 million). In order to compete with the
incumbent six companies a new entrant would have to make the same kind of investment virtually over-
night while at the same time oVering retail prices which were substantially below all the existing suppliers.
This kind of scenario can reasonably be discounted.
With respect to the third caveat, on every occasion that one of the companies has raised its domestic
electricity and gas prices the others have, sooner or later, followed. They may have raised prices by diVerent
amounts and at slightly diVerent times, but this herd-like behaviour is now sowell institutionalised that none
of the companies has any fear that by raising prices it will become isolated and thereby lose signiﬁcant
market share.
Fourthly, so far, and based on previous experience, the companies would appear to have absolutely no
reason to fear that the State will intervene if they raise prices. Such an intervention has only occurred once
(the 1997Windfall Tax) and this was primarily a response to the manner in which the energy companies had
been sold oV cheaply at privatisation. It should also be noted that since then, the Government, OFGEM
and BERR have repeatedly eulogised the UK’s laissez faire energy industry model. They are deeply
committed to it as an ideological project. Any intervention in the market by these bodies would therefore
be interpreted as an acknowledgement that the model has failed. This view seems to be conﬁrmed by the
failure to announce any serious attempt to restrain domestic energy prices in the March 2008 Budget.
Gas Storage
Some ﬁnal remarks should be added regarding the market structure of natural gas storage. This sector
was originally regulated as part of British Gas Corporation plc, and subsequently BG plc but in 2000, gas
storage (with the exception of LNG storage) was de-regulated in the erroneous belief that the sector was
potentially competitive. (It wasn’t because the three existing storage facilities had very diVerent technical
proﬁles such that they can not compete with one another). In 2000–01 OFGEM required the two largest
facilities, Rough and Hornsea, to auction their storage space and at the time the prices received at the
auctions were exceptionally low. Subsequently BG plc sold both facilities which by 2002 had passed into the
410 We discuss the price elasticity of demand for individual supply companies below.
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hands of Centrica and SSE respectively. By the following year, these two facilities accounted for around 88%
of total UK gas storage space (Wright, 2006, p 31) but in reality, Centrica (Rough) controlled 100% of long-
term (seasonal) storage space while SSE (Hornsea) controlled 69% of mid-term storage space. In eVect the
former was now amonopoly and the latter the dominant player in a market which contained only two other
very small players, Scottish Power (HatﬁeldMoor) and EDF (Hole House). Once it became evident that the
UK’s own gas supply was rapidly depleting and the country was becoming dependent on imports, storage
pricesmore than trebled. In short, this sector remains almost totally uncompetitive and the consequent rapid
rise in storage prices has contributed to the upward movement of domestic natural gas prices.
Oligopoly plus Vertical Integration
Responding to the extremely diYcult market conditions experienced by the UK energy industry in the
years 1997–2001 as described above, by 2002 a wave of disposals and acquisitions had largely taken place
which resulted in an industry which was highly integrated both horizontally and vertically. By 2007 this had
produced an industry structure as illustrated in Figure 3.
Figure 3
UK ENERGY INDUSTRY COMPANY PORTFOLIOS 2007
Companies with Domestic Supply Operations
Upstream Mid-Stream Downstream
Non-
Gas Electricity Wholesale Gas Domestic Domestic
Company Production Generation Trading Transmission Distribution Storage Supply Supply
Centrica (British Gas) g e g e g g e g e
SSE e g e e g g g e g e
Iberdrola (Scottish Power) e g e e e g (minor) g e g e
E.ON UK g (minor) e g e e g (Minor) g e g e
RWE npower e g e g e g e
EDF Energy e g e e g (minor) g e g e
Companies without Domestic Supply Operations
Upstream Mid-Stream Downstream
National Grid g e g g
British Energy e e e
Drax Group e e(minor) e
International Power e e e
Others g e g e g g e
Source: Author research. “Others” includes major upstream gas producers, small electricity generators and independent
suppliers to non-domestic customers
Note: g indicates ownership of gas assets; e indicates ownership of electricity assets
The principal exceptions to this trend were British Energy plc (nuclear power) and National Grid plc
(formed out the merger of BG Transco (gas transmission) with the National Grid Company (electricity
transmission). National Grid is prevented by its licence from owning energy supply companies (and visa-
versa) and this has been the only form of vertical integration proscribed by the Government, OFGEM and
BERR. It is argued that such “ownership unbundling” allows fully eVective third party access to the
transmission sector which in turn enables vigorous supply competition to take place. As we shall see, this
conﬁdence in the creation of a hypothetically competitive industrial structure for the UK’s energy market
has been entirely misplaced.
If one wishes to understand theworking of theUKdomestic energymarket and the prices emanating from
that market then the crucially important form of vertical integration is not that between transmission and
supply but between “upstream” (gas production and electricity generation) and “downstream” supply as we
shall now demonstrate.411
Table 7 shows the extent of “physical” integration between these two segments for Centrica, the only
company which is a signiﬁcant gas producer while Table 8 shows the extent of physical integration between
electricity generation and small customer supply for each of the six domestic electricity suppliers.
411 The BERR/OXERA report referred to above which aYrms that the UK has the “most competitive” energy market in the
EU/G7 countries virtually ignores the question of vertical integration.Only a brief reference to the subject suggesting practical
diYculties in obtaining data is included in Section A3.3 of the report (BERR/OXERA, 2007a, p 72).
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Table 7
RATIO OF OWN GAS PRODUCTION TO DOMESTIC GAS
SUPPLY VOLUMES (CENTRICA), 2003–07
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Centrica 0.50 0.53 0.46 0.31 0.42
Source: Centrica plc, Annual Reports and Accounts
Table 8
RATIO OF OWN ELECTRICITY GENERATED TO DOMESTIC AND
SME ELECTRICITY SUPPLY VOLUMES, 2003–2006/07
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Centrica 0.34 0.46 0.47 0.61 0.86
EDF Energy n/a n/a n/a 1.28 n/a
E.ON UK n/a 1.2 1.31 1.32 1.32e
Scottish Power n/a n/a n/a 0.90 n/a
RWE npower 1.51 1.44 1.50 1.64 1.52
SSE n/a n/a n/a 1.77 n/a
Sources: see Appendix
Notes: SME % Small & Medium Enterprises
Supply volumes for Centrica: domestic customers only
Supply volumes for EDF: domestic and SME customers
Supply volumes for E.ON: domestic customers only
Supply volumes for Iberdrola: all customers (excluding “exports” to
England)
Supply volumes for RWE npower: domestic and commercial customers
Supply volumes for SSE: domestic and SME customers
From Table 7 it can be seen that Centrica can supply between 31 and 53% of its “British Gas” domestic
gas consumers. However, there is some indication that Centrica is ﬁnding it harder to satisfy this sector from
its own resources and the company is known to be searching for additional gas reserves through acquisitions.
Table 8 shows the extent to which the companies’ own electricity generation operations can cover the
requirements of their domestic and SMEcustomers. In the case of bothCentrica andE..ONUK, by 2006–07
the in-house generation assets of these two companies could supply 86% and 132% respectively of the
requirements of their domestic (only) electricity supply customers. With respect to the remaining four
companies, the supply data relate to both domestic and SME customers but since the percentage of their
domestic and SME customers’ requirements covered by the companies equity generation ranges from 90%
to 177% it seems fairly clear that they can easily serve the needs of their domestic customers alone from their
own generation.
That the companies see this kind of vertical integration as being very important is evident from remarks
taken from company documents. For example, referring to its UK operations in 2004, EDF Group states
that its strategy was:
“to develop a vertically-integrated operation by acquiring an electricity generating capacity which
would fully cover its residential clients, seeking to optimise the totalmargin between SalesRevenue
and Production”. (EDF, Document de Base 2004, p 136)
By 2006, it had achieved this objective, stating:
“The output from EDF Energy’s generation plants broadly covers the customer demand from
EDF Energy’s SME and residential customers, while demand from large business customers . . .
is covered through wholesale market purchases”. (EDF, Document de Reference, 2006, p 72)
Similarly, although it has clearly not reached the degree of vertical integration achieved by EDF, Centrica
states that:
“Upstreamwe will continue to pursue the ideal integration position to support a business with our
levels of demand in gas and electricity”. (Centrica, Annual Report & Accounts, 2005)
Indeed, all six of the UK energy supply companies have, on various occasions, stated that vertical
integration is their objective.
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Using Vertical Integration to Control Proﬁt Risks
The motivation for this kind of vertical integration is clear: in the absence of suYciently deep and liquid
ﬁnancial hedging markets, the companies have resorted to physical hedging instead—vertical integration
provides that physical hedge as the companies themselves have stated. Thus for, example, in 2003, having
recently acquired Powergen, E.ON stated:
“Powergen’s exposure to low wholesale electricity prices in the UK is partially hedged by the
balance provided by its recently expanded retail business”. (E.ONAG,Annual Report on Form 20-
F, 2003, p 76)
However, two years’ later, withmarket conditions considerably changed, the company notes that, “E.ON
UK’s exposure to [rising] wholesale prices in the UK is partially hedged by its retail business”, while on the
same page stating,
“In response to these increases in wholesale prices UK suppliers including E.ON increased their
retail electricity prices a number of times during 2005”. (E.ON AG, Annual Report on Form 20-F,
2005, p 62).
In similar vein, EDF states that:
“Due to the vertically integrated nature of the Group, the electricity demand from the retail
business provides a natural hedge for the electricity procured from the generation business. (EDF
Energy plc, Annual Report & Accounts, 2005, p 27)
while in the same report EDF UK states:
“Despite exceptional rises in the energy market prices in 2005, the Group has managed to limit the
rise of its energy costs to 29% compared to a market rise of 67% in gas and 70% in electricity on
year (price rises based on average day ahead prices on the spot market between 2004 and 2005).
The Group has achieved this through vertical integration and a hedging strategy implemented
together with EDFTrading, a sister organisation of the Group”. (EDFEnergy plc, Annual Report
& Accounts, 2005, p 2).
Taking this “textual” evidence together, we can draw the following conclusions:
(1) When wholesale electricity prices are falling steeply (as in 2002) vertically integrated companies
can increase the proﬁts of their supply businesses by maintaining retail prices to domestic
customers at existing levels, or perhaps lowering them only after a considerable lag, or by only a
small proportion of the wholesale price decline. The latter also appears to have been the case with
Centrica and falling wholesale gas prices in the ﬁrst part of 2007.
(2) When wholesale prices are rising steeply, companies can pass on all or part of this burden to their
retail domestic customers who are eVectively, “captive” for a period of time. (And since all or most
of the companies are raising their domestic prices, customers will be uncertain as to whether to
“switch” and which supplier is likely to remain the most attractive for the foreseeable future.)
(3) While companies may quote public domain wholesale prices in justifying their retail price
increases, they may not actually be paying these prices (cf the above EDF quotation.). Indeed, in
general, wholesale prices today, this week or this month do not reﬂect the cost of gas delivered
today, this week or this month. Suppliers contract for their gas years and months ahead of the gas
delivery day and also use diVerent contracts for diVerent supplies. This means the cost of the gas
delivered today is the weighted average cost of a contractual portfolio of gas prices stretching into
the past—and this may bear no relationship at all to current wholesale prices.
However, even where companies appear to be increasing retail prices to domestic customers less than
might be considered “justiﬁable” in the light of the wholesale price increase—indeed even if they may claim
quite honestly that their retail businesses are making a loss, as a consequence—as was recently claimed by the
Chief Executive of E.ONUKplc, (Financial Times, 2008d)—vertical integration of the kind described above
may enable the company as a whole to proﬁt from such a situation as we shall now demonstrate.
Vertical Integration in Action (1): An Example from Electricity
As we have seen, it appears to be the objective of all the companies supplying the domestic electricity
market to be able to achieve 100% vertical integration with their generation operations: in other words if
their domestic supply market is 25 TWh per year, they require (and indeed, have mostly achieved) upstream
capacity capable of generating 25 TWh per year. Any excess of electricity generation over this level can be
sold into the considerably more competitive industrial and wholesale markets where they have less
market power.
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Table 9
PROFIT PERFORMANCE OF COMPLETELY VERTICALLY-INTEGRATED DOMESTIC
ELECTRICITY SUPPLIER c 2005
Generation Segment Supply Segment
Electricity Generation 24,544,320MWh Electricity Supply Sales to 24,544,320 MWh
Sales to Supply Business Domestic Customers
Millions Millions
Revenues £928.6 Revenues w 75.36/MWh £1,849.7
Fuel Cost £539.5 Wholesale Costs £928.6
Other Costs £180.9 Transportation Cost £493.0
Operating Proﬁt £208.2 Supply cost ! proﬁt £428.1
Margin % 22.4 Supply cost £400.4
Total Costs £1,822.0
Operating Proﬁt £27.7
Margin % % 1.5
Source: Drax Group plc Annual Report & Accounts 2005 (for generation segment data), Centrica plc,
Annual Report & Accounts 2005 (for supply segment data).
Note: in 2005, the net electricity generation of theDraxGroup (23.2 TWh)was broadly similar inmagnitude
to the electricity volume of Centrica’s domestic supply business (25.4 TWh). In the circumstances we have
not felt it necessary to make any proportional adjustments to the Drax-based data for revenues, costs and
proﬁts as these would be unlikely to make any material diVerence to the argument.
In this theoretical company (but where the ﬁgures are based on industry data) the supply segment
purchases all its wholesale electricity from the Group’s generation segment; visa-versa the generation
segment sells all its output to the supply segment. We believe the proﬁt margins are more or less typical for
the industry at this time—22.4% for generation and 1.5% for Supply. Total Proﬁt is £208.2 million ! £27.7
million % £235.9 million with an overall margin on external revenue (that of the supply segment) of 12.8%.
We now assume a 30% rise in all wholesale prices. The charge for electricity by the generation segment
to the supply segment increases to £1,207.2 million while, at the same time, the fuel costs of the generating
segment, rise from £539 million to £701.4 million (we assume the other costs remain as before). Since the
wholesale electricity cost charged to the supply segment only originally accounted for 50.2% of the supply
segment revenues (£926/£1849.7), the maximum “justiﬁable” increase in the domestic retail price would be
30% x 0.502 % 15.06%.412
However, let us also assume that, in the interests of public relations the company decides that its supply
business will raise retail prices by only 12%. Then the proﬁt performance is as shown in Table 10.
Table 10
PROFIT PERFORMANCE OF COMPLETELY VERTICALLY-INTEGRATED DOMESTIC
ELECTRICITY SUPPLIER c 2005 AFTER 30% INCREASE IN WHOLESALE PRICES
Generation Segment Supply Segment
Electricity Sales 24,544,320 MWH Electricity Sales 24,544,320 MWh
Millions Millions
Revenues £1,207.2 Revenues £2,071.7
Fuel Cost £701.4 Wholesale Costs £1,207.2
Other costs £180.9 Transportation Cost £493.0
Operating Proﬁt £324.9 Supply Cost ! proﬁt £371.5
Margin % 26.9 Supply Cost £400.4
Total Costs £2,100.5
Operating Loss "£28.9
Margin % % "1.4
Since the prices (and revenue) of the supply segment have only increased by 12% while the cost of the
wholesale electricity charged to the supply segment has increased by 30% (and assuming the other costs
remain as before), the supply business records a loss of £28.9 million while the supply segment margin has
fallen from 1.5% to "1.4%. However the total operating proﬁt of the vertically-integrated operation has
actually increased from £235.9 million to £296.1 million (£324.9–£28.9) while the total margin on external
sales has risen from 12.8% to 14.3% (£296.1 x 100/£2,071.7).
412 The question ofwhat is a “justiﬁable” pass-through ofwholesale to retail price is discussed further in Section 5 of our evidence.
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It must be emphasised that this example is an “ideal type” used for explanatory purposes; it does not
represent a real company. Nevertheless it demonstrates very clearly how vertically integrated companies can
beneﬁt from the same rising wholesale prices which they blame for “loss making” in their downstream
business.
Other things being equal, we would expect a company which has many levels of vertical integration to
have more opportunities to follow this strategy than those which have fewer or no such vertical structure.
Certainly the evidence that non-integrated energy companies are at a disadvantage in this respect is
illustrated by Drax Group whose operations comprise one very large coal-ﬁred power station which is
totally exposed to the vagaries of the wholesale markets and in 2007 was caught by falling electricity prices
and rising coal costs such that its operating proﬁt (before exceptionals and re-measurements fell by 16%
(from £548 million to £462 million), (Drax Group, Preliminary Results, 2007) while the operating proﬁts of
the three other companies which have published 2007 results (Centrica, E.ON UK and RWE npower) all
saw their proﬁts increase.
Vertical Integration in Action (2): Centrica plc
Given the number of vertical integration tiers in Centrica’s portfolio of UK energy businesses (see
Figure 3), we should expect it to have the more possibilities for successfully controlling its proﬁt risk. This
expectation is fulﬁlled.
Table 11
CENTRICA’S OPERATING PROFITS FROM UK ENERGY
OPERATIONS, BY SEGMENT, 2001–07
Centrica’s Proﬁts from its UK Energy Businesses
(Operating Proﬁt before Exceptional Items and Remeasurements)
Financial Total UK
Years British Gas Energy
ending Residential British Gas Operating % Increase
December Gas & Homes British Gas Wholesaling Gas Proﬁt in Operating
£million Electricity Services Business & Trading Production Gas Storage £ million Proﬁt
2001 "46 n/a 44 573 n/a 571
2002 218 61 65 72 447 1 864 51.3
2003 136 84 51 81 480 40 872 0.9
2004 249 95 64 "61 573 69 989 13.4
2005 90 111 77 "117 1,020 154 1,335 35.0
2006 95 102 87 "178 864 228 1,198 "10.3
2007 571 151 120 234 429 240 1,745 45.7
Total Proﬁt
2001"07 1,313 604 508 4,417 732 7,574
Source: Centrica plc, Annual Reports & Accounts
HowCentrica’s portfolioworks for the company is illustrated inTable 11, which shows the locus of proﬁts
moving between its diVerent energy businesses. In 2005, for example, a year of high gas prices, Centrica
made very large proﬁts from its gas production and relatively little from its domestic customers. In 2007, in
contrast, upstream proﬁts were much lower and these were exceeded by a 500% increase in proﬁts from
domestic customers as falling wholesale prices were not passed on to consumers. In between, 2006 might
appear to be an exception, a year in which the upward surge in proﬁts faltered. However, in 2006 Centrica
reduced its gas production by 37% due to “management decisions to carry out remedial work on South
Morecambe’s cooler units during an extended summer maintenance period and our decisions to switch oV
the ﬁeld in response to low intraday gas prices especially in the fourth quarter of the year” (Centrica Annual
Report & Accounts 2006, p 15). If production had been maintained at 2005 levels proﬁts could have been
as much as £1,370 million. In addition Centrica has clearly beneﬁted by adding an increasingly important
“midstream” segment to its business—gas storage. Remarkably, proﬁts from this essentially monopolistic
segment (see our previous remarks) actually made twice as much money for Centrica in 2007 than the
company’s energy sales to businesses.
Nevertheless, although Centrica has more vertical integration tiers than the other ﬁve domestic energy
suppliers, we have also noted that extent of vertical integration between those tiers is less than the others (See
Tables 7 and 8). Indeed, although it is the only company with a substantial gas production tier, in 2007 its
own gas supplies only provided 42% of the volumes required by its domestic customers while its own
generation volumes, having increased substantially during the past few years, still only covered 86% of its
domestic customers demand. This suggests that the company may have more to gain by increasing its ﬁnal
energy prices and preserving its domestic segmentmargins than other companies which are better positioned
to take advantage of the kind of scenario illustrated in Tables 9 and 10. On the other hand, Centrica also
emerges asmore of an upstream company than a gas and electricity supply company: 68%of its accumulated
proﬁts between 2001 and 2007 came from its upstream and midstream operations.
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Switching as Countervailing Power for Domestic Consumers?
It has already been noted that OFGEM and BERR believe that in spite of the development of oligopoly
the gas and electricity industry which serves domestic customers remains highly competitive because there
is evidence of considerable customer switching between the six suppliers.
In fact, other things being equal, the UK domestic fuel market ought to be highly competitive: because
although there are no substitutes for the products sold by the domestic fuel supply industry as a whole and
therefore we would expect the industry’s price elasticity of demand to be very low, this is not the case for
each individual supplier. Here we see the exact opposite: there are perfect substitutes for each individual
company’s product and we should therefore expect the price elasticity of demand for each company’s
products to be very high indeed.
In other words—and this is the narrative which OFGEM and BERR would have us believe—each
company will raise its gas and elasticity prices above those of its competitors at its peril: if it does so it will
rapidly lose its customers (because a perfect substitute is available), sales volumes will fall as will revenue
and proﬁts.
Unfortunately we only have data from two companies, Centrica and E.ON UK, which are suYciently
detailed and disaggregated to examine the validity of the OFGEM/BERR narrative. Table 12 provides data
on Centrica’s domestic gas market revenues, sales volumes, customers and prices and the annual changes
in these variables between 2001 and 2007.
At ﬁrst, the data look broadly consistent with the OFGEM/BERR narrative. In 2002 the gas price
increases by 7.6% over the year compared with the average for 2001, the company loses 4.5% of its gas
customers, sales volumes fall by 12.3% and revenues by 5.6%. The responsiveness of demand for the
company’s gas to the change in price (% change in sales volume divided by % change in price) is moderately
elastic: a 1% increase in price results in a 1.63% fall in sales volume. However, the following year (2003) the
pattern begins to change: an average annual price increase of 1% only results in a 0.8% fall in sales.
Thereafter, until 2007, the pattern is completely inconsistent with the OFGEM/BERR narrative: the price
elasticity of demand falls well below unity and as low as 0.26 in 2004. In that year the price increases by
11.8%, the company loses 6.5% of its customers; however sales volume only fall by 3% and revenue actually
increases by 11.4%. The same pattern broadly continues for the succeeding two years. Indeed, in 2006,
Centrica’s gas price increases by amassive 28.6%, but customers and volumes only fall by 7.8 and 7.9%while
revenues increase by a substantial 15.2%. Only in 2007 does the pattern revert to the Ofgem/BERR
narrative: a very small annual increase in price (part of which is actually a price reduction) is accompanied
by a 2.4% fall in customers while both volumes and revenues fall by 11.1%. The only problem with this
account is that this was the year in which the companymade a record proﬁt of £571million from its domestic
gas and electricity business.
Table 12
CENTRICA, DOMESTIC GAS MARKET DATA AND PRICE ELASTICITY, 2001–07
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Revenue from domestic sales 4,029 3,805 3,742 4,170 4,196 4,832 4,296
£m
Domestic gas sales TWh 260.6 228.4 226.6 219.7 194.8 179.3 159.4
Domestic gas customers (000s) 13,451 12,839 12,590 11,771 11,131 10,263 10,018
Weighted average domestic gas 43.80 47.12 47.57 53.16 61.16 78.66 79.26
price p/therm
Annual change in domestic gas "5.6 "1.7 11.4 0.6 15.2 "11.1
revenue %
Annual change in domestic gas "12.3 "0.8 "3.0 "11.4 "7.9 "11.1
sales (TWh) %
change in number of domestic "612.0 "249.0 "819.0 "640.0 "868.0 "245.0
gas customers (000s)
Annual change in domestic gas "4.5 "1.9 "6.5 "5.4 "7.8 "2.4
customers %
Annual change in domestic gas 7.6 1.0 11.8 15.0 28.6 0.8
price %
Price Elasticity of Domestic Gas 1.63 0.85 0.26 0.76 0.28 14.56
Sources: Centrica plc, Annual Reports and Accounts 2001–06, Centrica plc Preliminary Annual Accounts
2007
Notes: The price changes shown are simply changes in the average annual price disclosed by Centrica: in
reality price changes did not occur at year-end but took place (sometimes more than once) within the
calendar year. The price elasticity of demand is given as: " (Δq/q x 100) $ (Δp/p x 100) where p is the
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average annual domestic price, q the quantity of gas sold and Δ the change in price and quantity; the minus
sign is added in the formula because it is conventionally assumed elasticity should have a positive value
whereas it is also conventionally assumed that an increase in price is associated with a decrease in quantity
sold ( a downward sloping demand curve).
Indeed when we compare the pattern of change in Centrica’s total customer numbers (gas and electricity)
with the change in operating proﬁt from domestic sales throughout the whole period 2001–07 we observe
no particular relationship whatsoever (Table 13).
For example, in 2002 Centrica lost 1% of its customers but its operating proﬁt increased by 1,047%; in
2003 it gained 0.8% more customers but its operating proﬁt fell by 37.6%; and in 2004, when the company
registered its second biggest drop in customers (5.6%) its proﬁts increased by 83.1%. In other words, as a
proﬁtability “driver” customer numbers (and hence the signiﬁcance of “switching”) appear to have been
almost totally irrelevant for this company.
Table 13
CENTRICA: CHANGES IN DOMESTIC CUSTOMER NUMBERS AND DOMESTIC ENERGY
SUPPLY OPERATING PROFIT, 2001–07
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Domestic gas customers (000s) 13,451 12,839 12,590 11,771 11,131 10,263 10,018
Domestic electricity customers 5,374 5,795 6,189 5,950 5,920 5,759 6,019
(000s)
Total domestic customers 18,825 18,634 18,779 17,721 17.051 16,022 16,037
Annual change in total "191 145 "1,058 "670 "1,029 15
customers (000s)
Annual change in total domestic "1.0 0.8 "5.6 "3.8 "6.0 0.1
customers %
Domestic energy operating 19.0 218 136 249 90 95.0 571.0
proﬁt £m
Annual change in domestic 1,047.4 "37.6 83.1 "63.9 5.6 501.1
operating proﬁt %
Source: Centrica plc, Annual Reports & Accounts
Although the disclosure of E.ON UK’s market data is considerably less detailed than that of Centrica,
the same pattern of extremely low price elasticity of demand is also clearly apparent (Table 14).
Table 14
E.ON UK: DOMESTIC GAS AND ELECTRICITY MARKET DATA
AND PRICE ELASTICITY, 2003–06
2003 2004 2005 2006
Domestic gas sales TWh 51.2 51.5 54.1 52.4
Domestic electricity sales TWh 30.0 29.2 28.4 26.5
Domestic gas customers (000s) 2,527 2,673 2,656 2,649
domestic electricity customers (000s) 5,397 5,380 5,148 4,956
Annual change in domestic gas sales (TWh) % 0.6 5.0 "3.1
Annual change in domestic electricity sales (TWh) % "2.7 "2.7 "6.7
Annual change in gas customers % 5.8 "0.6 "0.3
annual change in electricity customers % "0.3 "4.3 "3.7
Annual change in domestic gas price % 18.5 11.9 47.0
Annual change in domestic electricity price % 16.4 7.2 30.0
Price elasticity of demand (gas) "0.03 "0.42 0.07
Price elasticity of demand (electricity) 0.16 0.38 0.22
Sources: E.ON UK plc, Annual Report & Accounts, E.ON AG. Strategy & Key Figures, various years.
Note:Where, as in this case, there are two years where the elasticity value is negative this indicates a situation
where a price increase is associated with an increase in the quantity sold. For 2003, only the combined sales
volumes for Domestic and SME customers are disclosed by the company. We have assumed that domestic
sales volumes would be the same proportion of the combined (Domestic ! SME) total as in 2004.
In 2004 a substantial increase in the company’s gas price (18.5%) is associated with an increase in both
customers and sales volumes, while in 2005 another gas price increase during the year (11.9%) results in only
a very small fall in customers but quite a large increase in sales (5%). And in 2006, huge increases in both
gas and electricity prices are accompanied by proportionately much smaller falls in volumes sold.
Throughout the whole period, the responsiveness of demand to price increases is highly inelastic.
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The answer to this apparent conundrum of very low price elasticity of demand in an industry where the
“competitors” are each selling a perfect substitute is fairly straightforward. Firstly, during the period in
question, all suppliers have been increasing their prices making it diYcult for consumers to understand
(using OFGEM’s favourite metaphor) precisely “where to shop”. In any case, when OFGEM urges
domestic consumers to “shop around” for cheaper suppliers, (as though buying domestic fuel supplies is
like purchasing the family’s weekly vegetable requirements) it is using a totally inappropriate metaphor
given that the transaction costs of time, trouble and legitimate fear of billing problems mean that customers
are unlikely to “switch” more than once per year at most. Therefore, when a consumer commits to a
particular supplier he/she is locking himself/herself into a an indeterminate price: the customer has no
knowledge whether the price to which he/she has committed will remain constant or whether it will remain
the best bargain. The position is not much better if the customer chooses to accept a ﬁxed price contract
where, again, the customer is having to gamble on whether the contract will remain the best one for the
foreseeable future. Furthermore, to complicate matters for the consumer the supply companies are now
beginning to oVer additional non-energy price inducements (typical of oligopolistic “competition”): for
example EDF Energy now oVers its customers free “Nectar Points” for use at Sainsbury’s. It is therefore
hardly surprising that consumers are confused and anxious when considering whether or not to switch
supplier and that consequently price changes have only a limited impact on the volume of switching and
sales volumes. Indeed, according to a recent study by Davies et al., so confused were electricity consumers
in 2000 that almost a third of switching consumers moved to a supplier that actually charged more than the
incumbent; and by 2005 matters had barely improved: in that year only an eighth of consumers who
switched to get lower prices chose the supplier who gave them the best deal (Davies et al 2007)
4. Wholesale Gas Market and Prices to Consumers
Turning now to wholesale markets, while we restrict our attention to wholesale gas markets these are of
course also relevant to the electricity market via the use of gas in the UK’s gas-ﬁred power stations.
A Home-Grown Problem
An oft-repeated contention of Ofgem and BERR is that the pricing of gas on the UK’s wholesale markets
is deleteriously aVected by the lack of liberalisation in continental Europe, in particular via the oil-indexed
contracts which have been prevalent in the contracting for imported gas on the continent. A ﬁrst point which
may be made with respect to this contention is that there is a considerable body of research evidence that
gas prices trend upwards with oil prices in liberalised markets without any linkage to “unliberalised” ones
(Barcella, 1999; Serletis & Herbert, 1999; Asche et al,2006; Panagiotidis & Rutledge, 2007). These ﬁndings
conﬁrm the intuitive conclusion that gas prices are unlikely to spend long periods lagging behindmovements
in oil prices—ceteris paribus, producers are likely aspire to achieving prices in a similar range on a per joule
basis and are not therefore likely to sell their gas at a discount to oil for any length of time.
These points mean that in order to explain the volatility and high levels of UK gas prices we have to look
tomore home-grown causes. Our view, explored at length by one of us inGasPrices in theUK (Wright 2006),
is that the behaviour of theUKwholesale gas prices is logically linked to the liberalisation of theUKmarket,
which has at times delivered prices in excess of both the oil equivalent price and the price of gas on
continentalmarkets.Why this is the case has four basic ingredients: (a) the gas industry is frequently aZicted
by physical disruptions in supply caused by breakdowns and other random events (b) in a liberalisedmarket
these everyday disruptions have immediate and dramatic reﬂection in wholesale market prices, not just
because of the consequent shortfall in aggregate production, but also because market participants take
positions to proﬁt from the diYculties of the supplier or suppliersmost aVected by the disruption (c) because
another aspect of gas market liberalisation has linked an increasing proportion of UK wholesale gas
deliveries to these volatile short-term markets—contracts are increasingly “gas-indexed”—the prices
signalled by the relatively small volumes traded in short-term markets therefore price much larger volumes
of gas being sold into the market (d) because of the potential cost to individual suppliers of physical
disruptions, particularly if they occur during the winter or just before the winter as stocks are being built
up, futures prices can soar to dramatically high levels.
This last point, the cost of insuring prices in a liberalised gas market, is indicated in Figure 4. The ﬁgure
is stacked with the blue-shaded area representing the “beach” or “upstream price” (average unit price
received by producers of gas), while the red-shaded area shows the premium over the beach prices registered
by the most commonly used index price for UK gas deliveries futures market—the Month-ahead price.
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Figure 4
THE IMPACT OF FUTURES MARKET COSTS ON THE PRICE OF GAS
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While a small part of the diVerence between these two price series may be explained by entry capacity
charges (theMonth-ahead price is for delivery to the UK’s notional National Balancing Point—NBP—and
therefore includes these charges for transportation), most of the diVerence reﬂects the additional costs
imposed on consumers by liberalised gas wholesale markets. Traders buy and sell the risk of delivering the
right amount of gas at the right time and this is reﬂected in a risk premium which increases the price. As
well as providing traders with a source of proﬁt, this premium also clearly escalates in wintermonths as both
the risks of securing supply, and the costs of failing to do so, increase.
Another conclusion which may be drawn from Figure 4 is that at least until the ﬁrst quarter of 2004,
upstream producers were not responsible for driving the trend in UK gas prices in an upward direction—
this was a function of the wholesale markets.
The fact that Figure 4 does not extend beyond the ﬁrst quarter of 2004 is because BERR ceased to provide
a quarterly beach/upstream price ﬁgure after that time. Subsequently, there is only an annual beach price
to work with. Using this in Figure 5 it is compared with (a) the Month-ahead futures price and (b) the
weighted average cost which Centrica states that it pays for gas to supply its domestic customers. While
during the period beyond the beginning of 2004, the upstream price received by producers was clearly now
playing a role in pushing UK gas prices upwards, the behaviour of the futures price was adding to this eVect
to a steadily increasing extent as the risk premium commanded by wholesale markets increased. Moreover,
Centrica’s gas costs, which comprise a portfolio of contracts with diVerent time proﬁles, are shown to be
similar to and sometimes exceeding the Month-ahead price.
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Figure 5
WHOLESALE PRICES TO SELLERS AND BUYERS COMPARED
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5. Relationship between Wholesale and Retail Gas Prices
If the behaviour of wholesale markets already spells diYculties for consumers, these are compounded by
the way the relationship between wholesale and retail prices may be manipulated.
The relationship between wholesale market prices and retail prices is frequently discussed under two
misconceptions. Firstly, it is suggested that if wholesale prices rise by x%, then it is quite reasonable to expect
retail prices to rise by the same percentage. Such an argument is implicit in a graph which appeared on the
front page of the Observer Business section on 24 February 2008 and has also been peddled by OFGEM
and recycled by the Financial Times.413 In fact this supposition is entirely fallacious. Because wholesale gas
prices, for example, only constitute around half of the ﬁnal price of gas to domestic consumers, a wholesale
price rise of say, 20%, could only be used to try and justify a 10% increase in retail prices. We say “try and
justify” because if the gas and electricity retail markets were really competitive, cost pass-throughs to
consumers could not be automatic. Secondly, as noted above, wholesale prices today, this week or this
month do not reﬂect the cost of gas delivered today, this week or this month. Suppliers contract for their
gas years and months ahead of the gas delivery day and also use diVerent contracts for diVerent supplies.
This means the cost of the gas delivered today is the weighted average cost of a contractual portfolio of gas
prices stretching into the past—and this may bear no relationship at all to current wholesale prices.
In order to be able to understand the relationship between wholesale prices and the ﬁnal prices paid by
domestic consumers knowledge of this weighted average cost of gas or electricity supplies is essential.
Fortunately, one company (and only one of the Big Six) does disclose these costs and other data which
makes it possible to decompose the domestic prices of gas and electricity into its their three main cost
components: the cost of the gas itself; the cost of transporting it to consumers; and the cost of marketing
and billing for it (the so-called “supply cost”) which also includes the company’s proﬁt margin.
FromFigure 6 it can ﬁrst of all be seen that the cost of transporting gas to households has been very stable
since 2001, coming in at 0.6pence/KWh in every year apart from 2002. On the other hand, it is clearly the
case that changes in the wholesale cost of Centrica’s gas have been a major driver of increases in prices.
However, this is not the whole story: in both 2002 and 2004 it can be seen that changes in the supply cost
(including proﬁt margin) have also played a role. Moreover, such large increases were not caused by
dramatic changes in the actual costs of marketing and billing, they were caused by increases in downstream
proﬁt margins: as price control were lifted in 2002 the proﬁt margin on domestic energy sales was raised by
Centrica from 0.4% to 4.2% and then in 2004 it was raised from 2.6% to 4.1% and according to the
company’s preliminary 2007 results its proﬁt margin on domestic energy supply has now risen to 8.8%.
413 see OFGEM’s “Factsheet” No 66 (8/11/06), “Household Bills Explained”, later uncritically recycled by the Financial Times
on 5December 2006.Warwick University academics Waterson, Giulietti andGrossi also appear to be oblivious to this point
in an article for Power UK (January 2008, p 60).
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Figure 6
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After 2004, in 2005 and 2006 (the data are not yet available to construct a 2007 breakdown) the gas supply
margin was squeezed as increases in wholesale prices were not fully passed on to domestic consumers,
particularly in 2006. However, this should not be seen as either an indicator of competitive pressure or a
friendly gesture byCentrica to its customers. FromTable 10 it can be seen that over these two years Centrica
made £1,884 million in proﬁts from its gas production arm, some 74% of its overall proﬁt. Moreover, as
Table 10 also shows that Centrica managed to maintain the proﬁts from its domestic energy business
roughly constant in between 2005 and 2006, a feat achieved at the expense of its electricity consumers. From
Figure 7 it can be seen that the electricity supply costmargin suddenly leapt upwards in 2006, from1.8 pence/
KWh to 2.6 pence/KWh.
Figure 7
CENTRICA (BRITISH GAS) ELECTRICITY: BREAK-DOWN INTO COMPONENT COSTS
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6. Regulatory Oversight
This last point also highlights an issue of regulatory oversight which Figure 8 brings into sharper relief.
While Figures 6 and 7 expressed supply cost margins for domestic gas and electricity in terms of pence/
KWh supplied, Figure 8 converts these costs to an annual bill based on the average gas and electricity
consumption levels of Centrica’s domestic customers. This shows that the annual supply cost (marketing
cost, billing cost and proﬁt margin) of electricity had been relatively stable compared with gas supply costs
between 2001 and 2006, ﬂuctuating between about £71 and £79. Then suddenly, just as gas supply margins
were facing a severe squeeze, electricity supply costs leapt to an average of £108.60 per customer.
Moreover, in this context it should also be noted that in 2001, Ofgem estimated the annual supply cost
per electricity customer (excluding proﬁt) as just £40 and £20 per gas customer (Ofgem, 2001b). Since 2001
companies have had to invest in new technology to deal with switching and other supply business demands;
this may have increased the supply cost; on the other hand, the growth of dual-fuel customer billing will
have worked in the opposite direction. On balance it seems unlikely that Ofgem’s 2001 estimate of supply
cost would have changed very much.
In other words not only doCentrica’s levels of electricity and supply costs per customer seem substantially
out of line with Ofgem’s own estimates, but the dramatic hike in the electricity supply cost during 2006 is
a levy on electricity customers constituting prima facie evidence of price discrimination against domestic
electricity consumers.
Figure 8
ANNUAL SUPPLY COSTS FOR BRITISH GAS’ RESIDENTIAL CUSTOMERS
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7. UK and European Markets: Myth and Reality
To the great irritation of our European Union neighbours, who have chosen to manage the risks
associated with the supply of gas and electricity to their citizens diVerently from the UK, Ofgem and BERR
have been wont to hide behind a “blame it on Europe” smokescreen. They have also trained a small army
of journalists to parrot this line of argument eg “The problem is not that suppliers are rigging their tariVs,
but that wholesale prices are soaring and consumers here are forced to pay through the nose for gas
imported from the Continent, where the market is opaque and uncompetitive”. (Observer, 2008).
Unfortunately, just like the view that the extent of “switching” reﬂects the degree of competitiveness in the
market, this argument is also entirely fallacious. It is based on the non-sequitur that if the rest of Europe
had more liberalised gas and electricity markets the UK’s problems would evaporate, particularly because
greater liberalisation would lead to the disappearance of oil-indexed contracts in the rest of Europe and
therefore of the contaminating, Interconnector-delivered link with oil markets. In fact, it is highly unlikely
that greater liberalisation of European markets would (a) lead to a reduction in the volume of gas covered
by oil-indexed contracts many of which have only recently been signed with major producer nations and
are not due to expire until the mid 2030s (Energy Charter Secretariat, 2007), or (b) even if it did, that the
result would be to sever the link between oil and gas prices—as we have already noted, there is a body of
research which suggests otherwise. Moreover, why would liberalisation not have similar eVects in
continental Europe to those which it had in the UK in 2005/6?
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A separate issue aVecting the relationship between the UK and continental gas markets, and which has
nothing at all to do with perceived continental conspiracies tomake the UK consumer suVer, is that the UK
has painted itself into a corner by not building additional storage capacity commensurate with the country
becoming a net importer of gas (see ILEX, 2005). The consequences of this shortcoming are starkly evident:
during summer months the UK is exporting relatively cheap gas to the continent as other EU countries seek
to establish winter security for their consumers, but then is being forced to buy it back at a premium when
the country needs to import during the winter. If the UKhad built suYcient storage it would not be exposed
in this way: summer gas could go straight into storage in the UK, obviating the need to import during
periods of potentially premium prices.
8. Conclusions
Our ﬁrst conclusion responds to the Committee’s questions about the competitiveness of the UK’s retail
energy markets. We believe that our evidence demonstrates two main points: (a) that the market structure
which has evolved is anti-competitive and (b) that any amount of switching by retail consumers has and will
fail to change this. In particular, litmus tests for the anti-competitiveness of the market structure are not
only concerned with market concentration. As we have seen, the companies involved in the market have
arranged their aVairs so that they can sustain high and rising proﬁts whatever the level of their ﬁnal prices
to households and small businesses. Corroboration of this and of the ineVectiveness of switching is that
companies can be observed to make more money with lesser number of customers—hardly a punishment
for causing their customers to switch.
Our second conclusion is that UK households are paying higher gas and electricity prices as a result of
the increased uncertainty which liberalised wholesale gas markets entail and reﬂect, imposing an insurance
premium on consumers which is highly sensitive to the actual and perceived risks of shortfalls in supply over
winter months. Moreover, policy has contributed to this problem by failing to ensure that suYcient gas
storage be built in a timely fashion.
Our third conclusion is that, apart from the anti-competitive structure of the UK’s domestic gas and
electricity markets, there is also evidence of actual anti-competitive behaviour. There is evidence of both gas
prices to households being raised by more than might be justiﬁed by increasing wholesale prices and of
electricity consumers being discriminated against. While this evidence is from one company, this is only
because there is only one company which discloses suYcient information to consider these issues. All
companies have the ability to vary the mark-up on wholesale, transportation and supply costs, according
to market conditions and speciﬁcally, to discriminate between gas and electricity customers in order to
protect the overallmargin; only lack of company-sourced data prevents us fromascertaining how frequently
other supply companies exercise this option.
Our ﬁnal conclusion is that it is the domestic consumer who is most vulnerable to the deployments of
companies’ market power which we have identiﬁed—the domestic consumer is at the end of the chain and
thereby the ultimate recipient of price risk as it is passed down the chain. However, this does not also mean
that we see a remedy in the break up of the portfolios which companies have built up in order to manage
their risks. Indeed such a break-up could have serious consequences for prices if it increased uncertainty and
undermined the capacity of supply companies to contract for eg the large volumes of imported gas which
the country will increasingly require. Instead we would propose the re-introduction of price control
regulation as the only way of ensuring that households and small businesses are not exploited. Moreover,
it may well be, bearing in mind the large investments in electricity generation capacity which companies are
being supplicated to undertake, that rate of return regulation would be a better option than the previously
favoured price-cap form of price control regulation.
The urgency of adopting some such measure to protect not just the fuel-poor but also the mass of low-
to-middle income domestic energy consumers at a time when they are being squeezed by other inﬂationary
pressures (in particular higher mortgage and food costs) is underlined by the fact that there is growing
evidence that the supply companies are now anticipating a surge in wholesale electricity prices over the next
ﬁve years as a result of an expected rapid decline in the capacity margin of UK electricity generation. For
example, in 2006RWEAG stated that, as a result of the shut-down of around 7GWof nuclear capacity and
8.2GWof coal-ﬁred capacity (as a result of the Large Combustion Plants Directive) “a sustained increase in
wholesale prices” will commence around 2011 (RWE, 2006, p 116). In 2007 the company made the same
prognostication (albeit more euphemistically), anticipating that “market fundamentals” in the UK would
soon lead to “a sustained return of value to the generation sector”. (RWE, 2007). It should be added that
research commissioned by BERR itself points in the same direction: According to the Energy White Paper
of 2007:
“In most scenarios examined, we see some decline in the amount of capacity that is in excess of
expected peak demand between now and the middle of the next decade. As a consequence, we
would expect to see an increase in electricity prices . . .” (DTI, 2007, p132)
However, in spite of the urgent need to address the serious social and economic problem of rapidly rising
domestic fuel bills by regulatory intervention, we do not underestimate the possibility that after the years
rising proﬁts which they have enjoyed since regulation was abolished, the big six companies will strongly
oppose any move back towards price control regulation for domestic consumers.
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APPENDIX
COMPANY-SOURCED FINANCIAL AND OPERATING DATA
In constructing the tables containing company ﬁnancial and operating data we have used the following
sources:
Centrica plc: Annual Report and Accounts, 2001–2006, available:
http://www.centrica.com/
Centrica plc: Preliminary Results for 2007, available: http://www.centrica.com/
Drax Group plc, Annual Report and Accounts, 2005–2007, available:
http://www.draxgroup.plc.uk/
EDF Group, Document de Base 2004, and Document de Reference 2005–2006, available: http://www.edf.fr/
92053i/Home-fr/Meta-Plan/EDF-Group.html
EDF Energy plc: Annual Report and Accounts, 2003–2006, available:
http://www.companieshouse.gov.uk/
E.ON UK plc, Annual Report & Accounts, 2003–2006, available:
http://www.companieshouse.gov.uk/
E.ONAG,Annual Report & Accounts 2003–2007, and Strategy & Key Figures, 2004–2006, available: http://
www.eon.com/
E.ON AG, Annual Report on Form 20-F, 2003–2006, available:
http://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml
RWE AG, Annual Report and Accounts 2003–2007 and RWE Facts and Figures, 2004–2007, available:
http://www.rwe.com/generator.aspx/language%en/id%450/home.html
Scottish Power Ltd, Annual Report & Accounts 2006–07, available:
http://www.companieshouse.gov.uk/
Scottish Power plc, Annual Report & Accounts 2003–04 to 2005–06, available as supplements to 20-F
Reports at: http://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml
SSE plc, Annual Report & Accounts 2004–05 to 2006–07, available:
http://www.scottish-southern.co.uk/SSEInternet/
The proﬁt data presented in Tables, 2, 3 and 4 are for Operating Proﬁt (proﬁt before tax and interest
payments), for UK-only energy related operations. The ﬁgures are as published at the date in question, ie
we have not used the remeasured ﬁgures which are sometimes displayed where the company presents its
prior-year results for comparative purposes.
As stated in the text, this data (and the operating data in other tables) have been aligned so that there is
the maximum overlap between the diVerent ﬁnancial years used by the companies: data from those
companies with ﬁnancial years ending in March have been aligned with data from those whose ﬁnancial
year ended the precedingDecember. This applies in the cases of Scottish Power and SSE both of which have
ﬁnancial years endingMarch. Consequently ﬁnancial and operating data from these two companies derived
from (eg) their 2006–07 Annual Reports are placed under the column headed 2006.
The data were primarily obtained from the “segment information” notes to the accounts of ﬁve of the
companies which publish consolidated accounts for their UK operations (Centrica, EDFEnergy plc, E.ON
UK plc, Scottish Power Ltd/plc and SSE plc). The exception is RWE npower where we have used the
segment data of theGerman parent companyRWEAGwhere the segment is for RWEnpower’s operations
and the data is for EBIT (with currency conversion from euro to sterling at the annual average rate stated
by the company). EBIT is earnings before interest and taxationwhichmeans that the ﬁguremay also include
some post—tax income from any associate companies or joint venture in which the parent owns less than
50%. We do not believe that the use of EBIT for RWE makes any material diVerence to the argument). In
addition, since E.ON UK’s annual report for 2007 was not yet available, for E.ON UK’s 2007 operating
proﬁt ﬁgure we have used the EBIT ﬁgure for the company’s UK segment from E.ON AG’s 2007 Annual
Report (which has been published). However, since ourmain argument is centred on the period 2003–06 any
slight distortion arising from using EBIT for 2007 and Operating Proﬁt for the years 2003–06 is minimal.
The choice of the year 2003 as the base line for our analysis is based on two factors (1) 2003 is the ﬁrst
full year after the UK domestic energy supply industry was fully de-regulated (in April 2002); (2) there were
no signiﬁcant acquisitions of other domestic energy supply businesses by the six companies after this date.
However, both SSE and Centrica made acquisitions of generating capacity over this period and in 2004
E.ON acquired Midlands Electricity, a regulated distribution business.
Among the six companies, only Centrica discloses a detailed segment breakdown of its diVerent business
operations. However, EDF Energy, E.ON UK, Scottish Power and SSE provide separate segment data for
their regulated and non-regulated operations. The RWE npower data obtained from RWE AG’s annual
reports provides no further breakdown, however since we know that RWE npower has no regulated energy
businesses, we have been able to include the company in both Table’s 2 and 4.
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In 2005, UK companies were required to begin to use International Financial Reporting Standards
(IFRS) in place of UK GAAP. This has had implications for the proﬁt and loss account in so far as
companies are now required by IAS 32 and IAS 39 to include their losses and gains on certain derivative
contracts in their income statement by “marking to market” or some other method of assessing their fair
value. (Derivatives which are for “own use” are exempted, however). The inclusion of these hugely volatile
“paper” gains and losses is widely recognised as potentially distorting the underlying business performance
of the company and the six companies whose operating proﬁt we have used in Tables 2, 3 and 4 all provide
suYcient information to either add-back or deduct the value of these volatile re-measurements.
28 March 2008
Supplementary memorandum submitted by Ofgem
I welcomed the opportunity tomeet with you and othermembers of the Committee last month. Following
our meeting, you asked us to give you some background information on new electricity generation
requirements; the windfall to generators under the European Emissions Trading Scheme; the causes of fuel
poverty; and the link between gas and oil prices.
New Electricity Generation Requirements
Peak electricity demand in Britain is currently around 62 gigawatts (GW). This compares with a total
generating capacity of 75GW. Of that 75GW, approximately 39% is from coal; 38% from gas; 14% nuclear;
5% oil; 2% hydro; and 2% wind. In addition there is an electricity interconnector with France which is
capable of importing or exporting about 2GW.
However, Britain’s nuclear power plants are ageing and many coal and oil-ﬁred plants will have to close
as a result of the Large Combustion Plant Directive (LCPD). The LCPD requires large generators to meet
stringent air quality standards by January 2008 or to opt out of the LCPD. If they opt out, they must close
by the end of 2015 or after 20,000 hours of operation from January 2008, whichever is soonest. Some 12GW
of coal and oil-ﬁred generating plant falls into this opted-out category. All of this plant, some 15% of
Britain’s present total capacity, will have to close by the end of 2015. In addition, according to current
timetables, 7.4GW of nuclear generation capacity will have closed by 2020. Another 2.4GW is due to close
by 2023. Only Sizewell B, the pressurised water reactor (PWR) in SuVolk, has a signiﬁcant lifespan beyond
2020; it is due to close in 2035. However, plant life extensions should allow some delay in these closure dates.
The closure of existing plant means that there is a substantial requirement for new build. Several factors
will aVect the level and nature of new build:
— Market prices and economics: Expected levels of coal, gas, carbon and power prices are the major
factor driving investment in new capacity. Higher carbon prices will tend to skew investment
towards lower carbon generation plant, such as gas and nuclear. However, market participants are
unable to predict the future. In addition, they value diversity, particularly if market and political
signals are uncertain. As a result, generators are likely to favour a diverse mix of generating assets
in the future, including some new coal.
— Planning:The biggest single obstacle faced by new generators and transmission owners will remain
planning provisions—particularly for major electricity infrastructure. The UK Government’s
Planning Bill aims to improve the planning process for major infrastructure projects, but this
legislation would apply only to England and Wales, where planning delays are less acute at the
moment.
— Grid connections: The electricity transmission networks—the wires which carry electricity from
generators to customers—require investment to enable more generation to connect. New lines
need to be built, especially to help connect more renewables, and better use needs to be made of
existing lines. Ofgem is playing its part by allowing a 100% increase in investment in the energy
networks and by reviewing the arrangements for allowing generators to gain access to the
networks.
— Skills: The power sector has an ageing workforce and the Sector Skills Council estimates that,
without a marked increase in recruitment and training, a signiﬁcant shortage of skills could
develop as early as 2013. Building signiﬁcant numbers of new power stations and new network
infrastructure would require a strengthening of the science, engineering, project management and
on-site trade/technician skills base. The longer lead times for nuclear power would allow the
industry more time to plan ahead.
— Lead times:The whole process from decision to invest through to start up can take about ﬁve years
for a combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT) power station: two years for design, planning consent,
project planning and permitting, two for construction and six months for commissioning. A coal-
ﬁred power station might take around seven years, of which four to ﬁve years would be needed for
construction. A new nuclear power station might take around ﬁve years for construction but has
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an extended licensing period that would extend the overall programme towards ten years. In
addition, there could be bottlenecks in the supply chain depending on demand for construction
from other sectors.
— Subsidy: The renewable electricity industry in Britain is supported by a subsidy through the
Renewables Obligation (RO). The proportion of Britain’s energy coming from renewables has
increased since the RO was introduced but by far less than is required to meet the target. Other
countries have diVerent support mechanisms, eg feed-in tariVs. Whether they have more or less
renewable energy than Britain will be inﬂuenced partly by the support scheme but also by other
factors—such as a lack of planning constraints and the availability of spare transmission capacity.
Windfall to Generators Under the EU ETS
The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) aims to reduce emissions of carbon dioxide
and combat the serious threat of climate change. It works on a “cap and trade” basis:
— EU Member State governments are required to set emissions limits for all installations in their
country covered by the scheme.
— Each installation is then allocated allowances equal to that cap for the particular phase in question.
The allocation of allowances is set out in the National Allocation Plan for the particular period.
The ﬁrst phase of the EU ETS ran from 2005–07; Phase II runs from 2008–12.
— Installations can meet their cap by reducing emissions below the cap and selling the surplus
allowances. Alternatively, they can let their emissions remain higher than the cap and buy
allowances from other participants in the EU emissions market in order to meet the cap. A carbon
market has emerged which enables this trade in allowances to happen.
The UK National Allocation Plan has granted electricity generating companies—free of charge—a
proportion of the tradeable emissions permits they need to meet their obligations under the scheme. Ofgem
has long argued that these permits should be auctioned to energy companies rather than given free of charge.
We are pleased that 7% are being auctioned from 2008 and hopefully that all permits will be auctioned
from 2012.
Phase II of the EU ETS runs from 2008–12. Although the generators receive most of their required
allowances for free, the full traded allowance price is reﬂected in the price of electricity traded on the
wholesale market. This is because:
— the generators who need to buy extra allowances to cover their emissions will, as you would expect,
factor the cost of these allowances into their price;
— the generators who hold enough allowances can sell them. They will only generate if the electricity
price is high enough to compensate them for using, rather than selling, their allowances.
The free allocation of allowances therefore increases generators’ proﬁts over the ﬁve years of the phase.
With carbon prices up 25% in the past year, the £9 billion windfall that Ofgem identiﬁed in January covering
the period from 2008–12 is now worth in excess of £11 billion calculated at today’s market prices.
It is less clear whether the full cost of allowances is passed through to end user prices. We believe that is
certainly the case for the sales to large and medium industrial and commercial suppliers and largely the case
for domestic customers. There is some evidence that, at times of rapidly rising prices, some of the vertically
integrated power companies smooth their price increases to domestic consumers by cross-subsidising
between generation and supply. The surplus generation proﬁts from the EU ETS increase their ability to
do this.
Ofgem originally highlighted this issue in its response to theGovernment’s EnergyReview in 2006. Ofgem
also highlighted that by reducing the free allocation of allowances to generators to the maximum extent
possible would mitigate this eVect and could provide for measures to alleviate fuel poverty.
Fuel Poverty
Fuel poverty has three main causes: low incomes, poor housing and high energy prices. After a
considerable period of decline from 1996, fuel poverty is now rising and current estimates suggest that
4.5 million households could be fuel poor.
The above factors have not contributed equally to changes in fuel poverty. The Government’s 2007 Fuel
Poverty Annual Report stated that, “For the reduction in overall fuel poverty between 1996 and 2005, with
all the changes in methodology excluded, nearly three quarters was due to increased incomes, around a ﬁfth
was due to energy eYciency measures, with the remainder due to energy price reductions.” The Scottish
Household Condition Survey 2002 attributed the reduction in fuel poverty in Scotland to the following
factors: 50% to increases in household income, 35% to reduced fuel prices and 15% to improvements in
energy eYciency.
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I have written to you separately with further information on the scale of the fuel poverty challenge; the
steps to target existing measures under the Fuel Poverty Action Programme; and our view of the work that
still needs to be done.
Oil and gas price link
There is a strong correlation between oil prices and wholesale gas prices. The high oil price can aVect UK
gas prices via two main mechanisms:
— European contract prices and their impact on Britain, via arbitrage across the interconnector; and
— any remaining British gas supply contracts that contain oil-indexation.
European contract prices
The European gas price is aVected by the contractual link between oil (and a number of oil-related
products) and prices for gas in contracts to supply gas into Europe. In most European supply contracts gas
prices are indexed to movements in oil prices with a lag of between three and nine months. This contractual
link aVects GB prices due to the operation of the interconnector and the arbitrage in trading based on
relative prices at Zeebrugge in Belgium and at the National Balancing Point (NBP) in Britain. This occurs
in two main ways:
— Summer eVect:Higher European prices during summerwill tend to increaseUKgas exports across
the interconnector, as UK suppliers seek to sell surplus UK supplies into the higher priced
continental market. This pushes upUK summer gas prices, which in turn increases the price of gas
injected in to storage for use during the following winter. The cost of this higher priced gas, added
to storage and cycling costs, can push forward winter prices higher to the extent that storage is
expected to be the marginal source of gas on a signiﬁcant number of winter days.
— Winter eVect: During winter, GB gas demand is typically greater than UK Continental Shelf
(UKCS) supply, withEuropean imports, via the interconnector, and storage providing the balance
of supplies. When this occurs, the price of the European gas will inﬂuence the GB gas price, either
directly, when imports are the marginal source of supply, or indirectly through storage prices as
outlined above.
UKCS oil-indexation
In Britain some long-term gas contracts are still linked to indices that include oil prices. However, these
contracts represent a very small proportion of UK gas supplies. Since market liberalisation in the early-
1990s, these contracts have not tended to inﬂuence British gas prices. When there was a signiﬁcant surplus
of UK supplies, gas from these relatively high-priced contracts was not required to meet demand other than
on a very small number of days of high demand. As the supply/demand balance has tightened these
contracts’ inﬂuence on British prices will increase.
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